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If a person is tried for fraud for practicing law without a degree, and the verdict is not guilty, would double jeopardy prevent future fraud charges? [SPOILERS for Suits] In season five of the TV series Suits, Mike Ross, who has practised law for a few years without a degree and passing the Bar himself, is tried for fraud. The jury's verdict is revealed to be not guilty. Does this mean that Mike could continue to practise law without a licence and never face fraud charges again, or could a new fact pattern emerge if he continued to practise without a licence post-acquittal, opening himself up to prosecution again? | No The charge would more likely be "Unlicensed practice of law" (UPL), possibly in addition to a charge of fraud. Each time that Rose engages in UPL would be a separate offense, and could lead to a fresh trial. This is no more covered by double jeopardy than a serial killer gets a free pass on future killings because s/he was acquitted of one particular murder. The exact definition of UPL varies by state, but making a living as a lawyer without a license is UPL in every US state, I think. For a work of fiction in which UPL is central, see The Rooster Bar by John Grisham. | If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury. | You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm. | Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system. | Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established. | I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts. |
Why did Justice Antonin Scalia advise not talking back to judges, not even politely? I copied and pasted the transcript from YouTube commencing at 91:04, the end of the 2007 Ames Moot Court Competition. As you can read, the English barrister's comeback was polite — no profanity or sexual language. But why did Justice Scalia still disadvise this comeback? What exactly is wrong? The other thing I think you all did quite well — you have to know how to handle the boorish judge. Trust me, I was no nastier today than I am usually. And you have to know how, with composure, to respond to that judge, you know. You can't respond in kind. There's a wonderful story that I think Justice Jackson used to tell about the argument in England, where at a certain point, their arguments went on for days, or still did, until recently. The judge looked down at Counsel, He said (ENGLISH ACCENT) Counsel, I've been listening to you for three hours, and I'm none the wiser. [LAUGHTER] And the barrister, who probably lost his case, said, (ENGLISH ACCENT) I expected that, my Lord. But I thought you might be better informed. [LAUGHTER] You'll have to resist making those comebacks to the judge who is torturing you. | It is a joke to illustrate the advice that just because the judge is rude to you you should never be rude back, and definitely not with a subtle rudeness couched in polite terms. In British English if you ask someone for an explanation of something and their reply does not really provide any enlightenment at all, and certainly no real explanation, you might say "I am none the wiser" meaning that your understanding of the matter has not been increased by what you have been told. But the usual meaning of "wiser" is to do with a general characteristic someone has. - e.g. "more experience made him wiser person". Saying that someone is wise in this sense is a compliment and saying that they are unwise is a criticism. Saying that someone's understanding of a matter has increased - that they are better informed - is often neutral - just a fact. Essentially what the judge is saying is that despite days of supposed explanation by the barrister, the barrister has not really come to the point and explained anything - the judge is criticising the barrister. The barrister, in retaliation, pretends to take the phrase "I am none the wiser" said by the judge literally (rather than idiomatically) as if the judge was saying "I am a fool and you have not made me any wiser". The gist of what the barrister is saying is "you are a fool and trying to make you wiser would be a hopeless task but I was trying my best to explain this matter to you in words even a fool like you would understand". | If one day the child goes around to the father's house, perhaps in a state of upset, and says, "That's it, I'm staying," what is the legal position of the father? An eleven year old child really has no say in the matter. A judge in a custody case may consider what the 11 year old has to say but is unlikely to give it much weight. (In contrast, a judge is likely to give a lot of weight to the views of a child who has a job, who is doing O.K. in school, and is a year or two from becoming a full fledged adult.) This is up to his parents to resolve absent circumstances not present here (e.g. the child has made bona fide allegations of child abuse, or the parents are both incarcerated). And, if the parents can't resolve the dispute, it is up to a court in a case where parenting time is at issue (probably either a legal separation or a divorce in this case). For example, while (as noted below) the police will not generally drag a child kicking and screaming to the other parent without a court order, if the child is at his father's house, the father can absolutely drag the child kicking and screaming to the child's mother's house, no matter how much the child doesn't like it. Moreover, while the father will not be violating any law, if he does not do that, a child custody judge is likely to look dimly upon a parent who intentionally withholds visitation from another parent without good cause, when the court considers what kind of child custody arrangements to put in place. And, the court has extremely great discretion in these matters. The judge is also likely to be pretty unhappy with both of the parents for failing to be capable of communicating or cooperating over child rearing related issues, because they are apparently so focused on not getting along with each other over their issues with each other. In particular, if the mother calls the police claiming "child abduction," what will be the police position? Will they come to the door of the father? Will they drag the child kicking and screaming back to mother's house? It is not generally illegal for a married parent in a situation where there is no child custody order in place to have that parent's child with them over the objection of the other married parent. Absent a court order to the contrary, the police will probably call this a "civil matter" and will be unlikely to take any action until there is court guidance, absent exigent circumstances like evidence of recent not previously adjudicated claims of child abuse or neglect. The way to resolve this would be with a court filing of some sort seeking to resolve the parenting time issue, if necessary, on an emergency basis. Post-Script Whether or not the parents want to end the marriage, this situation is long overdue for court intervention. I've had couples who "pull the trigger" too soon, but this would not be a case of that type. Either the father or the mother needs to find a solicitor (if at all possible to afford that) and get the court system involved. If there is a breakdown in communications over matters related to the child, and the child is not cooperating in the face of an ambiguous parenting situation involving two parents who can't communicate about their child, the situation is out of control. Prompt court action could prevent a more negative outcome in the future by creating stability and structure in the situation. | Judicial immunity means only that the judge can't be sued by the people negatively affected by his decisions, even if they were made corruptly. The idea is that if this were possible, then anyone who lost a case before the judge could sue him, perhaps falsely claiming that he was corrupt. Defending such suits would be a major nuisance and expense for the judge, and some fraction of such cases might be wrongly decided against him (courts do err sometimes). So, a party who said (or insinuated) to the judge that "you'd better decide my case in my favor or else I'll sue you" would have a credible threat, and the judge might be intimidated into giving in. This would certainly not be in the public interest, and so judicial immunity removes this possibility. It's a trade-off: the harm done by false accusations would outweigh the good done by legitimate lawsuits against truly corrupt judges, and you can't allow the latter without creating the possibility of the former. However, judges can still be held accountable for corruption - just not through the mechanism of lawsuits by the affected parties. This is addressed within the Dennis decision, in the paragraph right above the one you quoted: But judicial immunity was not designed to insulate the judiciary from all aspects of public accountability. Judges are immune from 1983 damages actions, but they are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other citizens. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). So a corrupt judge can still be prosecuted by the state: removed from his job, fined, sent to prison, etc. But the decision to prosecute him would be made by a state prosecutor, who has no personal stake in matters before the court, rather than by a potentially disgruntled litigant. | If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked. | There are two common defenses to defamation (there are others): That what you said is true. That what you said cannot be reasonably interpreted as a factual claim. If after examining the totality of the circumstances, a fact-finder (judge or jury) sees your statement to be an expression of opinion rather than a factual claim about the subject, you would not be found to have defamed the subject. The opinion defence doesn't have a bright line rule. In your example, I think it is clearly on the side of opinion. However, if you were to say something like "Douglas Dunce, Apple's Chief Engineer, has an IQ of 76", that would be almost certainly be deemed a factual claim. The leading case here is Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. The court held that "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected". Other summaries of this defence: http://www.defamationlawblog.com/2009/01/fact-vs-opinion-setting-the-record-straight/ http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/opinion-defense-remains-str | If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | NO If there were no extenuating circumstances (or they should not have been looked at as they were not presented), the losing party can petition for reconsideration and appeal the decision as a matter of law. The Judge/court of appeals then reviews the case and decides if the verdict stands. But you can't plead new facts at that stage, so if the losing side's lawyer messed up the case, that's up to them, not the judge. If it was a criminal case, the victim can't force the DA to appeal either, though they can try to get an injunction in related civil cases. But no person, or for the matter neither party, can sue the judge at all for misbehavior on the bench because judges have judicial immunity. Even when they did something so out of scope, such as a judge ordering from the bench that a lawyer shall be beaten up by police because they missed a court date, they get immunity as they acted as a judge (Miles v Waco). Indeed, let me quote from the first section of that SCOTUS case (emphasis mine): A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson *10 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).1 Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). ... Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). In the example OP posed nobody, not even the police, becomes liable for the actions of Bob but Bob himself: Police does not need to help you, even if they know for a fact that something is happening right now. There's a huge error in the case as presented by OP You start to work up a case, and points 1 to 3 are fine. But you start to get off the rails starting in point 4: The evidence does not say that someone is to be locked up, it only indicates what the facts of the case (upon which is to be decided) might be. The decision if someone is to go to jail or not is only up to the verdict - which happened in dot 5. Dot 5 however indicates that the judge looked at extenuating circumstances which is also evidence, so point 4 is presented incompletely. Let me present a more complete version of point 4: Evidence from side A was presented, as was other evidence by side B. To the victim, it seemed that side A (either her attorney or the DA, not clear from OP) had the better evidence and might get a conviction on side B. But the Judge did weigh the evidence differently than the observer and declared a verdict favoring B in point 5 to the dissatisfaction of the victim The missing bullet between 5 and 6 (a motion for reconsideration or appeal) does not seem to happen. Assuming it did not happen, because months go by, the verdict becomes final and the case becomes res iudicata - the case is closed. Point 6 is a different and separate crime. The case files of the earlier case can get pulled to show a pattern of behavior, but not to re-adjudicate the earlier case. Finally: Point 7 does not matter before the law: If-Then hypotheticals can't be adjudicated. Because the counterpoint to the presented argument in this point is: Would the lawyer of Side A have filed for reconsideration and/or appeal, the verdict would not have become final and waiting for the verdict from the court of appeals, Bob might still await the next step of the trial. tl;dr As presented, the rundown of the hypothetical case does not present anything that the judge could be liable for but instead shows that side A did not take the necessary steps to ask for reconsideration or file an appeal to the verdict they didn't like. The separate incident opened a new case, the hypothetical that side B would sit in jail is conclusory. |
Triple Talaq Bill introduced in Indian Parliament From an article in a leading newspaper: Mr. Shashi Tharoor said he was against triple talaq, already voided by the Supreme Court, but opposed the Bill as it conflated civil and criminal laws. How does it conflate civil and criminal laws? | How does it conflate civil and criminal laws? It doesn't directly, but it criminalises a process that was until recently purely a civil matter. The so-called triple talaq bill - now enacted as the The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 - makes, at section 4, divorce by talaq a criminal offence: Any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq referred to in section 3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. However, all other modes of divorce, such as The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 for example, fall within the gamut of civil law. | I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation). | This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification. | In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another. | Probably not. As I understand it, the case is being run in Scotland on the belief that Scottish constitutional law is more likely to allow this claim than English law is. That is why the case is not being run in the High Court of England and Wales. The case can't start in the Supreme Court because (apart from specific kinds of disputes) the Supreme Court only hears appeals (see the Constitutional Reform Act 2005). If the Court of Session rejects the case, the plaintiffs might then appeal to the Supreme Court, which would hear the appeal under Scottish law. Scottish law is different to English law, but there's only one Parliament and one Crown. The letter you linked to goes to great lengths to highlight possible differences between Scottish and English law, but they all occur prior to the Treaty of Union which took effect in 1707. The Scottish Parliament's Union with England Act 1707, section 18, says that Scottish law continues in force except insofar as it is inconsistent with the Treaty. A law which provided for Ministers' or the Crown's powers to be curtailed in Scotland but not in England (in respect to a single indivisible subject matter such as the Parliament) would be inconsistent with the core proposition of the Treaty, which is the creating of a joint Crown and a joint Parliament (sections 1 and 2 of the Act). The above difficulties are to say nothing of the low likelihood that any court can: (a) stop Ministers from giving advice, given that the Minister is not exercising any power (only the Queen can actually prorogue Parliament); or (b) stop the Queen from proroguing Parliament (since Her Majesty is the source of the court's authority, and not subject to it). (For completeness it should be noted that the Scottish Parliament that passed the Union with England Act 1707 and the current Scottish Parliament are two entirely different things. The current Scottish Parliament was created by the UK Parliament's Scotland Act 1998, and its powers are set out in that Act. The current Scottish Parliament is prohibited from legislating with respect to the union with England (schedule 5 paragraph 1).) The letter also says that proroguing Parliament would be inconsistent with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. That Act expressly says that: the European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed on exit day (section 1); and up until two years after exit day, the Government can make regulations with the force of law to deal with deficiencies in UK law caused by Brexit, e.g. the conferral of powers under UK law on an EU body (presumably the regulations could transfer that power to a UK body) (section 8). The Act goes on to say that, if it gets Parliament's approval for a withdrawal agreement, the Government can make regulations with the force of law to implement that withdrawal agreement. If there is no withdrawal agreement, then there's no need for the Government to get Parliament's approval. Not only does the Act not say that Parliament needs to sit in order to consider Brexit, but it expressly sets out a coherent way to deal with the consequences of a no-deal Brexit, namely the regulations made under section 8. The case is pretty weak and would require a very adventurous judge to approve it. EDIT: Well fuck me: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2019/41.html | Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed. | IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed. | Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel. |
Could a contract with ludicrous terms be enforced? Say, for example, that A makes a contract with B. A agrees to sell his very rare car, of which no more are up for sale, to B for £1. Later, when B comes to collect A's car in exchange for a quid, A refuses to go ahead with the deal. A says that the deal was so ridiculous that no reasonable person would have actually believed that someone would uphold A's end of it. B sues A because A has not followed through with the deal. a. Can a court enforce this contract if it were written and signed on paper, or does A's defence hold up? b. If the contract were verbal, would a court ever be able to enforce it? c. If A thought his defence would hold up, and thus made the exact same contract with two other people as well as B (without anyone but A knowing), how would a court respond if A lost? | Consideration has to be sufficient; it does not have to be adequate See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Consideration need not be adequate; that is, the deal does not have to be "fair". Consideration must be sufficient - this is different from adequacy. Insufficient consideration falls under: performance of a duty imposed by law, performance of a duty imposed by an existing contract, acceptance by a creditor of part payment by a third party, composition with creditors, moral obligation (i.e. you can't do it for love), illusionary or uncertain promises. Parties are free to make whatever bargain they choose and it is not for the courts to enquire as to whether it was an objectively "good" bargain for both parties. The court does not care why you made the deal you did or if anyone else would make such a deal (with some very narrow exceptions: see unconscionability) or even if you come to regret the deal you made: they will just enforce it. In fact, contracts where one person promises to pay £1 or some other nominal sum are so common that they have a name: Peppercorn contracts. That's because under common law (civil law is different) "bare" promises cannot be enforced but if I pay you £1 in return for your promise, then we have a contract. | as a witness. You secretly disapprove of the thing taking place Does this actually invalidate the document (as not properly witnessed)? No. In regard to the substance of a contract, witnessing does not imply, entail, or require approval thereof by the witness. The meaning or relevance of a witness's signature is nothing more than him or her certifying that the act of "2+ other parties entering a contract" took place indeed. And are you committing a crime by doing it? I highly doubt it, regardless the country or jurisdiction. The witness's [bizarre] act of acquiescence falls short of criminal conduct such as (1) forging someone else's signature, or (2) fraudulently "acknowledging" the presence of the contracting parties when in fact at least one of them was totally absent. Only if the witness subsequently acts in a way that hinders the purposes of the contract, thereby causing harm, the harmed party(-ies) might sue the witness for tortious interference with business or relation (or its equivalent in other non-U.S. jurisdictions). For instance, suppose a contract-based transaction requires involvement by a third party, who is hesitant to perform the transaction because suspects that the witness's signature was forged. That suspicion may prompt the third party to inquire of the witness whether he actually signed as witness to the contract. If the third party rejects the contract-related transaction due to the witness's [false] denial, the harmed party(-ies) in the contract may sue the witness for any losses (examples: bounced checks, costly delays, missing of deadlines, provable loss of business opportunities) that his false denial caused. | What if somebody copies your signature on a contract that says you can't sue them? what can the judge do to stop this paradox? I will assume that by "copying the signature" you mean "without the person's consent". In that case, the contract is void and consequently unenforceable. However, it would need to be proved that the person whose signature was unlawfully used did not intend to be a party to that contract. For a contract to be valid, the parties must have knowingly and willfully entered it, whether it is via a document or through their subsequent conduct/actions. False pretenses, identity theft, and akin offenses preclude these two essential requirements of any contract. Moreover, if the person who forged the signature is a party to the contract, then that unlawful act clearly contradicts the prerequisite "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" that is presumed in contracts. The remedies or actionability available to a person whose signature has been forged depend on the laws of each jurisdiction. | Contracts A contract is not a piece of paper; it is an agreement intended to be legally binding between 2 or more people and it may be verbal or written or a combination of both. That said, where a person has signed a document knowing that it contains contractual terms, in the absence of fraud that person is bound by the terms: it is immaterial whether the person signing reads the document or not. So there are two reasons why a signed contract would not be binding: the person did not know it contained contractual terms fraud. It is in the second case that the validity of the signature would matter. Fraud would have to be proved: it would not be sufficient to say "I did not sign that"; the person would need to demonstrate that a fraud has been perpetrated. Signatures Particularly today, with the ability to scan a signature it is trivially easy to affix anyone's signature to anything. However, a party to a contract is entitled to rely prima facie on the validity of the signature. A person would have to provide evidence that it was not their signature or had been affixed without their knowledge or consent. A court would look at the entire circumstances surrounding such a claim; if a person had, up until the dispute, acted as though they had signed the document then a court would probably not countenance an argument that they hadn't. It is always possible to construct contrived circumstances where this or that could happen but, in reality, they are extremely rare. Unless you are dealing with a con-artist, you can trust the signature; if you are dealing with a con-artist, you have bigger problems. See, the President has endorsed this answer: | No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions. | No Or at least not necessarily. Contract terms are legally one of three types: Conditions, Warranties, or Intermediate. Breach of any term allows the aggrieved party to sue to recover damages - monetary compensation to restore them to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. Breach of a condition also (or instead) allows them to terminate a contract. Breach of a warranty does not. Intermediate terms are terms that might be a condition or might be a warranty depending on how egregious the breach was. A contract can explicitly make a term a condition, the historical and still used phrase being that X is “of the essence”. If the contract is not explicit (most aren’t), then that is the concept that the court uses to decide - is the term “of the essence”, that is, absolutely fundamental to the performance of the contract. Similarly a term can be explicitly a warranty, usually by saying party Y “warrants” something. Most incidental or procedural terms are warranties - if breached, they never give rise to a right to terminate. Most terms are intermediate, particularly most terms about time. Normally, intermediate terms are warranties but if a breach is egregious enough, then this can elevate the term to a condition. Payment terms are a classic: if you are a day or a week late in making payment, the other party can’t cancel the contract. If you are a year late, they can. Somewhere in between, your breach changes the term from a warranty to a condition. For your situation, the early delivery is clearly a breach of a warranty, not a condition. If it even is a breach - the contract may say that they are obliged to deliver by 1 December: delivery on 1 November is clearly in compliance with that term. If it is a breach, you do not have the right to terminate the contract and if you tried you would be breaching the contract yourself by repudiation. By the way, repudiating the contract is definitely breaching a condition. A huge number of contract disputes turn on who validly terminated and who repudiated the contract. If it is a breach, you can sue for damages which, since they have not charged you for November, would be what it cost you or what you lost by having their bin on your premises for a month. My guess that this would be in the order of zero. | The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement). | it's not illegal to sign a contract that demands illegal things, however, such a contract, in general, is called an illegal contract. Illegal contracts are null and void. Contracts that violate public policy never have force in the first place. A contract can't force people to declare lies under oath or demand them to murder someone. Thus, a contract demanding such is illegal. As a result, such a clause would not just be unenforceable, it might void the entire contract wholesale if it is not severable. In the least, any clause demanding illegal acts was null and void ab initio, and never was valid. void contracts in law germany explicitly makes contracts void that are "Sittenwidrig" in § 138 BGB and also illegal ones in § 134 BGB Declarations to the Agentur für Arbeit are made under threat of perjury, and thus lying is illegal. It is also Sittenwidrig. This makes the provision void. Murder is illegal, inciting to murder someone is illegal, and so a contract to murder someone for pay is void. Such a contract also is Sittenwidrig. Selling the right to ask to marry your daughter per see isn't illegal, but it is Sittenwidrig and as such the contract is void. california judges refer to such contracts as illegal contracts, defining this as a test where making non-enforcement of such a contract something of public interest: It is in the public interest that people tell the truth to the unemployment office, so a contract demanding you to lie is illegal. It is illegal to lie on the stand (perjury), and thus the contract is illegal. Conspiracy However, the contract can also be evidence of criminal activity in itself: It manifests the will of two parties to commit an illegal act. That is the core of a conspiracy charge. Conspiracy is illegal and usually a felony. germany: Conspiracy to commit a crime is §30 STGB |
Can the defense claim that the defendant isn't the defendant? And if so, how is the case handled? "I object, Your Honor. What precedent are we setting here? That the defendant isn't actually the defendant?" — An American Pickle (2020) Suppose that a man that society identifies as Herschel Greenbaum is put on trial for a crime that Herschel Greenbaum allegedly committed. However, his attorney claims that the defendant is not Herschel Greenbaum, but another person, Ben Greenbaum, and thus he is innocent. Would such a defense be possible? If so, how the trial would be handled? My perplexity is that the purpose of a trial is to establish the innocence or guilt of the defendant, not to establish that the person in the courtroom is the actual defendant. Note: It seems that my question is somehow unclear. To make it more clear, you can image that the prosecutor has very compelling evidences against Herschel Greenbaum, and that the judge, the jury, and even the defense are quite convinced that Herschel Greenbaum is guilty. Can the defense prove that the man in the courtroom is not the real Herschel Greenbaum? If so, what happens? Is the verdict: "Herschel Greenbaum is not guilty," or is it: "Ben Greenbaum is not guilty," or is there no verdict and the trial is canceled, since the defendant was the wrong man, or something else? | This is, in effect a defense of mistaken identity, and an assertion that the person on trial is not in fact the person who committed the crime. It is not legally significantly different from a case where the defendant claims that a witness has identified the wrong person. Exactly how the defense would be conducted would depend on what evidence establishes that "Herschel Greenbaum" committed the crime, and what evidence establishes (or disproves) that the defendant on trial is that same Herschel Greenbaum. The purpose of a trial is to establish or fail to establish the guilt of the person actually on trial, normally the person present in the courtroom. (trials do not establish innocence in the US). "The defendant" is the person actually on trial, even if an incorrect name has been used in bringing the charge. In such a case people would need to be careful about evidence that applies to a person named "Herschel Greenbaum" but might not apply to the defendant actually on trial. | There is no crime of "police misconduct" in the US, but murder or theft are certainly crimes which would qualify as "police misconduct". To take a real case, an officer in Georgia was convicted of aggravated assault, violating oath of office, and making a false statement (not murder, though he did kill the victim). In principle, he would also be liable in a lawsuit by the victim's family. However, these would be separate legal processes, the criminal prosecution being conducted by and at the discretion of the government prosecutor, and the monetary lawsuit being conducted by and at the discretion of the victim's family (on behalf of the victim). It is possible that an officer will be convicted yet not found civilly liable, or vice versa; or both, or neither. The victim (or family) doesn't necessarily have any connection to the criminal case, although they typically can testify during the sentencing phase. In some jurisdictions (e.g. California), the victim has a right to testify at a sentencing hearing. The result of a lawsuit can never be imprisonment – that has to come from criminal prosecution, and criminal prosecution does not result in a monetary reward to the victim (any criminal fine goes to the government). | Your question is very broad, but yes, there innumerable ways that the actions of a victim/complainant can result in a not-guilty verdict. I'll list some. Contemporaneous consent to contact. If the victim/complainant consented to the contact, then the offence of assault or sexual assault will not have been committed. Self-defence. If the victim gave the accused reasonable grounds to believe that the victim was about to use force against the accused, then depending on the circumstances, it might not be an offence for the accused to take certain actions against the victim for the purpose of defending themself (the accused). The provocation defence that is based on conduct of the victim. See Criminal Code, s. 232, which can result in a not-guilty verdict for murder. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time. | Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft. | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | If it was for a criminal case, the jury would have to decide if they believed the person who claimed he/she cracked the code. Really, any evidence is interpreted by the jury if it is regarding facts. 1) An issue of fact, not law. A question of fact is resolved by a trier of fact, i.e. a jury or, at a bench trial, a judge, weighing the strength of evidence and credibility of witnesses. Conversely, a question of law is always resolved by a judge. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/question_of_fact |
Who owns the software created by a dissolved startup company? A theoretical company existed which used to be registered in the United Kingdom and has since been dissolved. The company was a SaaS(Software as a service) company. The code was written by Person A, who was a minority shareholder director of the company. There was no copyright, trademark or other license on the actual code files themselves and the original developer has access to the entire complete codebase. Question: Who 'owns' the code? What freedoms does Person A have to use the code in a similar or project of their choice? | When a company is dissolved, someone takes over the company's asserts, often the creditors, or they may be sold for what they will bring. Failing anyone else, it may be the crown. Assuming that the copyright was in fact owned by the company (and not by someone else and merely licensed to the company), someone owns it, (just as someone owns the physical property that the company had) but it may be hard to find out who. It is even possible that the owner is not aware of the copyright. As for Person A, that depends on the details of A's contract or agreement with the company. A may be a co-owner (unlikely). A may have rights to use the code to some extent. Or A may have no more rights than I do (that is, none at all). According to "Ownership of copyright works " an official UK government web page: Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or a film, is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work (subject to any agreement to the contrary). The expression “in the course of employment” is not defined by the Act but in settling disputes the courts have typically had to decide whether the employee was working under a ‘contract of service’ (eg as an employee) or a ‘contract for services’ (eg as a freelancer or independent contractor). Where a person works under a ‘contract for services’ he will usually retain copyright in any works he produces, unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary. Thus if person A was acting as an employee of the company, the copyright would automatically be owned by the company, in the absence of any written agreement between A and the company. The page goes on to state: When you ask or commission another person or organisation to create a copyright work for you, the first legal owner of copyright is the person or organisation that created the work and not you the commissioner, unless you otherwise agree it in writing. However, in some circumstances, for example when copyright is not dealt with in the contract to commission the work, courts may be willing to find that there is an implied licence allowing the commissioner to use the work for the purpose for which it was commissioned. This does not necessarily result in a transfer of ownership. Instead, the commissioner of the work may only get a limited non-exclusive licence. ... Thus if A was acting as an employee in creating or co-creating the code, and there was no written agreement on the matter between A and the company, A would have no rights to the code, and the copyright would pass to whoever purchased or was awarded it after the company dissolved. Such a copyright might well have been included in a purchase of "all other assets" (or some such language) and no explicit or specific mention of it been made. The situation in the US would be basically similar. Work by an employee within he scope of employment is a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH) under US copyright law( See 107 USC 101), and the employer is legally the author (which is not true in UK law), unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. The natural person(s) who in fact created the wok have no rights unless an agreement grants such rights. On dissolution the copyright does not end, nor is it transferred to the creator, but passes to whoever bought it, or bought or was awarded the general assets of the company (such as in a bankruptcy proceeding). | First off: Legally, everything is copyrighted anyway. Licensing is not at all necessary. Hence, even if a court would disagree with # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0, that would just make it closed source. Having said that, the law generally doesn't bother with trivialities such as "file headers". Any commonly accepted way to state the copyright and license terms is OK. Your LICENSE is such a common convention. If you want to avoid all doubt what is covered under that license, put a reference to that LICENSE in each header. If you have just five files in one directory that are all licensed the same, I wouldn't even bother with that. Again, the default position is that everything is closed source. | There are two common approaches. The first approach is simply to let copyright law apply. Under the default terms, the IT provider has no rights to copy your software. Running software is allowed, of course, and not a problem that you need to deal with vis-a-vis the IT provider. You still can sue them if they copy your software, even in the absence of a contract. That is the chief function of copyright, after all! The second approach is to allow the customer to subcontract third parties to act on behalf of them, while acknowledging that such subcontracting does not dissolve them from any responsibilities towards you. In other words, if the 3rd party would do something unauthorized, you have a claim towards the customer and they have a distinct but related claim towards their IT supplier. | From the perspective of US law: Scenario 1: Removing the watermark is perfectly legal, obviously. You own the copyright. Scenario 2: Abandonware is not really a thing in the US when it comes to copyright (and the Wikipedia article you linked says this.) Even if the company went out of business, the copyright almost certainly went to somebody - the former owners, the creditors, etc. As far as the Internet Archive goes, they are taking advantage of an exemption in the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, along with the copyright exemption found in 17 USC § 108. But both of these exemptions require you to be a "library or archive" to take advantage of them, and you are not a library or archive, so you cannot take advantage of either. As a practical matter, if the software is really abandoned it's unlikely that anyone will actually come after you for infringement, but that's not quite the same as it being legal - you could be on the hook for up to $150,000 in statutory damages per work infringed, if the owner does sue you. You could attempt to claim fair use, of course. If the image is abandoned you might get a favorable result on factor 4 of the fair use test (the effect on the market for the original) since there's no market if nobody can find the owner. But it would depend on the other factors; that alone wouldn't get you fair use. Scenario 3: I'm not sure where you get the idea that downloading a copyrighted image to your desktop is somehow protected. It isn't automatically legal to save a copy of something just because it's on the Internet. And the existence of a watermark may indicate that someone wanted to prevent the file from being copied. The website containing the image will likely have terms of use, which may indicate whether or not you're allowed to make a copy. For example, Stack Exchange's TOS says in part: Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. | At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent. | Ownership is a fundamental concept in property law which can be difficult to apply to software, such as computer games. A physical record of information, such as a game disc, a piece of paper with a product key on it, or a computer hard drive with software installed on it, is personal property (chattels). You own these things. However, copyright law restricts what you can legally do with them. For example, the copyright holder generally has the exclusive right to make a copy of a program, which would generally include downloading (and saving) a game ISO. In recent decades, anti-circumvention provisions have been added to national copyright laws. These generally make it illegal to use cracks and other techniques for circumventing DRM, even if you “own” a copy of the software. What is “owned” is the right to assert a claim in court (a chose in action), which is also a kind of property. Specifically, the right to use proprietary software, or software license, is generally understood as a bundle of contractual rights, often documented in an end user license agreement. (While these contractual rights are a kind of property that can be owned, “ownership” of software can also refer to the rights of the copyright holder, which the more limited rights of a licensee are derived from.) Actually determining the legal effect of a software license is complex. As it is intended to create contractual rights, the terms of the contract (license agreement) are important, but not determinative. Consumer law may impose standard “fair dealing” terms which could have complex effects on the rights associated with a digital product in a particular jurisdiction. Because of the low money value involved, these complex legal issues are rarely tested in court. The specific questions you pose all appear to breach copyright or anti-circumvention law. However, you may have acquired contractual rights, including implied rights associated with your purchase of chattels, or dealings with a platform operator like Steam, which limit the copyright holder’s ability to take action against you. You may also have the right to do things that fall within a fair use or fair dealing exception in your jurisdiction. Again, the law is often untested, especially outside of the United States, because it is rarely in the parties’ interest to litigate. However, the exceptions to anti-circumvention law are often different to, and less permissive than, the exceptions to copyright. To further research your questions in a particular jurisdiction, I would look for exceptions to copyright and anti-circumvention law which protect consumers’ rights, if any, to back up or resell copies of licensed software. | If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA? | As @amon stated in a comment, copyright requires creativity. If the author of a tool wants to claim copyright on the output of that tool, then that output must contain something that required the creativity of the tool author. For a tool that just re-indents its input, the output is created from the input with a mechanical, non-creative, transformation and the output does not contain any creative content that wasn't already present in the input. For that reason, authors of such tools can't claim any copyright on the output. For a tool like bison, which was mentioned in the comments, the output contains a measurable amount of creative content that was not present in the input, but which was provided by the authors of bison. For that reason, the authors of 'bison' do have a copyright claim on the output of the tool (for which they give a broad permission to use). So, the basic question becomes, how much of the (creative) content of the output can be traced back to the tool itself and not to the input that the tool processed. For linters/formatters, that is likely to be very little. For code generators, it can be anywhere between very little and all of the output. The license restrictions on the code produced by the tool itself are by default the same as the license restrictions on the source of the tool, but the tool author can choose to apply any other license to the tool code that ends up in the output. If the output of the tool is, at least in part, dependent on an input file, then the authors of the input file also have a copyright claim on the tool output (as their creative work influenced the output), so the tool author can not claim exclusive ownership. The usual situation is that for tools that don't add creative content to the output, the author explicitly states that the don't have any copyright claims on the output. For tools that do add creative content, that content might be released under very permissive conditions (like, "you can use the output as a whole for any purpose, but you can only separate out the code that comes from the tool's codebase if you adhere to the <X> license") |
How long does a GPL licencee have to respond to a source code request before it becomes a GPL violation? I have requested source code for a product that contains software licensed under GPL 2. The product includes a written offer to provide source code if you send a written request by email. The offer is valid for three years. But I have gotten no response. How much time do they have to respond until it is copyright violation? I didn't find that info in the GPL license. | The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction. | You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine. | The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use. | The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now. | There is no contract between you (the licensee) and the licensor of the software. The creator of the open source software just says "here's the software, you may use it if you like, as long as you fulfil some conditions. ". No contract, no liability. I think the developer would only be liable if they intentionally created software that causes damage. (Which has happened, some open source browser plugins have recently been modified to run bitcoin mining software, or worse. I suppose the miscreants could follow all the GPL rules or whatever license is used). | The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage. | What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation. | am I required to send the stuff back? No, but you should be able to prove that you met the conditions of the original contract between you two. There is no gift. There is a compensation that forms part of the contract between the offeror and you. The offeror's preference to call it a "gift" does not change the legal fact that his offer and your acceptance to complete Nightwave Season 2 constitutes the formation of a contract. From that standpoint, you are entitled to keep the items he mailed to you as long as you honor your part in that contract. You are right by conjecturing that a party is not allowed to unilaterally alter a contract. Any modification has to be agreed upon by all parties to that contract. However, a consent or agreement may be inferred from the parties' subsequent conduct. Hence the best way to pre-empt or supersede any such inference consists of letting that party know that you disapprove of the belated alteration(s). The absence of a written agreement can only complicate matters, though, since it appears that neither party has an objective, directly credible way to prove the terms of the original contract. Perhaps such terms can be deduced from the subsequent emails that he has been sending you, but that is impossible to ascertain without knowing the wording of the subsequent communications between you two. Lastly, enforceability of your contract is less clear if completing Nightwave Season 2 through someone else's performance amounts to an unlawful act. Not being knowledgeable of the terms and conditions of that game (?), I am unable to state with certainty whether the offeror could lawfully recover from you the items he mailed. |
What does Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) have to do with personal freedoms? There is a post floating around on Facebook that "quotes" the Supreme Court's ruling in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866): I'm certain that the author's interpretation of the ruling is strained (at best), but is there any validity to this interpretation? Does this ruling make something like a "mask mandate" unconstitutional? | Let’s look at the full paragraph Neither the President nor Congress nor the Judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. So what it actually says is: you can’t unless you can. The Constitution says this to say about habeas corpus: The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. The case decided that military commissions (and the denial of habeas corpus) were constitutional where there was no civilian court available. Because Indiana had never been in rebellion and civil courts continued to function there, military tribunals could not be used. However, they could be uses in states that had been in rebellion. You can’t unless you can. This is specifically about rights guaranteed in the Constitution In this particular case, the right of habeas corpus. There is no equivalent right applicable to face masks so a law mandating them in certain circumstances does no more infringe a Constitutional right than mandating the wearing of clothes in public. You can’t unless you can. Breaking the law doesn’t cause you to lose your job The second quote, the origin of which is unknown and definitely not in the case, is total fantasy. Even if a law against face masks was unconstitutional, the authors of that law have overreached and the remedy is to go to a court to have it declared unconstitutional. They don’t lose their jobs as a result. Even if they wrote the law with criminal intent, they must be removed from office in accordance with the normal procedures such as impeachment for the President, by a two-thirds majority vote of their house for a Congressperson etc. | I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation. | In the USA, could a clause (article, proposition) of a State Constitution be held unconstitutional, with respect to the USA Constitution, by the Supreme Court? Yes. The supremacy clause in the US Constitution means that State law is supervened by Federal law. This includes State constitutions. If it could, has it ever happened? Yes. Here is a list of all SCOTUS cases that have overturned state law. For state constitutional provisions see nos 37, 49, 50, 51, 54, 74, 75, 139, 140, 151, 182, 188, 202, 207, 224, etc. (there’s nearly 1,000 in the list, you can go through them yourself). Also, could a decision by a State Supreme Court be reversed by the USA Supreme Court? Most of those cases will have gone through the State Supreme Court first. Except where SCOTUS has original jurisdiction (those involving disputes between the states or disputes arising among ambassadors and other high-ranking ministers) the state courts must have ruled to enliven its appellate jurisdiction. | Let's back up. It's premature to say that SB 8 "avoids the constitutional restrictions on banning abortions". The constitutionality of SB 8 has not been resolved; the Supreme Court said so explicitly (page 2). In fact there is good reason to think that is unconstitutional under existing interpretation of the Constitution per Roe v. Wade and the like. (Whether the court will actually follow existing interpretation is another question, of course.) But the courts do not determine the constitutionality of laws just because someone asks them; they only do so when it needs to be decided to resolve a particular case. For instance, if a person is charged with a crime, they can challenge the constitutionality of the law under which they are charged, and courts will address that question unless the case is resolved some other way. There are also ways that a person who wants to violate the law can pre-emptively sue the government to prevent them from enforcing the law, if they can show such enforcement is likely to affect them. The issue in SB 8 is that since it wouldn't be the government enforcing the law, it's unclear who an abortion provider can pre-emptively sue. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, they tried to sue the State of Texas, its courts, and a private party who they thought might be likely to sue them. The SCOTUS majority found that none of those defendants were relevant. However, if and when an abortion provider actually does get sued, there'll be a clear case which has proper parties and is ripe, and courts then will have to consider whether SB 8 is constitutional or not. So if your hypothetical gun control statute were treated similarly, the law might avoid pre-emptive challenges, with a chilling effect on gun sales. But sooner or later, someone would probably violate the law (maybe deliberately as a test case), and the courts would consider whether it was constitutional or not. Under prevailing interpretations of the Second Amendment, they'd probably find that it wasn't. A key difference, of course, is that abortions are much more time-sensitive than gun purchases; being temporarily blocked from having an abortion is much more consequential in most cases than being temporarily blocked from buying a gun. The other subtext is that, although SCOTUS said their decision in Whole Woman's Health is not based on the constitutionality of SB 8, it's widely suspected that several of the justices are not all that keen on the constitutional right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade, and might look to overturn Roe when it comes up. As such, they may not be very motivated to look for procedural avenues to block SB 8 in the short term, since they might be inclined to uphold it in the long term. The dissenters in Whole Woman's Health certainly thought those avenues were available. But in the case of your hypothetical gun control bill, if a majority of justices were pretty convinced that the law was unconstitutional, they might try harder to come up with grounds to block it pre-emptively. | It is generally understood that governments do have the right to quarantine citizens in case of epidemic outbreaks. In nations with a rule of law, the extent of quarantine regulations may be challenged in court. A challenge against the app has been filed, and trying to second-guess the court by reading sections of the constitution seems to be pointless. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | No, all text of the Canadian constitution is of equal force. The 1993 Supreme Court case New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly) makes this clear: It is a basic rule, not disputed in this case, that one part of the Constitution cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of the Constitution: Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148. So if the privilege to expel strangers from the legislative assembly is constitutional, it cannot be abrogated by the Charter, even if the Charter otherwise applies to the body making the ruling. This raises the critical question: is the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers from its chamber a constitutional power? The opinion went on to determine that the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers was an unwritten constitutional principle which could not be abrogated by the written constitutional Charter (though they did not specifically call it an unwritten constitutional principle at the time, this is retroactively so through Reference Re Secession of Quebec para. 52). Edit: Following Toronto (City) v. Ontario (AG) 2021 SCC 34, it's not entirely clear New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. is still good law as the majority relegated unwritten principles to interpretive aids and filling structural gaps of the written Constitution, without referencing this case. The rule that the (written) Constitution cannot contradict itself seems logical though, and the cited Reference re Bill 30 does indeed state at para. 62 that the written Charter cannot override other parts of the Constitution (presumably we should read that as specifically written parts, since that's what was at issue in the reference). | TL;DNR: Madison, Hamilton, Justice Harlan & Justice Scalia agree with you. Justice Black does not. You raise an interesting question. As you point out, the Qualifications Clause, Art I, § 2.1, (those who vote for the House of Representatives “in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”) gives states the power to establish voter qualifications. Yet 18 U.S.C. § 611, passed as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, (the IIRIRA) makes it illegal for most aliens to vote in federal elections. What gives? First, the IIRIRA is purely symbolic. It literally has no effect on who can vote in the US. For almost a century, every state has prohibited aliens from voting in state elections. Under the Qualifications Clause, this means no aliens can vote in federal elections. (Before WWI, many states allowed aliens to vote.) Second, some people argue Congress has control over voter qualifications under the "Elections Clause," Art. I, § 4.1, which gives Congress the power to regulate the "Times Places and Manners of holding elections." Like Dale M, these people read, "Manners of holding elections” to include the qualifications for voting. This reading of the Elections Clause is inconsistent with several of the sources of constitutional authority Americans typically consult, including the text, the intent of the Founder and precedent. All of these support the “Qualifications Clause” reading of the Constitution. 1) Constitutional Text: Reading the Elections Clause as giving Congress control over voter qualifications, renders the Qualifications Clause almost completely meaningless. Yet everyone agrees the Constitution should be read so that all its parts mean something – no part should be rendered superfluous. 2) Intent of the Founders: When the Founders debated voting qualifications, they were clearly worried that politicians would manipulate the electoral rules to favor them. The Founders believed the Qualifications Clause kept both national and state politicians from stacking the electoral deck. First, by giving the power of deciding who could vote to the states, the Clause prevented national politicians from choosing their own electorate. Secondly, by requiring the states to use the same qualifications for voters in state and national elections, the Clause prevented state politicians from manipulating the rules in national elections. As for the Electoral Clause, in Federalist 60, Hamilton was clear who controlled voter qualifications: “The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen…are unalterable by the [federal] legislature…” 3) Precedent and practice: For most of our history, people acted consistently with Hamilton’s statement. They tolerated a wide variation in who was allowed to vote across states. As noted above, many of those states specifically allowed aliens to vote. (And, starting in 1787 with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, Congress passed a series of laws allowing aliens to vote in territories.) When Americans did make nationwide changes to voting qualifications, they did so by amending the Constitution. There are only a handful of Supreme Court decisions involving federal control over voting qualifications. In 1970 the Supreme Court upheld a federal law changing the voting age to 18. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, relied on the Elections Clause to say that Congress had the power to change voting requirements. None of the other Justices shared Black's views on the Elections Clause. Instead, they agreed with Justice Harlan, who said, “nothing” in the Constitution, “lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress.” (These Justices used the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for federal control over voter qualifications.) Since then, no Justice has followed Justice Black. Instead, they have followed Justice Harlan. For example, in 2013, Justice Scalia, (in an opinion joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, Roberts, and Sotomayor) said, “the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them.” From this evidence, I’d say you were right to be puzzled about the constitutional authority for the IIRIRA. A federal law preventing aliens from voting in federal elections undermines the text of the constitution by rendering the Qualifications Clause superfluous, goes against the clear intent of the Founders, and is inconsistent with 200+ years of history and precedent. It only survives because it has no practical effect on voting in the US. |
Are new works without a copyright notice automatically copyrighted under the Berne Convention? Does the Berne Convention automatically give copyright protection for new works that lack a copyright notice? For example, if I wrote and released a PDF book but forgot to include a copyright notice, do I still own the copyright to the book? | Copyright notice is not relevant to having a Copyright. 1 Copyright starts to exist the moment a work is created. When the pen touches the paper the first time or the hammer strikes the block to become a statue, the work is started to be created. At that moment 2, copyright is gained as it becomes a work, usually defined in the national laws. Publication for sure grants all the rights according to the Berne Convention rules - which are the absolute minimum standards. In the united-states the Berne Convention's agreement is for example codified as 17 USC §102 and uses the moment of creation to start rights: Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Similarly, the German Urheberrechtsgesetz does list what can be copyrighted and that the copyright is with the author, and presumes the act of creation creates the copyright for nationals, and publication for non-nationals: Section 1: The authors of works in the literary, scientific and artistic domain enjoy protection for their works in accordance with this Act. Section 2: (1) Protected works in the literary, scientific and artistic domain include, in particular: [List of items] Section 120: (1) German nationals shall enjoy copyright protection with respect to all of their works, whether or not they have been published and regardless of the place of publication. In the case of a work created by joint authors (Article 8), it shall be sufficient if one of the joint authors is a German national. Section 121: (1) Foreign nationals shall enjoy copyright protection with respect to their works published in the territory to which this Law applies, unless the work or a translation of the work has been published outside that territory more than 30 days prior to its publication within that territory. Subject to the same limitation, foreign nationals shall enjoy protection with respect to their works published in the territory to which this Law applies in translation only. There is no registration needed to have a copyright. However in the US you need to register a copyright to seek specific damages in the courts. 1 - Currently. In the past it had been very relevant, but laws have changed since then. 2 - Technically shortly after the moment that the first touch is done and the work gains some originality, but there already can be an artistic expression in a single brushstroke of a minimalistic piece or a single stroke calligraphy - and the absolute minimum originality needed is rather low: while putting ARD in a line in a specific font is not protectable under copyright (it's a trademark), a 6-tune jingle is enough to be deemed a protected work in itself! Under German law, this is the Kleine Münze | Everything except the summary and the cover art are all facts; facts are not subject to copyright. The summary and cover art would be subject to copyright. You may have a fair use defence given that all you are doing is cataloguing the books. | Copyright infringement requires that you actually copy elements from an earlier work produced by a different author. If you created a similar, or even identical, work independently, it is not copyright infringement. When considering whether or not infringement has occurred, the court is likely to consider whether the defendant could reasonably have had access to the plaintiff's work. If the court finds that they could have, then the defendant would be required to produce evidence of original authorship. Consider the My Sweet Lord/He So Fine case, where the court found the defendant had subconsciously copied the plaintiff's song. Had Harrison been able to produce evidence of original authorship, the judgment could have been different. In your example, it is unlikely that an suit in copyright infringement could be decided against you, as you've stated the text is generated randomly. However, more evidence of this randomness might be required to support your case. Of course, whether a computer or automated process can produce works independently is still questionable; I'm not aware of cases that have tried this. The US Copyright Office has said that Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable. Of course, whether this has a bearing on your particular scenario is undecided, and I'm not sure how it would be decided. It is almost certain that the worst case outcome would be an injunction requiring you to cease publicising the product, or perform reasonable checks prior to publication to ensure that the product of your program infringes on works; it would be unlikely that you would have costs ordered against you, especially if the program is truly random, and the random text was given as much, or more, publicity than the coherent text. | They are claiming copyright protection so you cannot copy it unless fair dealing exemptions apply. However, there is no copyright in facts - only in they way facts are presented. If you present them in a different way ... | Whether published or unpublished, they are still protected by copyright. (They are probably unpublished for copyright purposes, but in the US this makes little difference for any recently created work (that is anything after 2002). For older work see the Cornell chart.) They cannot be copied or distributed without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing applies. And it is hard to see how either would apply to entire essays simply begin placed in a database. Placing text in a database is probably making a copy, and might be distributing it or publishing it, depending on how access to the DB is granted. Now data from the essays, as opposed to the texts of the essays themselves, are probably facts. Facts are not protected by copyright in any Berne Convention country, including the US, the UK, and the EU. | Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties. | U.S. law defines a derivative work in 17 USC §101: A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, [...] abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. Similarly, the Copyright Act of Canada reserves exclusively for the copyright holder the right to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the work... Finally, in any of the 171 nations that are signatories to the Berne Convention treaty, Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the exclusive right of making and of authorizing the translation of their works throughout the term of protection of their rights in the original works. Therefore, if it highly likely that you need authorization from the copyright holder to produce a translation of a copyrighted work in your jurisdiction. In nations that are Berne signatories, copyright is automatic, so there is no need for a copyright holder to display a copyright notice in order to receive exclusive rights under copyright law. | Ideas are not protected by copyright, only arrangements of words are protected. If you "rephrase" by only a minor change of wording, leaving much of the wording intact, that is still a copyright infringement unless an exception such as fair use or fair dealing applies (and that seems a bit doubtful in this case). If you "rephrase" so that the wording is quite different, even though the idea is the same, there is probably no infringement. Copying elements of computer code or other IT commands that are essential to making an example work is not infringement. Where there is only one or a very small number of ways to naturally express a fact, copying such expression is not infringement, as facts are not protected by copyright. Adding examples but keeping significant wording unchanged is still likely to be infringement. |
In Australia, do laws prevent an employer stipulating the financial institution which your pay must be deposited into? This rumour keeps coming up time and time again, (probably because I've worked in financial services where this may be more commonplace - I no longer do) but every now and then, I'll hear someone claim that it is unlawful for your employer to demand that your pay be deposited into an account held with a specific financial institution. There is no option for payment by cheque, but the account is provided free of account holding charges. I've been told it may be related to third-line forcing, but I'm not sure this applies. Is there a legal basis for these claims? | Section 324 of the Fair Work Act 2009 provides: Method and frequency of payment (1) An employer must pay an employee … in money by one, or a combination, of the methods referred to in subsection (2) … (2) The methods are as follows: (a) cash; (b) cheque, money order, postal order or similar order, payable to the employee; (c) the use of an electronic funds transfer system to credit an account held by the employee; (d) a method authorised under a modern award or an enterprise agreement. (3) Despite paragraph (1)(b), if a modern award or an enterprise agreement specifies a particular method by which the money must be paid, then the employer must pay the money by that method. I am not aware of anything in the employment law that would prohibit an award or agreement from nominating the financial institution. It may fall foul of third-line forcing but not if, for example, the employer was a financial institution that required the use of its own accounts (no 3rd party so no third-line forcing). Putting that aside, the employer has an obligation to pay; the choice of method lies with the employer. If it is too hard to pay electronically (e.g. employee hasn't given accounts details, the account is in the Caymen Islands etc.) then they must pay in cash or by cheque/money order. | They have to pay you for all hours "worked". If you are an intern, it would come down to whether you are an unpaid intern and therefore agreed to that or if you are a paid employee. I noticed your post said you were an intern and then were asked to stay on, so I don't know if you stayed on as an intern or employee. Employees should be compensated for their time and effort, so if you are an employee you should get some compensation. As for how you claim it, you are going to have to talk to them. If it bothers you that you won't be paid for the training and they won't agree to pay you, your best bet is to find a different job. This article lists how to take them to a tribunal or talk to a union, if you do not want a different job and wish to pursue the matter: https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/rights-at-work/pay/problems-getting-paid/#ifnotgettinganywhere | I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply. | It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer. | If there is no written contract, why not just respond to their invoice with a letter stating you do not intend to pay because the trial was free so you don't owe anything. If they attempt to collect, make the same case to the court. Then the burden is on them to prove otherwise. Which, if there is no written contract agreeing to pay an ETF, might be difficult for them to do. Be careful about surreptitiously recording phone calls without the other party's knowledge or consent. In some jurisdictions this is illegal and can subject you to criminal prosecution. | Raise the question with your employer If you believe that you are an employee and not a contractor then there is presumably something you want from your employer. This may be additional wages and entitlements that you would have or will become entitled to for past or future work respectively. Or you may have been injured and want workers' compensation. Or terminated and you want redundancy pay. Whatever it is, work it out and raise the issue with your employer. You might want to consult an accountant or union to help you. They may acknowledge that you were incorrectly classified and give you what you want. Winner, winner, chicken dinner! Or they may dispute it. If so, you need to follow the dispute resolution processes at your workplace. These typically involve informal discussions, escalating to mediation and then to a workplace tribunal run by the government. You will almost certainly want to consult a lawyer or union to help you - given that you don't know where to start the learning curve is likely to be too steep. In virtually every jurisdiction if people are employees at law they can't choose not to be. in british-columbia the relevant law appears to be the Employment Standards Act although it's not unheard of in edge cases for a person to be an employee under one law (e.g. workers' compensation) and a contractor under another (e.g. income tax). From the linked site: The overriding question is “whose business is it?” Is the person who is doing the work doing it as a person in business for themselves? If you are working "for" your own business you are probably a contractor. If you are working "for" your employer's business you are probably an employee. For example, if you are an accountant with several dozen clients, maintain your own business premises and charge for your advice based on the amount quoted rather than by the hour, you're a contractor. If instead, you have 2 clients, work from their premises at set hours and get paid by the day or week, you're an employee with 2 jobs. In edge cases these are not cut and dried - Google are Uber driver's employees. In Australia: no. In California: yes. In the UK: yes. | I think you are misinterpreting what the article is saying. It's not Germany as a whole that is banning managers contacting employees (and since you are not a manager, this wouldn't affect you anyway), it is the German ministry of Employment banning it for its employees. When it comes to your own workplace, you will need to look at your own contract and see whether you are allowed to work on the weekend without, for example, getting extra money for that work. This is probably not the case for you as a PhD student, but if it is, you would usually need to talk to your employer before doing work on the weekends. | If this requirement was not made before rendering the service, you are under no obligation to accept the term. You and the service provider must now find an agreeable method of payment. You still owe the provider but if you are compelled to pay then the provider will be compelled to be more accommodating in their allowed payment methods (cash, at least). As a general rule, if you are providing a service for any significant amount of money, you should require payment up front or at least a deposit and payments at milestones. Especially if you're 7,000 miles away from your client and put any restrictions on method of payment. |
Please explain former High Court of Australia Justice Kenneth Hayne's jape? The questioner is Oxford Law Prof. Joshua Getzler. Former High Court of Australia Justice Kenneth Hayne answers at 1:08:28. They're both Australian. Joshua my answer is very simple. If you could let me have something in publishable form, my time for final report is 1st February next year. I'd be much obliged. Undoubtedly Hayne is joshing! Because sitting next to Hayne, Lord Mance — former Deputy UKSC President — guffaws, and thumps the table with his hand! | Justice Hayne was acting as a Royal Commissioner on banking misconduct and the issue being discussed was in the scope of the RC. The joke (as such) was he was asking for someone to write the final report for him. | This paper studies the question, in a restricted context of federal cases (the main problem is getting data, but turns out that some federal court clerks have been obliging). From that database, between 1998-2011 1,156,460 felony cases were resolved. 0.2% of those cases were pro se representations with virtually all cases having professional representation ("data missing" is 10 times more frequent than pro se, and the only thing rarer was pro bono attorney at 0.03%). As for outcomes, it is possible that pro se defendants had the charges dismissed at a higher rate (16.9% pro se vs. 6.1% represented -- "possible" is a way of simplifying the statistical problems in interpreting these numbers); with acquittals it's a wash, and with convictions pro se defendants may have done worse (14.8% pro se, 4.9% represented). There also seems to be a trend that juries convict pro se defendants more often than they do represented defendants (90% vs. 77.9%). Ah, and this paper follows up and contradicts the findings of the Hashimoto study, linked in the comments. | The question largely does not come up in the US, but it does in some officially bilingual jurisdictions such as Canada. If someone ventures to paraphrase law of the US into Farsi or Spanish, that could be a kind act on their part, but it has no official status: only the law as enacted has legal weight. Though India is officially multilingual in many ways, acts of parliament must be in English – the English version is authoritative, even though translations may be made. In Canada, both English and French versions are official; so in the case of R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265, a conflict is detected: The French version of the text, which translates could bring the administration of justice into disrepute, is less onerous than the more stringent English version, "would bring the administration of justice into disrepute", and consequently is preferable in that it better protects the right to a fair trial (invoking a separate principle of interpretation, lenity, in case of ambiguity). There is some indication that EU directives can be translated after the fact, so that the 1979 Wild Birds Directive was translated from English into Slovak some years later. In the case of the EU, the Directorate-General for Translation shoulders that responsibility. | Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581. | That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this. | The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer. | I did the Googling: Prior to the case described in this article, a notice was to be deemed served if the sender can sufficiently prove that the letter was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted. Law - Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 The case made it clear that the same law also sets a condition, where if the letter was not received at said mailbox, or too late received, the notice is to be deemed not served. The receiver is not required to prove that the letter has not arrived in the mailbox. Also, if your mail has been tampered with, you should contact Royal Mail - they will perform an investigation and put your mailbox in order. I work with tenants and landlords, thus lots of official notices. In this practice, it's often a recommended action to follow up on a notice and make sure the receiver has indeed received and acknowledged the notice. I don't know if it's a legal requirement, but often in disputes (which go to arbitration by a 3rd party), if one party states they did not receive the notice and the other party can't sufficiently prove that they did everything in their power to contact and confirm the delivery of the notice, the notice is regarded as not served. I believe you cannot deny post. If it's in your mailbox, it's your responsibility to check and read it. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare |
City Charging Sewage For Outside Water Use i.e Sprinklers, Garden Hose, etc The town of Centreville in Maryland has enforced a 25% increase on water usage charges for 2021 and another 25% increase through 2022 due to underestimating the cost to replace century-old water pipes. Is it appropriate for the town to charge sewerage usage for outside watering such as sprinklers, garden hoses, etc. as well? Right now as it stands everyone, I know is being charged sewerage usage based on how much water they use even though not all water usage requires sewerage use, since the water does not ever go into the sewer system. Only Solution I see: A meter that only monitors sewage waste. | As there are commonly no meters on sewer outlets, if sewer charges are to be based on usage, they must be based on water usage. This is a very common practice, I have encountered it in several different US states, including NY, NJ, and MD. There is no way to accurately measure how much of the water use is used outside and does not flow down the sanitary sewer connection. Also, much of the water used may eventually flow down a storm sewer, and so adds to the burden on the sewer system as a whole. In any case, measuring sewer usage by total water usage is the closest estimate possible, aside from the kind of "return factor" adjustments mentioned in the comment by Nate Eldredge. Use of such a return factor might be better policy, but I can't find any law or case that mandates it. | The two cases are very different. The first involves a debt collector entering onto property in connection with an allegedly overdue utility bill, which is something a debt collector ordinarily would not be permitted to do without a money judgment following a court proceeding and further court orders authorizing collection of the debt from tangible personal property on the premises. This is pretty much completely without justification and realistically is a criminal offense as well as a basis for a civil lawsuit, although the modest money damages involved may have made such a lawsuit ill advised for the resident impacted by the unlawful entry. Notably, in this case Scottish Power, "admitted the error, apologised and offered compensation." I doubt that an American utility company would have had the good sense and grace to act the same way. The story doesn't make entirely clear if these were Scottish Power employees or debt collection contractors hired by Scottish Power. The question implies that abusive utility company collection agents are a systemic problem in Scotland, although the article itself does not. The second involves a utility company, Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE), drilling a lock to enter onto property in order to check a utility meter, in a building where some other tenant at a different address was not paying an electric bill on a different meter, which presents a very different issue. The customer at the address drilled had reasonably documented the utility company's mistake, but the company, for some reason, didn't believe the customer and didn't make arrangements to visit consensually when the customer was home. Instead, while the customer was work on Wednesday two male SSE workers drilled through the lock to gain entry into the flat, and when they got in and looked at the meter, they realized that they were mistaken. The fact that the story describes the two men as a "warrant team" leaves open the possibility that a warrant for entry was received from a court based upon bad information from the utility company when it should have known better, although that issue isn't clarified in the story. The customer “lodged a formal complaint against SSE for unlawful entry and reported the incident to the police.” And an ombudsman elevated the issue. According to the utility company, it "offered to replace all the locks in her property and offered her a goodwill gesture payment of £500. Both were rejected by Ms Harvey who wanted compensation for further rental, hotel and new property costs which we were unable to agree to." Utility companies will generally have an easement or some similar legal right to enter onto a customer's property to read a utility meter or the deal with something broken on the premises that affects the larger utility system such as a short circuit that is bringing down the power of everyone on the block, without notice in cases of emergencies. So, in this case, the issue is not the absence of a right to enter somewhere, but the fact that the utility company went to the wrong place (where it may very well have had no right to enter because there may have been no utility meter to check at that location), which in and of itself, would be mere negligence if it hadn't received such clear communication from the customer and ignored it, and secondly, whether the method it used to gain access to the property in the good faith belief that it had a legal right to enter to gain access to the property was reasonable. Charitably, it could be that the utility company had a key allowing it to enter and read the meter at the proper address, but that key didn't work because they were at the wrong address and the utility official may have mistakenly believes that the lock was broken rather than that the address was wrong. In that case, the question would be whether it was reasonable to force entry in a non-emergency case like a meter readings, rather than trying to contact the owner to resolve the question, which it probably was not. It isn't quite as obvious that this would be a criminal trespass, because ordinarily entry onto property under a claim of right, even if mistaken in good faith, does not constitute criminal conduct, although a claim of good faith in a context where the company as a whole knew better even if the right hand may not have known what the left hand was doing, probably doesn't hold up under agency law that imputes the knowledge of any agent of the company to the company as a whole. But, while the company may have committed a crime, the two workmen detailed to do the work may have been acting in good faith personally, and may have even had a warrant. Certainly, the utility company should have liability to repair any damage that was done to the premises in order to gain entry that arose from its negligence in going to the wrong address and its unreasonable failure to confer with the customer about the problem in a non-emergency. SSE would probably be well advised to admit with good grace that it was in the wrong and to pay the still very modest amount that the customer claimed for an alternate rental, rather than fight this issue where its fumbling became not just rude but abusive. | Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know. | You will need to sue them for the money. You may decide that the cost and stress of doing so is not worth it, and just write off the cost. In future you should require a deposit (if you don't already), and not return it until you have checked that the final utility bills have been paid. (I am assuming there was no deposit, or that you have returned it already; if not, you can pay the electricity company out of that deposit.) | If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor. | There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door". | Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease. | I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level. |
What happens if I sell the same physical item to several people? Follow-up question for Could a contract with ludicrous terms be enforced? At the end of the hypothetical there, they raise the possibility of someone secretly selling the same physical item (a unique car) to several different people. It seems to me that this must be against the law somehow, but I don't know exactly how it's handled. This possibility was not addressed in the discussion. Concretely: I own a valuable physical object. I make a contract to sell this object to each of several different people, in exchange for money. To avoid detection, the deal is that they send me the money now, and then they pick up the item from an agreed-upon location on a specific date in the future. On the specified date, all of the buyers arrive at the specified location and discover that the object is present and nobody's stopping them from taking it ... except each other. I have pocketed the money and left town. What is the name of the crime and/or tort I have committed? Who gets to keep the object? How have the courts handled this type of scam in the past? Is it handled differently if the "valuable physical object" is real estate? (It seems to me that this scam might be easier to execute with land, since nobody expects land to be delivered to them.) | What is the name of the crime and/or tort I have committed? You are guilty of the crime of fraud, the crime of theft of the money and the item (I can't point you to the precise statute). You have breached your contract of sale. You are probably liable for fraud civilly (i.e. you could be sued for fraud). But, if one was really creative, I imagine that one could find more grounds for civil and/or criminal liability, although they would probably be unnecessary since the victims have plenty of remedies to secure all possible relief already. Who gets to keep the object? Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, in the United States, the general rule is delivery of possession by the seller (which didn't really happen here to one distinct person), but for unique goods, title passes when the unique good is identified to a contract with a buyer, so first in time to contract, first in right to the car, would probably prevail. But, I don't know what the rule would be in England and Wales. Is it handled differently if the "valuable physical object" is real estate? Land is harder to defraud someone with, because a reasonable person knows that in England and Wales real estate title is (usually, but not always) represented by a certificate of ownership maintained by a public official in the Land Registry, and is easily checked (about 15% of land in England and Wales show in the link is not registered so the possibility for deception is somewhat greater in that context). Also, generally, you don't pay for real property until you simultaneously receive payment in good funds, while brief extensions of credit for a non-perfectly contemporaneous sale transaction are more common in cases involving tangible personal property. | A settlement can include whatever terms the parties agree on, short of terms prohibited by law. Usually one party gives up at lest some claims. Then other party nay also give up,claims, or make a payment, or both. There may be other terms as well, including confidentiality of the details. It is not uncommon for both parties to give up all claims against each other. Settlement agreements are legally binding on both parties. We cannot advise on what kind of settlement a particular person should take in a particular case. For tht, consult a lawyer. | Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams. | Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either. | No. By handing the necklace the way you described, you commit personal property transfer as all the three requirements are met for the gift to be legally effective: donative intent, delivery and acceptance. Once property has been transferred (no matter gift or sale), it is not yours anymore. | Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer. | This is a general common law answer; specifics in California may differ. Yes, they are committing the tort of trespass and you could sue them for whatever damage they did to your property; probably nothing. On the other hand, if you keep the ball, you are committing the tort of detinue (wrongful detention of another person's goods when the owner has requested their return) and they can sue you for whatever damage you have done to them; the cost of a new ball probably. TL;DR No, it isn't; give it back. | You can't You are asking the analogue of "What happens when you start a game of chess with the black queen on D1?" and the only correct answer is "That is not a legal starting position, the only position the Black Queen may have at the start of the game is D8. Re-setup the board to how it should be." An AI can't hold property, because it is not a recognized legal entity, and trying to file for a transfer to an illegal recipient is in itself impossible. As such, all your plan fails on step 1 (transfer property to AI) and all other questions are moot - the position required can't come up legally, and attempting to get it done results in the documents that tried to do it being all Void and Null: The person that tried to get rid of the company is the owner. That person is liable for all the tax that needs to be paid. All lawsuits against the corporate or the owner proceed as if nothing had happened. YES, you could be sued for attempted tax evasion, communally called "tax fraud". |
Can parents be taxed for giving gifts to children? Are there scenarios where parents would be taxed for giving gifts to their children, such as on birthdays, Christmas, etc.? Would gifts be subject to gift taxes if the amount exceeds $15,000/$30,000 (the current maximum that's subject to the annual exclusion for single parents and married parents, respectively)? Also, what about the kiddie tax? (I assume the kiddie tax applies just to monetary income, rather than physical gifts.) For gift taxes, I've assumed that holiday-themed gifts to children wouldn't be the focus, but it appears children aren't exempt the way spouses are. Does this mean that to avoid gift taxes, parents must be careful not to exceed the amount covered by the annual exclusion for each child? And for the kiddie tax, would this mainly apply to things like an allowance, not one-time gifts? | (This is not meant as personalized tax advice - consult a tax lawyer or accountant for advice on your own tax situation.) As background, it's helpful to remember why the gift tax exists - it's to close a loophole in the estate tax. If a wealthy parent dies and leaves all their assets to their child, the government collects estate tax on the amount of the estate. So the parent might think to circumvent this by gifting most of their assets to the child before they die. That would deprive the government of a lot of revenue, so the gift tax ensures that such gifts are taxed in a roughly similar way to inheritances. So yes, if a parent gives their children birthday presents whose value exceeds the annual exclusion, then the parent must report the gift to the IRS (Form 709), and pay gift tax if necessary. Note that they only have to actually pay tax once the total amount of the gifts over their lifetime exceeds a lifetime exclusion amount, currently about $12 million. This tax is really only meant to hit the "1%". It doesn't matter whether the gifts are of money or other items of value. "The gift tax applies to the transfer by gift of any type of property." If it only applied to money, there'd be another loophole: the parent could dodge the tax by spending all their assets on a $20 million dollar gold bar (or painting, jewelry, rare postage stamp, etc) and give that to the child instead, which the child could then turn around and sell. The "kiddie tax" is an income tax on children. Gifts are generally not taxable income to the recipient, so the child would not be liable for any income tax, no matter how large the gift or how it is given. (The gift tax is not an income tax and is imposed on the giver, not the recipient.) | This would be infringement. It generally doesn't matter that you're giving things away for free. Keep in mind that the point of these laws is not only to prevent third parties from making money off the creator's ideas, but also to protect the creator's ability to make money. If you're providing free knock-off Winnie the Pooh products, that cuts into the market for the creator's legitimate products. | So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way. | Oliver or his shell corporation could have directly forgiven the debt as a gift to the debtors. As a gift, it would not have to be reported as income, according to the IRS. In that case, he would need to file Form 709 and he would have to pay federal gift tax. There is an annual exclusion of $14,000 per donee, which probably is a drop in the bucket. It may not be required to pay tax on gifts to a 501(c)(3) organization, since the gift-bump is offset by the associated charitable gift deduction. The charity can then forgive the debt as a gift (and as tax-exempt, would not have to pay gift tax). In that sense, the second transfer was necessary, although it would not have been if RIP had directly obtained the debt (or if CARP were a 503(c)(3)). | It is perfectly legal and, many would argue, reasonable to have secular reasons to do something that happen to align with religious reasons. In other words, just because there's a religious reason to do something doesn't invalidate secular reasons to do the same thing. The New York Times had an article in 2013 that explained the origin of the federal holidays in 1870: Congress acknowledged that Jan. 1 is "commonly called New Year's Day" and Dec. 25 is "commonly called Christmas Day." and further on in the article: If you read the language of the [1870] bill, it's clear that Congress chose dates commonly celebrated as holidays by the American people, not for religious reasons but because of a history of recognition and celebration on those dates. The federal holidays make sense from an efficiency perspective. If a significant number of federal employees will be taking those days off for celebratory purposes then it doesn't make sense to open federal offices if there's not enough staff. Federal holidays only apply to federal employees and the District of Columbia. There's no requirement that your private employer, state employer or you recognize those holidays. | Probably A valid gift requires: Intention of donor to give the gift to the donee (donative intent) Delivery of gift to donee. Acceptance of gift by donee. As the legal guardian, parent could refuse acceptance on behalf of the child. Again, in the same capacity, they could limit or restrict use of the gift providing while the child remained a child. | You are describing a charity. In the simplest case, a charitable foundation could be established to receive donations and dispense payments for medical services. There are various irrelevant non-legal reasons why it might not work (e.g. insufficient contributions relative to demand). The main legal concerns of such a foundation are its tax liability (do they have to pay income taxes on contributions?), and local regulations (how do you distinguish between a scam and a real charity?). The tax question is primarily about 501(c)(3) status, and for the most part there should be no problems with charitably dispensing contributions, though there is a requirement that no part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual – perhaps the CEO would be an exception to the universality of the program (but providing equivalent service could be a pre-tax employment benefit). A recipient does not have to pay tax on a gift, owing to the "medical exclusion" Registration is a state-level matter, here is the Washington law. Nothing in that law says "you can't provide coverage of medical expenses", and no maximum income level is imposed on the recipient of a charitable gift. The concern of these regulations is mainly record-keeping and access to records, not on specific ways of benefiting the community. Since unlike taxes contributions cannot be coerced, this means that some people might not pay what other people deem to be "their fair share", which is, again, a political issue. | Children can enter contracts There seems to be this pervading myth that they can’t. This is weird because, if true, it would mean that a child couldn’t buy anything: a chocolate bar, a bus ride, a sandwich, because all sales involve a contract. What is true is that a contract is voidable by a minor. That is, they can walk away from it anytime until they turn 18 and for a reasonable time thereafter. They can’t do that if the contract is for “necessities” (all of the above examples are), if the contract is complete (again, all of the above) or if the contract is clearly for the benefit of the child (e.g. contracts involving the child’s education). Children do not normally need a parent’s permission or approval to enter a contract. So, the contract is binding on Mary and voidable by James. John’s involvement is irrelevant unless he is a party to the contract in some way such as if he is acting as a guarantor. |
May an invocation of spousal privilege support an adverse inference? A sues B. At trial, B asks A about statements he made to his wife. A objects, invoking the spousal communications privilege. The court sustains the objection, so the statements do not come in. B then calls A's wife as a witness. A objects, invoking the spousal testimonial privilege. The court sustains the objection, so the wife does not testify. B asks for a jury instruction saying that the jury may make adverse inferences against A about the testimony that was excluded based on the spousal privilege. A objects. Must/may the court give that instruction? Does the answer change depending on whether it is the litigant or the spouse who invokes the privilege? | Must/may the court give that instruction? No. It would be error for the court to give that instruction. The only privilege for which an adverse inference instruction is generally authorized in civil litigation is the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This is because when you invoke it, you are implicitly asserting that your testimony could be used against you, if you gave it, to show that you were guilty of a crime, and because a relevant question will be about events pertinent to the lawsuit. An adverse inference is also not allowed for invoking the 5th Amendment when you are a defendant in a criminal case because that would undermine its purpose in the the criminal justice system. An invocation of a marital privilege, in contrast, merely implies that you are married, which is not something that would normally and naturally suggest that you did something for which there is civil liability. One could probably imagine a fact pattern in which being married was a disputed issue that could give rise to liability (e.g. under the "family car doctrine"), of course, in which the invocation of the privilege would estop A from asserting a defense on the ground that he isn't married to A's wife (either at the time of the communication if the confidential communication privilege is raised, or at the time of the testimony, if the right to not testify against a spouse privilege is raised, as the case might be). Tricky cases would involve people who were unmarried at the time of the accident but subsequently married. But, outside very unusual facts, people generally don't deny that they are married in a lawsuit and then try to assert the marital privilege in a lawsuit. Does the answer change depending on whether it is the litigant or the spouse who invokes the privilege? No. | Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception. | In principle, the victim can be granted immunity for his testimony. At that point, since his testimony cannot incriminate him, the 5th Amendment protections no longer apply. He can be ordered to testify and held in contempt of court if he refuses. | We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered. | This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification. | The Miranda warning only has to be given to a person being interrogated in custody, and on the premise that the wife is not in custody, the police do not need to read her the warning. Therefore, anything she says can be used against her, or somebody else, unless there is a separate reason why the statement could not be used. The wife may invoke the spousal testimony privilege, in which case she cannot be compelled to testify against the husband. The officer could theoretically testify that the wife said "I washed blood out of his clothing", but this is an assertion made by an out-of-court declarant to prove the truth of the question at hand, i.e. hearsay. There are numerous exceptions to the definition so that in some cases, the statement would not be hearsay. If the wife refuses to testify, that cuts out half of the exceptions, but maybe the wife is a co-conspirator. | Is it normal under German law to just assume the accused will never go after a witness? This is not a question that can be answered here, or probably anywhere with any degree of certainty. The form seems to allow giving a different address (like a work address), but this seems to require a "good reason". What are acceptable reasons? These include an imminent risk of serious detriment to her well-being and a well-founded reason to fear she (or anyone else) might be improperly influenced if she gives here address. Staying anonymous; She is asked to provide a written statement. SHORT ANSWER A witness is not obligated to give the material witness statement to the police. Instead, a witness is only obligated to appear before and make a statement to the German public prosecutor (Staatsanwalt). AND... every (potential) witness is obligated to give their particulars at the hearing, including full names, maiden name, age, occupation and place of residence. Some or all of these details may be omitted, however, if there is a specific risk. In those cases, the identity of the witness may be kept undisclosed. LONG ANSWER Book1, Chapter 6 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, Strafprozeßordnung (StPO), gives the rules for examining, and protecting, witnesses. Section 48 (Obligations on witnesses; summons): (1) Witnesses shall be obliged to appear before the judge on the date set down for their examination. They shall have the duty to testify if no exception admissible by statute applies. (2) ... (3)... An examination shall, in particular, be made as to whether an imminent risk of serious detriment to the witness’s well-being requires measures to be taken pursuant to section 168e or section 247a, as to whether any of the witness’s overriding interests meriting protection require that the public be excluded pursuant to section 171b (1) of the Courts Constitution Act and as to what extent it is possible to refrain from asking non-essential questions concerning the witness’s personal sphere of life pursuant to section 68a (1) [see below] Account is, further, to be taken of the witness’s personal situation and the nature and circumstances of the offence. Section 68 (Examination as to witness’s identity; limitation of information, victim protection): (1) The examination shall begin with the witness being asked to state his first name, last name, name at birth, age, occupation and place of residence... (2) A witness shall, furthermore, be permitted to state his business address or place of work or another address at which documents can be served instead of stating his place of residence if there is well-founded reason to fear that legally protected interests of the witness or of another person might be endangered or that witnesses or another person might be improperly influenced if the witness states his place of residence. If the conditions of sentence 1 obtain at the main hearing, the presiding judge shall permit the witness not to state his place of residence. (3) If there is well-founded reason to fear that revealing the identity or the place of residence or whereabouts of the witness would endanger the witness’s or another person’s life, limb or liberty, the witness may be permitted not to provide personal identification data or to provide such data only in respect of an earlier identity. However, if so asked at the main hearing, he shall be required to state in what capacity the facts he is indicating became known to him. (4) ... (5) Subsections (2) to (4) shall also apply after conclusion of the examination of the witness. Insofar as the witness was permitted not to provide data, it must be ensured in the course of the provision of information from or inspection of the files that these data are not made known to other persons, unless a danger within the meaning of subsections (2) and (3) appears to be ruled out. Section 68a (Limitation of right to ask questions to protect privacy): (1) Questions concerning facts which might dishonour the witness ... or which concern their personal sphere of life are to be asked only if they cannot be dispensed with. Section 168e (Separate examination of witnesses): If there is an imminent risk of serious detriment to a witness’s well-being in the event of his being examined in the presence of persons entitled to be present and if that risk cannot be averted in some other way, the judge shall examine the witness separately from those entitled to be present. There shall be simultaneous audio-visual transmission of the examination to the latter. The rights of participation of those entitled to be present shall otherwise remain unaffected. Sections 58a and 241a shall apply accordingly. The decision referred to in sentence 1 shall not be contestable. Section 247a (Order for witness examination via audio-visual means): (1) If there is an imminent risk of serious detriment to the well-being of the witness were he to be examined in the presence of those attending the main hearing, the court may order that the witness remain in another place during the examination; such an order shall also be admissible under the conditions of section 251 (2) insofar as this is necessary to establish the truth. The decision shall not be contestable. Simultaneous audio-visual transmission of the testimony shall be provided in the courtroom. The testimony shall be recorded if there is a concern that the witness will not be available for examination at a future main hearing and the recording is necessary to establish the truth. Section 58a (2) shall apply accordingly. | Your silence can be used against you: this is known as an adoptive admission. It is an exception to the hearsay rule, and is based on the premise that if a person hears and understands an accusation against them (even framed very indirectly), and "adopts" the truth of the accusation by directly acting in a certain way or by failing to dispute the accusation, this can be introduced as a form of admitting to the accusation. For instance, B might say to A "I laughed when you shot Smith in the foot" and A might say "That was pretty funny, right", that can be admitted and interpreted as a confession. The same goes for A saying nothing. What's crucial is that the accusation has to be made in the defendant's presence, they must hear and understand it, they must be able to deny the accusation and it would be natural to deny the accusation. There is a relationship between this and the Fifth Amendment, see Salinas v. Texas (and prior law), that "To prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from shielding information not properly within its scope, a witness who “‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’". During a non-custodial interview, defendant was asked asked if his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder”, and he said nothing (and actually gave non-verbal indicators that the accusation was true). He did not invoke his right to silence, thus the court reasoned that "Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment". |
Where is the line in regards to jury intimidation? I have been closely following the Kyle Rittenhouse case closely. During a discussion on whether the jury could view video evidence multiple times, protesters with megaphones could be overheard in the courtroom. Earlier in the trial, when the judge was admonishing the prosecution for violating Rittenhouse's 5th amendment rights, the clerk can be barely heard warning the judge "They can hear you in the library". This makes me think the jurors can hear the protesters as well. With this in mind, what exactly counts as jury intimidation? | The conduct described is much more likely to be characterized as "contempt of court" than it is to be described the criminal offense of "jury intimidation". As the answer by @DavidSiegel does a good job of discussing, "jury intimidation" requires an intent to influence a juror. In contrast, contempt of court merely requires that judicial proceedings be disrupted in a manner disrespectful to the court in the conscious presence of the judge or in violation of a court order. It is unlawful and constitutes contempt of court to even mildly disturb or annoy jurors under a contempt of court standard, with the judge in the case adjudicating the contempt cases and imposing punishments in them, personally, as collateral proceedings in the criminal case. If the protesters were warned of a potential contempt of court charge, ordered by the judge to go further away so as not to impact the jurors, and a protester declined to do so, a contempt of court punishment would probably stick, even in the absence of a criminal charge, and notwithstanding First Amendment concerns. | The Brandenburg Test This is not a "general test" - it's the test that applies. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: The speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” AND The speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.” The first goes to mens rea; that the person intended by their speech to incite lawless action. This is a matter of fact based on conduct before, during and after the speech act. That is, intention can be established by what the speaker said and did before they spoke, while they were speaking and after their speech concluded. The second is based on the speech act itself. Here we have no precedent as to whether the incitement must be explicit (Lady McBeth or Iago) or implicit (Marc Antony): Hence, since Brandenburg, the Court has not elaborated on whether words of incitement are a necessary condition for conviction or if, absent words of incitement, a defendant has a First Amendment defense as a matter of law. We are left only with the Court's language in Brandenburg to try to divine whether words of incitement are in fact a necessary condition for conviction. The text is ambiguous. The Court stated that the First Amendment protects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Professor Gunther's position, that Brandenburg adopts Judge Hand's view, is supported by its self-conscious use of the term "inciting," suggesting that words of incitement are a necessary condition. No doubt, the Court was aware of Judge Hand's use of that term. But, of course, the Court did not state explicitly that a speaker has a First Amendment defense. Rather, it used an additional term, advocacy directed to "producing" the imminent criminal conduct. Arguably, unless the "producing" language was merely surplusage, the Court recognized that language not explicitly inciting lawless conduct may nonetheless be sufficiently dangerous that it should be criminalized. | Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence. | You will most likely be instructed to not share or even use your own translation of the testimony. In California, the instruction on translations is: Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony for other jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff). In People v. Cabrera 230 Cal.App.3d 300, it was ruled that supplying a competing translation is juror misconduct, see also People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907 (it is misconduct for a juror to inject expertise into the deliberations, referring to the fact that a juror "informed the jury ... [that he had a] background in law enforcement, and that the lack of evidence did not mean the defendant has no criminal background, because juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age." Florida has a similar instruction: The evidence you are to consider is only that provided through the official court [interpreters] [translators]. Although some of you may know (language used), it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the English [interpretation] [translation]. You must disregard any different meaning. If, however, during the testimony there is a question as to the accuracy of the English interpretation, you should bring this matter to my attention immediately by raising your hand. You should not ask your question or make any comment about the interpretation in the presence of the other jurors, or otherwise share your question or concern with any of them. I will take steps to see if your question can be answered and any discrepancy resolved. If, however, after such efforts a discrepancy remains, I emphasize that you must rely only upon the official English interpretation as provided by the court interpreter and disregard any other contrary interpretation. | The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions. | In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | Laws criminalizing perjury are not about being mistaken or less believable in your testimony. The crime is, very narrowly, stating something which you do not believe to be true, while under oath. If you make a statement that happens to be untrue but you believe it is true (you are mistaken), that is not perjury. In the US, moreover, you have to assert something literally untrue, not simply say something that could be interpreted as being untrue. Rental arbitration hearings are nothing special, except that witnesses may or may not be sworn under the particular state's laws. If a witness is sworn and unambiguously asserts "Jones gave Smith $1,000 at that time", and another sworn witness asserts "Jones did not give Smith any money at that time", that might suggest that one witness testified as to something that they did not believe to be true. It might also show that they were standing in different places. Even if the circumstances show that the two witnesses observed the same facts, you would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one party knew at the time that their statement was false. It is also possible that one witness made mis-remembered or misinterpreted what they saw. They might say or write something else (under oath, or elsewhere) that establishes that they knew better. An example is US v. DeZarn, which clearly established that the defendant could not have believed the statement that he testified to. With no official record of what a party testified to, it may not possible to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a party committed perjury, since it can be reasonable to doubt claims of what he actually testified to. The defendant's attorney may, however, have to create such a doubt. Some answers could be perjurous if the question and answer are short enough, for example "Did you cash the check?" "No", if witnesses to the hearing testify convincingly that this exchange took place. |
Can a police officer, under these circumstances, enforce the following arrest warrant out of Jurisdiction? A warrant is issued for the arrest of Jimmy Jones for crimes committed in Springfield County. Officer Bob is an officer with the Shelbyville Police Department, a city in Simpson County near the boarder of Springfield County. Officer Bob knows that Mr. Jones is hiding in Springfield County and that it is time critical such that Officer Bob cannot contact proper authorities. No crime described in the warrant occurred in Simpson County. Can Officer Bob enforce this warrant in Springfield as an officer of Shelbyville PD? The correct answer should be able to show specific case law. Jurisdiction: Fictional U.S. State (AKA I'm not looking for a specific state law but a federal law ruling.). | Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000. | In part, we don't know because there are currently no rules that address certain outcomes, so it will depend on who is on the Supreme Court when the issue is raised. A warrantless search will not be legal beyond current doctrines regarding crime in progress and imminent danger, even if it involves time travel. So you will need a warrant, and you will need probable cause to get it. Currently, if you break into a person's house to discover that there is a body there, you can't get a warrant to legitimize that illegal search. Adding time travel does not change anything. In situation 1, I assume they have probable cause and a warrant but the evidence was destroyed by the time of the search at time T+n. As long as prior time T is still after the crime, a warrant to search at time T would not be a problem. In scenario 2, there is nothing preventing them from stopping the crime or arresting the perpetrators in the act. However, if they travel back in time and break in to a suspect's house in order to witness the crime, that is an illegal search. You could likewise arrest a person before he escapes to the phantom zone, if you have probable cause that he had committed a crime – by the time of the arrest. Forward time travel poses a more serious challenge, as articulated in Minority Report. It would, or should, be very difficult to issue an arrest warrant at time T based on knowledge of a crime committed at T+n. Because of the arrest, the crime was not committed and there was no probable cause, so there should have been no warrant (oh no, paradox). | As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible. | I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances. | The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal. | More generally, but subject to the specifics of state law, a person may be required to assist a police officer. For instance in Alabama A person commits the crime of refusing to aid a peace officer if, upon command by a peace officer identified to him as such, he fails or refuses to aid such peace officer in: (1) Effecting or securing a lawful arrest; or (2) Preventing the commission by another person of any offense. In Washington, the obligations is much narrower: A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer. Washington seems to be in the minority, compared to Alabama. | What law in the U.S. governs when you need to pull over for a traffic stop? Specifically, Massachusetts? Refusal to submit to a police officer, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 25 (2016) governs. The relevant part reads: Any person who, while operating or in charge of a motor vehicle . . . who shall refuse or neglect to stop when signalled to stop by any police officer who is in uniform or who displays his badge conspicuously on the outside of his outer coat or garment . . . shall be punished by a fine of one hundred dollars. What about a police standing on the side of the road, waving you over? (perhaps at a speed trap) If the police officer is on a uniform and displays his badge, probably. What about a police just standing on the side of the road, looking at you? Assuming the police officer doesn't "signal" you to stop, you would be okay under this statute. Whether he is legally justified in asking you to stop is a separate issue outside the scope of you question. Bottom Line: Someone who doesn't want to run afoul of this law should stop whenever they think a police officer is pulling them over. | I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions). |
Can a judge be removed from a trial for bias? Judges and juries are supposed to be impartial. Jurors are removed all the time for being potentially biased towards one side in a case. A judge in a case that is a current event as of writing , has been accused by much of the media and other observers as being biased, in this case towards the defendant. Can a judge be forced to recuse themself from a trial for credible accusations of bias? If so, what are the processes the defense or prosecution can take to do so? | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. | See jury-nullification. I'm not a legal historian, so I can't say for sure what the laws on jury acquittals were at that time in that jurisdiction. However, when a jury has final discretion to acquit a defendant of a crime that's it: They can effectively ignore laws if they want to acquit someone. Such acquittals do not set a precedent or have any bearing outside of the trial in which they issue their verdict. | In the U.S., in a criminal case, there is a right to a speedy trial, and if a jury cannot be assembled by that deadline (as extended by available extensions) for reasons that are not the defendant's fault, than the charges must be dismissed. Usually, the issue is not finding enough impartial jurors in high profile cases, which takes time but can be done, but in not finding enough jurors at all, where response rates to jury summonses are low and the municipality is a small one. | You can't guarantee a juror's disregard, and some attorneys might utilize the "once it's said, it can't be unsaid" strategy because they know that the jury will still keep it in the back of their mind even though they've been told to ignore it. But there are checks and balances to prevent a remark having an impact on the final decision: Jury deliberation. Chances are, not all jurors will keep the thought in their mind. The jury gets a chance to deliberate after the case has been presented, and it's very easy for other jurors in the deliberation room to point out they're ignoring that piece of information and not let it influence the final decision. Declaring a mistrial. A mistrial is fully at the judge's discretion, but generally anything that affects the jury's ability to remain impartial can result in a mistrial being declared (for example, if an attorney deliberately said something outrageous to influence the jury when they knew it would be withdrawn, the judge will likely declare a mistrial without much thought). Once a mistrial is declared, the case will be postponed and a brand new jury will be selected that hasn't heard the previous remarks - easiest way to erase it from their minds is to not use their minds. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare | I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts. | Your question isn't quite as simple as it sounds; some civil cases are tried before juries, and though a judge can give directions to a jury to give a particular verdict, they are not always required to obey; there are eighteenth-century English cases on the point that established that principle for most related jurisdictions. But your last sentence does have a simple answer: No. A judge usually takes an oath on assuming office, to administer the law without fear or favour. That means he will investigate the relevant law (with the assistance of the parties' lawyers), and enforce what it says. "This law would be unfair to the customer, so I will ignore it" would be just as bad as "The mechanic threatened to hit me with a wrench, so I find for him". Of course, most jurisdictions do have overriding principles of fairness; it may be that this contract term was not shown to the customer, so is not enforceable, or it may be that it is contrary to public policy to be uncertain what repairs will cost. But unless there is an explicit legal reason, the judge will have to find for the mechanic. It would be neither improper nor unusual for the judgment to include the sentence "This result is clearly unfair to the customer, and I urge the legislature to look at closing the loophole; nevertheless, the law is clear, and I find the customer must pay the increased price." | canada The mere fact of being frequently overturned on appeal would only have reputational consequences and secondary effects on career advancement (not suggesting these are minor effects). But being overturned at a rate of 95% suggests that the judge might not be conducting themselves with integrity or not being diligent in the performance of their judicial duties. These are two core ethical principles set out by the Canadian Judicial Council (CJC). (However, the CJC is clear that these principles "do not set out standards for defining judicial misconduct.") Depending on what is leading the judge to such a high rate of appellate intervention, the underlying cause may warrant removal. The possible reasons that the CJC can recommend a judge to be removed are listed at s. 65(2)(a) to (d) of the Judges Act: Where, in the opinion of the Council, the judge in respect of whom an inquiry or investigation has been made has become incapacitated or disabled from the due execution of the office of judge by reason of (a) age or infirmity, (b) having been guilty of misconduct, (c) having failed in the due execution of that office, or (d) having been placed, by his or her conduct or otherwise, in a position incompatible with the due execution of that office, the Council, in its report to the Minister under subsection (1), may recommend that the judge be removed from office. For some examples where the CJC recommended removal of a judge, see: the Report to the Minister of Justice re: Paul Cosgrove (2009) (in which the CJC declined to consider whether serious incompetence could be a ground for removal; instead basing the recommendation for removal on serious misconduct that was damaging to the administration of jusice and the public's confidence in the judiciary); the Report to the Minister of Justice re: Robin Camp (2017). |
What if a law creates a dangerous situation? In Saitama (not sure of city or prefecture) they created a law that if a cyclist rings a bell at a pedestrian then they can get a 10000 yen fine. So if you are a cyclist and you down a pedestrian because they don't know you are there because you are scared of the fine so you don't ring your bell to let them know you are there and some pedestrians (or are children) erratically move so they might move too suddenly close to the path of your bicycle for you to stop in time. Who is liable if compliance with law leads to damage or injury? | Not a full analysis, but a framework for thinking about it: Like the French Civil Code, the Japanese Civil Code only has a single provision on tort liability. Article 709 of the Civil Code states: "A person who intentionally or negligently violates the rights of others shall be liable for the loss caused by the act." Tort law was gradually developed largely based on case law, including cases on pollution. Statutes outside the Civil Code also regulate specific types of torts, such as the Law on the Compensation of Losses arising from Car Accidents enacted in 1955, the 1973 Law on the Remedies of Harm Caused to Human Health by Pollution, or the 1994 Law on Product Liability. In a 1990 article, Takao Tanase posited that the calculated structuring of governmental and legal processes, not a cultural propensity toward harmonious social relations, accounted for the persistently low litigation rate in Japan. In Japan in 1986, fewer than 1% of automobile accidents involving death or an injury resulted in litigation, compared to 21.5% in the United States. The litigation rate was low, Tanase said, because Japan provides non-litigious methods of assessing fault, advising victims, determining compensation, and ensuring payment. Non-litigious dispute resolution mechanisms, mediation services, consultation centers operated by governments, the bar association, and insurance companies. The Japanese judiciary also works hard at developing clear, detailed rules that guarantee virtually automatic, predictable, moderate compensation for most accident victims. This contrasts with the American tort system, where the legal rules concerning both liability and non-economic damages ("pain and suffering") are stated in general terms, leaving a great deal to the judgment of constantly rotating lay juries—which in turn makes courtroom outcomes variable and difficult to predict. The result was a system that is vastly more efficient and reliable in delivering compensation than the American tort system. Tanase estimated that legal fees comprised only 2% of the total compensation paid to injured persons. In the United States in the late 1980s, according to two big studies of motor vehicle accident tort claims (not just lawsuits), payments to lawyers equaled 47% of the total personal injury benefits paid by insurers. This expense drives up the cost of insurance to the point that huge numbers of drivers are uninsured or under-insured, which means that victims of their negligent driving will get little or nothing from the tort system. (Source) So, getting to the question: if you are a cyclist and you down a pedestrian because they don't know you are there because you are scared of the fine so you don't ring your bell to let them know you are there and some pedestrians (or are children) erratically move so they might move too suddenly close to the path of your bicycle for you to stop in time. Who is liable if compliance with law leads to damage or injury? In Japan, the person who was hurt would promptly be taken to a local hospital, quite likely by the person who caused the harm or a completely unrelated bystander. But, since Japan has national health insurance and very affordable hospital pricing even to the insurer, the economic impact of the accident, even if the injuries were serious, would be much smaller than in the case of a comparable accident in the United States. No one would sue. But, the bicycle rider would apologize repeatedly, and would promptly and diligently pay some moderate compensation to the person harmed. The amount paid would be a bit more than amount of the exclusively economic part of the harm (excluding health insurance payments that it was forced to make as a result of the accident) that were caused by the accident to the person who was hurt. No one would consider the impact of the government regulation as something relevant to justice between the people who were involved in the accident. But people who saw it happen might start having discussions with people in the vicinity and influential people in local government about whether this law was a good idea. It is possible that the law would be changed as a result of this incident and similar ones. But, it is even more likely that the police would unofficially make it known that in some circumstances they will neglect violations of this law when doing so helps to prevent an accident if the person doing so tries to be polite in the process and apologizes for doing so. The local authorities and people informally in the area, might also, or instead, probably encourage bicyclists to call out vocally in a loud but civil voice: "Excuse me good person, I'm coming behind you", rather than ringing a bell, which would be even more effective at preventing an accident. It is quite likely that this scenario was the intended effect of the local law. | First of all, there are 3 crimes here: the hit and run committed by you the accessory after the fact crime committed by your friend the "attempt to pervert the course of justice" (different jurisdictions call it different things) committed by you and your friend. Second, the lawyer is your friend's lawyer - they have no client privilege towards you. Third, your lawyer cannot help you break the law - any attempt to get them to do so by say, attempting to pervert the course if justice, is not privileged. | As a practical matter, if you learn that people are gathering around a street racing event, leave. In all likelihood, you should do the same if you learn that people are gathering around a cockfighting event, a duel, a staged fight between people outside of a licensed boxing or fighting event, or any other illegal contest. Rather than worrying about the precise contours of these laws, avoiding this situations is the safest rule for your personal safety from other participants and from authorities. | I am not a lawyer and I have never even been to the UK. You will not go to prison if your neighbor's dog attacks you and it dies as a result of you defending yourself. You might go to prison and/or owe the owner damages if: You are somewhere you do not technically have a right to be. It can be shown you could have retreated from harm but chose instead to stand your ground. The force you used was deemed excessive - it showed intent to harm the dog more than necessary to protect yourself You contributed to the confrontation in a way that a reasonable person would think might cause trouble You might be able to protect yourself from problems by: taking pictures or videos of the dog behaving badly or aggressively note dates and times when you observe the dog behaving badly or aggressively formally contact the dog's owner with your concerns and/or evidence in which you assert your rights to access the areas you walk through and your right to defend yourself in the event that you are attacked by the dog if possible, change your route or schedule to avoid the problem entirely Good luck | This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied. | I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with. | From Rule 170 of the Highway Code: watch out for pedestrians crossing a road into which you are turning. If they have started to cross they have priority, so give way If this was indeed the case, then it suggests that the OP had right of way, and the driver was at fault. In any case, the driver should have indicated before turning. | I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed. |
Are lawyers allowed to lie about the law during closing arguments? In his closing arguments during the Kyle Rittenhouse case, the prosecution said (full quote) that “You lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people”. (bold-italic added). The bold-italic is plain untrue. I understand that lawyers will stretch the evidence to suit their client's needs, but are they allowed to stretch the law? | A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal. | Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints. | The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her. | A summary is here: see for example Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 'in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel'. In the same vein, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 held that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so, likewise, may waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel". In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 it is held that this extends (via the 14th) to state courts. As to the expression "practice law", maybe the meaning of this expression is taken to be self-evident, though clearly it is not. Statutes that prohibit that act for non-lawyers generally specify things such as "for another person" or "holds himself out as entitled to practice law". | There was a case like that in 2010 in germany tl;dr synopsis of the German article: The police raided the private home of an alleged member of a criminal gang. This was performed as a no-knock raid. The police officers did not announce themselves as such when they started to break open the door. The suspect had reason to believe that a rival gang was planning an attempt on his life. So the suspect believed that the people trying to break into his home were actually members of said gang trying to murder him. The suspect used a firearm to shoot at the intruders through the door, lethally injuring a police officer. When the police officers then identified themselves as such, the suspect surrendered immediately. A court later ruled that killing the police officer was self-defense, because they were reasonably convinced that the defendant was unaware that he was dealing with police officers, believed to be in a situation where his life was in danger and where lethal violence was the only way to save his life. Here is the verdict. [In German, of course] | We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered. | Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side. | The simple answer to the question you asked is that they are not mutually exclusive. Self-defense and “castle doctrine” are defenses. A person can be charged and tried for murder, and one or both of those can be their defense. But shooting someone in self defense does not guarantee immunity from a charge or trial. In the first place, you need to show that it was indeed justifiable self-defense. As a source for this answer, see Texas state law library. https://guides.sll.texas.gov/gun-laws/stand-your-ground That site itself says that the laws are complicated and refers readers to “plain English” from which I selected https://www.bhwlawfirm.com/deadly-force-self-defense-in-texas/ For self defense, the site says: Texas law provides for a justifiable defense at trial when using deadly force if the person claiming self defense: Reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary; Had a legal right to be on the property; Did not provoke the person against whom deadly force was used; and Was not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force was used. For protection of property, it says Under Texas Penal Code §9.42, a person may use deadly force against another to protect land or property if: He is the owner of the land; He reasonably believes using the force is immediately necessary to prevent arson, burglary, or robbery; and He reasonably believes that the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means. OK! To summarize the story linked by the OP, homeowner hears and then finds a man outside breaking into homeowner’s shed. He confronts intruder who then moves toward homeowner with a pickaxe. Homeowner shoots and intruder runs off. let us agree that the first shot was allowed under Texas law, preventing a robbery and perhaps an attack with a pickaxe. The homeowner says that he then shot again “into the night.” At this point he is shooting a fleeing person. We can even leave out all of the irregularities once he calls 911 two hours later to report an invasion in progress even though the intruder was dead. In any case, there is also the questions are: Is the homeowner’s version of events true in the first place? If we accept everything he said, was the shot the killed the man justifiable under Texas law? These are for the prosecutor to decide if it is worth trying and the jury to decide. Back to your question of how can they charge him if he had a right to stand his ground? Further, even if a person has a justification for using force, he may still be arrested and face trial. Self defense is a defense against a murder charge, not a get out of jail free card. |
Filing a complaint against USBP officials This is a bit of a long story, and may make more sense over on the legal stackexchange, so I will keep it brief: I (a US citizen) attempted to enter the USA with third party goods (my father's things), and was denied entry I (on the same day), re-attempted entry with my father (Canadian citizen) present (from the US side, he had flown and taken a taxi to the border to meet me). The intent was for him to claim his goods. I was once again forcibly denied entry. The USBP official was belligerent and aggressive, and, despite me fully complying, the situation resulted in five USBP agents escorting me to my vehicle with hands on holsters. This created a very messy situation as Canada nearly denied my father entry (he visited the USA and returned without the necessary COVID testing) I am very frustrated that the agents escalated a very simple situation to such an extreme. While I'm aware of the political situation in the USA, and the resulting aggression from the border agents would fully be ignored, I'd like to know if I have legal grounds to at least initiate some sort of investigation. On the first entry (a different agent), it was made clear that I could cross, being an american citizen, however the goods themselves were denied. On the second crossing, that option was never presented, and I was given zero opportunity to even speak, being instead threatened with weapons. I'm not sure if this falls into "denying a US citizen entry into their home country" What legal precedent can I use (if any) to start a complaint such that these inappropriate and dangerous actions can be brought to light? Edits to address the comments No particular goods were cited by the border agents at either attempted crossing, "Third party goods" was the extent of the explanation both times. No force or aggression was supplied on my side. The only question I could fully ask without being interrupted was "Can you please explain why I am being denied entry, these goods are no longer third party". That alone immediately prompted the multi-officer march towards me. I should add that the particular officer I was dealing with was immediately, quite literally red in the face from anger within seconds of beginning our conversation. He was clearly unhappy before I walked in, slamming doors and knocking things over from inside the office before coming out to "escort" me to my vehicle. However, regardless of this, there is no reason why even the idea of firearms should be involved in a nonviolent situation. (Not that it is relevant, because nobody actually ever looked inside the vehicle or inspected the goods). There was no contraband or any goods that otherwise would have been denied entry. There was clothing, a set of golf clubs, and a bicycle. My father could not cross the land border into the USA due to current COVID restrictions. He is permitted to fly, but not drive across the border. I, an american (dual) citizen, can drive across the border. That was the original intent of the trip and my father was in the air while I attempted the first entry. | You don't need any legal precedent to start a complaint process. You can just file a complaint through the CBP's system. | The answer from @BlueDogRanch is right as far as it goes, but omits a critical point. There are certain acts that are excluded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act and granting a visa when it should have been denied is almost certainly one of them. The critical provisions are 28 USC § 2680(a) and (h). 28 USC § 2680. Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-- (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. . . . (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law. The decision to grant or deny a visa is generally placed in the discretion of a visa officer, evaluating the facts when informed by guidelines established by the U.S. Secretary of State and Department of Homeland Security which is a quasi-judicial role, and is subject to administrative appeal in some cases. As a result, even if that discretion is abused, the employee and the agency are immune from liability under the FTCA. The claim may be barred under 2680(h), as well, if the visa officer is sued for conspiring to cause one of the enunciated intentional torts and the visa officer is not a law enforcement officer. Also, if liability exists at all under the FTCA, it arises against the United States and not against the employee personally: The general rule is that federal employees enjoy absolute immunity from tort claims that challenge negligent or wrongful acts performed while acting within the scope of government employment. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229-30 (2007). The source of this absolute immunity is the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2010). Under the Westfall Act, the exclusive remedy for anyone injured by the negligent or wrongful act of a federal employee acting in the scope of employment is a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2010). The bottom line is that there are no private causes of action that arise under the immigration laws for a person not personally claiming improper denial of an immigration benefit. Cf. Mirmehdi v. United States, 662 F.3d 1073, Footnote 4 (9th Cir. 2011) (no cause of action exists for selective enforcement of the immigration laws); Tsolmon v. United States, 15-20609 (5th Cir. November 7, 2016) (discretionary exception clause barred FTCA action for failure to follow department policy re potential visa issue). But see Watson v. United States, 14-CV-6459 (E.D. New York, February 25, 2016) (discretionary acts exception did not apply to the deportation of a child who was a known U.S. citizen by immigration officers since this is beyond the scope of their authority). There is also no constitutional right to have the government deny a visa to someone not entitled to a visa under U.S. law or immigration guidelines. If someone brought a suit of the kind described in the question, they would almost certainly lose, probably on a motion to dismiss by the government filed before they were required to answer the complaint on the merits. A sufficiently negligent decision might constitute good cause to fire the visa officer from that person's civil service job, if their supervisor chose to seek the termination of the visa officer's employment. I will refrain from answering whether the sovereign immunity that exists in this circumstance is good policy as the question asks as that would be beyond the scope of this forum and implicate wide ranging questions of pure opinion. Suffice it to say that U.S. law on this question would not necessarily apply in every country. | I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario. | There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court. | You are courting seduction by the sovereign citizen doctrine. This is a crackpot legal theory that will get you nowhere. Run away as fast as you can. See, for example, Can a natural US person hold citizenship while remaining non-juridical?. See also "Mercedes-Benz Financial (DCFS Canada Corp.) v. Kovacevic, 2009", CanLII. This person fared particularly poorly because his argument relied in part on the UCC, which is a United States model code, but he was arguing in a Canadian court. Still, even in a US court, he would have lost. See What are "freemen of the land" or "sovereign citizen" theories and do they hold any water?. | The simplest solution is to hire an attorney to do this for you. If you want to do it the hard way, you need to try to figure out why your motions were denied. For example, did you file proper motions, or did you just write on a piece of paper "I need all of Walmart's records"? Why do you think that a court will / should supply you with an Open Record (of what)? A real lawsuit is not like Judge Judy where you tell your story and hope the judge has sympathy on your plight. Did the judge say / write anything about why he is denying your requests? | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. | If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts. |
When there is a hung jury, is it reported how badly it is hung? I would think it would be important to the State to know how many hold-outs there were. It seems like it would effect the cost/benefit analysis the State makes when deciding whether to re-try the case. It seems like it'd be more worth re-trying a case that was hung 11-1 in favor of conviction rather than if it was hung 1-11 in favor of acquittal. So are the vote totals known in a hung jury? | No Jury deliberations are secret and while it might be useful to know how hung a jury was and in which direction, the information cannot be accessed without breaching the sanctity of the jury room. | The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available. | I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions). | Carl may not do this, as he would be prohibited from making this argument at trial. At trial, evidence must be relevant, meaning that it makes a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Because the trial is meant to determine whether Carl is or is not guilty, his promises of future philanthropy have no bearing on the matter. And even if they somehow did, Carl still would not be able to tell the jury about them because they would be blocked under Rule 403, which excludes evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by its risk of biasing or confusing the jury. If Carl attempts to make these statements anyway, he risks a mistrial, which means he has to start over with with a new jury. In some jurisdictions, Carl may, however, be permitted to make this argument during the sentencing phase, where the court can properly consider the societal effects of whatever punishment it imposes. At this point, though, it's obviously a little late for Carl, as it presumes he has been convicted. | The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact. | If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate. | If a person A, speaking by telephone to an election official B in Georgia, attempts to influence that official to improperly alter an election result in a way that would constitute frauds or otherwise be a violation of Georgia law, then the person A has committed a crime in Georgia. There are various ways to commit a crime in a place without being physically present in that state. Since there is no question what was said on the telephone call in question (because it was recorded) the question to be determined would seem to be whether it constituted a crime under Georgia law, and whether the Georgia officials think it is worth prosecuting. It is true that a trial for a criminal accusation is normally held in the state where the crime was committed (or allegedly committed). But that need not be in a state where the person was ever physically present. If a person living in State C does business is state D, and is requires to file a tax return with the authorities in D, and it is alleged that the return was false, then the person is being accused of a crime in D, committed when the false return was received in D. | It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example). |
Jurisdiction of file a complaint of a party who fraudulantly denies the contract The complainant started working for a company as a freelancer, there is no duly signed document but the complainant has the confirmation message in Skype conversation. Also he has all the conversation with the said company's employees regarding the progress of the work and other conversations. Now the defendant company says that "you were not worked in our company as an employee nor freelancer". Also they are accusing that the complainant accessed the server illegally and stole the data. Actually it was legal work, so how can the complainant get remedy? while filing the case the court questioned the jurisdiction because the complainant is in one district and the defendant is in other district within the same state Tamilnadu. Actually the work was done and committed in the place of Complainant but later point of time the defendant fraudulently denies the work and accusing that the Complainant access their server illegally from Complainant in his location. The complainant filed case in the Judicial Magistrate Court under 200 CrPC (1973) along with all the evidence to prove his innocence. How could we decide the jurisdiction? Is there is any case law or sections in favor to the complainant in India to file a case in his Jurisdiction? | Normally, an alleged offence of this sort that crosses jurisdictional boundaries will be deemed to have been committed where the defendant is located at the time of the offence regardless of where they live - as it is they who do the actus reus at the relevant time. In india, the venue is determined by section 177 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However, there is any doubt which is the appropriate venue section 178 will apply: Place of inquiry or trial. (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed, partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence, is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Also, note the provisions of section 462: Proceedings in wrong place. No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub- division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. | To answer the last part of the question: Jurisdiction would be where the copied media is being producted and where it is being consumed/sold. Moving media from one jurisdiction with ineffectual protections to another jurisdiction is part of product piracy. The scheme you suggest might shield the company producing the counterfeit goods, leaving the importers holding the bag. If the importers and manufacturers are controlled by the same person, courts in jurisdictions with strong protection might hold that person liable for the whole criminal enterprise. There is a widespread assumption that the internet is 'beyond national laws.' That is wrong. Enforcement may be difficult in some cases, but the laws apply. If you try to make profits by skirting the edges of law, you need really good, really professional legal advice. | By "complain" I assume you mean "take legal action against him". You would need a legal basis, and a lawyer. When you say that you don't have a contract, I assume you mean that you don't have a piece of signed paper, but you do have an agreement – which is a contract. As far as websites are concerned, there are only a few likely causes of legal action: copyright infringement, and non-payment for services. As far as copyright is concerned, this law may be relevant. If we assume that you and the client are operating in Iran, your copyright is protected, but Iran does not enforce other country's copyright laws (they are not signatories to the Berne Convention). If the issue is that the client is not paying for services rendered, you can sue them. The civil code (in English) is here. See article 219 ff. for the specifics, but basically you show the judge that there is an agreement, and that you were not paid. The client can then argue that you didn't actually do the job agreed to, or that you were paid. There are other possible responses (e.g. the "client" might prove that you agreed to do the work for free), the details of which will come out in your discussion with the lawyer. | No contract can limit a court's jurisdiction An NDA is a contract: it cannot prevent the application of the judicial process. Should your dispute reach a courtroom, the NDA and the documents it seeks to protect are all admissible and you should subpoena them from the defendant and submit those copies to the court (that way you are not breaking the terms of the NDA). What is not admissible is bona fide "without prejudice" documents: that is documents that contain admissions and offers made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. This privilege is established by the context of the document, not by if it does or does not have the words "without prejudice" on it (except, of course, that their presence/absence is part of the context). | You have to serve the defendant Unless and until you do, you aren’t going to court. If you can’t find the defendant, you can’t sue the defendant. Rules of service vary by jurisdiction but under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) implemented in all jurisdictions in australia they are (for an individual): hand it to the defendant leave it in the presence of the defendant and explain what it is leave it with a person at the defendant's home address who appears to be over the age of 16 years and living at that address leave it at the defendant's work address, with a person who appears to be over the age of 16 years, if the defendant is a sole trader ask the Local Court to post it to the defendant either at the defendant's work address if they are a sole trader, or the defendant's residential address. So, it is really not that hard. However, if this proves too difficult, you can apply to the court for substituted service. Courts will generally allow any method where you can prove that the Statement of Claim came to the defendant’s attention. For example, service by Facebook has been acceptable. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | Jurisdiction is generally a matter for courts to decide. For example, in Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F. 3d 1294 (2012), the plaintiff, having had their work published in Sweden, had filed a claim there, and lost. They then took the claim to the United States. Copyright infringement is generally actionable per se - no damage needs to actually be proven or sustained. Typically, the rule is that the proper law will apply. This is the state that seems to have the closest and most real connection to the facts of the case. Now, where there is more than one jurisdiction in which a claim may be brought - as in your example - a plaintiff may research the relevant statutes to determine which jurisdiction is most likely to afford them the most favourable outcome. It's called forum shopping. It is likely that the proper law will be that of A or C. This depends on a number of factors: Whether the infringing party profited from the infringement. If the infringing party profited from the act, then you are likely to want to bring the matter in A, so that you can recover damages. Whether the infringing party has any presence in B. If the party has a presence in B, then a claim in B is likely to be more cost-effective. Again, depending on the laws of the country, it may not be possible for the artist to bring a claim against the infringing party if they have no local presence. Some countries have laws that explicitly allow extraterritorial service. Whether the hosting service was aware of the copyright infringement. If the hosting service was aware of the infringement and failed to prevent it, then you may be able to claim for contributory infringement - they could then, depending on their contract/agreement with the infringing party, be able to claim for damages. The Napster case may be somewhat relevant to this, but it's hard to say anything concrete when working with hypothetical countries. At the very least, a claim against the hosting service - which may just be an injunction ordering the removal of the content - could be fruitful. The actual laws of the countries involved. If the artist has sufficient money, they can just choose the forum that is most favourable to them. In short, private international law is a tricky subject and there are so many factors that need to be accounted for. | Can a lawsuit naming multiple defendants be partially dismissed? Yes. This happens routinely. As one random example, in a recent 7th Circuit case, there was no doubt that the Plaintiff had stated a legally valid claim against two off-duty Indianapolis officers who choked a bar patron unconscious, dragged him facedown to parking lot, beat him still further, emptied his wallet, and left him covered in blood. But, the Plaintiff also named the city that employed them in its municipal police department when they were on duty as a defendant. The trial court denied the city's motion to dismiss, and a jury awarded $1.2 million of damages against the city as well. The 7th Circuit, however, held that the trial court should have dismissed the City that employed them as a defendant, since it did not have legal liability for the off duty conduct of its officers, and the City further purged itself of any claim that it adopted a policy tolerating this conduct when it fired the officers after learning of the incident. On the other hand, a plaintiff can sue defendants in the alternative and only has to dismiss a defendant when it is clear that no reasonably jury could hold that particular defendant liable. For example, suppose that a house with a structural carpentry defect was built by two framing contractors. It is clear that the defective work was all done by a single framing contractor and that it was defective, but there aren't good records of which contractor did what work. The Plaintiff can properly sue both framing contractors in the alternative for the damages caused by the defective framing work, and can leave it to the jury to decide on the merits which of the two did the defective work if the question isn't cleared upon unequivocally before then. |
Do I need a TV licence to watch internet live streams? I am aware I need a TV licence to watch any live TV (including via the channel’s online catchup service), and I need a TV licence in order to watch any content on iPlayer. In the answer here: https://law.stackexchange.com/a/53694/628, it’s suggested that some live streams would count as TV. I am interested as to exactly what counts as live TV. Presumably, a YouTube or Twitch live stream doesn’t count. Does watching a football match on Amazon Prime, or BT Sport, count as live TV? Or if Netflix were to start live streams? | The law says you need to be covered by a TV Licence to: watch or record programmes as they’re being shown on TV, on any channel watch or stream programmes live on an online TV service (such as ITV Hub, All 4, YouTube, Amazon Prime Video, Now TV, Sky Go, etc.) download or watch any BBC programmes on iPlayer. This applies to any device you use, including a TV, desktop computer, laptop, mobile phone, tablet, games console, digital box or DVD/VHS recorder. And What is live TV and when do I need a licence for it? Live TV means any programme you watch or record as it’s being shown on TV or live on any online TV service. It’s not just live events like sport, news and music. It covers all programmes on any channel, including soaps, series, documentaries and even movies. If you’re watching live TV, you need to be covered by a TV Licence: if you’re watching on TV or on an online TV service for all channels, not just the BBC if you record a programme and watch it later if you watch a programme on a delay to watch or record repeats to watch or record programmes on +1, +2 and +24 channels to watch live programmes on Red Button services even if you already pay for cable, satellite or other TV services From the TV Licensing body. Basically, if its playing solely because you hit the play button, its not “live TV” and you dont need a license to view it. If it would be playing at the same time for everyone on a schedule rather than on demand, its live TV. This includes sports on streaming services. So, a Youtube video you can view at any time is not live TV, but a Youtube video you have to see at a certain time is. A subsequent recording of a live stream that you did not make is not live TV for the purposes of licensing. A Twitch or Facebook livestream would also require a TV license to view. | To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law. | Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed. | They are probably not required to provide online access at all. They are probably required to provide some sort of written statement, unless you have waived that in favor of online or electronic versions. The exact requirements will vary in different jurisdictions. | Various elements could be legal, or not. For example, it is legal to require students to do things in order to pass a class. It is legal to require a student to write a program for a course (entirely, or in part). It is legal for a teacher to give a "group grade". It is not clear whether it is legal to require the student to assign copyright or license to the teacher / school – it may be legal to require a student to pay for their class, and copyright transfer might be valuable consideration for such a contract (assuming that there is a contractual relation at all as opposed to a statutory mandate – e.g. "high school"). If this is a public school, you can't make students pay for a mandatory class, therefore you cannot require assignment of copyright. It is very probably illegal for the student to access the educational records of other students, but the app could be developed with dummy data. | When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms. | http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/dk/dk091en.pdf is the Copyright Law in English for Denmark. You should probably try to find a Danish version to ensure the translation is accurate. Chapter 2 lists the exemptions from the general rule that you need the copyright owner's permission to use their IP. Unfortunately, the usage you have made does not meet the requirements for private use (s12): digital copies may only be shared among the members of one household, placing them on the web extends beyond your household. It may meet the requirements of educational use (s13) providing that your school has met the requirements for Extended Collective Use (s50). For photographs, this seems unlikely, such arrangements are usually limited to songs and television works. Under Chapter 6b, you are permitted to use "orphaned works", however, this requires that you have made a diligent search for the owners and have been unable to either identify or locate them. Copyright violation is subject to both penal sanctions (fines and in egregious violations imprisonment) (s76) and damages (s83). TL;DR Yes, you could be sued. Yes, the copyright holder would probably be successful. No, it is extremely unlikely they would bother. | "Terms of Service" implies that you are providing a service. If it's offline, you probably aren't doing that. You can still have a license agreement that applies. If certain types of CC licenses are involved, you may even be required to. |
Can a person be held liable in California if an intruder falls into their pool which didn't have a fence? According to the Municipal Code of Santa Monica: The swimming pool or spa, or the entire parcel on which it is located, shall be walled or fenced from the street or from adjacent properties; and where located less than 30 feet to any parcel line, shall be screened by a masonry wall or solid fence not less than 6 feet in height on the side facing such parcel line, subject to the requirements of Section 9.21.050, Fences, Walls, and Hedges. In the TV show Curb Your Enthusiasm the following story occurs: A person breaks into a house in Santa Monica for the purpose of robbery (not disputed) They run out through the back yard They stumble, fall into the unfenced pool and drown In real life, can the owner of the house be held civilly or criminally liable in this situation? On one hand, the pool did not have a fence despite it being legally required. On the other, they did enter the property illegally. | Short Answer In real life, can the owner of the house be held civilly or criminally liable in this situation? No. Long Answer On one hand, the pool did not have a fence despite it being legally required. On the other, they did enter the property illegally. Negligence Per Se And Attractive Nuisance The doctrine you are considering first is called "negligence per se" and states that failure to follow a penal statute or other law or regulation is negligent as a matter of law if the harm caused by failing to take the action it mandates is the kind of harm that the statute was intended to prevent. It isn't perfectly clear, but the answer to that is probably "no, this is not a negligence per se" case. Laws requiring pools to be fenced are largely directed at a particular type of tortious conduct called an "attractive nuisance" that could cause, for example, children who can't swim to be attracted to a pool that is dangerous to them without supervision. These laws are not intended to protect adult robbers (if the person engaged in robbery were an armed seven years old, that might be another story). California, however, has discarded the attractive nuisance doctrine that used to be part of its law, in 1970, in the case of Beard v. Atchison. Common Law Premises Liability In California The common law duty that a property owner owes to trespassers is to keep it free of deadly traps. You have liability if you turn your lawn into a literal mine field full of explosive land mines. But, you did not at common law owe a duty of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable accidental injury to trespassers such as robbers. So, there would be no common law duty here. But, California has abandoned the strict common law distinction in premises liability between invitees, licensees, and trespassers in lieu of a general duty to use reasonable care that is fairly tailored to the precise circumstances of the accident. California Civil Jury Instruction No. 1001 (2000) citing Ann M. v.Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 674-675, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207 (1993). California, rather than focusing on the nature of the duty that the landlord owes to a trespasser, focuses more on this factor as part of the question of issues like whether the harm was foreseeable. A Statute That Is On Point And Controlling Here Despite this evolution in California's common law of premises liability, however, California does have a statute that singles out felons who are injured on someone else's property in the course of a felony, specifically, California Civil Code § 847, which states (emphasis added): (a) An owner, including, but not limited to, a public entity, as defined in Section 811.2 of the Government Code , of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, shall not be liable to any person for any injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of any of the felonies set forth in subdivision (b) by the injured or deceased person. (b) The felonies to which the provisions of this section apply are the following: (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (6) lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life; (8) any other felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder; (10) assault with intent to commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer; (12) assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to murder; (18) burglary; (19) robbery; (20) kidnapping; (21) taking of a hostage by an inmate of a state prison; (22) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; (23) selling, furnishing, administering, or providing heroin, cocaine, or phencyclidine (PCP) to a minor; (24) grand theft as defined in Sections 487 and 487a of the Penal Code ; and (25) any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an assault. (c) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises at the moment the injured or deceased person commences the felony or attempted felony and extends to the moment the injured or deceased person is no longer upon the property. (d) The limitation on liability conferred by this section applies only when the injured or deceased person's conduct in furtherance of the commission of a felony specified in subdivision (b) proximately or legally causes the injury or death. (e) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises only upon the charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b) and the subsequent conviction of that felony or a lesser included felony or misdemeanor arising from a charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b). During the pendency of any such criminal action, a civil action alleging this liability shall be abated and the statute of limitations on the civil cause of action shall be tolled. (f) This section does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner's agent which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. (g) The limitation on liability provided by this section shall be in addition to any other available defense. This statute is controlling and would probably immunize the property owner from liability in the fact pattern of the question. My initial review suggests that originally, it contained only parts (a) to (c) and (g) which are more emphatic. But, later, parts (d) to (f), which created narrow exceptions to this general rule, were added. | Is there a way for us to prevent the sale of the house until they have moved the fence? For example, it seems that filing suit against the current owners doesn't necessarily prevent the sale, and that the suit would be pointless after the sale is complete. You can't prevent the sale, but if you file suit to adjudicate the boundary dispute and file what is called a "lis pendens" giving notice that the suit is filed in the real estate records, the buyer will taken subject to the lawsuit and realistically, won't close in the first place. The prospect of an impending sale is unlikely to be something that would cause the court to take expedited action or issue a temporary restraining order, because you can preserve your rights with a "lis pendens" which doesn't take a court order. The absolute minimum amount of time in which you could get a court order on the merits without a temporary restraining order is perhaps three to four months, which is almost surely too long to prevent a sale of a house. The suit isn't pointless after the sale is complete. You can still enforce the boundary against the new owner. And, often, a new owner, having no ego in the placement of the fence, might settle the case sooner than the old owner would have. But, better practice in terms of neighbor relations would be to file suit first, so that the new buyer, if the buyer goes forwards with the sale, is aware of the defect. The old owner is also more likely to have evidence useful in the lawsuit you bring. Short of filing suit, send a letter to the realtor and the neighboring property owner with a copy of the survey advising them of the problem. If you could somehow figure out who was handling the closing, you could tell them too. This will impose upon them a legal duty to advise the new buyer before closing, and if they fail to do so, they expose themselves to the risk of a fraud lawsuit from the new owner. But, while this is cheaper, it also presents a risk that they won't warn the buyer who will then not have notice and the risk of being sued for fraud may cause the seller and the seller's realtor to resist your suit more aggressively and to be less prone to settle it. If you wanted to be really aggressive, you could give the neighbor notice that the fence is over the line and that you will destroy it if the neighbor doesn't act, and then tear down the fence, which is strictly speaking within your rights if you can do so without a breach of the peace, because it is on your property. I wouldn't recommend this approach, however, as it could lead to violence or police involvement that depending on the policeman who isn't trained in real estate law, might get you arrested which is not good even if the charges are later dismissed. | Is entry into the yard subject to 24 hour notice? Most likely it is. Note that section § 47-8-3 defines both dwelling unit and premises. The latter encompasses the term "appurtenances", which the Black's Law Dictionary defines, inter alia, as "an adjunct; an appendage; [...] garden [...]". At least in the context of fenced backyard, the fact that § 47-8-3 defines dwelling unit and premises separately does not exclude "premises" from the scope of § 47-8-15. That is because the fence is "a structure [...] or part of a structure [...] that is used as a home, residence". Indeed, the existence of the fence suggests that the backyard is intended for only that tenant's exclusive use/enjoyment, with the implications it has on tenant's privacy. | united-states The argument you are making, restated in legal terms, is roughly as follows: Users have a duty to not reuse passwords. When a user reuses a password, and their password is subsequently stolen and used to fraudulently access the plaintiff's system, that password reuse becomes the proximate cause of the plaintiff's business injury. Therefore, our storage of plaintext passwords cannot be the proximate cause, and so we cannot be liable. This argument is mostly wrong. Leaving aside the fact that you're going to have a tough time convincing a jury of #1, a tort may have more than one proximate cause. Both the password reuse and the plaintext storage were but-for causes of the injury (i.e. if either had not happened, then the injury would not have happened). The injury was foreseeable, because it is well known in the security industry that many users in fact do reuse their passwords, professional advice notwithstanding. In most US states, that's enough to establish proximate cause. In the minority of states using the "direct causation" test, you might be able to characterize the user's password reuse as an intervening cause, and thereby avoid liability. However, there are other elements of tort law which must be established aside from proximate cause, and so by itself this does not resolve the question of liability. Other defenses might be applicable; for example, the terms of service might contain an indemnification agreement, which (if upheld) would make the user(s) responsible. The defendant might also argue that there is no duty of care, that it was not breached, or that the injury was or should have been de minimis (i.e. that the plaintiff should have taken greater care to prevent damages arising from account hijacking). | No Section 18-1-704.5. (1) says that : The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (*emphasis added) Subsections (2), (3), and (4) all refer to "any occupant of a dwelling" as the class authorized to use force by this section. An offie is not a dwelling. Section 18-1-901. Definitions says: (g) "Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation. Section Section 18-1-704 provides that: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203.of person's authored by this law to use force Under that provision, the use of deadly force does not seem clearly justified. It is highly questionable that "a lesser degree of force is inadequate". Any conclusion that the intruder represents an "imminent use of unlawful physical force" seems dubious, but I can't say what a court might find. This law is fairly recent, there may be no published case law for it. | In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it. | There don't appear to be any Santa Clara-specific laws on the matter, so California law (including this) would govern this situation. A landlord generally has an obligation to maintain the premise in habitable condition (can't stick you with the bill for repairing the water main), and has to fulfill the obligations of the lease (if the lease says that a working washing machine is part of the premise, the landlord has to fix it if it breaks). An AC is not part of what makes a unit "habitable" in the legal sense. You should have to scrutinize exactly what the lease says about the AC, but saying that it is provided "as is" indicates that the landlord is disclaiming any obligation to fix it if it breaks. You are allowed to use it, but if it breaks, he won't fix it. The fact that he has no obligation to fix it does not relieve you of your duty to care for his property (irrespective of the fact that it was abandoned by a prior tenant – there's a notification procedure regarding abandoned real property, which I assume the landlord followed so it is his AC). Your obligation to compensate the landlord for damaging his property is not triggered by his legal obligation to maintain the property, it is triggered by the fact that it is his property. So you are legally on the hook: under §1929, "The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned by his want of ordinary care". However, the size of the hook is not clear: the cost of replacement or repair could be vastly higher than the actual value of the unit. There is a legal concept of "unjust enrichment" that could be applicable, if the landlord plans to bill you $500 for a new AC which he got for free, but you'd probably need to hire a lawyer to make a solid legal argument in court. | There are a few problems with your line of reasoning, but the main one is that if the government can't locate a defendant, California's Rules of Civil Procedure provide a variety of alternative means of service. When all else fails, the government can serve the defendant "by publication," meaning that they simply publish a notice of the lawsuit in a newspaper. If the defendant fails to appear to defend the suit after service by publication, the court will enter default judgment, the government will seize the property, sell it, and use the resulting revenue to continue operating. |
Will a Rittenhouse conviction on lesser charges prevent any future retrial on higher charges? Suppose that the jury unanimously agrees on guilt in "second-degree recklessly endangering safety" but is hung 50/50 on pushing to a higher "intentional homicide" charge. Can the jury then declare a conviction on only the lower charge, but still allow a future retrial to get the higher charge? Historically, I am tempted to answer "No": Higher courts interpret convictions on lower charges as "implied acquittal" on higher charges (for which Double Jeopardy would apply to any retrial). But, in theory, a jury might be able to say "Double Jeopardy will not apply because we could not decide on higher charges" or, equivalently, "There is no implied acquittal of the higher charges". | The question of double jeopardy is not for a jury to consider. It is a question of law that is decided by the judge. In this case, Rittenhouse is charged, among other counts, with first-degree reckless homicide. If he is found guilty on a lesser charge, he will have been acquitted of first-degree reckless homicide, and he will not be able to be retried on that charge by the state of Wisconsin. (If the trial is invalidated to the extent that jeopardy never "attached," for example if it is found that the judge had been bribed to prevent conviction, then a new trial could be brought.) Once jeopardy attaches, there can be no additional trials for the same crime, and any subsequent attempts at prosecution should be dismissed by the court long before a jury is selected. By contrast, if a court determines that a trial does not constitute double jeopardy and a jury is seated, the jury will not consider the possible existence of double jeopardy; the only way to challenge a trial judge's decision on that question would be through the appeals process. If the trial jury in the original trial cannot decide unanimously to acquit on a particular charge then it is a hung jury,and indeed that may result in a mistrial on only those counts on which the jury has deadlocked. From Wikipedia, quoting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: If the jury cannot agree on a verdict on one or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial on those counts. A hung jury does not imply either the defendant's guilt or innocence. The government may retry any defendant on any count on which the jury could not agree. States, however, may approach this slightly differently. | If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear. | As far as I understand, no. In Canada, everyone has the constitutional right to be free from any cruel or unusual punishment, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. If you're guilty of a crime, well then, you're guilty. You're either going to be tried in court (and if you were guilty of that crime, then you will probably be found guilty), or you will plead as such. Before being tried, you could try to plea bargain with the prosecutor: plead guilty and be sentenced to a lesser charge. Say you were charged with assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm. You thought that the punishment was cruel or unusual - and thought that the trial judge had made an error in the law. In this case, you can make an appeal to a higher court. There are also other things that can factor this: mitigating and aggravating circumstances. If many circumstances are mitigating, then it may make way for a lower punishment, and vice versa with aggravating circumstances, where punishment may be higher. Again, this is something where if something was erred, you can appeal to a higher court. However, just because you think a sentence is too long won't constitute cruel or unusual punishment. In R. vs Latimer, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that minimum sentences, even if within special circumstances, will not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, and be upheld. Originally, he had been sentenced only to one year, based on the recommendation of the jury. He had been charged with second-degree murder. The Supreme Court reinstated the default punishment: A life sentence with no eligibility of parole for ten years. | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). | I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). | Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial. | The title question is overly-ambitious: it is not guaranteed, and nobody thinks that it is. The law does what is practical to achieve the desired result. Actual failure one way or the other is mostly irrelevant until a clear pattern to the failure is found, then there might be a legal resolution, but it might also require a political resolution. One consideration is whether it is possible for a defendant to receive a fair trial in a certain jurisdiction. Generally, you are tried in the jurisdiction where the offense occurred, sometimes (rarely) the venue can be changed to a more neutral location. This consideration is significant in high-profile cases. For example, the trials of Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad took place relatively far away from the scene of the crime. The trial judge must weigh the arguments for an inconvenient trial location, and in this trial the judge refused a petition for a change of venue. The judge stated that "As far as change of venue, I do not think that that would give the defendant any kind of a fair trial beyond what we are doing here today. I don’t think there’s any place in the state of Minnesota that has not been subjected to extreme amounts of publicity on this case" A second layer of protection is that prospective jurors may be excused. If a juror declares in advance (during voir dire or elsewhere) that the defendant is guilty, they will be excused for cause. The defense (or prosecution) also has some number of peremptory challenges – in this case, the defense has 5 and the prosecution has 3. In this category, a seated juror can be excused for cause (this happened), when a juror admits that some news e.g. about the city's settlement had prejudiced the juror. Also related to juror selection is that juror must swear to follow the law in reaching a decision. The third layer of protection is limiting testimony, for instance if the prosecution were to ask a witness something like "Won't there be major riots if Chauvin isn't convicted?", the defense would presumably object and prevent such testimony from getting uttered in the first place, or getting officially stricken if it somehow gets out. The fourth layer of protection is that jurors are meticulously instructed as to the logic of decision-making. If you can find a copy, there are here (MN does not make the instructions freely publicly available). Here are the California instructions. Additionally, a judge might attempt to limit what can be said by the media, or might sequester the jury so that they cannot hear any such publicity during the trial (but that's impossible for pre-trial publicity). Another layer is that a mistrial can be declared. However, what goes on in the jury room is in a black box that the legal system cannot generally touch. If a juror was paid off, that could be touched by the legal system, but there is nothing that can be done if it turns out that a juror has a bias in favor of the prosecution, despite the premise of neutrality. Finally, if the facts are so clear, a judge might overturn a conviction on the grounds that a reasonable jury could not reach that conclusion, based on the facts and the law. By "final" I ignore the possibility of an appeal. | To answer the first question, the answer seems to be "generally not." In federal courts, this is explicitly not allowed -- rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the only people who can be present before a grand jury are government lawyers, the witness being questioned, interpreters, and a court reporter In state courts, the rules vary by state. However, again, private citizens are generally either completely not allowed to act as prosecutors, or are only allowed to act as prosecutors in a restricted set of situations and subject to the ultimate control of public prosecutors. For instance, in Virginia (which allows private prosecutors), the private prosecutor can't speak in front of a grand jury, initiate a criminal case, or participate in a decision to dismiss charges (page 23). In New Hampshire, private prosecution is limited to misdemeanors with no possibility of jail time, and again the state can dismiss charges (page 8). Rhode Island, like New Hampshire, allows private prosecution for misdemeanors but lets the state dismiss charges (page 11). The justification for allowing the state to dismiss charges is generally "prosecution is inherently a governmental task, so the government must retain ultimate control." |
Would a police do anything if someone is provoking a fight? I'm not looking for legal advice from a lawyer. I'm living in a shared house with a bunch of young people and one is trying to provoke a fight with me. After getting in my face and trying to instigate a fight he says "what are you going to do? you can't hit me because you're 7 years older than me!" Is there any legal remedies for this? I'm moving out and the landlord doesn't care about his behavior. I was thinking, can a police officer be called over? Last night I had a female guest and he made her feel really uncomfortable, and he woke everyone up in the house at 3am by yelling at me. I can go to my bedroom and close the door but then I don't get access to the rest of the house. For what it's worth, he's twice my size but I would love the opportunity to pummel him. If he takes the first swing then it's self defense, right? | To start off, you appear to be confusing assault and battery. Assault does not require physical contact in order for it to occur. Verbal assault is still a crime, but in your situation it doesn't appear that any verbal assault has occurred - he is not actively threatening you with harm, and you are not in fear of being harmed. Yelling can sometimes qualify as verbal assault, but any form of verbal assault is very hard to prove because it leaves no evidence. Unless someone other than the two parties involved comes forward, it likely won't go anywhere. Assuming this has been going on for some time, what you appear to be experiencing is harassment which usually qualifies as a civil matter, and police will not take any action other than asking one of you to leave in order to resolve the issue. Most often, they will ask you (as the person being harassed) to leave, but that can also be in your benefit. If you can prove the other person's harassment caused you to have to leave in order to be comfortable again, then you can claim damages and can sue that other person for the harassment - basically suing for damages of not being able to live in and enjoy your residence which you pay for, as well as any additional costs you encountered by having to find an alternate place to live because of their actions. Again, this is difficult to prove without someone else who has witnessed the continued harassment stepping forward (e.g. your guest who might have only witnessed it once is probably not an incredibly strong witness, because harassment is often defined as having persisted over time, and they cannot testify to more than what they saw in one night). The case would likely just devolve to a matter of "he-said" between the two of you - he will likely claim you just didn't like him and are making things up to get money out of him. You'd need to make sure you have other evidence that supports your side of the story. As far as claiming self-defense, my completely non-legal and mostly combination of "I wish this were common sense" and "I hate when people try to justify unneeded violence" advice is never rely on the self-defense plea. Unless you are in fear of your life, your best course of action if he threatens violence or actually hits you is to leave and let the police handle it. If you have physical marks on you and he has none on him, the case becomes much more clear-cut. If you fight back, and you both have marks, then it again becomes a case of "he-said" and it's hard to prove who initiated the confrontation without cooperating witnesses, and you'd likely both end up being arrested when the police showed up if they can't determine who the instigator was. Just because you know something was in self-defense doesn't necessarily mean the police, a judge, or a jury will believe you. Ultimately, if you're uncomfortable with the place you're living, you should start planning to move elsewhere immediately (which you appear to be doing). If you can both a) avoid financial damages to yourself by preventing yourself being put into a situation that requires you to move quickly without much planning and b) prevent the continued harassment - then you should. Don't let the pot just keep boiling over until it explodes all over the kitchen. You have the power to make this stop too, and you shouldn't rely on other people making the situation go away for you (e.g. your landlord is bound by a contract, and evicting a tenant based on your word can open them to a lot of legal troubles - they have to be very careful with how they handle such a situation). Yes, it sucks that it's not your fault you have to go through the extra effort or move away to resolve the situation, but getting yourself out of the situation should be your number one priority, and doing it yourself is often the easiest solution. | I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? | Unfortunately, the police are correct The limit on filing a civil claim (a lawsuit where you seek monetary compensation) is before you turn 40. If you were 11 in 1985 then it is too late to sue your assaulter. For criminal prosecution, the law was changed in 2016. Prior to the change, the limitation was the same as for civil cases. After the change, there is no limit but only if the offence was committed on or after 1 January 2017. Assuming that your reference to Kelly is to this guy - the alleged offences were committed in the 1990s and the prosecutions are under Illinois, Minnesota and Federal law (the Federal crimes alleged are not the sexual assault of a minor). Each state has it's own rules. | The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent. | If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing | If you are arrested for assault, you have available to you the defense of the right to defend real or personal property: you "may use reasonable force to protect that property from imminent harm. Reasonable force means the amount of force that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary to protect the property from imminent harm". The level of force proposed is clearly within the boundaries of the reasonable. | In 50/50 custody you have the right to stand your ground to ensure the safety and well being of your children. You do not need to involve police unless it is an emergency. "911 Operator, what is the emergency". Only call them when you feel your children are in grave danger. For example, you know for sure that the other parent is drunk and driving, or the other parent is drunk and on the ground unable to move and the child is in danger, etc. If you involve the police over your partner excessive drinking than, and they find that she was not excessively drinking, you will face false accusation charges and her lawyer will try to make you look like the bad guy trying to take away her children. how drunk does my ex have to be for me to deny a drop-off? Is it entirely based upon outward signs or blood-alcohol level? You should not search for drugs or alcohol, or administer tests, as to avoid the accusation of an illegal search. You can, however, based on your judgment of common sense assess the situation and see how drunk (s)he is and make your decision based on that circumstances. Make a 1-page log to document the date, time, situation description (3-5 sentences of what you see and why you make that decision.) It would be wise to have a witness around, so write down the person name as well for reference, (NOT MANY PEOPLE LIKE TO BE WITNESSES, But you can write down the people names that you know were around that incident.) Don't tell your partner that you are making the log. Suprise them in the court when you have a full page of incidents due to drinking. Am I correct in assuming that in order to protect myself from being accused of denying visitation, that (in the future) I need to involve the police if I suspect her of being intoxicated? *Always protect yourself! Be Your Own Advocate. * Don't involve the police unless its am emergency, read the first comment above. If I involve the police, do I need to be sure that she is extremely intoxicated in order to avoid a "false alarm"? (Obviously, this scares me as I'd prefer she didn't drink at all) This drinking incident is alarming itself. However, you should consult with your family law attorney. I would say that document five issues if it exceeds 5 in one month than filing a motion with the court to adjust the drinking problem, and that you request the child to be with you 60/40 custody. You must be able to demonstrate that you have the time, commitment and resources to take over the 60/40 custody. What options do I have, if any, if she drinks around him in her own home? Is she within her legal right as long as she doesn't get in a car, doesn't pass out or does something blatantly abusive? File a motion to adjust the custody, speak with your family law attorney. |
Does the Bar Council of India enroll candidates who passed 10+2 with vocational subjects? As a vocational student in 10+2 (I.T CBSE), I want to pursue BA LLB. Is there any problems for vocational students, who have passed their 12th, to enroll in Bar council of India? Do I meet the criteria to enroll after passing BA LLB? What is the criteria to study BA LLB? Does that need specific ARTS stream in 10+2 or can Information Tech (CBSE) 10+2 students also qualify to study law? If one wants to pursue BA LLB after 12th and subjects in 10+2 being vocational, is the eligibility not met? I want to study law further but the admissions teacher is telling me I could face problems later. | There are multiple questions here, so I've picked those that seem to be most relevant. What is the criteria to study BA LLB? As well as being an Indian national, one needs at least 45% aggregate in their 12th (a.k.a 10+2) to be eligible for the CLAT entrance exam - a pass being a prerequisite for enrollment in to an under graduate five-year BA LLB course. There are are no restrictions for vocational students, and CBSE 10+2 marks are recognised for the CLAT. Do I meet the criteria to enroll after passing BA LLB? After successful completion of the BA LLB, one may enroll with their state Bar Council. The process is fairly straightforward, as long as the application forms and supporting documents are in order. This is the process for the Bar Council of Delhi, with the other states following the same or similar pattern. After all this, in order to practice law one then needs to pass the All India Bar Examination - see this FAQ for further guidance on this (but things may change during the five years it takes to do the BA LLB). | Legal Services Society is a non-profit organization created by the BC Legislative Assembly through this act, created in order to serve the legal needs of certain classes of society, defined vaguely with reference to "a reasonable person of modest means". Accordingly, they have rules regarding who they can and cannot serve. and they are constrained financially. With vast demands on their resources and little by way of resources, prudent triage is called for. That is, when you show up, you shouldn't expect to talk to a senior attorney (or an attorney). From what I can determine, you cannot expect to get your problem solved right away. It is also not clear that your problem is within the scope of what they do (criminal, incarceration, serious family matters, immigration). "Giving legal advice" is something that only a few people are legally allowed to do – lawyers, who have you as their client. If the person were an attorney, they still couldn't give you legal advice until the appropriate relationship is created (and they have the relevant facts). The person you met with may be a paralegal or a law student. Under the law (sect. 8 of the act), you cannot sue them for damages because of their actions, except if carried out in bad faith. The waiver might be a bit redundant, but it is a wise idea to tell people that you can't sue them. If you want to know what you can expect from the lawyer, this publication will be helpful, though it is generic and not specific as to your particular issue. | If you stay licensed, you have the option to enter the practice of law in the future with no administrative hassles. In contrast, if you let your license lapse, you could have to study for and take the bar exam over again, go through an arduous background check known as a character and fitness review (reviewing your entire adult life), and face months of delay and significant expenditures of money to practice law again. The character and fitness review also isn't just a time and money saver. Once you are admitted, you can only have your licensed revoked or suspended for doing something that violates professional ethics after you are admitted to practice. When you apply to the practice of law initially, you can be denied the right to practice law for bad characters for all manner of things in the broad discretion of the licensing officials. There are many kinds of conduct that can't be considered after you are admitted that can be used to deny you a license to practice law in the first place. Effectively, you are doing the continuing education courses and paying the fees to keep the option of returning to the profession trouble free, open. For example, I continue to be admitted to the practice of law in New York State, even though I no longer take cases there on a regular basis, so that in the one or two cases every few years that I do have in that state, I do not need to get a pro hac vice admission for a single case in that state, and so that if I ever want to relocate to New York State to practice law actively there, I can without a minimum of bureaucratic hurdles to doing so. Continuing education courses are also tax deductible in most cases. Even if I was no longer actively practicing in either of the states where I am admitted to the practice of law, keeping the licenses in force would also allow me to apply for admission to the practice of law in many other states on a streamlined basis available for currently licensed lawyers who have been admitted to practice for at least five years. Some states also allow you to go on "inactive" status with reduced fees and continuing education requirements, and then return to active practice again, by paying the fees and starting to take regular continuing education classes again, which makes this affordable during a period when you are exploring another career, considering an early retirement, or taking time off to raise kids. In New York State, lawyers also have the ability to conduct certain kinds of real estate transactions for their clients without a real estate broker's license. Once you are admitted to practice you are also grandfathered in if the requirements to be admitted to the practice of law change in the future. For example, suppose New York State required a one year apprenticeship before you could practice independently starting in 2021. If you were admitted to practice in 2020, you would be exempt from that requirement. | It is age discrimination, and it is legal. There is a federal prohibition against discriminating in employment provided that you are at least 40 years old. There are innumerable laws that require age discrimination w.r.t. being under 18, such as the lack of a right to vote. Contracts with minors, such as are involved with opening a bank account, are generally invalid with the exception of "necessities", education and insurance in Massachusetts. No law compels a bank to "accept" any person (to open a saving or checking account – even more so with accepting a loan application). A bank account would be a "public accommodation", which is not subject to a "no age discrimination" requirement at the federal or Massachusetts level. | In most jurisdictions, practicing law without a bar license is a serious offence, which, inter alia, is the primary reason why a non-lawyer would use this disclaimer. Lawyers also use this disclaimer to avoid any 'constructive implication' of attorney-client relationship. | Yes. It is legal. Curriculum requirements are policy decisions of an institution, not binding contracts with students. It might be ill advised policy, but it is not prohibited. | Education level is not an FHA protected category. However, whenever you give one broad group preferential treatment over another, you'll raise eyebrows. Someone might argue, for example, that while your incentive does not explicitly mention a protected category like race or sex, it might disproportionately impact one group in a protected category over another. In fact, the Supreme Court in 2015 addressed this question in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project. They found (albeit by a 5-4 vote) that disparate impact could, under certain circumstances, be the basis for a discrimination claim under FHA. The Wikipedia article on this subject is informative. As for your case, it really depends on what you are trying to accomplish with the policy, and what you reasonably predict it will do. For example, given that in most areas, white people more often have graduate degrees than black people, then if this policy did in fact end up advantaging white tenant over black tenants, someone might claim that you are in effect discriminating on the basis of race. I would not want to be on the defending end of that claim. In general, if you want to be safe from FHA's wrath, you need to evaluate each applicant on their individual merits as a tenant, not their membership in some group. Whenever you treat one person differently from another person, you should have a reason that clearly derives from your business interests as a landlord, and you should write it down. Legal questions aside, it seems like a really bad idea to offer incentives like this. I can't imagine it achieving any legitimate business goal, and I can easily imagine it making tenants or applicants feel cheated and devalued. And when people feel cheated and devalued, even if they haven't legally been wronged, they often seek legal redress. Or slash your tires. The fact that grad degrees would not be required under your policy isn't relevant. In the eyes of the FHA, any disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category is discrimination. The only real question here is whether this is disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category. | I think what you're talking about is probably quite rare. There are certainly law firms that market their ability to thoroughly investigate the facts, aggressively question or impeach hostile witnesses, present compelling evidence at trial, or make persuasive oral arguments. But I don't think I've ever heard of a firm that treats any particular litigation tactic as its specialty rather than treating it as part of its specialization in domestic relations, DUI defense, employment law, etc. If you think of litigating at different stages of a case as "techniques or functions," then I'd point to the various firms that consider themselves trial specialists, or appellate specialists, or even Supreme Court specialists. Even then, though, any of those specialties is going to involve a variety of discrete techniques or functions. A trial lawyer needs to do investigations and cross examinations and closing statements, and a Supreme Court specialist needs to be able to petition for cert, draft merit briefs, and give oral arguments. |
What is the legal status of intimate photos sent to your (now) ex-partner after a break-up? When I met my now ex-boyfriend, we were both already over 18. I took digital nude pictures of myself and transferred them electronically to him, i. e. I was sexting him. He didn't specifically ask for them, I just wanted to pleasure him. There wasn't much accompanying text to the nudes. Now, after the break-up, I thought about these photos. I wonder who owns them now and if I could make him delete them. But I'm not planning to take any legal steps, I'm just curious. I'm also not aware of him posting them anywhere and I do not suspect him to, so this is not about revenge porn. I found an article on Vice.com, but it is a bit unclear: According to Olivarius, you may have a case if a former partner refuses to delete your nudes after you’ve asked them to, but proving guilt in court in this situation will be extremely difficult. What is the legal status of nude pictures sent to a now ex-partner after a break-up? I saw this earlier question but it doesn't contain an answer to my question as the cases discussed are quite different. | I assume these are digital photos that were electronically transferred (not prints physically delivered). If they were prints physically delivered, he owns those prints, since you used to own them but you unconditionally transferred ownership to him by giving them. No backsies under the law. The photos are protected by copyright law, which means that the person who took the pictures has the exclusive right to make copies, disseminate them, and authorize making copies. In order for anyone to make a copy, they need permission – a license – from you. In the world of pre-planned business deals, the copyright holder writes up a document granting B some right to use the protected material, which typically means "you can install it on your various devices but may not give copies to others". In this case, however, you didn't create an explicit written license. So if this ends up in court, the question is what implicit license you granted. The courts will not decide that you granted him the license to unrestrictedly sell or give away copies of the protected material. The most likely outcome would be that he can only keep his copy, i.e. he will not be forced to erase the copy that you sent him. What the courts would do is try to discern what license you most likely intended to grant to him. There is a provision in copyright law that allows a licensee to make backup copies of a computer program (17 USC 117), but a digital photo is not a computer program. So the lifespan of the copy that you sent would be the lifespan of the phone (I assume) that you sent it to. Since actually using a digital photo technically requires making a copy (from disk storage to computational memory), there is a legal direction (dead-end) that you could go where the photo could exist on the phone, but never be opened again. Again, the courts would have to discern what license you probably intended w.r.t. ever opening the photo – obviously you intended that the file could be opened / viewed any number of times. You could argue that the license which you granted was conditional, i.e. "you can have and use these pictures as long as we are a thing", but establishing that this was part of the license would be tricky. Free digital content often has some "as long as" condition attached to it, i.e. "you can use this program as long as you are affiliated with University of Whatever". I don't consider a conditional license to be a ridiculous interpretation, on the other hand the particular court (judge) might decide that people who sext should be forced to live with the unpleasant consequences of their decisions. If we exclude such a line of thinking, I don't see a compelling counter-argument that your ex-partner inequitably loses a right by construing the license as conditional. I don't know if there is any case law that addresses this: at any rate, copyright law would severely limit what he could do with the pictures (the tort "invasion of privacy" also limits dissemination). | Law is not science or math or solid logic. However - “The two identical color passport-style photos” makes it clear that for each person in question there are two identical photo documents. External to this passage is the background knowledge of what passport and other identification photos are like. They show an individual. And, the photos are not to prove your relationship, but are a way to connect the people on the documents with the faces of the people in question. | Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data | Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law. | I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28). | It's probably due to GDPR. You will see that around 2018-05-25 when GDPR came into force, many US-based websites changed their terms of service to increase the age requirement from 13 (age below which the U.S. COPPA law applies) to 16 for European users. For example, here are Stack Exchange's terms of service from 2018-05-02, mentioning 13 years, and here is the version one day later mentioning 16 years. The GPDR allows companies to process personal data under a variety of legal bases, such as “legitimate interest”, “necessary for performing a contract”, or “consent”. But children are not able to give consent in this context. If a website wants consent from a child for some data processing, Art 8 GDPR requires the service to make “reasonable efforts” to check with the parents first. This reasonable effort is more effort than just banning children from using the services. The GDPR itself does not define exactly when someone is a child for these purposes – it lets individual EU member states define the exact age limit, which may be anything between 13 and 16 years. Thus, websites that definitely do not want to have to comply with Art 8 GDPR take the upper bound of that limit and mention in their terms of service that the service is only intended for persons aged 16 or older. The text of Art 8 GDPR is: (1) Where point (a) of Article 6(1) applies, in relation to the offer of information society services directly to a child, the processing of the personal data of a child shall be lawful where the child is at least 16 years old. Where the child is below the age of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child. Member States may provide by law for a lower age for those purposes provided that such lower age is not below 13 years. (2) The controller shall make reasonable efforts to verify in such cases that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child, taking into consideration available technology. (3) Paragraph 1 shall not affect the general contract law of Member States such as the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract in relation to a child. | The simple way is to post a picture of you and the widget to a site like Flickr. A more expensive way (but with rather more weight) is to get a Notary to certify they saw you and the widget on January 9th. Both the above provide evidence you had access to the widget before January 10th, but neither prove you owned it. For that, you would need a dated (possibly even notarized) bill of sale or similar - but if you acquired the widget via a gift, that won't work. A signed witness statement from the giver would probably serve (and the statement could legitimately be created when you are prosecuted). None of the above are unforgeable - but you don't need that. Depending on how the law is written, you will only need to show ownership on the balance of probabilities, or you might only need to show reasonable doubt that you didn't own it on 9th January. | As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia). |
Are judges supposed to take public opinion into account? Is there a legal consensus on whether judges should / should not be influenced by public opinion? If so, is there some maxim, phrase, or principle that illustrates that position (e.g. "innocent until proven guilty" is a phrase for a different legal principle)? I am rather surprisingly unable to find answers via Google - I find lots of papers that investigate whether judges are influenced by public opinion, which is tangential to the questions. This is the only relevant result I've found, but it's a only one result so it might not be representative. | united-states In the US Judges are generally not supposed to take public opinion into account, nor the views of executive officials, except as those are expressed in briefs or other documents submitted during a case. This is part of the "Independence of the Judiciary" or "Judicial Independence" Where a court has been too strongly influenced by short-term public opinion in a criminal case, this has been held to be a violation of Due Process, as was noted in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) although the main issue there was the right to Counsel (a lawyer). In the opinion it is said that: It is perfectly apparent that the proceedings, from beginning to end, took place in an atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public sentiment. (287 U. S. 51) However guilty defendants, upon due inquiry, might prove to have been, they were, until convicted, presumed to be innocent. It was the duty of the court having their cases in charge to see that they were denied no necessary incident of a fair trial. (287 U. S. 53) In The Federalist #78 Hamilton wrote: ... from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security. The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. | This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification. | Common Law The trier of fact decides the credibility of witnesses The trier of fact for a criminal matter is usually a jury. They decide what witnesses to believe and how much they believe them. Common law uses an adversarial approach - the court is not (particularly) interested in determining the truth, the role of the court is to decide the dispute between the parties. If the parties agree the sky is green, it is not for the court to find that it is blue. Each witness has a direct examination, and is then available for cross-examination by the other side and potentially redirect examination by their side (a witness is always a prosecution or a defence witness). There may or may not be physical or documentary evidence introduced by one (or more) witnesses and the testimony of those witnesses determines how much that is worth (e.g. there is never just a pathologist’s report - it is always supported by the testimony of the pathologist(s)). The jury is free to believe some, none or all of any given witnesses testimony for whatever reason they choose. They then decide if the evidence they believe satisfies the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt - if so, the verdict is guilty, if not, its not guilty. For a bench trial the judge is the trier of fact as well as law. They do the same thing except that they have to publish their reasons, jury’s don’t. Civil Law There are generally no juries in civil law jurisdictions so this all falls on the judge(s). However, civil law courts are much more inquisitorial rather than adversarial - their role is to determine the truth independently of what each side is arguing. This means the judge has more leeway in probing witnesses and pursuing their own lines of inquiry - a judge that does that too much in a common law court is going to get rolled on appeal. Notwithstanding, they still decide whether they believe the witness or not so it comes down to pretty much the same thing. | So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other. | Decisions that break with precedent do happen with some regularity, but far "from all the time" in the US. When they do happen, they are generally only at the top level of a state or federal court system, that is a State supreme Court (or equivalent, some states use a different term) or the US Supreme Court. There are several factors which discourage judges from simply ignoring precedent. First of all, all the training a lawyer receives teaches him or her to respect precedent, and to find rules by examining past cases. precedent is literally the stuff with which a lawyer works, rather more than the wording of statutes (although those are also important). Secondly, as a lawyer works as a litigator, judges will usually ground their decisions on precedents, particularly in appellate cases, explaining their decisions largely in terms of how they conform to or extend precedents. Thirdly, if a lower court judge fails to follow precedent, that judge will often be criticized by an appellate judge or justice, often in the course of an opinion overturning the lower-court judge's ruling. This does not feel pleasant to such a judge. Fourthly, decision that fail to follow precedent are often (although not always) criticized by legal scholars, particularly in law review articles and treatises. Fifthly, lower-court judges who often fail to follow precedents, are less likely to be recommended by senior judges for promotion to appellate positions. However, the actual appointments are controlled by politicians (in most cases) not other judges, so this factor may not be as strong it it would first seem. Only once a judge gets to the level of the Supreme Court of a state, or the Federal Supreme Court, is that judge (now a Justice) expected to alter precedents as needed, and most justices have said that they make such changes only reluctantly. I am not aware of any US state or federal statute or regulation that specifically;y requires judges to follow precedent. The most common way to alter precedent is not to overrule or ignore it, but to distinguish a prior case. This happens when a judge says something like: In the previous case of A v B when had situation X which lead to outcome Q. But in this current case we have the very different situation X1. In the case of X1, the outcome should be S instead of Q. If the new case becomes persuasive the old case A v B may apply to only one specific set of facts that almost never comes up, and the new rule apply to almost all other possible situations. The old case may cease to be cited or applied without ever being formally overruled. And, of course, where the rule is statutory, it may be changed if the legislature alters the law. If the rule is constitutional, it may be changed by a constitutional amendment. For example the 1830s case Barron v Baltimore held that the US bill of rights did not apply to the states, only to the Federal Government. But after the 1868 14th amendment, courts started to incorporate much of the bill of rights into the Due process clause of the 14th, and apply it against the states. This took place gradually, mostly during the period starting with 1898, up until about 1970, but with some incorporation coming as late as 2010 (Heller) | Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? ... Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: "Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago..."? Yes. Or is it now considered a deliberate lie? A judge's assessment of a witness's credibility and reliability is much more nuanced. See "How is a judge to evaluate a witness's credibility?" | Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this. | There isn't to the best of my knowledge, any single document that tells courts to follow precedant or when and how to do so. Each State, and the Federal government, has a set of court rules of procedure. These will indicate, among many other things, the form that should be used in citing previous cases, but that is about form, not content -- about how to cite a case, not about when a court should or should not cite one. Some precedents are what are called persuasive. These are from other court systems: say a different state, or even another country. These also include rulings from other courts at the same level, say from a different district, or even from lower courts. Other precedents are binding. These are from a superior court to the one where the case is cited. In a state's lower court, rulings of that state's supream court are binding. In Federal district courts, rulings of the Court of Appeals for the same Circuit, and of the US Supreme Court are binding. In Federal appeals courts, rulings of the US Supreme Court are binding. They are also binding in state courts on matters where the US constitution is involved, or where Federal law supersedes state law. Prior rulings of the same court are strongly persuasive, but not strictly binding -- a court can overrule its own precedents when it thinks the law or justice requires this, although most courts are reluctant to do so. Or more often it can distinguish a previous ruling, saying, in effect: "that previous ruling is still valid, but this is a different case in such and such a specific way, so the result is different". Students in law school spend a good deal of time learning how precedents are cited, and how they should be used, learning what sorts of things are controlled by precedents, and how to find the precedents that apply to a particular case. When they become lawyers and then judges, they taken this body of learning with them, and use it in writing decisions, and opinions that explain those decisions. New law from the legislature can reverse previous court decisions, except in the case of decisions interpreting the constitution (federal or state). Amendments can change the constitution. Judges must adapt to such changes in the law. To a significant extent our system of precedent is a matter of tradition, going back largely to the common-law courts of England, although it has been modified by specific legislation in many ways, as well as by more recent court decision and practice. It is passed on in law schools, in legal apprenticeships of various kinds, and in individual court decisions. |
Is the plot of Fatal Attraction legally accurate? Fatal Attraction is a 1987 film. The part of the plot I'm interested in is: Daniel "Dan" Gallagher is a successful, happily-married Manhattan lawyer whose work leads him to meet Alexandra "Alex" Forrest, an editor for a publishing company. While his wife, Beth, and daughter, Ellen, are out of town for the weekend, Dan has an affair with Alex. Although it was initially understood by both as just a fling, Alex begins to cling to him. After leaving unexpectedly in the middle of the night, Dan reluctantly spends the following day with Alex after she persistently asks him over. When Dan attempts to suddenly leave again, she cuts her wrists in a manipulative ploy to force him to stay. He helps her bandage the cuts, stays with her overnight to make sure she is all right, and leaves in the morning. Although Dan believes the affair to be forgotten, Alex shows up at his office one day to apologize for her behavior and invites him to a performance of Madame Butterfly, but he politely turns her down. She then continues to call him at his office until he tells his secretary that he will no longer take her calls. Alex then phones his home at all hours, claiming that she is pregnant and plans to keep the baby. Although he wants nothing to do with her, she argues that he must take responsibility. After he changes his home phone number, she shows up at his apartment (which is for sale) and meets Beth, feigning interest as a buyer. Later that night, Dan goes to Alex's apartment to confront her, which results in a scuffle. In response, she replies that she will not be ignored. Dan moves his family to Bedford, but this does not deter Alex. She has a tape recording delivered to him filled with verbal abuse. She stalks him in a parking garage, pours acid onto his car, ruining the engine, and follows him home one night to spy on him, Beth, and Ellen from the bushes in their yard: the sight of the family makes her sick to her stomach. Her obsession escalates further when Dan approaches the police to apply for a restraining order against Alex (claiming that it is "for a client"). The lieutenant claims that he cannot violate her rights without probable cause, and that the "client" has to own up to his adultery. I highlight the relevant part. It's surprising to me that Dan, who's obviously being harassed, cannot get a restraining order against Alex. Is the lieutenant correct when he says he cannot authorize a restraining order because it would violate Alex's rights, unless Dan admits to adultery? | 1: What's the correct process to get a restraining order? The police aren't involved in the formal process, although sometimes people go to the police and are told that they have to go to a judge instead. The aggrieved plaintiff presents an ex parte affidavit or makes statement in person under oath to a duty judge (who often asks clarifying questions). If this statements states a basis for a protection order one issues with a prompt return date (a week or two). At the return date the order either becomes final if the defendant doesn't show up, is vacated if the plaintiff doesn't show up, or is tried in an evidentiary hearing if both show up. Of course, a court order is ultimately just a piece of paper and there is no legal recourse against the government if they don't successfully stop the person restrained from doing something. Also enforcement of restraining orders was a lot more lax in 1987 than it is today, and men asking for restraining orders were taken less seriously then, than they are now, by most judges. 2: Can Dan keep his adultery secret during that process? Not really. In the initial ex parte hearing, Dan can probably tell the story artfully in a way that hides the adultery, but in the adversarial hearing, if there is one, the other side (or their lawyer) can ask him under oath about the affair and he has to answer truthfully in a public court hearing setting. 3: Is it plausible that Dan's family and friends don't learn about that process? Yes. Unless he's famous enough to make the newspapers (which in a decent sized city is pretty famous), and if he initiates the process, the only person who gets formal notice before the order issues is the court, and if the court issues the initial order, the only person who gets notice is the defendant. If Dan doesn't call family or friends as witnesses and don't tell his workplace why he's at court, nobody is told. It isn't a secret. It's a matter of public record that could be subsequently discovered at any time. But there is no active means of notification of friends and family in the short term. Realistically, Dan might ask a cop or a lawyer what to do, get accurate or inaccurate information, and decide not to pursue it for fear of creating sworn proof of his affair at a hearing. Cops love to provide legal advice that they aren't qualified to dispense. Dan's concern is particularly relevant because this happened in New York State in 1987 when New York State didn't have no fault divorce at the time, and the outcome of divorce proceedings on the merits for property division and alimony and custody would have been heavily influenced by marital fault in the divorce case. Revealing an affair under oath as he might have been required to do at a hearing would have crushed him in a subsequent divorce outcome if his wife found out and decided to divorce him. | The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal. | 18 USC §912 provides that: Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. I do not think that in the context of a movie, play or game the person portraying an FBI agent or other LEO is "acting as such", and surely this does not involved obtaining "any money, paper, document, or thing of value". The Wikipedia article on Police_impersonation says: Dressing up as a police officer in costume (e.g. for Halloween), or pretending to be a police officer for the entertainment purposes or a harmless prank toward an acquaintance is generally not considered a crime, provided that those involved recognize the imposter is not a real police officer, and the imposter is not trying to deceive those involved into thinking they are. Nevertheless, replica police uniforms sold in the UK must not be identical to the uniforms currently used by the police, and traders have been jailed in the past for selling on genuine uniforms. Many films and TV shows have portrayed FBI agents, in some cases actual agents by their real names. This goes back as far as the 1935 moviw G-Men starring James Cagney. Many examples are listed in the Wikipedia article Federal Bureau of Investigation portrayal in media, and many of them used realistic badges and depictions. They were not treated as criminal impersonations, even when the FBI or its officials strongly disapproved of particular movies. The somewhat similar US federal law 10 USC 772 prohibits wearing military uniform by persons who are not authorized, but paragraph (f) provides that it is permitted: While portraying a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, an actor in a theatrical or motion-picture production may wear the uniform of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force. A Vietnam-War-era court case held the restriction "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force" to be an unconstitutional restriction of speech, and held that unauthorized wearing of a uniform was only punishable if there was charged a proved an "intent to deceive". I would expect a similar limitation of 18 USC §912. That said, if the email was such that a reasonable person might well be deceived into believing that it really came for an actual FBI agent or other government employee, there might be a problem. The suggestions on that point in the answer by user hszmv seem reasonable to me. An imaginary "Confederal Department of Interrogation" say, keeps things firmly in an alternate reality. | A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer. | I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well. | It's been a while since I've seen the film (and what I remember of it is the ending), but if I recall, Skinner was conspiring to conceal evidence that the restaurant was legally Linguini's so that Skinner could become the legal owner under Gusteau's will. As such, under French Law, an employer may fire an employee for disciplinary reasons that fall into three categories: "Faute Simple", "Faute Grave", "Faute Lourde". In likelihood, since legally Skinner was attempting to steal from the owner of the restaurant, this would likely fall under "Faute Lourde." This is defined as when "when an employee intentionally and willfully attempts to harm the employer or other employees. In this case, the employer must demonstrate intentionality." If not, it would certainly be Faute Grave, which is the same as "Faute Lourde" although the reason does not have to show the intent was malicious, but that it simply harmed either the employer or an employee. At best, Linguini was within his right to fire Skinner without a notice period or pay for the unintentional concealment of his ownership of Gusteau's, though if I recall, Skinner's malicious intention was clear to Linguini by the time he was declared the legal owner. (source) | TV shows like COPS will have the arrestees/suspects/bystanders/victims sign a waiver to appear on the show, along with anybody else that they film in the process, otherwise the faces will be blurred, or removed from the show entirely. Additionally you can tell the camera crews that they are not allowed in your home. If they do enter your home without permission, you can sue them for trespassing. It should be noted that those shows are often edited for drama, and as such seem much more dramatic than it is. The film crews may spend weeks or more (400 hours of video) just to get enough "good stuff" for a 22 minute episode, and then make it look like it all happens over the course of an evening. As for the moral/social acceptance of a lack of privacy, that question really isn't on-topic here. This should be the same for any other "COPS-like" TV/youtube show, but there are some shows out there that don't take the rules as seriously as others. Those usually operate under the "who we are filming probably can't afford a lawyer" mentality so they keep going until they get sued. | Every State in the union has some form of involuntary mental health hold. Regardless of whether or not the patient claims it was an accident, it is incumbent upon the hospital or facility where the individual is held (which is typically at least 72 hours) to do an in-depth analysis of whether the person is a danger to themselves or others. While in this scenario it may've been an inadvertent overdose, the empirical evidence suggests it could have been intentional as the practitioner cannot see into the thoughts and motivations behind the patient's actions. Even taking the patient at face-value, addiction to the extent of overdose is also a mental health issue, which may cause a person to be a danger to themselves. From a clinical perspective, it is much more likely than not that one of the two scenarios occurred, versus a truly mistaken overdose. One would need to mistake their actions numerous times in a day to take so much as to overdose. If you look at it from the inverse perspective, if the facility failed to keep a person who'd just overdosed, or the first responder failed to initiate a hold and the person later died, minimally they would be liable if sued by the family in an action for wrongful death. The unfortunate facts are that if a person was set on committing suicide, it unlikely they would be forthcoming with that fact, for this very reason (the mandatory hold), so a person's word cannot be the determining factor. Even if someone was not intentionally trying to take their life, having taken enough Xanax to cause medical overdose would suggest the potential that even if not suicidal, the individual was at a minimum abusing the medication by taking much more than prescribed (or in a way that is contraindicated - such as with alcohol or other depressants) and potentially suffering from benzodiazepine addiction. Either way, if the hold was not initiated or cut short - and then someone ended up dying from an overdoes - the responsibility and potential liability is the same. A person who is suicidal can reassess what may be a snap decision, or have a chemical imbalance stabilized, or a severe addiction identified in that amount of time. For the person who ctually takes so much medication as to mistakenly cause overdose, this is certainly inconvenient; however, 72 hours is a short time in the grand scheme of things to potentially save a life. The law will nearly always err on the side of safety and prevention. |
Cases where both parties acted in self-defence (legally)? I'm very interested in exploring potential cases where two opposing parties were potentially/actually charged with assault, but both were found to be acting in self-defence. (Obviously there are seperate trails). My understanding of self-defence law, generally speaking, is it works on the concept of reasonableness. Meaning, an actual threat doesn't actually have to exist, just a reasonable perception of one. This theoretically could lead to conflict where there is no aggressor in a given situation. Just as a hypothetical example, a car backfires in a "bad neighbourhood" and two individuals perceive that threat, pull weapons, which then makes both parties perceive each other as a threat, either directly, or the thought the other party would misunderstand their intentions. I'm after real-life examples of such an occurrence. | Something pretty close happened in Arvada, Colorado recently. A "good guy with a gun" shot the "bad guy with a gun" who shot a cop. When another cop arrived on the scene, he shot and killed the "good guy with a gun" mistaking him for the "bad guy." The good guy with a gun died, so criminal charges and defenses became moot. But there was no doubt that the "good guy with a gun" was justified in shooting the bad guy, and the authorities investigating the case determined that the cop who shot the "good guy with a gun" was also justified in his actions. The shooting happened on June 21 in Olde Town Arvada. Police also released their timeline of events that can be viewed at the bottom of this article. According to police, Officer Beesley was dispatched to a suspicious person call at about 1:30 in the afternoon. When Officer Beesley was walking in the area of Weber Street, the suspect got a semi-automatic shotgun and ran after Officer Beesley. Arvada Police say that when Officer Beesley stopped to turn, he was shot “immediately” by the suspect. The police timeline then states that the suspect shot out the windows of the officer’s car, returned to his truck and grabbed an AR-15. The suspect went back to Olde Town Square with the AR-15 when he was confronted by the good Samaritan. The good Samaritan was armed with a handgun and shot the suspect. Police say that a responding Arvada officer encountered the good Samaritan ad that the good Samaritan was “holding the suspect’s AR-15.” That’s when the responding officer shot the good Samaritan. Another Colorado case in 2016 that attracted international attention involved a shootout between two biker gangs at a motorcycle show. It wasn't possible to determine who was an aggressor and who was firing in self-defense, and so, ultimately, the only prosecutions were for people who had guns that they weren't allowed to legally possess due to prior felonies or prior domestic violence cases. It is much more common for these situations to be resolved by prosecutors not bringing charges at all than it is for them to be resolved in mutual murder trials where self-defense is asserted in each trial. Also, in both of these cases, the genuinely most criminally culpable people as far as after the fact investigations could tell, were killed (although there is always a temptation to throw the dead guys under the bus). | It Depends This will depend on the jurisdiction. In the US it will depend on the state. In some states it is legal to use deadly force in defense of property. In some an aggressor is not entitled to self defense. Oregon Rule The page "Self-Defense and Deadly Force in Oregon" by Susan G. Hauser states: According to Oregon law, “A person may use physical force upon another person in self-defense or in defending a third person, in defending property, in making a [citizen's] arrest or in preventing an escape.” “In Oregon,” says Portland criminal defense lawyer Lisa J. Ludwig, “it’s not really organized around a location so much as the reasonable perception of a threat.” One may defend one’s life, no matter the location, or use force in defense of a person or defense of property. Oregon Laws ORS 161.209 provides that Except as provided in ORS 161.215 (Limitations on use of physical force in defense of a person) and 161.219 (Limitations on use of deadly physical force in defense of a person), a person is justified in using physical force upon another person for self-defense or to defend a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force, and the person may use a degree of force which the person reasonably believes to be necessary for the purpose. ORS 161.215 provides (in relevant part) that: Notwithstanding ORS 161.209 (Use of physical force in defense of a person), a person is not justified in using physical force upon another person if: (1) With intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, the person provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that person; or (2) The person is the initial aggressor, except that the use of physical force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person the intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful physical force; or ... ORS 161.219 provides that: Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.209 (Use of physical force in defense of a person), a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person unless the person reasonably believes that the other person is: (1) Committing or attempting to commit a felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person; or (2) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary in a dwelling; or (3) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force against a person. ORS 161.225 provides (in relevant part) that: (1) A person in lawful possession or control of premises is justified in using physical force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by the other person in or upon the premises. ? (2) A person may use deadly physical force under the circumstances set forth in subsection (1) of this section only: (2) (a) In defense of a person as provided in ORS 161.219 (Limitations on use of deadly physical force in defense of a person); or (2) (b) When the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the commission of arson or a felony by force and violence by the trespasser. ORS 161.229 provides that: A person is justified in using physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission by the other person of theft or criminal mischief of property. Analysis When the question states: it is not legal to use deadly force in defense of property this is incomplete. While deadly6 forcwe cannot be used to defend "property" under ORS 161.229, a person may use deadly force to defend "premises" under ORS 161.225. This includes both a home an any other building. Under ORS 161.215 one who provokes another or is the aggressor in a confrontation may not use physical force, and therefore is not entitled to assert a right of self defense. Under ORS 161.219 one may use deadly force against a person who is "Committing or attempting to commit a felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person" Conclusion As John is stealing from James, it would appear that John is the aggressor, and has provoked James. Moreover, John is (probably) engaged in a felony, and may well be using physical fore in committing that felony, depending on details not states in the question. Thus it would seem that in the circumstances described in the question, John does not have a right of self-defense as against James in Oregon, and will not prevail if he raises the issue of self defense in an Oregon court | So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense. | Yes there has At common law you cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant. However, statute law can allow this - either intentionally or unintentionally. An example is Barbara Bagley v. Barbara Bagley, 2016 WL 6299507 (Utah 2016). | The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks). | Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong. | What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles. | JeffUK has quoted the relevant law. However the question then becomes "what is an 'offensive weapon'", and "what is a lawful excuse?". Almost anything can be classified as an offensive weapon if you can use it as a weapon. See https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q338.htm A lawful excuse is something like "I am going to play baseball, which is why I have a baseball bat". It is emphatically not "I want it for self defence". Specifically, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/offensive-weapons-knives-bladed-and-pointed-articles cites Patterson v Block [1984] 81 LSG 2458 – carrying a weapon for defence can still amount to intent to cause injury So the answer to the OP's original question: Is it legal for a private citizen to carry any kind of weapon for self defence purposes in the UK? is "No". |
Can your previous employer force you to help them with something? I got an aggressive call from my former manager, and he wants me to tell them how to fix something. The problem is that I don't remember and I no longer work for them, so can he sue me for not helping them? Do I even have any obligation towards my former employer even if I could help? It sounds ridiculous and I've experienced seen something like this before. Assume that this takes place in the U.S. or Canada. | It is not uncommon for an employer to ask a former employee to assist with something as a courtesy, and sometimes the former employee will choose to do so. If it requires more than a small amount of time, this may be done under a short-term consulting contract for pay. But unless there was a contract of employment requiring such post-employment advice, there is no legal obligation for the former employee to provide such assistance. The most the former employer could do is give a poor reference if asked by potential future employers, and most large corporate employers now only give job title, salary range, and dates of employment to avoid claims of incorrect or defamatory statements in such references. | What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this. | The "Severance Agreement" is a contract between the company and you. It spells out what the company will do and probably what they expect you to do going forward. Simple enough. The statement you referenced merely says that you are not being forced to sign the agreement. That's all. You don't, presumably, have the option of remaining employed at this company but you DO NOT have to sign this agreement. But if you don't, it's likely that any benefits being promised in the agreement will not be delivered to you. So specifically in answer to your questions: It protects them against a claim that they somehow forced you to sign the agreement. Likely anything that the agreement says the company will do such as pay you a certain amount of money and the like. Bottom line is that if you don't like the agreement, don't sign it. If you want the benefits they are promising in the agreement, then sign it and move on. | are employers legally allowed to punish (e.g. fire, reprimand, etc.) an employee who shares wage/salary information with their colleagues? No. Section 8 of the BC Labour Relations Code preserves for the employee "the freedom to communicate to an employee a statement of fact [...] with respect to the employer's business". More conclusively, section 64 entitles a person to disclose --except for purposes of picketing-- "information [...] relating to terms or conditions of employment or work done or to be done by that person". Wage/salary information clearly is a condition of employment. the only answer to that question relies on a law from a different province (Ontario) and so is not relevant in BC. That answer is relevant to Canada (also the question was about Canada). That answer cites a statute from Ontario because that is the jurisdiction that the asker specified. It would be tiresome as well as futile to provide the statutory equivalent of every province on a matter that the provinces are very unlikely to legislate materially differently. | In Canada can employer force employees not to discuss wage? Not in Ontario. That would violate Section 74(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000: No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall intimidate, dismiss or otherwise penalize an employee or threaten to do so, (a) because the employee, (v.2) discloses the employee’s rate of pay to another employee for the purpose of determining or assisting another person in determining whether an employer is complying with Part XII (Equal Pay for Equal Work) See also Section 74.12(1)(a)(v.2). What if the employee signed a confidentiality agreement where they agreed not to discuss wages? The agreement would be void in that regard. See Section 5 of the same Standards: [...] [N]o employer or agent of an employer and no employee or agent of an employee shall contract out of or waive an employment standard and any such contracting out or waiver is void. The allowed exceptions are any clauses that provide a greater benefit to an employee than the employment standard (see 5(2)). | Legal action might be taken by the garage, because you had a contract to repair the gearbox which you cancelled (causing them some damages in time spent). You could hope that the store-owner will pay the invoice that you sent, but that seems to not be likely. The store owner can't sue you for sending him the invoice: the mechanic can sue you for not paying what the work billed for. But you do have a recourse, which is that you were acting on behalf of the store owner. I assume that you were in possession of the old gearbox, so it simplified matters if you took transported it to the mechanic, since the store owner was going to pay. In other words, you were acting as the store owner's agent: you were authorized to create a contractual arrangement between the garage and the owner. The one problem is that apparently the garage thought they were doing the work for you, and not for the owner. So they may sue you, and you may sue the owner. And suing anybody costs money. The owner is, perhaps, trying a strategy of not paying what he does actually owe, in the theory that the alternative of suing is too much time and bother (besides, it's the garage owner who would have to get the ball rolling – unless the shop owner first wants to sue to recover the gearbox). Given the information you have provided, I don't see a basis for the shop owner suing you. In order to sue someone, that person has to have caused you some damage. He could claim that he didn't authorize you to take the gearbox to the garage, or that you were negligent in making the arrangements with the shop (for instance if he said "but only if they will do the diagnosis for free"), in which case the court will have to decide whose story is more believable. | As seen here, the laws of the employee's state and city are controlling, and not that of the employer. A person working for a North Dakota company in Seattle is owed at least Seattle minimum wage. This to "were the employee usually is working" so it does not suddenly switch when the employee takes a working vacation. | As a general rule, if a business, like a bank, is legally required to keep information confidential, and an employee breeches confidentiality, then your recourse is to sue the business for damages. See for example ch. 35 of Title 12. The bank cannot claim "It's not our fault, an employee did it" (the Latin for this is "respondeat superior", whereby a part is also responsible for the acts of their agents). As far as I know, there is no law against asking for information that can't be given. This does assume, however, that your mother does not have a legal right to the information (which could arise from some form of co-signing). Also, would assume that they have a normal privacy policy, and not one where they say "We will tell your mother if she asks" (they would have informed you of that, so read the privacy policy). This is a question best answered by your own attorney, to whom you would reveal all of the details. |
Are political flags equivalent to signs? Context: A Florida Condominium HOA prohibits signs. UPDATE: Assume that HOA governing law is FS718. Excluding the flags described in FS718: (4) Any unit owner may display one portable, removable United States flag in a respectful way and, on Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, Flag Day, Independence Day, and Veterans Day, may display in a respectful way portable, removable official flags, not larger than 41/2 feet by 6 feet, that represent the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, regardless of any declaration rules or requirements dealing with flags or decorations. Are political Flags ("Trump 2024") prohibited under the HOA's no signs rule? Why or why not? | Are political Flags ("Trump 2024") prohibited under the HOA's no signs rule? Why or why not? Probably. The Florida statute seems to imply that a flag is a type of sign and usually a political sign, even in the form of a flag, is still considered to be a sign. The Florida statute, in any case, only excludes the U.S. flag, not any other kind of flag. The First Amendment doesn't apply to an HOA declaration, although one could argue that FS 718 is a content based restriction of speech by exempting only the U.S. flag on particular days, and not other kinds of flags on other days, but that doesn't make a remedy clear. Allowing political signs isn't an obvious remedy for a 1st Amendment violation in FS 718. | Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. | First of all, to clarify some numbering, HR 4635 (107th Congress) was not actually passed. The language was passed as part of HR 5005, becoming Public Law 107-296, and this provision now appears at 49 USC 44921. The exact text of this provision is: A Federal flight deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The language makes it clear that this is only referring to civil liability. So, if the officer is defending the flight deck, and they are sued for damages resulting from their actions, the plaintiff will not win (assuming the law is correctly applied). But this law says nothing about whether or not they can be prosecuted for a crime. In any case, the officer in your example does not appear to have been defending the flight deck, so this law wouldn't apply at all. In your example, the officer's defense against a murder charge would probably be based on defense of others. There is a discussion on Justia. It seems that a key question would be whether shooting the unruly passenger was proportional - was there a reasonable fear that the passenger was actually going to kill someone? | Assuming that the HOA duly adopted the rule that requires this disclosure, probably yes. An HOA is not subject to the privacy law or constitutional restrictions of a governmental entity, an HOA is the de facto owner of the common areas of the HOA, and in general, a private property owner can insist on getting any information the private property owner wishes as a condition of using a private property owner's property. Generally speaking, however, the declarations of a condominium set forth the process by which rules like this one can be adopted and those rules have to be followed for the rule to be valid. | Political speech is at the core of First Amendment protections on free speech, but there are still legal limits that exist on political speech. (I respectfully disagree with the idea posited by user6726's good answer that political speech is immune from legal restraint.) Direct incitement to imminent lawless action that is likely to occur can technically be prohibited and people can be arrested for it, but the segments I've seen of the most pro-violence of Donald Trump's rallies have not quite risen to that standard. He has been couching his incitement-related language carefully; it sounds much tougher than it actually is. "I will pay to defend you if you commit a crime" or even an approving "back in the day, you used to get a punch in the face for X" is not the same as saying "Punch those people in the face on your way out" or "Let's knock those protestors out of here in 3, 2, 1... GO!" While I'm not saying that a pre-crime promise to cover legal fees can never be enough to rise to the level of conspiracy (that's an interesting question), it also isn't really incitement to riot. But If Donald Trump, or anyone else, used their political position to speak at a public event and directly incite a riot, then they could be arrested under an applicable law without violating the First Amendment. There are also other limits on political speech, such as defamation. While a political speaker has incredibly wide leeway, there are still limits that exist, especially if the speaker targets a private citizen rather than another political figure. | "Posted" is a Term of Art "Posted" is a term of art in trespass law, specifically meaning that signs forbidding entry have been placed at the borders of a parcel. The page "Properly posted definition" from Law Insider reads: Properly posted means that signs prohibiting trespass—or bright yellow, bright orange or fluorescent paint—are clearly displayed at all corners, on fishing streams crossing property lines, and on roads, gates and rights-of-way entering the land. Or, they are displayed in a manner that is visible to a person in the area. The entry "Posting" in the "Legal" section of The Free Dictionary reads: Posting In connection with Trespass statutes, the act of placing or affixing signs on private property in a manner to give notice of the trespass. The page "The Importance of Posting Property Signs" reads in relevant part: Why should you use posted signs on property? Posting property is a great way to let someone know they have entered private land and they might not be welcome. Using posted signs not only indicates trespassing but also can specify restricted activities. Signs are good for both rural and urban settings as a way to protect owners and their property. ... Most states have specific rules for property signs that must be followed. Some rules may include: Words used: POSTED or NOTICE Sign size: 11" x 11" or 144 square inches Lettering size: minimum of 2" Sign color: purple, bright orange, yellow Sign distance: every 100 feet Some states allow the use of spray paint to mark trees and fences in lieu of a sign. Purple paint is frequently used because it stands out against common natural colors. However, if a trespasser is unaware of this marking method, it would be more effective to use a sign. Check local and state laws to confirm what is needed to properly post legally in your area. Several US states use the term "Posted" in their laws on trespass, and provide that the presence of the word "posted" on a sign has special significance. Maryland maryland Maryland Criminal Law Code § 6-402 (2017) provides that: (a) Prohibited. -- A person may not enter or trespass on property that is posted conspicuously against trespass by: (a) (1) signs placed where they reasonably may be seen; or (a) (2) paint marks that: (a) (2) (i) conform with regulations that the Department of Natural Resources adopts under § 5-209 of the Natural Resources Article; and (a) (2) (ii) are made on trees or posts that are located: (a) (2) (ii) 1. at each road entrance to the property; and (a) (2) (ii) 2. adjacent to public roadways, public waterways, and other land adjoining the property. The law firm page "Trespassing Laws in Maryland" reads in relevant part: Posted Property Trespass A person is not allowed to enter onto property that is posted conspicuously against trespassing. That posting can come in the form of signs that are placed where they can be reasonably seen or by paint marks on trees or posts at the entrances and land adjacent to the property. New York new-york-state The page "Posting Your Land" from the NY Dept of Environmental Conservation reads in relevant part: Trespassing Trespassing is illegal even on unposted property. Instead of posting, a landowner or other authorized person may issue written notice to another individual informing them that they are prohibited from entering the property. The notice must contain a description of the property, what restrictions apply (hunting, fishing, trapping) and the person or persons prohibited from entry. It should be delivered by certified mail or other processes (ex: legal notice in newspaper) to prove that the person was served. At any time, anyone by the landowner, occupant, or other authorized person to leave the premises (posted or not), must do so immediately. Trespassing on areas posted against trespass pursuant to the Environmental Conservation Law is punishable by a fine up to $250 and/or up to 15 days in jail. It is a defense to this type of trespass that there are not signs posted instructing people to stay off the property. It may also be a defense that any signs posted in the area are not in the proper place to be easily seen by visitors to the property. Signage Details Hardware and farm supply stores frequently carry signs for posting. Customized signs may also be obtained from local printers. DEC doesn't provide signs to private landowners unless the landowner is a cooperator under the Fish and Wildlife Management Act. In this case, they will be provided with "Safety Zone" signs. Cooperators provide free public access to most of their property in a large cooperative hunting/fishing area. Signs must be a minimum of 11 inches by 11 inches. They also must bear the name and address of the owner, lawful occupant or other person or organization authorized to post the area. The sign must bear a conspicuous statement which shall either consist of the word "POSTED" or warn against entry for specified purposes or all purposes without the consent of the person whose name appears on the sign. These words must cover a minimum space of 80 square inches (about 9 by 9 inches) of the sign. Image from the NYS DEC page linked above (There is a very similar image included in the Wikipedia article "Trespass".) California california In California "Posted property" is the legal term for property where suitable signs have been placed along the boundary or near it, to informa people tht trespassing is forbidden. But it appears that in CA the word "Posted" need not appear on such signs, the words "No Trespassing" being sufficient. California also makes it a misdemeanor (Under section 602) to enter into or remain on property of another, without any legal right to be there, if one is instructed not to enter, or to leave, but such proeprty is not considered "posted". California Penal Code section 553 provides that: he following definitions apply to this article only: (a) “Sign” means a sign not less than one (1) square foot in area and upon which in letters not less than two inches in height appear the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” (b) “Posted property” means any property specified in Section 554 which is posted in a manner provided in Section 554.1 . (c) “Posted boundary” means a line running from sign to sign and such line need not conform to the legal boundary or legal description of any lot, parcel, or acreage of land, but only the area within the posted boundary shall constitute posted property, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (e) of Section 554.1 . California Penal Code section 554 provides in relevant part that: Any property, except that portion of such property to which the general public is accorded access, may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the manner provided in Section 554.1 , and thereby become posted property subject to the provisions of this article applicable to posted property, if such property consists of, or is used, or is designed to be used, for any one or more of the following: ... California Penal Code section 554.1 provides that: Any property described in Section 554 may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the following manner: (a) If it is not enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of the area and at each entrance. (b) If it is not enclosed within a fence, and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or contains any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs along or near the exterior boundaries of the area at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner, and, if such property has a definite entrance or entrances, at each such entrance. (c) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre, and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of such fence and at each entrance. (d) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or has any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs on, or along the line of, such fence at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner and at each entrance. (e) If it consists of poles or towers or appurtenant structures for the suspension of wires or other conductors for conveying electricity or telegraphic or telephonic messages or of towers or derricks for the production of oil or gas, by affixing a sign upon one or more sides of such poles, towers, or derricks, but such posting shall render only the pole, tower, derrick, or appurtenant structure posted property. California Penal Code section 555 provides that: It is unlawful to enter or remain upon any posted property without the written permission of the owner, tenant, or occupant in legal possession or control thereof. Every person who enters or remains upon posted property without such written permission is guilty of a separate offense for each day during any portion of which he enters or remains upon such posted property. | Short answer: It depends on the state and exactly how you do so. Stating how you voted, by itself, is fine; however, taking a photo of your ballot instead of just saying how you voted is illegal in some states, especially if the photo was taken within a polling place. Laws banning these so-called "ballot selfies" may be unconstitutional, and have been successfully challenged under the first amendment in some cases. There is not a general ban on simply saying who you voted for. This is an extremely common practice, and it is the basis for "exit polling," where voters leaving a polling place are asked whom they voted for in order to collect voting statistics to predict the winner of the election. This type of polling has been upheld by courts, and it sounds like laws banning it were primarily concerned with voter intimidation rather than vote-buying. As of 2016, 18 states banned sharing any photograph of a ballot, while an additional 6 ban photography in polling places. The rationale for such laws is to prevent vote-buying, because if you can't take a photo of your ballot, you can't prove whom you voted for (whereas without the photo, you could simply vote however you like, then lie). However, at least one such law has been challenged in federal court and invalidated as a violation of the first amendment (in Rideout v. Gardner) "because it is a content-based restriction on speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny." If such first-amendment challenges continue to be upheld, it is possible that this practice will be legal throughout the United States. | Fully enclosed area means being inside something, likely a non-see-through fence. You will not convince anyone that a trash can is "fully enclosed; it is a container, which is called out. Your chance of litigating this successfully is approximately zero unless your goal is to spend money and force the HOA to do the same. You can certainly ask what the expectation is or examples that meet the requirement. Your ability to fight your issue by citing other installations is limited unless they are forcing you to do something other homes are not required to do. "I can see your can with a drone" will not let you leave your trash can out. |
Clever Probate Fraud (UK) - How Did He Do It? I’m hoping someone can help me understand this clever bit of probate fraud. In summary: Swindler made fake wills for sailors who had died intestate leaving high value estates. The wills looked real because they emulated the will forms that had been used by the Navy. The wills that the fraudster made disinherited relatives and left everything to various charities. He claimed to have discovered these “lost" wills” and approached the charities. He was then able to charge them a hefty percentage fee from the estate as a finders fee. My Questions: Who administers the will of someone who dies intestate, who has no family? Other than the administrator, who else did he need to convince the will was genuine? By what credible set of occurrences could have have led him to ‘find’ the ‘lost’ will as a non-family member, nor friend? Would he have to have somehow had access to the deceased's property after their death? Is there somewhere else he could have ‘found’ the will that would have been credible? How could he have gotten away with listing ‘fake’ witnesses? (doesn't the administrator do research?) Once he had convinced the right people/organisations, who would have been responsible for selling the deceased’s assets, and paying the money to the charities in the will? Finally: What benefit could his approach have had over simply acting as a normal heir hunter, e.g. using genealogy research databases to track down distant family members (who eventually brought his fraud to light), and just charging them a finders fee as he did the charities? | Who administers the will of someone who dies intestate, who has no family? There is a position known as the "public administrator" paid mostly from fees charged to probate estates in most jurisdictions. In the absence of such a post, creditors of the estate or beneficiaries of the estate can apply to do so when there is no family. Other than the administrator, who else did he need to convince the will was genuine? The court with probate jurisdiction. By what credible set of occurrences could have have led him to ‘find’ the ‘lost’ will as a non-family member, nor friend? Is there somewhere else he could have ‘found’ the will that would have been credible? A companion had it. A bank had it. A former lawyer of the person had it. A military colleague had it. A landlord or storage unit company found it. Note also that the probate court sees only the will, and doesn't hear the whole story of how it was found, in the absence of a will contest or a will not executed with the usual formalities as these wills would have appeared on their face to have. And, if the notices to disinherited family members are not actually delivered (not mailed or mailed to bad addresses), the disinherited family doesn't show up to contest the matter until the finder's fee has been collected, the fraudster is nowhere to be found, and the charity has received the money and is being asked to refund it. Would he have to have somehow had access to the deceased's property after their death? No. Often a will in not stored with someone's other property. And, in this case, he already knew that there was no actual will to find. He just needed to know that they died and weren't paupers. How could he have gotten away with listing ‘fake’ witnesses? (doesn't the administrator do research?) If the witnesses signatures are notarized, the witnesses aren't interrogated unless there is a contest. Frequently, they are law office or bank employees who witness many wills and may not have a very specific recollection. The notary's authenticity wouldn't usually be checked unless there was a dispute as to the will's authenticity raised by some interested party. Once he had convinced the right people/organisations, who would have been responsible for selling the deceased’s assets, and paying the money to the charities in the will? The executor of the estate appointed by the court. Sometimes distant family, sometimes a creditor or a representative of a charitable beneficiary, sometimes the public administrator. What benefit could his approach have had over simply acting as a normal heir hunter, e.g. using genealogy research databases to track down distant family members (who eventually brought his fraud to light), and just charging them a finders fee as he did the charities? Family, even distant family, is likely to know more about the decedent and to research that relative (previously unknown or little known to them) than a charity that never met the decedent and doesn't want to contest a bequest to itself. Also, close disinherited family will usually find out eventually. A finder's fee recipient can be paid and gone by then. A recipient of the inheritance under a forged will can be forced to disgorge it to the rightful heirs. Money laundering of the finder's fees received would be a necessary component of the scheme if it is to be successful. This was a pretty successful "long con". After the fraud was discovered and proved: The relatives we had found were then able to inherit, following the rules of intestacy laid down by law. The criminal was not prosecuted in this case because of his advanced age. In fraud, if they only catch you after you are dead, it is a win for the fraudster. Footnote In cases where the decedent had no family, this is a "victimless" crime that gives money to the finder and charity in lieu of an escheat of the decedent's entire estate to the government. Second Footnote This is not a common fact pattern at all. I've never seen it in twenty-five years of practice, I've never encountered someone who has seen this happen, I've never seen a news account or continuing education instructor account, or professor's account of this particular kind of scheme before today, and I've never seen a court opinion addressing this fact pattern. This may be the only time in the history of the world that this particular kind of fraud has occurred. More common instances of fraud involve: A family member who feels great financial need duping other family members to get the entire estate for himself or herself. A family member forging a will in an effort to win an internal family struggle where the testator isn't budging. A family member forging the estate plan the decedent intended to make, but didn't, with little substantive change. An outsider or family member winning the trust of a frail but wealthy elderly person and having that person execute a will leaving them everything. A professional conservator or guardian for someone who has no close family (or unrelated power of attorney agent) charging excessive fees (perhaps for services not actually rendered) and making undisclosed self-dealing transactions (e.g. gifts to himself or herself, and unfair business deals with related parties). | Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages. | How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders. | Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. | A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals. | Point three should include "to the best of my knowledge and belief", or be modified to state that none of those "house or the adjacent shop" have informed the affiant of any such delivery, or delivered any such package to the affiant. It might add that the affiant had questioned such persons and they denied receiving such a delivery. The point here, of course, is to prove that the package was never properly delivered, no doubt in support of a claim on the delivery service. The ordinary assumption is that if a person in the "house or the adjacent shop" had accepted a package, it would normally have been given to the addressee at an early opportunity. | Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove. |
Can a HighWay Enforcer/Patrolmen remain in a Cross State Pursuit? I kind of got this question in my mind as I saw a North Augusta Squad Car drive out of the city not responding to any emergency. Say a South Carolina HWP were to do a routing traffic stop and the person flees, They go into Georgia and then Alabama. Can the HWP unit remain in the pursuit or does he have to break off? Can he request to remain in the pursuit? | Hot Pursuit What you're describing is a hot pursuit, and in the US, common law says that police officers crossing state lines while in hot pursuit is absolutely allowed. An active pursuit is considered an exigent circumstance, which gives police all kinds of temporary powers they don't normally have. | The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf | This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat. | united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect. | I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks... | tl;dr Hitting the pedestrians is a separate crime, even if they shouldn't be there. Background On a highway, you might have a legal right of way and therefore a claim against the pedestrians for failing to yield. Since the states (and not the federal government) own and operate the interstate highway system, your specific answer depends on the state law. In North Carolina, for example, pedestrians walking along or upon a highway have a statutory duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles. So you could probably videotape and press misdemeanor charges against them individually. That said, contacting the police and waiting (or taking an alternate route) is the best recourse. Having the right of way (or feeling ethically justified) doesn't allow you to commit an offense like hitting a pedestrian. The fact that the pedestrians aren't supposed to be in your way is of little consolation in the charges you'll face if you injure or kill one. The court will see this as a legal/ethical problem, but one that won't go in your favor. In particular, you deliberately directed your vehicle into the crowd with the knowledge that the action might cause harm. One doesn't have to imagine the Austin Powers steamroller scenario to know that injuries are possible when cars go through crowds. That will pull all of the "involuntary"-flavored mitigations off the table. In particular, driving a car into a crowd might be considered "an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty." In the worst case scenario, where someone died as a result, a North Carolina prosecutor might push for second-degree murder (which operates on a "recklessness-plus" standard and might not be as crazy as it sounds since driving into the crowd is likely reckless, and driving in slowly with them yelling at you to stop could push a jury over the top). In that case, as a defendant, you'd hope your charge could be mitigated down to something like death by vehicle (which is similar to "vehicular manslaughter" in other states), and you'd shoot for the misdemeanor version of death by vehicle since you weren't driving under the influence. However, a key element of proving death by vehicle is that you unintentionally caused the death---and the fact that you deliberately drove into the crowd might ruin your defense. In the case where you just hurt someone, you'd likewise hope to mitigate intentional charges to unintentional ones. A claim for false imprisonment is unlikely to succeed. False imprisonment is called a variety of things---like felonious/misdemeanor restraint, unlawful detainment, etc.---depending on where you live. To prove it (and generalizing a bit since this varies by state), you typically have to show (1) detention or restraint against your will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint. A big challenge here is that courts often interpret this to mean detention or restraint by exercise of force or threat of force, as in Harris v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380 (1928) for example. The protesters are just in the way, so it's unlikely this would hold up. Self defense almost surely won't be a viable excuse. The idea of driving the car slowly through the crowd relies on the notion that you should be able to escape the alleged detention. The escape you're considering in driving through the crowd likely comes at the expense of making contact with members of the crowd. Making unprivileged contacts might be allowable in self defense. However, self defense probably hold up either. Setting aside notions of proportional defense, you have to be defending yourself against something: force or threats of it by the protesters. So if they don't use force, or threaten it, against you, then your defense is going to be really shaky. | When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? No. Federal law enforcement officers' jurisdiction generally* includes the entire US. Federal and state jurisdiction are said to be concurrent with one another. If the federal law enforcement officer has a lawful basis to effect an arrest, the arrest can be effected on a state† highway easement. Is there any immediate or long term consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? If the officer were outside his jurisdiction (which isn't the case here) then the officer is generally treated as any other private individual. In this case, "outside his jurisdiction" means "in another country," which brings up all sorts of additional complications that aren't really in scope here, largely because the laws and legal systems of other countries are different from those in the US. Are there any nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? There are plenty, but perhaps the most prominent one, if the internet is any guide, is that an officer is not required to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of a Terry stop or an arrest. The time for this is much later, after a judge is involved. Arguing with an officer on this score is just going to make things worse. Instead, one should cooperate while stating one's objections clearly and calmly, especially making it clear that cooperation does not imply consent. * Some categories of officers do have more limited jurisdiction: thanks to cpast for the example of park rangers, whose jurisdiction is essentially restricted to national parks. The officers in this case are CBP field officers. There is a wide misconception that CBP officers' jurisdiction is limited to within 100 miles of the border, but that 100-mile limit only applies to their power to board and search vessels and vehicles without a warrant in order to prevent illegal entry into the US. Their power to make warrantless arrests "for any offence against the United States" committed in their presence is not geographically restricted. † The original video was filmed in South Portland, Maine, and the roadway is a municipal street, Gannett Drive, to be precise. The point remains, however, that it is a public right-of-way, and federal officers are not "out of their jurisdiction" simply because they've left a federal facility and entered a public place. | In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source. |
Can a police officer enter with no warrant or cause, and must I comply with orders if one does? This is a hypothetical question. I am in my garage on a Saturday reloading ammunition and cleaning several guns for a range trip the next day. It is hot and I had the large garage door open. As always when I have my safe open and guns on the bench I was wearing a loaded pistol in a hip holster. A cop apparently just driving by stops and gets out of his car and comes into the garage. I asked him what he was doing and if he had paper on me or any reason to be there and he said no. He just wanted to see what the guns were about. At that point he demanded that I give him my gun and move away from the open safe and the guns on the bench, for his protection, and to put my hands up. I told him to stop immediately and leave my property. He did NOT have a warrant or any piece of paper with my name on it issued by a judge or justice of the piece giving him the right to enter my domicile or seize my property. I further told him that my home security system was recording all this. He again told me to put my hands up and move away from the guns on the bench. I again demanded that he leave and that he had no right to detain me in my own home. At that point he pulled his gun and pointed it at me. I had not yelled, acted in any way other than calm and had not reached for my pistol or any of the guns on the bench or in the safe. He told me that I had to stop the recording and that he wanted the recording that currently existed. I ended up being arrested for menacing, resisting arrest and a bunch of other stuff. My question is when he drew his weapon was he operating under the color of law and if I had defended myself by drawing and firing would I have been liable for criminal charges? | united-states This question does not indicate in what jurisdiction the hypothetical events take place. Since they are hypothetical, I am going to assume the United States. Perhaps other answers will be given for other jurisdictions. I would be interested to read such answers. The Officer's Authority In the hypothetical situation described, it would appear that the police officer had no warrant or other court order, and that he did not have any probable cause to believe that any criminal activity was in progress, or that any crime had been committed. Indeed it would appear that the officer did not even have the "reasonable suspicion" required for a so-called Terry stop (named for the case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which such stops were declared legal). In any case the encounter described is not a Terry stop, because such a stop takes place "on the street" or in a public place, not on private property. So far it seems that the police office is acting without lawful authority. When the man orders the officer to leave his property, the demand is lawful, and by not leaving, the officer becomes a trespasser, unless the officer has some justification not mentioned in the question. The Duty to Comply However, once the officer starts to give orders, the other person must generally treat them as lawful. There are exceptions: Officers cannot compel people to commit crimes, nor to submit to rape or murder. But orders given for the ostensible protection of the officer have particular deference. As the US Supreme court said in Terry v. Ohio (cited above): ... we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. (emphasis added) Resisting the Officer Following the logic of Terry Courts tend to give deference to police assertions of the need to protect themselves. The modern tread is to require citizens to submit to police orders in such cases, even if the citizen believes the order to be unlawful, and even if the court eventually agrees. In many states, violent resistance to such orders would be a crime even if the order was later ruled unlawful. In every US state, he use of deadly force, by drawing and firing a gun at a police officer who has issued possibly unlawful orders, but has not threatened the life or well being of anyone, and has not used any force at all, would be clearly criminal. Nolo Press's article on "Resisting Unlawful arrest" says: Historically, American citizens were legally entitled to use reasonable force to resist unlawful arrest. Some states continue to follow this rule, while others don’t. A statute rejecting the traditional rule might say something like this: “You can’t use force to resist if you know or should know that you’re being arrested by a police officer, regardless of whether the arrest is legal.” ... It’s critical to note that one can be convicted of resisting arrest even without having committed the crime that was the basis for the arrest. It should be understood that even in those US states which follow the "traditional rule" and permit resistance to an unlawful arrest, only "reasonable force" is permitted. Shooting a gun at an officer is deadly force, and will not be reasonable unless the person has a justified belief that the officer is about to kill or seriously injure the arrestee or another person without justification. Also, if the arrest is somehow lawful, even though the arrestee reasonably believed it to be unlawful, the use of even "reasonable" force is no longer permitted, and the arrestee may be convicted of resisting arrestee and other crimes. This makes resistance a dangerous gamble, even in states that follow the traditional rule. In addition, resistance is all too likely to lead to escalation of the conflict, and end with the arrestee shot dead or seriously injured. Even if the officer's actions are later held unlawful, that will not bring the arrestee back to life. Under Color of Law The question asks if the office's actions are taken "under color of law". They are, in US law. This does not mean that the acts are lawful or proper. Rather it means that they are take by means of legal authority. Such acts therefore constitute "state action" subject to the limitations of the 14th Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. The Wikipedia article on this topic (linked above) says: ... just because something is done with the "color of law" does not mean that the action was lawful. When police act outside their lawful authority and violate the civil rights of a citizen, the FBI is tasked with investigating. The well known "section 1983" (42 USC. § 1983) provides a private right of action in such cases, saying: Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... Here the hypothetical officer's entry onto private property, his refusal to leave when ordered by the owner, his order to put down the pistol and step away from the other guns (implying an arrest or detention), his order to stop recording and turn over the record, and his drawing of his firearm are all acts taken "under color of law", and had the citizen submitted, he could have subsequently filed a Sec 1983 suit against the officer, although he would have had to establish harm done to collect more than nominal damages. The officer is relying on his authority as a police officer to enforce his orders, and indeed to support his presence on private property. This makes his actions clearly done "under color of law". | The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home. | I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state. | There will be a local rule regarding what police have to do with a person in custody. Here are the rules for Seattle. The main relevant rule is that they must take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of the detainee. They must use seat belts, unless the vehicle does not have seat belts in the detainee area. Additionally, they are not to respond to routine calls while transporting a detainee, but they may may respond to a threat to life safety. Typically, high speed response indicates a threat and not a noisy dog complaint. There is no obligation to refrain from responding, nor is there a requirement to release detainees. I don't think there is a clear and bright line: it comes down to what an officer would (in light of department instructions) judge to be reasonable. The officer may be wrong and the department may be wrong in what is legally "reasonable", and this could come out as a result of lawsuits and Dept. of Justice investigations. You can file a complaint with the Civil Rights division of the DoJ, see here. | Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me. | In the US, police do not put a person under house arrest, instead, the courts do, as an alternative to standard imprisonment (either awaiting trial, or serving their sentence). The police are not involved at all; the courts cannot be sued for lenient sentencing. If a person leaves their house (even to buy a bottle of milk), they will have violated the terms of their more lenient sentence, and will be arrested and sent to regular jail. Generally, police are not liable for damages, especially when they fail to be omnipotent in their efforts to prevent others from doing wrong. | Defendant's girlfriend should produce the copies of the recording to police, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. Possession of the recording should induce the police and prosecution to at least re-evaluate the charges against Defendant, as Defendant would be able to subpoena the gun's owner to testify about the purchase and then use the recording to impeach him if he then denies owning the gun. It is unclear, though, whether the audio actually has any value because we don't know what charges Defendant is facing. If he's charged with unlawfully owning a gun, the recording would likely be quite helpful; if he's charged with unlawfully transporting a weapon, the recording's value would probably depend on whether the law in question outlaws "knowingly" transporting a weapon or "negligently" transporting a weapon, or transporting a weapon regardless of whether he knew about it. | This is a no win situation. People who try to stop in a safe public place fearing that the cop may be an imposter risk prosecution for resisting arrest. But, no one will offer you any remedy if the cop was an imposter who was victimizing you. One recommended course of action if you doubt a cop is real is to call 911 as you pull over to confirm that the cop trying to pull you over is real. |
Does the Secretary of Defense's vaccine mandate constitute a legal general order under UCMJ? 10 U.S.C. includes the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (near as I can tell), specifically I'm curious how the decisions made by the Secretary of Defense play into the (Section 891) Article 92 regulations. Specifically, Article 92 acknowledges two types of orders that a soldier might end up in trouble for disobeying: general orders and other, specific orders. On the face of it it would seem to me that an order from the Secretary of Defense carries the full weight of the Office of the President, and therefore the Commander in Chief as an order-giving entity that soldiers are obliged to obey. This Wapo Article discusses the refusal of the OK Nat'l Guard to follow the order (on counter-orders from the Governor). I'll break out the separate, interesting question about DoD authority over Nat'l Guard units into another post. But it makes me wonder: Would a general officer refusing to relay the vaccine mandate to the units under their command constitute disobeying an order under Article 92? If so, would an order like this from the Secretary of Defense constitute a general order or the more specific "other" case? | A lawful order issued by the President or Secretary of Defense carries the full weight of an order under the UCMJ. Note that the OK National Guard will come under this jurisdiction during annual training orders, which is a federal call-up. | As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible. | You may be mistaken about the purpose of the Miller test. If some content is obscene according to the Miller test, then it does not receive First Amendment protection, and could be prohibited from distribution by the government. However, it says nothing about the contractual obligations that two parties can agree to. To the extent that the obligations themselves are objectionable this analysis would fall under the doctrines of unconscionability and public policy. | 1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged. | The relevant conventions tried to discourage the traditional mercenary business model, but they also try to avoid loopholes in their rules. Under command by and authorized by Russia? Yes. Wearing clothing/insignia recognizable at a distance? I don't know, but a big Z would be enough. Carrying arms openly? I presume so. There is no requirement that armed forces use only their own nationals (see the French Foreign Legion). While Russia tries to deny being "at war," under international law it is, and residents of the unoccupied part of Russia may rally around the flag. We don't know what will happen after the war. There is the precedent of the SS, which was declared a criminal organization at Nuremberg (that is, membership was considered evidence of complicity in their crimes). | No. They could be, but the "nullification" wouldn't be automatic. That is because, as the Congressional Research Service says in its excellent "Executive Orders: An Introduction": "Once issued, a valid executive order has the force and effect of law. Executive orders do not, by default, expire when the issuing President leaves office. Instead, an issued executive order remains in effect until it is either struck down in court, modified, or revoked." Because executive orders persist but can be easily changed, one of the first orders of business of a new administration is to revoke, modify or re-issue inherited executive orders. As far as your hypothetical, most commenters agree that when the President is expected to return to office quickly, the Acting President's job is simply to "keep shop." However, in extreme cases, such as the one you outline, they also agree the Acting President can exercise the full-range of Presidential powers. Thus, the Acting President could revoke the problematic orders. (This is discussed in Yale Law School's in the Yale Law School's "Reader's Guide" to the 25th Amendment.) If you want to know more, the Wikipedia page on Executive Orders gives a short (and harmless) summary. For more detail, see either the CRS pamphlet cited above, or their earlier pamphlet,"Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation." | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. |
Corporation tax and annual accounts for a closed UK company that lost money Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Person A starts a limited liability company B in the UK, registered in England and Wales, through Companies House. Company B has expenses and some income, but overall makes a loss. Person A decides to close the company before the first anniversary and the company is struck off the register. Because the company is closed, person A has difficulty filing annual accounts with Companies House and a corporation tax return with HMRC. I was unable to find guidance on UK government websites about this situation. Does company B need to file corporation tax with HMRC and annual accounts with Companies House? Does person A need to declare or pay income tax on the company's trading loss? | According to dot-gov's Strike off your limited company from the Companies Register page... Does company B need to file corporation tax with HMRC? Yes You must send final statutory accounts and a Company Tax Return to HMRC. ... and annual accounts with Companies House? No You don’t have to file final accounts with Companies House. Does person A need to declare or pay income tax on the company's trading loss? Yes If you’ve made a loss in your final year of trading, you might be able to offset the tax against profits from previous years - this is known as ‘terminal loss relief’. You can claim this on your final tax return. However, you're better off checking with HMRC to be sure. | Less than zero dollars. An undertaking like this is usually categorized as either a hobby or a business. The official guidance is in IRS Publication 535, but a determinination takes into account lots of different factors, such as: how much time and effort goes into the undertaking; whether the taxpayer relies on the income for basic expenses; whether the taxpayer adapts his/her methods to increase profitability; whether the taxpayer has made profits this year or in years past; whether the taxpayer can reasonably expect to turn a profit in the near future. Even if you're losing money, the IRS may still say it's a business if all the signs suggest that that's what it is. | The usual method is that every country charges you income tax for income that you make while your body is in the country. Big exception is the USA which wants a chunk of every income, and some countries like Germany calculate your tax rate based on world wide income, but charge that tax rate on your income in Germany. "Double taxation agreements" usually have the purpose that if two countries think you should pay tax on the same money, then somehow you only pay once. If you were a US citizen, then being tax-free in Indonesia wouldn't help you at all, because the USA would want full US tax minus zero Indonesian tax. In the UK, you need to check what money you have to pay tax on as a UK citizen, especially in the first and last year when you are still in the UK. For the use of a bank account in which country, ask a lawyer. Especially as making a stupid mistake could be very costly. It may be easier to set up a company in Indonesia and your company pays the company, because it is very unlikely that your UK company wants to learn about Indonesian tax law and risk getting it wrong. | In the UK: "Under section 277 of the Companies Act 1985, where a shareholder knows or has reasonable grounds for believing that a dividend was improperly paid, he is liable to repay it to the company." So if the company declared a dividend based on incorrect knowledge of their financial position, and they find out their true financial position that wouldn't allow a dividend payment, not only can (and must) they revoke or cancel the dividend payment, they can even force shareholders to repay the dividend. But that only applies if the declared dividend is more than the company is legally allowed to pay. The company might say "we have enough cash in the bank and no debt, we could pay a £10.00 dividend without breaking the law, but we only pay £0.50". If they discover their numbers are wrong, and they could only pay £8.00 legally, then they can't change their declared dividend from £0.50 to £0.40. The declared dividend is legally binding, except when the dividend amount is too high to be legally allowed. | In general, a liquid account, denominated in monetary units (dollars, pounds, euros, etc) from which the owner has the right to make a withdrawal at any time is treated legally much the same as cash. This includes a bank account and a brokerage 'cash" account. It will not include a mutual fund account denominated in shares of stock, nor a debt which is not collectable at will. When the proceeds of a transaction are depositd into such an account, I believe that the profit (if any)m has been "realized" and that a taxable event has occurred. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1001 a gain or loss is realized on the sale or other disposition, or exchange of property. Nothing is ssid about 'cash" or accounts with a signature authority. Under 26 CFR 1.1001-1: ... the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained. in Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) The US Supreme Court wrote: Rather than assessing tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the value of a taxpayer's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences of a gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer "realizes" the gain or loss. The realization requirement is implicit in § 1001(a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1001(a), which defines "[t]he gain [or loss] from the sale or other disposition of property" as the difference between "the amount realized" from the sale or disposition of the property and its "adjusted basis." As this Court has recognized, the concept of realization is "founded on administrative convenience." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 116 (1940). ... Section 1001(a)'s language provides a straightforward test for realization: to realize a gain or loss in the value of property, the taxpayer must engage in a "sale or other disposition of [the] property." The parties agree that the exchange of participation interests in this case cannot be characterized as a "sale" under § 1001(a); the issue before us is whether the transaction constitutes a "disposition of property." ... Neither the language nor the history of the Code indicates whether and to what extent property exchanged must differ to count as a "disposition of property" under § 1001(a). Nonetheless, we readily agree with the Commissioner that an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event under § 1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are "materially different."... ... We start with the classic treatment of realization in Eisner v. Macomber, supra. In Macomber, a taxpayer who owned 2,200 shares of stock in a company received another 1,100 shares from the company as part of a *pro rata- stock dividend meant to reflect the company's growth in value. At issue was whether the stock dividend constituted taxable income. We held that it did not, because no gain was realized. ... In Phellis and Marr, we held that the transactions were realization events. We reasoned that because a company incorporated in one State has "different rights and powers" from one incorporated in a different State, the taxpayers inPhellis and Marr acquired through the transactions property that was "materially different" from what they previously had. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S., at 169-173; ... Taken together, Phellis, Marr, and Weiss stand for the principle that properties are "different" in the sense that is "material" to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or extent. Thus, separate groups of stock are not materially different if they confer "the same proportional interest of the same character in the same corporation." Marr v. United States, 268 U. S., at 540. However, they are materially different if they are issued by different corporations, id., at 541; United States v. Phellis, supra, at 173, or if they confer "differen[t] rights and powers" in the same corporation, Marr v. United States, supra, at 541. No more demanding a standard than this is necessary in order to satisfy the administrative purposes underlying the realization requirement in § 1001(a). See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S., at 116. For, as long as the property entitlements are not identical, their exchange will allow both the Commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the appreciated or depreciated values of the property relative to their tax bases Thus any exchange of property for other property which is in some significant sense different, such as interests in different mortgages of similar market value, or any sale of property causes a gain or loss to be realized.It does not matter in what sort of account the proceeds are held, or even whether the proceeds are in cash as opposed to some other sort of property. The beneficial owner realizes a gain or loss, even if s/he is not the legal owner. | The IRS summarizes the rule as follows: Generally, you cannot deduct personal, living, or family expenses. However, if you have an expense for something that is used partly for business and partly for personal purposes, divide the total cost between the business and personal parts. You can deduct the business part. For example, if you borrow money and use 70% of it for business and the other 30% for a family vacation, you can deduct 70% of the interest as a business expense. The remaining 30% is personal interest and is not deductible. Refer to chapter 4 of Publication 535, Business Expenses, for information on deducting interest and the allocation rules. Business Use of Your Home If you use part of your home for business, you may be able to deduct expenses for the business use of your home. These expenses may include mortgage interest, insurance, utilities, repairs, and depreciation. Refer to Home Office Deduction and Publication 587, Business Use of Your Home, for more information. Business Use of Your Car If you use your car in your business, you can deduct car expenses. If you use your car for both business and personal purposes, you must divide your expenses based on actual mileage. Refer to Publication 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses. For a list of current and prior year mileage rates see the Standard Mileage Rates. In practice, a mixed use expense will often be disallowed unless you can document in some way the percentage of use that was business related (e.g. with some kind of log). For inexpensive items, it is often cheaper and easier from a bookkeeping perspective to have dedicated business and dedicated personal items, even if it means that there is some duplication of purchases. Also, if property is owned by the LLC, but used for personal purposes by the owner of the LLC, this will very likely destroy the limited liability protection associated with the LLC. Comingling of business and personal property is a leading reason to pierce the company veil. | united-states Meet the word "clawback". The general rule is that anything you do simply for asset protection can be undone by the government or courts. See the excellent book by Adkisson and Riser titled Asset Protection. First, the creditor is going to ask about all your assets including transfers. You have to answer truthfully, or else you open a whole other can of worms. The creditor and court will look at the character of these transactions. Suppose you sell a Ferrari worth $200,000 appraised value, to your brother for $155,000. However, it was an open eBay auction. Plaintiffs review it, hoping to find it was a "vest pocket" sale rigged to be unappealing to anyone but family. Wrong: it was a competent and earnest listing, which did attract 12 stranger bidders, and 3 bidders took up your offer to let them inspect the car. And according to Ferrari brokers that price was realistic given the soft market. Your brother simply outbid them, for nostalgia reasons. You did get the money and did use it to settle with creditors. That sale will be considered legitimate, because there's extensive provenance held in reliable third party hands (eBay). You sell the Ferrari for $100 to your brother. The court will presume that you intend to buy the car back for $100 after your legal troubles have cleared. This sale will be declared invalid, the Ferrari clawed back, and the creditor will be able to target that asset. The same thing can happen if you are insolvent, expect to enter bankruptcy, and pay a creditor "out of turn". E.G. you settle your debt with the country club (so you can keep attending) before you pay your tax bill. The creditors, IRS or court can "claw back" that payment. That happened to my family's business once. Meet the word "Penalties". OK, so what does a dumb crook do? They lie about their assets. They testify "I crashed the Ferrari on the property, it was a basket case. I parted it out and chopped up the rest, threw it in the weekly trash week by week". And they can produce no documentation of any part sales. Meanwhile, plaintiff had already pulled DMV records and found it's currently registered... to the brother, with a DMV sale price of $100. They sent over a detective, who has pictures of it sitting in the brother's garage. And plaintiff gleefully maneuvered the dumb crook into a lie under oath. And now they face judicial punishment - including harsh fines, and jail for contempt of court or refusal to disclose. This bypasses the Fourth Amendment, so there is no trial for proof of guilt. But it's a government agency, not a private party All the moreso, then. Government has the right to bypass some of the rules for private parties - such as being able to do asset search, subpoena, or attach assets without filing a lawsuit. The IRS is probably the most experienced at pursuing asset hiders. They have "their own" Tax Court which does exclusively tax cases. | Do I have to pay taxes if I register the domain but the website income belongs to someone else? No. The person or company who runs, and/or profits from, the business is the entity under obligation to pay all the applicable taxes: Value Added Tax, income tax, corporate tax, and so forth. Unless you charge a significant amount therefor (see the comments), the mere registration of just one domain is unlikely to trigger tax obligations. |
Why is marriage with a minor legal in the US while sex with a minor is not? It seems that marriage with minor is legal in many states. Yet sex with a minor is not. So they can't consummate the marriage before the child is of legal age? In most cases, minimum marriage age is lower than minimum age of consent. States vary. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/child-marriage-us-states-america-minimum-age-bride-girls-a9467121.html It seems to me that sex by itself is a relatively minor issue compared to marriage, being pregnant, and losing virginity (which is a non-issue for a boy). Notice all of those almost always involve sex. So it puzzles me that sex is illegal but marriage and having children is legal with minor. | The ultimate answer as to why any given law is the way it is, as opposed to some other way that it might be, is because the legislature, or the courts if it is part of the court-made common law, chose to make it that way. Law is a human institution, and is not always logical or consistent. However, in this particular case, prohibitions on sex with a person under a given age (not always the age of majority, often known as the "age of consent") have a long history as a part of the law, which can be discussed here. The question seems to be missing a key detail. Where marriage is legal below the age of consent, sex within a legal marriage is normally an exception to statutory rape laws, that is laws against sex with a person under the age of consent. For example, the Arizona Criminal Code § 13-1405 provides in pertinent part that: A. A person commits sexual conduct with a minor by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person who is under eighteen years of age. But AZ Code § 13-1407 provides in pertinent part that: D. It is a defense to a prosecution pursuant to section 13-1404 or 13-1405 that the person was the spouse of the other person at the time of commission of the act. It is not a defense to a prosecution pursuant to section 13-1406 that the defendant was the spouse of the victim at the time of commission of the act. [§ 13-1406 prohibits sexual assault, defined as sex without the other party's consent. It includes classic forcible rape] ... F. It is a defense to a prosecution pursuant to sections 13-1405 and 13-3560 if the victim is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age, the defendant is under nineteen years of age or attending high school and is no more than twenty-four months older than the victim and the conduct is consensual. California Penal Code Section 261.5 provides in pertinent part that: 261.5. (a) Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor. For the purposes of this section, a minor is a person under the age of 18 years and an adult is a person who is at least 18 years of age. [emphasis added] Colorado Code [§ 18-3-402] provides in pertinent part that: (1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: ... (d) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; or [emphasis added] (e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than seventeen years of age and the actor is at least ten years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; [emphasis added] The Wikipedia article "Statutory rape" lists several reasons that have been given for such laws. It states: The original purpose of statutory rape laws was to protect young, unwed females from males who might impregnate them and not take responsibility by providing support for the child. In the past, the solution to such problems was often a shotgun wedding, a forced marriage called for by the parents of the girl in question. This rationale aims to preserve the marriageability of the girl and to prevent unwanted teenage pregnancy. [citations omitted] Obviously, this rationale does not apply if the parties are married, and the man is legally obliged to support his wife and child, as was the usual practice before modern times. The Wikipedia article also states: Statutory rape laws are based on the premise that an individual is legally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse until that person reaches a certain age. The law mandates that even if he or she willingly engages in sexual intercourse, the sex is not consensual. When an underage marriage requires parental consent, as it does in some US states, this rationale is less applicable. Another rationale comes from the fact that minors are generally economically, socially, and legally unequal to adults. By making it illegal for an adult to have sex with a minor, statutory rape laws aim to give the minor some protection against adults in a position of power over the youth. Again parental consent provides some protection against this concern, and as the classic adult predator would not be willing to marry the victim, an exception for marriage does not enable such predators a free pass. In general social policy and public opinion have treated sex within marriage differently, and more favorably, than sex outside of marriage. Rules in the common-law system reflect this. The legal requirements of a marriage have been thought to offer protection (both for the underage person and for society) against the problems that underage sex would otherwise cause, and so consensual sex with a person under the age of consent within a lawful marriage is generally legal. It might be debated whether this is good reasoning, and one might argue that laws on this point should be changed. There have been changes, piecemeal, state by state, not all in the same direction. One common, although not invariable, change is so-called "Romeo and Juliet" laws, which remove or reduce criminal penalties when the "adult" is not that much older than the "child" (often within 3 years of age, although laws vary by state within the US) and the sex was consensual. These are described at greater length in the Wikipedia article. Note that the AZ and CO laws quoted above have such provisions, and that CA reduces penalties in such cases in a section not quoted. Details of the various statutory rape laws within the US as of 2003 can be found at "Statutory Rape Laws By State". This gives specific legal citations to the laws involved. These are often still valid even if the details of the law have changed. | In the U.S. Those stories could constitute "obscenity," in which case they could violate all sorts of federal and state laws. I was surprised to discover on this DoJ page: 18 U.S.C. § 1465 and § 1466: It is illegal to sell and distribute obscene material on the Internet. Convicted offenders face fines and up to 5 years in prison. It is illegal for an individual to knowingly use interactive computer services to display obscenity in a manner that makes it available to a minor less than 18 years of age (See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) –Communications Decency Act of 1996, as amended by the PROTECT Act of 2003). It is also illegal to knowingly make a commercial communication via the Internet that includes obscenity and is available to any minor less than 17 years of age (See 47 U.S.C. § 231 –Child Online Protection Act of 1998). Under some state laws merely authoring or possessing obscene material is a felony. However, if the material is not obscene then it is actually protected by the first amendment. In fact many public schools (at least when I was growing up) required us to read "literature" (e.g., The Color Purple) that included descriptions of child rape and sexual abuse. Descriptions of purportedly actual sexual abuse of minors are also common in the testimony and published biographies of abuse victims. In the U.K. Such obscene stories are also illegal in the U.K. The relevant law is the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The Crown Prosecution Service provides information on the specific application of that and related laws. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). | So far as I can see, no US law required an airline to demand written parental consent for a passenger aged 17 in 2004, nor does any law requires such consent now. A passport could probably have been required. Minors in general may make and enforce contracts, including those for purchase of travel services. Parental consent is only required for a few specific activities, and air travel does not seem to be one. The question asks "Was I liable at 17 or 18...?" Liable for what? There is no liability unless there is wrongdoing or negligence or at least harm to someone. I don't see what there was to be liable for here, so there is no reason to try to determine who was liable. Had a law been violated, it would make sense to ask who was criminally responsible, but apparently none was. If no one was harmed there is no civil liability. I am not clear why the OP thinks there was a legal problem. Nothing in the question indicates that there would have been. | You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries. | If both parties are legal, permanent residents of California, their marriage is recognized under Californian law no matter where it originated (provided that the marriage doesn’t violate Californian law, e.g. if Alice were a minor). Alice and Bob would file for divorce in California and the matter would be adjudicated under a Californian court and under Californian law. After these proceedings, Alice and Bob would still be married in Afghanistan (and maybe other foreign countries? That’s a tricky question, so if someone else can figure it out please leave a comment!) but the US would cease to recognize the marriage. In no case would either a Californian or Afghan court make a ruling under the other’s laws. As far as child custody, property, etc. the divorce would essentially proceed as a normal divorce case, although things could become complicated if Alice and Bob own property in Afghanistan, which would usually still be able to be appropriated by a Californian court but, once again, the matter is complex since Afghanistan still recognizes the marriage. As you can tell, a divorce of this nature is not as complicated as one might think, but nevertheless could create some complicated legal situations. Also, marriage is regulated state-by-state, so other states may have different rules regarding foreign marriages. As always, the best path of action is to consult an attorney who specializes in divorce. Edit: A commenter brought up the issue of whether California would recognize a marriage where both parties weren’t present. While this varies by state, California generally doesn’t allow so-called “proxy marriage” unless one of the parties is deployed in the military. | germany Is there any act of husband or wife which can be considered as rape? The paragraph for sexual offences is §177 StGb. Obviously there are nuances between those offences, not everything is "rape", but all of it is illegal. To answer your question, yes, the same acts that are considered rape when they are not husband and wife. While marriage had been an exception, this was considered archaic by many and this exception was removed in 1997: Vergewaltigung in der Ehe ist seit Juli 1997 strafbar. Mit dem 33. Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz wurde das Merkmal außerehelich aus dem Tatbestand der Vergewaltigung, § 177 StGB, gestrichen, sodass seitdem auch die eheliche Vergewaltigung als ein Verbrechen geahndet wird. Translation: Marital rape has been punishable since July 1997. With the 33rd Criminal Law Amendment Act, the characteristic "extramarital" was removed from the definition of rape, § Section 177 of the Criminal Code, so that since then marital rape has also been punished as a crime. There is no mention of how consent is to be expressed or even that it needs to be expressed explicitely. | The legal solution is very simple. Under Philippine law (Title 1, Marriage, Article 2) No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. If you do not consent to the marriage during the ceremony, that is the end of the matter, you are not married. You can also refuse to apply for a license under article 11 (which requires your sworn application – refuse to swear). If your are threatened with violence, you can report this threat to the police, since not even your father is allowed to threaten to assault or kill you. |
Is it legal to bring an unarmed emptied/spent casing to school? I am a bit experienced with firearms and know how to handle them. I take them out to the range and fire them. My friend is a hunter and recently gifted me with a SPENT 30-08 Springfield casing AT SCHOOL. Now in my school handbook it states: It shall be a Class I felony for any person to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind, or any dynamite cartridge, bomb, grenade, mine, or powerful explosive on school property. it also states that Infraction 2 Possessions, uses, or transfer of anything deemed as a weapon. This is not classified as a weapon since the shell was ejected, the powder was burned, and the casing was deemed "Harmless". I am asking this because my elementary school completely shut me down for having a bullet scale not behind powder or in a casing and they almost expelled me about 10 years ago if my grandfather hadn't stepped in. I need an answer here to calm my father down. I live in the United States in South Carolina. | The first passage quoted appears to be from the North Carolina General Statutes section 14-269.2 (Weapons on campus or other educational property) The roughly corresponding section of South Carolina law is SECTION 23-31-215 (Issuance of permits.) subsection (M) (5). It is quite different in both wording and content. I do not find the second quoted passage in an online search, and I presume it is of the school's own writing. If you were in elementary school "about 10 years ago" it would seem that you are probably in high school or college now. Rules for those institutions are often quite different from elementary school and from each other. I have no way to evaluate what the school regulations on such subjects might be, but it is probably safer to leave your empty casing at home, although no rule you have quoted or that I can find online would prohibit it. An expended cartridge or casing is not a "gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind" and so this provision of NC 14-269.2 would not apply, even in North Carolina. An expended cartridge is not likely to be defined as a "weapon" either, and so the second quotes passage should not apply, although it is possible that the school regulations define "weapon" differently so that an expended cartridge is included. I have no way to know what other provisions the school regulations might include that would be relevant. | It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do. | It depends on the jurisdiction (naturally). The answer for Washington is "No, not exactly". RCW 9a.83.030 states that "The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file a civil action for the forfeiture of proceeds". The police can seize real property, but must file a lis pendens regarding the property. The bar that has to be cleared for forfeiture is "probable cause". The Institute for Justice has an extensive analysis of civil forfeiture, especially with a state by state summary (they aren't positionally neutral on forfeiture, but they are legally respectable). Then after a inevitable judgment (90 days if the judgment is sooner), the property is transferred. Notice is to be "served within fifteen days after the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person who has a known right or interest therein, including a community property interest", so they would notify Bob (assuming they know Bob is the real owner). Or, if Bob learns of the seizure that "If a person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right". It is possible that Bob's property could be taken (nothing prevents it), especially if Bob's hands are unclean. | He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse. | It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority. | Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence. | I'll use Wisconsin as a jurisdiction. If you file a false death certificate, that's a felony. But you probably wouldn't go that far. It could be disorderly conduct. In Wisconsin disorderly conduct is described as follows: Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. There's also a statute prohibiting "Disrupting a funeral or memorial service" but it won't apply in this case unless disorderly conduct applies. It would raise the penalty to a class A misdemeanor (or a class I felony if you somehow did it again after being convicted once.) On the civil side, there could be an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, either for the false report of your death, or for a "corpse" suddenly coming to life. This kind of lawsuit requires "extreme and outrageous conduct", but if this isn't, I don't know what would be. | I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario. |
US Copyright Question Let’s say I want to create a website that helps people troubleshoot a topic. I get my facts and information from site A, and use that info to write my own articles (Not copying word for word, but stating the same ideas). Site A has this policy: "Any duplication or use of images, diagrams, or text, or other electronic or printed publications is not permitted without the prior written agreement by Site A." Copyright.gov says this: "Copyright does not protect facts, ideas, systems, or methods of operation, although it may protect the way these things are expressed." So am I allowed to take the facts and information from Site A and use it on my own site? I will not take their images or interpretation of the facts, but just the facts themselves. And I will write my own articles and "fluf" based on the facts. Note: I live in the US EDIT: I tried to add this as a comment but it was too long. So my current understanding is that facts in lists of obvious order cannot be copyrighted, but their explanations or instructions can be. So can I do this? SITE A: How to fix a black screen on your computer Fixing a black screen can be quite easy! Just follow these simple steps. Restart by holding down the power key for 5 seconds (This can help refresh the system if something is not working right) Remove the battery, then replace it (This can help remove all background operations) Throw it out the window because there is nothing else you can do to fix it My Site This guide will show you how to fix a black screen on your computer! Try holding down the power button for five seconds to reset the device. If that does not work, try removing, then replacing the battery. Doing this can help stop any tasks your computer may be running. If the above steps don't work, bring your computer to a repair shop for further analysis. | copyright.gov is the oficial site of the US Copyriuht office, and is here quoting 17 USC 102(b) which is the actual copyright law. Under it, copyright protection extends to expression, but not to any idea, etc. However, these are not in conflict, because using information or ideas from a work to create a new and original work is not "duplication or use of images, diagrams, or text, or other electronic or printed publications" so Site A is also correct. However, a close paraphrase where the words are changed but the sentence and paragraph structure of a text is followed, presenting the same ideas in the same order in sentences of the same structure in the same order, may constitute a derivative work, and thus a copyright infringement. Wikipedia describes "close paraphrase" as: "... the superficial modification of material from another source." It goes on to give an example: Facts and ideas cannot be protected by copyright, but creative expression is protected. The test of creativity is minimal. Hilaire Belloc's 1897 More Beasts: (for Worse Children) illustrates creative expression in his description of a llama: The Llama is a woolly sort of fleecy hairy goat, with an indolent expression and an undulating throat; like an unsuccessful literary man. If this somewhat dubious source was used for the article on llamas and was still protected by copyright, it would be acceptable to say that the llama is an animal with a shaggy coat, and perhaps that it has a long neck. These are facts. But use of the phrases "indolent expression" and "undulating throat" might violate copyright. The original choice of words is part of Belloc's creative expression. Going further, the simile "like an unsuccessful literary man" is also creative, and is also protected. A clumsy paraphrase like "resembling a failed writer" might violate copyright even though the words are entirely different. More than the facts have been copied. So when the question reads: am I allowed to take the facts and information from Site A and use it on my own site? There answer is: "Yes, but the rewriting must be more than superficial, A mere substitution o synonyms will not do, the expressive structure must also be rewritten." However, if the expressive structure is simply a list of facts in an obvious order, such as alphabetical or chronological there is no copyright at all on either the words or the structure. see Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) edit The scenario added by edit looks reasonable. In this case it would seem that the operator of "my site" has probably not infringed the copyright on "Site A". | Ideas are not Subject to Copyright Copyright does not protect ideas. This is true in the US, in the UK, and under the copyright laws of every country that I know of. Article 2 paragraph 8 of the Berne Copyright Convention reads: The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. If the ideas of a work have been so re-written or recast as not to constitute a derivative work, the original author has no rights over the new work, which becomes a separate work with its own copyright. In such case there is no legal requirement for any credit or acknowledgement, at least not under copyright law. Also the use of a work whose copyright has expired, or is for some other reason in the public domain and not protected by copyright, may be legally made without acknowledgement of the author, or even under a false designation of authorship. Plagiarism Passing someone else's work off as one's own is generally considered to be plagiarism. Some people consider that using significant parts of another's work without proper credit is also plagiarism. Plagiarism is not a legal matter. It is considered highly improper in the academic and journalistic worlds, and may carry serious consequences there. It is considered unethical by many in other situations as well. However, it does not constitute copyright infringement, and copyright law cannot be used to prevent or punish plagiarism that is not also infringement. Works Created by an Automated Process or Script Whether an automated process can (at the current state of the art) truly extract facts and re-express them to a degree that would constitute a new, non-infringing work, I tend to doubt. Whether even sufficient alteration could be made by an automated process to reliably constitute fair use, fair dealing, or have any similar exception apply I also doubt. The US Copyright Office Compendium of Copyright practice (an official publication of the US Copyright Office) states in item 307: The U.S. Copyright Office will register an original work of authorship, provided that the work was created by a human being. The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor” that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Because copyright law is limited to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,” the Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the work. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) Similar legal limits on AI authorship apply in many other countries. Fair Use Fair use is a specifically US legal concept, and generally does not apply in any other country, although I understand that Israel has closely followed US law in this matter. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. That law specifies four factors which a court must consider in making a decision on whether a use is a fair use. particularly important is whether the new work will harm actual or potential markets for the original, and whether it will serve as a replacement for the original. US Courts also often consider whether a new work is "transformative", that is whether it serves a significantly different purpose than the original does. For example, in a popular song, lyrics are often intended to have an emotional effect. In a textbook on verse, the same lyrics may be used to demonstrate poetic technique, rhyme, meter, etc. That would be a transformative use. The presence of proper attribution or credit is often a significant factor in the decision by a court as to whether a use is fair. Using another's work without proper credit is significantly less likely to be found to be a fair use, although credit is not an absolute requirement of fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and the various questions on this site tagged fair-use for many more details on fair use. Fair dealing and Other Exceptions to Copyright In the UK and some commonwealth countries, there is a doctrine known as "fair dealing" It is somewhat similar to fair use, but is generally more limited. In other countries there are various "exceptions to copyright". Some countries have a few broad exception, some have many narrower exceptions. India, for example, has more than 28 separate exceptions. What is covered varies from country to county. Exceptions for teaching, comment and analysis, and news reporting are common. Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Berne Copyright Convention (linked above) recognizes such exceptions, stating: It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. The convention goes on to state, in article 10, that: (1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries. (2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice. (3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of this Article, mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author if it appears thereon. Thus article 10 paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention establishes an international norm that works used under an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing, shall be properly credited. Web-Scraping The law on computer scraping is still under development, and varies from country to country. If a site operator makes it clear to users that scraping is unwelcome, it may be unlawful, depending on the rules of the country or countries involved. When a Terms of Service (TOS) document constitutes a binding contract or agreement that users must accept, and when such an agreement prohibits scraping or other automated access, that prohibition may be enforceable. in Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) a US Federal district court held that sending a cease-and-desist letter and enacting an IP address block is sufficient notice of online trespassing, which a plaintiff can use to claim a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). However, that decision has been criticized by many, and was not a Circuit court or Supreme Court case. In the recent case of Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) the US Supreme Court narrowed the application of the language in the CFAA making access that "exceeds authorization" criminal. In the case of HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether scraping a public website after a cease-and-desist letter has been sent constitutes a violation of the CFAA (this was the fact pattern in Craigslist v. 3Taps). The Court sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration. The Ninth Circuit Court reaffiremd its prior decision that when the website had been made publicly accessible, the CFAA did not apply, even in the face of a C&D letter. This seems to overrule 3taps. Note that other means of prohibiting scraping may still be legally sound and enforceable. See "hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn" from the National Law Review. (This article and the decision it reports was brought to my attention via a comment by user Michael Seifert.) The article "Web Scraping Watch: Cases Set to Clarify Application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" discusses these cases in more detail, but does not incloude the latest ruling in the HiQ Labs case. Conclusion Unless the results of the "rewrite" done by the "program" are sufficiently original to be neither a quotation, a fair use, nor a derivative work, but a new work using the same ideas, they will need to qualify under fair use or some other exception to copyright (unless permission has been obtained). This may well require a proper attribution of the original article. In any case, such credit is considered to be ethically mandatory by many. The web-scraping done to obtain the initial data may or may not be lawful, depending on the contents of any TOS document, and whether the relevant laws make such a document enforceable, which is still not a fully settled point under the law, and which varies by country. Personally, I would think giving proepr credit much easier and safer than trying to justify not doing so, but that is not law, just my opnion. | united-states Functionality in general is not protected by copyright, although it may in some cases be protected by a patent. As the question noted, there are many IDEs and creating another one generally similar to those is not a violation of anyone's IP rights. The "look and feel" of a piece of software has been held by US courts to be protected by copyright. Broderbund Software. Inc., v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986), was a relativcly early case in which the visual display elements of a software program were held to be protected by copyright. In the decision it is said that; On the “Choose a Font” screen, no mechanical or practical factor compelled [defendant] to use those exact words (“Choose a Font”). He could have written: “Select a Font,” or “Indicate a Typeface Preference,” or “Which Type Style Do You Prefer,” or any combination of these terms. . . .The bottom line is that the designer of any program that performed the same functions as “Print Shop” had available a wide range of expression governed predominantly by artistic and not utilitarian considerations. Another relevant early case was Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F.Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). In this case, the Defendant "oftklone intentionally set out to "clone" or copy the functionality and interface of the popular program Crosstalk XVI (I was a user of thwt program many years ago). The court wrote: In the instant case, however, the arrange- ment of the status screen involves consider- able stylistic creativity and authorship above and beyond the ideas embodied in the status screen. It cannot be said that the idea of the status screen, i.e., using two symbol commands to change the operations of the computer program and reflecting that fact on a screen listing the computer program’s parameters/commands with their operative values, could not have been expressed in a large variety of ways. The defendants have never contended that they could not have arranged the parameters/commands in a wide variety of patterns without hampering the operation of their program. and found copyright infringement on that basis. Section 310 of Copyrightable Authorship: What Can Be Registered by the US Copyright office, says: The U.S. Copyright Office will not consider the so-called “look and feel” of a work. Invoking a work’s “feel” is not a viable substitute for an objective analysis of the work’s fixed and creative elements. See 4 MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON Copyright § 13.03[A][1][c] (2013) (criticizing the use of “feel” as a “wholly amorphous referent” that “merely invites an abdication of analysis”). The question asks: How far can I go in copying the user interface before it becomes copyright infringement ? There is no clear bright line on this matter. The more one copies interface elements and choices from a specific source, the stronger the case for infringement is. Using elements and choices that have become common industry practice in multiple works froim multiple developers and companies is probably safe. Clearly and extensively imitating the visual appearance and interface of a single specific work of software might well be infringement. One would be wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright law, and specifically "look and feel" issues, beforign publishing such a work of software. This issue is discussed extensively in Look And Feel In Computer Software (1993) by Jack Russo & Jamie Nafziger, published by Computerlaw Group LLP, which seems to be a law firm specializing in computer law. The Law of Look and Feel by Peter Lee (Professor of Law and Chancellor’s Fellow, University of California, Davis.) & Madhavi Sunder (Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.) is a 60-page law review article dealing with this topic. There is far more detail in these publications (and many others to be found on the net) than I can summarize in an SE answer. Configurable Interfaces The question asks whether the use of a configurable interface which could, but does not by default, imitate an existing interface would be infringement. I have not been able to find any case on point, or any discussion in a reliable source of this issue. Therefore, I am going to speculate. If there is a single choice between overall "themes" or "shells" and one of them imitates the interface from a protected program without permission, that would probably be legally the same as if the program shipped with that interface. It might or might not be infringement, depending on the details, as discussed above. If there are many settings, but the program is shipped with instructions advising a combination of settings that imitate another interface (or the developer or distributor provides such advice to users), that would probably be legally the same as if the program shipped in that configuration. If the developer provides a few preset configuration files which control these interface settings, and one such file results in settings that imitate another interface, that would also probably be legally the same as if the program shipped in that configuration. If there are many settings and there is no particular guidance or advice to a user on what combination to use, nor any predefined settings file, but users must discover (if they choose) a group of settings which imitate another interface, that is probably not infringement. I repeat that this section of the answer is based on general principals, but not on specific case law, nor on specific legal scholarship, and a court faced with this issue might rule otherwise. Before implementing this as a business plan, one might be wise to consult a lawyer with IP expertise. | The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony. | Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board. | Video would not be transformed in any way, and discussion would take place on reddit or other discussion platforms. So you are copying someone else's video and reposting it verbatim and in full in vimeo, without adding any additional content of your own? What is even the need for it? If you want to discuss the video in Reddit or similar, you can link to the original video instead of your copy. The usual way that fair use is used is when you include the relevants parts of the work being criticized as part of your video. There are other points to take into consideration; IP lawsuits are very specific of the details of the works involved (for examples it could be easier to consider fair use the inclusion of the full original work if it were a short one that if it were a long one) so it is difficult to give an absolute "yes" or "no" answer. But what you attempt to do seems highly problematic. If your argument were valid, what would prevent me from setting an URL to download the latest Hollywood blockbuster because I am commenting about it on Reddit? Imagine that I start selling copies of "The Avengers XXII: A day at the Park"1 adding just a note at the end saying "I like this movie, but they played frisbee a lot too much" as opinion/commentary/criticism... do you think that it would qualify as "fair use"?2 Coupled with the fact that it seems that copying the video seems not necessary for commenting on it (again, just link to the source) I would consider more prudent3 not copying it. 1Well, technically I would say that I were selling my opinion (which is perfectly legal), with the film included only as "fair use" to provide context to my opinion. 2Answer: No, it would not. 3I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, and this site does not provide legal advice. | It depends on the nature of the quote. Quotes from Buddha, Aristotle and Lincoln are out of copyright. Otherwise, the two basic questions are: who put that quote in fixed form, and is copying it "fair use"? If for example you happen to be at a political rally where a politician makes a noteworthy extemporaneous quote, you could be the copyright holder, because copyright law protects the person who first puts the work into fixed form. (If he's reading from prepared text, the speech writer or his employer would hold copyright). You can also quote small bits from any source, such as "Don't think about your errors or failures; otherwise, you'll never do a thing". It would not be "fair use" to chop up a novel into a sequence of 2-3 sentence quotes. This assumes that you manually assemble the quotes from legal sources, such as a print copy of "The Martian". Whether or not you can legally pull the data from an online source depends on the terms of service for that site. That lets out brainyquote as a source, so check the TOS for whatever source you get the material from. | You can read it, you can examine it to the point where you understand it, and then you can get inspired by the code and write your own code, without copying the code on the website, which does the same thing. If there is no license, then you can do what copyright law allows you to do. You are not allowed to copy the code, or create derived works by taking the code and modifying it. |
How you can take down copyrighted content in Telegram? Suppose that a content creator C has posted video courses and other online content for which fees are charged. Several Telegram channels and bots are posting these videos without C's authorization and causing significant financial harm to C. How can C close those channels? Suppose that C has already tried contacting [email protected] but did not get any responses. | The takedown process is explained in detail here. If you do not get a response from the ISP or hosting firm within the time allowed, you can bring suit against both the offender (if known) and Telegram in federal court, because failing to honor takedown notices forfeits Telegram's Section 230 immunity from liability under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. | Nothing in 17 USC 512, which includes the DMCA Safe Harbor and Takedown procedures requires an online service provider to notify others who may have made copies of content (including archive sites) claimed to be infringing that a takedown notice has been received or that access to the content has been blocked or removed. A separate DMCA takedown could be sent to the archive site. The internet archive honors robots.txt files set to deny access to a particular site, page, or section of a site by removing from public view all archived versions of that content. This is often done when a new owner acquires a domain and it is repurposed or put up for sale. To the best of my understanding there is no legal requirement that an archive act in this way, but the IA at least does so. | You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry. | You're talking about sites like Youtube, so I'll focus on that. That quote, which you bolded, was over-simplified. The actual law is 17 USC 512 (c) Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users. (1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider (A) -- (I) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; -- (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or -- (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C says and complies with a DMCA takedown notice). What you're talking about is membership fees (e.g. Youtube Premium)... or general advertisements that would be placed on any video without awareness of it being infringing. That does not violate Safe Harbor per se. At least not on a legitimate site which is dominated by legitimate content and makes an honest, credible effort to keep it that way. The important clause in (B) is "In a case..." Under (B), they lack the ability to control each activity (upload or view). Youtube's inability is due to receiving 500 hours (30,000 minutes) of uploaded video every minute, obviously requiring 30,000++ staff seats working 24x7 to curate. That would amount to about 200,000 staff - all of Google is around 50,000 right now. Even if a small site were able to moderate all content, they might still have a Safe Harbor defense if they could credibly say that they did not know the material was infringing. If someone created a "Juan Brown" username and uploaded blancolirio's videos from YouTube, they could say "we did not know that was not the real person". But if the video started with an HBO splash screen and tones, then heck no. But non-moderation is not an airtight defense. When sites are neglectful toward removal, they can soon develop a reputation as a haven for such infringing content - which the sites tend to embrace, since it brings many customers! This was the undoing of several music sharing sites in the 00's, since this awareness of their reputation, plus a lack of diligent removal, failed them on all three arms of 1(A) above. Remember that a competently run website that relies on user submissions is well aware of the DMCA and its case law, and has tailored its rules and enforcement to make it easy to defend a copyright claim. For instance, in the case of music, Youtube uses some human intervention but largely automated means to either take it down and give the uploader a copyright "strike" leading to a ban (which alienates their biggest contributors, especially when a popular Youtuber like blancolirio winds up with a distant car stereo in background noise, remember the detection is by "bot" and no human ever sanity-checks it). de-monetize the suspect video (uploader gets nothing, but, neither does YouTube). monetize it, but give the revenue stream to the rights holder due to an agreement with them. The last one is Youtube's preference with regards to music. As this was vastly easier, more practical and better for the community all-around, allowing whole classes of content to be created that would be prima-facie illegal otherwise. And it's content people are already creating and Youtube can't stop them, so it solves a big policing problem too. | Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly. | It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain. | In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost. | It is not obvious what the answer is. There are two fundamental questions – what will Youtube do in response to a particular action, and how can you put an end to the infringement? Youtube's response is driven by federal law, 17 USC 512. There is some danger to Youtube that you could sue them for contributory infringement, and this law specifies the conditions under which they can be immunized against such a suit. Referring to the stage of the DMCA take down process that you are at, they will put the material back up unless its designated agent first receives notice from the person who submitted the notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) that such person has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider’s system or network. As a prelude to filing such an action, the infringer must file a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the judicial district in which the address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of the United States, for any judicial district in which the service provider may be found, and that the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person Observe that the person has to consent to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction. Small claims court is a state court (copyright small claims court does not yet exist). Under 28 USC 1338, "No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights". For the most part, federal law preempts state law, but that guide might point to something about your case (an added right) that overcomes federal preemption. Supposing that that is the case, you might file a suit in state court over that added right: then, it is literally true that you "filed an action seeking a court order to restrain". You could also just go ahead and file an action in state court, because sometimes the court just does what it thinks is right, even if it doesn't have jurisdiction. Even if the suit is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, you will have "filed an action seeking a court order to restrain". However, Youtube may not be impressed, the way they would be if you picked Federal District Court. At this point, your options (for getting the material taken down) require filing a suit against the infringer. You can file an infringement suit in the UK, but the material will probably be restored on Youtube until they eventually receive a court order demanding that the material be taken down. You can file a suit right now in the relevant federal court in California and notify Youtube, and they should leave the material taken down. Since you are not suing Youtube in small claims court and the infringer is also not in California, you could not sue in small claims court (somebody has to be in California) unless you are suing Youtube (and will lose because they cannot be sued, per safe harbor rules). |
Can you de-identify a lawfully recorded audio-only call to lodge with the court and offer into evidence? Bob, while providing lawful notice of call recording by beep-tone warning notification, records calls with a company that does not record calls where it ordinarily conveys information that exposes it to liability for policy-driven fraud affecting the public at a broader scale in California. The representatives during these calls typically merely carry out the instructions they are given in most cases unaware of the potential natures of these assertions being of breach of law; however, the company’s business, profitability and rising stock prices are each detrimentally reliant on these frauds. Bob is able to prove that the company fires those who are found to have consented to go on the record and admit to certain omissions, fraud, malicious and/or oppressive acts. Is Bob permitted to de-identify, that is, alter the pitch of the speakers of the calls, and minimally censor parts of the call wherever Bob and the company rep talk at the same time so that the exact extent of change in pitch cannot be deciphered and then reversed to identify the employees or other representatives of the company to protect them from similar retaliation? Is this a grey area of falsifying evidence or is there case law or statute that permits de-identification where a reasonable suspicion or concern is present that a company would retaliate on those who effectively inadvertently whistleblow or are compelled to whistleblow by the lawfully created audio-only call records? | If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | Disclosures are prescribed by state law. Fair housing, which is a federal concept, pertains to issues such as using prohibited personal facts to determine whether to accept an offer. (Hazardous materials disclosures are also mandated at the federal level, but are are included in state requirements which can get pretty broad). If you are buying in Washington state, RCW 64.06.020 says what and how you must disclose. The list of disclosures is very detailed, covering title and covenants, water, sewer, structure, systems and fixtures, environment, and mobile home related. The only one of the 86 questions about smoke is whether smoke alarms are present. Thus smell of smoke is not a legally material fact that must be disclosed, in this state. The California disclosures, even longer, are here, and there is likewise no "smells bad" disclosure. It is unlikely that any state in the US mandates such a disclosure, since it is somewhere between a subjective evaluation and a self-evident fact. Some people are very sensitive to certain smells while others do not care. The burden is on the buyer to pursue matters of personal concern (in writing!), such as whether any dog has been present in the house in the past 5 years (some people care). You have to look carefully at the response. "Don't know" is usually a safe bet, unless you actually have factual knowledge. From what I can determine, Massachussetts is on the opposite end of the spectrum from California. There are some requirements imposed on real estate agents, and there is the federal lead paint disclosure, but otherwise it appears that nothing is mandated by law. This form seems to be used by the real estate association, and there is a question about "history of smoke/fire damage to structure". The reasonable interpretation of that is "has the house caught fire and suffered damage", so "no" from a cigar-smoker would not be fraudulent. If the intent of the question were to reveal if someone has smoked frequently in the house, that would he the question they'd ask. You can check whether you have this form and see what it says, but "smoke damage" would not normally be interpreted as meaning "smells a bit funny". | Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed. | The police are probably exempt from liability and the evidence is probably admissible pursuant to California Penal Code § 633 which states (referencing the two party consent statutes): (a) Nothing in Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 prohibits the Attorney General, any district attorney, or any assistant, deputy, or investigator of the Attorney General or any district attorney, any officer of the California Highway Patrol, any peace officer of the Office of Internal Affairs of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, any chief of police, assistant chief of police, or police officer of a city or city and county, any sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff regularly employed and paid in that capacity by a county, police officer of the County of Los Angeles, or any person acting pursuant to the direction of one of these law enforcement officers acting within the scope of his or her authority, from overhearing or recording any communication that they could lawfully overhear or record prior to January 1, 1968. (b) Nothing in Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 renders inadmissible any evidence obtained by the above-named persons by means of overhearing or recording any communication that they could lawfully overhear or record prior to January 1, 1968. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 633. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 372 P.3d 811 (Cal. 2016) (Tape recordings of defendant's telephone conversations with sister of murder victim admitted at murder trial did not violate state Invasion of Privacy Act, since sister was acting pursuant to direction of police inspector acting within the scope of his authority.); Armenta v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 61 Cal.App.3d 584 (1976) (Section 632 was not violated when sheriff's deputies recorded conversation between enrollee in methadone maintenance program and fellow enrollee who was acting as undercover informant, since prohibition under that section does not apply to police informants); People v. Collins, 182 P.2d 585 (Cal. App. 1947) (Testimony of district attorney's stenographer, who listened in and took notes over concealed microphone equipment, was properly admitted.) The year 1968 is when California adopted its statutory invasion of privacy law. Prior to that point and still today, the constitution's protection of privacy and requirement for warrants to do a wiretap is much narrower than the requirement under California's two party consent statute (but for Section 633 above). I also doubt that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy while in custody in the back of a patrol car or while otherwise arrested. There is definitely no expectation of privacy in that situation if the suspects have been given Miranda warnings. | It's not clear whether you mean that the entire agreement is carried out by text message. If you have a paper or electronic document stating what the parties will do, that is the agreement, and signatures are a conventional form of proof that there is an agreement. A handshake or a verbal statement – or text mesage – could also serve as evidence of the agreement, though there could be problems with the quality of the evidence (e.g. how do the witnesses know which piece of paper you agreed to). There is not a huge body of law surrounding text messages (and apparently none regarding text messages and contracts). We know that a text message is not a "printed receipt" (Shlahtichman v. 800 Contacts), and that a text message is a "call" w.r.t. the Do-Not-Call law (Campbell-Ewald Company v. Jose Gomez, Keating v. Nelnet). The closest that I have been able to come in terms of a decision about whether a text message is "written" is Commonwealth v. Mulgrave 472 Mass. 170, which states that While Massachusetts appellate courts have yet to approve admission of text messages or any other writing under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule... The wording "any other writing" implies that the court believes text messages to be "writing", which of course it is if you look at the plain meaning of the word "write". Contracts can be formed and signed by email: 15 USC 7001 states that a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form....a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation so the fact of electronic writing does not make the contract non-written. There must be a venerable and well-known rationale behind the written / oral asymmetry, which presumably has to do with the volatility of memory which would be front and center in a dispute about oral contracts. FRE 1001 "clarifies" that a "writing" consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent set down in any form, and that a "recording" consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent recorded in any manner. 15 USC 7001 also states that An oral communication or a recording of an oral communication shall not qualify as an electronic record for purposes of this subsection except as otherwise provided under applicable law So a recording of an oral contract would be useful to prove that there was an agreement, but would not change the fact that the contract is oral. | The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps. | Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful. |
Is there federal liability for broadcasting a false advertisement In the USA is there federal liability to a broadcaster if that broadcaster transmits an advertisement that makes a false commercial claim? For the scenario that I am thinking about, the advertiser has no knowledge that the claim is false and is not in a position to determine the truth of the claims made in the advertisement. Ex: The WXYZ station broadcast an ad that Acme brand ferret oil will make your hair grow, but this product has no effect on actual hair growth. | There can be liability. 15 USC 52 says that "It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement". In the case Standard Oil v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, one of the petitioners was Batten, Barton, Durstine Osborn, an advertising agency. In this particular case, using a set of tests established by previous case law, the court find that "BBDO knew or should have known of the deceptive nature of the F-310 advertising". See p. 13ff of this FTC document regarding advertising agency liability, which summarizes the situation that An ad agency does not have to substantiate independently the claims or scientifically reexamine the advertiser’s substantiation. However, it cannot ignore obvious shortcomings or facial flaws in an advertiser’s substantiation. Cases also include catalog marketers, infomercial producers and even Home Shopping Network. Given the right knowledge, a broadcaster could therefore be liable, if they know they are broadcasting false advertising. | I think the question answers itself : what's being put forward as a problem (that official organisations can cover their members' liability at events) is actually their main advantage. Liability doesn't go away - assuming your friend's lawyer's advice was accurate, it might have been better phrased as "liability will be on the participants". I'm not sure it's entirely right (though it might just be overly specific) in the way it's been reported - if there was anything that could be considered incitement to, or encouragement of, unlawful activity, there may be an additional liability on the person whose name is attached to the group, and possibly the platform used (though this is a young area of law at the moment). What's covered by the insurance will be dependent on the policy, so that's not a question that The Bloke On The Internet can answer. In terms of discounts, I don't see any reason these couldn't be offered on a social media group - or that there would be a significant difference between a social media group, an official or unofficial website, or coupons published in a magazine or distributed in flyers on a street corner. It's worth bearing in mind that distributors don't do this out of kindness - it's just advertising. If an official club, or the associated manufacturer (the owner of the brand), believed there was quantifiable loss - primarily financial, but possibly reputational - there may be grounds to demand any unofficial group cease and desist, irrespective of where (social media, websites, physical premises) they had a presence. But perhaps the greatest advantage (though I'm drifting off topic for this SE) for an official group is that it can use whichever medium it considers most useful at the time, or a combination of several. One tied to a specific social media platform will always be limited in its longevity. | Posting such a pic and statement may give grounds for a lawsuit, but probably not Overview That is going to depend very much on the the jurisdiction, and on the specific facts. If the statement that the pictured person owes a debt is false, this may be a case of defamation, but that was explored thoroughly in Can you post a picture in your business to embarrass or defame a customer? and its answers. See FindLaw's page "What Is Invasion of Privacy?" for an overview of the classic privacy torts. See also this page quoting the Restatement (2nd) of Torts, § 652 See further the Wikipedia article "Privacy laws of the United States" which gives a history of the four torts. Note that not all US states recognize all, or indeed any, of the privacy torts. Nor do all non-US jurisdictions. In some places these torts have been recognized, or blocked, by legislation, in others by court decision. And in the US they are limited by the federal First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Right of Publicity,aka Appropriation There is, in general, no right to privacy in one's physical appearance under any of the standard privacy torts, except that if one's likeness is being used to advertise something, or imply sponsorship or approval of a commercial product, many jurisdictions protect a right of publicity (sometimes called the tort of Appropriation of Name or Likeness). But here it does not appear that the image is being used to advertise or promote or sponsor anything, so that would not apply. Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion The tort of Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion would only apply if the picture were taken on someone's private premises or somewhere else there the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Otherwise it would not apply, there is no general right to privacy for a picture taken in public. Private Facts The tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts could possibly apply if the fact of the unpaid debt had been carefully kept secret, and if its disclosure would be highly offensie to a reasonable person. But nothing that is a matter of public record can be the subject of such a suit anywhere in the US, because under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) publication of facts derived from public records is protected under the first and fourteenth amendments, even against a specific state law granting protection. This will obviously not apply outside the US. False Light If the statement of the debt were true, but in some significant way misleading, the tort of False Light might apply. This is described by the Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 652E as: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. Note that the standard of (b) above is the same as the "Actual Malice" standard for defamation cases where the plaintiff is a public figure. False light cases are in many ways similer to defamation cases, and some jurisdictions have treated themn as identical tro defamation, while otrhrs do not recognize them at all. Nothing in the facts stated in the question would imply a false light claim, but more context might possibly support such a claim,. Conclusion Nothing in the question clearly indicates that any privacy-based tort would apply, but the facts are stated it a very brief way in the question. Further context and detail might clarify the answer one way or the other. This answer is largely based onunited-states law, althoguh some of it will apply elsewhere. | In the US, it is not illegal to lie in general. This includes lying about someone: it's not illegal per se to lie about them. What is illegal is slander and libel: lying about someone in a way that hurts their reputation. The defamation doctrine in the US is generally a common-law doctrine (i.e. the rules and limits are based on court decisions, rather than on laws passed by legislatures), although it may differ state-by-state. Depending on the state, some defamation may be criminal; there is no federal criminal defamation. US defamation law is largely defined through its interaction with the First Amendment. While libel is not constitutionally protected, punishment for libel is seriously limited by the need to avoid either punishing protected speech, or chilling potential protected speech (i.e. discouraging people from saying something that would in fact be protected, because they aren't sure whether or not it's protected). Libel in the US only applies to a false statement of fact, or an opinion which implies some false fact. If it can't actually be proven incorrect, it can't be libelous in the US. The question of whether it's a statement of fact doesn't just depend on the literal speech; it includes things like the context, and is a question about what a reasonable person would think. If I were to claim that someone was "literally Hitler," for instance, no reasonable person would think I was seriously claiming that the person was the former leader of Nazi Germany. Now, no reasonable person who is familiar with Twitter would ever assume that the tweet meant Obama literally stood up in front of the UN and said "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan." So, it only counts as libel if a reasonable person would think it implies some fact. But a reasonable person familiar with Twitter would most likely think Miesel is saying "The president's pollution plan is a pointless piece of political puffery planned to placate principalities and potentates." This is basically a matter of opinion. Even to the extent that it's not a matter of opinion, public figures in the US cannot win a defamation suit unless they show "actual malice:" the speaker must actually know or actually strongly suspect that their statement is false in some material way. It's not enough that a reasonable person would think "this might not be true;" the speaker themselves must doubt the truth of it (they must be reckless, not just negligent). Courts are also extremely deferential to defendants in these cases. While it is technically possible for a public figure to prove defamation, it is exceptionally difficult. If the person didn't know they were falsely attributing the quote, and honesty thought it was correct, they're in the clear. If the quote isn't supposed to be a statement of fact, but it implies false facts, but the speaker honestly thinks those facts are true, they're in the clear. Private figures don't have to meet the actual malice standard to prove defamation. They still need to show that the statement is a statement of fact or something implying false facts; if it's obviously a summary of something they really said, possibly with added editorial comment, they can't prove defamation. | Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this. | Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 28 USC 1605, subsections (b-d) are clearly irrelevant (mortgage foreclosure, maritime liens). Under (a), the exception to immunity can be because of (1) waiver, (3-4) property takings in violation of international law and other property issues, and (6) contract enforcement. Then there are two more potentially applicable subsections. First there is (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States It would be a stretch to apply this exception, but the law is full of stretches. Then there is: (5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to— (A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or (B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights There is a piece of congressional legal research suggesting that FSIA would not allow the suit, specifically looking at the Missouri suit against China. Missouri does indeed invoke (2) and (5). The analysis points out that there may be some connection between commercial activities and harm in the US, but that the harm is not "based directly on" such commercial activities. For example, operating a healthcare system in China does not directly cause damage in the US, nor does producing medical equipment, nor operating social media platforms (these are three of the claims of Missouri). Nor does conducting "commercial research on viruses by the Wuhan Institute and Chinese Academy of Sciences." SCOTUS explained in Argentina v. Weltover that the damage in the US must follow "as an immediate consequence" of the activity, not just an eventual result. The main problem with the territorial tort claim in (5) is that the tort would appear to be a failure to perform a discretionary function in "allowing the virus to spread," but that reduces to saying that they failed to take sufficiently strenuous action to prevent the spread, and perhaps suppressing information. But the governments have discretion in these matters. So under existing law, it is more likely than not that the courts would not apply an exception to the jurisdiction question. | The hypothetical situation would be a material misrepresentation of the facts, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation - both are grounds for nullifying the contract. Under your hypothetical this is almost certainly material and is certainly a fraudulent misrepresentation. A fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts pertinent to a contract occurs when one party, to a bargain for exchange, misstates a fact and either knows or believes that the fact is not true, or is not sure whether or not his statement is true but claims it to be true nonetheless. If a party to the contract relies on the fraudulent misrepresentation and enters into a contract based on that misrepresentation, the contract is voidable by the innocent party. A material misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that will induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract. If a misrepresentation is material to the contract, the contract will be voidable by the relying party even if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. So, in this scenario, the contact would be voidable because there is both a material misrepresentation, as well as a fraudulent one. If the other party suffers a monetary loss because of the deceit, you would almost certainly be held responsible for any damages that may flow from the inducement. | In general, knowingly making a false statement as part of a commercial or financial transaction, or as part of a contract, with the intention that the other party will rely on that statement and be harmed by this is likely to be fraud. However, there are some limitations. For the lie to be common-law fraud: The other party must in fact rely on the false statement. The other party must suffer harm as a result of relying on the false statement. The reliance must be reasonable. If a seller advertises having new 1957 model cars in 2020, a court might well find that this was so improbable that no reasonable person would have relied on hte statement, and that therefore it is not fraud. Whether the reliance is reasonable depends on the overall facts of the case, and the details might affect what is considered reasonable. In some jurisdictions such a false statement might be actionable false advertising even if it is not fraud. If the US mails are used as part of a fraud or attempted fraud 18 U.S. Code § 1341 applies. This law applies whether any actual harm occured or not, adn whether the victim relied on the false statement or not. It is commonly known as "mail fraud". 18 U.S. Code CHAPTER 47 is a US Federal law that prohibits a variety of false statements and false documents. Section 1001 of this chapter prohibits false statements and documents "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States" but I am not clear if this would apply in the case described in the question. Other sections of chapter 47 deal mostly with false statements made to the US Government, or to obtain money or benefits from the government, Or in connection with various particular regulated activities, and do not seem to apply to the case in the question. According to the Justia article on Fraud: Federal fraud statutes, along with most state laws, require proof of a “scheme or artifice” to defraud. The statutes do not provide an explicit definition of these terms, but courts have developed definitions through precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Carpenter v. United States that the terms apply to any plan intended to deprive another of property, regardless of whether it would cause immediate financial harm. However, I think that a scheme such as the one described in the question would be more likely to be prosecuted by a US State than by the US Federal government. Either the state where the maker of the false statements was at the time of the statements, or the state where the victim was present could prosecute. |
Is it legal to dismiss an employee for resigning? Let's say I work as an employee at a company, and have a contract that states I must give a minimum of 1 month's notice in writing to resign. In trying to be fair to my employer, and to give them additional time to hire a replacement, I give them 2 months notice in writing. My employer then immediately terminates my employment with 1 months notice (which is the minimum required by the contract). Was my resignation a legal reason for the employer to dismiss me? | The legal reasons for dismissal in the UK are described here: it includes such things as being unable to do your job, redundancy, violence on the job, being sent to prison, the factory burning down. It does not include quitting. "Unfair dismissal" is described here, and it says Situations when your dismissal is likely to be unfair include if you...resigned and gave the correct notice period This page then describes recourse for unfair dismissal. §108(1) of the Employment Rights Act says that Section 94 does not apply to the dismissal of an employee unless he has been continuously employed for a period of not less than two years ending with the effective date of termination. §94(1) then says that "An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer". §108(2) also lists numerous cases where the two-year tenure condition does not apply. Most of those reasons clearly don't apply to the act of giving notice (it includes e,g, pregnancy, whistle-blowing etc), which means that any firing because an employee is pregnant (etc.) is automatically unfair, regardless of duration of employment. §104 which is within the set of conditions that are "automatically unfair" is "Assertion of statutory right", (1)An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee— (a)brought proceedings against the employer to enforce a right of his which is a relevant statutory right, or (b)alleged that the employer had infringed a right of his which is a relevant statutory right. However, the reason for being fired in this case has nothing to do with bringing proceedings against the employer, or alleging infringement of a statutory right. As far as I can determine, being fired because you quit is not deemed automatically unfair in the sense of short-circuiting the two year employment requirement; and for an employee with less than two years of service, no justification is necessary. | I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht". | If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand. | Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed. | Don't do it. It is of course breach of contract when you signed a contract with no intention to fulfil it. However, you are talking about Germany. German employers take a very dim view of this. While a UK employer would say "good riddance" and do nothing, many German employers would see that as a personal insult. It's something that you just don't do in Germany. There's a good chance that they will do what they can to make you miserable if you do this. For example, inform authorities that you just cancelled your contract which may get a visa cancelled. Or tell the company that you want to start with, which will also take a very dim view of this. Or sue you for damages, not because they want to get the money, but to make you miserable. On the other hand, if they send you a contract, and you sign it, you have a contract. | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful. | Some jurisdictions tend to favor non-compete agreements, others hold most of them to be unenforceable. From a very quick search, BC is a little reluctant to enforce them, but they can be valid if sensibly drawn. However, the text you included in the question is not a non-compete agreement at all, it is a non-solicitation agreement, a much less restrictive agreement, which is significantly more likely to be upheld. The agreement quoted in the question does not mandate the employee continuing to work for the employer for any minimum time, not two years, and not six months. (Another provision might specify a required notice period, but that was not quoted and may not be in the agreement.) The agreement quoted does not prohibit the employee, after s/he leaves the job, from working for a competitor of the former employer, not even for a brief period. What the agreement quoted does do, is prohibit the employee from asking individuals and businesses who were customers of the former employer for orders for the same products as are sold by the former employer. This applies to orders on behalf of the employee personally, on behalf of a new employer, or on behalf of a business in which the employee has some sort of ownership stake (such as partner or shareholder). That is all that the quoted language prohibits. This means that the employee cannot ask those who were customers of the old employer, to buy from or through him, the same products that the old employer sells. It does not mean that the former employee cannot sell such products, if the inquiry comes from the customer. This sort of agreement is primarily aimed at preventing a salesperson from taking a client list with him or her to a new employer, and trying to get them to move their business from the salesperson's old employer to his or her new employer or business. If the employee is primarily an instructor and does not also act as a salesperson, this agreement will have almost no effect on him or her. This site discusses such agreement an myths about them in BC, Canada. It says: Non-competition clauses can be enforced by courts in BC. It is true that employers face an uphill battle in getting a judge to agree to enforce a non-compete, but it can and does happen. If you are wondering whether your non-compete will stick, ask an employment lawyer. Enforceability of a non-compete depends on the specifics of the wording of the clause itself and the overall employment contract. Some key considerations are whether the clause is clearly worded, and whether it is limited in time, geography and scope of what is covered. If a non-competition clause is enforced by a judge, it will only be applied to prevent the employee from the specific activities listed. If the employer has missed something from the clause, or there is a “loop-hole,” that is generally fair game. Many contracts include non-solicitation (aka non-solicit) clauses, which are meant to prevent the employee from contacting clients. Non-solicitation clauses are still an uphill battle to enforce, but slightly easier than a non-competition clauses. This is because non-solicits don’t dictate where an employee can work, just what business they can seek out. Even if there is no contract, obligations to respect confidential information, and fiduciary duties (in the case of key employees) last beyond the end of employment and can limit competition. An online paper on "Is my Employee’s Non-Compete Agreement Enforceable?" by Lisa Stam says: In Canada, courts have generally been reluctant to uphold agreements that have the effect of restricting an individual’s ability to earn a living or pursue the job of their choice. Indeed, courts take the initial position that restrictive covenants in employment agreements are unenforceable, unless the employer can demonstrate otherwise. A restrictive covenant must jump through several hoops to be deemed enforceable. ... A non-solicitation agreement will allow a former employee to work for a competitor, but prevent them from soliciting the clients (and possibly the employees) of their former employer for a specific period of time. Former employees may have close relationships with clients. Allowing them to solicit these clients may give them an unfair advantage against the former employer in the marketplace. If the employee does not solicit the client, but the client leaves to follow them anyway, there is little an employer can do. ... If a court finds a restrictive covenant clause unreasonable, for example it restricts solicitation for 12 months when 6 would have been reasonable, they will not read it down to fix it. Canadian courts require the employer to get it right the first time and a flawed clause will therefore normally be unenforceable. In short, the above quoted agreement may not be enforceable. But if it is, it only restricts solicitation, not competition, and does not require the employee to work for the employer for a period of two years, or any other minimum time. |
Copyright: Idea vs Execution? I have been helping a nonprofit by developing a piece of software that they needed. The software is more-or-less built to their specs in a "functional" way, but I wrote 100% of the code: they are not programmers. Anyhow, we didn't make any kind of contract at the beginning verbally or otherwise. Who owns the copyright to all of this? Do they have any rights to it at all for providing "ideas"? | The Organization Does Not Own the Copyright As you were clearly not an employee of the organization, and did not have a specific contract with them, this was not a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH). Therefore, the copyright initially belonged to the author, in this case the programmer, that is you. That being so, it would require a written document to transfer the copyright to another during your lifetime. In future there should be a written agreement in such a case, spelling out just what rights are to be retained by whom. It can save lots of trouble. The organization would have an implied license to use the software. The terms of this would be defined by the conduct of the parties, and might be a matter of dispute. Probably there would be a non-exclusive license without any fee or ending date. Probably there would be no license to distribute to others unless you explicitly grant one. Specific US Laws 17 USC 101 defines a WFH: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. (emphasis added) 17 USC 201 provides that: (a) Initial Ownership. — Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire. — In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. ... (d) Transfer of Ownership.— (d) (1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession. (d) (2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. 17 USC 204 provides that: (a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent. | It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t. | Yes, you can fork it - but you can’t use it GitHub explain what’s a public deposit with no licence means here. If you find software that doesn’t have a license, that generally means you have no permission from the creators of the software to use, modify, or share the software. Although a code host such as GitHub may allow you to view and fork the code, this does not imply that you are permitted to use, modify, or share the software for any purpose. Your options: Ask the maintainers nicely to add a license. Unless the software includes strong indications to the contrary, lack of a license is probably an oversight. If the software is hosted on a site like GitHub, open an issue requesting a license and include a link to this site. If you’re bold and it’s fairly obvious what license is most appropriate, open a pull request to add a license – see “suggest this license” in the sidebar of the page for each license on this site (e.g., MIT). Don’t use the software. Find or create an alternative that is under an open source license. Negotiate a private license. Bring your lawyer. | By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement. | There is no IP in ideas! There is copyright in writing it down - they can't use your exact words without permission. However, sending it to them in the form of a suggestion would give them a pretty much unassailable argument that you have given them an implicit licence. You can patent an invention (not an idea), claim IP in a trade mark (also, not an idea), register a design (again, not an idea) and hold copyright in an artistic work (once more, not an idea). They are required to keep confidences but offering them a suggestion probably doesn't count as supplying confidential information. I can see no risk in acting on customer suggestions. Hence, the idea to raise prices can be acted on or not at the discretion of the company. | is contract text itself subject to copyright? What are my options? It largely depends on the originality of your contract. C & J Management Corp. v. Anderson, 707 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (2009) points to multiple references against preclusion of "a copyrightable interest in a contract". But you would need to prove that your competitor copied "original elements" of your contract including "a minimum degree of creativity and originality required to support a valid copyright". See Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (1973). Your post provides no information that would help identifying or ruling out this issue in your matter. Without realizing, you might have paid dearly for boilerplate language that your lawyer copied from somewhere else. Indeed, there is so much regurgitation and copy/pasting in the legal "profession" (judges included, as is notorious in judicial opinions they release and in the similarities --verbatim-- among the procedure law of many, many U.S. jurisdictions). That regurgitation is not bad in and of itself, though, since what matters is the expeditious administration of justice and the protection of your rights, rather than obtaining creative expressions authored by some lawyer. You might end up wasting valuable energy and money if you went after the competitor for something like this without first assessing the extent of originality in your contract. Focus instead on the much more detrimental fact that your competitor "plays dirty in general". | No Let’s assume the most generous interpretation: you came up with a fully fleshed-out idea for a television show - name, characters, plot, scene-setting - the lot. You told this idea over the phone to someone else who made this show incorporating every single part of your idea. Here’s the rub: nobody owns ideas. Unless you had them sign a non-disclosure agreement before you told them (which you didn’t), they are free to use your ideas however they like. | You don't need the copyright. You need a license that allows you to use the artwork. If there was no agreement in writing or verbally about a payment, then she owns the copyright on all the artwork she created, and you have no license. Publishing your app without copyright or license would be legally very dangerous; it would actually be copyright infringement. You have no right to demand the copyright or a license. You can persuade the designer, usually by paying money, or by paying some percentage of the income from the app, to give you the copyright or a license to use the graphics. And you definitely want things in writing. How to get a license? You find the person, send her a letter asking for a license, which would be for example a letter saying "I hereby grant s1ddok the non-exclusive right to include the artwork listed below, to which I hold the copyright, in the applications XXX and YYY, and to sell copies of those applications including the artwork, in exchange for a payment of $ZZZ" or something similar. She may do this if offered an appropriate amount money, or a percentage of the sales or profits, or some amount per application downloaded. A copyright transfer is a bit more complicated (especially if she is abroad) and will also cost you more, because copyright transfer means she loses the right to her own works. |
I want to quote some of a book but publisher is defunct? As I've stated, I want to quote some of a book in one that I am writing, from the 1800's. The publisher is defunct now. So do I still need permission or can I just add it? Don't want to get in trouble for using it but I can't find a way to get permission? I want to add from Jane Eyre by Charlotte Bronte Mr. Rochester had given me but one weeks leave of absence: yet a month elapsed before I quitted Gateshead. I wished to leave immediately after the funeral; but Georgiana entreated me to stay till she could get off to London: wither she was now at last invited now by her uncle, Mr. Gibson; who had come down to direct his sister’s interment, and settle the family affairs. Georgiana said she dreaded being left alone with Eliza; from her she got neither sympathy in her dejection, support in her fears, nor aid in her preparations; so I bore with her feeble-minded quailings, and selfish lamentations, as well as I could, and did my best in sewing for her and packing her dresses. The publisher was Smith, Elder & Co. | A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain | This almost certainly falls under fair use. In fact, there are numerous examples of such books already. You are using a small portion of the work, and it is for a transformative purpose- teaching about it. | A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission. | After some more research, I found several german retailers like Frankonia and Brownells, which do ship firearm magazines to Austria. My reasoning is as follows: If they were regulated in any way, they would either be confiscated or sent back to the store. In either way, the customers would get in contact with the store, and the store would stop shipping magazines to Austria. Since I was unable to find a german store which specifically mentioned that they would not ship to Austria, I am going to assume that they are not regulated and can be purchased freely. | You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime. | For a particular poem(s) the copyright term in ROK is Life + 50 years. In copyright, these are measured as calendar years so it will enter the public domain on 1 January 2019. That is, unless you plan to use it in a country that doesn't observe the rule of the shorter term (like the USA) - in those countries it may still be under copyright based on the term using their individual domestic law. Ask another question if you want this clarified. Copyright in the anthology belongs to the person who created that work i.e. the editor(s) who selected and arranged those particular poems from those particular poets. The duration is measured from the (last of) the editor's death(s). IF you are not copying or deriving from the anthology (i.e. you are only using one of the poets and are arranging them in a different way), this is irrelevant to you. | This would be considered a derivative work, which is not peritted without permission. Copyright duration varies by country but is at least the lifetime of the author plus 50 years. In France, it is 70 so Giraud's work becomes public domain in 2082. The second piece is public domain and therefore fine. | Someone similar say While it is quite true that no one can have a copyright that excludes all others from preparing their own unique copy of the Bible or other public domain works for copyright protection, our Bibles and other materials are not exactly like any others and are fully protected by copyright laws in all countries So for example, I could theoretically take an ancient public-domain texts and republish it in some modified form. Copyright does not protect the original, but it does protect my modifications. To the extent that Mechon Mamre does include protected material (of their own creation), and Snunit redistributed that material with permission, Mechon Mamre might sue you for copyright infringement. Since they don't say what their creative contribution is, it's hard to evaluate the merits of their claim. |
Why are terms and conditions of a website legally binding? There are many resources (e.g. this) about ways of creating legally binding terms and conditions for a website. What I don't understand is: why can't a user claim that terms and conditions were not displayed to him or that he was allowed to proceed despite not checking the box or clicking the agreement button (e.g. due to a malfunction of the website)? | The user can always claim that. Whether such a claim will be believed is another matter. A party to a contract with a "wet-ink" signature can claim that it was forged or that the signer was impersonated. But such claims are hard to prove, particularly if they are not true. The answer to the question in the title is that terms are binding if the user freely agrees to them, and if they meet the conditions for a legally binding agreement in the relevant jurisdiction. The question in the body is more about what evidence will establish this. Suppose the code behind a web-site is so designed that no user is allowed to proceed without affirmatively accepting the ToS, and the operator can demonstrate this. That will be persuasive evidence that the user did accept the terms. If the site logs the consent in a database along with a timestamp that would be further evidence. A journaling database provides an audit trail of changes, which would be further evidence. Evidence of other users that the site always worked that way, and of coders that the code had never permitted a user to proceed without accepting the ToS might also help. Backups of the DB stored with a 3rd party including the consent logs would also provide evidence that the timestamps were present and unchanged. A hash of the log can be stored on the blockchain. The site could also send a "registration accepted" email to the user (if the user has provided an email address) which could include a mention that the user had accepted the ToS. Such an email would be reserved in the logs of the senders and receiver's email providers, and could be retrieved as evidence. Ultimately it will be a question of what the finder of fact believes, if the matter goes to court. And as user Amon says, the US standard is preponderance of the evidence (that is, the evidence is at least a little bit stronger on one side. This is sometimes loosely expressed as more than 50% or 51% or better proved, but courts do not in fact measure degrees of proof in numbers), not absolute proof. | There are only two arguments you can make: The match making website did something wrong. I don't see how you can make this argument unless you have some reason to suspect they actually did something wrong. Strict liability applies. I think this fails for two reasons. One is that no theory of strict liability that I know of would apply to this situation. The other is that this is precisely the kind of risk that a user of the site should be protecting themselves from because it is much easier to detect fraud when you have extensive contact with someone than when you just operate a matchmaking service. So absent some evidence they did something wrong, such as ignoring specific warning signs from this particular user, there is no way such a suit could succeed. | It is not critical, however, it can help and it can't hurt. You own the copyright and if you were to take legal action you would need to prove this - the notice is evidence you can use to do so. Note that some jurisdictions (including the US) require registration of copyright before commencing legal action and that damages only accrue from the date of registration. A more significant issue is: what rights does the website owner have? They may believe that their contract with you involved a transfer of the copyright to them: did it or didn't it or doesn't it say? | Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts. | The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done. | You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted. | There are three answers here. First, as is common on this site, you are using the term, "legal" and "illegal." Those are not legally meaningfully terms. A good lawyer won't use those terms to mean allowed or disallowed. We talk in terms of potential civil or criminal liability, or other sanctions and consequences. To say that something is "legal" does not communicate much. Second, all contracts are governed by a duty of good faith. That means that you cannot try to "trick" someone with the terms of the contract and expect to enforce that contract against them and you cannot try to skirt your obligations by finding a tricky form of compliance not within the mutual understanding of the agreement. As with all things, defining good faith is not easy, and depends on the specific context of a situation. It is worth distinguishing between the duty of good faith, and the duties one owes to a fiduciary; good faith is surely far less, but nevertheless still meaningful. Third, a defense to non-performance of a contract is that the agreement as written is unconscionable. A contract that is a grossly unfair deal where the contract was not actively negotiated (i.e. Blindly signing a bad form contract), may fall under this category. Note: I am not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; contact a licensed attorney in your area; do not rely on my statements; I merely am providing a general answer that is academic in nature. | It sounds to me like the parties made proposals with an intent to draw them up and formalize them but didn't intend to form binding agreements. The first agreement sounds vague. The second was committed to writing, suggesting that the written deal was to be the real agreement, and not executed. In the last case, it doesn't appear that there was an agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term, which was the price. Going to court is expensive. It is expensive whether this is litigating underlying disputes or trying to enforce an alleged oral settlement that is disputed. Also, settlement discussions that don't result in a resolution are not admissible as evidence in court. Making a deal would be nice, but Dave's concept of what constitutes a deal seems to be out of touch with reality. |
Is a defendant allowed to contribute to his defense during trial without arguing pro se? I have been watching the Kyle Rittenhouse trial. In the deliberation to determine jury instructions, much ado was made about a grainy video purportedly showing Kyle point his gun at Joshua Ziminski. The judge was about to deny the video, but the prosecution was able to argue for approximately an hour about it until eventually the judge allowed it. For most of the argument, the defense said almost nothing and just let it go. A panel of lawyers I was watching commentate on the hearing said it was a critical error and may have blown the case. I'm not saying Kyle had the knowledge to do this, but could another defendant in a similar case realize the moment was critical and step in when his lawyers were dropping the ball? | Your lawyer must act in your best interests; not follow your directions Lawyers are professionals and they are supposed to use professional judgement in how they run a case. While a client can suggest a course of action, the lawyer is not only not obliged to follow it, they would be committing malpractice if they unquestioningly did so. Just like a doctor would be if they unthinkingly implemented a patient suggested treatment plan. A panel of lawyers I was watching commentate on the hearing said it was a critical error and may have blown the case. So, a group of Monday-morning quarterbacks who weren’t chosen and don’t know all the facts would have done it differently? Perhaps it was a mistake. Or, perhaps the lawyer judged that there was nothing he could say that would help and considered that sounding desperate about the video would elevate its import in the minds of the jury. | So the most obvious is that the U.S. Miranda Rights specifically mention right to legal counsel and right to state provided legal counsel (Public Defenders) if you cannot afford legal counsel (Contrary to some opinions, these guys are very good at their job... it's just that they are also very over worked and private industry pays better). While the right exists in the U.K., the U.K. version of the required reading of rights only speaks to right against self-incrimination, which, if you want a difference is a good place to look. In the self-incrimination clauses, the U.K. and U.S. versions are very different. The U.K. right is a qualified right where as the U.S. is an absolute or unqualified right. This is a distinction which sounds silly upfront but is very serious in how things will transpire. Suppose that you are arrested for the murder of your spouse. You definitely did not do and the "one armed man" definitely did. Either way, you remain silent during interrogation. At trial, your defense is "It wasn't me it was the one armed man" and you intend to present evidence of this. In the U.S. this would be permitted, no further questions asked (or at the least, defeated by other means unrelated to you giving the cops the cold shoulder). In the U.K., this would be first be challenged by the prosecution with "Why didn't you say this when you were arrested?" and your silence on this matter will be used against you. In fact, asking that challenge in the U.S. is very inappropriate, as was recently seen in the Kyle Rittenhouse trial, where the Prosecution did ask that up front to Rittenhouse, prompting a scolding from the judge out of view from the jury. The reason for this is that in the UK there are more strict rules placed on cops during interrogation than there are in the U.S. (In the former, cops cannot lie to you about the facts of the case and they cannot interrupt your statements to them once you start to respond. This is par for the course in the U.S. for cops. In fact, in the U.S., shouting "It was the one armed man" on arrest can do more damage than just shutting up until you're before a judge and jury since that lets the prosecution use the implausibility of a one armed man against you (in both nations, statements that are against your interest do not violate hearsay rules, thus, the cops will only use such a statement against you... it's your job to prove it true or at least plausible enough to make a jury doubt the cops are right.). Also note that this is England and Wales jurisdictions only. Scotland, having its own legal system, retains the right against self-incrimination as an absolute right. Also a big obvious one but the read rights would not be called the "Miranda Rights" by the police or legal community (it may be, by the crooks they are arresting who have no clue that the TV version might be the U.S. one since it's more likely to get shown there than on U.K. TV.). In the U.K. they would be called "Standard Cautions" or "Reading the rights". The U.S. name derives from the SCOTUS case Miranda v. Arizona which was the ground-breaking case that made this required by all police when interrogating a suspect. Additionally, each state has their own version, which generally reads the same way (they explain your 5th and 6th Amendment rights to silence and an attorney) and may vary on asking if you choose to waive the rights upon receiving an affirmative answer that the rights were understood ("With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?" is the proper phrasing). They also are read from cards (business card to index card sized) where the right is printed in English and Spanish and the suspect must sign it as part of acknowledging that their rights were read. | Your main misunderstanding is that opposing counsel cannot testify. He can ask a question, such as "Did you say ...?", which provides Einstein an opportunity to answer in a way that maintains the credibility of his testimony, but consel cannot just enter his own testimony into the record. In addition, counsel on "his side" has the opportunity to pose appropriate clarifying questions, e.g. could ask "Did you repudiate that idea 88 years ago?", though there is a problem that the attorney may not have the technical expertise to recognize the subject-matter question that they should ask. Expert testimony does not attempt to determine the state of scholarship in an area, it attempts to resolve a specific factual matter. The two are not the same thing. Einstein would not testify as to what his general and special theories of relativity say, except in a bizarre universe where some person is accused of the crime of denying the theory of relativity. Instead, he might be testifying for the defense, where the defendant is accused of an act that (it turns out) is physically impossible in light of the theory of relativity. If Einstein had been in the habit of posing random mutually-contradictory conjectures on a weekly basis, opposing counsel's question could be relevant to establishing that the witness's testimony is not reliable. Theoretically, counsel could "hint" that the witness is scientifically flighty, so Einstein would have to have a credible explanation for changing his position. It is easy to demonstrate that scientists in general do change their positions as knowledge expands, so Einstein's burden would not be very substantial. | So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification. | In the United States, the question that determines whether it's perjury is whether or not you believe what you said was true. Whoever— (1) having taken an oath..., willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) ... willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury. So if an attorney asks if you saw the defendant, and you believe you saw the defendant, "yes" is generally going to be the correct answer. You're free to qualify your answers or answer questions that weren't put to you, but you aren't obligated to do so. Generally speaking, our adversarial system puts the burden on the defense to ask if you're sure, how the lighting was, whether you were wearing your glasses, whether you were drunk, etc. | The California jury instructions for the crime of perjury give more detail on what it means to commit perjury: it's not just that you make a statement that is false, you have to willfully state that the information is true even though you know it is false. If you have a belief that you will be convicted for perjury (or any crime) by testifying, you may invoke your 5th Amendment right (I assume you are not testifying as the defendant in a criminal matter). You might (theoretically: see below on immunity and perjury) be granted immunity from prosecution, in which case there is no 5th Amendment right to refuse to testify (you are not putting yourself in criminal jeopardy), and the court can order you to testify. Or, you might not be granted immunity and still be ordered to testify. The federal immunity statute, 18 USC 6002, also needs to be scrutinized. When ordered to testify, "the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination", but it generally cannot be used against him: no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case However, there is an exception: except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. In other words, you cannot be immunized against a perjury charge. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 defendant refused an order to testify, on the grounds that they (allegedly) believed that the government's grant of immunity was not broad enough, i.e. that there were areas where they might be questions and forced to criminally implicate themselves. They refused, and were held in contempt. The opinion recognized that the 5th Amendment "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used" (emphasis added). In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, the court held that The Fifth Amendment does not relieve a witness from answering merely on his own declaration or judgment that an answer might incriminate him; whether he must answer is determinable by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, and unless there is reasonable ground, as distinct from a remote or speculative possibility, to apprehend that a direct answer may prove dangerous to the witness, his answer should be compelled. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 asserts that "the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law, citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (itself quoting Lord Chief Justice Cockburn): "the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct" Although the wording of the immunity statute does not allow immunity from prosecution for perjury, the 5th Amendment right can only be invoked against a real legal jeopardy. They can be compelled to testify, they probably cannot be immunized against a perjury conviction (certainly not at the federal level). We would need to know the entire circumstances of the case to be able to assess whether the "knowing to be false" part could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer. | Yes, Defendant may compel Plaintiff to appear and may cross-examine Plaintiff personally. The right to counsel does not include the right to have an attorney testify for you at trial. At trial or deposition, Plaintiff's lawyer generally has no business testifyng at all, and his statements would not be evidence. If the attorney's testimony is necessary for trial, he would likely be disqualified from representing Plaintiff. Defendant is unlikely to persuade the judge to question Plaintiff for him. The judge might ask questions to clarify answers that Defendant elicits himself, but he might also just rule based on whatever information he receives, regardless of how clear it is. |
Is there double jeopardy protection for a Contempt of Congress conviction? So a person is subpoenaed by Congress to provide documents and give a deposition. The person refuses, is indicted and convicted. Can the person then be subpoenaed again for documents and testimony and then go through the process (indictment, conviction, etc) again. In other words, aside from the 1 year maximum sentence and small monetary fine for a contempt charge, is there anything else Congress can do to compel the provision of evidence (a warrant be issued for documents, etc.)? | Double jeopardy applies to the same facts, not to the same sorts of crimes. Say if you are tried and acquitted of murder of person A, that won't later save you from being tried for murder of person B. Same applies to your question: if the documents/testimony on the second occasion are different from the first occasion, there is no protection. If they are the same, there is. | The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering. | Documents are not protected under the 5th Amendment, so a person can be compelled to produce documents that may incriminate them. The person cannot be forced to testify against themselves, however – they can invoke their right to not testify against themselves. The attorney-client privilege canon has some exceptions, for example (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules or (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services (bearing in mind that POTUS is required by law to turn all documents over to the national Archives, so turning the records over is "compliance with the law" and a think that an attorney would do for their client, though this event is quite belated). No subpoena was issued and no testimony was given, so the Fifth Amendment is irrelevant. | Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair. | In the U.S., one trial can be held for multiple co-defendants, though prosecutors and defense attorneys will have reasons for seeking separate trials (If only to avoid having a scene similar to the on in Dark Knight where Harvey Dent has about 50 mobsters caught in one RICO violation plus their lawyers and the judge's simple question of "How do you plea?" is met with a din of responses.). The Defense's reason for this is that an individual may not have been a part of every step of the collective guilt and thus some charges might not be appropriate if it's an individual's guilt compared to a groups guilt. For example, the six police officers involved in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray at trial were all tried separately. The first trial was declared a mistrial over the hung jury, and two subsequent trial's resulted in findings of not guilty by a judge during a bench trial. The remaining individuals had charges dropped (The three officers who had yet to have trials plus the one officer whose trial resulted in a mistrial). One of the findings a running theme of the officers as individuals did nothing wrong, though had they been tried collectively, the results may have been different, since the individual trials meant certain facts couldn't be brought up as they didn't apply to the individual but did if they were tried as a group. From a prosecutor's standpoint, separate trials mean that you can use one suspect against the other and make a deal for lighter charges in exchange for testimony against a partner in crime. The U.S. legal system does allow for plea deals between the defense and prosecution (and while it's not the only nation that allows this, it's one of the few where plea bargaining is not viewed as a "dirty" tactic and is openly embraced (U.S. attorneys tend to hate going to trial and will try to avoid it.). Prosecutors are not above offering immunity or granting lighter sentences in exchange for help in other cases, often in the form of testimony against the big fish. For a criminal who believes "snitches get stitches", an offer of flipping on your co-defendant for a sentence of 10 years, with parole in 5 is nothing to sneeze at when you're looking at 25 to life without parole for what you did. It's not immunity for testimony (typically, witnesses in plea bargains are not allowed to take the 5th with respect to questions on the stand because they will typically plea before the trial, and thus can't be prosecuted for the same crime.). | (assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions). | Yes, you can be compelled by the government to reveal information: All it takes is a judge agreeing with a plaintiff or prosecutor that it has some relevance to a complaint over which the court has jurisdiction. If that point arrives and you want to protect that information you only have three choices: Get a legal team good enough to convince the court otherwise. Face the consequences of contempt of court for failing to supply the information requested. Flee to another jurisdiction before #2 happens. | Is there any precedent saying that a witness is immune to any crime he admits to while being a witness? Yes, there is precedent, but it unlikely to apply to your situation. The applicable type of immunity is called witness immunity. There are two types of witness immunity, transaction (aka blanket immunity) and use immunity. Both must be granted by the prosecution. Check out this article on Nolo-Legal for a description of the two: http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/immunity-exchange-testimony.html Immunity can apply to a civil case, but the prosecution's grant of immunity must specifically say so. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263–64 (1983). While there is authority for witness immunity in civil cases, the witness would be unlikely to get it. Generally, the prosecution provides immunity when they need testimony from a witness and that witness asserts their 5th amendment right against self incrimination. By providing immunity, the prosecution removes the 5th amendment concerns and the witness can then be compelled to answer the prosecution's question. This process is explained in more detail in this article. http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-prosecutors-grant-immunity-what-does-immunity-grant-mean-the-witness.html Given the way in which immunity is granted to witness, it is most likely to happen in civil cases where the government—not a private party—needs a witness's testimony. For example, a civil case brought by the government for a consumer protection, anti-trust, or securities law violations against a company. Also, the witness might want to know the statute of limitations for under-aged possession of alcohol. If it lapsed there would be no need for immunity. |
What 2012-2015 SCOTUS decisions make "letter[s] from the grave" inadmissible into evidence? I've read this interesting bit: In a 2008 trial where a man was accused of poisoning his wife with antifreeze, Schroeder allowed into evidence a letter the wife wrote a neighbor accusing the husband should anything happen to her. The so-called "letter from the grave" evidence proved key to conviction. Wisconsin's Supreme Court this year ordered a new trial for the man and ruled the letter should not have been admitted as evidence. Schroeder sentenced the defendant to life in prison without a chance of parole. Before announcing his sentence, Schroeder told the defendant: "Your crime is so enormous, so monstrous, so unspeakably cruel that it overcomes all other considerations." I have tracked the case to its Wikipedia page but from a quick read of the latest decision in this saga, it's not clear why the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided the evidence was inadmissible... other than them saying The State asserted, as it does on appeal, that United States Supreme Court cases decided in 2011, 2012, and 2015 modified the definition of what constitutes a “testimonial” statement and that under the revised definition, Julie’s letter and other statements do not qualify. The circuit court agreed and ruled that the letter and statements are nontestimonial and could be admitted at trial. The State subsequently filed a motion to reinstate the original jury verdict without a retrial, and the circuit court did just that, reinstating the original conviction as well as Jensen’s life sentence, explaining that there was no need for a new trial because the evidence would be “materially the same as the first trial.” Jensen appeals. Somewhat strangely for a legal decision, the exact SOCTUS cases don't seem explicitly cited. The decision mentions the Confrontation Clause; upon looking at the Wikipedia article on the latter... two 2011 cases are mentioned (one of them rather confusingly summarized, IMHO): [In] Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), the Court ruled that admitting a lab chemist's analysis into evidence, without having him testify, violated the Confrontation Clause. In Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011), the Court ruled that the "primary purpose" of a shooting victim's statement as to who shot him, and the police's reason for questioning him, each had to be objectively determined. If the "primary purpose" was for dealing with an "ongoing emergency", then any such statement was not testimonial and so the Confrontation Clause would not require the person making that statement to testify in order for that statement to be admitted into evidence. So what were the 2012 and 2015 cases? | The general problem with a "letter from the grave" is that it violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. The major decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause from the years in question are: Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of hearsay statements whose primary purpose was to address an ongoing emergency) Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit expert testimony as to hearsay statements assumed to be true for purposes of informing her opinion) Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, (2015) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of hearsay statements that "were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence") | united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more "special verdict" questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called "courts not of record", a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record. | Appeal proofing decisions is a common practice of trial judges (and even intermediate appellate court judges and state supreme court judges) well known to practitioners and even discussed by law professors in class at times, but I'd have a hard time coming up with a reference where it was discussed. There is probably a law review article that discusses the practice somewhere. It also comes in several versions. One is to make copious findings of fact (especially on credibility) that are hard to reverse on appeal. A judicial finding that someone had an intent to defraud another party based upon his demeanor when he testified about that issue can overcome all sorts of technical objections to a claim in a lawsuit on a more strict liability basis like breach of contract. Another is to give a "soon to lose" party everything he wants procedurally, even when he isn't entitled to it so he can't appeal on procedural grounds. For example, a court might admit otherwise inadmissible evidence over the objection of the other party and then rule against the party seeking to admit that evidence anyway on the merits. Lawyers often assume that this is happening when a judge starts making blatantly incorrect rulings on procedural issues against them repeatedly in an otherwise strong case in a bench trial. A third is to provide an alternative holding that reaches the same conclusion in case for a different legal reason in the event that an appellate court does not agree with the primary holding. A fourth (mostly limited to appellate contexts) is to decide a case on grounds that make the case uninteresting to review on further appeal (e.g. finding that a factual conclusion is supported by evidence in the record, or that an issue wasn't preserved adequately in a trial court) or beyond the jurisdiction of other courts (e.g. deciding a case based upon state law so that the U.S. Supreme Court won't review it). | canada Evidence of offences other than the one for which the accused is being sentenced is admissable at a sentencing hearing, even evidence of untried offences. R. v. Edwards, 2001 CanLII 24105 (Ont. C.A.): [39] There are statutory provisions that do permit the use of evidence about the offender, even though that evidence also discloses the commission of other crimes. First, s. 718(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code set out as two of the objectives of sentencing: (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; [40] Neither of these objectives can be fairly achieved through sentencing without knowing something, and perhaps quite a bit, about the background and character of the offender. The Crown, in this case, in effect put its case for admission of this evidence on the need to separate this respondent from society. The sentencing judge can consider such evidence of untried offences. (R. v. Jordan, 1991 CanLII 203 (B.C.C.A.)) When there is a dispute about any fact that might aggravate the sentence, the Crown (prosecution) must establish that fact by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal Code, s. 724(3)(e). See also R. v. Roopchand, 2016 MBCA 105: The first ground [of appeal] is whether the sentencing judge erred by taking into account the accused’s pending charge for an untried offence when imposing sentence. The use to be made of evidence will be informed by the purpose for which it is to be admitted. With respect to what use can be made of evidence of untried offences at a sentencing hearing, the case law is clear: while such evidence cannot be used for the purpose of punishing the accused, it is admissible when its purpose is limited to shedding light upon some aspect of the accused’s character and background which is relevant to the objectives of sentencing being considered by the judge R. v. Angelillo, 2006 SCC 55: The fact that Mr. Angelillo had been charged with two new counts of fraud, both of which were allegedly committed while he was waiting to be sentenced, was obviously relevant to the assessment of the danger his release would represent for the community. In Angelillo, the judge could even have "postponed the sentencing hearing to a date after the interim release hearing regarding the new charges in order to be better informed of the risk resulting from the subsequent act." | Yes. The precedent is President Gerald Ford's pardon of his predecessor Richard Nixon in proclamation 4311 before any possible prosecution had started. The pardon was granted specifically to prevent the disturbance of "the tranquility to which the nation has been restored" by "the prospects of bringing to trial a former President of the United States" (emphasis mine). It is noteworthy though that a pardon can be rejected by the recipient, and that there may be good reason to do so, because accepting one is an admission of guilt.1 In the words of the Supreme Court (Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915): There are substantial differences between legislative immunity and a pardon; the latter carries an imputation of guilt and acceptance of a confession of it [...]. (Again, emphasis mine.) Proactively pardoning large swathes of current and former government officials, family members and other people connected to the Trump administration would therefore be a double-edged sword: It surely may save a lot of the money and headache coming with being the target of an (even unsuccessful!) investigation; but it may also amount to admitting that the Trump administration was essentially a criminal organization. 1 As always, things are a bit less clear-cut when one takes a closer look. Because I googled "prospective pardon" after the correct remark by JBentley I stumbled upon the entirely relevant and eminently readable Congressional Research Service reports on pardons. The first one is a "pardons FAQ", the second one is a more thorough legal exploration of what pardons actually do. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court and Federal Courts have edged away from a 19th century opinion (Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866)) which viewed a pardon as an all-encompassing expungement. Newer decisions (prominently, Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 86 (1915) which I quoted) don't. | What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission & editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial). | In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge. | Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial. |
Dog bite (i.e. charge of owning an aggressive animal) I'm curious to understand better the details of the Aggressive Animals Prohibited charge. I found a relevant discussion here: How accountable are dog owners for their animals' actions?, but I'd like to dig deeper here, in the areas described below. In a hypothetical scenario, a dog bites a stranger who tries to pet the dog without asking permission (no verbal communication with the owner). The dog at the moment is on a short, non-retractable leash with about 3 feet of slack (half of the standard 6ft. leash). At the same time, the stranger: 1) approached the dog too quickly, 2) quickly extended the arm towards the dog's head, 3) did not communicate the intent to the owner, 4) when doing this, the stranger blocked the path of walking for the owner and the dog. It is entirely possible that the dog acted defensively in such situation, trying to protect the owner and itself. For the local jurisdiction (Boulder County, Colorado, USA), the county's relevant statue is available here: https://library.municode.com/co/boulder/codes/municipal_code?nodeId=TIT6HESASA_CH1AN_6-1-20AGANPR Below is the beginning of 6-1-20. - Aggressive Animals Prohibited.: Aggressive Animals Prohibited. (a) No person shall own or keep any aggressive animal. An aggressive animal is one that bites, claws, or attempts to bite or claw any person; bites, injures, or attacks another animal; or in a vicious or terrorizing manner approaches any person or domestic animal in an apparent attitude of attack, whether or not the attack is consummated or capable of being consummated. (b) It is a specific defense to the charge of owning or keeping an aggressive animal that the person who was bitten, clawed, injured, or approached by the aggressive animal was: (1) Attacking the aggressive animal or intentionally provoking the aggressive animal; How can one show that this incident includes elements of intentional provocation? I understand that this might be border-line with "negligent behavior" from the victim of the bite, but what is the difference between the two in legal terms? The statue referenced above does not include a formal definition of "provocation" -- how can the court decide on it then and what will it use for definitive guidance on this? One more note on this: provocation in human terms is different than provocation in animal/dog psychology. Can the court consider the situation from this perspective and, for instance, take seriously a letter from a dog trainer/behaviorist stating that the dog was triggered by such sudden and expected behavior of a stranger? Another procedural question here is whether a deferred prosecution is possible or not in such case. What would that include and imply? What can be expected in such a case with a dog that has no history of aggression and an excellent record of training (certificates of course completion, letters from trainers, etc.)? | The answer does ultimately reduce to the specifics of local law, which could be state, county or city. Ordinarily, the person who acted negligently would bear some element of responsibility for his actions, but local states can change that. The person did not intentionally provoke the dog, he was negligent, and they are not the same thing. So you need to get an attorney to take care of your particular problem. Municipalities are typically intolerant of dogs that bite humans. In Washington, the owner is strictly liable for any damage caused by a dog biting a human, except in the case of a person illegally trespassing, or when the attack was provoked. A dog can then be declared to be dangerous, which can have significant insurance consequences, or worse. | How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small. | In this answer, I address title question: "If someone catches a Pokemon that is on my property, is that theft?"1 The Pokémon is an entry in a database, presented by Nintendo to users in their mobile app and can be included in a user's collections after that user completes some in-game actions. It isn't your property. It isn't even their (the users') property. Further, a Pokémon appears for all users can be captured again and again by multiple users until it disappears for all users. One user capturing a Pokémon doesn't make it unavailable for others. The Pokémon doesn't "become subject to" any property rights of the owner of the real property that it happens to be virtually overlaid on. Said another way, it doesn't "incur" any of their property rights. Capturing it in-game is not theft. 1. The question in the question body is "does [a Pokémon] incur any kind of property right for the property owner". Incur means "to become subject to". That is different than the broader verb "implicate". This question does not ask (and this answer doesn't answer) whether the Pokémon can implicate the property owner's property rights (e.g. via attractive nuisance, trespass, etc.). Some of that is addressed at a separate question. | A property owner has the legal right to set the rules for their property, which can include a no-pets policy. This includes property owned by the government, by government agencies, and government-funded operations. The service animal exception is the accommodation for disability that is required under the ADA and analogous state laws. So if you take your dog for a walk through the parking lot, they can tell you to pack it up and go away. | Astronauts are employees of the government and are thus barred from suing in lieu of receiving the government equivalent of worker's compensation. This wouldn't bar a suit against a third-party contractor who made a defective product, but I suspect that their contracts contain a waiver of liability for negligence or defective products given that this is highly experimental technology. Certainly, it would not be homicide as it was an accidental death of someone who consented to the high risk of accidental death involved. The dog would have been the property of the government, and the government wouldn't sue itself for damages to the dog. The harm that comes to animals in legitimate scientific research is not considered cruelty to animals as it is justified by a higher legitimate purpose and not for the intent of gratification of someone who enjoys torturing animals and would have been cleared by a scientific ethics committee in advance. | The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification. | It ultimately depends on the situation, but here's a general breakdown: Many states in the United States have anti-trespassing laws that allow citizens to use deadly force in response to threat of bodily harm. These laws and statutes intersect to provide more protections for gun owners encountering trespassers, burglars, or thieves in their home. However, pointing a gun at someone can be considered assault on the idea that it is a threat that puts someone in fear of harm. Thus, the legality of pointing your gun at someone depends on numerous factors. To name a few, it depends on How a state's criminal laws are defined What was the trespassing incident? Was the trespasser in one's home, or on one's property Whether one feared bodily harm from the trespasser Here's a real instance of this happening in the US: A farmer from New Hampshire was sentenced to 3 years in prison after brandishing his handgun to a trespasser. See article here. | Overview This is a somewhat complex issue. The presence of "No Trespassing" signs would make anyone who enters the property without a specific invitation a trespasser. So would the presence of a fence, even if there was a closed but unlocked gate. An "Enter at your own risk" sign probably would not make such people legally trespassers. In West Virginia, a landowner or lessee or other lawful occupant owes a duty of "reasonable care" to invitees and other non-trespassers. No such duty is owed to trespassers. However, the owner or lawful occupant is expected to avoid dangerous conditions and reckless hazards, as well as intentional causes of harm (such as booby-traps). If through recklessness or serious negligance a dangerous condition exists and a person, even a trespasser, is injured or killed because of such a condition, the owner or lawful occupant is likely to be liable. However, if the danger is "open and obvious" or is as well known to the injured person as to the owner or occupant, there is no liability. A warning sign might make a danger "open and obvious". I do not see that video cameras will be relevant to the matter at all. Cameras do not warn a pedestrian not to enter, nor do they warn of any danger, nor do they prevent a pedestrian from being injured. They may help in detecting or even preventing crime, but will not affect liability for injury to a pedestrian. Sources West Virginia Code Code Sections §61-3B-3. (Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.) of the West Virginia Code provides that: (a) It is an unlawful trespass for any person to knowingly, and without being authorized, licensed or invited, to enter or remain on any property, other than a structure or conveyance, as to which notice against entering or remaining is either given by actual communication to such person or by posting, fencing or cultivation. §55-7-27. (Liability of possessor of real property for harm to a trespasser.) (a) A possessor of real property, including an owner, lessee or other lawful occupant, owes no duty of care to a trespasser except in those circumstances where a common-law right-of-action existed as of the effective date of this section, including the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly causing the trespasser injury. (b) A possessor of real property may use justifiable force to repel a criminal trespasser as provided by section twenty-two of this article. (c) This section does not increase the liability of any possessor of real property and does not affect any immunities from or defenses to liability established by another section of this code or available at common law to which a possessor of real property may be entitled. (d) The Legislature intends to codify and preserve the common law in West Virginia on the duties owed to trespassers by possessors of real property as of the effective date of this section. Articles from Law Firms The article "West Virginia Legislature reinstitutes “open and obvious” doctrine" from the law firm Farmer, Cline, & Campbell discusses how the case of Hersch v. E-T Enterprises, Ltd. P’ship. in which a WVa court abolished the "open and obvious" except to liability, imposing dameages for an "open and obvious" hazard, specifically an open stair without guardrails. The legislature then amended §55-7-27. (a) to restore the exception. The article also reads: West Virginia state law requires property owners remove hazards from their property to reduce the risk of these injuries. The expectation is dependent on the type of person that is on the property. Previously, visitors were broken into one of four categories: invitee, licensee, social guest or trespasser. The duty of care owed to the visitor depended on the category under which the visitor qualified. Today, there are only two categories: trespasser and non-trespasser. The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Mallet v. Pickens, abolished the four categories mentioned above, and held that “landowners or possessors now owe any non-trespassing entrant a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.” The article "Property owners may be liable for injuries to trespassers" from the law firm Farmer, Cline, & Campbell reads: West Virginia homeowners are not obligated to protect those who trespass upon their property. However, they should be aware that they cannot willfully cause injury to any who do trespass. This law can become an issue for homeowners with frequent trespassers as they may find themselves liable for injuries any people, even the uninvited ones, sustain if their properties are left in an unsafe condition. For example, homeowners and landowners could potentially face lawsuits if they purposefully made their properties unsafe. They may also be held liable if the condition of their properties could cause serious bodily harm or death. Further, landowners can also potentially face legal consequences if they fail to warn potential trespassers that there are hazards on their properties. The article "Determining Duty in West Virginia Premises Liability Cases" from Colombo Law reads: Most states use three categories to determine whether a duty is owed to individuals who enter the property of another. These three categories are business invitee, licensee, and trespasser. In the past, West Virginia was one of the many states that followed this standard. However, in 1999 West Virginia abolished and replaced the three specific classifications with a new, more general standard of determining whether the individual is a trespasser or a nnon-trespasser Trespasser. A trespasser is an individual who enters the property of another without the permission of a landowner. An individual will be deemed a trespasser if they do not have either express or implied permission from the owner. In West Virginia, the courts offer little protection to those who are trespassers. As a trespasser, a landowner must only refrain from intentional or reckless conduct. Non-Trespassers. Contrary to trespassers, landowners owe a duty to anyone that is permitted to be on the property. If an individual enters private property with the express or implied permission of a landowner, the landowner must ensure that the premises are reasonably safe for those on the premises. To ensure you are meeting the standard of care, the landowner must inspect the premises to determine whether there are any dangerous conditions present on the property and repair and/or warn individuals of the danger. Premises liability is the legal premise for which landowners are responsible for harm caused by unsafe conditions existing on the landowner’s premises. Premises liability is a broad concept that may be raised for a variety of harms present. One main reason for personal injury actions stemming from premises liability include slip and fall accidents as a result of: Slippery floors Uneven sidewalks or pavement Objects protruding from carpeting , floorboards, or store shelves |
Can a judge's decision to admit or not to admit "character evidence" under Wis. Stat. § 904.04 be challenged (on appeal)? In the heated exchange between the judge and prosecutor (see 2nd video here) in the Rittenhouse trial, the judge says that he admitted "90404" evidence in other trials that the defendant was intending to shoot people on other occasions, but that he's not allowing it in this trial. It seems to me that this kind of decision by a judge can basically make or break a case based on intent, outside of the extremely clear cut ones when the defendant says something like "I'm going to kill Mr. XYZ [specifically] because I hate him [in particular]". "90404" seems to refer to Wis. Stat. § 904.04, which seems to be about "character evidence". So, I'm curious if this kind of judge's decision to allow or not to allow such evidence can be appealed anywhere, or if his ruling is final under Wisconsin law. | Acquittals in criminal jury trials cannot be appealed (at least in a way that affects the outcome, Colorado and a few other states allow criminal appeals by the prosecution solely for the purposes of clarifying the law prospectively). Interlocutory appeals (i.e. appeals before the case is over) by the prosecution are allowed for pre-trial rulings (e.g. suppression of evidence rulings in a pre-trial hearing), in criminal cases, but not for evidentiary rulings made in the midst of a jury trial (which is when jeopardy attaches for the purposes of the double jeopardy rule, which is what prevents acquittals from being retried). An error in a ruling on an admission or rejection of evidence at trial may be appealed by a convicted defendant if the alleged misapplication of the evidence rule was an abuse of discretion by the judge, and was not "harmless error" (i.e. if as part of all errors made in the case there is a reasonable probability that it changed the outcome that the jury reached). | The only thing which has a name and sounds somewhat like what you're talking about is "jury nullification". This generally refers to the situation where a jury deliberately sets aside the judges instructions about the law and supplies their own interpretation. For example, Peter Zenger was technically guilty of seditious libel because as a matter of law the material was sedition libel and the only legal question was whether he had published it. The jury found him not guilty, on the grounds that the statements were true, but truth was not an element of the crime. It is the general pattern in the US that the judge is the only person empowered to say to the jury what the law is. By selecting specific instructions (phrased as "If you conclude X, you must find the defendant guilt", that is, stating the "finding-to-verdict" equation), the jury is given a formula for figuring out what the law says. Trial judges are not the ones who decide what the "framers" of the law intended, that comes from higher appeals courts who may study the legislative history. It can happen that a law uses an unclear phrase like "irreconcilable differences" and the jury doesn't know exactly what that means: then the judge may tell them to decide on their own, or give them a dictionary (however, there probably is an instruction for divorce law, and it's unlikely that a jury would be involved in a simple marital dissolution). It is entirely possible that jurors will end up misinterpreting what the law says in some instance, but I doubt that it happens very often. It is more likely that jurors will deviate somewhat, compared to judges in a bench trial, in matters of judgment such as whether an action is "reasonable". | A judge has the authority to determine what law applies to a case and to instruct the jury accordingly, and also has the authority to determine which evidence is admissible. Presentation of a defense, in practice, involves presentation of evidence supporting a legal theory. In order to be admissible in evidence in an evidentiary hearing or trial, the evidence must be relevant to a legal theory that is in some way connected to the evidence. If no reasonable juror could make a ruling establishing that a legally recognized defense was established based upon the proposed evidence (especially if the proposed evidence is prejudicial to the prosecution case on the basis of reasoning that is not a legally valid defense) it can be excluded. For example, evidence in support of the theory that the defendant murdered the victim because the murder victim raped the defendant's sister six years ago, might very well sway a jury to acquit the defendant. So a defense attorney might want to make this argument. But, this is not a legally recognized justification for murder, so evidence in support of this defense would be excluded as irrelevant by the judge. In federal court, and in states with rules of evidence based upon the federal rules of evidence, the primary legal authority behind this is Rule of Evidence 402: Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Some states also have procedural notice requirements for certain kinds of affirmative defenses. For example, if someone is arguing an alibi, a notice of an intent to present this defense must be provided by the defense a certain number of days before trial, so that the prosecution can develop the very different in kind type of evidence needed to rebut that defense, rather than having someone acquitted due to surprise when rebuttal evidence exists but the prosecution doesn't know in advance to locate the necessary witnesses and evidence to rebut this kind of defense. | What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? In an adversarial system (such as that in the jurisdictions in the U.S.) the surprise factor is disallowed on trial. I am not knowledgeable on the procedural exceptions, but generally speaking the documentary evidence (including deposition transcripts) has to be filed during the discovery stage of proceedings. A discovery deadline is set up during case scheduling, and extensions of that deadline have to be requested via motion. There is the slightly related concept of sequestration of witnesses whereby inconsistencies may serve to impeach a witness's testimony, but that is different than withholding from the jury any pre-existing evidence that a plaintiff would like to be considered on trial (whether for impeachment or otherwise). Also, it is in the injured party's best interest that the jury get to see the evidence rather than have it merely rely on a witness's reaction of surprise. The wrongdoer's lawyer will try to confuse the jury and thus outweigh the jury's perception of a "surprised witness", but that attempt is likelier to fail if the jury has the evidence with which to compare the witness's testimony at trial. | Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. | The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge. | There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced. | This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off. |
May I bring weapons and/or defend myself when trespassing for a legal reason? Let's say I have to trespass for a legal reason, e.g. a court order allows me to retrieve property. Am I allowed to defend myself while trespassing? Can I bring weapons or whatever is needed to defend myself while carrying out the order? | As the answer by Greendrake says, if you have a a legal reason, to enter property, you re not a trespasser. Trespassing is generally defined as entering on property against the expressed will of the owner or lawful occupant, without lawful authority. A firefighter is not trespassing when responding to a fire, even if the owner orders the firefighter to leave. A building inspector is not tresspassing while making an inspection (if local law grants an inspector access). Neither is a police officer with a warrant for entry, or a person with a court order to recover property. In some cases such lawful authority must be communicated to the owner, in others it need not be, this depends on the nature of the authority and the exact provisions of the governing law. Whether such a person entering with authority may be armed depends very much on the local law, and the nature of the authority. In some cases and some places such a person is free to be armed, in others this would be illegal. If one is lawfully present somewhere and is attacked, one is entitled to defend oneself (or another), although there may be a duty to avoid a confrontation by retreating if this is reasonably possible when not in one's own home in some jurisdictions (such as California). But the use of deadly force (such as a gun) is generally not lawful unless there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. None of this is legally different when one is lawfully on another's property than when one is in a public place. California Law California Penal Code section 693 provides that: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. It should be read together with sections 692 and 694. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction #505 reads: The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if: The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ [or] ) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being (raped/maimed/robbed/ )]; The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; AND The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified According to "California Self-Defense Laws" (a page posted by a CA law firm: California law allows use of force in self-defense or defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or they are in imminent danger of physical harm, and that force is necessary to stop the danger. However, you may only use the degree of force reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The page "California Self Defense Laws" from Findlaw reads: The right to use force -- even deadly force if necessary -- to defend oneself is a broadly accepted principle of the criminal justice system. But while all states allow defendants to claim self defense if they can back up such claims, states differ on the scope of what may be considered appropriate use of force and when it may be applied. ... As a general rule of thumb, any force used against an intruder must be proportionate to the harm reasonably feared. In People v. King {Crim. No. 20380. Supreme Court of California. August 29, 1978.} The California Supreme Court held that self-defense was a possible defense to a charge of possession of a handgun by a felon, and wrote about the right of self-defense in CA law. The opinion reads: [I]t is apparent that the conviction cannot stand if the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the right of self-defense as it related to the section 12021 charge. ... When enacting section 12021 and its predecessor statute, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of the several existing statutes giving any person the right to use force, including deadly force in appropriate circumstances, in defense of self or others. This right has been included in provisions of the Penal Code since its enactment in 1872. Section 692 provides: Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made: By the party about to be injured; By other parties." Section 693 provides: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. Section 694 extends the right to defend others, providing: Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense. Although the extent of these rights has been defined and circumscribed by judicial decision (see, e.g., People v. Ceballos, supra, 12 Cal.3d 470) none of these sections has been amended to restrict the rights affirmed therein since its adoption over a century ago. Civil Code section 50, affirms the same rights, providing: Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest. It, too, was adopted in 1872, and it was amended in 1874 to expand the right of defense first declared to encompass guests. Similarly the provisions of sections 197 and 198 governing the circumstances in which homicide is justifiable were included in the Penal Code of 1872, and are traceable to the Statutes of 1850. ... Use of a concealable firearm in self-defense is neither a crime nor an unlawful purpose. ... We conclude, therefore, that the prohibition of section 12021 was not intended to affect a felon's right to use a concealable firearm in self-defense, but was intended only to prohibit members of the affected classes from arming themselves with concealable firearms or having such weapons in their custody or control in circumstances other than those in which the right to use deadly force in self-defense exists or reasonably appears to exist. Thus, when a member of one of the affected classes is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate section 12021. As in all cases in which deadly force is used or threatened in self-defense, however, the use of the firearm must be reasonable under the circumstances and may be resorted to only if no other alternative means of avoiding the danger are available. In the case of a felon defending himself alone, such alternatives may include retreat where other persons would not be required to do so. | The club renting space from the shopping center makes no difference; the difference is public vs. private land. The legal controller of the land you are on - whether the shopping center, the club or private land around the shopping center - can ask you to leave at any time for any reason. There is no wiggle room. A controller is not necessarily the owner - a tenant is a controller as is an emergency service executing legitimate control. The police are law enforcement; if you don't leave private land by request, their duty is to remove you at the request of the land owner. Private security also has the same function, though their jurisdiction is more limited off their property, as they are private hired by the shopping center or club. Either would ask you to leave, and if you refuse, you could be arrested for trespassing. If arrested, the local district or county attorney would have some discretion on prosecuting you for trespassing. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas). | Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.). | Check out this article on "Attractive Nuisances" http://realestate.findlaw.com/owning-a-home/dangers-to-children-attractive-nuisances.html Here are some of the general requirements of something being an "Attractive Nuisance" A potentially dangerous condition exists on the property The landowner created or maintained the potential hazard (this one is important since you did not create nor maintain the potential hazard) The landowner should have known the condition would attract children The landowner should have known the condition could harm children Generally, a landowner is not going to be held liable for the injuries of a undiscovered trespasser. Consider that word undiscovered. (aka, the landowner doesn't know someone is sneaking in and using the trampoline) However, if a landowner knows that trespassers have been on his/her land, then these persons are discovered trespassers to whom the landowner owes "the duty of ordinary care to warn of danger." What all this means? Anyone can always be sued for anything. If the kid jumps badly, lands on your property, gets hurt, they might have a case or the judge might see it your way. Perhaps consider the laws of "Attractive Nuisances" and "Discovered Trespassers". To note: A lot of people might say that you can't be held liable for something like this, but that is slightly false. As a property owner you CAN be held liable for anything that happens on your property. Including someone trespassing onto your property without your permission, even to commit crimes, and hurting themselves in the process. Many court cases have ruled in favor of the law-abiding landowner, but that's not to say there is a guarantee of this. The best thing to do is always minimize your risks. | IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed. |
In the UK can someone be fired for job hunting In the UK: Assuming that no job hunting or application has been done during work hours, can I be fired for openly job hunting out of hours? What if I advertise my availability on a site like LinkedIn? | In Great Britain Employees have two types of protections: contractual and statutory. It would be in breach of contract ("wrongful dismissal") for an employer to dismiss without notice for job hunting but contractually there is nothing to stop an employer dismissing for any reason if they give the notice required (which may be only a week or two, say). Statutory protection may, however, prevent "unfair dismissal" but this generally only applies if someone has been employed for at least two years. There are some exceptions - e.g. dismissal as an act of religious/racial/sex discrimination etc. is prohibited even if the employee has less than 2 years service but these exceptions do not include job-hunting. So someone who has been employed for less than 2 years could be dismissed with notice for job hunting. There are also contractual and statutory protections in Northern Ireland. The contractual ones are the same as in the rest of the UK but some of the details of the statutory protections are different from GB. | united-states Even in the 49 U.S. states that are "employment at will" states in the U.S., there are reasons for which termination of employment is prohibited under both state and federal law, and termination without cause entitles an employee to unemployment benefit if certain other conditions are met. Most unionized employees, most public sector employees, most private sector employees in Montana, and a small number of employees (mostly senior management) with written employment contracts that so provide can only be fired for cause. There is a split of authority in the U.S. on the status of not making full disclosure is something that the employer required you to disclose and that you represented that you did disclose in the hiring process, such as your social media accounts. This is commonly called "resume fraud" even though it actually applies more broadly than resumes. Also, sometimes the question might be resolved differently under parallel state and federal laws. In general, in the U.S., asking about social media accounts is something that an employer may permissibly ask unless it is use to facilitate discrimination on a prohibited ground. One rule, which applies in some jurisdictions, is that "resume fraud" (i.e. a material misstatement in a resume or employment application) discovered by an employer after an otherwise wrongful termination can serve as a lawful basis for terminating employment that excuses the wrongful basis for termination of employment (at least assuming that the information withheld or misrepresented was on a matter that the employer could lawfully consider). Even if the information not disclosed was not itself a basis upon which the employer would not have hired someone, the dishonestly in the hiring process would be a basis for termination of employment. For example: The Seventh Circuit, which covers Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, has consistently held that it’s permissible for employers to reject job applicants and fire employees who are suspected of engaging in resumé fraud. The rationale for the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is very straightforward: lying to employers is a legitimate and non-discriminatory basis for turning down an applicant or firing an employee. The cases of Carter v. Tennant Co., Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass and Gilty v. Village of Oak Park all stand for this proposition. . . . . If the employer, as part of its investigation of the allegations in the lawsuit, discovers that the employee engaged in resumé fraud, can the employer use that belated discovery to its advantage? According to the United States Supreme Court, the answer is yes. More specifically, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., the Supreme Court essentially held that an employer’s belated discovery of an independent, alternative basis for firing an employee (e.g., resumé fraud) can be used by the employer to reduce the plaintiff’s potential recovery. (Think of this as the employer’s “if we knew then what we know now, we wouldn’t have hired you in the first place” defense.) In other jurisdictions, "resume fraud" is not itself a basis for discharge, although it might be used as evidence to support an initially claimed valid reason for terminating employment in the face of an employee allegation that this was a mere pretext for wrongful termination. I don't know which states or how many U.S. states fall in each category. The former rule is the rule in almost all cases under federal private sector employment law. A variety of cases that address the question in the context of public employment sector employment can be found here. In addition to these general rules of law, there are also often reasonable questions of fact about whether a prospective employee substantially complied with an employer's social media disclosure question on a fact by fact basis that turns on the exact wording of the question and the reasonable interpretations that language could be given by the employee. For example, if a question has a social media disclosure requirement and one doesn't disclose a blog, one might reasonably argue that a blog is not a social media account, depending on the language used in the question. | It seems that this is known as a "working interview". Asking a candidate to do actual work without paying for it is illegal under Texas law. However asking a person to take an extensive, even a multi-day, skills test is not. Asking a prospective web developer to submit a portfolio of prior work, or to design a web site for a fictional company, say for the Acme Company that supplies the Coyote, is legal. Had the applicant created a web site for the actual employer without being paid, the applicant would own the copyright, and the prospective employer would be in violation of Texas minimum wage law, and would have committed copyright infringement if they used the design, without securing permission. Statutory damages for wilful copyright infringement can be as high as $150,000, and as low as $750. A federal suit must be filed to collect such damages. However, if no actual work was done, I doubt that the applicant has a valid claim. One would need to consult a lawyer to see if some other basis for a claim would apply. Many lawyers will offer an initial consultation for free or a nominal charge. Here are some Texas sources on the issues with "working interviews". The page "Are “Working Interviews” Legal?" from the Gay Reed law firm says: If you bring someone in for a working interview you must pay them for their time in compliance with state and federal law and make appropriate withholding. Some believe that since they are only going to be there for a few days, you don’t have to do new-hire paperwork. Just skip the I-9, background check, application, and W-2. Wrong again. If you hire anyone – for 1 day or 1,000, you have to do new hire paperwork. Depending on how long you would like to conduct your interview, we can create a day contract or a week contract for the prospective employee. This will limit your exposure under unemployment compensation laws, and you can even reduce the amount you pay. Where you might pay a good hygienist $20 per hour or more as a full time wage, you can pay them minimum wage during a working interview. The page "What Is a “Working Interview” and How Does It Work? from CEDR HR Solutions says: A “working interview” is the act of assessing a job candidate’s skills and ability to fit with your existing team by bringing them in to perform work for your business temporarily before you officially bring them on board. Traditionally, working interviews take place after a successful verbal interview. ... However, using working interviews does not exempt you from your obligations as an employer, and performing working interviews without understanding their legal implications can actually get you in a lot of trouble. ... If your “interviewee” is performing work for your business that would usually be performed by one of your employees, in a legal sense, that person must be treated as an employee of your business. By testing your applicants’ abilities and knowledge without having them perform actual work for your business, you can get an idea of their skill level without putting your practice at risk. “Skills tests” are especially helpful when it comes to evaluating candidates for clinical positions. ... Instead of performing an unpaid working interview or trying to call someone an independent contractor when they do not fit those requirements, hire them and use a “Getting Acquainted” period to judge whether a new hire will be a long-term fit for your practice (90 days is often a good span of time for this). The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) has a page on "Interviews" which says: Interviews When interviewing applicants, apply the same standard that is applied to job applications - ask only about things that are directly related to the job requirements for the position under consideration. Watch out for tape-recording - the applicant might be tape-recording the interview without an employer's knowledge, and a video- or tape-recording of an interview would be discoverable in a discrimination claim or lawsuit. Tell the managers who conduct interviews to be extremely careful about note-taking during interviews - anything like that can be discovered in a claim or lawsuit - many discrimination cases have been lost due to careless and/or embarrassing comments written by interviewers. Test for whether something should be written down: would you feel comfortable explaining it in front of a judge and jury? "Working interviews" are not the same as pre-hire interviews at which an interviewee might demonstrate how he or she would carry out a sample task - an "interview" during which the worker performs actual work and receives what most companies would call "on the job" training or orientation to the company is work time - a company must pay at least minimum wage for such training time, satisfy all of the usual new-hire paperwork requirements (W-4, I-9, new hire report, and so on), and report the wages to TWC and IRS. The TWC can be reached at: 512-463-2222 The TWC page on the minimum wage says that Texas uses the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hr. It lists several exceptions, none of which seem to apply to the situation described in the question, or rather the situation that would have occurred had the applicant accepted an "unpaid trial" or "working interview". The actual Texas law is Chapter 62 of the Labor Code The exact section is 62.051. | Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual. | You are probably an employee Answer these questions: Can you say “no” when the University offers you work? Or vice-versa, can they say “no” when you want to work? Can you subcontract the work? That is, can you hire someone to do what the University hired you to do? Do you control how and when you work? For example, when you break University rules are you subject to University discipline or is this treated as a breach of contract? Do you provide your own tools and equipment? Can you make a profit or loss (if you get paid by the hour the answer is “no”)? Do you take out your own public liability and/or professional indemnity insurance? If the answers to most of these questions are “no”, you’re an employee. | could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)". | If you are on Tier 4 (students on full-time degree), you have more restrictions besides the number of hours. One of this is no self-employment (which includes freelance and consultancy or creating your own company). | It is. Part 2 Chapter 1 Section 8 specifically says "People who are not married or civil partners do not have this characteristic." In practical terms, a claim for unlawful dismissal would not have to rely on this Act or this Characteristic. Many company handbooks refer to avoiding discrimination on "marital status", so the claim could be made that the company had acted against policy. Not as strong as national law, but likely to succeed in absence of other factors. Single people who were expected to cover shifts that people with a family consistently avoided could argue constructive dismissal on "making unreasonable changes to working patterns or place of work without agreement" grounds. And cases of sexual harassment are as likely to refer to Sections 11 or 12 of the Act as to Section 8. There appears to be some interest in this - north of the border if not in England and Wales - and perhaps less jurisdictionally in Bella De Paulo's article for Psychology Today, which concludes "All serious forms of prejudice and discrimination go through a similar process of going unrecognized, then getting dismissed and belittled once people start pointing them out, and in the best cases, eventually getting taken seriously. Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that when she was first appointed to the Supreme Court, the other judges did not think gender discrimination existed. ..." |
Can someone working with a law enforcement agency "get away" with a speeding ticket if is required ASAP on a location? On the episode Red Alert (S03E13) of the show The Mentalist, CBI (like the FBI, but only for CA) Consultant Patrick Jane gets stopped by a police officer on it's way to a crime scene because he was going 13mph over the speed limit. He shows his badge as proof that he is working for the CBI to try and persuade the officer, but he still gives him a ticket. If this were to happen in the real world, would it would be possible for him to "get away" with the ticket in the state of California? He was needed as soon as possible by an actual LEO for an active investigation and is working for a state agency, but he is not legally an LEO. | Law enforcement officers have a wide latitude when dealing with someone who is not following the law; in general they cannot issue you a fine if you are not speeding but they are not required to issue a fine if you are speeding. So if the LEO decides for whatever the reason that you do not deserve a ticket even if you were driving sobre the speed limit, he ello not issue it and that would be the end of it. Now if the officer issues the ticket, there is recourse. The most simple would be simply to forward additional evidence to the police department, even informally, to see if they rethink about it and void the ticket on their own. If they still refuse, there are always procedures to legally challenge a ticket, which may depend based on the jurisdiction and even the kind or amount of sanction. In general I would expect that it goes that far and you can show that it was indeed an emergency, even in the absence of a specific law a judge would invalidate the fine because it would go against the public interest. And if even that does not work, you may probably ask for a pardon. | Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings. | This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate." | You (probably) did not commit a crime in Colorado. The answer to your question though is probably Driving an unsafe vehicle Colorado Revised Statutes Title 42. Vehicles and Traffic § 42-4-202 (1) It is unlawful for any person to drive...on any highway any vehicle...which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this section and sections... The above is not a crime , it is (5) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction. A class A traffic infraction is a civil violation. Note that some driving offenses are crimes: In Colorado, driving more than 25 mph over the posted limit is a class 2 misdemeanor, and doing so in a constriction zone is a class 1 misdemeanor. Also note that I say probably because it is possible that they charged you with something more extreme- reckless driving? violation of noise or pollution ordinances?- but for a fine small enough that you don't say, 2 points, and you did not have to go to court (you could have if you wanted for the ticket, but not required) it is very unlikely. | Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence. | There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf | The officer is saying that he believes the information to be correct, but a clerical error or typo isn't a question of saying something that you don't believe to be correct, it is a question of incorrectly putting what the officer believes to paper, often in a context where the mistake is obvious, without an intent to mislead. You would not prevail in court. Courts have broad authority to correct clerical errors even years after the fact. In civil actions in federal court this is authorized by Rule 60. But, almost all courts have this authority with respect to court process which includes traffic tickets. Since it is clearly a typo, it would not cast doubt on the integrity or accuracy of other statements in the ticket. A typo reflects fat fingers, not dishonesty. | Are police required to contact a real lawyer if you ask? give opinions from a number of lawyers and police in different jurisdictions. The basic consensus is that in most jurisdictions, such behavior will get the case thrown out of court and often get the police officer who tried this fired. HOWEVER there was a case where this was tried and while the case was thrown out on appeal, it was not as simple as the postings in the above article may have made it appear. This story shows a case where the Tennessee police actually did this. While the lower court allowed it because the defendant was "gullible", the appeals court rejected this argument. [T]he conduct of the law enforcement officers in this case, and in particular Detective Henry, is so egregious that it simply cannot go unchecked. That Detective Henry would illegally pose as an attorney and arrange the circumstances of the defendant’s case to make it appear as though he had successfully undertaken legal representation of the defendant is abhorrent. That the detective would specifically instruct the defendant not to communicate the relationship to his appointed counsel, in what we can only assume was an effort to enlarge the time for the detective to gain incriminating information from the defendant, renders completely reprehensible the state action in this case. Given the unconscionable behavior of the state actors in this case and the fact that the defendant was essentially prevented from proving prejudice through no fault of his own, we have no trouble concluding that the only appropriate remedy in this case is the dismissal of all the indictments. |
How do I convert a partnership to a sole proprietorship? My wife and I have a partnership for a small business (cash flow < $50k/year in either direction), registered in Oregon, USA. She died recently; I am her sole heir. Her will and the partnership agreement both pass the assets to me. With only one surviving partner, this can no longer be a partnership. How can I smoothly convert this to a sole proprietorship? I contacted the Oregon Business Registry, but they claim this is a legal question, not administrative. All they could do is to point me to their FAQ and help pages, which do not cover the situation. From this, the best that I can find is to terminate the partnership and register independently as a sole proprietorship. I welcome any other suggestions. | File as a partnership for the return for the calendar year of her death. File on Schedule C as a sole proprietorship in subsequent years. Generally there is nothing to formally terminate. Unless there are licenses to do business involved, no formal notification of change of entity type is necessary. Since a partnership is a pass-through business, the tax characteristics from year to year carry automatically through your individual returns (just one return with no ambiguities if you filed jointly as widows and widowers are allowed to file a final joint return after the death of their spouse). | Finding S seems to be hard and I have not much hope, if her siblings cannot provide any information. I think the "inhabitants registry" (Einwohnermeldeamt) is not allowed to give you her first address in Spain ("Zuzugsanschrift im Ausland") (§§ 44 and 45 Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG)). The best option I see is a court auction (Zwangsversteigerung), more precise a "Teilungsversteigerung". If one of S's siblings want money for the land, he can ask for a court auction at the local court (Amtsgericht). The court will get S's first address in Spain (§ 34 BMG) and if it cannot deliver its letter to S, there will be a "public delivery" (öffentliche Zustellung) through a posting in court. It would take a while, but in the end the land could be yours. Be prepared that the cost for the court auction will be much higher than the 1000€. If you plan to take this way, ask a lawyer for detailed advice. Also you need one of S's siblings to participate in the process. If the trees are really a danger for your house, the heirs could also have an obligation to remove them. Maybe this could help you too. | The first step of a non-governmental debt collector would be to sue you and obtain a money judgment (if this debt collector is legitimate, something the comments touch upon). A tax debt is different, if this is a legitimate tax debt. There is usually an internal tax collection agency process that must be exhausted, resulting in an assessment of taxes which then results in a non-judicial imposition of a tax lien, upon which what is sometimes call a distaint warrant authorizing execution against assets pursuant to the tax lien is issued by a court in Oregon. Outside Oregon, the Oregon money judgment or the distaint warrant would have to be domesticated into California as a foreign judgment, which is a basically administrative process that might be possible to do without notice to you (I'm not a California law expert on these fine matters of procedure). Once there was a money judgment domesticated into California, your wages and bank accounts could be garnished, your property could be seized pursuant to writs, and liens in your personal and real property could be perfected and foreclosed upon. Of course, if this outfit is a sham, with a fake debt, this is unlikely to happen, and they might give up, or you might sue them for violating debt collection laws or engaging in fraud, or a law enforcement agency might do that based upon your complaint. It might take a civil action of some sort to set aside in invalid judgment, if it was invalid, but the process of setting aside an invalid foreign tax debt is very complicated even for an average small firm lawyer. Lack of notice of a lawsuit is generally a strong defense to a private sector debt, but is not always such a strong defense to certain kinds of tax debts (and the process for different kinds of tax debts is quite different). | Likely not, unless A finds a jurisdiction with sufficiently lax accounting and taxation standards. As described in the question, A, B, and C are distinct legal entitites. For each entity, the tax office would want to know what the revenue, expenses, and net income are. By providing a service (use of the house) free of charge between two entites of the shell construct, profits are moved from C to A. This is usually illegal. The required paperwork might not have to look like a normal rental contract between a tenant and a landlord, since many questions are resolved by the ownership, but it would have to specify payments. The tax office should complain if they differ too much from the going market rate. Consider that C might be a LLC, and that C might be a civil judgement against C. Someone would look at the assets owned by C, and that includes the house D. | The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today. | No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive. | In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source. | Fundamentally, to what extent is a Limited Partner subject to a potentially ruinous financial situation resulting from financial wrong-doing committed by the Managing Partner? Civil tax liability Under U.S. tax law, a limited partner in a limited partnership that is taxed under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e. as a partner) is responsible for that limited partner's share of all taxable income of the partnership, for all interest owed on the unpaid taxes, and generally speaking (subject to very narrow exceptions), to penalties assessed on the unpaid tax. Moreover, frequently, the limited partner has no right to be involved in the tax litigation by the tax matters partner of the partnership on the issues that matter. The limited partner's tax liabilities to the federal government and any other taxing authorities with a pass through income tax system are not limited to the limited partner's investment in the limited partnership. Criminal liability exposure The limited partner will generally not have any criminal liability for tax crimes committed by a general partner or other partnership official engaged in tax work on behalf of the limited partnership without more affirmative involvement in and endorsement of the misconduct, although the partnership itself might See U.S. v. Arthur Anderson, LLP (which was reversed on appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court because proof of intent was inadequate, but demonstrated the principle.) A limited partner would bear the limited partner's pro rata share of a criminal fine but that would be limited to the limited partner's investment in the limited liability partnership. Mitigating the harm with a lawsuit The limited partner will usually have a right to bring a civil action (i.e. a lawsuit) against a general partner whose management of the taxes of the partnership cause the limited partner to incur tax penalties, on a breach of fiduciary duty theory, but the limited partner will generally not be able to recover back taxes owed, or interest on back taxes owed, in a lawsuit of this kind. The limited partner might also be able to bring a lawsuit on other theories that might involve an award of punitive damages against the general partner or other person handling the taxes of the partnership who was involved. The legal theories are complex and many would involve a "derivative action" rather than a direct suit against the general partner or manager. Other questions The "what to do about this situation" part of this question is beyond the scope of Law.SE as it calls for individualized legal advice. A good response to this situation would be challenging to formulate for even a specialist business law and litigation practitioner with far more factual detail available. Litigating of issues like this routinely costs each side hundreds of thousands of dollars and can take multiple years. |
Is Patty Mayo's Youtube content legal? I've recently been watching a youtuber by the name of "Patty Mayo". He arrests people who fail bond payments or fail to appear in court. I've seen "Cops" before, but this guy doesn't blur faces and lists the fugitive's full name and on what charges they're being arrested for, as well as why they were supposed to appear in court in the first place. He also seems to goad confessions out of the fugitives for their original crimes. All on camera, obviously. His videos regularly have hundreds of thousands of views, sometimes going over a million or more. He also uses the videos to promote his own merchandise, but I've noticed that he mutes the volume whenever his company name is said. Is this legal? To me this seems like he directly profits off of destroying these people's reputations and uses his own job to (closest term I could find) "double dip". He seems to do most of his work in LA. | If Mayo's content was against YouTube's Terms of Service, due to copyright, illegal activity or lack of model releases for the people filmed, I think by now Google would have taken his channel down due to complaints and Google's own housekeeping. To me this seems like he directly profits off of destroying these people's reputations... What is happening is one or a combination of several of these things: As NateEldrige pointed out in his comment to the question "the fact that Mr. X has been ordered to appear in court on charges of Y, and did not do so, would typically be a matter of public record. (That's probably how this bounty hunter found out about them in the first place.)" So revealing that could hardly violate any law. Public records for people wanted for bounty violations are public and are used to find them. Video taping the general public is generally legal. See Law SE What is the definition of a "Public Space" for photography? and Wikipedia Photography and the law. After the taping of a segment, it's possible all individuals are asked to sign a release allowing the use of the video. See Is it legal for police to travel with a film crew and publicize arrest footage without consent? - Law Stack Exchange. If they don't sign, he can't use the tape. There are some sites on the web that claim that (some or all of) Patty Mayo's videos actually use paid actors to recreate bounty hunter and arrest incidents, and as such the videos are not "real." As for He also uses the videos to promote his own merchandise, but I've noticed that he mutes the volume whenever his company name is said. This may be a result of Google's TOS and restriction on advertising or use of his business name in his channel; it's hard to say without knowing details. | Yes. This is treated as time served as several media accounts of sentencing hearings in these cases have demonstrated. See, e.g., this account in The Atlantic magazine, and this one in the newspaper USA Today, and this one in the newspaper the Houston Chronicle. I also saw a similar account in the L.A. Times but can't provide a link because my non-subscription access limit has been exceeded. | Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country. | Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties? Pretty much, I'd say. It may not be a good customer experience, but the flight attendant certainly isn't doing anything illegal. You don't have a legal right not to hear speeches that offend your IP sensibilities. I don't think it's legally any different than if they were showing an in-flight movie that you didn't like. If you try to forcibly stop him, you are likely to be found in violation of 49 USC 46504, which prohibits "assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties". Even if making speeches about Mickey Mouse is not part of his duties, anything physical you did to try to stop him would likely tend to also lessen his ability to perform his actual duties. Violation of 49 USC 46504 is a felony and carries a prison term of up to 20 years. If you try to shout him down, you might be charged with disorderly conduct under state or local law, like this guy. You could probably push your call button to summon another flight attendant, and politely state that you object to the loquacious crew member's behavior, and could they please ask him to stop. Alternatively, you can put on your noise-cancelling headphones and turn up the volume on your music. Anything beyond that and you're in a bad legal position. Of course, you can certainly file a complaint with the airline after the fact. There's a fair chance you'll get an apology, maybe some extra air miles, and the flight attendant might be disciplined or fired. But that's an internal customer service or personnel matter; nothing to do with law. | Yes australia This is a straight up and down case of “deceptive and misleading conduct”. There is plenty of case law to support that testimonials (which this is) must be genuine, not paid for as they are from an actor. Further, they cannot be cherry-picked. If 5 real people reacted and 2 reacted negatively, you cannot just show the 3 who reacted positively - you have to show them all or otherwise disclose that 3 out 5 people loved the product. When actors (or people who are otherwise getting paid) are used that fact must be disclosed if it is not clear from the context. In a typical ad where people are just shown using the product without giving a personal endorsement it’s sufficiently clear that they are actors. However, in the type of ad you describe if they were actors this would need to be stated. Television and radio personalities must disclose when they are being paid for an endorsement under enforceable codes. Influencers are required to do so under non-binding codes, however, it is likely that breach of these codes would also be a breach of the law. | You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer | Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. |
Storing EU PIIs in US located servers I have a business based in Romania and I am about to launch an iOS mobile application that will be available all over the world. The application will communicate with a backend server, which is used to process and store data, including PII (email, name, date of birth, gender, location, and maybe more in the future). My target audience lives mainly in the US (specifically NYC), reason why I want to create the server in that region, for better performance, but I have read that storing EU data on US servers is no longer compliant with GDPR. For reference, I use DigitalOcean droplets, if you are familiar with them. I don't want to limit the accessibility only to US users, as some European users may still sign up. Having the server hosted in EU is also not a good option, as the latency for US users would be too high, and the user base will be mainly from US. I was thinking about how other businesses handle this situation. Having separate databases which handle PIIs from different regions is not applicable in my situation, as the application is similar to a social network and the latency problem would not be solved in this way. | As you, the data controller, are from the EU, all your processing activities must comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the users are from. Since the EU–US Privacy Shield was invalidated in the 2020 Schrems II decision, it is no longer straightforward to use US-based services as your data processors. You have a variety of options to consider. Accept the ~77ms latency from an EU data center. This is the easiest solution from a compliance perspective. Depending on the application, this really might not be a problem. Use services based in a nearby country that is covered by an EU adequacy decision, such as Canada. E.g. the AWS Canada-Central region near Montreal is about 10ms away from NYC. Digital Ocean's Toronto region is about 20ms away. I would choose this approach if you're very concerned about latency and want GDPR compliance with reasonable effort. Handle non-EU data processing activities through a non-EU subsidiary entity. However, that entity would have to actually determine the purposes and means of processing. Setting up a non-EU office with non-EU staff would be costly. You couldn't work remotely for that entity from within the EU without defeating its purpose. Sign standard contractual clauses (SCCs) that serve as a legal basis for data processing activities in the US, after performing an analysis that indicates that the specific concerns as in the Schrems II case do not apply in your case, and potentially after identifying and implementing measures such as end-to-end encryption as explained by the EDPB Recommendations 01/2020 on supplementary transfer measures. Most companies end up relying on SCCs, since otherwise the use of US-based services is impossible. But it's doubtful whether the necessary analysis has been properly performed. The supplementary measures suggested by the EDPB are sometimes feasible in specific use cases (e.g. encrypted backups), but are generally impossible to fulfill for typical cloud services. So even though this is a popular option, it comes with substantial risk for your compliance efforts. | I suspect that US voting records would fall under Article 2(2)(a): Article 2 Material Scope ... This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; I doubt it would be possible to argue successfully that a foreign election is anything other than "an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law." Even the territorial scope could be questioned. This is set forth in the next article, on "territorial scope," the second item of which says: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. It is probably arguable whether processing absentee ballots from EU residents constitutes "offering services to data subjects in the Union," but in this case it's likely to be more difficult to resolve that question than to determine whether the activity falls outside the scope of Union law. | Enforcement against non-EU entities is difficult, and especially digital services would be impossible to shut down. Ultimately, enforcement would depend on judicial assistance between the relevant EU member state and the jurisdictions where the data controller is established or has relevant assets. Your case involves physical goods and other regulations though, so that (some amount of) compliance by the data controller is necessary in order to have continued access to the EU single market. Which instruments for enforcement of fines are available depends on the EU member state, but could e.g. involve confiscation of products or payments. A non-EU B2B service provider would also have economic incentives to comply as EU data controllers cannot share personal data unless an adequate level of protection is ensured. In reality, it is fairly unlikely that non-EU data controllers will get fined anytime soon because data protection authorities tend to prioritize more clear cut cases, and tend to stay within their jurisdiction. Of course, non-EU data controllers are usually required to register an EU representative precisely to subject them to a particular authorities' jurisdiction, but a non-compliant controller is unlikely to do that. A note on the GDPR's territorial scope: it is far less extraterritorial than some people believe. Per GDPR Art 3(2) the regulation applies to non-EU data controllers, (a) to the extent of their processing activities that relate to offering of goods and services (also unpaid services) to data subjects in the EU, or (b) when they monitor/track behaviour of data subjects as far as the behaviour takes place in the EU. For example, a B2C company would have to comply with the GDPR regarding how they handle shipping addresses of their EU customers. The EDPB has issued in-depth analysis as part of their guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope. However, the ECJ has found that some of the GDPR's effects are confined to the EU. For example, Google has to hide some results from EU searches in order to comply with the GDPR's Right to Erasure, but cannot currently be forced to hide the results from non-EU searches. | GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland. | This might be based on a misunderstanding of the GDPR. The GDPR applies under three circumstances: Art 3(1): you (the data controller) are established/live in the EU. Art 3(2)(a): you offer goods or services to people in the EU. Art 3(2)(b): you monitor behaviour of people who are physically in the EU. What is not a factor: what citizenship your site visitors have (see Recital 14). whether your site can be accessed from the EU (see Recital 23). The crucial part is what “offering of goods or services” means. The EDPB has issued official guidelines on the interpretation of this targeting criterion (guidelines 03/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR). Some important notes: The offer of goods or services does not have to involve any compensation. Gratis access to a website can also be a service. GDPR applies when targeting people currently in the EU. US tourists in the EU are protected, EU tourists in the US are not. The moment of offering the service matters. E.g. a US person using an US service cannot claim GDPR protection against the US service while travelling to the EU. Instead of looking at the users of the service, we should look at the target market of the service: if the service doesn't cater to people in the EU, GDPR doesn't apply. The essential question is whether the provider of the service “envisages” offering services to people in the EU. Does the service provider intend for EU data subjects to use the service? The guidelines assemble a non-exhaustive list of indications from case law, in particular the Pammer and Alpenhof case. An excerpt of indications that GDPR might apply: the EU or member states are mentioned in the offer of services the website has marketing targetted at an EU audience the activity at issue is of international nature, e.g. tourism mentioning special contact details for the EU market using a top-level domain name associated with the EU or member states travel instructions when visiting from the EU mentions of an international clientele including people/companies from the EU use of a language or currency other than yours offering delivery of goods to the EU So whether GDPR applies would depend on the subject matter of your website, and on whether you intend to participate in the EU market (even if only online, even if your service is gratis). If GDPR were to apply, then blocking people from the EU would be questionable. It might also be illegal, but not on GDPR grounds. If GDPR does not apply, then blocking people from the EU is already unnecessary. However, geoblocking would be a very strong indication that you don't intend to offer your services to people in the EU. There is no good case law on whether geoblocking is necessary or sufficient. I assume that geoblocking is sufficient (even if it can be easily circumvented e.g. with a VPN), but that it's not necessary in the first place. You could also re-emphasize that you're not targeting the EU market when considering the above indications. E.g. a web shop might clarify that they only ship to North America, but not internationally. Again: your targeting of your website is the crucial factor, not the origin of your visitors. So even if there is an occasional EU visitor, that doesn't mean you have to comply with GDPR. | The GDPR does not set fixed retention periods. Instead, it says data may not be kept for longer than necessary. What is necessary depends very much on the specific context of the processing activity, in particular on the purpose of processing. The GDPR allows retention for as long as necessary. For example, businesses (including financial institutions) are required to keep financial records. This requirement stems from EU member state law, which also sets specific retention periods. If a business wants to keep personal data in financial records for longer than this retention period, they can't just point to the law to authorize this processing – they must instead find a different purpose why they need to keep the data, and then find a suitable Art 6 legal basis. In some cases, retention periods might not be coupled to a fixed duration, but to certain events. For example, personal data for online accounts should typically be kept until the account is closed, which is potentially indefinite. This follows directly from the GDPR approach of limiting data storage by necessity, not by duration. All processing needs a clear purpose + a legal basis. In the context of a genealogy site, the site should analyze carefully what data they collect for what purposes. These purposes might enable potentially unlimited retention. But such processing must also be covered by a legal basis, and I doubt that the site would have a legal basis to make such storage irrevocable. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(a) consent, then the data can only be used as consented to, and consent can always be withdrawn in the future. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract, then the data can be used for compatible purposes in the sense of Art 6(4), but that would require a new legal basis (e.g. legitimate interest). If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest, then the data can be used for Art 6(4) compatible purposes but the data subject has the Art 21 right to object to processing. While a genealogy site may have a legitimate interest in keeping supplied data in order to use it for future research, I think this is a fairly weak legitimate interest that can be easily overridden by an Art 21 objection, which in turn could require Art 17 erasure of the data. The genealogy site should also keep in mind principles like data minimisation and data protection by design and by default, so just keeping data for the off chance that it might be useful in the future is not GDPR-compliant. Data can only be collected and processed for “specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes”. The Art 89 privilege for research purposes also imposes conditions. There is a pretty big carveout in these GDPR requirements for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, and statistical purposes. Specific rules for this exemption are given in Art 89 GDPR. The main value of this exemption is that Art 89 research purposes are always considered compatible with the purpose for which the data was originally collected (cf Art 5(1)(b)), though this might not cover data that was collected under the legal basis of consent (cf Art 6(4)). Other GDPR rules stay intact, and Art 89(1) imposes extra steps to consider: Special attention MUST be given to the data minimisation principle. If the research purpose can be achieved without identifiable data, the data MUST be anonymized. If the research purpose can be achieved with pseudonymized data, pseudonymization MUST be used. Appropriate safeguards MUST be implemented (though this just re-iterates the general requirement in Art 24). In some cases, the research purpose stands in conflict with data subject rights like the right to be informed or the right to object. If so, EU or member state law can provide exemptions from the data subject rights, but can also impose further conditions or safeguards. It is not possible to rely on the Art 89 exception without taking member state law into account. Art 89 does not modify necessity-based retention. Now on to the main question: how long can the personal data be kept for research purposes? While Art 89 research purposes allow us to extend the retention period because we have a new and compatible purpose of processing, it does not affect the general principle that data may only be kept as long as necessary for that purpose. In a scientific context, it would be common to preserve many data sets indefinitely for the purpose of enabling reproducibility of the scientific findings. A privately-run genealogy service might not benefit from Art 89. This “research” angle doesn't seem to be a good fit for a genealogy site. Such a site would typically not be collecting personal data for specific research purposes. At best, it would be operating as an archive of personal data which can be mined by future generations of researchers. But the GDPR specifically only considers archiving purposes in the public interest, which might not cover privately run archives. Archives rely on specific privileges in national laws, and severely restrict access to the information. For example, I'm leafing through the law on public archives in a German state. It forbids access for 10–100 years, depending on the date of death of the data subject and on the age of the documents. This leads me to believe that a privately run genealogy site cannot reasonably rely on the Art 89 exemption, and must instead rely on an ordinary processing purpose + corresponding Art 6 legal basis. This doesn't directly prevent indefinite storage, but means that it will be easy for a data subject to invoke their right to erasure. It is not quite enough to say “we will keep the data indefinitely”, it is also necessary to have a clear purpose for this retention. | I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28). | GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Wrong. User consent is one of the ways that justify storing personal information, but there are others. You may check art.6 to see the several reasons that allow to store personal information. In this case, it seems reasonable to justify it under the paragraph f (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of course, that means that the data has to be used for this purpose. Avoiding spammers and other banned users would be such a purpose, but you should ensure that you do not send those e-mail address commercial information or even a Christmas greeting. In any case, be careful with anything you store. If along with the e-mail you stored more info, this could be interpreted as excessive and beyond the scope of paragraph f. For example, imagine storing "User wrote nazi statements" explaining why the e-mail is banned; EU laws are very restrictive about storing information about political or religious beliefs. |
Irrational fear of needles I want to get an injection (vaccination or treatment) for very good medical reasons. Unfortunately I have an irrational fear of needles (I don’t actually, it’s hypothetical). I can approach a doctor and say I want this injection, I can pay for it if needed, but as soon as a nurse arrives with a needle, I run away, and I definitely don’t consent to the injection at that point. What can my doctor do legally? Can he ask me to sign a form for example where I consent to the injection and allow him to give me the injection even if I strongly refuse a minute later? If I sign to give him permission to get two strong men to hold me in a chair to give me the injection, against my strong objections at that time, would that be legal? | Medical PoAs in General A medical power of attorney (PoA) is only valid (at least in most US states, the rules vary a bit) when the principal (the person granting the power), is unconscious, unable to make a choice, or legally incompetent. A fear, even an irrational fear, will not suffice to make a person incompetent. Maryland To deal with a specific example, consider the law of maryland. According to the article on "Powers of Attorney" from The People's Law Library : Unless otherwise stated in the advance directive, the directive goes into effect when the person becomes too sick to make a decision about his care. If the patient is unconscious or not able to communicate, then the attending doctor may make the determination that the advance directive is in effect. Otherwise two doctors must certify that the patient is not capable of making an informed decision about care. More specifically to use a Maryland advance directive (healthcare PoA) for the purpose described in the question, a person would need to create a written Advance directive under code §5–602(a). It would need to include language waiving the right to revoke the directive. The person would then need to be formally declared "incapable of making an informed decision" about injections by two physicians. Then, and only then, would anyone acting under the PoA be justified in restraining the principal and forcibly administering an injection. I suspect one would find many health care facilities very apprehensive of malpractice suits and other possible legal complications in such a situation, and thus very reluctant to undertake care in such circumstances. Specific Maryland Laws Maryland code section 5–602 reads, in relevant part: (a) (1) Any competent individual may, at any time, make a written or electronic advance directive regarding the provision of health care to that individual, or the withholding or withdrawal of health care from that individual. (a) (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the absence of a validly executed or witnessed advance directive, any authentic expression made by an individual while competent of the individual’s wishes regarding health care for the individual shall be considered. ... (e) (1) Unless otherwise provided in the document, an advance directive shall become effective when the declarant’s attending physician and a second physician certify in writing that the patient is incapable of making an informed decision. (e) (2) If a patient is unconscious, or unable to communicate by any means, the certification of a second physician is not required under paragraph (1) of this subsection. §5–601 reads: (f) “Competent individual” means a person who is at least 18 years of age or who under § 20–102(a) of this article has the same capacity as an adult to consent to medical treatment and who has not been determined to be incapable of making an informed decision. ... (m) (1) “Incapable of making an informed decision” means the inability of an adult patient to make an informed decision about the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of a specific medical treatment or course of treatment because the patient is unable to understand the nature, extent, or probable consequences of the proposed treatment or course of treatment, is unable to make a rational evaluation of the burdens, risks, and benefits of the treatment or course of treatment, or is unable to communicate a decision. §5–604 reads: (a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an advance directive may be revoked at any time by a declarant by a signed and dated written or electronic document, by physical cancellation or destruction, by an oral statement to a health care practitioner or by the execution of a subsequent directive. (a) (2) A declarant, knowingly and voluntarily, may elect in an advance directive to waive the right under paragraph (1) of this subsection to revoke any part or all of the advance directive, including the appointment of an agent, during a period in which the declarant has been certified incapable of making an informed decision under § 5–602(e) of this subtitle. (b) If a declarant revokes an advance directive by an oral statement to a health care practitioner, the practitioner and a witness to the oral revocation shall document the substance of the oral revocation in the declarant’s medical record. Alternate Procedure In many cases it is possible to treat and mitigate irrational fears. The process is not instant, but it is often effective, I understand. The hypothetical patient might be wise to undertake such treatment. It is possible to render a person unconscious without using an injection, although this has significant risks. That is not a legal issue, but a person could consent to such a procedure, and then be injected while unconscious. Whether a doctor would be willing to undertake this I cannot say. Some medications normally taken by injection can be administered by other routes, but I gather that some cannot, so this might or might not be a useful solution. | In the US the first amendment protections given to free expression make defamation claims significantly harder to pursue than in some other countries. o-called 'product defamation" claims are generally harder yet. In the case of Dominion Voting Systems some of those sued seem to have made fairly specific allegations, which, if true, would involve probably criminal wrong doing. And please note that none of those suits have yet had a trial on the merits, to the best of my knowledge. We don't know if the statements complained of will be held to be defamatory or protected. Claims that a vaccine is not as safe as it should be, or the regulators were too quick to approve it, are harder to frame as defamatory of the drug companies. Since the government contracted in advance for enough vaccine to give a dose to everyone in the US (as I understand it) damages would be hard to prove. And there would be a risk of a PR backlash. It is not as if any of these companies has tried to file a suit and had it dismissed. They have not chosen to file, for which there could be many reasons. | One approach is to direct their attention to this publication from the NY Dept. of Health. It says "Physicians and hospitals are required by state law to maintain patient records for at least six years from the date of the patient's last visit". There is also a PDF printout which you can hand to them. If they still absolutely refuse, the publication explains about the appeals process and the consequence to the doctor, but it also provides some "rationalizations" that the staff-person might invoke (for example "Yes, but we charge for copying, I thought you meant for free" – they can charge up to 75 cents per page). There is no legal basis for their 2-year conclusion. | This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals. | You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe. | Your question is about "Would it be kidnapping if I was injured and someone took me to a hospital without my consent", so I don't understand these other answers which say "it depends on the situation". The key point is what you mean by "without my consent". Good Samaritan laws are also relevant, which offer defenses to people who do things that would otherwise be unlawful when they are doing it with good intentions to help someone who they believe is injured or would become injured without their intervention. The main things to consider are the degree of injury, which is a spectrum ranging from no injury at all to being dead, and whether the injured person is conscious. Are you so injured that you are unconscious? In most jurisdictions, being unconscious is considered as you consenting to any actions which are done with the intent of giving you medical assistance, which is on a spectrum of saying "hey are you ok?" or shaking you in order to wake you up, all the way up to treatment including major surgery. So by being unconscious it is usually automatically consent, but if you are awake and are refusing help or treatment, even if you could die if you didn't receive treatment, it would be easy to argue that you were not consenting and that any treatment/assistance etc was unlawful. This situation sometimes happens, and EMTs are often trained to wait until the person goes unconscious to then give them medical assistance/transport etc, but assisting someone before they go unconscious could still be argued as permissible, if the injured person was so distressed that they were unable to give/refuse consent, or at least if the assistor believed that to be the case. This is why if someone has a major medical problem and is unconscious, hospitals can resuscitate them and even perform surgery without them signing a consent form. By being unconscious, it is considered that they are consenting to any necessary surgery to help them, even including amputation or other negative consequences. Conversely, if someone has a valid Advance healthcare directive on file which forbids measures such as resuscitation, they will be considered not to consent, and will usually be left alone without life-saving assistance. Resuscitating/performing surgery on someone in this case can be cause for damages to the injured person, because it would have been clear that they did not consent to such assistance. | You may not assault a violator, you may notify the authorities. If your state has passed a law making it a felony to be outside without a mask, you can perform a citizen's arrest (but no state has such a law). So you cannot take the law into you own hands, and you run the risk of being arrested on felony assault charges if you do. There is always a significant risk that you are wrong about whether the order applies to a particular individual. You can always file a lawsuit, but you'd be in highly-experimental legal territory in terms of succeeding, specifically the claim that the person endangered your health (you can't sue on behalf of others, except e.g. as a parent on behalf of harm done to a child). For instance, nobody has successfully sued another person for going out in public having the flu on the grounds that they unreasonably put plaintiff at risk. You would have to experiment with that argument, to show that going out with a mask is reasonable and going out without a mask is unreasonable. | You can refuse to pay. The doctor can either accept your refusal or pursue the debt in court. If he pursues the debt you will probably lose. The Common Law position Your contract with the doctor was for him to do whatever he did and you to pay for it. Your contract with your insurer is for you to pay the premium and them to reimburse you for whatever they cover. The fundamental question is why you were taking the doctor's (via his secretary) advice on your contract with your insurer? The advice was wrong, however, it is difficult to see that there is a case for negligent misstatement; you would have difficulty showing there was a duty of care and even if you did showing what damage flowed from it since it is quite likely that you would have had the procedure notwithstanding the absence of cover, unless it was purely cosmetic. The Consumer Law position California probably has consumer protection laws regarding misleading and deceptive conduct - I have no idea what they are. If this is so then your doctor's statement was misleading - consequences may flow from this. |
Which standards prevent laws from naming specific targets? It seems normative that a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions. Imagine: "Violation of this section is punishable by a $100 fine; Joel S. to pay triple." Such rules could surely cause conflicts of interest, and I know from programming that very specific heuristics tend to be brittle in practice. Are there specific legal principles which put this practice off limits? | It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed. | Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most "common" crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries. | Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache. | Washington v. Davis held that if a law or other action (in this case, a Verbal Skill Test as part of D.C. police hiring practices) is not necessarily unconstitutional if it results in discriminatory outcome. In order to be actionable against the state, one must prove that the law was intended to discriminate from the creation of the law. Your quoted source is in fact wrong and your number 2 option is the correct summation of the quote. Only laws that are purposefully discriminatory are unconstitutional. | Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46". | We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to. | No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it." | Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability). |
Are websites like r/WSB illegal due to market manipulaion? Note: I am not invested in HTZ or GME. This is not investment advice and is in no way to be construed as investment advice. Websites like r/wallstreetbets can cause herd investments in various stocks. This is not unique to WSB and also exists anywhere stocks are discussed publicly (twitter has many accounts touting investment ideas). Recent examples being Hertz and Gamestop: https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/hertz-stock-price-skyrockets-since-filing-bankruptcy-traders-global-holdings-2020-6-1029285231 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gamestop-stock-price-volatility/ Are the websites, and the advice they "appear" to give, illegal? Is this market manipulation or could one be accused by posting on these websites as a "market manipulator"? Or, are the websites fully legal and are just "opinions" that others reading can construe in any way they want. I am reminded of SEC vs Lebed: https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/21/business/sec-says-teenager-had-after-school-hobby-online-stock-fraud.html http://laweconomicscapital.com/2019/01/more-on-internet-stock-manipulations-sec-v-lebed-2000-revisited%EF%BB%BF/ Thank you for your interpretations Edit Coincidentally, this article just came out: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-26/reddit-fueled-rallies-like-gamestop-s-defy-easy-crackdown-by-sec?srnd=premium | united-states That is going to depend greatly on the circumstances. In the US generally anyone may express an opinion on the value or merits of an investment, indeed that is protected speech under the first amendment. However, a person with an interest in a stock or other security who publishes an opinion or statement intended to deceive people, with the further intent of profiting by the deception, may well have committed securities fraud. If the published text contains false statements of fact, known to the author to be false, or that the author knows have not been checked and might well be false, that is additional evidence of such fraud. There are other cases in which such posting of an alleged "opinion piece" might be criminal or an actionable tort. But that would not make the site illegal. It would be the specific acts by specific people that would be illegal. Only if the site were routinely used for such unlawful purposes and seemed to have no legitimate purpose would one be likely to say that the site was illegal, and even then it is a stretch. | This is not "libel," which is a form of defamation (publishing a false and defamatory statement that injures another). "Bait and switch" is a type of violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law. That Law makes it illegal for a business to engage in any false or deceptive practices, or to perform any false or deceptive acts, in commerce. Read more about it on the Massachusetts' state government site. If the restaurant's conduct was deceptive and it caused you harm (for instance, you would not have gone into the restaurant and ordered at all if you had known you had to order a drink to get the favorable price on sliders,) there may be a violation. | The stock exchange deals in two broad types of things: shares in companies (or other organisations) and derivatives. The first is easy to deal with: buying and selling shares is not gambling - ownership of part of the company passes from seller to buyer. The value that they agree on represents their valuation of the company at the time of the trade; into this will factor all sorts of things that are speculative and ill-defined. However, this is no different from people agreeing on the price of a block of land, a ship or a prize bull - each party evaluates their expected future income stream and decides if they will agree to that price. Derivative trade, however, can be shown to be financially identical to gambling. However, just because things are identical in one field (finance) does not make them identical in another (law). Derivative trade is legal; gambling isn't. Why? Because derivative trade is not legally a subset of gambling. | There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model. | If the ability to get a Pannini is conditioned on buying paper towels for money, then he isn't really selling paper towels for $2 and the Pannini for free, he is really selling a package consisting of paper towels and a Pannini for $2, so it would probably still be illegal. The phrase lawyers and judges use to talk about attempts to create loopholes like this one is "too clever by half", which means: "Shrewd but flawed by overthinking or excessive complexity, with a resulting tendency to be unreliable or unsuccessful." | If only the tip is left in such "fake" money, it would not be theft as there is no legal obligation to leave a tip at all (except in those establishments that add a tip or "service charge' to the bill.) If the "money" is not an attempt to imitate real cash, it wouldn't be counterfeiting (leaving monopoly money for example would not be counterfeiting). The server would be understandably angry. The restaurant might refuse to seat the people who left the "fake" another time, if the servers identified them to the manager, but nothing would require them to do so. This is all on a US basis, I have no idea if tips might be legally required in other countries. | Although crypto space may be little regulated, insurance is in most jurisdictions highly regulated. Any such arrangement would need to comply with current laws on insurance, until and unless modified laws to cover this sort of thing are passed, and then it would need to comply with those. Tax authorities generally allow one to declare "other business income" or "other investment income" without forming a legal entity. I cannot say how such income would be classified in any given jurisdiction. Whether the platform, or some legal entity associated with the platform, would need to be registered will depend on the current laws and regulations governing insurance, and on the way in which teh contracts are structured. A disclaimer cannot prevent one from being sued. The contracts would need to carefully and explicitly state who is liable for what. Programs cannot be held accountable for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. If negligence in the creation or operation of a program causes a loss, the operator may well be liable. Programs cannot be sued for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. It may well be essential to constitute the "platform" as a legal entity of some sort. Otherwise its operator will be liable for its actions. I cannot be sure. I once encountered a somewhat similar system in which insurance was provided by individuals exchanging contracts, so that in a sense each member insured all the others. There was a company that supervised and provided legal and administrative services to the group of individuals, and collected fees for this. That sounds a bit similar to the suggested platform, but I don't know exactly how that company was organized. The system was called "NJ CURE". I don't know if it is still in operation. | First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea. |
Is it legal to sell 'Vaccine Control Group' ID cards stating the holder "must not be vaccinated"? This is an independent group called the 'Vaccine Control Group' selling ID cards stating they "must not be vaccinated." Is the sale of these cards from legal standpoint, well, legal? Are businesses required to follow what these ID cards say? | Businesses are not required to do what the card says, they are required to do what the card-holder says, to the extend that what the card holder says relates to giving or denying consent to be vaccinated. Since they don't vaccinate people who are unconscious, consent will always be directly obtained from the patient and the card has absolutely no effect. Also, control subjects are selected at random and the subject does not know what group they are in. Possession of such a card therefore has zero scientific effect. | Washington state dedicated a section of their code to explicitly make this illegal (to install it, not just use it). RCW 46.37.685(1)(b) says It is unlawful for a person to have an installed license plate flipping device on a vehicle, use technology to flip a license plate on a vehicle, or use technology to change the appearance of a license plate on a vehicle. and it is illegal to sell them. Georgia does not seem to have a specific law on the topic, but the same effect holds under GA Code §40-2-41, which says: Unless otherwise permitted under this chapter, every vehicle required to be registered under this chapter, which is in use upon the highways, shall at all times display the license plate issued to the owner for such vehicle, and the plate shall be fastened to the rear of the vehicle in a position so as not to swing and shall be at all times plainly visible... It shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the license plate legible at all times. No license plate shall be covered with any material unless the material is colorless and transparent. No apparatus that obstructs or hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate shall be attached to the rear of any motor vehicle required to be registered in the state. We can start with the question of whether the vehicle must be registered: yes, it does. Then we can ask if "which is in use upon the highways" is true. This is not obvious, because that clause could be interpreted as meaning "which is at some time or other in use upon the highway", or else as "at those times when it is in use upon the highway". I strongly suspect that the courts would find in favor of the first interpretation, not the second, especially since the law also says that you must "keep the license plate legible at all times" (not "at all times when you are on the highway"). Finally, a plate flipper clearly "hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate", and the law prohibits the attachment of such device, not just its use. So obscuring your license plate is just not legal. | You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though. | Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets. | Could the Federal government say that if you are not vaccinated against Covid then you lose your welfare benefits? Would it be constitutional? What I am asking is, would a federal law (passed by congress) requiring people on welfare to be vaccinated be constitutional? For the most part yes. Arguably, a religious exemption might be required. But the federal government absent other countervailing considerations, generally has the power to mandate vaccination and other responses to a contiguous disease in cases where the vaccination would affect interstate commerce. All manner of things can be established as conditions to federal spending and federal programs. In cases where the program is purely federal, that discretion is almost unlimited (except for individual liberty considerations like freedom of religion). In cases where state cooperation is required, as noted in the answer by user6726, this discretion isn't absolutely unbounded if the state objects. | In this statement of "Patient Rights & Responsibilities from Nash UNC it is said that: A patient has the right to know the names and the jobs of his or her caregivers. But I do not find any actual law that establishes such a right. Hospitals usually have a policy that doctors and other caregivers must wear name-tags and identify themselves to patients, but that does not necessarily apply to questions after the fact, nor can I be sure that any law mandates such a policy. | This sounds like legal nominative use to me. The issue is trademark. Trademark law isn't a monopoly on using the trademark, it is a prohibition on using the trademark in a way that misleads a customer about who is selling something or what is being sold. You cannot sell goods in a manner that implies inaccurately an affiliation or endorsement of a trademark owner, causing confusion in the mind of a reasonable consumer. But, it sounds like your disclosure makes a factually accurate statement without implying or stating that the goods are sold with the affiliation or endorsement of Kodak, only that you used their goods as parts in your product. To be safe, in order to be completely clear and avoid all doubt, you might want to say, in addition, "This produce is not licensed or authorized by Kodak." The First Sale rule expressly protects your right to resell physical good protected by trademark or copyright to someone else, so the sale itself is not illegal, it is just a question of whether you have abridged its trademark. Conceptually, what you are doing isn't that different from stating that the used car you are selling had all replacement parts obtained to maintain and repair it done with dealer approved parts, rather than third-party knock offs, which would likewise be legal. Similarly, you could sell a house with a listing that identifies the brand of every building material used. For example, "this house was constructed using Pella Windows." | There is language, but not a mechanism, covering this. Section 3(a)(3) of version 4 licenses says If requested by the Licensor, You must remove any of the information required by Section 3(a)(1)(A) to the extent reasonably practicable. If you become aware of a person using your material and attributing you, and you want the attribution removed, you would accordingly notify them (somehow), and they are required to remove the offending material. The removable informations includes: i. identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Licensor (including by pseudonym if designated); ii. a copyright notice; iii. a notice that refers to this Public License; iv. a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties; v. a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably practicable; |
Is it legal to CC a real or fake lawyer on an email as an intimidation tactic? What if this is combined with registering a new domain? I heard about this idea on Reddit. To intimidate someone, send them an email and CC (copy) a lawyer with their business email address with the name of the law firm they work for. Also, you can purchase a domain name that sounds like it's a law firm. Then have it redirect to an actual law firms website. However you can set it up so the emails still are recieved by your own website. Is any of this illegal? Here is an example: Joe's landlord isn't returning his damage deposit after Joe moved out. Joe buys the domain "newintownlawyers.com" and sets it up to redirect to a real website belonging to a law firm e.g. "bobslaw.com". Joe then emails his ex-landlord demanding his damage deposit back with a CC on "[email protected]". His ex-landlord reads the email, sees the CC, types in newintownlawyers.com and visits bobslaw.com, thus thinking it's a real law firm that he's in trouble with. Would it make a difference if an email from "@newintownlawyers" is sent to the ex-landlord to further intimidate him? To my understanding simply setting up a new domain and having it redirect to another is legal even if you don't have anyone's permission. | A standard common law fraud analysis applies to the person to whom the representation was made. Is it a misrepresentation of a material fact, made with the intent that it be relied upon, which is justifiably relied upon, and the reliance causes damages? Usually, the answer will be "no." Being represented is not a material fact to a disputed issue. In the case of criminal mail and wire fraud in the U.S actual reliance and damages are generally not necessary. But materiality is still required. Arguably there is a Lanham Act violation for deceptively using the tradename or trademark of a firm in a manner that is misleading. The trouble here is "use the information for what?" This said, it is a bad idea as a tactic to use. For example, I was a lawyer in a fraud case where a defendant we were suing for fraud did something very similar to this (not as an email cc, but representing that they had a lawyer when they didn't). The misrepresentation that they were represented by counsel (for reasons similar to those described) wasn't itself actionable. But being forced to go on the stand and testify under oath that you lied about someone being your lawyer in the middle of a fraud case where you are also accused of lying about other things powerfully destroys your credibility in general with a jury. | No. If the person who reviews the contract is in fact a lawyer, and does the review in his or her capacity as a lawyer so that there is in fact an attorney-client relationship, the lawyer would be subject to malpractice liability if the review failed to meet the required standard of care. This generally means that the lawyer made errors that no reasonably careful attorney would make. It would also require proof of loss caused directly by the negligent legal advice. See the Wikipedia article on Legal Malpractice. If the person reviewing the contract is not a lawyer, or there is clearly no attorney-client relationship, there is probably no liability (although there might be a case for unlicensed practice of law, depending on the jurisdiction). A lawyer might be able to use a written disclaimer to indicate that there is not an attorney-client relationship, but I am not at all sure of that. I am not addressing the issue of why a lawyer would be willing to provide such advice for free, nor the ethics of asking for such free advice, as mentioned in the comment by @Studoku above. If a lawyer is willing to give such free advice, that is his or her decision. This answer assumes US law, since no jurisdiction is stated in the question or comments. Details may depend on the specific state. Laws elsewhere will likely be roughly similar, but may not be. This answer is not to be construed as legal advice, but merely as a general opinion on the state of the law, for educational purposes. | Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose. | There is no public place to “file” that. When privilege is claimed and the other side challenges it then the person claiming privilege needs to establish somehow that the attorney client relationship exists and is pertinent to the question. In the normal course of things there would be an engagement agreement in the attorneys files. And not everything communicated between a client and attorney is protected by the privilege. It only covers legal advice and specifically does not cover discussions planning criminal activity. | This negotiation tactic is not a crime, but it does implicate an ethical rule for attorneys, Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5, which exists in some states, but has been dropped from the national model rules promulgated by the American Bar Association and is a controversial matter from state to state with several variant forms in different states. In Colorado, the relevant rule of professional conduct for lawyers (Rule 4.5 Threatening Prosecution) states: (a) A lawyer shall not threaten criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter nor shall a lawyer present or participate in presenting criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. (b) It shall not be a violation of Rule 4.5 for a lawyer to notify another person in a civil matter that the lawyer reasonably believes that the other's conduct may violate criminal, administrative or disciplinary rules or statutes. The concern about the statement in the question is that mentioning that certain allegations would be put in a publicly filed complaint is an implicit threat to expose criminal acts of the other party if the other party doesn't cooperate, but to refrain from doing so if the other party cooperates. This violates Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5(a) above, and goes beyond Rule 4.5(b) above which states that it is not improper to simply tell someone that it may have been illegal and a crime to do the things that he did. The critical distinction is the implied promise not to disclose these crimes publicly if the other party cooperates by not filing the proposed complaint. Under Rule 4.5, a lawyer can tell someone that certain conduct is probably illegal, and can unilaterally report illegal conduct, but can't hold open the possibility of not reporting illegal conduct to gain a civil advantage. The theory is that it is contrary to public policy for a lawyer to put himself or his client in a position where he is promising to help cover up a crime or other violation of the law. This is controversial, and is not adopted in all states, because it makes some very subtle distinctions that often hinge on strongly implied concepts, and that it provides benefit when applied in many cases to someone who has broken the law, instead of making their violation of the law something that makes them worse off in civil cases as well as in other contexts. There is not a counterpart to Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5 in the Rules of Professional Conduct of New York State, New Jersey, or Florida. So, to the extent that this conduct is subject to ethical rules in any of these states, it would only be indirectly through, for example, through Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 in each of these states, which is a general catch all clause prohibiting lawyers from committing culpable crimes or that is dishonest or that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 8.4 is the counterpart for lawyers of the substantive offense in military justice that a military officer has failed to comport himself as an officer and a gentleman. The history of the decision to remove an express prohibition on threatening prosecution from the ethical rules for lawyers is explained in a 2008 ABA article that also discusses how liability might arise under Rule 8.4. In general, there is nothing wrong with making threats in a negotiation. Often that is precisely what negotiations are about. What is (arguably) wrong is making criminal, administrative or disciplinary charge threats in a civil lawsuit to gain advantage in a civil lawsuit. A prosecutor is perfectly free to make those threats in a criminal case, for example. Similarly, it is perfectly acceptable to make a threat of civil legal action, such as filing a lawsuit, in a civil matter, so long as it doesn't imply a threat to bring criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges if the other side doesn't cooperate. Whether it is proper for an attorney to do this depends heavily upon the state in which this negotiation is taking place, which is not identified in the question. | I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. | Unless you received an order from the court prohibiting contact, it might be legal; but it's probably not the best idea. Let the lawyers handle it Attorneys have far better, more effective means of dealing with this situation than the course of action you describe. Lawyers have productive tools to accomplish the job and they know how to use them. For example, assume the best-case-scenario results from your idea and you get the other side to admit their affidavit is fallacious in some way. "Aha!" you shout. "Success! Daylight!" But then what? It's not on record. You can't testify to the admission because that's hearsay. Now imagine they next share this information about your little conversation with the counterparty that had them sign the affidavit in the first place. After first being alerted of your concerns, they both now act in concert to shore up their stories and you never see that "daylight" again. Contrast that outcome with one where your guy or gal's attorney deposes the witness under oath, gets them to concede to your version of the facts then introduces the deposition as favorable evidence at trial. That's a much better outcome for "your side." Wouldn't you agree? Be wary of unintended consequences Generally speaking, such direct contact between the parties is often problematic and rarely helpful. (Except, in some cases, when direct contact between the parties leads to a negotiated settlement. Which happens far less often than the direct contact going sideways making the situation even more intractable.) Before you launch off on your own and do something that might be counterproductive. First, identify the areas of the affidavit that you think are inaccurate. Give that information to the party you support, then have them run it by their attorney to figure out the best way to handle the situation. |
Law Firm with one lawyer and hundreds of legal experts who haven't passed the bar In this hypothetical scenario lets say there was a law firm that has only one lawyer to file all paper work, make all court room appearances to represent the firm. All of his work, however preparing for cases and communicating with individuals is done by hundreds of legal experts who have not passed the bar. The law firm does not hide this fact. Is this illegal? Is this done in practice on a smaller scale? Could one lawyer be actively involved in several different legal cases if legal experts who have not passed the bar are doing all the grunt work? What are the limitations of what a legal expert who has not passed the bar can do? | A Lawyer may hire paralegals, clerks, secretaries, and other assistants. The lawyer may hire as many as s/he pleases, and assign them whatever tasks s/he chooses. However, some kinds of documents may need to be signed by the lawyer (which ones will depend on the jurisdiction, in the US on the state). During the so-called "robo-signing scandal" it was held that, in some US states at least, a lawyer who signs certain kinds of documents without reviewing them has failed to perform the duties imposed on the lawyer by the law, and the documents may be invalid. Large numbers of mortgage foreclosure cases were dismissed when it became known that the lawyer signing relevant documents had not in fact reviewed them (or in some cases had not even signed them, but had permitted a non-lawyer to sign the lawyer's name). In addition, some functions in some jurisdictions must be performed by an actual lawyer. For example, paralegals and other non-lawyers cannot validly give legal advice. Only a lawyer can represent a client in court. And so on. I question whether one lawyer could in most kinds of practice keep up with the work of "hundreds" of non-lawyers, but that would depend on the kind of work done by the firm. In the US, some law firms are essentially collection agencies. There a single lawyer with many many assistants suffices, I understand, and that structure is not uncommon in the US. | Hire a lawyer Just like you shouldn’t search the internet for medical advice, you shouldn’t do it for legal advice either. It takes a university degree and several years of on-the-job training to become “comprehensively aware”. | Yes It's not uncommon. In fact I am aware of at least one case where the trial judge referred it to appeal before he made his decision on the basis that whichever way he decided the law was so unsettled that grounds for appeal would occur. In that case the court of appeal called up the trial judge to sit on the 3 judge appeal a) because he knew the case and b) because you don't get to not make a decision because it's hard sonny-jim. | The first thing to keep in mind is that, before appearing on the stand, an expert witness will have given a sworn deposition and delivered a written report of his or her findings. They could expect to be questioned about anything they say under oath that contradicts something else they said under oath. It’s not illegal for an expert to admit they were wrong before, or that there are other facts that support a different conclusion—indeed, a witness on the stand might be obligated to—but it might not do their professional reputation and their credibility with the jury any good, either. In the U.S., the opposing counsel is generally allowed to contact a witness, and take a statement, but may not ask the witness to testify falsely or offer any inducement prohibited by law. (See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 173/Model Rule (MR) 3.4.) It would certainly be illegal for a witness to take money from both parties in the case without informing them or the court, or to swear that whatever the highest bidder pays them to say is their expert opinion. If this happened under direct examination, the lawyer would probably cut their losses by asking no further questions and getting the witness off the stand. Putting the witness on the stand would give the other side an opportunity to cross-examine them. Grilling your own expert as a hostile witness, even if the judge allowed it, would only make your position seem tendentious. Nothing stops an expert witness from giving testimony that is more helpful to the other side. They are witnesses, not lawyers, and their duty is to tell the truth, not to zealously advocate on behalf of some client. | Living Wills A "living will" which is a "pull the plug" document that isn't customized to an individual's preferences (probably 95%+ done by lawyers are not customized anyway) through a service like LegalZoom is probably fine, although doing it yourself you don't get the same guidance about how to use it in practice and are more likely to screw up the formal execution of the document (e.g. not having the proper witnesses and notary observe the execution, or signing in the wrong place, etc.). But this document is usually prepared by a lawyer at little or no extra cost when you have your last will and testament done, so the cost of not screwing up the execution of it isn't great. And, lawyer drafted documents are less likely to be contested in practice, even when a non-lawyer on paper does everything right. Someone who does their own living will also often doesn't realize the important of also having medical powers of attorney and durable powers of attorney for property which are also necessary. Simple Wills A "simple will" is quite another matter. First, I've never met a layperson who doesn't think that they need no more than a "simple will" when in fact they often do, either because they are affluent, or have a blended family, or need testamentary trusts to manage property for children or young adults or black sheep or for tax purposes or because some family members are non-citizens. In general, a lot of the value of having a lawyer do the work comes from the lawyer's ability to spot issues that are exceptional and take you out of the "simple will" solution by itself. Often an issue spotted can result in larger monetary savings or a much smoother probate process. For example, a lawyer can identify cases where a probate proceeding in more than one state is likely to be required and suggest steps to avoid that expensive result. Second, many non-lawyers have a very hard time thinking about all possibilities. They do fine thinking about what rules make sense if everybody alive today is still alive when you die and you own what you own now when you die, but have a very hard time thinking about what would be appropriate if people predecease them or if their assets change substantially. Lawyers are much better at working through what is sensible in all of these possibilities, many of which won't happen, but some of which will happen. This matters because a will never expires unless it is expressly revoked. I've probated wills drafted during WWII in basic training (as required) before the decedent went off to war and never amended over the next 60 years, and it is very hard to be that thoughtful when you are doing it yourself. Third, it is very common for non-lawyers to use language that isn't obviously ambiguous or otherwise problematic until you are forced to apply it in practice. Estate planning lawyers are much more aware of these traps in the "moving parts" of an estate plan and of the possibilities that need to be provided for. To give one example, suppose that you leave your second wife your house, and leave the remainder of your estate to your children (her stepchildren). It is very easy to say this in a way that does not make clear whether she takes the house subject to the mortgage, or if the mortgage is a debt to be paid before the remainder of the estate is distributed to the children. Similar issues often come up in relation to tax elections and allocation of tax debts among heirs. Providing for the disposition of pets is another thing that few non-lawyers manage to do well. Lawyers, in contrast, generally draft in a manner that avoids these ambiguities and sets forth rules that are sensible, fair and will work in practice. The issues are even more fraught if businesses or investment real estate is involved. And, non-lawyers (even sophisticated, affluent business people) routinely fail to grasp that a Will only governs assets which don't have beneficiary designations and is subject to forced marital share and minimum family inheritance laws that act by operation of law as well as other "gap filling" presumptions that modify the literal meaning of certain kinds of language in a Will. Finally, screwing up the execution of a Will is very common, while lawyer drafted wills are much less likely to be contested. In my twenty years of experience as a lawyer who does estate planning as part of his practice and teaches lawyers, financial planners and paralegals about the topic, I find that the increased litigation costs associated with a do it yourself will (on average) is about ten times as large as the savings associated with doing it yourself. Sure, one time in three or four or five, somebody does their own will and doesn't screw it up and it all goes fine, but a majority of the time, do it yourself will drafters do something that would be considered malpractice if a lawyer did it. Pay lawyers now, or pay lawyers more later. Honestly, if all you need is a "simple will" and you are not willing to spend the $500-$2,000 to have a lawyer draft appropriate documents, and help you execute them, you are probably better off doing nothing at all and dying intestate (i.e. without a will so that the default provisions of the law apply), which often isn't a horrible result in a plain vanilla, unblended nuclear family that isn't particularly affluent. | Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party. | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | I think you would do much better to describe the situation, and the result you wish to achieve. Include enough detail for the lawyer to understand the nature of the case, but keep it brief. More details should come once the lawyer has agreed to take the case, or to give you an interview/consultation to discuss it. Later in your letter, if you like, you might include "We understand that ORC 2741.02, 2741.06, and 2741.07 may give us a basis for suit" but I would not go into any more detail about the law in an initial letter. If during the consultation (in person or by phone or zoom or some such), the lawyer does not mention laws you have learned of and think relevant, you could mention them and ask why the lawyer is not addressing them. The lawyer does not need or want to be told what you think the law is, the lawyer needs to know what the situation is and what you hope to do about it. That includes who "we" are. Update As the answer from ohwilleke says, a telephone all might be better than a letter. But in either case, the key things the lawyer will need to know are: 1) who are you?; 2) what is the situation you are concerned with (details may be important here)?; 3) what do you want to accomplish through the lawyer's services?; 4) who are the other parties involved? You will want to learn: Does the lawyer m(olr law firm) handle that sort of case?; Are they willing to take you on as clients?; 3) Hpw much experience has this lawyer had with this sort of case?; 4) What are the likely upfront costs?; and 5) What are the chances of success? Items 4 and 5 may not get answers in a first round of contacts. 2nd update, based on revised letter You still start with a statement of the law you think give you a claim. Please do not do that. In this draft letter you do not say anything about the actual problem you have or what you want done until the sixth and next to last paragraph of the letter. Even then you are not very clear on what you want the lawyer to do. "we find ourselves forced to learn how to sue an ex-customer" sounds as if you are asking for education, not legal services. I would suggest something more like: We are an association of traditional artisans. An Ohio business {insert business name} that had formerly purchased and resold some of our work has been using the images of us and our families to advertise its goods without permission. We want this stopped and also want monetary damages for past use. We think we may have a claim under {ORC sections}. In any case we want this stopped by whatever legal process would be most appropriate. That puts the situation first, your desire second, and any comment about the law later (or it could be left out). |
What does "appropriated to the contract" mean in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 18, Rule 5? Here, the verb appropriate is followed by TO. What does it mean that someone appropriates "goods of that description and in a deliverable state" TO THE CONTRACT? At large, what does it mean that a person appropriates goods TO THE CONTRACT? This syntax feels bizarre. Which definition of appropriate applies here? I know many legal terms are still in Latin. Is the Latinate meaning of appropriate relevant at all? Googling links to this wordreference.com thread. Sale of Goods Act 1979 Rule 5. (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods then passes to the buyer; and the assent may be express or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made. | A popular word meaning the same would be assigned. See for instance Merriam-Webster entry 2 definition 2: "to set apart for or assign to a particular purpose or use". As an example, if you go into a pub and ask for a pint of beer and the barman says "certainly sir", at that point there is a contract of sale but you are not the owner of any part of the beer in the barrel. But when the barman fills a glass for you at that point the beer is appropriated to the contract of sale and becomes your property. The beer has been appropriated to the contract by the seller with the assent of the buyer. On the other hand if the barman says "certainly sir but I am a bit busy right now so would you mind coming round this side of the bar and filling a glass from the barrel yourself" that means that the beer has been appropriated to the contract by the buyer with the assent of the seller. | Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them. | 39 USC 3009(b) says that Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. and (a) prohibits "the mailing of unordered merchandise". (d) then says For the purposes of this section, “unordered merchandise” means merchandise mailed without the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient. If you previously expressly request a jar of herring and they deliver a jar of herring, you have to pay for it. If instead they send you a jar of honey, then since you did not expressly order a jar of honey, they have violated the law. It doesn't matter whether they deep-down intended to send a jar of herring and accidentally sent honey, or they deep-down deceptively, deliberately and maliciously sent you honey – you still didn't order honey. So it isn't necessary for the law to say anything about error, since the effect of the law is clear enough without saying "whether deliberately or by error". TOS wording cannot override federal law. | Depends on the context Statutory timeframes Certain documents, like a Statement of Claim or an Adjudication Application, set very strict timeframes in motion by their receipt and there are real legal consequences if they are not responded to within a statutorily mandated period. For the former, failure to respond may result in a default judgement and, for the latter, it prohibits the adjudicator from considering a response. In such circumstances, the statute will set out the notice period. Contractural timeframes The document may be initiating an action where there are timeframes spelled out in a pre-existing contract. For example, what’s commonly called a “show cause notice” is a notice from one party to the other that they are invoking a contractural term that requires them to give the other party the opportunity to respond, that is, to “show cause”, why they should’t do something the contract then allows - like terminating it. In such circumstances, the contract will set out the notice period or, if the contract is silent, then a reasonable notice period is required - see below. Reasonable notice It is inherent in contracts, but also a feature of the law more generally, that when a specific notice period is not given, reasonable notice is required. What is reasonable depends on all the circumstances including the ability of the recipient to respond, the severity of the consequence of not responding, and the urgency of the issue. For example, a reasonable time to respond to an eviction notice will be longer than that required to respond to remove your vehicle that is blocking a fire escape - particularly if the building is presently on fire. Date of the notice or date of receipt? When measuring all these times, the question might arise as to whether they are from the date printed on the notice, the date the notice is delivered (or, in legal speak, served), or the date that it comes to the attention of the recipient. Again, that will depend on the circumstances and a statute or contract may measure time from any of those things. They may also have deemed receipt, that is, receipt has legally occurred even if it hasn’t factually occurred. For example, receipt may be in the ordinary course of mail for a posted letter - so for a letter posted by Express Mail, the next business day after postage even if the Post Office loses it. Any or all of these may be subject to their own measures of reasonableness. For example, even if the time is measured from the date on the notice, this would not be reasonable if the sending party waited 2 weeks before sending it. Similarly, if the recipient can demonstrate that they spent the last 6 months in a coma, it might not be reasonable to sanction them for failing to respond. The legal art of service, deemed or otherwise, is a whole subsection of law in itself. | What makes something a take-it or leave-it contract? The lack --be it essential or literal lack-- of opportunity to negotiate the terms of a contract. That is also known as adhesion contract. And (if I am the one taking it), are unclear clauses categorically interpreted in my favor? Rather than "categorically [interpreted]", a more accurate characterization is to say "reasonably [interpreted]". Among the reasonable interpretations of a contract, the adopted one is that which favors the party who was not the draftsman of the contract. This is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem and is cognizable in jurisdictions of the U.S. and in many others world-wide. The doctrine of contra proferentem is sought to compensate for the gap of parties' bargaining power. In an adhesion contract, the fact that one party may only accept the contract "as is" (or reject, which would render this a moot issue) evidences that the draftsman of that contract has significantly more bargaining power. A contract need not be one of adhesion in order to trigger the doctrine of contra proferentem, though. In the case of negotiated contracts, the doctrine may apply selectively so as to interpret ambiguous clauses against the party who ultimately caused the ambiguity in those clauses. Some jurisdictions are more emphatic about this aspect of contract law, which at first glance may seem a departure from the principle of interpretation [literally] against the draftsman. There could be scenarios where a party (the non-draftsman) suggests a clause, and the draftsman incorporates that clause but devises some wording to render the contract unclear in that regard. The doctrine would apply not merely by virtue of the latter party being the draftsman, but because he in his capacity of draftsman tweaked the clause arguably in an attempt to frustrate the other party's interest in --or purpose for-- that clause. | on behalf means that the party of the agreement is the landlord, not the property manager. The contract both entitles and obliges the landlord, not the property manager. The property manager is not a party of the contract. So the fact that the property manager is fired completely unrelated to the existing contract. Additionally, in most jurisdictions that I know of, even if the property changed ownership (the landlord sold or gifted it, or the landlord died and it was inherited by someone) the contract would still be in force, as the change of situations would not invalidated the rights and obligations of the other parties. | There isn't enough information to give a reliable answer in the abstract. It is a hard concept for lots of people to understand, but words don't have the same meaning in every context. Law is not physics or chemistry. Words that mean one thing in a particular instrument or statute could mean another thing somewhere else, even if exactly the same words are used. More context would be helpful in determining a meaning. It could be a reference to a type of use, like AirBnB or other short term rentals (e.g. use as a hotel or hostel). It could also be a reference to a type of building that is not permanent such as tents, RVs, or other non-permanent structures intended for residential occupancy. Usually, a look at what the adjacent and framing language of the covenants say would clarify the intent as would some sense of the kind of structures built or intended to be built in the vicinity. It also isn't clear from context if the emphasis is on "residential" (e.g. in a property with a storage facility included), or on "temporary" (e.g. in a posh suburb). | As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid. |
Being asked to start teaching before being employed as a new faculty Suppose that a non-US person F is scheduled to join a US university as a teaching-focused faculty member. F's official starting is set to be January 4th and, at that university, classes start in the same week, and F will be teaching 2 courses in F's first term. F has been inforems by HR hat F will need to apply for an SSN upon arrival in the US, and F will only be able to start working once F receives an SSN by mail, which may take 3-4 weeks. F's department head says this is normal, all foreign hires go through the same process. He also says F is expected to start teaching F's courses right away, even if F isn't officially working yet. Is this indeed the normal process/expectation for foreign hires? Also, is it even legal for the university to ask new hires to start working without putting them on the payroll? Does F risk violating the terms of an H1B visa by "working" without being employed/paid? Entering the US before the term starts to apply for the SSN number earlier isn't really an option, as F can only legally enter at most 10 days before the starting date of F's visa. (This was previously asked on academia.stackexchange, but it was suggested to cross-post this question here.) | Worth reading this document (pdf) from the US Social Security Administration (SSA). It describes the rules for Foreign Workers and Social Security Numbers and on the second page states: Do I need to have my number before I start working? We don’t require you to have a Social Security number before you start work. However, the Internal Revenue Service requires employers to use your Social Security number to report your wages. While you wait for your Social Security number, your employer can use a letter from us stating you applied for a number, and your immigration documents can prove your authorization to work in the United States. Obviously, you should confirm this approach with your employer. | My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others. | If you have already claimed unemployment, this might be considered a job offer. If you have not yet field a claim, then it doesn't matter, only offers after a claim is field affect unemployment benefits to the best of my understanding. You could ask for a job offer in writing. If one is not provided, that is pretty good evidence that there never was an offer. If one is provided, you will have a clearer notice of the offered terms and duration, and that the offer is authorized, and can better judge what to do. | There is no legislation in Germany that explicitly states how long you have to wait in such a situation. First let's look what happened: According to your work contract, you are obligated to be available for work and follow the directions of your employer. Let's not go into nuances of the latter duty, because they depend on what type of work you are doing. Your employer is obligated to pay you if you fulfill your duties. What happened is called Annahmeverzug (default of acceptance) in German civil law (§ 615 BGB): Kommt der Dienstberechtigte mit der Annahme der Dienste in Verzug, so kann der Verpflichtete für die infolge des Verzugs nicht geleisteten Dienste die vereinbarte Vergütung verlangen, ohne zur Nachleistung verpflichtet zu sein. Er muss sich jedoch den Wert desjenigen anrechnen lassen, was er infolge des Unterbleibens der Dienstleistung erspart oder durch anderweitige Verwendung seiner Dienste erwirbt oder zu erwerben böswillig unterlässt. … English translation: If the person entitled to services is in default in accepting the services, then the party owing the services may demand the agreed remuneration for the services not rendered as the result of the default without being obliged to provide cure. However, he must allow to be credited against him what he saves as a result of not performing the services or acquires or wilfully fails to acquire through use of his employment elsewhere. … If your employer doesn't enable you to work, they have to pay you for your time. You don't have to make up that time. If you save money by not working or had the opportunity to earn money by other means1 during that time, this can be deducted from your pay. Now, the question is how you fulfill your duty of being available for work. This depends on the specifics and really can only be answered by a lawyer or court (and IANAL). You do not need to endure hardships but have to accept reasonable inconveniences. Thus, you can leave if waiting becomes more than an inconvenience (usually that will be caused by weather or by bodily functions). If you leave, you should still be available for work unless that becomes unreasonable, e.g., because you could use that time to earn money by other means. 1 Usually, it can be safely assumed that you don't have that opportunity. However, a daytaler might easily have that opportunity. | FDIC Regulation 500 prohibits discrimination in making loans on the basis of "National origin" but not on the basis of immigration status. This story from The Nation says that Bank of America is denying accounts to non-citizens, and arguing that it is legal because of increased risks, although there are current court challenges to this. Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A is a case now pending challenging loan denials based on immigration status. This has particularly come up in regard to DACA recipients, rather than people with LPR status. The US "public accommodation" laws probably do not apply, as a bank is not usually considered a place of public accommodation. Any specific state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status might apply. In short, this is an issue still not clearly settled. There seems to be no law or regulation requiring banks to ask for citizenship information, much less to deny accounts based on it, and it would be well to seek a bank with a different policy if possible. The above is very US-specific. Many countries do limit banking access based on citizenship, i understand. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. Before challenging any bank action, you may well wish to seek advice from a lawyer. | You need, at least, to let the person receive 2 reminders which have to name a reasonable period (after the first exceeds, you can send the second) and if the last deadline exceeds, you have the possibility of escalating further. Although often repeated, this is not correct which makes most of your argument moot. By German law (specifically § 286 BGB) these are the exact conditions for a default of payments: (1)If the obligor, following a warning notice from the obligee that is made after performance is due, fails to perform, he is in default as a result of the warning notice. Bringing an action for performance and serving a demand for payment in summary debt proceedings for recovery of debt have the same effect as a warning notice. (2)There is no need for a warning notice if a period of time according to the calendar has been specified, performance must be preceded by an event and a reasonable period of time for performance has been specified in such a way that it can be calculated, starting from the event, according to the calendar, the obligor seriously and definitively refuses performance, for special reasons, weighing the interests of both parties, the immediate commencement of default is justified. (3)The obligor of a claim for payment is in default at the latest if he does not perform within thirty days after the due date and receipt of an invoice or equivalent statement of payment; this applies to an obligor who is a consumer only if these consequences are specifically referred to in the invoice or statement of payment. If the time at which the invoice or payment statement is received by the obligor is uncertain, an obligor who is not a consumer is in default at the latest thirty days after the due date and receipt of the consideration. (4)The obligor is not in default for as long as performance is not made as the result of a circumstance for which he is not responsible. Depending on what was contractually agreed on the default happened even before the first warning. For example that is the case if a specific payment due date was agreed to. Even if a warning would be required it is only one and you can see that no requirements on the specific wording or form on that warning is given. I don't know how you assume an "official reminder" should look like. According to the law a specific and explicit demand to fulfill an obligation is enough. Also, the warning does not need to contain a specific date. If it doesn't the default is effective immediately. | A babysitter is a household employee in the IRS's parlance. This means that: [Y]ou may need to withhold and pay social security and Medicare taxes, pay federal unemployment tax, or both. To find out, read Table 1. You don't need to withhold federal income tax from your household employee's wages. But if your employee asks you to withhold it, you can. The thresholds in Table 1 (for 2021) are: If you pay more than $2,300 in a calendar year to any one household employee, you must withhold Social Security & Medicare taxes from that employee's wages, as well as pay the employer's share of these taxes. If you pay more than $1,000 in a quarter to any one household employee, you must pay federal unemployment tax. In addition, you are liable for Virginia state unemployment tax as well. As noted in the above document, you do not have to withhold income taxes from your household employees. You and your employee can agree to a withholding arrangement for income taxes, but it's not required. This doesn't mean that your employee isn't liable for income taxes on these wages, it just means that they're not your concern. Finally, note than wages paid to anyone who is under the age of 18 at any time in 2021, and whose work for you is not their primary occupation, are exempt from Social Security & Medicare taxes. Such wages are still subject to federal unemployment taxes, though. (And possibly also Virginia unemployment taxes, though I haven't checked.) See the "Wages Not Counted" subsections within the sections on "Social Security and Medicare Taxes" and "Federal Unemployment Taxes" in the above-linked publication. | How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management. |
Would Georgie’s “Teddy Bear Casino” from Young Sheldon actually be legal? On the TV series Young Sheldon, Connie secretly runs an illegal casino (slot machines and card games where you can earn cash), which is shut down by the police. Connie’s grandson Georgie thinks she can reopen the casino by making all the games only give out prize tickets, which can be redeemed for teddy bears, and then adding a side desk where Connie buys back bears for $100 each. Would this really be legal? | Potentially -- this is almost exactly how Pachinko parlors in Japan operate, with non-cash prizes being given out, but with "known" nearby establishments (sometime located in the same physical building) that will buy them for cash. Other options include the giving of vouchers/gift cards as prizes. Whether this is legal or not is a question of if the buyer is "truly" acting independent of the gambling establishment. The general legal term for this is "arm's length transactions". A completely unrelated organization is presumed to be acting in its own best interest, in an "arm's length" manner, though this can be overcome with evidence of collusion. If the casino is willing to "buy back" its marker at a given price (much like Las Vegas casinos are required to do), this can be done with independent intermediary negotiators in a legitimate arm's length transaction. In the Japan example above a "three-shop system" of nominally independent shops circle goods between them to effectively "legalize" (or at least not draw the ire of authorities over) cash gambling payouts. | This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing. | As far as I can tell, that would be a criminal act. Georgia law § 16-8-2 - Theft by taking says: A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. Georgia law § 16-7-21. Criminal trespass says: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without consent of that person. If you know the store is refusing to sell you a product, and you eat that product anyway, that is theft. If you don't eat the food but just open it, that's still criminal trespass. Even if you're leaving them money, you're still taking and/or damaging their property without their consent. Additionally, if they told you to leave, and you refused and instead started opening food items, you might be guilty of trespassing in the more traditional sense: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority... Remains upon the land or premises of another person... after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart. As to whether it was legal to give the candy to your daughter before the disagreement and refusal of service, that may depend on what the standard practice is. It seems to me that in most clothing stores you're supposed to pay before consuming the product - this isn't a sit-down restaurant. But if there's nothing else going on, I think the average store would refrain from calling the police if the person did not try to hide the evidence (for example, by stuffing the empty box on a shelf) and if the merchandise was paid for before the person attempted to leave the store, regardless of whether it's technically illegal. | There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card. | The real question is do they have to refund the rest of the summer camp fees if Bob is expelled due to his own intentional misbehavior? Not if the contract was written by a good lawyer, or even by a merely competent lawyer. In that case, the contract will provide that there is to be no refund in the event of expulsion. | I think this relates to individual stores interpretation of California's "ABC Laws": § 25658. Sale to and consumption by person under 21 years of age; Use by peace officers to apprehend sellers of alcoholic beverages to minors (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic beverage to any person under 21 years of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in Section 25667 or 25668, any person under 21 years of age who purchases any alcoholic beverage, or any person under 21 years of age who consumes any alcoholic beverage in any on-sale premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (c) Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishing, giving, or giving away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age, and the person under 21 years of age thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The last part is the part that scares business owners. Some interpret it as "if they furnish alcohol to you (a person over 21) and have reasonable suspicion that the purchase will be given to the minor, the person furnishing the alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor". This is absolutely true in the case of bar owners/bartenders. If they sell somebody a drink, even if that person is over 21, and that drink is then given to a minor, they can be (probably not successfully) held responsible in some form for any injury that person sustains or commits as a result of alcohol consumption. Some stores take this much more seriously (because a violation can mean the loss/suspension of the liquor license) than others, and it is at the stores discretion to deny the sale based on any suspicion, whether based in reality or not. | It is basically fraud, and there are two ways in which it could be illegal: it might be a crime, and you might get sued for doing it (you would not be fined or imprisoned, but you may have to compensate the hotel chain for their loss). Whether or not it is a crime depends on the jurisdiction. In Washington, there are very many laws against fraud such as RCW 9.38 (credit), RCW 9.45 (numerous things where a business defrauds others), RCW 9.60 (forgery) but none of them would apply to lying about a material fact to a business in order to get a discount. Texas likewise has a long section on criminal fraud. It is not clear from the wording whether a customer lying to a business (not involving forgery, vehicles, credit, or financial institutions) is covered. 32.42(b)(10) says A person commits an offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence commits one or more of the following deceptive business practices... making a materially false or misleading statement of fact concerning the reason for, existence of, or amount of a price or price reduction The question of interpretation that this raises is whether a person who has said "I'm over 70" so that they can get a discount has made a statement "concerning the reason for a price reduction". The ordinary interpretation of "concerning the reason for" would be that it refers to explaining why or under what conditions a price reduction exists. For the moment, I am skeptical that this definition would include the case at hand, but that will require a search through case law and jury instructions. From the lawsuit angle, you would have knowingly made a false material statement in order to obtain a value, which is illegal, and they could sue you to recover the discount. | I am assuming that you are in the United States for this question. Please correct me if this is not the case. MathWorks still holds the right to take action, which may be anything from cease-and-desist letters up to litigation. You have followed the correct process in asking for permission to use a trademark. The owner of the trademark, MathWorks, has given you their answer, which is quite simply, "no". You may not feel that their reasoning is fair, but the default state of trademarks is that they are under ownership of whomever created them, and you do not have permission to use them. Things will remain that way unless MathWorks changes their mind. It doesn't matter if it feels dismissive of them; they are under no obligation to even consider requests to use their marks. If they didn't explicitly say, "sure, go ahead", or even, "yes, you may use it provided you follow a list of conditions", then using their trademark will be an unlicensed usage. If you still would like to pursue getting permission to use their trademarked assets, you will need to try to contact them again. Until they say otherwise, using their trademarks will be considered unauthorized use. (Edited to add this clarification brought up by @David Siegel): However, your usage might not be violation of trademark. The primary purpose of trademark restriction is to stop someone from misrepresenting a product as being from the entity that owns the trademark; this stops someone from, for example, selling a cola soft drink called "Coke-a-Cola". The reasons for this are manyfold, but the basic idea is that allowing that type of usage means that consumers might not be able to tell that your product is distinct from the original, and could then mistakenly attribute the quality and level of service of the previous brand with the new product. If your usage of MATLAB marks is such that you are identifying the products used as from MathWorks, and not yourself, and are doing everything in good faith to disassociate your website and/or offerings from MathWorks, it is possible that your usage would be considered correct usage of trademark. Even if it is legal usage, MathWorks still may decide to take action. If MathWorks believes that your usage is unauthorized and that it is trademark violation, they may decide to take action. This is regardless of whether it actually is; until you have this case in front of a court, you will not get a definitive answer. We cannot answer whether this is a legal usage of trademark. Ultimately, whether or not a usage of a mark is considered to be correct usage is a question that can only be answered by the courts, which means the only person who can give you concrete advice on a course of action is a lawyer. In lieu of proper legal advice, you will need to weigh the risk of MathWorks taking action against your usage with the benefit you receive from usage. (Edited to add this clarification by @Dale M): Regardless, you may be breaking copyright by using the logo. There is a separate issue besides just trademark at play here. The copyright for the MATLAB logo belongs to whomever created it/owns it (presumably, MathWorks in this case). Using the logo without permission is a copyright violation. The only case in which this would not be a violation is if the logo is released for use in general under a compatible license, such as Creative Commons; do note that these licenses typically have additional conditions, such as requiring attribution. If you are unaware as to whether there is a such a license, or if you fail to follow the terms of the license, usage of the logo almost certainly constitutes copyright infringement. |
Is recreational marijuana actually legal in states that voted it to be legal? Update to clarify what is meant by "actually legal": my question is whether, in states that voted recreational marijuana use to be legal, it is possible for anyone in the US Government (federal, state, or local) to prosecute and convict you for using marijuana recreationally. My understanding is that, for example, Nevada voted it to be legal recreationally, but it's still illegal at the federal level. And so, there's a difference in what federal law says, and what state law says. How is this difference reconciled? Also, how is it possible for different jurisdictions to create laws that contradict one another? Shouldn't there be a filtering process that wouldn't allow the non-superseding jurisdiction to pass the law in the first place? | In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws & regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this "How Stuff Works" article. | I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds. | We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means. | Well, moral obligations are not laws, nor sometimes even moral obligations. Some laws are based on what some courts and legislatures think are moral obligations. We think cannibals have a moral obligation not to eat people; cannibals think non-cannibals are fools for passing up a good BBQ. As for a leader's moral responsibility for millions of lives, we can take as extreme examples Mao, Hilter, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc., that there are no obligations. The law that could apply in the case of a POTUS who does not "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States..." (oath of office for POTUS) is that of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors", the grounds for most impeachments. But "faithfully executing the Office of President" has no moral obligation; it has legal implications, that's all. High crimes or misdemeanor are legal definitions, not moral, and depend on previous cases of what a crime or misdemeanor is. Insobriety can be illegal; there are laws on the books concerning public drunkenness. But in the contest of POTUS (one who is hopefully not passed out on the sidewalk in front of the WH), it remains to be seen if insobriety is a high crime or misdemeanor. That would be up to the House Judiciary Committee and US House of Representatives, which by Constitutional powers handles impeachment proceedings. The Twenty-fifth Amendment outlines who succeeds the president due to "Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office," but it does not state who has the power to declare a President incapacitated. It's possible that a POTUS who incapacitates himself with alcohol is guilty of a "high crime or misdemeanor." But how drunk do you have to be to be incapacitated? Drunk enough to think a Game Boy is the nuclear football? Again, that's up to the House. Some past presidents have arguably been functional alcoholics (or functional recovered alcoholics.) But incapacitated? That can be subjective when it comes to the application of the law. And morals have little to do with it, unless those morals have a basis in that same law. Update 12/04/16: Some federal judges have been impeached due to drunkenness: http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html and http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html | Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment. | I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with. | Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have. | Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so. |
Is it legal for either a public or private workplace to require a flu vaccine (in the US)? Note - Disregard medical workers, direct medical workers or similar jobs. Not looking to debate that some industries may have needs. I see that many workplaces and universities are mandating COVID vaccine verification. Although I don't understand the legality on this, I do understand that a "national emergency" might make it hard to debate this. And I am not condoning the mandate, I am saying for this question on the FLU VACCINE, let's not debate the COVID vaccine. So let's note two examples: Private company/school. No workers in medical or like field. Public. So public school, civil workers, etc. Edit Note: Because the only answer I have is so poor and does not even address what the question is asking I will add an addendum. The question is in regards to how an employer would ever have access to tell if you had a flu shot. I have owned a few businesses and paid for med coverage for employees. I have almost no rights to any sort of their medical information. What's funny is I went through a workmen's comp claim and had almost no rights to info on that employee even though they were putting a claim against my business. So how in the hell in the past 2 years have the flood gates swung open on employers access to employee medical. There is no way I would have been able to tell if an employee had a flu shot two years ago. | A company can mandate getting a flu shot as a condition of employment. The government can do the same (for its employees) – Washington state has done so at least for covid. Some individuals qualify for a disability accommodation, so they would be exceptions (e.g. they could be moved to working away from the public). A sincere religious conviction also gives rise to a religious-accommodation exemption. This guidance addresses the question of what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief. | Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing. | Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged. | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | I know of no legal restrictions on using the title of Doctor in the United states. I know next to nothing about Canadian law and can't speak on that. Falsely claiming to have a license to practice medicine is probably illegal, depending on circumstances, and practicing medicine without a license is most certainly illegal, and there a numerous federal and state laws that would apply. But simply styling one's self as Dr. is unlikely to be held by a court as a claim to hold a medical license, or a particular degree. It's, of course, misleading and generally frowned to use the Dr. prefix unless one has earned an MD or PhD. Some holders of honorary doctorates use it as well, though some debate whether that's acceptable or not. | You generally are not required to share your medical details with people you don't want to. That said, the camp would also not be required to allow people who don't comply to enroll. They can't force you to divulge your information, but you can't force them to let you come if you don't, either. HIPAA deals with the ability of healthcare providers to disclose medical information to parties who aren't the patient themselves - it would be a HIPAA violation for your doctor to disclose your information directly to the camp without your consent. HIPAA has absolutely no bearing on who you choose to disclose your own information to, however - you can disclose your own information to anyone you want. | In general, under the common law, a contract cannot validly require a person to commit or abet a crime. Thus if an NDA requires one to lie about or actively cover up a crime, it is void (in that aspect, at least). But there is, in most cases, no affirmative duty to report a crime, except for certain individuals in particular situations. Thus an NDA that simply requires silence may be valid. There have been many Federal and state laws passed to protect so-called "whistleblowers" (people who draw attention to criminal or improper actions of which they have confidential knowledge. Many of these are listed and described in the Wikipedia article "Whistleblower protection in the United States" Exactly what protection is offered varies widely. Many of these deal with public employees or government contractors, not private employees. In the case of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) the US Supreme Court held that statements made in the course of a person's position as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, have no First Amendment protection against employer discipline. Whether a private employee will be protected against retaliation or the penalties listed in an NDA depends on the area of the alleged violation, and the specific facts of the case. One would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable in this specific field before relying on such protections. | The emergency temporary standard requires either vaccination, or testing with masks for unvaccinated workers, for employees of an employer with 100 or more employees but has exceptions for employees working alone or exclusively outdoors. According to 1910.501 - Vaccination, testing, and face coverings: 1910.501(b)(3) The requirements of this section do not apply to the employees of covered employers: 1910.501(b)(3)(i) Who do not report to a workplace where other individuals such as coworkers or customers are present; 1910.501(b)(3)(ii) While working from home; or 1910.501(b)(3)(iii) Who work exclusively outdoors. |
What laws do crypto exchanges need to abide by? So they need to collect personal information on each user most of the time right? But how thorough does this information need to be? Do the exchanges need to check with each government to make sure the information is valid? Or is submitting documents enough? | Do the exchanges need to check with each government to make sure the information is valid? Or is submitting documents enough? They need to understand the (usually very complicated) laws governing financial services and data protection in every jurisdiction where they operate. The specific requirements will vary from one jurisdiction to the next. The usual way of acquiring this understanding is to hire a lawyer (or several). | Note that what is being bought or sold here is actually information about the exploit. Attempting to criminally penalize the transmission of information in the US often runs into First Amendment issues. If a person has good reason to know that information is going to be used to commit a crime, or is likely to be so used, and there is no plausible legitimate use for the information, that person might be charged with complicity or conspiracy for distributing the information. But where there are legitimate uses, that is much less likely. Here the information could be used to defend against the exploit, or to identify and remove software subject to the exploit, or for research into such exploits generally. There may be other legit uses as well. Some years ago the Federal government attempted to prosecute a person for exporting a book describing how to create an encryption program. The courts eventually ruled that this was protected speech. I suspect a similar ruling would be made in the sort of case described in the question, but the details would matter. | No GDPR applies to people (not just citizens) who are in the EU. It has no applicability if both parties are not in the EU. | Your basic regulatory umbrella for anything that stores, transmits or interacts with any private health information or health IT systems is Health Information Privacy | HHS.gov, as well as state authorities. There are severe penalties at the federal and state level for non-compliance and privacy breaches, and many other agencies - such as the DEA, state health departments, insurance companies - would have to be involved in testing and certification of such a App. You will simply not be able to distribute the App on Google or iTunes without their approval, and those distributors will not approve a App that has not been strictly vetted for privacy and HIPAA compliance. In order to distribute such as App - with a TOS that assures personal privacy and shields you from liability (if possible) - you will need to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on legal representation for compliance. As an example, see ohwilleke's answer to What kind of lawyer should I seek to understand compliance requirements for processing credit cards? | Although crypto space may be little regulated, insurance is in most jurisdictions highly regulated. Any such arrangement would need to comply with current laws on insurance, until and unless modified laws to cover this sort of thing are passed, and then it would need to comply with those. Tax authorities generally allow one to declare "other business income" or "other investment income" without forming a legal entity. I cannot say how such income would be classified in any given jurisdiction. Whether the platform, or some legal entity associated with the platform, would need to be registered will depend on the current laws and regulations governing insurance, and on the way in which teh contracts are structured. A disclaimer cannot prevent one from being sued. The contracts would need to carefully and explicitly state who is liable for what. Programs cannot be held accountable for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. If negligence in the creation or operation of a program causes a loss, the operator may well be liable. Programs cannot be sued for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. It may well be essential to constitute the "platform" as a legal entity of some sort. Otherwise its operator will be liable for its actions. I cannot be sure. I once encountered a somewhat similar system in which insurance was provided by individuals exchanging contracts, so that in a sense each member insured all the others. There was a company that supervised and provided legal and administrative services to the group of individuals, and collected fees for this. That sounds a bit similar to the suggested platform, but I don't know exactly how that company was organized. The system was called "NJ CURE". I don't know if it is still in operation. | Yes you would. Bitcoin is a form of property right or asset, just like any other form of wealth. And, income is a positive increase in the sum total of your property rights. You might be able to take deductions in connection with whatever you parted with in order to obtain a bitcoin, depending on the transaction, just as you might be able to take a deduction for inventory expenses associated with income in the form of money. | Paying taxes with cryptocurrency is a potentially taxable event under federal tax law. It is equivalent for federal income tax purposes, for example, to paying taxes in kind with IBM stock. See, e.g., this IRS FAQ. You can owe capital gains taxes on involuntary transfers. For example, if you own a rental property and don't pay property taxes and it is sold at a tax sale, you owe capital gains taxes and depreciation recapture taxes on the amount realized in the tax sale if it exceeds your basis in the rental property (which it usually would since third-parties bid at tax sales). | There is not necessarily a contradiction. Information that they may keep may be: Account information Subscriber information Information on breaches of the Terms of Service or Agreement So yes, they might certainly not keep any logs – although that claim is doubtful, since they almost certainly keep at least error-level logs of their services – but that doesn't mean that they have no information to disclose to law enforcement. It's also questionable what "logs" refers to – would aggregate statistics be considered a log, by law? Would your last known IP address be considered a log, provided they don't keep any other history? |
How to comply with 18 USC 2257A We want our app to comply with 18 USC 2257A, which states that (...) producers of pornography, or depictions of any sexual activity using actual people, are required to verify that the performers are of legal age (18–years–old or older) by maintaining records of the performers’ names and ages. They also are required to disclose the location of these records,... So I suppose we basically need to disclose the exact geolocation of the datacenters that store this kind of content. We're currently using Google's Firebase, hence Google Cloud Storage to keep our files. And, as I would expect, they have no guarantee about which zone the servers are located. My question is: is it possible in any way to achieve compliance with 18 USC 2257A while using Google Cloud Storage (Or perhaps any other cloud storage service)? If not, if you have suggestions of providers that may offer the service that we need, I'm happy to hear them. | So I suppose we basically need to disclose the exact geolocation of the datacenters that store this kind of content. That is incorrect. You need to identify a place of business where federal investigators may inspect the records without first making an appointment for access. The location of cloud storage is not particularly relevant. is it possible in any way to achieve compliance with 18 USC 2257A while using Google Cloud Storage (Or perhaps any other cloud storage service)? Yes. You must store the records as required by the statute and by the regulations issued under the authority of that statute, 28 CFR Part 75. I only scanned the regulations, but it seems that the "location" of the records is the place where they are available for inspection, not necessarily the place where digital files are stored. (The regulations also provide that you may indeed keep the records in digital form.) But consider, for example, what would happen if the FBI came knocking for an inspection and a local utility company accidentally severed the fiber cable on the next block. Such a network outage happened at my company a few years ago, and the incident disabled all of our redundant networking, so we had no internet access whatsoever for several hours. The investigators would probably tolerate such a disruption, but it is probably better to have a copy on site in addition to any off-site copies you might have. Regardless, you should hire a lawyer with relevant experience, because you need advice from someone who can find out whether there has been any litigation that may have a bearing on your rights and obligations, and you should find out what state and local law have to say about this, if anything. This is a criminal statute, and trying to protect yourself from criminal liability without qualified legal advice is quite possibly going to leave you vulnerable. | This is a good question, as it raises an issue which places the controller's interest in providing a smoothly functioning customer sign up process against customers' right not to have their data leaked. Note that it is not necessary to consider "enumeration" here. Even just being able to check whether one person has a registered account raises the issue. The relevant provisions of the EU GDPR (or in the UK, the UK GDPR as defined in sections 3(1) and 205(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018) are (emphasis added): Article 4(2): 'processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction So, disclosure of the fact that a user has a registered account amounts to "processing". Article 6(1): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of these, only (a) and (f) are likely to be of any relevance: (a) is not too useful since it isn't feasible to design a sign-up system that depends on the user's consent (which they may not give). That leaves us with (f). As noted by the Information Commissioner's Office, "Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing.". The legitimate interest here would be that you need a sign up system which prevents duplicate registrations. Remember though that the processing has to be "necessary" for the purposes of the legitimate interest. One might argue that it is not since you could design the system to give the appearance of accepting the duplicate registration followed by sending an email to the account holder to inform them. On the other hand this will result in a less user friendly experience which could itself be a legitimate interest. Ultimately this is a balancing exercise and it is hard to say whether you have struck the right balance until someone complains to the ICO or the court and a decision is issued. The fact that the practice is widespread among well-resourced and large companies would tend to indicate that it is lawful albeit this is not conclusive in the absence of a court decision. I'm not aware of any cases involving this particular issue but would be interested to hear from others on this point. If the processing is unlawful then Article 18 is applicable: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies: [...] (b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead Where processing has been restricted under paragraph 1, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject’s consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. In other words, the data subject could ask you not to disclose their registration status via the sign up page, and you would be obliged to comply with the request. Separately from the above points, in order to be lawful you must provide the data subject with certain prescribed information at the time when the data is collected. Of particular relevance here are the following items: Article 13(1): Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information: [...] (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; So even if you conclude that the processing will be lawful you will have to give some consideration to the basis so that you can comply with the above provision. | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. | Two questions, here: Can a text story be obscene under the law? As one who hosts a website, can you be held liable for the content of a site? Can a text story be legally obscene The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit published their opinion on United States of America v. Frank Russell McCoy on March 12, 2015. Mr. McCoy maintained a website, young-stuff.com, from his home. He authored or edited more than 200 graphic stories detailing "sexual abuse, rape, and torture of young children." Mr. McCoy was indicted in June, 2007 and found guilty. The appeals court affirmed the conviction. Both the initial trial court and the appeals court found Mr. McCoy's stories "lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Can a web site's host be held liable for the content of a site? Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act says that No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. It also states that no internet entity has immunity from federal criminal law. Section 230 has been found to apply to intermediaries of third-party content. Generally, most assume that when the content is simply hosted and not moderated by the web site then there is no liability for the provider. That's not always the case and is determined by whether the host of the web site is considered a provider of interactive computer services or an information content provider. Any person responsible "in whole or in part...for the creation or development of information" is an information content provider. Which are you? In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that roommates.com was not immune under Section 230 because they asked questions of their users that helped facilitate a potentially illegal search under the Fair Housing Act. They, therefore, helped create the content the site hosted. The question will ultimately rest on whether someone decides the content is obscene enough to be prosecuted and then if you, the site's host, aided in creating the content. This definitely requires the assistance of competent legal counsel. | According to EU case law, everything in your scenario is legal except if Example Site is hosting the image without authorization and Pirate Site is a for-profit site, then Pirate Site is presumed to be violating Article 3 of the Copyright Directive on communication to the public (in this scenario, Example Site is also trivially violating Article 2 on the right to reproduction). In Meltwater, Case C-360/13, the court ruled that browser cache and on-screen copies fell under the temporary reproduction exception, Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. This means that the visitor is not infringing copyright (IPKat reference). In BestWater, Case C-348/13, the court ruled that embedding content was itself not a communication to the public when that content was hosted with rightsholder authorization, and so did not violate Article 3. This means that Pirate Site is not infringing on communication to the public rights (it is also not creating a copy itself, so is not breaking Article 2) (IPKat reference). When content is not hosted with authorization, the situation is quite a bit more nuanced. GS Media, Case C-160/15, is the controlling case. Here, the court ruled that if a link (note it doesn't even have to be embedded/hotlinked) is posted by a for-profit site, that site is expected to have done its due diligence to ensure the linked content is hosted legally. Therefore, it is presumed to be violating Article 3, i.e., the burden of proof is on the link posting site to demonstrate that it had done its due diligence in verifying the legality of the linked content. So in this scenario, Pirate Site is presumed to be infringing on communication to the public rights (IPKat reference - WARNING: slightly NSFW image here, Playboy was one of the parties to the case). | When the data controller is from the EU/EEA/UK, the GDPR applies. Any website inherently processes personal data such as IP addresses. Thus, when transferring personal data into the US (e.g. because the website is hosted in the US), it is necessary to comply with the GDPR's Chapter V which covers international transfers. The US hoster would also have to be bound as a data processor per Art 28. There are multiple legal bases for international transfers into the US. There used to be an “adequacy decision” that allowed transfers without further conditions in the form of the EU–US Privacy Shield, but it was found invalid in the 2020 Schrems II ruling due to concerns about US mass surveillance. The next alternative are “appropriate safeguards” to protect the transfer, which generally requires that the data exporter and data importer (here: you and the hoster) sign standard contractual clauses (SCCs). But in the wake of Schrems II, it is clear that SCCs alone are not sufficient, and would generally require supplemental measures to protect the personal data. The concern is that an US company would not be legally able to comply with the SCCs they've signed. Art 49 has fallback legal bases for occasional transfers such as the data subject's explicit consent, which are not useful here. What most people do is pretend like SCCs are sufficient and hope that regulators turn a blind eye, at least until another adequacy decision is negotiated. However, guidance by regulators including EDPB recommendation 01/2020 explains that it's the responsibility of data controllers to analyze their specific transfers, adopt supplemental measures if necessary, or stop transfers if such measures are impossible. To cut the chase short: there are no technical measures that could help in a cloud or SaaS setting, and I would include webhosting in that setting. As a consequence, it's effectively impossible to be GDPR-compliant while relying on services that store or process personal data in the United States. It would therefore be prudent to migrate an US-hosted website to a server located in the EU/EEA or in a country that has an adequacy decision. Your registrar's information seems correct in this regard, though it is admittedly a bit self-serving for a company that offers web hosting itself. On to your specific questions/arguments. Is all of this irrelevant because you are not using an US “cloud” service? No. Don't get distracted by the word “cloud”. The issue is that you are using an US-based service that processes personal data in the clear. Can you avoid disclosing the international transfer because you aren't processing personal data? But you are most likely processing personal data. The GDPR's definition of personal data does not just include identifying information, but any information relating to identifiable persons. Identification includes being able to single out a person. IP addresses are likely (but not necessarily) a kind of personal data. In any case, your use of Google Analytics sets tracking cookies that definitely allow identification of visitors. Since you are performing an international transfer of personal data, you must inform the data subjects. Is copying a standard privacy policy sufficient? While transparency about processing activities is an important part of GDPR, it is only a part. Other parts include: having a clear purpose and legal basis for processing activities binding services who process personal data on your behalf as data processors per Art 28 (here: in particular hosting and analytics) finding and implementing appropriate security measures having a plan for dealing with data subject requests In any case, the privacy policy must fulfil all points mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. Ideally, it should also cover the information obligations from Art 15. There are guidelines on transparency from the EDPB. If your privacy policy was drafted before 25 May 2018, it likely wasn't updated for GDPR. There is a staff-only private area. Whether or not there is any private area is not relevant for GDPR. GDPR is not about protecting private data in contrast to public data, but about processing of personal data, i.e. data that relates to persons. Also note that the staff members are data subjects as well. The only cookies are “technical cookies”. Very good! The ePrivacy directive is closely related to GDPR and addresses what kind of information you may use from user devices, including cookies or similar technologies like LocalStorage. This directive was implemented in the Italian Data Protection Code. You may only use cookies etc if they are strictly necessary for providing the service explicitly requested by the user (such as storing a language preference on your website), or if the user has given their consent. You are using Google Analytics, but only if the user gives consent. Since Google Analytics is an US-based service, some of the above concerns about international transfers apply. Relying on consent is good, though Art 7 GDPR gives some conditions for consent. In particular, the user must have a real choice. While analytics can probably be used without consent, setting cookies for analytics does require consent. As much as I loathe them, consent management tools can be useful here e.g. because they also help with keeping records of consent. In summary: While you have good data minimization practices, your website likely isn't GDPR-compliant in its current form. You can take some first steps toward better compliance, such as by avoiding unnecessary international transfers and updating the privacy policy to better align with Art 13 GDPR. Fines are unpredictable. Most data controllers are non-compliant in some way (probably including myself). But most data controllers don't end up getting fined. While fines should be “effective” and “dissuasive”, they also have to be proportionate to the infringement. Many data controllers have been able to substantially reduce or completely avoid fines by quickly remediating compliance issues when being contacted by their supervisory authority. I have yet to hear about a fine for data transfers into the US, but of course I have no idea what cases the supervisory authorities are currently investigating. | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient. |
Is voting in the House of Representatives automatically postponed if the Speaker of the House is unable to attend due to sickness? I am wondering what happens when the Speaker of the House is unable to come in to the U.S. Capitol Building due to sickness on a day in which voting is to take place. Is there anything written in the U.S. Constitution that says that the Speaker must be present in order for any voting to take place in the House chamber? Is all voting automatically postponed until the Speaker has recovered from his/her sickness and is able to attend? I admit to not knowing too much on how things work in the House, or in the Senate, in regards to the issue of attendance on voting days. | No, votes would not have to be postponed. The Constitution has nothing specific to say about this. (It's not that long - you can and should read it through and check for yourself, and searching is even easier.) The Constitution's only reference to the Speaker of the House is Article I Section 2: "The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers [...]". (Other than the 25th Amendment which prescribes the role of the Speaker in receiving declarations as to whether the President is incapacitated.) The House's procedures, and the Speaker's role in them, are left up to the Rules of the House of Representatives, which the House makes for itself. (US Constitution, Article I, Section 5: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings [...]".) Rule I, Section 8 provides: (a) The Speaker may appoint a Member to perform the duties of the Chair. Except as specified in paragraph (b), such an appointment may not extend beyond three legislative days. (b)(1) In the case of illness, the Speaker may appoint a Member to perform the duties of the Chair for a period not exceeding 10 days, subject to the approval of the House. If the Speaker is absent and has omitted to make such an appointment, then the House shall elect a Speaker pro tempore to act during the absence of the Speaker. So if the Speaker is ill, she can appoint a temporary substitute (Speaker pro tempore), who can preside over all House business, including votes. If she cannot or does not do so, the House may elect a Speaker pro tempore with the same authority. (That election itself would be presided over by the Clerk of the House, an administrative official, as specified by Rule II Section 2(a).) Either way, there would be no need for votes to be postponed. | The first legal issue relates to the step where "Those state legislatures refuse to allow any Electoral College slate to be certified until the 'national security' investigation is complete". The "electoral voting" law regarding voting of presidential electors is ARS 16-212. First, On the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 1956, and quadrennially thereafter, there shall be elected a number of presidential electors equal to the number of United States senators and representatives in Congress from this state. Second, After the secretary of state issues the statewide canvass containing the results of a presidential election, the presidential electors of this state shall cast their electoral college votes for the candidate for president and the candidate for vice president who jointly received the highest number of votes in this state as prescribed in the canvass. Finally, A presidential elector who knowingly refuses to cast that elector's electoral college vote as prescribed in subsection B of this section is no longer eligible to hold the office of presidential elector and that office is deemed and declared vacant by operation of law. The chairperson of the state committee of the political party represented by that elector shall appoint a person who is otherwise qualified to be a presidential elector. The replacement presidential elector shall cast the elector's electoral college vote as prescribed by this section. Notwithstanding section 16-344 and any other statute, the nomination paper and affidavit of qualification of the replacement presidential elector may be completed and filed with the secretary of state as soon as is practicable after the presidential elector's appointment. There is no provision for legislative "certification" and no authority to override the procedure set down in law. The appointment statute (344) gives sole discretion to the state party chairmen to appoint that party's electors: The chairman of the state committee of a political party that is qualified for representation on an official party ballot at the primary election and accorded a column on the general election ballot shall appoint candidates for the office of presidential elector equal to the number of United States senators and representatives in Congress from this state and shall file for each candidate with the secretary of state, not more than ten days after the primary election, by 5:00 p.m. on the last day for filing: Name, residence and postal address and an affadavit of residence in the state are needed. Again, there is no provision for "certification" by the state legislature. The certification that takes place is that the electors sign the presidential elector ballot certificate of vote, e.g. Arizona 2016, which simply notes that the electors have been "duly elected". In general, Arizona law does not require "certification" of any election. Pennsylvania law on the election of electors (25 PS 2878) similarly does not give the legislature any veto power over the electoral process. The law on the voting of the electors also does not provide for any legislative intervention. This does not mean that the legislatures cannot pass an act ceremonially "de-certifying" or invalidating the 2020 election in general, or the nominations of one or both parties. Or, they could pass an act amending the election process to require legislative certification in the case of presidential electors. There is no realistic chance that such an act would be found legally sound, and is outside the scope of the existing Newsweek fantasy. | Constitutional matters can be, and often are, decided by a single judge in a garden-variety trial court. It's just that the judge's decisions may be reviewed and possibly overturned by a higher court, one of which is the supreme court. Furthermore, district courts are bound by precedent. If a case turns on a new statute, however, the trial judge can indeed find that new statute unconstitutional without a higher court first having done so. If a panel of judges is evenly divided on whether to overturn a lower court's ruling, the lower court's ruling stands, but no precedent is set. The supreme court often has an even number of justices hearing a case, whether because of a vacancy or because a justice has recused him or herself. | The leaders can't do it unilaterally, but the members collectively can expel other members. It requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate. US Constitution, Article I, Section 5: Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. Normally this would be preceded by a committee investigation, which might issue a recommendation as to whether the member should be expelled. To date, fifteen US Senators have been expelled via this process: see https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm. Fourteen of them were in 1861 for supporting the Confederacy, and the other was in 1797 for "Anti-Spanish conspiracy and treason". There were several more cases in which the Senate considered expulsion but ultimately voted not to, and others in which the Senator in question resigned under threat of expulsion. | The US President is indeed bound by the Constitution, and indeed by the ordinary laws. Current Justice Department policy is that a sitting president may not be indicted. No court has ever held this, the US Constitution does not give explicit presidential immunity the way it gives limited immunity to members of congress (in the "speech and debate" clause). No sitting US President has ever been charged with a crime, much less indicted, so the matter has never come before a court. An old news story indicated that President Grant was stopped for a traffic offense (speeding, in a horse-drawn carriage), accompanied the officer to a police station, paid an appearance bond for the traffic court, and then failed to appear, forfeiting the bond. Even if this is accurate, no claim of presidential immunity was made, and no court decision was rendered. So no precedent was established by that event, one way or the other. Any President may be impeached and convicted, if Congress sees fit to do so. There is no enforceable standard on just what is and is not an impeachable offense. That is left to the sound judgement of Congress. Nor is Congress required to act if it chooses not to, no matter how strong the evidence may be. Nixon's Vice President , Spiro Agnew, was investigated for alleged corrupt practices. It appeared that Maryland (where he had been Governor) was ready to indict him on several charges. He was persuaded to plead "no contest" in a plea bargain to a single count, and was sentenced to probation with no jail time. At the same time, he resigned as VP. No one knows what would have happened had he continued to insist on his innocence, and claimed before the court that a sitting VP could not lawfully be indicted (a claim he had made earlier in the process). Even assuming that a sitting President cannot be indicted or tried, nothing prevents such a person from being charged and perhaps convicted after his or her term has ended. The constitution explicitly says that if an official is impeached and removed from office, there may be a subsequent trial on any relevant charges. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (Art I; section 3; clauses 6&7) Whether any statute of limitations would be tolled (paused) while the president was in office cannot be determined until and unless the matters comes before a court for a decision. Note that the US Constitution imposes few duties or obligations on individuals. it is mostly concerned with specifying he structure of the federal government, and the powers of and limitations on its various parts. It also specifies the relations between the Federal and State Governments. It also declares a number of rights held by individuals, most of which can be regarded as limitations on the power of the government. If the President were to be accused of a crime, it would almost surely be one established by statute, not by the constitution directly, because treason is the only crime defined directly by the constitution. However, the official acts of the president are clearly limited by the Constitution, and in a number of cases have been held void as being unconstitutional. One of the more famous cases is Youngstown Sheet and Tube vs Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952), also known and the "steel mills seizure case". During the Korean War, President Truman attempted to take control of a number of steel mills to stop a labor dispute, on the ground that this was hindering the national defense. The US Supreme Court ruled that he lacked the power to do this, and that his action was void. | No. There are no consequences for Congress. This follows, in part, from the Speech or Debate Clause, which is a clause in the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 6, Clause 1). The clause states that members of both Houses of Congress: shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. | Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws. | No. Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution states The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them. Congress could include an increase to presidential compensation in the bill but it couldn't take effect until the next election. |
Who ordered the masks in American airports? I'm travelling recently for the first time in a while. I understand the scope of the mask orders: in the airports and on the planes. What confuses me is what authority ordered it and where does that authority come from? Different people, signs at the airports, and websites are calling it all of the following, among a variety of less common combinations and apparent synonyms: Federal mandate Federal regulation Federal law Presidential order TSA regulation TSA rules Additionally, they all mention fines and even imprisonment for non-compliance. I'm especially confused how all American airports (not planes while in the air) are not subject to their local state jurisdiction instead. And what would be the technically correct name for the order? | There is a line in airports between the secure zone and the public zone. TSA has broad authority over the secure zone (a post 9-11 fact), and has mandated wearing a mask in its zones of authority. Because federal law supercedes state law, TSA rules override what the state or city may say. This is in fact an implementation of an executive order by Biden. Outside the secure zone, there is a CDC order requiring masks "at transportation hubs". Again, since airports are part of the interstate transport system and the federal government regulates anything that is interstate, the federal rules override any local rules. These things are "orders". Mandate is a popular term. A regulation is a rule constructed by an executive agency to implement some act of Congress. The act of Congress is popularly how people see "the law", though the details of implementation as specified in a rule (regulation) are also "law" at least in the view of legal scholars. Typically, POTUS gives a general order which results in some action by a federal agency, which may in turn issue its own orders. | In the third of your sources (Harassment act, section 5), near the end, it says: If the defendant breaches an order under section 5 or 5A of the PHA 1997 without reasonable excuse, she/he will be guilty of a criminal offence (section 5(5) PHA 1997). The penalty that may be imposed upon breach of the new section 5A restraining order is identical to that which can be imposed under section 5. (Emphasis added) In Item 2 of the first source (darlingtons.com) it says: If a person disobeys the terms of an Order of Court which carries a penal notice, he will have breached the Injunction. As to whether such a breach constitutes contempt, will be considered on a case-by case approach according to the particular facts of the given case. The seriousness of the breach, and the question as to whether such action undermined or ‘laughed in the face of the Court Order’ so as to be contemptuous, will be determined by the Court. In item three of this same source it says: If the Court considers that the breach was intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice, the Court has power to commit a person to prison, and/or impose a fine. In short it appears that the court is expected to use judgement on a case-by-case basis. Violation of a restraining order because the person subject to the order had to provide emergency medical or fire or rescue services, or otherwise provide needed assistance in an emergency, with no improper motive, would, I should think, not lead to any penalty for contempt. US practice also expects a court to exercise judgement when sentencing for contempt. | Bobstro gave the practical answer, that it's a stupid idea for many reason. This is for the US in general, states may have laws that say otherwise. It is not illegal to provoke someone or a government official (police), it's done all the time in protest (not riots). It is not illegal to run from a cop who has not detained you in any way, or has not issued an order to you. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that people not suspected of criminal activity can ignore a police officer who approaches them. Wisconsin has even said, that even after a police officer knocked on your window, you can still leave. However, it may give probable cause, especially with the statement of "Oh shit! The police!" It IS illegal to run from a cop who has detained you or issued a lawful order. The order "STOP" is a lawful order, and from that point on, you are committing a crime if you do not stop. For your case, check out the NYTimes article "Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules". | It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched. | Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public. | This would probably constitute illegal wiretapping and would certainly constitute a 4th Amendment search if conducted by law enforcement. Normally, the definition of whether something is "public" for purposes of an expectation of privacy is whether it could be detected by a human being unaided by technological enhancements from a place where someone could lawfully be to make that kind of observation. Some of the relevant cases are Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. (1967) (tape recorder outside a public telephone booth was a search violating the expectation of privacy) and U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. (1984) (tracking device placed in barrel by authorities violated expectation of privacy). RFID signals are not "public" even if they are not encrypted with a private code because a device, such as the ones identified in the question, is necessary to receive them. The Wiretap Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 2511, is a federal law aimed at protecting privacy in communications with other persons. Typically, when you think of a "wiretap," the first thing that comes to mind is someone listening to your telephone calls. But the Act protects more than that. Under the Act, it is illegal to: intentionally or purposefully intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a "device." The Act provides criminal and civil penalties for violations, although it creates various exceptions to when interceptions and disclosures are illegal. From here. In this circumstance, despite being passive, one is intentionally intercepting the contents of electronic communications through the use of a device. The fact that there was not in all cases an intent to communicate through, for example, an RFID chip, on a specific occasion probably does not suffice to render it not a communication. | The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal. | First, it is highly unlikely that it would remain continuously exactly at 60,000 feet. I mention this because that altitude happens to be the boundary between Class "A" airspace, and Class "E". (see graphic below) Class A airspace is the domain of a lot of commercial air traffic, so the FAA regulates it closely. Specific requirements for aircraft can be found in 14 CFR 91.135. If no prior coordination was made with FAA Air Traffic Controllers, and no clearance was explicitly given, the balloon would be in violation of this regulation at a minimum. Presuming it would drift above 60,000', it would still be in Class E airspace, which the FAA has jurisdiction over, even if the flight requirements are less stringent. Specific requirements for balloons can be found in 14 CFR Subpart D, 101.33, 101.35, 101.37, and 101.39. Presuming the Chinese did not comply, it would also be in violation of these sections. |
What's the difference between 'gambling' at an arcade or a carnival and gambling at a casino? I've seen this asked a million times on quora and reddit, but the answers don't seem so good. As for (law) stackexchange, it seems this has been asked only once in a case where apparently you can't lose. Scope: Focus on games where you can lose (re question above). Like you don't get any tickets. Or you don't get enough tickets to win something. Not every game in an arcade gives tickets like when you play time crisis or house of the dead. Exclude those. Focus on the ones where you do get tickets depending on your performance or luck (or both). So far some answers I've seen involve: Technically the prizes you get at arcades aren't money. Sub-question 1: Though you could sell the prizes? The prizes' total value doesn't exceed the cost of obtaining such prizes. Sub-question 2: And if they did? Something about games of skill vs games of chance, typical terms in gambling law, but these terms kind of bore me whenever I ask/read about gambling (eg this), so I didn't read further. Please avoid bringing this up if you don't mind. It's really boring. | Jurisdictions vary but, in general, gambling involves wagering something of value in a game of chance to win something of value. “Something of value” is usually interpreted broadly but it must usually be something that can, at least in theory, be sold for money. So, skins in a popular online game qualify if there is a secondary market for their trade. However, a mother’s love isn’t. “Game of chance” versus game of skill is a continuum. So, for example, Snakes and Ladders is a game of pure chance - it can be played equally well by an automaton as a human. Go is a game of pure skill - it requires a human brain or an extremely sophisticated algorithm to play well. Sport is considered a game of skill so competing for prize money is not gambling even if there is an entry fee. However, wagering on the outcome of sports is gambling even though it requires considerable skill to do well. Arcade and carnival games avoid gambling laws by: primarily being games of skill (e.g. a shooting gallery); by giving everyone a prize, the vast majority of which cost less than the price of entry. This is the “loot box” solution and really nudged the line; by being exempt, either explicitly or by a long period of tolerance by the authorities. | Is he committing a crime in Albania? It would help if you posted the statutes that regulate or prohibit betting, since the terms thereof would shed light on the legal definition (aka prima facie elements) of betting and/or the legislative intent behind those statutes. Absent that information, your description reflects that most certainly the Albanian is committing a crime. The Albanian's conduct matches --at least-- the ordinary meaning of betting: he is not disbursing (or promising to disburse) money merely for fun or leisure, but for the prospect of possibly profiting from an uncertain event of which he officially has no control. Doing it through a third party located in another country changes nothing in this regard. Am I committing a crime in Italy? The Italian might be considered an accessory of that conduct being classified as criminal in Albania. Thus, facilitating activity that is prohibited in Albania could turn out to be problematic even for the Italian. Furthermore, even if betting is legal in Italy, the Italian might be in trouble under the laws of Italy if taking money (without the requisite license) from someone else to make bets constitutes unauthorized business of gambling. The condition that the Italian would retain a portion of any profits makes the business (or for-profit) element quite evident. | Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court. | You present ordinary fact testimony regarding how the winner was actually selected and then you hire an expert witness to conclude that this process is sufficiently close to random for the purposes for which it is being used. In some cases of "safe harbor" random selection methods like rolling dice, drawing cards, drawing lots, pulling the short straw, flipping a coin, activating a random number generator, pulling a slip out of a hat, etc., you could dispense with the expert testimony because there is case law already establishing that the method in question counts as a random method of selection. | The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use. | The exact procedure varies from one district to the next, but generally speaking, it is essentially by lottery. The procedure is typically spelled out in the court's local rules. Jump to page 105 of SDNY's local rules for an example. The lottery system is not entirely random, though. Frequently it is weighted to make it more likely that a case is assigned to a judge from the district's courthouse nearest to the parties, or to make it less likely to be assigned to the chief judge or a judge on senior status. There are then various other rules governing assignments of cases to new judges or visiting judges, but those typically don't happen when a case is originally filed. | I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed. | What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area. |
How bad does your lawyer need to be for your trial to not be fair? I am watching the Kyle Rittenhouse trial, and his lawyer just seems horrible. He doesn't object to anything. For instance, he didn't object once when the police officer who downloaded the videos was testifying as to their content. How did he know anything about them? Shouldn't those questions have been directed to their creators? This officer wasn't there, he isn't a video expert, he has no more knowledge than anyone else in the courtroom. He didn't object to any of the videos having inflammatory titles or superchats even though they had nothing to do with his client. With this in mind, how bad does your lawyer need to be for your conviction to be overturned based on not actually having counsel? | The grounds for setting aside a conviction because you have a bad lawyer is called "ineffective assistance of counsel". This can (usually) only be raised when your direct appeals have been exhausted in a collateral attack on a conviction which was historically called a habeas corpus petition, although some state systems give it a different name. In a nutshell, the lawyer's work must be very, very bad to the point where a responsible criminal defense lawyer would feel an urge to throw up upon hearing about it. The legal standard in making his ineffective assistance claim is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): One must show that one's attorney's performance was deficient and (2) that deficient performance caused actual prejudice to the defendant’s defense. Id., 466 U.S. at 687. To prove deficient performance under Strickland, a state prisoner must “demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” under the then “prevailing professional norms.” Id., 466 U.S. at 688. The Supreme Court has recognized that the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice is the barometer for measuring “what is reasonable.” See: Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005). While the Fifth Circuit applies a strong presumption that counsel performed adequately and insulates his informed tactical decisions from ineffectiveness attack unless they are so egregious as to render the entire trial unfair, the appeals court has recognized the distinction between strategic judgment decisions and omissions that amount to no strategic decision at all. See: Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 608 (5th Cir. 2006); Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 604 (5th Cir. 1999). Deficient performance alone is not enough to secure ineffective assistance relief. The state prisoner must establish prejudice by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to under confidence in the outcome.” Id., 466 U.S. at 694. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this prejudice requisite to mean that there is a harmful constitutional trial error only if there is “more than a reasonable probability that it contributed to the verdict.” See: Mayabb v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 1999). Federal relief after it has been denies at the state level in a state collateral attack, is even more limited by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), especially 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (from the same linked source): “The AEDPA specifies that federal habeas relief ‘shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ “The Supreme Court has held that a state court’s decision that correctly identifies the governing legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case is sufficient for a federal habeas court to grant the writ. For a federal court to find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent ‘unreasonable,’ however, the state court’s decision must have been more than simply incorrect or erroneous; its application of federal law must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’ Moreover, the state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct, and the federal court only reviews the facts for clear and convincing error.” Id., at 385. For example, most of the instances described below have been held in particular cases to be insufficient to overturn a conviction in a death penalty case: In many cases, the appointed attorneys are overworked, underpaid, or lacking the trial experience required for death penalty cases. There have even been instances in which lawyers appointed to a death case were so inexperienced that they were completely unprepared for the sentencing phase of the trial. Other appointed attorneys have slept through parts of the trial, or arrived at the court under the influence of alcohol. While not precisely on point, the threshold for reversing a conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel is generally lower than the standard to be subject to discipline or to be disbarred as an attorney: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was more direct in an Associated Press account: “People who are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty … I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-executions stay applications in which the defendant was well represented at trial.” Before the 2001 public criticisms offered by Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg, three major newspapers had conducted investigations that offered compelling evidence about the deplorable legal representation provided in capital cases. The Chicago Tribune reported on November 15, 1999 that 12% of those condemned to death from 1976 to 1999 were represented by “an attorney who had been, or was later, disbarred or suspended—disciplinary sanctions reserved for conduct so incompetent, unethical or even criminal that the state believes an attorney’s license should be taken away.” The newspaper said that an additional 9.5% had “received a new trial or sentencing because their attorney’s competence rendered the verdict or sentence unfair, court records show.” (Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, “Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict”). Less than a year later (September 9, 2000) the Charlotte Observer reported that at least 16 condemned inmates in North Carolina, including 3 who had been executed, were represented by attorneys who have been disbarred or disciplined for unethical or criminal conduct. The following day the Dallas Morning News reported that it had examined 461 capital cases in Texas and found that one in four of the condemned inmates had been represented at trial or on appeal by court-appointed attorneys who had been disciplined for professional misconduct at some point in their careers. (“Quality of Justice,” 09/10/2000). The most common issue that is successful is a complete or nearly complete failure to present meaningful mitigating evidence in the death penalty sentencing phase of a death penalty case. What Explains These Patterns? In Death Penalty Cases But, this pattern of granting relief for ineffective assistance of counsel is partially a function of jurisprudence politics. Many judges are opposed to the death penalty, but find on the record before them that it is likely to that defendant was not innocent of murder. If at least two appellate judges on a panel of three appellate judges believe this, a ruling that assistance of counsel was inadequate for this reason vacated the death penalty sentence, but not the conviction, usually leaving the defendant in prison for life without the possibility of parole. Also, due to "death qualification of jurors" and the particularly poor public defender systems for death penalty case defendants in the states that produce the most death penalties, the risk of wrongful convictions in close cases, and of ineffective assistance of counsel, is particularly high. Most states with quality public defender systems for first degree murder defendants have either abolished the death penalty, or have very few death penalty convictions. In Other Cases The difficulty of an ineffective assistance of counsel defense from a "legal realist" perspective is that lots of guilty criminal defendants received ineffective assistance of counsel. If the bar is not set very high, a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be raised in a very large share of all felony convictions, even though they are unlikely to prevail on the merits, either because the defendant's guilt was clear, or because the lawyers error was immaterial to the result (two points which overlap). Keep in mind that there is no right to counsel on a collateral attack of a criminal conviction, that very few convicted criminals serving long terms in prison who had incompetent counsel are affluent, and that charitable free legal representation in collateral attacks on criminal convictions is mostly limited to death penalty cases and rape cases where DNA evidence is available. More than 95% of convicted felons serving long terms have never set foot on a college campus as a student. So, in the usual collateral attack on a conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, you have a high school drop out, or high school graduate who never went to college and is marginally functionally literate trying to convince a judge who graduated from law school that his lawyer who graduated from law school didn't know as much about the law and how to defend a criminal prosecution as the defendant does. The likelihood that a defendant who received a marginal quality defense from their lawyer is guilty of a serious crime is particularly high for this subset of cases. Because it takes so long to adjudicate ineffective assistance of counsel claims (it isn't uncommon for it to take two or three years just to rule on a direct appeal from a conviction and another year or three to get a ruling on a collateral attack on a conviction that is denied before an appellate judge so it can make reported case law), almost all of the convictions appealed on this ground that produce case law precedent are very serious offenses like aggravated rape and murder. Otherwise, the issue would have become moot when the sentence of incarceration was served. For most kinds of offenses, the vast majority of strong cases for the prosecutor result in guilty pleas before trial, producing a substantial sentence discount, so only the hard cases go to trial. But, if the death penalty is on the table (and the prosecutor won't budge, perhaps for political and publicity reasons), or an extremely long sentence for a violent felony is on the table, the sentence one can bargain for in a plea bargain, and the sentence that would be dispensed if one is found guilty at trial, are much more similar. So, the incentive for a defendant to "roll the dice" by going to trial is greater, even if the defendant is actually guilty, so a larger proportion of cases with a high probability of conviction at trial go to trial anyway. Also, it is hard to provide "competent" acquittal creating criminal defense cases when the client is clearly guilty. Sometimes the defense was weak because the lawyer was incompetent, but sometimes the lawyer presented a dubious defense because that was the best available option under the circumstances. (This doesn't mean that there is nothing for a competent criminal defense lawyer to do; but most of the work for a competent criminal defense lawyer in these cases comes in the sentencing phase and in the plea bargaining stage.) Judges don't want to order the release of people convicted of serious, usually violent, felonies if there is a good chance that they are guilty and a good chance that a retrial might not result in a conviction simply because the evidence has grown stale. This is particularly true in this subclass of cases (when they don't involve the death penalty which presents some unique issues related to the "death qualification" of the jurors), with a higher than average percentage of actually guilty defendants. While judges don't want innocent people to rot in prison, due to the barrage of dubious collateral attacks on convictions filed in weak cases, without lawyers, by convicted criminals serving long sentences, judges tend to become jaded about the merit of these collateral attacks. About one in seven cases in federal district courts (the trial court level of the federal courts) is a prisoner's petition. One in five appeals in the federal appellate courts is a prisoner's petition. But only about 1% of those petitions are granted in non-death penalty cases. This is because the defendants serving very long sentences have little to lose and everything to gain by filing even a marginal collateral attack with a low chance of success. | The defence in a criminal case has no obligation to inform the prosecution of anything. The onus is on the prosecution to provide the evidence to convict and the defence doesn't have to and indeed shouldn't help them do it. The defence can and probably would use conflicting statements by a prosecution witness to discredit that witness in the eyes of the jury. These do not have to be material to the case: just showing the witness is inconsistent in general is helpful. | The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal. | I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case. | I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it. | It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees. | As George White says, it's hard to prove a negative, but in this instance, there's quite a bit of evidence supporting you. First, the ABA has standards for legal commentators but they are very weak. They say pretty much what you would expect, and, they are non-binding: they explicitly say they "not intended" to provide grounds for "professional discipline." Second, there are articles by lawyers indicating there are no state bar standards. Taken together, the weak ABA standards and the articles should give you enough evidence to prove your case in the "court of buddy opinion." The ABA rules on legal commentators were issued in 2013 as part of a Fair Trial and Public Discourse Black Letter. The letter covered public comments on cases by lawyers involved in the case, lawyers not involved (ie, commentators) and judicial and judicial employees. According to the ABA, the standards are: intended to provide a guide to best practices for lawyers who provide public commentary or consult on criminal cases in which they are not personally involved; (Standard 8-1.1(a)(ii)) To explain what it meant by a "guide to best practices," the ABA included the following caveat about the applicability of the standards: While these Standards are intended to provide a basis for the formulation of internal guidelines within lawyers’ offices...they are not intended to serve as the basis in and of themselves for the imposition of professional discipline...(Standard 8-1.1(c)) In other words, the ABA's rules truly are just a guide to best practices. As for the guidance itself, it does not come close to requiring "due-diligence." A lawyer who is serving as a legal commentator should strive to ensure that the lawyer’s commentary enhances the public’s understanding of the criminal matter and of the criminal justice system generally, promotes respect for the judicial system, and does not materially prejudice the fair administration of justice, in the particular case or in general. To that end, a legal commentator should: (i) Have an understanding of the law and facts of the matter so as to be competent to serve as a commentator; (ii) Refrain from providing commentary designed to sensationalize a criminal matter; and... It may be that some states provide more stringent restrictions, but a quick search suggests they don't. Otherwise, there would not be a law review article arguing "The Legal Profession Must Broaden Ethical Standards for Legal Commentators," or an ABA Journal article (from this June) giving advice on becoming a legal commentator without mentioning state bar restrictions. I'm sure if you look, you can find more evidence. | In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so. |
Would comparative advertising, from a country where it is allowed, in a country where it is banned, be allowed? Note: I have little to no idea about how the law behind this works, I will try to cite my claims as well as I can. The title of the question is a bit hard to understand but I'll specify it here: Let's imagine I live in Germany, which is part of the EU, where comparative advertisement seems to be banned[1]. I get an ad on a platform like YouTube, which is an American company, where comparative advertising is most definitely allowed under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)[2]. This imaginary ad I get is some company comparing themselves to another. Both of those countries have their headquarters in countries where comparative advertising is allowed. Would the law technically allow Youtube to serve that ad? [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_advertising#European_Union [2]: https://www.kelleydrye.com/getattachment/7befe471-fd7b-46a9-9177-755b5eccd246/attachment.aspx | This will ultimately depend on the specific laws, but the scope of EU laws like Directive 2006/114/EC is generally restricted to the EU Single Market. Thus, we would have to consider whether the advertisement in question is directed at that market. In your scenario, you have two US-based companies that engage in comparative advertising via an US-based platform. But where these companies are headquartered is not directly relevant, as non-EU companies can participate in the EU Single Market as well. Instead, EU rules are applicable if either: the comparative advertising occurred in the context of the activities of an EU establishment such as an EU-based subsidiary; or the advertising was directed to a country in the EU Single Market, for example by fulfilling the criteria listed in the Pammer and Alpenhof cases. For example, lets assume that the companies do not have a direct EU presence, but that they offer goods or services to consumers in the EU and the comparative advertisement was in German and mentioned prices in Euros. If so, there would be a good argument that EU rules apply and that the comparative advertising was potentially illegal. But as another example, lets consider two restaurants/diners in Memphis, Tennessee, US, that made unfair comparative advertisements which were distributed via YouTube. It is possible to view the advertisement from the EU. But is there any reason for this ad to be illegal in the EU? No. This ad falls out of scope of EU law as the ad is not directed towards the EU Single Market, and it is unlikely to mislead consumers in the sense of fair competition laws as there won't be any potential customers for the Memphis restaurant in the EU. National laws could take a more narrow approach though. Does YouTube have any responsibility here? No, fair competition laws generally only address the competitors, not the platforms through which advertisements are distributed (e.g. newspapers or social media platforms). Online platforms with user-generated consent benefit from safe-harbor laws. However, there are some legal theories such as the German Störerhaftung under which it might be possible to hold an otherwise-privileged service provider responsible for acts committed by an unknown third party. Note that while comparative marketing is quite regulated in the EU and thus rare, it is not actually illegal when done fairly. For example in Germany, § 6 UWG defines criteria to determine whether comparative advertising is unfair. | Yes One could certainly put up a site whose only content was a link to another domain. And I can't find any law which this would violate. If the link is a "deep link", and if it bypasses a log-in page, while the other site is so designed that all access is intended to go through the login, I believe (but cannot at the moment verify) that the owner of the other site could claim that this violates their copyright. In any case it is not a good idea.But a link to an appropriate page should have no problem, nor should pointing your domain at an appropriate entry page. Therefor, since simply re-pointing a domain should have the same effect as simply linking, in those cases where it works at all, it should be legal. Doing it with an iframe, which would truly open another site within your site, may not be if the other site forbids such use, as in the ToS. The case law on that is not settled, but many sites object to it, as the answer by @BlueDogRanch points out. I don't see a good reason why one would want to do this, but that isn't the question. Copying the HTML of another site and modifying the URLs while keeping the content the same would pretty clearly be a copyright infringement, besides being a lot of work to little obvious point. It also isn't what the question asked about. Building a one-page site that has only a simple link or a redirect would clearly be legal, and would serve the purpose of causing your domain to lead a user to another site, but it isn't, strictly speaking, what was asked about either. | It is certainly possible to incorporate companies with the same name in two different states. If neither company does business in the other person's state under that name, it isn't actionable for either company. If one company was already doing business under its name in a state where another company is formed under that name, it would usually be possible to force the new company to cease and desist from using that name, either with an action directed at the infringer and the Secretary of State (or other official charged with business incorporations in a state) of that state, or in an action directly against the infringer alone. Also, even if a trademark isn't formally registered, it can arise at common law simply through use of a name in a particular market in a particular place. This is harder to prove and the remedies for violating a common law trademark a more limited, but it is not entirely unenforceable. | If the website containing the GDPR-wall processes any personal data of users who hit the GDPR-wall, the GDPR applies to that website. This can be as simple as writing a logfile of all visits to the website. In this case it will be illegal if the website owner does not comply with the GDPR. However a supervisory authority would probably not spent any time on such a minor violation. As long as the the website with the GDPR-wall does not process any personal data, the GDPR does not apply, so nothing in the GDPR can forbid the GDPR-wall. Some related remarks: The GDPR does not require a "privacy policy" on the website if the website does not process any personal data. If personal data is processed based on consent, that consent must be freely given. Also it may not be disruptive. So a cookie wall asking for consent would be illegal. But the GDPR does not care about any other disruptive popups, as long as they are not related to asking for consent. Using GeoIP is a perfect way to implement such a GDPR-Wall, because it would block everyone from within the EU, but nobody else. So it blocks exactly those for who the GDPR would apply. In such a case it would not be reasonable to expect anything more from a website owner. A user which uses a proxy, can not expect to be protected by the GDPR, because it bypasses a restriction set by the owner of the website. A webserver does use the IP-address of all incoming requests, to send the reply back. That could be considered a processing of personal data, but everybody seems to agree it is not. I am not sure why. But I do agree that it would be very impractical if that is considered processing of personal data. I added an example from the Washington Post So you have to pay $9/month for a GDPR compliant subscription. Because the price you have to pay is not unacceptable high, I think it would be valid to offer the premium version this way. This does not force you to choose one of the other subscriptions. In december 2018, the Austrian DPA (DSB) has confirmed that a similar offer is lawful. On derstandard.at you get a choice between free access with tracking and advertising, or pay 6 Euro/Month for tracking free access. Because 6 Euro/Month is cheaper than subscribing to the printed edition, the DSB accepted that as a valid choice. More information can be found on noyb.eu or, (with more details but in German), on wbs-law.de. | How do you know if the copyright claimant or owner of them material you are using is allowing their content on Youtube? You don't. ... does fair use automatically cover you for anything related to this? No Is it illegal to share the music experience of a legally purchased MP3 ... or to provide services that play songs ... but are not hosted by your website (in which case you just act as a pointer to other sites which are participating in illegal activities)? Yes What rights/privileges can cover you if you wish to participate in this? None I've heard (rumours probably with no legal standing), that as long as you are not monetizing their material, you will not have any legal action taken against you. You probably won't have action taken against you. That said, you probably won't get busted for smoking weed in your basement. Lack of enforcement makes it no less illegal. What copyright means Copyright is a legal right created by the law of a country that grants the creator of an original work exclusive rights to its use and distribution, usually for a limited time. The exclusive rights are not absolute; they are limited by limitations and exceptions to copyright law, including fair use. The copyright holder decides how, when and by whom their work can be used and copied. At some point this right expires and the work passes into the public domain. It is not trivial to determine what works are public domain and what are not as it depends on the copyright law in the country they were created in at the time of creation and how that law has changed subsequently. In most of the world, the default length of copyright is currently the life of the author plus either 50 or 70 years. Many jurisdictions also grant workers for hire moral copyright in their creative work even when the proprietorial copyright vests with their employer. Copyright comes into existence automatically; it doesn't need to be registered or denoted in any way. For example, I have copyright in this answer and you have copyright in your question. A few countries (the USA among them) have a copyright register but that only limits the remedies an unregistered copyright holder has; failing to register does not negate copyright. Further, a single work can have multiple copyright holders: a music video for example has (barring contractual arrangements): the composer(s) holds copyright in the music the lyricist(s) holds copyright in the lyrics the performer(s) hold copyright in the music performance the actor(s) (if any) holds copyright in the acting the producer(s)/director(s) holds copyright in the finished product. In practice, most of these people have contracts which give their copyright to someone else. Almost certainly, every MP3 of every song is covered by copyright; that is, someone, somewhere owns the copyright; that is at least one someone. How can you tell who that is? Often, in the absence of a claim of copyright, you can't. Obviously, if it is a song published by a record label than its pretty obvious that they hold copyright on it and you don't need to worry about the deals they have with the artist/composer etc. Remember, copyright violations are a civil matter; the state does not get involved. It is up to each individual copyright holder to take whatever action they wish under the law to protect their rights. | There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile. | Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful. | I can't answer this for all of Europe, but in the UK you can pick your company name as long as it cannot be confused with the name of another UK company (and some other rules, like you cannot name it Her Royal Majesty's Game Studio). Both companies may want to register trademarks, and if they register a trademark in the USA that you registered in the EU, then they cannot use their trademark in the EU, and you can't use yours in the USA. You can register your trademark in the USA if you're quicker. When you try to register a trademark in the USA, anyone with a valid interest can protest against it. If they notice the registration, they will most likely succeed if they object. If they don't notice – well, that's tough for them. I wouldn't say it's impossible to overcome your trademark, but it would be hard. |
Why did Lord Devlin bring up "the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble"? Don't NHS doctors receive consideration, even if patients don't pay? In saying "the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble", Lord Devlin is giving an example of contractual consideration for the private doctor. Correct? I'm not British. If I understand, patients pay nothing to consult NHS doctors. But the NHS pays its doctors. Thus don't NHS doctors' remuneration, paid by the NHS, constitute consideration for these doctors' consultations with patients? Why would doctors need to accept guineas from patients to beget consideration? If NHS doctors' remuneration, paid by the NHS, constitute consideration for these doctors' consultations with patients, then NHS consultations are contracts and don't involve any tort. Correct? Then what does "the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble" have anything to do with tort? Before Hedley Byrne was decided, tortious liability attached only to statements made fraudulently,6 and so the question for the court was whether such liability should be extended to statements made innocently but negligently. This, rather than the nature of the loss thereby caused, was the real focus of the judgments. There is no question that Hedley Byrne is a landmark case in the law of tort, although some think it represents a wrong turning in the law.7 In the following excerpt, Lord Devlin explains why, in his view, this development was necessary in order to avoid arbitrary distinctions between those situations in which recovery for economic loss is available and those where it is not: This is why the distinction is now said to depend on whether financial loss is caused through physical injury or whether it is caused directly. The interposition of the physical injury is said to make a difference of principle. I can find neither logic nor common sense in this. If irrespective of contract, a doctor negligently advises a patient that he can safely pursue his occupation and he cannot and the patient’s health suffers and he loses his livelihood, the patient has a remedy. But if the doctor negligently advises him that he cannot safely pursue his occupation when in fact he can and he loses his livelihood, there is said to be no remedy. Unless, of course, the patient was a private patient and the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble: then the patient can recover all. I am bound to say, my Lords, that I think this to be nonsense. It is not the sort of nonsense that can arise even in the best system of law out of the need to draw nice distinctions between borderline cases. It arises, if it is the law, simply out of a refusal to make sense. The line is not drawn on any intelligible principle. It just happens to be the line which those who have been driven from the extreme assertion that negligent statements in the absence of contractual or fiduciary duty give no cause of action have in the course of their retreat so far reached.8 8 At 517. Jodi Gardner, Sarah Green, Tort Law (2021) p 48. | You missed a bit: Unless, of course, the patient was a private patient and the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble: As well as the state-run National Health Service (which is generally free to most patients) the UK also has a number of private health care providers where patients pay, for example, to be treated sooner than they would if they went with the NHS. Some NHS doctors also work on a self-employed basis in this private sector, called private practice, which creates the contractual relationship alluded to by Lord Devlin. Re: Don't NHS doctors receive consideration, even if patients don't pay? Yes they do. But not from a (non-private) patient - they are paid by the NHS (or related entity). There are different contractual relationships available, such as being on a salaried payscale or in a partnership but all remuneration comes from the NHS. | Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract. | You are looking for the Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, which had its sixteenth edition published in April 2022. This book sets out the range of compensation based on the type of injury suffered. The scale is very detailed. For example, we can find in Chapter 7, (G) Injuries to the elbow (a) A severely disabling injury - £39170 to £54830 (b) Less severe injuries causing impairment of function but not involving major surgery or significant disability - £15650 to £32010 (c) Moderate or minor injury (i) Injuries fully resolving after about one year - In the region of £3530 (ii) Injuries with the majority of symptoms resolving within 18 to 24 months but with nuisance level symptoms persisting after that - In the region of £6500 (iii) Injuries recovering after three years with nuisance symptoms thereafter and/or requiring surgery - Up to £12590 There are lots of other rules about the calculations, which are beyond what can be summarised in a text box. In the case of assault, one might find reference to Chapter 4, which is on psychiatric effects including PTSD, as well as to the physical injuries. Probably the most important note is that they are Guidelines, not Rules, and so the court can deviate from them at its pleasure. But this is what the judge will have at their fingertips during the proceedings. Because these concern damages, receipt of an award will depend on whether the respondent actually has the money. For that reason, there is a statutory scheme, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, which can make additional payments to victims of violent crime. CICS awards are reduced based on civil damages already paid, because you can't be compensated twice for the same injury. They are also calculated after any insurance payout, so it's in the nature of a final resort. The CICS tariffs are not the same as the JCG ones. Taking the elbow example, CICS 2012 rates damage to one elbow with substantial recovery at £1500 (level A2), and with continuing significant disability at £6200 (level A7). Other eligibility rules and procedures are different as well. In practice, the majority of CICS awards are for between £1000 and £2400 (bands A1 to A4); there is a proposed simplification of the bands into fewer levels, but this has not yet been implemented. | In General Generally speaking, applying common law principles, no. In the case of a relative or friend or neighbor or someone like that, doing a favor for a business does not create a legally enforceable right against a business or business owner. Contract Claims The question assumes that there is not true express contract, or even really a contract to pay compensation in some amount or by reference to some schedule of rates, that was implied in fact. Unjust Enrichment Claims One can still recover for service or benefit rendered under a claim of "unjust enrichment" in the absence of a contract. But, in contexts applicable here (also called "quantum meruit") there must be an expectation of payment communicated in a way clear to an objective observer of the situation to recover, as opposed to a gratuitous provision of service. One classic case of unjust enrichment is when someone paints your house by accident, when they are actually under contract to paint your next door neighbor's house, and you know that they made the mistake but allow them to go forward expecting to be paid anyway. Another classic case is one where services must be provided by a doctor or repairman or lawyer on an emergency basis and everyone knows that they were hired with an intent that you pay them, but the price could not be agreed upon because it was urgent to do the work immediately before working out the details of a contract to provide services. In these circumstances, the service provider is entitled to payment of the fair value of the services provided despite the lack of an express agreement regarding the amount. In this example, however, there is not a clear expectation of payment that an objective outside observer would have been able to discern at that time the services were provided, so by default, the help provided was gratuitous, and not enforceable legally. Special Considerations For Spouses This general analysis also applies to a spouse, but not quite so strictly. While the spouse couldn't sue for compensation or having a legally enforceable right to compensation, the extent of the help provided would be one factor among many that could be considered in determining an equitable division of property (in states that are not community property states) and an appropriate and equitable amount of alimony in states that do not have a fixed formula for determining this amount. De minimis assistance would "come with the territory" and be part of a spouse's general right to an equitable division of property under a partnership theory of marriage. But, more extreme labors not compensated in money during the marriage, such as personally building a barn on a farm, or working full time in a spouse's business for a prolonged time period without express money compensation, might have a value assigned to it that is considered in balancing each side's share in an equitable division, if one spouse is reaping the benefit of the other spouse's unpaid labor by receiving, for example, a working farm or business. Similarly, in a fraudulent transfer case, it is possible that a payment to a spouse for extreme labors in the past of this kind would have a status similar to a payment for a pre-existing and not substantially contemporaneous debt. A spouse would be an insider. But, the transfer for no contemporaneous consideration might be considered safe from a fraudulent transfer attack after one year rather than the usual four year statute of limitations on fraudulent transfers. Concluding Observation: Questions Of Proof. Of course, all of this would be based when litigated on oral discussions and context limited by people's memories. This might make proof of a claim like this on the merits hard to win on at trial. But, it also makes disproving a claim prior to trial, when what happened is disputed, difficult. Caveat For Intellectual Property Claims I do not address the issue raised by a comment of designing a logo which raises legal issues specific to who owns intellectual property. Sometimes the person who comes up with an idea is the default owner of the intellectual property rights associated with that idea, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. This default rule usually applies even if the intellectual property was created with the intent that it be used by someone else. | In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021), the US Supreme Court addressed a case that sought one dollar in nominal damages. I'm assuming you mean only claims involving money damages as a remedy, because there are many claims every year involving no literal money damages and the remedy sought is some other kind of relief (although such relief would still have practical or economic value). | Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer. | england-and-wales Admission of the confession is at the discretion of the court PACE s78 gives the court the discretion to decide on the admissibility of confessions obtained if it appears to the court that "having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." There is deliberately no case law guidance on this. Superior courts in the UK have been scrupulous in saying that each case turns on its merits. The “circumstances in which the evidence was obtained” are certainly suss and would not be permitted by a police officer who is required to warn the suspect and advise them of their right to silence. However, that is not sufficient to exclude the evidence. The court also needs to consider whether it would have “such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.” If the confession is the only evidence then admitting it would clearly be unfair. However, if the Crown has mountains of other evidence, then the confession may only have a small probative value. There is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine in the UK Far more likely is that the Crown would not even seek to introduce the confession. It would just slow the trial and give the defence grounds for an appeal. Instead, they would use the confession to inform their investigation and get other evidence to convict. Legal privilege In England and Wales, legal advice privilege only applies where there is a lawyer present. If Badal is a lawyer, then the privilege attaches; if he isn’t then it doesn’t, irrespective of what he led Naina to believe. The same would be true even if Badal believed he was a lawyer but, for some reason, was not licenced in E&W. Litigation privilege is a broader concept and covers all advice, including from non-lawyers, where litigation (including criminal prosecution) has commenced or is reasonably likely. Based on the description, Naina has been committed to stand trial so everything she said is covered by privilege and is inadmissible. Why bother doing this? Most criminals are not sophisticated and will often implicate themselves if you give them enough space without the police or others violating any rules. Anecdotally, I have a relative who was a psychologist for a remand prison - prisoners charged but not yet tried. At the start of every meeting with a prisoner they would say “I work for the state, nothing you say is confidential and it can be used against you” - they still had prisoners confess to crimes they weren’t charged with, name accomplices, and tell where the loot was hidden. | The doctor is a professional Engineers don’t put extra wings on airplanes because the client asks. Lawyers don’t throw unsubstantiated allegations in their pleadings because the client asks. Accountants don’t change the balance sheet because the client asks. And doctors don’t prescribe unnecessary medications or vitamins because the client asks. For most people with normal health and a relatively balanced diet, nutritional supplements are medically unnecessary. They may make the user feel better through the placebo affect but doctors prescribe things that are necessary, not things the patient wants but doesn’t need. You can sue a doctor if they are negligent. One sure sign of negligence is if they adopt the treatment plan proposed by the patient without applying their professional judgement. |
Arbitration and GDPR Arbitration allow a both parties to settle the dispute outside the court where the arbitrator would decide the law to b e applied to the dispute?. However, arbitration will not exempt their obligation under the GDPR if the issue is related to GDPR compliance? | Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process For grievances between private parties, they can agree to resolve them through arbitration. For breaches of public law (like GDPR) the state is the one against whom the offence is committed. Arbitration is not available to resolve these matters - resolution is through the courts or administrative tribunals. | Yes, but ... You can bring a suit in an Australian court of competent jurisdiction. You would then need to find and serve the defendant in compliance with both Australian law and the law of the jurisdiction they are in. They can then raise a jurisdictional challenge that the Australian court is not the appropriate forum - they might be right depending on where the substance of the contract happened, whether the contract has a nomination of venue clause and if the contract is subject to an arbitration agreement. If the Australian court decides it does have jurisdiction it would have to decide which law applies - this is likely to be a mix of law because some laws in both jurisdictions are likely not excludable by contract. If you win, you would then have to get the judgement enforced somewhere the defendant has assets. Not paying a judgement is not a crime so the defendant will be of no interest to law enforcement - getting money from them is your problem. tl;dr Cross-national litigation is way more expensive in time and money and way less certain in outcome beyond the inherent uncertainty in any lawsuit. This is not something you can expect to succeed at without lawyers in both countries so you will be spending tens of thousands for an uncertain outcome. If you are chasing millions this may be worth it but if you are - don’t do million dollar deals by email in the future. | If such a company oversteps one of these parameters for lawful operation, are arbitration clauses binding in respect of these breaches, in removing judicial recourse for the customer in court, rather than in arbitration venues? In this situation, the arbitration clause (assuming it was actually entered into) is binding and there is no meaningful judicial recourse through a civil lawsuit. It does not bar criminal prosecutions or administrative agency action. And what . . . scenarios give rise to causes of action that can immutably transcend arbitration clauses? Civil actions seeking redress from sexual assaults are exempt from arbitration in the U.S., pursuant to H.R. 4445, the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, which was signed into law on March 3, 2022. | The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court. | The university has a legal obligation to collect certain data from attendees, including employees an visitors. It has decided to keep these records in digital form, and offers a smartphone app as a convenience. The university has outsourced the data processing activity to a third party. This is perfectly legal under the GDPR, if that third party is contractually bound to only process the data as instructed, and not for their own purposes. Whereas the university acts as a data controller (Verantwortlicher), the third party would be a data processor (Auftragsverarbeiter). I have some doubts though whether an app or a website is indeed the solution that offers the best data protection, especially taking into account the GDPR's data minimization principle. Requiring updates when entering or leaving any room is potentially excessive. Given the sensitivity of the data, the university should have performed a data protection impact assessment to weigh the consequences of this measure. At least for employees, the measure would likely have to be approved by the union (Personalrat) as well. | Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline. | They get paid either way I’m an arbitrator, adjudicator, and mediator and I’ll make this very clear: I don’t give a rat’s arse who wins. When I’m acting as a mediator I can go even further: I don’t give a rat’s arse if the dispute even gets resolved. My job is to do my job. To manage the process and, if making a decision is part of the process, make a decision. My paycheque is totally unaffected by who I decide for. Future employment prospects depend on you being good at the job. Bias is not being good at the job. Oh, yeah. Also, it’s the law that I’m impartial. In any event, most arbitration clauses give the parties no input in the selection of the arbitrator (e.g. by nominating the president of a professional association of arbitrators to appoint them) or require them to agree on the arbitrator. | Let's assume that I created a mobile app for iPhone that is tracking rides on a bike [...] So the app is processing that data in the way I programmed it but I as a person do not have access to that data. I assume in such case I am not the data controller according to GDPR because I do not have access to that data is that correct? Yes, as far as I can see that is correct. The GDPR defines a data controller as someone who "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" - you just provide a tool, you don't control for what purposes your customers use their ride data. This is also discussed in this question: How does the GDPR apply to software developed by one company and used by another? What if additionally to that I will program my app for example in such way that it will sometimes send current GPS coordinate to an online service controlled by external company such as Apple [...] But still my app would send this data directly to Apple server so I will still not have any access to that data. Does this change anything and does GDPR now apply to me? Yes, and yes. In that case, you are telling Apple to process data for you, so you would become the data controller (because you "determine[s] the purposes and means of the processing of personal data"), and Apple is a data processor for you. That means also the usual mechanisms kick in - you need to inform your users about this processing, you need to make sure Apple plays by the rules, etc. etc. I also do not know if Apple save this request on their servers or if they just automatically convert received gps coordinates to a name and return the answer without saving the request. This is exactly the kind of situation the GDPR is meant to address. Under GDPR, saying "I do not know what X does with the data" is not an option. This is something many companies tried in the past, that is why GDPR explicitly assigns responsibility to the data controller (i.e., you). As explained in a EU document, What is a data controller or a data processor?: The duties of the processor towards the controller must be specified in a contract or another legal act. For example, the contract must indicate what happens to the personal data once the contract is terminated. A typical activity of processors is offering IT solutions, including cloud storage. [...] So, no, you cannot just say "I do not know if Apple saves this request". Instead, you must make a contract with Apple which says whether (and how, and for how long...) they save the request, and you must inform your users about this in your privacy policy. And if Apple refuse to make such a contract with you, you must find a different company to work with. |
Who adjudicates whether a Bill contains "any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years" as per the Parliament Act 1911? The Parliament Act 1911 (in the UK) gives the House of Lords different levels of power over a bill that has been passed by the House of Commons, depending into which of three categories the bill falls: for a "money bill", the House of Lords can only delay passage of the bill by one month; for a bill that contains "any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years", the House of Lords has an absolute veto over passage of the bill; for any other bill, the House of Lords can delay passage of the bill by one year (or longer if there is no prorogation/opening of a new session during that year). The 1911 Act, at section 1(2), is explicit about who adjudicates any disagreement as to whether or not a particular bill is a "money bill": the Speaker of the House of Commons. However, the 1911 Act contains no explicit statement of who adjudicates any disagreement as to whether or not a particular bill contains "any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years". Who would adjudicate any such disagreement? | Before getting into the technical answer to this question it is worth noting that when matters of a constitutional nature are involved then in practice it is not just a matter of a technical "legal" answer. Students and academics like to pose hypothetical questions such as "What would happen if the Queen refused assent to a Bill?" or "If Parliament is supreme, could it abolish the courts?" etc. The practical reality is that a liberal democracy, such as ours, ultimately relies on those in positions of power to respect the democratic conventions and preserve the constitution. When there is a legal angle to some constitutional issue the courts will play their part but, whatever legal analysis their judgments may contain, they will always have in mind the importance of maintaining our democratic system. It is also worth noting that where an Act contains an "ouster" clause (saying that a certificate of X shall not be questioned in any court of law) the courts always find a way to interpret that so that it does not apply in any case where the courts think they should adjudicate! Those preliminaries out of the way, I think the technical legal answer to your question is that first of all the Speaker decides and provides a certificate under s.2(2). You will see that s.2(1) deals with "any other bill" (your third bullet point) and s.2(2) requires a certificate from the Speaker that "the provisions of this section have been duly complied with" (i.e. that it is indeed in the "any other bill" category). Of course there is a further question of whether, if the Speaker gets it wrong, the courts could intervene and exactly how that might happen (the so-called "John Bercow question" of what if a Speaker goes rogue), but the initial technical answer to you question is "the Speaker of the House of Commons". | The way law works is that you don't need to find a law which says you can do something. Instead, there needs to be an absence of a law which says you cannot do that thing. In other words, you can do anything you want so long as there isn't a law which says you can't. It's unlikely that you will find a law in any jurisdiction which says you cannot charge for a handshake. If you want the charge to be legally binding on the other party, then you need to ensure that the formalities of a valid contract are met. In particular, either each side needs to provide consideration (something of value) or the contract needs to be executed as a deed (england-and-wales). The party who pays the charge is clearly providing consideration. What about the handshake? Is it something of value? The rule is that consideration must be "sufficient" but does not need to be "adequate". That means that it must have some value (however small) but it doesn't need to be valuable enough to be a fair bargain for the parties. This was confirmed by the House of Lords in Chappell & Co. v Nestle Co. Ltd (1960) AC 97 (england-and-wales) which held that empty chocolate wrappers, which would be thrown away upon receipt, were sufficient consideration. A more common example of low-value but sufficient consideration is a "peppercorn" which is often used as token consideration where (in practical terms) a party is not offering anything of substance. Note that "value" doesn't need to mean something that benefits the recipient. It can also be something which detriments the person who provides it. The courts have held that a promise to do something you were not otherwise legally required to do is sufficient consideration. For example, in Hamer v Sidway (1891) 27 NE 256 (new-york-state), the court held that a promise to quit smoking was sufficient consideration. It doesn't matter whether the recipient values the consideration or not. In Chappell (see above) the court held: It is said that when received the wrappers are of no value to Nestle’s. This I would have thought irrelevant. A contracting party can stipulate for what consideration he chooses. A peppercorn does not cease to be good consideration if it is established that the promisee does not like pepper and will throw away the corn. A handshake is almost certainly sufficient consideration because it involves doing something that you were under no legal obligation to do before you agreed the contract. How you write a receipt is a matter of personal choice and therefore off-topic. | One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment. | Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure. | No. This is black-letter constitutional law. From Article 1, section 9: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. | There is no particular mention in the OSCOLA guidelines for how to refer to laws of England and Wales. In academic papers it is common to see both "English Law" and "English and Welsh Law", usually depending on whether the particular point relates directly to England, Wales or both. However, in the case of Welsh Measures and Statutory Instruments of Wales then it would be correct to only describe the laws as "Welsh Law". | It’s a common law rule dating from the 17th to 19th centuries Known as the rule against perpetuities “that prevents people from using legal instruments (usually a deed or a will) to exert control over the ownership of private property for a time long beyond the lives of people living at the time the instrument was written.” The rule has its origin in the Duke of Norfolk's Case of 1682. That case concerned Henry, 22nd Earl of Arundel, who had tried to create a shifting executory limitation so that some of his property would pass to his eldest son (who was mentally deficient) and then to his second son, and other property would pass to his second son, but then to his fourth son. The estate plan also included provisions for shifting property many generations later if certain conditions should occur. When his second son, Henry, succeeded to his elder brother's property, he did not want to pass the other property to his younger brother, Charles. Charles sued to enforce his interest, and the court (in this instance, the House of Lords) held that such a shifting condition could not exist indefinitely. The judges believed that tying up property too long beyond the lives of people living at the time was wrong, although the exact period was not determined until another case, Cadell v. Palmer, 150 years later. Historically, the rule was no longer than 21 years from the death of some person alive at the time the trust or estate was created. However, that person(s) must be limited and identifiable. Which led to the creation of Royal lives clauses. The descendants of British monarchs became popular because it’s easy to find out who they are, even many years after the fact, and that family tends to live a long time. Other popular choices, particularly in the United States, are the descendants of John D. Rockefeller or Joseph P. Kennedy. This is often only one of the conditions for the end of the trust and becomes a “savings clause” to prevent violation of the rule if the other conditions are (or become) too far in the future. The period has been changed or abolished by statute in many jurisdictions. For example, England and Wales has adopted a flat 125 year limit. As a state-based law, the United States is hugely variable. Examples For example, one of the businesses I run operates under a trust deed that says: "The Vesting Date" means the first to occur of the following three dates namely:- (i) Sixty years after the date of this Deed. (ii) Twenty years after the date of the death of the last survivor of the lineal descendants of His late Majesty King George V born and living at the date hereof or, (iii) The date (if any) which the Trustee shall in his discretion appoint as the distribution date of this settlement. The deed was made in 1982, which partly explains its style and implicit sexism, but I suspect that the solicitor who drafted it has been using the clause about George V for a lot longer than that. As of today, there are 35 living people who fall into the definition, including Charles III (see if you can work out the others); since there are now less than 20 years to go until 60 years after the deed, the clause will never be relevant. Another business operates under a deed made in 2022: 14.1 Termination date The Trust shall be wound-up and terminate on the first to occur of: a) the date which The Trustee with the written consent of the Leading Member Appointer determines; or b) 80 years from the date of this deed unless a State law allows otherwise including South Australia. Note that the reference to living people is gone. Also, note the specific reference to South Australia, a jurisdiction that has abolished the rule against perpetuities. So long as they don't change their law back, this trust is effectively perpetual. Finally, not how much easier this is to read and skips the implicit sexism; progress. Why doesn’t it affect the property of ‘immortal’ entities like companies or governments? Because, in theory, it isn’t dead people telling living people what they can do with the property. While the organisation may be ‘eternal’ the people making decisions for that organisation aren’t - the directors and legislators/executives in charge today can decide what to do with the property. This includes having the capacity to rewrite the rules of the organisation. While it may be hard to change a company’s rules and very, very hard to change a country’s constitution, it isn’t impossible the way it is with a trust deed or a will. Changing a deed or will too much can result in resettlemet; creating a new trust and usually crystalising tax obligations the delaying of which was often one of the motivations for the trust in the first place. | I don't wish to gainsay or contradict a "professional adviser", especially as I have no idea on what information they based their suggestion. All I can do is direct the OP to the relevant extracts from the section headed "II ACCELERATED POSSESSION CLAIMS OF PROPERTY LET ON AN ASSURED SHORTHOLD TENANCY" in the Civil Procedure Rules, especially my emboldened text at the end of Rule 55.15. Rule 55.14 (1) A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Rule 55.15 (1) On receipt of the defence the court will – (a) send a copy to the claimant; and (b) refer the claim and defence to a judge. (2) Where the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence – (a) the claimant may file a written request for an order for possession; and (b) the court will refer that request to a judge. (3) Where the defence is received after the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired but before a request is filed in accordance with paragraph (2), paragraph (1) will still apply. (4) Where – (a) the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence; and (b) the claimant has not made a request for an order for possession under paragraph (2) within 3 months after the expiry of the period set out in rule 55.14, the claim will be stayed. |
How often, if ever, has the US Supreme Court cited the Natural Moral Law in a majority decision? I think it's cited occasionally by justices like Clarence Thomas, but it seems only when he's in the minority advocating something that most people see as being inline with his Catholicism under the guise of natural law. Has a majority opinion ever taken in to account the natural moral law (please see encyclopedic definition) that is at odds, circumvents or makes up for lapses in the constitution? Has it ever been used to interpret the constitution? | I did not find any instance in which the US Supreme Court has ever used "Natural Moral Law." However, it did use "Moral Law" 13 times. Ogden v. Saunders Jordan v. De George DeWeese v. ACLU of Ohio Foundation Van Orden v. Perry McGowan v. Maryland Interstate Cir. v. Dallas Times Film Corp. v. Chicago Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson League v. DE YOUNG ET AL. Arizone Copper Co. v. Hammer Walker v. Birmingham Van Orden v. Perry Cohens v. Virginia It has used "Natural Law" 83 times. The most recent in 1996 in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). | The First Amendment is never interpreted as a complete prohibition against laws that could affect a religion, nor is it interpreted to mean that you can say or write anything whatsoever that you want. You cannot sacrifice humans when in the name of a religion, and you cannot sacrifice (murder) humans for fun. One part of the First Amendment regarding religion is the Free Exercise clause which says that you cannot prohibit the exercise of a religion, and another, the Establishment Clause, prohibits favoring a religion, or favoring religion over atheism. The clauses about free speech also do not mean that you can commit fraud and you cannot threaten people's lives. What decides how far the government can go is "strict scrutiny", a doctrine that limits the extent to which the government can infringe on fundamental rights – First Amendment rights are the canonical example of a fundamental right. The main hurdle that a law so scrutinized has to pass is that the law is necessary for a compelling government interest. Preventing massive deaths is generally seen as such an interest. Then, the law has to be narrowly tailored to affect "just those cases", and it has to be the lest restrictive means of accomplishing that end. Although the prevention of massive deaths is a compelling government interest, a government might screw this up in their legal arguments, as they seem to have done in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, where mass political protests were allowed but smaller religious meetings were prohibited. The government essentially "waived" that compelling interest, replacing it with an interest in preventing church meetings, which is plainly a violation of the First Amendment – they substantially burdened religious practices. | Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts. | It is complicated to answer why a law is what it is. Judge Frank Esterbrook writes (in the forward to Reading Law by Scalia and Garner): Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it "intends" only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others something else, if some interest groups favor one outcome and others something different; how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? I will provide the historical background leading to the current fair use statute and case law, but take from it what you will as to why it is what it is. Fair use is a statutory defence provided by 17 USC 107. Its application is clearly demonstrated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Fair use was an "exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act". (Campbell) Courts had been finding exceptions for "fair abridgements" and other precursors to fair use as far back as under the Statute of Anne of 1710. (Campbell, citing William Patry's "The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law".) This doctrine worked its way into US case law in the nineteenth century. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841)1, Justice Story distilled the essence of law and methodology from the earlier cases: "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." (Campbell) Folsom states: There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work. This early incorporation of fair use focused on whether something new was being created, or whether the "chief value" of the original work was being taken. This primary focus on transformativeness has stuck with with fair use doctrine until today. Campbell said (internal citations removed): The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation ("supplanting" the original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is "transformative". Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. Campbell also includes the following statement of rationale for why Congress included section 107: Congress meant § 107 "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way" and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 62 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). There is no support for your separation of "parody, comment, and criticism " from "teaching, research, and news reporting", or that there are differing amounts of commercial use allowed for these types of work. The statute lists together "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research" as examples purposes. The statute requires that "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" be considered in all fair use cases. There is also very little if any First Amendment rationale expressed for the fair use doctrine. The intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law is more clearly found in the idea/expression dichotomy. 1. Folsom v. Marsh full opinion text | Probably.* Congress has wide latitude to dictate the procedures of "inferior courts" -- the district courts and circuit courts of appeal. Those courts only exist because Congress created them, so Congress can generally set the terms on which they continue to exist. That power is limited in several important ways by the Constitution, including the terms and compensation of the judges, and standing to address cases, and then further limited by separation-of-powers principles. But the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are a good example of how Congress has already -- and largely unobjectionably -- imposed these types of demands on the judiciary. The rules are generally drafted by the judicial branch, but Congress approves them and gives them the force of law. In both sets of rules, you can already see some requirements on how decisions are worded: Criminal Rule 23 requires the court to "state its specific findings of fact" after a bench trial; Criminal Rule 32 requires the court to "set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence" in judgments of conviction; Civil Rule 52 requires the court to "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately"; Civil Rule 58 requires that "every judgment and amended judgment ... be set out in a separate document"; Civil Rule 59 requires the court to "specify the reasons [for granting or denying a motion for a new trial] in its order"; and Civil Rule 72 requires magistrates to enter "a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." The rule you're proposing seems to go well beyond these requirements, but I don't see how it would run afoul of constitutional constraints. I could imagine an argument that this somehow encroaches on the courts' inherent authority, but I'm not really convinced that that authority protects against this. For more information, you can read the Congressional Research Service report on "Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts." *This answer only applies to Article III courts, but even then does not apply to the Supreme Court, which is co-equal and generally has the authority to set its own rules. When it comes to Article I courts, though, Congress would probably have virtually unlimited discretion to impose the kinds of requirements that you're talking about, and even to say that the court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutionality at all. Congress might even get away with imposing these kinds of requirements on state courts through the Spending Clause | There isn't to the best of my knowledge, any single document that tells courts to follow precedant or when and how to do so. Each State, and the Federal government, has a set of court rules of procedure. These will indicate, among many other things, the form that should be used in citing previous cases, but that is about form, not content -- about how to cite a case, not about when a court should or should not cite one. Some precedents are what are called persuasive. These are from other court systems: say a different state, or even another country. These also include rulings from other courts at the same level, say from a different district, or even from lower courts. Other precedents are binding. These are from a superior court to the one where the case is cited. In a state's lower court, rulings of that state's supream court are binding. In Federal district courts, rulings of the Court of Appeals for the same Circuit, and of the US Supreme Court are binding. In Federal appeals courts, rulings of the US Supreme Court are binding. They are also binding in state courts on matters where the US constitution is involved, or where Federal law supersedes state law. Prior rulings of the same court are strongly persuasive, but not strictly binding -- a court can overrule its own precedents when it thinks the law or justice requires this, although most courts are reluctant to do so. Or more often it can distinguish a previous ruling, saying, in effect: "that previous ruling is still valid, but this is a different case in such and such a specific way, so the result is different". Students in law school spend a good deal of time learning how precedents are cited, and how they should be used, learning what sorts of things are controlled by precedents, and how to find the precedents that apply to a particular case. When they become lawyers and then judges, they taken this body of learning with them, and use it in writing decisions, and opinions that explain those decisions. New law from the legislature can reverse previous court decisions, except in the case of decisions interpreting the constitution (federal or state). Amendments can change the constitution. Judges must adapt to such changes in the law. To a significant extent our system of precedent is a matter of tradition, going back largely to the common-law courts of England, although it has been modified by specific legislation in many ways, as well as by more recent court decision and practice. It is passed on in law schools, in legal apprenticeships of various kinds, and in individual court decisions. | In the case New York Times Co. v. United States, the court issued a brief per curiam opinion basically saying that the NYT won, and then each justice wrote a separate concurrence or dissent. A few justices did join each others' opinions, and in particular, Justice Harlan's dissent was joined by both of the other two dissenters (who also wrote separately). On the concurrence side of things, Justices Black and Douglas joined each other, and Justices Stewart and White joined each other. The subject matter in this case was whether the New York Times was allowed to publish the Pentagon Papers; the United States government opposed this on the grounds that the documents were classified and (allegedly) a risk to national security. This gives us a total of nine signed opinions plus one unsigned per curiam opinion, which is rather short and so I don't think it should count. The sole function of the per curiam was to prevent any one of the concurrences from being characterized as "the majority opinion." | Here is a substantial collection of interpretive canons; this article discusses rules vs. canons. This article discusses contract interpretation from both the perspectives of drafting and litigating. These are all from the perspective of common law systems. This article (in English) and this chapter (English, paywall) reminds us that French contract law is different, to which I would add this which focuses on the French subjective theory of contracts – starkly distinct from the common law theory. This page (en français) will probably be of most interest to you. The 2016 modification to the civil code added art. 1190 (and other articles) which says Dans le doute, le contrat de gré à gré s'interprète contre le créancier et en faveur du débiteur, et le contrat d'adhésion contre celui qui l'a proposé which is contra proferentem. The Latin name is not officially assigned to this law, and being a new addition to French law, it's too early to tell if it will be so named in French legal practice. |
A Lawyer recieves an unintended letter from a client. Is it privileged? This is based on a situation in a mystery novel. In the novel a lawyer receives an envelope addressed to him by a client, in the client's handwriting, which the lawyer knows well. But the letter inside is not addressed to the lawyer, or indeed to anyone. Enclosed are sheets of paper with a watermark of the sort used in printing paper money, strongly suggesting a counterfeiting operation. The unaddressed and unsigned note is consistent with the idea of a counterfeiting operation. The note is also in the client's distinctive handwriting. The lawyer assumes that the contents of the envelope were placed there by a mistake of the client, and were intended to be sent to a confederate of the client in this illegal scheme. He further assumes that a letter intended for the lawyer was sent to the confederate. The lawyer had not previously known or suspected that the client was engaged in forgery or any unlawful activity. The lawyer decides to treat this as a confidential and privileged matter. But the narrator remarks that he is obviously wrong to do so. One passage reads: The obvious inference was that the letter which had come to Penfield [the lawyer] contained incriminating matter. That would explain everything. For if Penfield had thus stumbled on evidence of a crime, either committed or contemplated, he would have to choose between denouncing the criminal or keeping the matter to himself. But he was not entitled to keep it to himself; for, other considerations apart, this was not properly a client's secret. It had not been communicated to him: he had discovered it by accident. He was therefore not bound to secrecy, and he could not, consequently, claim a lawyer's privilege. In short, if he had discovered a crime and chose to suppress his discovery, he was, in effect, an accessory, before or after the fact, as the case might be; and he would necessarily keep the secret because he would not dare to divulge it. (Source: Chapter IV of The Shadow of the Wolf by R. Austin Freeman, first published in 1925, and now out of copyright. Freeman died in 1943. See http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks05/0500491h.html) The novel is set in England, roughly in 1925. My question is, would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? Are the answers different in 1925 England, 1925 US (say New York) 2020 England, or 2020 New York? I know that a lawyer cannot regard as privileged advice on how to commit a crime, or plans for a future crime. I understand that a statement by a client that the client has committed a crime in the past is privileged. But what about this sort of unintended disclosure by the client? | england-and-wales - present day... Would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? No Although it is possible to argue that the letter is a communication to the lawyer (albeit by mistake) its purpose is not in relation to seeking or receiving legal advice, so it fails to meet the definition of legal privilege: There are two forms of legal professional privilege: Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice. Litigation privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers, clients and third parties made for the purposes of litigation, either actual or contemplated. Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Yes, No, Maybe If the lawyer is a suspect/defendant then there is no requirement to answer any questions whatsoever. Similarly, there is no obligation on a witness to answer questions unless a statutory provision has been triggered, such as the lawyer being given a Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 Disclosure Notice. Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? Yes Although there is no general requirement to report a crime (of this nature) to the police, the lawyer's profession is in the "regulated sector" which requires Suspicious Activity Reports to be submitted to the authorities: ... in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering... What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? None that I can see ETA The status of legal privilege in 1925 seems to have been the same as now, and this Wikipedia article, under the heading History offers this in support: The common law principle of legal professional privilege is of extremely long standing. The earliest recorded instance of the principle in English case-law dates from 1577 in the case of Berd v Lovelace ([1576] EngR 10 (& Ors)) | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. | Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough. | Did the lawyer violate a fiduciary duty by telling the client that the asset had been acquired when, in fact it had not been, and if so, what are the consequences to the lawyer? Yes. A lawyer has the obligation that his representations to his client be diligent and materially truthful. Lawyer's violation of that duty prevents his client from making informed decisions. At the outset, the lawyer's malpractice would warrant sanctions by the disciplinary board where he incurred legal malpractice. A possible suspension, public reprimand, and/or the amount of a monetary sanctions depend on several variables such as lawyer's intent, board's rules & discretion, and lawyer's severity & history of malpractice. Quantification of the lawyer's liability to his client depends on the losses the client incurred as a result of the lawyer's misrepresentations. This largely depends on the terms of the contract between the investor and the company. The intentionality (as opposed to negligence) of lawyer's misrepresentations are likely to support a claim of fraud, for which many jurisdictions entitle the injured party to treble damages. What responsibilities did the lawyer have under "know your customer" or similar legislation to verify the client's ability to invest as an accredited investor? Know Your Customer mostly relates to prevention and detection of money-laundering (and, to a lesser extent, of tax evasion), not to provider's awareness of his client's financial sophistication. KYC entails a duty the service provider has --if at all-- toward the authorities, not toward the client and typically not either toward the company in which the client intends to invest. Therefore KYC seems inapplicable in the scenario you describe. It is unclear from your post why the status of accredited investor would be any relevant in this scenario. A startup in need for a particular asset seems unlikely to have a duty to ensure that its investors are classified as accredited for SEC purposes. Normally, malpractice is not held against the lawyer unless the client wins the underlying case against the company. Is this true here That seems unlikely. Despite the several gaps in your description, it certainly reflects separate causes of action involving different parties, different types of relation between them, unrelated states of mind, simultaneous fictions devised by the lawyer, and so forth. Accordingly, the outcomes of investor's ensuing claims against his lawyer are independent of investor's suit against the company. For instance, the extent to which the contract between the investor and the company remained is inconclusive because crucial details of the investor-company contract are missing. Nor is it clear whether the company incurred what is known as invited error by not pressing the investor on the second installment of X the company was expecting. But, regardless of the legal position of the investor and the company with respect to each other, both entities [detrimentally] acted in reasonable reliance on the misrepresentations a third-party made to each of them. | The U.S. Copyright Office says of poor man's copyright: There is no provision in the copyright law regarding any such type of protection, and it is not a substitute for registration. This means that the U.S. government will not grant you any special rights or protections for having undertaken poor man's copyright, unlike advance copyright registration, which confers the ability to collect statutory damages. In any case, as a prerequisite to legal action, you will need to register your work, even if you must do so after the infringement has taken place: You will have to register, however, if you wish to bring a lawsuit for infringement of a U.S. work. Instead, poor man's copyright is purely an evidentiary mechanism for proving possession of a work at a particular point in time. Suppose a best-selling author illegally uses huge verbatim passages of your unpublished work in a new novel. As part of your legal argument against the infringing author, you want to prove that you possessed your unpublished work decades before the author claimed to have started work on the infringing novel. The truly serious issue with many types of poor man's copyright is that it simply doesn't prove what it intends to prove. If you have a sealed envelope that is postmarked with a date, that only proves that the envelope passed through the postal system on that day. It says nothing about what the contents of the envelope were at the time; notably, the envelope could be mailed unsealed and then filled and sealed at a later date. More involved forms of poor man's copyright, like storing a work in an undisturbed bank safe deposit box, might carry more evidentiary weight, but such an approach could still be difficult to verify reliably: we must ask the bank to verify the negative that no one ever accessed the deposit box. This may or may not be something the bank is prepared to do, and they may or may not maintain such records perpetually. If you really want to prove that you had possession of a creative work on a particular day (which, again, is not a complete legal argument, but may be helpful), you will need to find a trustworthy third party who can demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the work has remained undisturbed in their possession since a particular date. A bank might be good at this, but the best agency I know of to carry out such a purpose is the U.S. Copyright Office! They allow you to register your work (for probably much cheaper than a decades-long deposit box rental) and confer the benefits of registration, e.g. statutory damages. I don't know of any legal cases that have tested a poor man's copyright in court. On a personal note, I suspect there are none, because the primary case that poor man's copyright is intended to protect against -- someone taking your unpublished work and making the baldfaced lie that it is their own, such that your only recourse is to prove a timeline that renders their claims impossible -- seems somewhat uncommon. Consider the likelihood of such a case occurring combined with the likelihood of a plaintiff who has undertaken poor man's copyright, and I suspect the likelihood is small indeed. | I'm not familiar with the lawsuit, but generally speaking, a court's finding that a lawyer falsified evidence would not directly result in the lawyer being disbarred, as the trial court does not have authority to regulate the practice of law. Instead, a court that reached that conclusion -- either by a verdict, or because a judge was persuaded by the evidence without reaching a verdict -- would likely report that outcome to whatever organization is responsible for licensing attorneys in that jurisdiction. | The issues here are fraud and false documents (forgery). While the mere possession of false documents is not necessarily a crime, the use of false documents in order to obtain a financial advantage is fraud, which is a crime defined by statute in all states. States may also have specific provisions relating to the possession of falsified documents, but generally it is not criminal unless the possessor is aware it is a false document, and that it will be used to secure some advantage. Fraud For example the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s192E states: (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (a) obtains property belonging to another, or (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Forgery Additionally, s253 of the same Act states: A person who makes a false document with the intention that the person or another will use it: (a) to induce some person to accept it as genuine, and (b) because of its being accepted as genuine: (i) to obtain any property belonging to another, or (ii) to obtain any financial advantage or cause any financial disadvantage, or (iii) to influence the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of the offence of forgery. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. ... and s255 (also see s254, which contains very similar provisions for the actual use of false documents): A person who has in his or her possession a false document, knowing that it is false, with the intention that the person or another will use it: (a) to induce some person to accept it as genuine, and (b) because of its being accepted as genuine: (i) to obtain any property belonging to another, or (ii) to obtain any financial advantage or cause any financial disadvantage, or (iii) to influence the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. ... and s307C: (1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person produces a document to another person, and (b) the person does so knowing that the document is false or misleading, and (c) the document is produced in compliance or purported compliance with a law of the State. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years, or a fine of 200 penalty units, or both. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the document is not false or misleading in a material particular. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who produces a document if the document is accompanied by a written statement signed by the person or, in the case of a body corporate, by a competent officer of the body corporate: (a) stating that the document is, to the knowledge of the first-mentioned person, false or misleading in a material particular, and (b) setting out, or referring to, the material particular in which the document is, to the knowledge of the first-mentioned person, false or misleading. (4) The burden of establishing a matter referred to in subsection (2) or (3) lies on the accused person. |
Does unlawful presence rule apply for conditional permanent residents? Jul 2018 I came to the U.S. with a K1 visa. Sep 2018. I married a U.S. citizen. May 2019. I got a conditional 2 year green card that expires in May 2021. May 2020. I divorced but I did not remove the conditional status. Did not apply for any documents. Nov 2021. I went back to my country with an expired conditional green card. Now I am in my country. I have an expired conditional green card. I did not apply for any documents. Question: Since my conditional green card expired in May 2021, and I stayed in the U.S. until Nov 2021, does all that time May-Nov count as “unlawful presence”? Or does “unlawful presence” not apply for permanent residents? Question: Am I going to have issues going back to the U.S. with my expired conditional green card, if I decide to go back right now? | According to USCIS Adjudicator's Field Manual chapter 40.9.2(b)(1)(C)(ii) (on page 73-74 of this PDF), it seems that unlawful presence began to accrue when your 2-year green card expired: The alien begins to accrue unlawful presence as of the date of the second anniversary of the alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence. See id . Also, failure to appear for the personal interview that may be required by USCIS in relation to the Form I-751 or I-829 petition results in the automatic termination of the conditional legal permanent resident status, unless the parties establish good cause for the failure to appear. In chapter 40.9.2(b)(1)(C)(iii) (on page 74), it says that if you make a late filing of Removal of Conditions and it is approved, you are deemed to not have accrued unlawful presence, but if it is denied, you are still considered to have accrued unlawful presence from the expiration of your 2 years. If the late filed petition is accepted and approved, no unlawful presence time will be deemed to have accrued. [...] If, however, the late filing is rejected, the alien begins to accrue unlawful presence time on the date his or her status as a conditional resident automatically terminated. | A few possible reasons it could be illegal (on an issue spotting basis, not a careful analysis of each possible reason): The EO is intended to discriminate on the basis of religion and in fact does so in violation of the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution. The EO is intended to unlawfully discriminate based upon race or ethnicity in violation of U.S. statutes or the 14th Amendment. The EO was adopted without observing the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The EO took effect prematurely because it was not duly published in the Federal Register for the time period required by law, or was otherwise insufficiently promulgated. The EO repeals other regulations currently in force in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The EO improperly disturbs the vested, albeit limited, rights of existing visa holders (or visa applicants) without due process of law, and/or in violation of unenumerated 10th Amendment rights. Refugee visa applicants under an already adopted regulation are entitled to an individualized consideration of their application as a matter of due process and the EO amounts to an ex post facto law as applied to people already in the application process under that regulation. The EO improperly deprives people who purchased non-refundable plane tickets in reasonable reliance of their visa rights which were not revocable under any law in place at the time those tickets were purchased of a property right in those plane tickets without compensation or due process of law under the 5th Amendment. The EO is void for vagueness as the ambiguities in its drafting makes it impossible to determine who is and is not affected by the EO and in what manner. There is a conflict in the immigration statutes between statutory provisions and treaty obligations related to refugees, and the regulation implementing a particular section of the immigration law's grant of regulatory authority, and the refugee protections must prevail. A person claiming to be a refugee has a due process right to individualized consideration of their circumstances, either by statute, by treaty, or under the constitution, which the EO does not respect. The treatment of dual citizens under the EO either is contrary to statutory immigration law or to a treaty or to the U.S. Constitution and customary international law. The EO violates one or more treaties between affected countries and the United States regarding immigration. The scope and terms of the EO exceed the authority granted to the President by the section of the immigration statutes relied upon for authority to pass the EO. The administration failed to articulate a rational basis for distinguishing between nations included in the ban and nations not included in support of the EO as required by the Administrative Procedures Act. There is no rational basis for distinguishing between nations included in the ban and nations not included as required by the U.S. Constitution (a much weaker test since it allows for post hoc rationalizations). Authority to implement the relevant section of the immigration law is vested in one or more officials at the United States Department of State, rather than the President directly, and none of those officials approved the EO. The military interpreters and their families may have a contract with the U.S. government as part of their employment that gives them a right to a visa, in which case the EO would be a law impairing contracts in violation of the U.S. Constitution, as applied to them. Some of the immigrants may need to accompany U.S. citizen children in order for the children to exercise the childrens' rights to enter the country and as applied the EO may violate the U.S. citizen childrens' rights. The CBP may be incorrectly interpreting the EO (which even the administration is not clear about) and therefore violating the law as applied because the EO does not actually authorize their action or because the way that they interpreted the EO was an abuse of their discretion. The manner in which the EO was implemented (e.g. long periods of time in handcuffs for civilians not accused of any crime and with no ability to foresee that they would be denied entry, separating young children from parents, etc.) may have been an unreasonable seizure as applied, even if detention per se was authorized. The 4th Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable in the manner that they are carried out even if the search or seizure is itself authorized by law. UPDATE February 2, 2017: A federal judge in California has found that at least some of these reasons have merit and has stayed the EO and set an expedited hearing and briefing schedule on whether the injunction against the EO should remain in force. UPDATE AND EPILOGUE June 28, 2018: The final version of the ban was ultimately upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Trump v. Hawaii on June 26, 2018 in a 5-4 decision. Litigation of the version of the ban in the OP was dismissed as moot when it was withdrawn and replaced with a similar but newer version of the EO. The four justices in the dissent rely on the first reason given, as did lower courts in the case and in parallel litigation. A core distinction between the majority and the dissent is the weight given by statements made by President Trump about the policy, and how much deference to give to the government's reasons for the policy offered up in court. Justice Neil Gorsuch, who cast a deciding vote in the case, took office April 10, 2017, after this answer and the first update to this answer were written. | Concerning the requirement to interview US workers before hiring workers for H-1B visas, this is covered in 8 USC §1182 (n)(1)(G)(i): (i) In the case of an application described in subparagraph (E)(ii), subject to clause (ii), the employer, prior to filing the application— (I) has taken good faith steps to recruit, in the United States using procedures that meet industry-wide standards and offering compensation that is at least as great as that required to be offered to H–1B nonimmigrants under subparagraph (A), United States workers for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought; and (II) has offered the job to any United States worker who applies and is equally or better qualified for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought. "Industry-wide standards" for the recruitment process typically means posting advertisements and conducting job interviews. Of course, if the company never intended to hire anyone but the H-1B candidate, that's not really "good faith", but this can be difficult for the feds to prove. Note that this requirement doesn't apply to all employers. Section (E)(ii) says that this rule only applies to those employers who are "H–1B-dependent" (which amounts to having a certain number of employees working under H–1B visas) and to those who have been caught willfully violating these rules within the past five years. I am unsure about the rules surrounding federal contracts, so folks should feel free to edit this answer to include such information. | The standard of proof for a criminal conviction is the same. So they would similarly need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the foreign national of a crime. But deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has a different standard of proof. (In deportation you also don't have criminal defendant rights like right to an attorney if you can't afford one.) I believe the standard is "clear and convincing evidence". | You don't need to "report" it to anyone in the US or do anything else. The US doesn't have any national registry of marriage. Any marriage or divorce conducted anywhere in the world is automatically recognized anywhere in the US (with some exceptions like polygamous marriages); the same is true in many other countries. How does the U.S. find out, for tax or insurance purposes? Obviously there's a little box that says [] Married but how would they know if I lied if I'm not registered in the United States? They don't, and don't need to. (The same is true for marriages in the US -- they don't directly "know".) You are required to use an appropriate filing status for your marriage status at the end of the year for each year's tax returns. If you don't, you are committing fraud. There are lots of things that you can intentionally lie about on tax returns, and they may not immediately "find out"; but when they do, you are in big trouble. Am I legally required to report it when I return? No. Would the Canadian/provincial government inform the U.S./state government? No. | I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case. | The only one I can find so far relates to a Brazilian citizen getting married abroad, called a: Consular Declaration of Civil Status These are issued by the Consular Authority to: Brazilian citizens who intend to marry before a foreign authority within their jurisdiction. The document is issued in English. Source: gov.br (I have yet to find if a comparable certificate is available in-country, for marriage or otherwise, but none of the official guidance sites I have trawled though mention it) | An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it. |
Why and how would shareholders pay fines for a company? Recently I read an article on a PG&E settlement which stated that PG&E shareholders would pay a $40 million fine and spend another $85 million Why is the fine being levied on PG&E shareholders? Isn't the owner of a share not supposed to be liable for company debts? Furthermore, how would this fine be carried out? Is every individual shareholder being sent a bill based on their percent ownership of the company? | They aren’t The journalist is attributing a payment by the company as a cost to the shareholders. In accounting terms, that’s a fair equivalency - the shareholder’s equity will fall by the amount of the liability. In legal terms, it isn’t - the company is a seperate legal entity from the shareholders and a payment by one is not a payment by the other, even though for each shareholder, the value of their shares will change. However, markets being what they are, the change in value is unlikely to be exactly the same as the amount the company pays, the value may even rise if the market expected the costs to be bigger than they are. They may rise even if the actual costs are bigger than the expectation - markets prefer certainty over uncertainty even in bad news. Of course, the bulk of the actual cost is likely to be borne by PG&E’s insurers. | If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it. What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing. | The court in France would not enforce a debt collection against you; but the person who owed you the money could - very easily. They would apply to the court in Scotland to enforce the judgement of the French court, the Scottish court would look at it, say "yup, the French court has made a decision", and then tell you to pay up. After that, the French company has the same range of options as a Scottish company would. I think (but I could be wrong), that the decision of the French court might well not go on your credit record - but the corresponding decision of the Scottish court would. Note that a CCJ doesn't go on your credit record if you pay within a short period (seven days?). In your case though, the right thing to do is Pay the amount you don't dispute you owe Wait for them to sue (they may well not). Defend the case (probably in writing, not in person). If you lose, pay up straight away (at this point the court has decided that you were wrong, and you do owe the money. As such you should pay.) | What you describe is forbidden by corporate law in every jurisdiction with which I'm familiar. I don't know the law in Quebec, but in principle: An entity in control of a corporation can't use that control to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of other shareholders. (If he does so through deceit then he is committing the common law tort of fraud, and quite likely a criminal offense.) A trustee or fiduciary that uses his control of assets to enrich himself at the expense of those to whom he owes a duty (e.g., minority shareholders) is guilty of various statutory offenses, among which may be "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" and "Fraudulent transfer." Sales of corporate assets in general must be done through an "arms-length" mechanism. If they are being auctioned off, and the auction isn't open, so that an insider is able to purchase them below "fair market value," then, once again, a fraud has been committed. The grading and remedies vary by jurisdiction. Of course, whether it's worth pursuing a remedy through legal action depends (as always) on: the amount at stake, the cost of pursuing the remedy, statutory allowances for punitive damages, the likelihood and cost of collecting on any judgement won. Only a lawyer familiar with the jurisdiction, the complaint, and the corporation's governing documents could help you answer that question. | We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances. | They can't simply keep the money; that's against the law. But in a situation like this, it's easy to get lost in the bureaucracy. The company may be in violation of different laws, re: For Your Information | United States Department of Labor, so you can try pointing this out in another email or letter. The threat of the Feds or other enforcement agency looking into the matter may make something happen. Or, try this: find the CEO (or a similarly high-ranked executive) on LinkedIn; many have open messaging in interest of good PR. Message/email them and carefully (and nicely) explain the situation. (A CEO will likely have an assistant monitoring their LinkedIn account. But, there are many stories of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos personally responding to emails.) Someone will make it happen and the employees who have not been helpful will be in hot water. | Non-Profits Need Not Have Owners But Must Have A Lawful Purpose Any non-profit company, for example, a 501(c)(3), is ownerless and can be run by a self-perpetuating board if desired, rather than having delegates that provide an outside source for new board members. In that case you have to set forth a purpose of the company or trust, to which its assets and profits must be used, and it must be managed in accordance with that purpose. You can also have a "private foundation" that is effectively ownerless, again with a designated charitable purpose. Generally speaking, the law limits how much compensation can be paid to officers and employees of such a company and restricts self-dealing transactions by such a company. You probably cannot create a valid trust or business with no beneficiaries and no designated charitable purpose which is supposed to merely accumulate its profits and assets. Ownerless Cooperatives Are An Oxymoron Your reference in this and other posts to an "ownerless cooperative" is basically an oxymoron. A cooperative is an entity owned by a class of people who have a contractual relationship with the entity (usually consumers or producers) who are the owners of the company with voting control and who are entitled to an adjustment of their transaction prices with the cooperative via a rebate or surplus check proportionate to the dollar volume of their dealings with the cooperative (Northwest Mutual, must rural electric companies, and most credit unions would be examples of consumer cooperatives, Ocean Spray is a good example of a producers cooperative). An ownerless entity is pretty much by definition not a cooperative. An excellent overview of forms of entity organization other than investor owned stock corporations can be found in The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. The Life Of The Law Is Not Math Or Logic Honestly, it sounds like, in your several posts on the subject, that you are attempting the hide the ball of an ulterior purposes which is material to the legality and organization of an entity. The law is not like science or mathematics. You can't prove a bunch of isolated propositions and then string them together logically. The law operates on an entire comprehensive "fact pattern" and even if every step of your chain of reasoning to an ultimately result is supported by legal authority, this does not mean that this will be the result you get when you put all of the pieces together. That kind of logical reasoning doesn't work in a legal context. The heading of this section is a paraphrase of a famous statement about the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. from "The Common Law" (1881) at page 1. Blockchains Are Not The Legal Innovation That They Claim To Be Using blockchain technology to manage "tokens" of voting control in an entity is ultimately completely irrelevant. Blockchain technology is just another alternative to certificated shares, shares kept on an ownership ledger, or shares kept through secondary shareholding intermediaries or brokers. The technology used to keep track of voting control or economic ownership is irrelevant, and some common entities (e.g. homeowner's associations) have ownership that is basically determined via a crude public blockchain called the county clerk and recorder's records. People who think that blockchains provide any significant legal innovation into anything (e.g. here) are fundamentally misguided and typically are not people familiar with the law who have misconceptions about how the law works. Also, contrary to the hype, blockchains are not fraud-proof and indeed, involve serious systemic risks of instability because an error in an old transaction can disrupt lots of current claims. Claims such as those made here that blockchain transactions are irrefutable are naive and basically false. A block chain is a bit like a real property record system without an adverse possession rule to make ancient glitches irrelevant. Moreover, blockchains are a solution to a non-problem. Authenticating ownership and voting rights, economic entitlements, and corporate actions is something that has never posed a very significant economic problem ever since writing was invented. These are economic problems that were already effectively solved in the days of the Minoans, and widespread ownership of well authenticated entities by numerous ever shifting groups of owners was a problem well in hand by the days of the British East India Company. Anonymous Ownership Or Contribution Records Are Illegal Truly anonymous ownership, however, is legally prohibited, even though ownership need not be made a matter of public record. In the case of for profit entities, by securities regulation which requires disclosure for purposes of exercising voting rights and for disclosing large blocks of ownership as required by law, and for purposes of tax law. In the case of non-profit entities, it is prohibited by virtue of laws regulating private foundations that impose tax requirements when certain concentrations of contributions come from a small, related group of people. In the case of political organizations, campaign finance laws require disclosure. | This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court. |
Can I freely roam on a government owned property, like a police station or a State Bank without permission from anyone? I wanted to know if the law allows us to freely move or trespass in a government owned property, especially like a police station or State Bank. I know that different countries will have different laws within their own state, but what would a general law say, which most of the countries adhere to? | Owners of property establish rules of trespass. This applies when the government owns the land just as it does for private property owners. Being a citizen of a country does not give you ownership rights on government land. The government is question can apply multiple rules to multiple pieces of property such as: Park use only during certain hours of the day No unauthorized access Access only for certain uses, such as no camping allowed Certainly no one thinks that military bases, prisons, etc. should have unrestricted access by the public. In general, if you're not allowed to be there the government will put up barriers, gates, lock doors, etc., or place signage to indicate limits. Really not all that different from private property. | Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions. | In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.) | In theory, this should be protected by the UN Dec. of Human Rights: Article 13 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Since it does not specify the type of movement, or restrict its dimensions, this could be construed to include freedom of movement through time as well as space. Other than that things like this there is no real law regarding this. | The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed. | There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door". | Are there any restrictions on the taxes or duties a U.S. state can levy? Yes. For starters, states may not use taxes or other means to impede the federal government in its constitutional exercises of power. This precedent stems from a case called McCulloch v. Maryland from 1819. In 1816, Congress established the Second Bank of the United States. Many states were not fans of this action. One of them, Maryland, established a tax on all notes of banks not chartered in Maryland. When the head of the Baltimore branch of the bank refused to pay the tax, litigation commenced and it was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. SCOTUS held that the Constitution grants implied powers to Congress that allow Congress to implement a national government using its express powers and state action may not interfere with such exercise of power. Taxation, of course, is just one way a state may attempt to interfere with federal power. Can states impose duties on goods that merely transit their territory? Generally no. The Commerce Clause bars states from implementing taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce or that put burdens on it by subjecting commercial activities to numerous or unfair taxation. The Due Process Clause complements this concept by requiring there be a definitive link between a state and the person, property, or transaction which it seeks to tax. This goes back to the SCOTUS decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona where the state enacted a law barring trains from operating in the state with more than 14 or 70 passenger or freight cars, respectively. The Court held that this was a substantial burden on interstate commerce because trains would need to be broken up before they passed through AZ. Also, you couldn't just stop on the tracks and "break up" the trains, so that had to be done at a stop before getting to AZ. The court determined that with this law, AZ effectively controlled the length of trains as far from its borders as El Paso and Los Angeles. The alternative was to operate all trains at the lowest level allowable by any state, which would lead to AZ dictating train lengths around the country. In determining the validity of the law or regulation, a court uses a balancing test to compare the burden on interstate commerce with the importance of the state interest (the AZ law was purportedly for safety reasons). | In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it. |
Is simple possession of a copyright-infringing item legal in the USA? There are quite a few laws in the USA (mostly at the Federal level) governing copyright and how to handle infringement. Most of these laws seem to establish criminal and/or civil liability for the act of copying rather than simple possession. So, my question is, if I have already come into possession of a tangible/physical item that violates copyright (e.g. a pirated video game cartridge, DVD, video tape, etc.), is there any law that creates civil or criminal liability for continuing to possess it? To be clear, I'm asking about bare possession, like keeping the item on my desk or something as a curiosity, rather than copying it further, importing it, exporting it, selling it, lending it, commercially exploiting it as part of a business venture, using it to assault a police officer, etc. As an analogy, most "illegal" drugs are illegal to simply possess. If I have some heroin in my desk drawer, that is illegal in itself even if I refrain from selling it to someone, shipping it across a border, etc. Is a copyright-infringing item similar to that or does the law only get involved when something else (e.g. further copying, sale, etc.) is done? Yes, it's possible that a law was broken in the acquisition of an infringing item. For the purposes of this question, that is irrelevant. In response to Nate Eldredge's comment, yes I am asking solely about bare possession. Maybe I plan to "play" or "load up" an infringing video game cartridge at some point in the indeterminate future, but what I care about now is whether I can be "busted" in the meantime just for having it or if a cause of action only arises when I play it. Of course, I am asking this as a hypothetical, and am interested in the theory of this rather than advice for any specific case or scenario. The problem I am having researching this is that a lot of actual court cases that seemingly involve possession of infringing items are actually about using or selling them. For example, physical shops selling pirated DVD's (which were actually a real thing 20 years ago) would occasionally get "busted" for selling the products or attempting to import them from whatever country it was that stamped them out by the dozen, not for simply having them on an upper shelf in the storeroom. | No, bare possession is not illegal under US law Nothing in Tile 17 of the US code (which is the copyright law) makes it illegal or even actionable to simply posses a single physical object (such as a game or a book) which constitutes a copyright infringement. Criminal copyright infringement is defined in 17 USC 506 and is limited to people who: Infringe for "purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain"; and Create infringing copies "which have a total retail value of more than $1,000" in a six-month period; or Infringe "by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution." However, in practice, the US Department of Justice only brings criminal copyright cases when infringement is carried on as a business, on a bulk or mass basis, and only when infringing copies are in fact distributed to the public. In practice the vast majority of copyright enforcement (both in the US and in other countries) is done by private suits by copyright owners or rights-holders. In the US such suits are generally to enforce the rights guaranteed in 17 USC 106. This protects six core rights (summarized): To make copies or phonorecords; To prepare derivative works; To distribute copies or phonorecords; To perform the copyrighted work publicly; To display the copyrighted work publicly; To perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. The copyright owner can do any of these or authorize other to do them. Anyone doing any of these without such permission is an infringer unless one of the exceptions or limitations in sections 107 thru 122 applies. There are also the "moral rights" specified in section 106A. These apply only to works of visual art in the US, and grant the artist the right to: Claim authorship of the work; Prevent the use of the person's name on any work s/he did not create; Prevent the use of the author's name on any work that has been changed so as to possibly harm the author's reputation; Prevent any "intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation"; and Prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature. Note that none of the six rights from sec 106 or the five moral rights from sec 106A covers possession of an infringing copy. One caution: so-called "first-sale rights" (from 17 USC 109) do not apply to an infringing copy, and it is infringement to knowingly sell, lend, rent or otherwise distribute an infringing copy. But the purchaser is not an infringer. Also, to play an infringing copy of a game might be a violation of the right to "publicly perform" the work, but not if done in private. However, in running a game it is likely that one or more temporary copies would be made. This is lawful if done from a lawful copy, but not if the person does not posses a lawfully-made copy. So playing an infringing copy of a game might well constitute an act of infringement, although a suit over a private act is unlikely. | It does not matter whether the document is authentic, because it is true, by law. Under copyright law, you must have permission of the copyright holder to copy any protected work (original creative work not created as a work of the US, as an example under US law). This is true whether or not the copyright holder tells you that copying requires permission. A matter for more concern is "false permission", where a person without the right to grant permission utters something that the courts would usually interpret as being "permission", for example releasing a Harry Potter book under CC-0. The legal requirement is that you have actual permission, not that a prohibition was not communicated to you. It is in your interest to know whether the actual person making available a work under some license actually has the right to grant a license. But there is no way to know for certain who holds copyright. You can, however, attempt to determine that a work has been registered with the US copyright office, looking here. Works are still protected when not registered, so failing to find a copyright registration does not guarantee that the work is "open access". It would tell you who the registered copyright holder is. There is no "innocent infringement" defense, but under §504(c)(2), your liability for statutory damages can be reduced to as little as $200, if you can prove that there were no indications that the work is protected. | It depends where you and your friend are and where the copyright was created. Ripping music for personal use is considered fair use/fair dealing in most jurisdictions. Having multiple copies/devices for personal use is OK too - practically, you can't watch more than one at a time unless you have a very unusual brain. If the intention is that both you and he would have and use copies then that is a violation. | This answer is limited to United States law. The situation in other countries is definitely different. Under United States law, the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has, as a right of the physical possession of that work, the right to the work's ordinary use. Licenses grant you additional rights such as the right to make derivative works, the right to make copies beyond what's needed for ordinary use, and so on. A pure license doesn't ask for anything in return, it just gives you new rights. Those rights may be conditional, but the conditions are just things you have to do to get new rights. They're not conditions imposed on any existing rights you had. A contract is an agreement between two parties. Both parties must agree to a contract for the contract to be enforceable. Contracts can take away rights you otherwise have. You don't need a license or contract to use a copyrighted work if you lawfully possess a copy of that work. Say you download a copy of a work covered by the GPL. You can refuse to accept the GPL license and you can still use that work. Why? Because no law prohibits you from doing so and there is no civil cause of action for using a lawful copy of a work under US law. But now say you want to give a copy of that work to your friend. This is illegal under US law because 17 USC 106 restrict that right to the copyright holder and there's no applicable exception since that's not part of the ordinary use. For a work covered by the GPL, the license offers to give you that right, a right you wouldn't otherwise have. It imposes conditions on you that are specifically in exchange for the grant of the new right. If you do accept the GPL, it functions as a contract. You got in exchange a right you didn't have before and if you don't comply with the GPL's terms, you don't have the copyright holder's permission to exercise those rights which is required under the law. By contrast, a click-through or EULA takes effect when you agree to it and such agreement is a condition for using the software. That's a pure contract and usually doesn't give you any rights you wouldn't have in the absence of such an agreement other than the use of the software. | Both the displayed site (including all text and images) and the html, css, javascript and other code that generates the display are protected by copyright. This is true in pretty much every country. You would not be able to reuse them lawfully without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. If no exception applies, and you have not obtained permission, this is copyright infringement. In most cases copyright infringement is treated as a tort (a civil matter), not as a crime. This means that law enforcement generally will take no action and have no interest in such a situation. The copyright owner could sue for infringement, and possibly collect money damages. In the US, statutory damages can be as high as $30,000, or up to $150,000 for "wilful" infringement, or as low as $750 (per work infringed). Or actual damages can be collected instead. In other countries, actual damages plus costs of suit are more likely, but the rule can be different in each country. The possible exceptions to copyright vary significantly in different countries. In the US the major exception is Fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? for more information In general short snippets of code can probably be used under fair use, but substantial parts of the code or the displayed site are less likely to qualify as fair use. And if it is illegal then why are there so many legal open source or paid software and applications for cloning of website like httrack, cyotek, webcopy etc? Most of these tools have legitimate uses, including learning how a site is constructed without distributing copied content; and cloning or partial cloning of a site with permission. Even if the tools were mostly used for unlawful copying, that might well not be a high priority for law enforcement, and cross-border law enforcement (which this in many cases would involve) is often much harder for the police and other authorities. | Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts. | Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test. | There's no "common law copyright" in the US. There's common law trademark, but copyrights and trademarks are different things. All copyright is based on federal copyright statutes, and an unregistered copyright is just called an unregistered copyright. What an unregistered copyright gives you is almost the same thing as a registered copyright: the exclusive right to exercise various rights (reproduction, distribution, public performance/display, etc.) Registration is required before you can actually file an infringement lawsuit, but it's OK if you only registered it after learning about the infringement. The main reason to register the work early is that you might be able to collect higher damages if it was registered before the infringement. If the work was unregistered when the infringement happened, you can only collect actual damages. If it was already registered, you can instead opt to collect statutory damages. Statutory damages don't require you to show actual loss; instead, the court awards between $750 and $30,000 per work based on what it considers fair. The lower limit can go down to $200 if the infringer had no reason to think they were infringing, and the upper limit can go up to $150,000 if the infringement was willful. You can also collect attorney's fees if it was already registered. In the comments, the question was raised of whether someone else might be able to register the copyright for your work before you and what would happen then. When I say "registration is required before filing a lawsuit," the requirement is that you submit the registration paperwork properly, pay the fee, and wait for the Copyright Office to act on the application. If they accept the registration, you're all set. Even if they refuse, though, you can still file an infringement claim -- you just have to also serve the head of the Copyright Office, who has the option of jumping into the case to argue about whether the work could legally be registered. You can also sue the Copyright Office to get judicial review of a denial under the Administrative Procedure Act (refusal still lets you file infringement lawsuits, but you can't get statutory damages or attorney's fees against an infringer unless the Copyright Office actually accepted the registration). |
How is posting fights involving minors not Illegal? If you visit r/DocumentedFights, r/fightporn and a few other sections of Reddit you see videos of Kids/Teenagers posted fighting a street fight as competitive sport (I dont even have words to describe it) and a lot of which are not even random incidents. Its more like a organized school fight. How is that even entertained by Reddit? I just find something wrong about any fight beyond competitive sports but these videos are more nauseous when the individuals fighting are kids. It looks like a ego trip for posters and some of the individuals involved in uploading in these videos. Even worse are people commenting or getting entertainment from these fights. I think the moderators and users of these sub-reddit are into fight porn which I don't have anything against but a line should be drawn where there is a doubt about the peoples age. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? | The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content | There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use. | Yes (probably), under COPPA The FTC has stated that YouTube content creators could be held liable under the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), a United States law that "imposes certain requirements on operators of websites or online services directed to children under 13 years of age, and on operators of other websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information online from a child under 13 years of age." (source) The FTC's FAQ on complying with COPPA notes that "operators will be held to have acquired actual knowledge of having collected personal information from a child where, for example, they later learn of a child’s age or grade from a concerned parent who has learned that his child is participating on the site or service." It also has the following question/answer (emphasis added): I operate a general audience video game service and do not ask visitors to reveal their ages. I do permit users to submit feedback, comments, or questions by email. What are my responsibilities if I receive a request for an email response from a player who indicates that he is under age 13? Under the Rule’s one-time response exception (16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(3)) you are permitted to send a response to the child, via the child’s online contact information, without sending notice to the parent or obtaining parental consent. However, you must delete the child’s online contact information from your records promptly after you send your response. Assuming the FTC is correct that content creators (not just the service itself) are responsible for COPPA compliance, a Discord server administrator would likely be required to ban/delete the account of a user upon discovering (acquiring actual knowledge) that the user is under 13. It may be a defense that they believed the user's retraction and claim that it was a lie, but I wouldn't want to be stuck arguing that in court (an underage user who doesn't want to be banned certainly would have a good reason to lie about their age upon finding out that they would be banned for having admitted their actual age). | The non-cougher committed an unjustified assault, and could be arrested or sued for his actions. The actions were clearly not the minimal level of force needed to prevent continued assault or to effect an arrest (the dude who entered and coughed clearly is guilty of assault). This is regardless of covid. Instead, the other guy decided to beat on the first punk. The courts might retaliate against the cougher by fining him or sending him to prison: that is what the law is all about (putting the use of force under the control of laws, not individual emotion). It would be legal to use some degree of force to arrest the guy, and it would be legal to use some degree of force to prevent the guy from continuing with his assault. The puncher was not engaged in self-defense, because there was no credible continuing threat and his response was way over the top. The particular response here, vigilante justice, was disproportionate, and not justified by the circumstances. A police officer might have arrested both of them, had one been present (but police have discretion, so he might have gone with the "you started it" theory). Legally, they were both wrong. | This has yet to be specifically decided in the federal courts. The Post Office can set "rules of conduct" for its facilities. Prohibiting photographing is plainly a restriction on one's First Amendment rights, and it is established beyond question that a government cannot issue / enforce a blanket prohibition of public photographing. Someone would have to take a case to court to determine whether this limitation on First Amendment rights passes the relevant level of judicial scrutiny. The rationale (as set forth by the USPS) is that such photographing may be "disruptive". One can perhaps analogize the right to film police with a new-found right to film post office, following from a right to public oversight over the government. DHS gives general guidance of its own (with a pile of redacted stuff), directing you to 41 CFR 102-74.420. Permission is thus required, until the courts find that to be an unconstitutional restriction (I would not expect there to be such a finding). But it is not unthinkable that the courts could at some point so rule. The YouTube aspect of the question is irrelevant: if you have the right, you have the right, and it doesn't derive from nor is it blocked by an intent to distribute on YouTube. | Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case. | SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand. | As a practical matter, if you learn that people are gathering around a street racing event, leave. In all likelihood, you should do the same if you learn that people are gathering around a cockfighting event, a duel, a staged fight between people outside of a licensed boxing or fighting event, or any other illegal contest. Rather than worrying about the precise contours of these laws, avoiding this situations is the safest rule for your personal safety from other participants and from authorities. |
Is it illegal for a school to take photos of children during online classes? Consider a situation where some students are required to turn on the camera during online classes - my question is: If a student's facial image is collected during online classes, is parental consent required prior to collecting it in the United States? | There is no generally applicable law that that effect in the United States, although, of course, there are laws in fifty different states, plus the District of Columbia and U.S. territories, that I have not comprehensively reviewed, and particular school districts might have policies of their own. Such a picture would probably be considered an "educational record" for purposes of a federal law known as the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) (the definition is set forth below), so sharing this collected picture outside the school might pose an issue in some circumstances as a violation of federal educational privacy laws. But merely collecting images during class and using them for internal purposes of the school would not violate these laws. Also, there is no private cause of action (right to sue) under FERPA and, in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Gonzaga University v. John Doe that students and parents may not sue for damages under 42 USC § 1983 to enforce provisions of FERPA. As an FAQ on the subject explains: Q. What penalties apply to the misuse or improper disclosure of confidential information? A. The penalty for noncompliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA) can be withdrawal of U.S. Department of Education funds from the institution or agency that has violated the law. This applies to schools, school districts, and state education agencies. The Family Policy Compliance Office of the U.S. Department of Education, charged with reviewing and investigating complaints, seeks to promote voluntary compliance with the law. A third party who improperly discloses personally identifiable information from student records can be prohibited from receiving access to records at the education agency or institution for at least 5 years. State laws on privacy may also apply penalties. . . . Q. What are the consequences of a third party’s misuse of education records? A. School officials must inform third parties receiving information, as allowed under FERPA, of the requirements concerning redisclosure of information. If a third party is found to have improperly redisclosed personally identifiable information from education records, the school may not allow that third party access to information for at least 5 years. If the school releases these records to third-parties as a matter of policy, without parental consent, at most, parents might either seek prospective injunctive relief barring the school from engaging in that conduct in the future in a declaration that the policy violates FERPA, or make a complaint to the U.S. Department of Education. An educational records are defined for purposes of FERPA (paraphrasing) as follows: FERPA Defines an Education Record Education records include a range of information about a student that is maintained in schools in any recorded way, such as handwriting, print, computer media, video or audio tape, film, microfilm, and microfiche. Examples are: Date and place of birth, parent(s) and/or guardian addresses, and where parents can be contacted in emergencies; Grades, test scores, courses taken, academic specializations and activities, and official letters regarding a student's status in school; Special education records; Disciplinary records; Medical and health records that the school creates or collects and maintains; Documentation of attendance, schools attended, courses taken, awards conferred, and degrees earned; Personal information such as a student's identification code, social security number, picture, or other information that would make it easy to identify or locate a student. Personal notes made by teachers and other school officials that are not shared with others are not considered education records. Additionally, law enforcement records created and maintained by a school or district's law enforcement unit are not education records. Part of the education record, known as directory information, includes personal information about a student that can be made public according to a school system's student records policy. Directory information may include a student's name, address, and telephone number, and other information typically found in school yearbooks or athletic programs. Other examples are names and pictures of participants in various extracurricular activities or recipients of awards, pictures of students, and height and weight of athletes. Each year schools must give parents public notice of the types of information designated as directory information. By a specified time after parents are notified of their review rights, parents may ask to remove all or part of the information on their child that they do not wish to be available to the public without their consent. U.S. school districts, in carrying out this FERPA mandate, typically request parental consent to share images of children attending a school with third parties as part of their usual annual enrollment paperwork for children attending the school. And, almost all but a a handful of parents usually consent in this context as a matter of course. The only other fairly widely recognized state common law or statutory right that is closely on point is the right of publicity - i.e. the right to receive fair market value compensation for commercial use of a person's image, for example, in connection with an advertisement. Even this right isn't uniformly available in every U.S. jurisdiction and would not limit non-commercial use of a child's photo by the school. Also, whether the school was public or private would matter. Public schools are eligible to claim governmental immunity to many kinds of claims that could arise in tort from an alleged privacy violation, but have more governmental rules and regulations to comply with than a private school (if it receives no federal funds, it doesn't even have to follow FERPA). There is not a widely recognized common law or statutory right apart from FERPA to not have your image (or your children's images) shared publicly without their consent in the United States (although sometimes a special situation may apply in the case of a particular child, if, for example, the child is in a witness protection program, or is the subject to a protective order imposed due to threats from a parent's ex-spouse, for example). Also, a private school could almost always make a of waiver legal publicity rights (if they exist at all) in its enrollment materials mandatory for all students. But, because attendance at a public school is mandatory (or more correctly, mandatory as a matter of last resort if the student can't arrange adequate private schooling or home schooling), a public school has less freedom to require parents of students to waive any legal rights that they do have as a condition of participating in mandatory school activities. European Union laws and regulations regarding data privacy would not apply to this fact pattern if the students and school are all located in the United States, despite a global internet medium of international commerce that is used to facilitate this domestic educational activity. | School districts / states do generally have the power to set the curriculum including the viewpoint that will be officially conveyed. One well-known major restriction on such viewpoint restrictions is that the schools cannot restrict the free exercise of a religion, and cannot take a position on a religion. Apart from the religion third-rail, schools have pretty free reign in setting the curriculum, see Evans-Marshall v. Tipp City for one instantiation. In this case, the teacher assigned various books, including Heather Has Two Mommies, one of the books that prompted an outcry. The upshot of that case is that a teacher cannot invoke the First Amendment to override policy. This article (draft version, easier to handle) (published version, annoying footnote structure) reviews the topic, and section III covers prior cases. It notes that the cases of Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell do not address the constitutionality of these education laws, though the reasoning in the prior cases might be applicable if there were a suit over curriculum. There is an implication that some of these rules have been enforced in the past, but most of the evidence is in the form of news stories (Beall v. London City School BOE is not available in the open). The article does engage in a somewhat deeper study of enforcement in Utah, where it was enforced (until it was repealed). Enforcement is necessarily indirect. The law require school districts to have a particular curriculum; violation would come when an individual teacher taught contrary to the prescribed curriculum. Those laws do not contain any provision like "a teacher who violates these rules gets fired", instead, punishment is via the general rule that you have to teach what is in the state-mandated curriculum. Rather than officially terminating a teacher for violating this curricular guideline, districts use vague reasons for non-renewal such as "due to problems with communication and teamwork" (from Evans-Marshall). | Per your comment responses, Maryland is a two party consent state which means that the other party must consent to your recording IF there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In one's own home is generally considered a place where one has this expectation and thus these recordings are problematic. Depending what you intend to do with them, I would first contact a lawyer to get legal advice as to how to handle this before you publish them. If you are looking to file a criminal complaint (and assuming statute of limitations hasn't run out) the prosecutor may be willing to not prosecute you for violating 2 party consent law because you were trying to gather evidence of someone else's crime, but it's not a guarantee (though this will look bad on the prosecutor come election season). If you are suing your parents it might not be admissible as evidence but I can't specifically say that either. If you are using it to show other people in the same situation what to look for it's probably best to find another set of recordings as these ones carry a lot of legal issues that will come back to bite you if you release them. Finally, while not legal, your parents may not want to pursue the criminal recording side of this matter if they are aware of the "Barbra Streisand effect," wherein actions taken to ensure something isn't viewed by the public cause that something to gain wider viewership than if they never bothered trying to censor it. | Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred. | One relevant US law is Title 18 Chapter 110. Using real children in porn is against the law, as is most anything connected to it (permitting children to do it, distributing, buying...). Under the definitions (18 USC 2256(1)) “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years. The possible hook for cartoons is via the definition of “child pornography” which is any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— ... (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. My guess is that hentai doesn't satisfy this definition, since I hear that the characters in a cartoon don't actually look like real people. However: there are also general laws against obscenity in some jurisdictions, and in US v. Whorley, it was held that you can still be convicted of receiving obscene material (Japanese child porn cartoons) – SCOTUS refused to hear an appeal. Most cases that are prosecuted also involve real child porn, or plea bargaining. In light of Whorley, it hasn't been definitively determined that hentai is against the law, but the first step has been taken. | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. | You cannot be compelled to sign a form indicating that you agree to something. However, your lack of agreement does not override a policy that they have authority to set. There is a contractual way that this could work out for them, depending on what exactly the document is. To be a contract, the parties must agree to the terms voluntarily, and if you do not agree to the terms, there is no contract. A 10 year old child cannot be bound to a contract, anyhow, so the child's consent is legally irrelevant, though strategically a good idea in the sense of alerting the child to their obligation. To be a contract, both sides must offer something that they are not already obligated to provide. What is the school offering? On the school's side, they might claim "We offer an education", but as a public school, they already have that obligation. Schools have broad authority to impose rules in order to operate, so in lieu of a successful lawsuit that the district overstepped their authority and violated someone's constitutional rights, the school could have a policy prohibiting use of a cell phone in school. Paired with such a policy, they can grant conditional permission, subject to the parent (and symbolically, the child) agreeing to certain terms. Since they are not obligated to allow cell phones at all, they are offering something of value to you, and you have a contract. The cell phone owner could try suing the school for keeping the phone, but the suit would fail because there was a breach of the contract. A strategy probably not worth pursuing is arguing that the confiscation clause is unconscionable (which would void the contract, which entitles the child to have a cell phone at school). Confiscating the phone is not theft, since the intent is not to permanently deprive the owner of their property (just as it is not theft when you have to leave guns or recording devices at the security desk). If a student were to take a forbidden thing without the owner's authorization (such as a gun, or a phone) and it was then confiscated, the rightful owner might be able to sue the school – as long as their hands are clear (if they had no knowledge that the thing was taken and used in an unauthorized manner). In this case, the parent clearly knows and authorizes. | what the law says about a person sending nude photos to a 10 year old child. The pictures are of her mom. This is a felony under Australian law and comes under the umbrella of Child sexual assault. The following quotes are from Statutory definitions of child sexual abuse, from the Australian State and Federal Governments. From the legislation for Northern Territory: Care and Protection of Children Act 2007 Exploitation of child Exploitation of a child includes sexual and any other forms of exploitation of the child. Without limiting subsection (1), sexual exploitation of a child includes: (a) sexual abuse of the child; and (b) involving the child as a participant or spectator in any of the following: (i) an act of a sexual nature; (ii) prostitution; (iii) a pornographic performance. This type of abuse would also constitute Child Sexual Abuse and Child abuse generally. The person is also calling the child's mom a whore and talking about sexually explicit acts he is doing From the legislation for Australian Capital Territory: Children and Young People Act 2008 In this Act: "abuse", of a child or young person, means- .../... (d) emotional abuse (including psychological abuse) if- (i) the child or young person has seen or heard the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a person with whom the child or young person has a domestic relationship, the exposure to which has caused or is causing significant harm to the wellbeing or development of the child or young person; .../... |
Open source rocket development Is it possible to collaborate openly (publicly) world-wide with others to develop a suborbital/orbital capable rocket/launcher and to publish the resulting know-how (both software and hardware)? There are laws that restricts exports of arms (ITAR in US, similar in EU) which may apply to publishing such info. It looks like ITAR does not care about information that is publicly available (ITAR paragraph 120.11) but I am not sure if I understand it correctly. Can someone confirm? These questions may be related: ITAR tag on Space Exploration SE Trade restrictions on open source software Do international sanctions have an impact on Open Source Software? Why can't I ask my question about amateur space projects and development? | It’s perfectly legal for private individuals and organisations to develop rockets Just like it’s legal for them to develop aircraft or motor vehicles. Space X, Boeing and BMW are all private organisations. While any of these could be used as weapon delivery systems, they aren’t weapons. There are a bunch of laws and regulations that they must comply with, but that’s true of any business. | Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark. | Bulgaria is one of many countries in which intellectual property can be protected with a single international patent filing, in lieu of a Bulgarian specific filing. In generally, you should assume that any patented idea likely to have international application, such as Internet based software, which is patented in the U.S. is also the subject of international patent protection, unless you specifically know that this is not the case. Virtually all patent lawyers know how to make this filing and most would recommend doing so in this case. So, yes, it is something you should worry about, and the better practice, by far, would be to obtain permission from the patent owner if the app is likely to have any meaningful commercial value. Now, if you were sued, there is a good chance that it would be in Bulgarian courts under Bulgarian patent law, which may be somewhat less harsh in some respects like damages awards than U.S. patent law. But, the basis for patent liability for an infringement in Bulgaria would be very similar. | You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey. | The short answer: No license is required in any U.S. jurisdiction to buy a firearm magazine. There are some jurisdictions that restrict the sale of "high-capacity" magazines to civilians. That's something that is changing often enough that any answer covering the U.S. will probably quickly be obsolete. Suffice it to say: If you can find it in a store there are no legal restrictions or conditions on purchasing it. Technically an "export" license might be required under ITAR to take magazines out of the country, but in practice this has not yet applied to individuals carrying low-tech small-arms accessories (in quantities reasonable for an individual's use). | Anything that helps you with your business and that you keep secret is a trade secret. The "keeping it secret" is an important part. Competitors are free to discover the same information themselves and use it, but stealing it from you is illegal. If a contractor needs to learn this information to do their job, you make them sign a non-disclosure agreement or confidentiality agreement which forbids them to pass that information on. That way, it remains a trade secret. If the contractor gives your trade secrets away, that is breach of contract and you can sue for damages. If a competitor pays your contractor to give them your trade secrets, that's not just illegal, it's criminal. On the other hand, if the contractor puts the information on his blog for example where everyone can read it, without having been enticed by someone to do this, then I believe your trade secret is gone and competitors can use it. Same as if you left documents on a park bench and your competitor finds them and reads them. You have to keep a trade secret a secret; if you fail to do so you lose. Asked about patents: If there is a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement in place, then nobody can apply for a patent. The whole idea of a patent is that you get legal protection in exchange for disclosing your invention. Applying for a patent would mean violation of the non-disclosure agreement. | Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk. | The problem is that open source licenses incl AGPL have legal force because copyright prevents copying + modifying software by default (software is treated as a “literary work” and therefore enjoys copyright protection). But copyright on datasets and ML models is very different – if it is even recognized at all. Thus, similar copyleft techniques would only work in particular jurisdictions. For example, the EU recognizes “database rights”. A copyleft license that accounts for this is CC-BY-SA-4.0, meaning that in an EU context, databases based on the original database would have to use the same license. However, database rights are not recognized in the US (facts are not copyrightable, and the “sweat of the brow” doctrine is not recognized). Thus, the CC-BY-SA-4.0 license would not have any copyleft effect with respect to databases in an US context. Independently of copyright in the database as a whole, the data in the database might be copyrighted material, for example if the database contains text or images, complicating matters further. Machine learning models derived from a data set are much more difficult. Clearly, ML models that have been trained are not a creative work and are therefore not eligible for independent copyright protection. At most, it can be argued that the model is an automatically transformed version of the input data, so that copyright in the input data implies copyright in the model.1 Perhaps hyperparameter choices could reflect some creative input. This is very much an active topic of debate. Given this uncertainty, it would be impossible to create a public license that works reliably. 1. An interesting discussion topic is the potential effect on Microsoft's Copilot ML model which was also trained on GPL-licensed source code. Instead of deriving force from copyright law, it would be possible to impose conditions via a contract, i.e. EULA-like terms that only provide access to the material after the terms have been accepted. But again, this is difficult. Contract law differs wildly between jurisdictions. For example, a contract is defined by the “meeting of minds” in some jurisdictions; by offer, acceptance, and consideration in others. But how does such a contract ensure appropriate consideration? How can acceptance be ensured if the material is publicly available? For these reasons, I think that unless broad international agreement emerges about IP protections for machine learning models, such a copyleft system for ML models is impossible. It is worth noting that the lack of such protections is probably quite good for innovation and research, since researchers are free to improve each other's work without legal concerns. The idea of copyleft is a hack to subvert the “everything is forbidden by default” system of copyright, but “everything is allowed by default” might be better.2 2. To continue the Microsoft Copilot example: some copyleft advocates like Bradley M Kuhn are sceptical about Copilot's GPL compliance, but remind us that copyleft maximalism means copyright maximalism, and that this is not the goal of open source. https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/feb/03/github-copilot-copyleft-gpl/ |
Can a dispute resolution clause be set aside? In relating to an international contract that includes a provision that in 'All dispute in relation to user agreements will be referred to California by Arbitration My question : If the disputes also involves an offence or a breach of law in a jurisdiction out side California , say United Kingdom , which is the place where the other aggrieved contractual party resides. can the clause be set aside ? | The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK. | Can a moderation team in a game extend a ban that you have just because they want to TL;DR Yes and no. It's their platform and you broke the rules that you agreed to. Therefore, you forfeited your right to use the service for as long as they deem appropriate up to and including forever. In exercising this power they must act reasonably which, in the absence of anything in the contract (and I can't see anything) means that their response must be proportionate and offer you procedural fairness. It's possible that they haven't done this - it may even be likely. However, in order to have this overturned, clause 24 of the EULA requires you to take the dispute to arbitration. Clause 24.4 sets out how to initiate this. | Your rights1 in a country depend on that country's laws with respect to aliens (foreigners). While you may expect some standards where countries have obligations under international law, a sovereign state is free to legislate with respect to aliens as it wishes. The short answer? You don't have British rights when you travel abroad, and the same is true for any person who travels internationally. But each country may afford certain rights and privileges to foreigners, especially those who are in the country legally. 1. Let's call them effective rights, because there's been a lot of (accurate) talk about you retaining your UK rights when you travel. Though this may be true, your experience overseas is going to really come down to the rights that the country that you are in recognises. Your responsibilities as a UK citizen, however, may continue even if not recognised by the country you are in by virtue of extraterritorial legislation. | What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes | The divorce under Florida, USA, law, will be recognised in the UK and have legal effect. Under the Family Law Act 1986 an overseas divorce obtained by means of judicial or other proceedings is recognised in the UK only if: it is effective under the law of the country in which it was obtained; and at the relevant date (that is, the date on which proceedings were begun), either party was either habitually resident or domiciled in that country or was a national of that country. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-divorces-set13/overseas-divorces-set13 You may need to take additional steps in the UK as a Florida divorce certificate may not be familiar to organisations who need to be told of your divorce. Obtaining recognition of your foreign divorce in the UK can be extremely complex and we strongly advise anyone who is unsure to contact a legal professional in the UK to ensure their overseas divorce is valid and there could be no repercussions down the line. https://www.nelsonslaw.co.uk/foreign-divorce-valid-england/ | The US has jurisdiction because the systems that the accused allegedly attacked are in the US. To use an example with older technology, you can't escape criminal liability for defrauding someone in one country simply because you did so through the mail or by telephone from another country. The UK and the US have an extradition treaty. The UK might refuse to extradite the accused; in that case the US would most likely complain loudly. If too many extradition requests are refused on one side, the other side might start limiting cooperation in any of several areas. | The existence of a law/legal system is the province of sovereign states. We do not have a world government so there is no world legal system. There is such a thing as international law, however, that is based on what the sovereign nations of the world agree is international law (usually in a treaty) and the degree to which they have implemented them in domestic law. For example, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over US nationals because the United States of America has refused to ratify the treaty that created it. There are also supra-national entities like the EU whose directives are binding on their member states and such states are required, as a condition of their membership, to enforce such directives domestically. A sovereign state's courts will decide when a person and their activities falls within their jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an Australian citizen can be prosecuted in Australia for paying a bribe to a foreign official in a foreign country even while working on behalf of a foreign company even if such activity is locally lawful. Why? Because Australia is a sovereign nation and it says it can. Sometimes it is impossible for a person to comply with the laws of multiple nations. For example, if the EU requires that certain data about their citizens is to be made confidential but the laws of the USA require a US corporation to disclose this information then it is impossible to comply with both. A person in such a position must decide which laws they will break. It is partly for that reason that multi-national corporations are usually multiple corporations i.e. they have a different corporate subsidiary in each jurisdiction (tax is another reason). For example, if all EU citizens do business with Google (Europe) then Google (USA) can rightfully claim that it has no data about European citizens to disclose. | I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract. |
Is citizenship a requirement to become a prosecutor/ judge in the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand? As I am currently pursuing a law degree in International and European law, I was looking at job opportunities in English-speaking countries. I know the basic (technical/ academic) requirements to become a prosecutor or a judge in each of those countries, however, I had a very hard time finding any information on the citizenship requirement for those higher legal positions. So, for each of those countries mentioned above, is it a requirement have citizenship of that country in order to be eligible for a position of a judge or a prosecutor? | new-zealand is it a requirement have citizenship of that country in order to be eligible for a position of a judge or a prosecutor? No. Technically, you don't even need to be a permanent resident — you can be just on a temporary work visa. However, while that practically won't pose a problem to become a prosecutor, it may well be de-facto impediment to become a judge. Whereas the eligibility requirements for judges (District Court, Senior Courts) say nothing about citizenship, practically who becomes a judge is decided just by one person — the Attorney-General, whose head is not transparent and who knows what considerations are entertained in it. Prosecutors in NZ can be split into 3 categories: Crown prosecutors — lawyers working for the Crown. Just become a lawyer and get a job at the Crown office. This is how many defence lawyers start their careers — get experience putting people in jail on behalf of the Crown, then jump on the other side and make heaps of money by keeping them out of jail. Eventually you may be invited to be a judge; Other public prosecutors — not necessarily even lawyers — Police, Ministry for Children, Work Safe, local governments/councils etc. If not lawyers, they still can conduct judge-alone/bench (not jury) trials; Private prosecutors. Any lawyer can do this for their clients. (In fact, just anybody can be a private prosecutor for themselves, but this is not a paid job of course). | Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one. | Does this mean that anyone who is born in the US is automatically a US citizen, whether they want it or not? Yes (subject to a couple of exceptions, namely the children of diplomats with full immunity and the children of a hostile foreign occupier). Or does this amendment just offer the possibility of requesting citizenship? In other words: is there an action to be made in order to become a US citizen when born in the US (and therefore one is not before this action is performed)? No. For someone who falls under the 14th amendment's citizenship clause, the only way to avoid being a US citizen is to relinquish or renounce it, which generally means that one is stuck with the US citizenship for at least 18 years. Most countries' citizenship laws, or at least all of those with which I am familiar, operate this way—automatically—for "normal" cases of acquisition of citizenship by virtue of the circumstances of birth. This is true whether the citizenship derives from the place of birth or from the parents' citizenship. | Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction. | Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer. | An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it. |
How different does something have to be so it doesn't infringe on a copyright? I'm an engineer and I wanted to make a toy for my 3 year old daughter for Christmas. She loves Little Einsteins but since that was 12 years ago, they don't really make many of the toys anymore. Any that are still available are held by collectors and sell at a premium ($100+ for a smaller one). I wanted to make her Leo's baton as that is her favorite character. I have a 3D printer and making something like that won't be an issue. My idea is making something that resembles it physically but not identically and has a few buttons that will play a couple of soundbites from the show when pressed (the baton on the show does not do that). It won't have any logos, iconography, or anything tying it to the show on the outside. If it's a legal issue, I can just change the soundbites to something generic but it would mean more to her for it to be a Little Einsteins thing. Will the physical likeness itself be a possible enfringement? This isn't something I would be selling or making money off of and since they aren't produced, the toy isn't easy to come by. NB: if I'm not stepping on any toes and make it as described for my daughter, could I document the build and put it online (a blog or social media)? Could I share the 3D model* on a website under the Creative Commons License (no money or anything is gained)? I'm sorry if this seems like a dumb question, I'm not familiar with copyright law and I don't want to get myself in any trouble. *Models are required for 3D printing | There are two aspects in which similarity enters the infringement analysis: As evidence of copying, and When determining whether what was copied was enough to be infringement Let's take it for granted that you've based your item off of Leo's baton. So, your question is about similarity at the second stage, after copying has been established. All US courts use "substantial similarity" as the test for this stage. (This can be confusing, because some courts use the same phrase for the amount of similarity required in the first stage, to establish that copying happened). Substantial similarity can arise even when taking only a small percentage of the original, especially if you've taken the "heart" of the work. (Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 471 U.S. 539 (1985) - where 300-400 words of a 7500 word manuscript were taken). Various circuits have developed their own specific tests that juries should use to assess substantial similarity. In the 9th Circuit, two cases that highlight their approach to similarity between works of art are: Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.1977) Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440 (9th Cir.1991) Krofft established a two-part test that separates idea and expression, such that copyright in a piece of art would not preclude people from taking that idea, but would protect the particular expression. You are not prohibited from making a baton, even if your inspiration was Leo's baton. However, if you take too much of the particular expression of Leo's baton, that crosses into substantial similarity. Whether you've taken too much is a question for the jury. "There is no special standard of similarity required in the case of 'things'." Pasillas uses the Krofft test to judge whether two masks are substantially similar. Given that both parties conceded that their works both shared the same idea, the court could skip to "whether the masks' expressions of that idea are substantially similar". But, it incorporated elements of another line of cases that further precluded a finding of infringement when expression necessarily follows from idea. [w]hen idea and expression coincide, there will be protection against nothing other than identical copying of the work no substantial similarity may be found under the intrinsic test where analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities in expression arise from the use of common ideas elements of expression that necessarily follow from the idea receive no copyright protection the court concluded that the similarities between the toy dinosaurs — their postures, body designs, and cuddly softness — all derived from the idea of a stuffed toy dinosaur, and accordingly found no substantial similarity of expression all of these similarities derive from the common idea of a mask depicting the man in the moon. Pasillas simply cannot rely on these standard elements to satisfy the intrinsic test of substantial similarity of expression When creating a baton, there are certain elements of the expression that are inseparable from or are standard elements of the idea. It needs to be narrow. It is standard to have a handle. The handle is often a different color. In summary: Just because you saw the baton, and decided to make a baton based on what you saw, that isn't necessarily infringement. If you take too much of the particular expression of Leo's baton, that will be infringement. The answer to that question is case-by-case, and left to the jury. "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the idea, and has borrowed its expression. Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." - Judge Learned Hand | I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.) | Public domain means that there is no (longer) copyright in the given work. This means that all rights associated with copyright are not controlled by anyone and there is no way to run afoul of copyright laws (note that in some countries a true "public domain" doesn't exist). Assuming you're correct that these works are in public domain, answers to your particular questions are: Does that mean I can play the video's as much as I want to any size crowd I wanted? Could I charge money to watch the videos? Yes and yes. If something is in the public domain does that mean all the parts of that thing are? This kind of begs the question. A work in public domain has no copyright in it. If one of its part has copyright, then it's not really public domain is it? What about the characters in the videos, could I make a new Bugs Bunny or Might Mouse animation on my own? If I wanted to use Popeye or Betty Boop or daffy duck in a video game could I? Copyright isn't your issue here, trademarks are. The characters are most likely trademarked, meaning you generally can't use them in your own works without licensing. | Not copyright as such because that is about protecting a 'work' — a voice is not a 'work'. As the court said in one of the following examples, "A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed.'" (You could copyright a roar or a yell — some kind of fixed arrangement of sound(s).) But some jurisdictions have recognised property rights in voices and/or that the voice is protected by the person's 'right of publicity' (the right to control the commercial exploitation of their identity, of which the voice is a part). For example: Bette Wins Ruling In ‘Sound-Alike’ Lawsuit - AP News June 23, 1988 SAN FRANCISCO (AP) _ A federal appeals court has reinstated a lawsuit filed by entertainer Bette Midler after an advertising agency allegedly tried to duplicate her voice and singing style in one of its ad campaigns. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously ruled Wednesday that Midler could pursue her suit against the Ford Motor Co. and the Young & Rubicam advertising agency. The court said certain personal attributes - such as a voice - can be considered property rights, protected by state law. ... U.S. District Judge Ferdinand Fernandez said Young & Rubicam acted like ″the average thief″ but dismissed Midler’s suit, saying no law prohibits imitation of a singer’s voice. But the appeals court disagreed. "A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face,″ the appeals court said. ″When a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs." judgment in Midler v Ford Another case in the US is Waits v Frito-Lay Inc. The US Court of Appeal found that a radio commercial's imitation of the voice of Tom Waits constituted a civil tort, "voice misappropriation". I'm not aware of any cases involving computer synthesis of voices. | There seems, to my ear, to be a degree of similarity between the first two works. The third does not sound, to me, very similar to either of the first two. That is not a legal question, and I am no expert. However, all of these seem to be simple themes of only a few notes, repeated, in one case with some variations. The history of music is replete with examples of short themes or figures duplicated without intentional copying. Generally, to win a copyright suit over a claimed infringement of a musical copyright one must show either proven direct copying, or identity of melody over a long enough passage that independent invention is not plausible. Normally access of the alleged infringer to the claimed source is also shown. How much identity is needed is a judgement call for the court involved, often based on expert testimony, but I rather doubt if the short themes linked in the question would be found to infringe one another. In any case, even if identity is proved, it is possible that both are copying some earlier source, perhaps one in the public domain, or one properly licensed. It is also possible that one of thee has obtained a license from another and so is perfectly legal. There is no way to know without the records of those involved. | If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes. | You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright. | Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board. |
If work done by Chanakya, like Chanakya Niti, is in the public domain, then how can some people publish and sell books? I want to make an Android app based on Chanakya Niti for that I definitely need a source. I have a book for that but my confusion is that it says you can't copy the content in any form. How can any publisher claim copyright on the teachings of person who lived in India centuries ago? The confusion is that many people are saying that it's in the public domain so you can make an app, but the source books are saying you can't copy the content. The second confusion is that a few people have said that you can't make money out of it, but the developers are already making money by monetizing their app. I want to make more money by putting it in the "in app-purchases" category, so why can't I do that? | The author of the book may have a copyright, because he created a new piece of work from the/a original work. For example, by translating it in another language or in a modernized language, by rearranging the content, by adding images or commentaries etc. You will therefore have to find a book or other source that is not or not anymore copyrighted. | Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them. | You can read it, you can examine it to the point where you understand it, and then you can get inspired by the code and write your own code, without copying the code on the website, which does the same thing. If there is no license, then you can do what copyright law allows you to do. You are not allowed to copy the code, or create derived works by taking the code and modifying it. | Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue. | You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license. | This sounds completely incorrect to me. First, subsequent research is not normally a "derivative work" for the purpose of copyright, since copyright doesn't protect your ideas but only the particular form in which you have expressed those ideas. Second, as the owner of the copyright, you can permit anyone to make any sort of copy or derivative work, or sell, assign, or license the ability to do so to other parties, without regard to whether the work has been published. The real reason that nonpublication of your work would stifle further research is that researchers will not have access to it. | You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders. | Works enter the public domain after ... years from publication. In the United States, this is incorrect for some works and incomplete for the rest. Currently, most works are copyrighted for the life of the author plus 70 years; publication date doesn't affect the copyright term. Works made for hire (such as code written for Google by an employee), anonymous works, and pseudonymous works are copyrighted for 95 years after publication or 120 years after creation, whichever is shorter. |
Is my company donating money to charity in lieu of paying me salary legal? I currently donate most of my money to charity, and knowing this my company has offered that they could deduce my salary and instead pay that money directly to charity. I posted a question to the finances board asking rather this would be a net gain to charity, and almost immediately someone suggested that this may constitute tax evasion and be illegal. I wouldn't think my company would screw up by accidentally offering to do something that was illegal. So would allowing my company to donate money to a charity I choose in lieu of a salary increase be legal for me and my company. | The company pays you a salary A. They need to withhold some amount B of that to give to the IRS. Now, if they pay you only C and withhold amount D that is based on that amount, and then make a separate tax-deductible donation E, that means the IRS does get not only an amount D that is smaller than B, but also the company can deduct E (in part) from their own taxes. As a result, that sounds like tax evasion on the face. However, if they still pay you A, withhold B (the tax on the whole amount), and payout C to you as well as the donation as part of your salary, that could possibly be a legal way - though you might want to consult your tax consultant. | Would this be legal? Probably at this scale. Not necessarily extrapolated to a large commercial operation involving more parties. At some point it becomes a payment system and a financial enterprise that becomes subject to financial regulation. Could her transfer be viewed as a donation as well? This is not a donation transaction and efforts to characterize it in that fashion would probably be disregarded by authorities. Could they be viewed as money laundering? The core element of money laundering is an effort to conceal the source of the funds for some purpose. It isn't clear if that would or would not be a motive. Other considerations A fairly common way to handle this kind of situation that is similar to what you suggest is called correspondent banking. Each side has an account in Russia and an account in Germany. Most day to day transfers happen by directing that money go from one German account to another German account, or from one Russian account to another Russian account. The big benefit of correspondent banking, aside from being transparent, is that it avoids currency exchange risks, fees and considerations for small, ordinary transactions. Of course, it simply isn't difficult or expensive to simply wire money from Russia to Germany, and vice versa, now and then. There are not strict currency controls, although there are some potential disclosure requirements. One reason for you, or authorities to worry about characterization of the transactions as money laundering is that if you have nothing to hide, simple wire transfers would be the usual and ordinary way of handling matters. | You are describing a charity. In the simplest case, a charitable foundation could be established to receive donations and dispense payments for medical services. There are various irrelevant non-legal reasons why it might not work (e.g. insufficient contributions relative to demand). The main legal concerns of such a foundation are its tax liability (do they have to pay income taxes on contributions?), and local regulations (how do you distinguish between a scam and a real charity?). The tax question is primarily about 501(c)(3) status, and for the most part there should be no problems with charitably dispensing contributions, though there is a requirement that no part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual – perhaps the CEO would be an exception to the universality of the program (but providing equivalent service could be a pre-tax employment benefit). A recipient does not have to pay tax on a gift, owing to the "medical exclusion" Registration is a state-level matter, here is the Washington law. Nothing in that law says "you can't provide coverage of medical expenses", and no maximum income level is imposed on the recipient of a charitable gift. The concern of these regulations is mainly record-keeping and access to records, not on specific ways of benefiting the community. Since unlike taxes contributions cannot be coerced, this means that some people might not pay what other people deem to be "their fair share", which is, again, a political issue. | Yes, your clause specifically limits you to only working for COMPANY, even in your off time. Canada does not have a law protecting your right to work secondary jobs (moonlighting) in your off-duty hours. This means that any contract clause specifically limiting you to work with the employer only is valid, and breaking it is cause for justified dismissal. Based on this, do I need to ask for explicit permission to work on such projects? Yes, you will need to disclose any potential "business or occupation whatsoever". You could play contract games by saying "it's only a hobby" or "it doesn't make any money", but you will be opening yourself up to issues. The best thing to do is to disclose your project to your employer and get in writing their permission to work on it with specific terms that you will not be using company time or resources in any way. See: Patterson V. Bank of Nova Scotia | If you have an agreement with a company that specifies "you agree to give me something of value, in case I give you something of value", you have a contract. In order for there to be a contract, there has to be actual acceptance of the offer. You can put out on a web page some contract stating those terms, and if you get positive acceptance of the contract (hence the standard click-through technology), then as long as you have done the thing promised, you can bill them for doing the thing promised. It's not clear what thing of value you are offering on the web page, since it's not "doing actual work". Them sending you an email isn't you doing something. One thing you could do is block all incoming emails, and for money you agree to unblock emails from registered subscribers. Just announcing that you will bill anyone for emailing you does not create a contract, because the emailer need not have even seen your announcement. This is why e-contracts need a click-through button. It's legal to request money, but there is no legal obligation for them to comply. That will be $10, please. | It doesn't seem as if the bank is discriminating in the way you suggest. They offer two types of account: (A) accrues or charges interest and (B) does not accrue or charge interest. The bank says you can choose A or B whatever your religion. You the customer choose A or B, possibly depending on your religion. So I do not see what cause of action you have or what damages you have suffered. Therefore I don't think you could sue them. | Would a marketplace for trading receipts be legally allowed to operate? Yes, or at least I think so, since it is highly doubtful that any legislation outlaws receipts trading. Unlike other documents, there is no commonplace notion that receipts are secret, non-transferable, or even private. For it to be actionable, the marketplace would have to engage in, or openly promote, practices which are "more unequivocally" illicit. The possibility that some people might pursue receipts for tax fraud, enjoyment of unearned rights, or other illegitimate purposes does not imply that trading of receipts in and of itself is unlawful. For instance, a person might come up with a bizarre --but nonetheless plausible-- hobby of collecting receipts with certain sequences of figures. | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. |
To what extent can a person use Wizards of the Coast's D&D monster information? I am creating some software that, at the moment, uses parts of the same format of summarizing creatures as the published works of Wizards of the Coast. Specifically the 2nd edition of Advanced Dungeons & Dragons (AD&D 2nd edition). For reference, this is what I'm talking about: What I'm including What theirs look like (if linking to this isn't allowed here I apologize) From what I understand from the research I have done this does not fall under copyright, though despite the research I still have a hard time understanding it all. Where I get slightly more confused is trademarks and what some refer to as "product identity" however I haven't been able to find much information on the latter. I don't understand how and what is protected outside the illustrations and perhaps the physical descriptions/explanations of the creatures. From my understanding of copyright and trademark the name and what I could refer to as the "recipe" (the list of attributes) of the creature can't be protected. So what exactly is protected here and how, if at all, am I allowed to use parts of what is protected to stay kosher. | AD&D, like all games, is covered under copyright. HOWEVER, games are not treated the same as books and other works. Rules of a game, including "stats" and other information required to play the game, are NOT protected by copyright. This is Copyright Law, and has nothing to do with a license which a work is published under. Artwork is fully protected by copyright, as is any setting descriptions. In the context of the D&D franchise, the actual wording of any rulebooks, monster descriptions, game modules, and such are all protected by copyright, so you can't wholesale cut-and-paste things. But, that does not extend to the various mechanics of the game. Armor Class, Hit Dice, etc. are all mechanics, and CANNOT be protected. That includes values assigned to monsters or characters or such. A company cannot also protect the particular layout of those statistics, if that layout is considered generic in nature. In the case we are talking about, a table listing the statistics is NOT protected, as it does nothing more than list those statistics, and contains no original, protected material of WotC. In addition, uniquely created monsters, characters, etc. all have their name protected, but not their statistics. But generic names thereof cannot be protected. It is perfectly permissible to have a clone copy of a Drow and call them a Dark Elf (a generic name). One could not copy the description of the Drow from a Monster Manual, but the idea of a Dark Elf cannot be protected, nor can the statistics thereof. It is explicitly permissible by Copyright Law to clone the rules to a game, which in the context of D&D includes a generic name for anything trademarked (thus, no Drow, and no Dungeon Master, but Dark Elf and Game Master), the mechanisms used to play the game -- including the terms used to reference them -- and all related numerical statistics associated with those components of the game. All of this is in addition to any rights the OGL gives you. These rights CANNOT be restricted by the OGL, as they are basic Copyright Law rights, not license rights. I've been writing D&D expansions and such for over 4 decades now (since the late 1980s), and this is what I've repeatedly been told by various Copyright lawyers. In short, provided you don't use the text description of a particular monster (and instead write your own one, using the same concept of what the monster is), and you don't use a trademarked name for it, it is possible to "scrape copy" the statistic summary section of any Monster Manual or the like. Here's an explicit parallel: the game of Monopoly. When creating a clone of Monopoly, here's what you CAN do: Copy the basic layout of the board - a square with the properties laid out in a path around the edge. Arrange the properties as they currently are, WITH THE CURRENT NAMES on them. Each property's name is not possible to protect, as they are generic names. Free Parking, Jail, and Go To Jail, and Go can all be labeled and placed accordingly. Chance and Community Chest cards can be named as such, and referred to as such. The text on the cards is also (mostly) usable. The costs and values of all Chance, Community Chest, and properties can be copied. The rules of movement, going to jail, etc. can all be copied. Have pieces that are Hats, Dogs, Cars, etc, and both Hotels and Houses, and explicitly refer to them by those names. Here's what you CANNOT do: Use the particular color scheme of the board Use any artwork, including the drawings on any cards. Use the particular graphic presentation of a card. Copy the design of any piece, except the House/Hotel which, insofar as they are very generic, can be extremely similar. You can only use the word "Monopoly" in the context of referring to the Parker Brothers game, not in any other context, as it is trademarked. The specific wording of the rulebook cannot be duplicated. You have to write the rules in your own words. The wording of certain Community Chest and Chance cards, where they are not just generic game instructions, cannot be duplicated. E.g. "Grand Opera Night—Collect $50 from every player for opening night seats" cannot be duplicated, but you can have any other wording for something that would gain you $50 per player. Now, see how that works in comparison to D&D? | The word "use", for purposes of trademark law, is a term of art meaning it is used in a way that may be a violation of law if not licensed. Not all uses of trademarks are violations. Similarly, there is a difference between using the name of a company and the brand of products or services sold by that company. In any case, using a trademark or trade name to REFERENCE a company or brand is not a trademark infringement. For instance, I don't need any license to tell you that I own a Dell or HP or Apple product, or that my software will run on a Dell or HP or Apple product. The use of a logo is, however, more sensitive and likely to require detailed legal analysis, if not an actual license. | In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage. | For your example of items with Marvel characters on them for sale by people and companies not licensed by Marvel, Redbubble clearly states that We ask, rather we beg, that you remember this when you are posting work on Redbubble. If you make sure that all the works you upload consist of your very own, original ideas and are not infringing on the intellectual property or publicity rights of another... (from https://help.redbubble.com/hc/en-us/articles/201579195 ) and further, Redbubble has full contact information for the submission of Notice and Takedown Reports by each real trademark owner. There are many individuals who upload products which use unlicensed artwork in violation of trademarks, and Redbubble acknowledges this and gives recourse to the license holder to inform them so they can remove the items. It's not a perfect system, but Redbubble it seems makes every effort to help police their market. ( Teepublic has a very clear policy statement, too: https://www.teepublic.com/copyright-policy ) Many companies - such as Marvel - employ agents to regularly check such websites and issue takedown demands to the sites; the sites in turn remove the products, and in some instances, ban the individual from using the site again. In the case of Amazon, there can be two types of products sold that use trademarked artwork and characters: items sold by legitimate businesses that have license agreements with the trademark owners and who have the products sold by Amazon itself; and items sold on the Amazon marketplace by individuals who open Amazon Marketplace accounts themselves and don't have licenses. Amazon will be sure to check the products they sell; they will have a takedown notices system for their marketplace vendors. eBay is somewhat the same way; there is a mix of individuals and businesses on eBay, but eBay doesn't operate an umbrella sell/ship by eBay, like Amazon. It's kind of a whack-a-mole situation on the Interwebs. How much time/money does a company spend to chase down trademark infringement? Is it worth going to court for persistent violators? (These are, for the most part, civil cases, not criminal). Violators can always open a new account on sites such as Redbubble and eBay under a different name. And it starts all over again. | It's Problematic The castle is both copyright and trade mark of Disney. As a trade mark, you are not permitted to use it in a way that indicates that yours is a Disney product or affiliated with Disney - you are probably OK here. As a copyright, Disney has the exclusive right to make derivative works which is what your mosaic is. So, you either need Disney's permission or the work needs to fall under the fair use exemption. As a single domestic work which substantially changes the original it probably does but the only way to know for sure is get sued and win. If you go ahead I would ask your client to indemnify you, however, this is only effective to the extent that your client has the financial resources to defend the lawsuit or pay the damages. However, there is an alternative. The Cinderella Castle was inspired by real architecture, all of which is public domain. If you copy one of these castles (e.g. Neuschwanstein Castle) you have no issues with Disney and only a true fanatic would notice the difference. | Probably not, without permission. Images of the character are usually copyrighted. The characters themselves are usually protected by trademark. Using the name of a fictional character without permission would imply endorsement by the firm that published works with that character. I've taken day long seminars focused mostly on all of the things that comic book companies do to protect their intellectual property rights in their characters. Of course, if you live in Finland, it is likely that no one in the U.S. would decide to take up the case for a U.S. media property, either because they aren't aware of it, or because it isn't economically worthwhile to pursue. | Under the Berne Convention, a copyright notice is not required at all, although using one is good practice. Using one usually eliminates the claimed status of "innocent infringement", which, if found true by a court, greatly reduces damage awards. It is usual to place such notices at or near the start of a work. That is where people tend to look for them, and I don't see any good reason not to follow this practice. The book tradition is the the copyright page comes before any part of the actual work, including the table of contents, sometimes with a continuation at the end of the work, if there is more than one page of notices. But that is not now a legal requirement, if it ever was. In short, there are no rigid rules on this, but putting a copyright notice at or quite near the start is good practice, and I would suggest sticking to it. | Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them. |
GDPR and Certification Check Based in UK. I manage a certification website that allows users to register an account and complete a course, before doing so they explicitly agree to the website's privacy policy and GDPR. The website collects their name and email address, along with any courses they have have completed / passed. Users are assigned (pdf) certificates via the website that contain a unique number. I now want to setup a publicly accessible search function that enables employers, or potential employers to validate the authenticity of these certificates based on this unique number, similar to CompTIA, Linux Training and others. The idea is that the (potential) employers will receive a copy of the certificate and enter this unique number on the website. A database check will be performed on this unique number and if it's valid, the user's name, email address and certification date will be displayed to the person performing the search, along with a This is a valid certificate number , message. If the unique number isn't found a standard not found message will be displayed. Do I need to be concerned about any GDPR or privacy issues here, or does it all sound ok? | GDPR definitely applies. Your scenario seems to raise two questions: What is the legal basis for processing? Are the security measures appropriate? Legal basis Every processing activity of personal data requires a legal basis. Most well-known is consent, but there are six categories in Art 6(1) GDPR including legitimate interests and necessity for performing a contract with the data subject. Conditions on consent are laid out in Art 7 GDPR. You say that data subjects “explicitly agree to the website's privacy policy and GDPR”. The GDPR does not generally expect “agreement” to a privacy policy, as information per Art 13 is an unilateral notice. Such general agreement also cannot constitute valid consent. In the context of certifications, the legal basis would likely be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject: You were contracted to provide this validation service to the data subjects. You should however make it clear which information will be displayed on the validation page (other than a valid/not valid) response. For example, I am concerned that showing the email address would not be strictly necessary for providing the validation service. You should also consider whether this validation service is a core component of your certification service, or whether there should be an opt-in or opt-out here. Security Measures The GDPR requires that you implement appropriate security measures, “taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms” of the data subjects (see Art 32 GDPR). This gives you a lot of leeway to determine what measures are appropriate, but also criteria that you must consider in your determination. A number of security measures are explicitly suggested and must also be considered: pseudonymization and encryption ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability, and resilience of your systems ability to restore the service (e.g. backups) processes for regularly testing and evaluating your measures Aside from generic IT security measures like backups and providing the service over a HTTPS connection, I would be concerned about “insecure direct object reference” style attacks on the database. If I know that certification no 1234 exists, I could try to get the information for other numbers like no 1233 and so on. This would leak personal data. Basic defenses could include requiring additional information such as the data subject's name to be provided, or using anti-bot measures such as captchas and rate limits. However, the real solution is to avoid sequential IDs, and to generate sufficiently large tokens with a cryptographically secure random number generator. Instead of a “certification number”, it would be better to view this as a “validation code”. | Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here. | The GDPR doesn't generally distinguish public from non-public personal data. If you have a good reason to contact the professor, do send them an email. GDPR does not prevent this. If you're sending this email for “purely personal or household purposes”, then GDPR doesn't apply anyway. There are rules in the ePrivacy Directive against unsolicited emails, but these specifically relate to emails for direct marketing purposes. A company is not allowed to send out spam marketing, regardless of whether they obtained the email address from a public data source. Companies can send email marketing to their own existing customers, or to people who have given consent. Consent is defined in a fairly restrictive way (as a specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes), so that mere publication of an email address cannot be interpreted as consent to receive marketing from a particular company. | For land ownership records and other similar scenarios such as business directors, the requirement for these to be public will be in legislation rather than a contract - this provides the legal basis, see GDPR Article 6(1c). Additionally when government departments are doing it they also have 6(1e) as lawful basis: "1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: ... (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; ... (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" -- GDPR, Article 6(1c,e). I'm not familiar enough with the specific legislation that will apply here but pretty sure this will be the case, and having said this you may well find public registries also become less public going forward. The reason ICANN has come under fire, is partly because under GDPR privacy is a protected fundamental right and therefore to comply personal data should be kept private by default and privacy never something you would be required to pay extra for. Any contract ICANN have in place with their registrars will not override legislation, it is in fact the other way around. "2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons." -- GDPR, Article 25(2). This doesn't stop ICANN from maintaining a register of domain name owners (registrants), but it does mean they can't just publish all records upon request to anyone anymore - whether people will be granted access to personal data will now depend on if they have a lawful basis for this, and in these cases their processing of the personal data will be limited to those purposes. Being nosey doesn't count! "When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract." -- GDPR, Article 7 (4) - Conditions for consent. What this means essentially, is that if the consent is conditional for the contract it will not be treated as freely given, and therefore not valid - it will no longer be acceptable to contractually bind the provision of a product or service with consent to publish personal data or any other form of processing such as marketing mailing lists. Looking now at the specific points you have raised: "GDPR article 6 allows for processing of personal data on a contractual basis (section 1b)" Whilst this is true, this is only part of it - it doesn't allow for unlimited processing for any purpose and sharing it with any people, if you look at Article 5(b) it states that the information is collected for specific explicit legitimate purposes. Each purpose requires its own legal basis and needs to be compatible with the principles of GDPR. Without consent, ICANN currently does not have a legal basis to make the WHOIS records public for EU citizens and should have adopted some technical controls to require them to opt-in if they wish to be included in the public register. They're coming under fire for non-compliance having been given 2 years to prepare and change their systems/processes. "processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;" Again whilst this is true, not all processing is necessary for the performance of a contract. In the same way people must give consent to receive marketing communications, they must freely give consent for their information to be shared/published (separate to the contract for provision of service) in the absence of other lawful basis for this processing. "Also section 1c, processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;" There is no legislation which requires them to publish the personal data of domain name registrants. In this paragraph 'legal obligations' refers to those required by legislation (i.e. statutory obligations), not contracts (or non-statutory obligations) which are covered under Article 6(1b). "And finally section 1e, processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" ICANN has no official government-assigned authority, and publishing the personal data globally is not in the interests of the data subject's or others' welfare or well-being - this is what is meant by 'public interest'. As far as I can see what ICANN are actually doing to comply seems to be accepted by the European Data Protection Board, they are only 'under fire' as you say because they are late in doing so. The deadline was 25th May 2018 and they had 2 years to prepare like all other organisations. | You won't be able to get around self-doxxing yourself. § 5 Abs 1 TMG requires tele-media service providers like you to list den Namen und die Anschrift, unter der sie niedergelassen sind the name and the address where they reside or are established Similarly, Art 13(1) GDPR requires you to provide the identity and the contact details of the controller In a German context, it is generally accepted that both of these involve a ladungsfähige Anschrift, i.e. a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit (not a post box). These requirements exist for both natural persons and legal entities, and for both businesses and non-commercial activities. The TMG Impressumspflicht talks about “geschäftsmäßige, in der Regel gegen Entgelt angebotene Telemedien” but in practice this only requires that the service could be paid (not that you're actually making any money), and that the service is offered routinely/business-like (not necessarily commercially). It does not matter where your service is hosted as long as you live in Germany. The TMG and GDPR might not apply if the forum is run purely privately, e.g. if it is only made available to a few close friends or family members. | Overview The GDPR requires data controllers (DCs) to exercise reasonable care when responding to an access, modification, or deletion request, to ensure that it comes from the actual Data Subject (person whose data is involved, here a DS). The GDPR does not specify just what methods must or may be used to ensure that an access (or other) request comes from the DS. It does say, in Article 12, that "additional information" may be requested from the DS by the DC for this purpose that is "necessary to confirm the identity" of the DS. If a DC receives data for identification purposes, it must be used only for those purposes, and retained no longer than needed. Personal Data (PD) in general must be limited according to article 5, so that data is used only for the purposes it was collected for, retained for no longer than needed, adn appropriately secured against unauthorized use or access. The DC is responsible for adhering to these limitations. Recitals 57, 59, and 77 (quoted below) confirm this, and discuss identification. If a DC violates these restrictions, it is subject to the same enforcement as it would be for violating any other GDPR provision. If a DS thinks the data requested to support identification of the DS is excessive, the DS may first complain to the DC, and then to the relevant supervisory authority if the response from the DC is not acceptable (allow at least 1 month for a response). But perhaps knowing that the GDPR forbids the DC from distributing or using this data except for the purpose it was collected, that is, to identify the DS, and from retaining it longer than need be, might offer some reassurance. A DS could also ask the DC what is the minimum data needed for identification, and redact data beyond this. The DC might need more than name and address, but not all that is on a bank statement or other ID document. GDPR Sources Article 12 (section 6) of the GDPR reads: Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. That includes access requests. Paragraph 1 of Article 11 reads: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Paragraph 1(b) of article 5 specifies that personal data shall be : collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; Paragraph 1(c) of art 5 specifies that such data shall be: limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed ... Paragraph 1(e) of art 5 specifies that such data shall be; kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; [emphasis added] Paragraph 1(f) of art 5 further specifies that such data shall be: processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing Recital 59 reads: Modalities should be provided for facilitating the exercise of the data subject’s rights under this Regulation, including mechanisms to request and, if applicable, obtain, free of charge, in particular, access to and rectification or erasure of personal data and the exercise of the right to object. The controller should also provide means for requests to be made electronically, especially where personal data are processed by electronic means. The controller should be obliged to respond to requests from the data subject without undue delay and at the latest within one month and to give reasons where the controller does not intend to comply with any such requests. Recital 57 reads: If the personal data processed by a controller do not permit the controller to identify a natural person, the data controller should not be obliged to acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation. However, the controller should not refuse to take additional information provided by the data subject in order to support the exercise of his or her rights. 3Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. Recital 77 reads: Guidance on the implementation of appropriate measures and on the demonstration of compliance by the controller or the processor, especially as regards the identification of the risk related to the processing, their assessment in terms of origin, nature, likelihood and severity, and the identification of best practices to mitigate the risk, could be provided in particular by means of approved codes of conduct, approved certifications, guidelines provided by the Board or indications provided by a data protection officer. The Board may also issue guidelines on processing operations that are considered to be unlikely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons and indicate what measures may be sufficient in such cases to address such risk. | There’s no definitive list of what is or isn’t personal data, so it all comes down to properly interpreting the GDPR’s definition: ‘[P]ersonal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’). — Article 4(1) In other words, any information that is clearly about a particular person. But just how broadly does this apply? The GDPR clarifies: [A]n identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. — Article 4(1) This means that because you say that coordinates and anticheat logs are linked to the cheaters ingame username and unique id, if there is a record of who that username and/or unique id belongs to, even if it is just an IP or email address, it is considered personal data because the information relates to an identifiable natural person. Personal data includes any data which can be linked to information where a person can be identified From CommentsIf the online username and unique id is not linked to the actual human (no stored real name, no home address, no IP), can the natural person actually be identified? The records and anticheat logs are linked to the unique id and username, however the unique id and username are (from my POV) not actually linked to the real human Only you can answer that question as it stands because we have no access to your data. From what you have told us, even though the coordinates and anticheat logs are linked to the cheaters ingame username and unique id, that alone doesn’t fall under the GDPR’s scope of personal data, as, in all likelihood, the usename and unique id could relate to anyone in the world. The issue comes if elsewhere you have a record of the person's name, IP, date of birth etc. which when combined with the anticheat logs could link that data to identifiable people. You might think that someone’s name is always personal data, but it’s not that simple, as the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office document what is personal data (PDF) explains: “By itself the name John Smith may not always be personal data because there are many individuals with that name. However, where the name is combined with other information (such as an address, a place of work, or a telephone number) this will usually be sufficient to clearly identify one individual.” Note: A name which is much less common could be personal data as the likelihood of it relating to others deminishes. John Smith is a common name all over the UK, but what about a particular polish/czech/hungarian/french.... name (let's say) living in Nottingham, UK? What is the likelihood of another person of the same name in Nottingham, UK? Add a middle name or double barrelled surname, and it becomes even more likely that it is personal data. If you’re unsure whether the information you store is personal data or not, it’s best to err on the side of caution. This means making sure data is secure, reducing the amount of data you store, collecting only as much data as necessary to complete your processing activities, keeping data for only as long as it meets its purpose, and ensuring only authorised people are able to access the data. | The GDPR applies to such sites if they offer services in the EU/EEA. If they clearly wanted to avoid being subject to the GDPR, they should block visitors from the EEA. For the GDPR, only location matters. Other concerns like residence or citizenship are generally irrelevant. Personal data does not turn non-personal just because it was public. So the GDPR still applies when the data was collected from public sources. However, the data controller (who determines the purpose of processing) often has to balance your rights and interests against other interests (e.g. when using legitimate interest as a legal basis for some processing). For the purpose of publicly displaying your data, only showing data that was already public anyway makes it easier to argue that this is fine. But when the GDPR applies, you have data subject rights. Relevant rights include: a right to access, to see all the data they have about you a right to rectification, to correct wrong data they hold about you a right to restriction, effectively an opt-out a right to erasure (also known as the right to be forgotten) These rights apply both against the website and against Google Search (arguably, both are doing the exact same thing). Google correctly points out that they can't remove information from the Web, but they can hide information from search results. If you feel that your requests have not been resolved correctly, you can issue a complaint with your country's data protection authority. In theory you can also sue them. In practice, GDPR enforcement against overseas data controllers can be quite difficult and has not yet happened. |
What different legal systems are there? What legal systems are there in the world and are they directly related to political structure? I guess something like: You're wrong until proven right You're right until proven wrong Also what is the proper terminology for a law system? | I can't do much better than the opening to Wikipedia's article on this: The contemporary legal systems of the world are generally based on one of four basic systems: civil law, common law, statutory law, religious law or combinations of these. However, the legal system of each country is shaped by its unique history and so incorporates individual variations. I believe that there are about 196 sovereign nations in the world so that gives 196 national systems. Many of these have sub-national jurisdictions (e.g. The USA with 50 states plus military law) so this total is at least several hundred and may run up to 1000. In addition there are systems of supra-national law such as maritime law, war crimes law and supra-national jurisdictions like the EU. So, short answer: lots. The correct terminology for a system of law is a jurisdiction. Note that many activities will be subject to multiple jurisdictions. | You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific. | Law, as such, is not a moral or a philosophical construct. It can be based on moral constructs and often it is. And, of course, the process of writing laws is often informed by philosophy. But law as such is neither one of those. Law is a set of behaviors which are known to be acceptable to the powers "that be." This maybe an unsettling idea. But it is true nonetheless. The phrase that summarizes this is "any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism." What makes it seem untrue is that in the modern tradition laws are written down. And, when there is a need to resolve doubt as to whether something is illegal or not, they are carefully considered through a deductive process. Within countries, there is little question who "the powers that be" happen to be. But when it comes to laws governing actions between nations, it is more complicated. Yes, treaties make it clear, ahead of time, what types of expectations exist. Predictability (even in war) allows for long-term planning. And even laws of war are usually followed because wars are fought with the expectation that at some point they will end. And predictability allows to set end-goal conditions. Notably, entities which have no clear end-goals in sight are the ones least likely to follow any laws. The idea of any group of countries sitting in court of another group of countries is mostly a political theater. There is no possibility of predictable outcomes from entities which have not made commitments to those outcomes. So whether some countries have to follow "laws" set out for them by other countries (or non-government entities) is largely a result of those countries or entities being in positions of power to dictate their will. This is not the same as international laws being strictly de facto. Agreed-upon restrictions and restrictions which have been dictated from the top-down, by those with more power, are de jure because they create predictable boundaries on behavior. De facto restrictions are the ones which have come to be the case without any prior agreement or fiat. | That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this. | Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law There are two different meanings of the word Jurisprudence A heavy word for the study or knowledge of the law. If a judge or law lecturer were to refer to "the role of freedom of contract in our jurisprudence" for example, this is the sense intended (this is the sense @ohwilleke refers to in his answer). The second meaning - and the more usual meaning nowadays, particularly in in academic circles (I note you are studying law so this is probably the meaning you are asking about) - could be described as the philosophy of law. In Legal Philosophies (1997) J W Harris says (p.1) Jurisprudence is a ragbag. Into it are cast all kinds of general speculations about the law. What is it for? What does it achieve? Should we value it? How is it to be improved? Is it dispensable? Who makes it? Where do we find it? What is its relation to morality, to justice, to politics, to social practices, or to naked force? Should we obey it? Whom does it serve? These are the questions of which general jurisprudence is comprised. They can be ignored, but they will no go away... Jurisprudence has to entrench on [the disciplines of moral and political philosophers] at many points, as well as upon those of social and political theory. It is a scavenger, as well as a ragbag; having no perimeter to its field of enquiry, save that what is studied must have a bearing on some general speculation about law. If jurisprudence has a heartland all its own, it is legal theory Much discussion about moral claims of the law (and moral claims on the law) takes the concept of law itself for granted. Yet, answers to such questions may turn on what picture of law we have. Legal theory asks: What is the nature of law (everywhere, or just in the modern state)? In a three year English undergraduate law degree, Jurisprudence has traditionally been studied as a compulsory module in the third year which concentrates on legal theory. One thing students immediately notice is that the exact scope and definition of jurisprudence is disputed (which can be discomforting since all the other modules they have hitherto studied - Contract, Tort, Crime, etc- have clear definitions). This uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that legal theories which come under the umbrella term of legal positivism have as one of their central themes the proposition that jurisprudence should only be concerned with positive law and that legal theory need not (and should not) look outside to ideas of morality or natural law. In other words not only do different legal theories have different explanations of the phenomenon of law, but they actually disagree about the scope of what it is they are supposed to be explaining! Traditionally jurists thought of God as the ultimate law-giver whose laws were written on human hearts (conscience). This is the "natural law" which human legislators add to by creating "positive law". For example murder is contrary to natural law but you need human laws to define the different categories of homicide, the prescribed penalties, and the procedure by which accusations are tried and decided. You also need human laws to define the circumstances in which a contract comes into being etc. Note: positive in used in its old original meaning of "laid down" as distinct from natural. It is nothing to do with the modern meaning of positive as being the opposite of negative. William Blackstone, in Vol. 1, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) Page 27, wrote: This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws. Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian1 has reduced the whole doctrine of law. This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws. Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.... Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There are, it is true a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the case of murder; this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, or superadd any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae [in the court of conscience] to abstain from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not so... In the Province of Jurisprudece Determined (1832) John Austin wrote at length about both natural law and positive law and sought to draw a line of distinction between them: AS one of the Law-Professors at the University of London, I planned and partly delivered a systematical Course of Lectures on General or Abstract Jurisprudence. In the ten lectures delivered at the beginning of my Course, I distinguished positive law (the appropriate matter of jurisprudence) from various objects with which it is connected by resemblance, and from various other objects to which it is allied by analogy. Out of those ten discourses, I have made the treatise which I now submit to the public, and which I venture to entitle “the province of jurisprudence determined.” Determining the characters of positive laws, I determine implicitly the notion of sovereignty, with the implied or correlative notion of independent political society. For the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated generally in the following manner. Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body > is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the phrase) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. To elucidate the nature of sovereignty, and of the independent political society that sovereignty implies, I examine various topics which I arrange under the following heads: First, the possible forms or shapes of supreme political government; second, the limits, real or imaginary, of supreme political power; thirdly, the origin or causes of political government and society. Examining those various topics, I complete my description of the limit or boundary by which positive law is severed from positive morality. For I distinguish them at certain points whereat they seemingly blend, or whereat the line which divides them is not easily perceptitible. Austin's account of positive law (essentially a command of a sovereign accompanied by a threat of sanction for non-compliance) has been criticised as being simplistic and of failing to provide an adequate explanation of law and legal systems, but to be fair to Austin he never claimed that his theory of positive law could alone explain what happens in legal systems. He recognised the influence of natural law/morality as part of an explanation. He simply wished to define the limits of Jurispudence as an academic subject, which he did narrowly. Some jurists, however, have subsequently sought to produce theories of law which seek to explain what the phenomenon of law is, and how it works, based only on positive law. Such theorists are called "positivists" and their school of thought is called legal positivism. In 1960 Hans Kelsen published Reine Rechtslehre which was translated into English in 1967 as The Pure Theory of Law. As the word pure in the title suggests Kelsen's theory is in the legal positivism school of thought - i.e. it seeks to explain law and legal systems by reference only to positive law. Kelsen himself was a moral relativist but not all legal positivists are necessarily atheists or moral relativists. Some may personally think that natural law/morality is important but nevertheless think that the discipline of law should be "self contained" and should be capable of being completely and satisfactorily explained without brining natural law/morality etc. into it. Natural lawyers critique the theories of legal positivism by saying that they are incomplete as they leave so much unexplained. Legal Positivists reply that their theories have a restricted scope precisely because everything outside the scope of the theory is not really law at all and so does not need to be explained by the theory. So you can see that the definition of Jurisprudence is rather woolly but philosophy of law with particular emphasis on competing theories of what the phenomenon of law actually is might be a short rough definition to convey the general idea of Jurisprudence as the word in generally used today. | No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it." | If a law is struck-down as unconstitutional, but all the precedent used to find it unconstitutional gets reversed; what becomes of the law? In U.S. law, the law has effect again, unless it has been amended or repealed in the meantime. Is it totally dead, needing be passed anew? In the U.S., no. It is not totally dead. It is merely dormant. It stays on the books and legislators may decide not to repeal it as a political statement. It also might be considered for interpretive purposes when construing another part of the same law. For example, the meaning given to a phrase in an unconstitutional part of the law might be applied to a different part of the law that is constitutional. Can the judiciary be asked to reinstated, after which point it can be used again? In the U.S., any court can determine that a law is unconstitutional, but the extent to which that ruling is binding precedent on other courts or other parties than those to the case before it depends upon the court in question and upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). For example, the legal fight in the U.S. to hold bans on same sex marriage to be unconstitutional was fought in and resulted in ruling in dozens of courts at the trial court and state appellate court, and federal intermediate appellate court level before a uniform ruling was established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, even if the issue arises in another case where there is a controlling precedent, attorney ethics permit an attorney to make a good faith argument for a change in the law to any court, so if there is some good faith argument for doing so, the attorney can push that the issue be reconsidered. Of course, usually the answer from the court will be "no." Or can it just be enforced again without any formal process; so long as nobody sues and gets it killed again by a lower court? Sometimes government officials enforce laws that have been held unconstitutional, either because they aren't aware of the relevant court decisions, or because they think that their facts are distinguishable from those under which the law was held unconstitutional (which sometimes happens on an "as applied" basis rather than on a "facial" basis that applies to all cases), or because they think the judge before them might rule differently despite the precedent. Also, would the answer differ according to country? If so, could you please give me some examples of countries handling this differently. Yes. Many countries with legal systems based upon the legal system of countries of continental Europe like France and Germany and Spain, which are called "civil law" countries have a very different process of handling unconstitutional laws, as does the European Court of Human Rights and the highest court of the European Union. In Germany, for example, questions of the constitutionality of a law may be raised only in the Constitutional Court and not in other courts. This ruling is usually final. And, unlike U.S. courts, the Constitutional Court can rule a law unconstitutional during the legislative process, rather than in connection with an actual case or controversy relating to the law taking effect (in which case the law never gets on the books in the first place). I don't know what happens when the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional. I do know, however, that in the case of the European Court of Human Rights and the highest courts of the E.U. that one of the usual remedies will be an order directed at a member state to amend its statutes to remove the offending law, with sanctions imposed if the member state fails to do so. Obviously, once such a law is repealed in this fashion, it would have to be re-enacted to take effect even if the precedent holding that the law was unconstitutional was undermined. | The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes). |
Law on selling self-made electronic devices if I make a microcontroller or any electronic device and it has LEDs, it is not me who created these LEDs, I bought them, even chosen for the pack of transistors that I bought on Amazon, so if I want to market a device that uses these LEDs and transistors, do I pay copyright to the author / brand of these LEDs too? And what if I buy a ready-made Wi-Fi card or SIM card reader that I buy and integrate into my device, must I pay copyright also? | Under the First Sale doctrine, when intellectual property is imparted to an actual physical thing, the first commercial buyer of that actual physical thing (that is made with proper intellectual property licensing or permission) is entitled to use it without further intellectual property limitations. As Wikipedia explains at the link: The first-sale doctrine (also sometimes referred to as the "right of first sale" or the "first sale rule") is an American legal concept that limits the rights of an intellectual property owner to control resale of products embodying its intellectual property. The doctrine enables the distribution chain of copyrighted products, library lending, giving, video rentals and secondary markets for copyrighted works (for example, enabling individuals to sell their legally purchased books or CDs to others). In trademark law, this same doctrine enables reselling of trademarked products after the trademark holder puts the products on the market. In the case of patented products, the doctrine allows resale of patented products without any control from the patent holder. A different analysis applies if the goods when first made were already infringing. But, in practice, the aggrieved IP owner usually sues the primary infringer or an importer of the infringing goods, rather than a retail purchaser, in those case. | Written down computer code is subject to copyright. If you do not have the permission of the owner to copy it you are breaching their copyright unless your use constitutes fair use/dealing. | No, it does not fall under fair use: It is commercial use in nature It is a copyrighted work It is hard to say what portion of the copyrighted work you'd be using based on your description, so test three is inconclusive It could be argued in your favor that the infringement would not have an impact on their potential market, but it could potentially impact the value If discovered the owner of the copyright could pursue action against the company you work for. | Ideas aren't property Your employer does not own your ideas. However, neither do you. Ideas are not something that is protected by intellectual property law. To be IP, you need more than an idea. What is IP? The most common types are: Patents - protect inventions and new processes Trade marks - protect logos, words and other branding Copyright - protects art, writing, music, film, and computer programs Registered designs - protects the visual design of a product Circuit layout rights - protect layout designs or plans of integrated circuits used in computer-generated designs Plant breeders rights - protect the commercial rights of new plant varieties. The normal operation of IP law is that if a person is engaged under a contract of service (e.g. an employment contract) then their employer owns all the IP they make which includes progress towards something that might be IP (e.g. all the work that leads up to a patentable invention). However, if they are engaged under a contract for service (e.g. an independent contractor), then the worker owns the IP. The work the employer owns is generally limited to work in the course of the employment. So if you are a software developer they will generally own all code you write that is useful for their business but won't own the romantic novel you write in your spare time. In either case, the specific contract can override the default assumption. What can you do? You can certainly use the idea for the app but you can't use anything that is subject to your employer's IP. That means you can't use any code or copy the user interface - it all has to be redeveloped from scratch. You also can’t develop something that would be of use to their business while you are still an employee. | Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter. | IANAL, just a programmer with an interest in legal rules. Due to the very permissive nature of the MIT license, no, it does not appear that anything illegal has been done. Specifically, the section to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software (emphasis mine) grants everyone the right to modify your code and share those modifications, provided one includes the license. Since this person has included your license (including your copyright notice), they have followed the conditions of the license and are able to share your stuff. Legally. Ethically, I still think its ****. This might be a good starting point in selecting a license (note the Modification column). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_and_open-source_software_licenses The CC-BY-SA license family, as mentioned by Ron Beyer in comments is on this list, for example. TL;DR: You unfortunately granted a more permissive license than what you wanted/needed to. This was a BadThing(TM), analogous to giving too broad of access rights to a method or class. Determine your desired permissions, then select a license that matches what you'd like to grant. | The chief legal problem might be (depending on how you build and operate the thing) the amount of Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) that you're causing. You are not exempt from FCC regulations, but § 15.23 Home-built devices. (a) Equipment authorization is not required for devices that are not marketed, are not constructed from a kit, and are built in quantities of five or less for personal use. (b) It is recognized that the individual builder of home-built equipment may not possess the means to perform the measurements for determining compliance with the regulations. In this case, the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices to meet the specified technical standards to the greatest extent practicable. The provisions of §15.5 apply to this equipment. Since the question assumes "the builder knows what he's doing", we may assume the FCC demand "the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices" is met. But that also would assume that the builder knew about EMI in the first place. | Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence. |
Can a car seller refuse to sell the car after the contract has been signed and the deposit has been paid? My friend (buyer) tried to purchase a car from a private individual (seller). They agreed on a price, drew up a contract, and signed it. The buyer paid the seller the deposit they agreed on. The seller is now feeling remorse or perhaps found a better price. Now the seller is refusing to sell the car or even return the deposit. Can the buyer take any legal action against the seller? In case it matters: both agents are in the United States with international student visas. | Nope, the seller can't refuse "to sell". They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over. | You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment. | There is no law against driving a hard bargain If you were describing real estate owners rather than YouTube channel owners we’d have a term for them: a motivated seller. There is no law against using the fact that someone is desperate to sell to negotiate a lower price: that’s just good business. In general, common law legal systems do not involve themselves in whether a price agreed between two parties was fair: if you want to sell your original Picasso for $1 or pay $1m for a used tissue, that’s up to you. If you have ethical issues with that, don’t do it but it’s not illegal. Legal issues can come up where you are the cause in some way of the motivation. A lender foreclosing on a mortgage is ok. A lender offering to buy the property to avoid foreclosure is not. The first is just enforcing the terms of the contract, the second looks like undue influence and unconscionable conduct. Some countries have laws against profiteering and you would need to look at the legal definition to decide if this is or isn’t profiteering. In the US, it isn’t because their laws only deal with profiteering that damages the government. Some US states have laws against price gouging but these are usually to prevent charging too much, not too little. Which clauses of YouTube's Terms of Service would be violated? None. YouTube does not have any terms about selling your digital assets and we know it happens. Which US sanctions would be violated? It’s impossible to say without reading the sanction. If it’s illegal to transfer money to the sanctioned people then the whole plan falls over because you can’t pay for the channel in the first place. | Whether or not this would be allowed would generally call for a more fact rich situation than the one presented in the original question, that would cast light upon why a retailer might be inclined to refuse to accept payment. Hypothetical legal questions that presume that people are acting irrationally for no good reason are generally ill posed and don't have meaningful answers. Sometimes, there might be a legitimate privacy interest implicated if the invoicing party acknowledged a payment from a third party. For example, suppose that the invoice was for a paternity test and payment would confirm that the incapacitated person actually obtained a paternity test. Sometimes, there are legal rights beyond payment that are implicated and the reasonableness of a refusal might hinge on those rights. For example, suppose that the invoice was for an option to keep using an oil well. Payment of the invoice by the deadline would keep the oil well operating and the land owner sending the invoice might prefer that it not be paid so that the oil well would be shut down. Quite a few contracts are structured in this way. Maybe the invoice was for the right to purchase a first edition of a book when it was finally released, for example, and not paying it would free up a copy for someone else at a price that had increased in the meantime. Or, suppose that the invoice were for unpaid taxes and payment of the taxes would prevent property from being seized for sale by tax authorities, and the taxing authority would prefer that the invoice was not paid so that the valuable property could be liquidated. But, it is hard to imagine that there would be any reason that an ordinary retailer with an ordinary bill would ever refuse payment, although I suppose that this might trigger an interest or penalty amount owed under the contract for late payment. If that were the case, the principal of mitigation of damages, which says that a party to a contract must take all reasonable steps to mitigate their damages, might obligate the retailers to accept the payment or forfeit the penalty amounts that the retailer could have avoided as damages by accepting payment. I doubt that an undelivered tender of payment from a third party would eliminate the obligation, but, it might limit the damages that could be claimed as in the scenario above. | In general, no. When the salesperson quoted the price and you accepted it you were each bound to that price by contract. Consideration under a contract must be sufficient (something of value for something of value) but it doesn't have to be fair: you can be obliged to pay $2 million for a cupcake or sell your Picasso for $1. You were and are under no obligation to pay and could successfully sue for the return of your money. To further clarify, it doesn't matter if the store has or has not provided the goods or services when they discover their error: they are obliged to perform their side of the contract without additional payment. Further, if this was a consumer contract then some sort of consumer protection law almost certainly applies. This would probably make what the store did not only a breach of contract but an offence against the state as well. | can the business set out that the deposit is paid back at their own discretion? Generally speaking, the business is allowed to do so. What matters is that at the formation of the contract the customer be properly informed about that "entitlement to discretion". The duty to specify criteria for refund of the deposit and most of all provisions in contracts are premised on the parties' freedom of contract. By contrast, in contexts of markets which are heavily regulated, legislation might constrain the concepts for which a customer may be billed and/or the corresponding amounts. Likewise, the term "deposit" might be statutorily defined in a way that it outweighs or strikes the business's discretion. If damages exceed the deposit, can the business request more money from the customer? It depends on the specific terms of the clause and whether it is altogether definite or conclusive in that regard. In turn, the specificity of the terms mostly depends on (1) how careful or skilled the draftsman is, and (2) the parties' bargaining power. | Nah, you can't. First of all, you can't require the other party anything until you have a contract. They owe nothing to you. Once you've got an offer from them (i.e. a written contract they offer you to sign), you can ask them to clarify the terms as much as you wish — until they get bored and withdraw the offer. You also can make counteroffers: draft your own contract instead and offer them to sign. (Note that by doing this you kill their initial offer i.e. you can't accept it anymore unless they offer it again). Misrepresentation (let alone fraudulent) is not relevant until proven. Lack of clarity or complex legalese language is no misrepresentation. | Ah, the old "is this contract invalid (but still legally binding for the other party)"? You signed a contract with someone else. You do not dispute that it was you who signed the contract and agreed to it. You made it abundantly clear that there was a contract between you when you allowed him to do the work. This means one of the following was true: There was a mistake in the contract. What was followed was how it was intended. You signed a contract containing false information in an attempt to defraud someone. One of these will end up much worse for you. The fact that the work was not completed to the agreed upon standard could be considered a breach of contract- this is something a small claims court would decide. |
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