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Can a restrictive covenant deny a land owner the right to use a road on their own property? If an easement appurtenant grants access to a property for the purpose of traversing it, can it also restrict the servient estate from any use of that way of access? I am wondering about the enforceability of a restrictive covenant on a deed that completely denies the use of a road to a servient estate. It would seem that a restrictive covenant that entirely prevents the servient estate from using a road that crosses their property, essentially conveys the property to the dominant estate because in that case the servient estate would have no use whatsoever of that portion of their property. Since the whole point of a property right is to use and enjoy that property, it would seem that a restrictive covenant entirely denying access to a part of a property to the property owner would violate that fundamental right. | Can a restrictive covenant deny a land owner the right to use a road on their own property? Yes. A restrictive covenant could impose such a limitation, although usually a court would disfavor that interpretation of a covenant unless no other reasonable interpretation is possible from the language of the covenant. This is basically because it would be lawful (at common law anyway) to convey the land in its entirety to the covenant beneficiary, so it is lawful to convey a lesser interest to that person. It isn't inherently unconscionable unless it makes the property subject to the covenant landlocked with no access to a public road, in which case some mandatory doctrines regarding a right of access would probably apply. Often this would be done to create a private drive across the "front lot" (which has direct access to a public road by other means) when the "back lot" of a parcel was conveyed by the owner of the combined lot to the new owner of the back lot. A covenant might be chosen instead of an outright conveyance of the dogleg of road because it retains mineral rights in the servient estate owner, because it clearly allocates property tax payment duties to the underlying owner as part of a larger economic deal, and/or because it could make a transaction possible that would otherwise be prohibited by subdivision requirements applicable in that locality. The restriction might also reduce the servient estate owner's liability for accidents arising from use of the covenant access easement, since it would ordinarily vest all maintenance and use regulation in the dominant estate owner. Some other common easements that deny the servient estate owner all use of land for a period of time are easements to allow staging of road construction activities, and easements incident to mineral rights in states where destruction of the surface is allowed if it is later restored when the minerals are extracted (such as Wyoming). | It depends; Permission may be Required This depends on both the facts on the ground, and the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Residential fences are often governed by specific local laws at the municipal or county level in the US, so no generally applicable answer is possible, short of a book giving laws for each locality. Common-Law Rules Under the common law, followed by many but far from all US jurisdictions, the key question is whether a fence is a "partition fence" or not. A partition fence is one built on or near the property line that is owned jointly by the owners of the properties it divides. A fence near the property line is probably a partition fence if: The two property owners jointly built or paid for the building of the fence; Parts of the fence are on each side of the property line; The owners have agreed that the fence is common property; or Both owners "use" the fence, as by connecting it to another fence running in a different direction, or by relying on it to contain domestic animals. A Fence is probably not a partition fence if: It is entirely clear of the property line; Only the owner on whose property it rests maintains it; and Only the owner on whose property it rests uses it. The owner of one of the properties may not remove, demolish, or modify a partition fence without permission from the other. Removing or modifying a partition fence without the permission of the owner of the adjacent property is a tort, and can lead to damages for the value of the fence begin awarded. The owners must each maintain a partition fence, often each caring for his or her side. Failing to do so may be a tort. If a fence is not a partition fence, the owner of the land is also the sole owner of the fence, and may modify or remove it without permission from, or notice to, the owner of any adjacent or nearby property. However, the above common-law rules may be modified by local laws, and one would be wise to check, or consult a lawyer who knows how to check, before making any demands. Sources The page "Removal or Destruction of Fences" from US legal reads: A fence is an enclosure creating an adequate blockade around a particular land for the purpose of prohibiting intrusions from outside. A landowner can remove a fence, separating his/her land from that of his/her neighbor, when such fence is located wholly upon his/her own land. However, a landowner is not empowered to remove a partition fence without the adjacent landowner’s consent. A partition fence is the joint property of adjacent landowners. A fence erected on the line between the lands of adjoining owners generally belongs to the parties as tenants in common. Generally, a partition fence is built equally on both sides of the line. Until the contrary is shown, the partition fence is presumed to be the common property of both owners. An owner of adjoining land can remove a partition fence upon formal notice to adjacent landowners. For an improper removal of a partition fence, an aggrieved party can bring an action for damages. The standard for measuring damages for such removal or destruction is its value at the time. The value is determined by replacement costs minus depreciation for age and use. Moreover, when someone builds a fence on another person’s land without any authority to do so, the landowner can remove or destroy such fence. A person is liable for removing, destroying, or injuring a fence belonging to another person just as one who commits such acts against any kind of property belonging to another is liable[i]. Such person is considered a tortfeasor. However, an individual cannot remove or destroy a fence on another individual’s land without his/her consent. The page "Property Line and Fence Laws in Maryland" from FindLaw reads, in relevant part: Maryland doesn't have specific rules dealing with fences. Instead, the state follows the common law practice that a fence built along a boundary line is owned in common by both property owners when both use the fence, unless otherwise agreed. A property owner is said to use a fence when they "hook-up" to the fence with another row of fence, or keep animals in the enclosure created by the fence. A fence built and used only by the builder is that person's sole property. When you purchase a new home, you take a property with an existing fence built and used by prior owners. Simply put, if you buy a property with a co-owned fence, you likely need to continue your maintenance of the fence. The page "Is it legal for the neighbor to remove a fence on our shared property line?" from Justia's "Ask a Lawyer" feature reads: If both landowners paid to install a fence directly on a property line in the past, then yes, they need your permission to remove or replace the fence. Many fences are not built on a property line, but are instead just on one property or the other. If you have had your land surveyed, you may be able to determine your exact property line. You or your neighbor are free to build new fences without permission as long as neither the fence nor any construction or excavation encroaches on the other's property. Fences are a common property dispute, and can have long term effects. If a fence encroaches significantly on someone else's land for many years, this can actually become the new legal property line in some cases. According to the "Fences" section of the page "Disputes between your neighbours" from th New Zealand Law Society: In New Zealand this is regulated by the Fencing Act 1978. Except where modified by individual agreements: Fences must be on the boundary line, though there is provision for give and take where the true boundary is difficult to fence. The cost of building or repairing a fence is borne equally between adjoining owners, unless one owner damages it, in which case the cost of repairs will fall on that owner. You can compel your neighbour to contribute to the cost of the fence bordering your two properties by following the procedures set out in the Fencing Act ... Developers of new subdivisions usually exempt themselves from contributing to the cost of a fence. Under the Property Law Act 2007, it is possible to apply to a District Court for an order to remove or alter a fence that is detrimentally affecting land or obstructing a view. Usually the cost of any removal falls on the person applying for the order. The Booklet "Fences and the Law from the Legal Services Commission, South Australia states, on page 2: Fences should be regarded as a joint asset between neighbours. Even if your neighbour has not paid for the fence they are still a joint owner. This is because a fence on the boundary is legally considered to be part of the land on each side. If you intend to remove or alter an existing fence, you should have your neighbour’s permission or a court order. If you want to put up a fence where there has not been one before, your neighbour has a right to object. It makes no difference if you intend to pay the total cost | What is the name of the crime and/or tort I have committed? You are guilty of the crime of fraud, the crime of theft of the money and the item (I can't point you to the precise statute). You have breached your contract of sale. You are probably liable for fraud civilly (i.e. you could be sued for fraud). But, if one was really creative, I imagine that one could find more grounds for civil and/or criminal liability, although they would probably be unnecessary since the victims have plenty of remedies to secure all possible relief already. Who gets to keep the object? Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, in the United States, the general rule is delivery of possession by the seller (which didn't really happen here to one distinct person), but for unique goods, title passes when the unique good is identified to a contract with a buyer, so first in time to contract, first in right to the car, would probably prevail. But, I don't know what the rule would be in England and Wales. Is it handled differently if the "valuable physical object" is real estate? Land is harder to defraud someone with, because a reasonable person knows that in England and Wales real estate title is (usually, but not always) represented by a certificate of ownership maintained by a public official in the Land Registry, and is easily checked (about 15% of land in England and Wales show in the link is not registered so the possibility for deception is somewhat greater in that context). Also, generally, you don't pay for real property until you simultaneously receive payment in good funds, while brief extensions of credit for a non-perfectly contemporaneous sale transaction are more common in cases involving tangible personal property. | While the elements of criminal trespass vary from one U.S. state to another, the majority rule is that a good faith belief that you have a claim of a legal right to be present on property (even if you are ultimately found to be incorrect on the merits) prevents you from having the intent necessary to commit criminal trespass. The majority rule is that there is strict civil liability for trespass without regard to intent, but the minority rule that civil trespass is an intentional tort isn't terribly uncommon either, in which case criminal and civil liability for trespass would often be the same. Given the legitimate possibility on reasonable grounds that someone inside some given building is not actually supposed to be there, how might this apply to the law about it being mandatory to leave? What if you claimed you either did not think they were really in charge, or that you simply had no way of verifying? This is irrelevant. The burden is on you not to go into property where you are not allowed to be, and not on someone else to tell you to leave. If you know you have no right to be on the property, the fact that you believe someone else may also not have the authority to control who is on the property is not a defense to criminal trespass. You can be guilty of criminal trespass in most jurisdictions even if no one asks you to leave, if you know that you do not have permission to be on the property. Lack of permission is the default in the absence of someone with apparent authority to do so telling you otherwise. | Trespass to land in most instances is a civil matter, and as such the police do not have the power to assist. Initially, the landowner should ask the trespasser to leave the land and if he/she does then all is well. If he/she refuses to leave the land then you will need to consider taking civil action. It could be dangerous for the landowner to try to remove the trespasser themselves. The owner of the land could commit several criminal offences if he forcibly removes the trespasser and his/her property from the land. The best and safest course of action is to obtain a court order, which, if breached, can then become a criminal matter. If the police do attend an incident such as this, they are merely there as observers for any possible criminal offences committed by either party. The police cannot assist in the removal of the trespassers or their property from the land in question. Emphasis mine. https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q56.htm | Trespassing requires that you be on someone else's property without their permission. The supervisor has explicitly given you permission, so it's not possible for you to trespass. You are correct that someone with the proper authority could revoke this permission at any time, at which point you would have to leave or be guilty of trespassing. The only way this situation could constitute trespassing is if they revoke your permission and you ignore them. You can't trespass somewhere that the property owner has allowed you to be and you observe the rules they have set (which may be implied) for you being there. | In general, permission is not granted to enter the premises of another by climbing a fence unless it is explicitly granted. That the fence is on your property, but adjacent to the school's property, is a complication. The school, observing that there is a boundary fence, might reasonably rely on that to exclude people from entering other than at desired entry points. So it might be that your entry over the fence would be unauthorized and thus technically trespassing. If you were to put a gate in your own fence, the school's reliance is probably less reasonable. Or if you were to formally notify the school that you intend to enter the school grounds over your own fence. However, in practice, you are not trespassing until you are notified by the owner or owner's agent or someone with proper authority. If there is no sign, there can be no claim that you were notified by one. So until a school official or employee notices you using the fence and orders you to stop, there is no issue. | It's not THAT easy, and it's fifteen years, not ten. As you say, Virginia requires your neighbors to do more than mow your lawn to get title to your land. In Virginia, most of these requirements are laid out in judicial decisions, not statutes. However, the one requirement set by statute is that the possessor has to have "possessed" the land for 15 years. As for the rest of the requirements, they are the usual ones. Ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Virginia gave a nice, concise summary. It said that to "establish title...by adverse possession," your neighbor would have to prove that their possession was: actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous... Here is what the Court said each element requires: Use and occupation of property...constitutes proof of actual possession. One is in hostile possession if his possession is under a claim of right and adverse to the right of the true owner. One's possession is exclusive when it is not in common with others. Possession is visible when it is so obvious that the true owner may be presumed to know about it. Possession is continuous only if it exists without interruption for the statutory period. Two things to notice: Because your neighbor's possession must be adverse, you can stop the 15 year possession "clock" by simply giving them your permission to mow the lawn. It does not matter that your neighbors are mowing "in secret and without letting us know it." That you are here asking about it shows the mowing so "visible" that you know what is going on. For more information Whether your neighbors can claim your land depends on how Virginia courts have interpreted the law. Luckily for you, several Virginia lawyers have gone online to explain those details. These two, (one in the Washington Post), give nice overviews, while this guy, says mowing alone probably won't do it. This guy says, "Virginia courts don’t make adverse possession easy," but he's a NYer, through and through, so who knows whether he knows what he's talking about? Of course, none of this is a substitute for talking to a Virginia lawyer with experience in adverse possession. |
Can police arrest you to later fish for probable cause? Do police need to have established probable cause before they arrest you, or can your actions later validate the lack of probable cause that they had when they arrested you? I suspect this may just be one of the many reasons not to talk to the police. | Police may not arrest you without probable cause, and the existence of probable cause is evaluated “at the moment of the arrest.” Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). Therefore, police may not “look for after-the-fact justifications for [seizures] that would otherwise be impermissible.” United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 2010). In Beck, for instance, the defendant was arrested because he had a prior record of illegal gambling and because an officer had heard "reports" about him doing something that was never specified. When the officer saw the defendant driving, he stopped him and searched his car, but found nothing. He arrested him anyway, and when they got to the jail, they found betting slips in his pocket. He was convicted under the local gambling ordinance based on that evidence, but the Supreme Court reversed the conviction: The constitutional validity of the search in this case, then, must depend upon the constitutional validity of the petitioner's arrest. Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it — whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. However, if they want to arrest you for Crime A but only have probable cause to arrest you for Crime B, they may arrest you on that offense, and doing so may quite easily give them the time or access they need to gather additional evidence on Crime A. This is why so many large drug busts start as turn-signal violations. | It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal. | This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider. | Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors. | While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork. | Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while. | The Evidence Would be Admissible. Under the so-called "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule the evidence would probably be admitted over Bob's objections in both cases mentioned in the question. Recent US court decisions have limited the exclusionary rule when police officers reasonably but mistakenly believe that a valid warrant exists, and find evidence acting under such an apparent warrant. However, if there is good evidence of intentional falsification by the police, the exception will probably not apply. As to the second case, where Bob is home and protests that an error is being made, police are not required to, and often do not, accept much that suspects or subjects of warrants say in their own defense. If anyone could simply claim there was an error and delay a warrant, perhaps giving time to dispose of evidence, many problems would result. However, the "good faith" exception only applies where the police reasonably and honestly believe that the warrant is valid, or that probable cause exists. If Bob says something such as: This warrant is for 1020 Anne street, where Alice Crook lives. But I live at 1050 Albert street. See the house number is 1050 right here. There must be a mistake. then a reasonable officer would probably double check the warrant, and if the officer unreasonably fails to do so, the search might later be suppressed. But this is going to be a very fact-sensitive inquiry, and none of the cases that I know of on the "good faith exception" rule are exactly on point for this situation. I cannot be sure how a court might rule in such a case. Leon and Evans Cases In United States v. Leon 468 U. S. 897, the US Supreme Court created a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. In that case the Court held that when officers make an objectively reasonable, good faith decision to rely on a warrant later held to be invalid, the exclusionary rule does not apply, and evidence found during a search under such a warrant, or in the course of an arrest under such a warren, is admissible. The basic logic is that when the invalid warrant was the result of an honest mistake, suppressing the evidence would have no deterrent effect on future similar mistakes, as no one intended to make them in any case. In Arizona v. Evans 514 U. S. 1 (1995), this rule was extended to officer who rely in good faith on information mistakenly provided by Court employees. The underlying logic is much the same. Herring v. United States In Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) this exception was further extended to officers who acted in good faith on the mistaken information of other officers. Evidence found in a search incident to an arrest, although there was no valid arrest warrant or other probable cause, was not suppressed. In this case a warrant had been issued but later recalled. however this recall was somehow not properly entered into the database of warrants maintained by a sheriff's office. When a nearby jurisdiction called to ask if there was an outstanding warrant on Herring, they were told that there was one. Herring was arrested, and drugs and an unlawful firearm found. Minutes later the officers were told that the arrest warrant was not valid. Herring was convicted based on the evidence from the search, and the US Supreme court upheld the conviction. The court wrote in Herring: When a probable-cause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a constitutional violation. The very phrase “probable cause” confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision. And whether the error can be traced to a mistake by a state actor or some other source may bear on the analysis. For purposes of deciding this case, however, we accept the parties’ assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment violation. The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223 (1983). Indeed, exclusion “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 591 (2006), and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule. ... the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ... When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted “in objectively reasonable reliance” on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. 468 U. S., at 922 (Leon). We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance “good faith.” In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when a warrant was invalid because a judge forgot to make “clerical corrections” to it. ... in Evans, 514 U. S. 1, we applied this good-faith rule to police who reasonably relied on mistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant was outstanding. We held that a mistake made by a judicial employee could not give rise to exclusion for three reasons: The exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct; court employees were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and “most important, there [was] no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in [those] circumstances” would have any significant effect in deterring the errors ... the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional ... ... To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. ... In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978), ... we held that police negligence in obtaining a warrant did not even rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, let alone meet the more stringent test for triggering the exclusionary rule. ... We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. In Leon we held that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” 468 U. S., at 922. The same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant. If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. See the Wikipedia article on Herring and this Leagal Information Institute article on the case | In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject. |
Is licensing required to use an excerpt of a song within a recording? I'm currently recording a cover version of a song for inclusion on a compilation album which will be sold on Bandcamp. Because Bandcamp does not pay mechanical royalties, the organiser of the compilation (and owner of the Bandcamp account) is paying up front for the song licenses. However, I want to include excerpts from two other songs within my recording - it would be an entirely new recording by me with no samples, but there would be two lines from two different songs along with the recognisable melodies. The entire recording is around 4 minutes, the two excerpts are around 10 seconds each, so they are not a substantial part of the piece - it is not a 'medley', the excerpts are meant as homages The focus of this question is this : Would rights for all three songs need to be obtained, or just the 'main' song being covered? In answering this question I would appreciate if you would consider and explain: Could the small excerpts be considered 'fair use'? Does it make a difference that one of the excerpts is by the same artist as the main song being covered? As the original artist will be paid the appropriate licensing for the whole song, would this negate the need to paid / negotiated for the tiny segment of another of their songs? Although the compilation is being 'sold' on Bandcamp, 100% of the proceeds are going to a fundraiser to pay for a child's medical bills (NOT an official charity in any way) | Whether the use of excerpts from songs protected by copyright in the cover version of a different song is a "fair use" under US law is always a fact-driven question, and often there is no clear answer to fair use issues short of a lawsuit. One must remember that fair use is a specifically united-states legal concept, and that reproduction of such a cover version outside the US would not be protected by fair use, even if it was fair use under US law. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. That law spells out the four factors that must always be considered in any fair use claim. They are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. These have been explained and analyzed in several answers here on law.se, recently including this answer. In this case the commercial nature of the compilation probably causes factor (1) to lean against fair use. The creative character of the songs being used will cause factor (2) to lean slightly against fair use. That the use is for a charitable purpose might have a positive effect on factor (1), although it does not fit the "educational" purpose specifically mentioned in the law. I don't see how this would be in any way relevant to the other three factors, but it might influence the decisions of copyright owners. There is not enough information in the question to even approximate an analysis of the other two factors in this case. Note that the "substantiality" mentioned in factor (2) refers to how much of the source work is used, not how large a part of the resulting work it forms. Note also that there is a wide range of what has been acceptable here. In one famous case (Harper v Nation Enterprises) some 300 words of a 500 page book were found not to be fair use because they were held to be the "heart of the work"; in that case there was also a substantial market effect. One might want to consult a lawyer with expertise in copyright and music to get a better idea if the specific use seems likely to be a fair use. Alternatively, one could ask the copyright owners of the works of which excerpts are to be included if a license can be obtained. Some owners will in some cases provide licenses for a small fee or even for no fee if the source is properly acknowledged. Others will not. Licensing of one song by a given artist does not affect whether use of another song by the same artist is or is not fair use, but it might influence the willingness of that artist to license the second song on favorable terms. | Yes it's illegal. Just like singing/whistling happy birthday in public (used to be) illegal. You could be sued for untold amount of damages that could ruin your life forever (in theory). If you whistle a mashup remix then it's legal as long as it's different enough from the original that you can't tell that they are the same song anymore. Yes anyone can sue you if you piss them off. Disney doesn't sue all the people who sing covers of their songs because it's bad for business to piss off your fans, but they can sue if they feel like it. This is more common sense than anything else but I suggest you look into fair use copyright law since there is a lot of misconception about it. https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/what-is-fair-use/ | They wouldn't need to keep samples, just the fingerprint. So they could send a guy with a laptop to Japan, download all the songs, fingerprint them, and take the fingerprints back home. It's not a problem, but it would be expensive. I suspect that US and European record companies will make the music available to them for free, otherwise they'd have to pay 20-30 million dollars for 20-30 million songs. The Japanese record companies wouldn't, so while it is technically and legally possible to collect the fingerprints, it would be expensive. And what is the benefit? We are talking here about music that you cannot legally own, that you cannot legally buy after the software recognised it, so there is very little incentive to spend that money. | It does. Youtube has a service where copyright owners of music can monetize infringing videos such that ad revenue goes to the copyright holder rather than the uploader. Alternatively the copyright holder can choose to have the video stripped of the music or taken down. In all other cases, the copyright owner simply isnt bothered to employ people to find illegally uploaded copies of the music | As for the subject matter (what can be protected), amplitude, frequency, harmonic pattern, duration etc. are all physical facts, and there is no protection for physical facts. The basic requirement is that the thing protected must be "creative". Once you have a creative composition (assuming it is a composition, where infringement is harder to establish), the question arises whether a particular other composition infringes, or is an independent creation deserving its own protection. Again, the law does not deal in technical acoustic properties, and "similarity" is dealt with in an essentially subjective manner. The find of fact, who is an ordinary observer, has to weight all of the evidence and decide whether there is substantial similarity (or striking similarity) which could be evidence of infringement (substantial similarity is not against the law, copyright infringement is). Both parties to the litigation will present testimony supporting their contention and refuting the others' contention. At some point, one side is likely to introduce expert testimony to the effect that there are only so many possible melodies, which if persuasive can overcome a feeling that two compositions are rather similar. The law only addresses the logic of that judgment, and not the scientific facts. For example, in the case of Testa v. Janssen, the legal premise is set doen that "proof of direct access is unnecessary where striking similarities between two works are present". HOw then do you know if there are striking similarities? To prove that similarities are striking, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "such similarities are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source." Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.1973) citing a previous ruling on that point. Ultimately, the courts cannot not dictate a scientific procedure for making that determination. | If the typography is a significant aspect of the overall art of a song title - wherever the song title may be reproduced, i.e. poster, CD cover, etc. - than I'd say that's part of the copyright of the artwork as a whole and not simply the title, and is under copyright. Further, individual type faces can be under copyright themselves. And band names can be trademarked; you will need permission to use the name for products and advertising, since using the name will imply an endorsement from that band. | There seems, to my ear, to be a degree of similarity between the first two works. The third does not sound, to me, very similar to either of the first two. That is not a legal question, and I am no expert. However, all of these seem to be simple themes of only a few notes, repeated, in one case with some variations. The history of music is replete with examples of short themes or figures duplicated without intentional copying. Generally, to win a copyright suit over a claimed infringement of a musical copyright one must show either proven direct copying, or identity of melody over a long enough passage that independent invention is not plausible. Normally access of the alleged infringer to the claimed source is also shown. How much identity is needed is a judgement call for the court involved, often based on expert testimony, but I rather doubt if the short themes linked in the question would be found to infringe one another. In any case, even if identity is proved, it is possible that both are copying some earlier source, perhaps one in the public domain, or one properly licensed. It is also possible that one of thee has obtained a license from another and so is perfectly legal. There is no way to know without the records of those involved. | In the United States, when you distribute a recording of a nondramatic musical work, the law grants a compulsory mechanical license allowing anyone to cover the song provided certain formalities are observed, and royalties are paid to the original artist. See 17 U.S.C. sec. 115. If your song falls under this section, then all that is required for your friend to cover it is to give you notice and to pay royalties as provided by the applicable statutes and regulations. Of course, you are free to negotiate other terms if you want to. But your song can be covered even if you don't. |
Voice samples from the old movies in the music tracks I bet most of you have heard - in some music compositions - short 5-10 seconds "injections" of voice-lines from some old movies. I'm producing a track right now, where I want to insert a phrase from "Conan the Destroyer" (1984), it's under 10 seconds in length. I wonder if such use is "legal"? I assume, due to neglectable short length of the sound-sample, it should be fine, but I just want to double-check. Any links to corresponding laws/acts would be appreciated, thanks. | Unless the "old" movie is so old that its copyright has expired (prior to 1926 in the US currently, I believe, the precise rule varies by country) or it entered the public domain in some other way (unusual), it is protected by copyright. One may use part of a copyrighted work only with permission from the copyright owner, unless an exception to copyright applies. Exceptions to copyright vary significantly from country to country In the US, the primary exception is fair use. This answer describes fair use is some detail. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. Whether something is a fair use is a highly-fact-driven determination., There is no clear bright line. Several factors must be considered, including at least the four= statutory factors. A short except, used in a transformative way, that does not harm the market for the original will often qualify as fair use, but details will matter. There is no specific length that qualifies a sound excerpt as fair use. For text, in the well known case of Harper v. Nation an excerpt of less than 300 words from a 500 page book was judged not to be fair use, because it was held to be "the heart of the work" and because its publication significantly harmed the market for the original (a paying contract was canceled because of the use). In other situations, much larger excepts have been held to be fair use. In some countries there is an exception to copyright known as "fair dealing" which is somewhat similar to fair use, but rather narrower and more restricted. Other countries have a list of specific exceptions (the law of India has more than 20 different exceptions). News reporting, criticism, commentary, and classroom use are common exceptions. In many countries, sampling is not covered by any exception, and permission is required. If an exception does not apply, and permission is not obtained, then using copyrighted content is copyright infringement. This is, in most cases, a tort, meaning that the copyright owner may sue the infringer. Such a suit may be brought in any country where infringing works are crested or distributed, and possibly in other countries as well. If the plaintiff (owner) wins, damages will be awarded. The rules for determining damages vary widely between countries, and the specific facts of the case will matter. To get a reliable opinion on whether a specific use qualifies under an exception to copyright, or requires permission, one would do well to consult a lawyer with copyright expertise. Or one could simply ask for permission from the copyright holder. For a publicly released movie, finding the copyright owner should not usually be too hard. The owner may say yes or no, or ask for a fee or other conditions. If the owner simply ignores a request for permission, that must be taken as a "no". For this kind of use, an owner is free to reject or ignore requests for permission if it so chooses. (In the US, cover versions of songs are subject to a compulsory license under certain conditions.) | Copyright is automatic - it starts to exist when you create a work of a type protected by law. Lyrics are such a work, and thus your lyrics are protected. Even the fact that the lyrics go with an existing (public domain) melody is protected. In addition, your recording is protected. However, the melody is probably not copyrighted, and does not become copyrighted merely because you re-used it. (Probably, because you didn't indicate how old, so I assumed old enough that nobody remembers the origin) | Each episode of the show as a whole, and all the individual images in it, are protected by copyright, but the idea of a holophonor, or indeed any idea, is not. The more closely anyone else's drawing of a gadget resembles one from the show, the more likely it would be to be found to infringe copyright. The same is true of a character image. The more distinctive and original the image, and the more closely someone copies it, the more likely a finding of infringement would be. | Game mechanics are not copyright able. However, the images, words used, description of the rules are all copyright. If the original games is the source of the video game then the video game is a derivative work. If the original game is only the inspiration and the look and feel is different then this is OK. Which is which will turn on the actual facts. | Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged. | On the face of it, transcripts are derivative work covered by copyright (even if automagically generated). You are allowed to use them if the use is fair use or if you comply with YouTube's terms of service. | TL;DR: Probably not. Per Wikipedia, under USA law, for any audio recordings published after February 15, 1972, the earliest it it will enter public domain is 2043. CBS Mystery Theater was published from January 6, 1974 through December 31, 1982, per Wikipedia. Therefore, these recordings are not likely to be in the public domain until after 2043. If CBS, or whichever company now owns CBS Mystery Theater were to have made it available under a sufficiently permissive license, it's likely that it would, in practice, be in a very similar status to being in public domain. However with a quick search, I couldn't find any evidence that the owner of CBS Mystery Theater has in fact done so. Of course, my searching is imperfect, and Wikipedia might be wrong. It's possible that it is indeed released under a sufficiently permissive license, though I wouldn't personally bet on it. Finally, I'm not a lawyer, so my reading of the whole situation might be really wrong. | Under U.S. law (17 U.S. Code § 101 ) A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” But probably, focusing on this definition doesn't get to the heart of the question you seem to be asking. A more important matter becomes what protections does a copyright exclude? This is covered in § 102 (b), which says: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The similarities you describe seem to be more ideas and concepts rather than Heinlein's expression of those ideas. I have looked no closer than the description used in the question, but the movie seems unlikely to have violated a protected right. Others might disagree. |
If a person keeps making business promises to deliver but does not deliver (Scams), could this be considered a Crime? I know one person who approaches many business for services and defaults on his promise to deliver. Basically he takes the money and simply runs away. This has happened multiple times and people say he is a scammer. He has lost countless civil lawsuits as well but none of them could be recovered as he has zero assets. He cleverly hides them all. For a jurisdiction, I am in Australia, but I would like this question to be general. i.e. If a person keeps making business promises to deliver but does not deliver (like a Scam), could this be considered a Crime? | Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar. | I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B). | Is UPS allowed to take my money and business without intention to fulfill its side of the transaction? No. The company's belated change of mind constitutes breach of contract, and its subsequent refusal to give you a refund completes the prima facie elements of fraud and/or unjust enrichment. The company's acceptance of your package & money and its subsequent act of sending your package to NC strike the applicability of its clause on Refusal of Service (see the link provided in the other answer). The blanket term of "among other reasons" is hardly enforceable at that point. In particular, the existence of a lawsuit between the recipient and the company further weakens any merits of the company's belated change of mind. That is because, by virtue of that lawsuit, the company currently has to deliver to that same recipient other packages anyway. Thus, the company cannot allege that delivering your package "is unsafe or economically or operationally impracticable". Also, since you are the one who paid for the service, the company cannot withdraw on grounds of "the person or entity responsible for payment is not in good standing". | What would be the best course of action now? It has been six months with no communication from him or his estate lawyer, and no will has been filed with the court. Since it's not entering probate, is there any guarantee that he has to faithfully execute the conditions of the will at all or notify any of the beneficiaries? Without probate, can he simply choose to not execute the will? A will has no effect or validity until it is admitted to probate. You can't do anything with a will outside a probate proceeding. Usually state law requires that a will that is in someone's possession be lodged with the court, whether or not they plan on opening up a probate estate, but this requirement is widely ignored. Unlike a will, a trust can be administered without court supervision, without being admitted to probate, although usually, the trust is required to file a notice of its existence with the court if it has become irrevocable (a requirement that is also widely ignored). The trustee of a trust has a fiduciary duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms and to keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about it. Again, sometimes the notice to the beneficiaries is overlooked. Also, it wouldn't be unusual for someone to inaccurately say that a will provided that a certain thing happen, when, in fact, that was a provision in a trust. People are sloppy in ordinary conversation about the distinctions between wills and trusts. If a trust was drafted to avoid probate, the will is probably just a "pour over will" which states that if there is any property that is not in the trust as her death that it is hereby transferred to the trust. Normally, a person would not have both a trust designed to avoid probate and a will with substantive provisions at the same time. If you suspect that you know who the trustee is, the first step would be to write a formal letter that you can prove was sent and received (e.g. via certified mail or FedEx), asking if there is a trust, and if there is one, if you are a beneficiary of that trust, and asking for the trust agreement (or at least the parts of it pertinent to you status as beneficiary). If the person that you suspect is trustee is a trustee, he has a legal duty to let you know these things (which doesn't mean that he necessarily will do so). If you fail to receive cooperation or a response after this initial inquiry, you may need to hire counsel to attempt to obtain this information through the courts. | First, if by "they say" you literally mean they use spoken words, and not a printed advertisement, or an advertisement on the internet that you can print out, then you may have a hard time proving what they said. If you can prove what they said that would be very helpful, a seller may be in trouble if their contract is not the same as what they promised. If things go to court, then a judge will first figure out what the contract is (let's say both sides have a copy of the contract - but the words are different, then a jury decides). That's not what we have here. Then the judge decides what the words in the contract mean. If the words are ambiguous, then the judge interprets the words in favour of the person who didn't write the contract. | Ignoring morals, is there legal obligation for him to attempt to return the refund? No, but he must pay for the goods if the supplier asks. Does this fall under unjust enrichment? No. This is simply a contract law issue. The person is contractually obliged to pay for the goods and, in the present circumstances, they haven’t done so. If so, to what extent must he try? He doesn’t have to make an active effort to pay but he can if he likes. However, if and when the vendor realises their mistake and asks for payment, it must be made in a reasonable time. | "Fraud" requires an intent to deceive. In cases like this I would fall back on the saying, "Never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence." Practically speaking: the email you received from them is an amendment to their Terms of Service. I.e., your contract with the company starts with their standard Terms of Service, and is modified by any agreement you reach that explicitly supersedes the ToS. Based on your description it is your credit card company that is in violation of its duty to adjudicate chargebacks. If you refuse the charge, and present the email agreement and evidence of A's "failure," then the card company has no grounds to impose the charge on you (unless the merchant in its response to the chargeback can convincingly argue that the email agreement is invalid). | Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own. |
When can employer on hourly basis cancel work at the latest? I'm trying to find out if a new policy implemented by my employer is legal. I'm employed on an hourly basis, no minimum amount of work, with shift plans made yearly. Now they started cancelling some work less than 3 hours in advance depending on business needs (which make sense, but aren't my problem). I can't track down any specific legislation, I found SR 220 Art. 324 and SR 822.111 Art. 69 (official commentary/explanations by SECO) which both seem to support me, but aren't specific enough to be of any use to me. Switzerland, Canton of Zurich. | First Part OR 324 is quite the right article for this. If the employer doesn't want that you work (because he has nothing to do for you) it's his problem, not yours. He still has to pay if you are there and ready to do work. This is for instance also mentioned in this article. The meaning of this is obvious if having a contract with a fixed number of work hours per day/month/year. Second part Prove that you have a fixed work contract. If the shift plans are made in advance you have a proof that you have a certain number of hours to work (and thus an expected income). If I interpret this here correctly, this is "echte Arbeit auf Abruf" (true work on request), because if your employer wants your work, you have to be there according to the shift plan, as opposed to your employer asking "who is ready to work tonight?". So your employer must pay you the hours agreed on in the shift plan, regardless of whether he has work for you or not (but you must explicitly tell him that you are willing to take work). Third part Can the employer change the shift plan, and to what extent? The employer must announce changes to work hours as soon as possible, and changes on short notice are only acceptable in emergency cases. A reduction in work hours due to not enough work shall not reduce the employee's salary. The business risk is entirely with the employer and he must not shift that responsibility to his employees. (That was common in the late 19th and early 20th century, with all the officially self-employed home workers in the textile industry). Here is a federal court decision that affirms this (BGE 125 III 65 S. 66). | Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement. | Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted. | Are there any protections against an employer circumventing the WARN act by staggering layoffs over multiple days? For example, could an employer lay off 200 people without notice by laying off 40 employees each day for a week? The WARN Act's definition of layoffs measures the number of employees laid off in "any 30-day period". 29 U.S.C. § 2101. So, to lay off 200 people without notice, it would have to stagger it at 40 people a month over five months, not over five days. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. | Executive Summary Yes, you must pay your employee (if the person is indeed an employee) to read the manual. This is because, (1) as you note in your question, reading the manual is a state OSHA required part of the job, and (2) hourly employees must be paid at least minimum wage for all hours they work and there is no exception for time spent reading safety manuals. Furthermore, household cooks who are employees who are paid by the hour are not exempt from the minimum wage. There is no really plausible exception to the requirement to pay a minimum hourly wage that would apply to someone who is an employee in this position. For example, this person could not plausible be classified as a salaried employee or manager in this scenario for FLSA purposes. You could, of course, set a reasonable expectation regarding how much time should be allocated to reading the manual, so long as the expectation you set is indeed reasonable - five minutes would be unreasonably short, but 20 hours to memorize it would be unreasonably long. Is The "Employee" An Independent Contractor? It is conceivable that the person you describe as an employee is really an independent contractor, rather than a employee, and hence not subject to minimum wage laws. For example, you do not have a duty to determine that a catering company that serves many customers and is its own business providing food for you on an irregular basis, or a third-party restaurant that delivers either itself or through a third-party delivery service, is paying minimum wage or complying with work safety laws like OSHA, because they are independent contractors. But, there is nothing in your question that suggests that this is the case. (Note that if this person is an "employee" and not an "independent contractor" that it is also important that you obtain worker's compensation and pay withholding taxes for your domestic employee; often this is done via a third-party payroll service.) Applicable Law The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., requires you to pay every hourly employee the federal minimum wage, plus overtime if applicable, from "Portal to Portal" (i.e. from showing up to work until leaving work, because commuting time is not counted as work for purposes of the FLSA). Hours worked is defined as follows by the FLSA at 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), contains no exception for time spent reading a safety manual: In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee. This states with respect to employees in domestic service at 209 U.S.C. § 206(f): Any employee— (1) who in any workweek is employed in domestic service in a household shall be paid wages at a rate not less than the wage rate in effect under subsection (b) of this section unless such employee’s compensation for such service would not because of section 209(a)(6) of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C.A. § 409(a)(6)constitute wages for the purposes of title II of such Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.], or (2) who in any workweek— (A) is employed in domestic service in one or more households, and (B) is so employed for more than 8 hours in the aggregate, shall be paid wages for such employment in such workweek at a rate not less than the wage rate in effect under subsection (b) of this section. The referenced Section 206(b) is the currently effective federal minimum wage (currently $7.25 per hour). The cross-reference to the Social Security Act states that employment taxes paid by the employer (such as the employer part of FICA taxes) do not count towards paying the minimum wage. California has a parallel state minimum wage of $10 in 2017 which is substantially similar except in amount. | No First, there does not appear to be unlawful discrimination: there is nothing to suggest that you are a member of a protected class and were terminated because of that. Second, you were given no reason for your dismissal so your employer is not claiming you were terminated for just cause. So, in BC, an employer "can end an employee's job by giving written working notice or pay" and this is perfectly legal. For someone who worked for "about 6 months", the notice/pay period is 1 week. So either they must give you 1 weeks work or pay you 1 weeks wages. | The real question isn't whether there is a law, but whether you want to keep your job. If you want to do something that you believe will affect your company negatively, and you ask whether it's legal or not, the question alone should show you it's a bad idea. And another question is whether you can be sued, and what it will cost you even if you can win a case, and the answers to that are "yes" and "a lot". |
Terminated without cause. Do I have a claim for unjust termination or toxic work environment? I was recently terminated without cause. I had been working in a liquor store for about 6 months. There was something "special" about the work environment. Several businesses in the area were owned by the same parent company. The store I worked in had a back door that connected to a brewery and restaurant etc. Sometimes management from the other parts would come in to "help out" or tell us what to do. For example the bar manager complained we were keeping the lights too bright and it was affecting his customers (the door was glass so you could see through it). I wasn't given a reason or notice for termination but I can guess why. Yesterday I was in a room alone and dropped the f word a few times. I was mad because a car just ran over my phone. Someone came in and told me not to swear. I apologized and said I didn't realize other people could hear. I latter found out he was a cook from the kitchen. My coworker told me I go home or go get my phone repaired. I left for a few hours. I know it's strange but it's common for people in this job to leave for long periods of time and come back to work later. After I returned my manager came in. She complained it was her day off and she lives far away. She asked for "my side of the story". So basically I was fired for swearing. What I would like is a) to get the job back b) get money I'm wondering if there could be discrimination? Other coworkers swear, even in front of customers. Others leave up to 2 hours early or take ridiculously long breaks. I found it very hostile that a cook would complain to management about me swearing, even after I apologized and explained I didn't realize people could hear. In general I felt the management did not provide a safe work environment On multiple occasions my manager told me she thinks a coworker of mine is doing a terrible job. She knows this but forces me to work with them. The store only has 2 people working at a time and some tasks require 2 people. Another coworker was very difficult to work with. I think he may have had a mental illness. I wasn't made aware of the details but he complained to the parent company about me and refused to work with me. Initially the manager had wanted to reduce my work hours so we wouldn't have to work together though this never happened. On one occurrence I was outside of work and he came running after me yelling about how I didn't do my job. He wanted to quit but management asked him to stay to give them time to find a replacement. He stayed for another day but got mad and walked out halfway through a shift. management had repeatedly asserted that people shouldn't be working alone, yet people often times were scheduled to work alone Work Safe came in on several occasions and made orders. Not all of the orders were fully enforced. For example we were supposed to have a Joint Health and Safety Comity. This was supposed to happen but just never did. Also the first aid kit went missing. When I needed to take time off work for a medical appointment they tried to tell me I wasn't allowed. management repeatedly said they would make things better, for example having a ban list for customers who were caught stealing. Though I was hired as clerk, I was told to stand outside and do crowed control (security guard work) On at least one occasion a restaurant worker tried to trick me into selling him alcohol even though he was underage. He used his position of how we are sort of coworkers to influence me. I didn't sell it to him in the end. We stopped accepting cash payments when COVID started. Management kept saying that we were going to accept cash payments again. In fact, one manager was working with us on the floor for a while. She saw how crazy and angry some customers got by not accepting cash. She said she realize this was abusive to staff and will have the tills with change back so we can start accepting cash again. So basically management new that we were working in an abusive environment. most of the price tags were wrong. Customers got mad about this but management did not give us the tools to fix it. one till can't print receipts and hasn't been fixed for over a month There were aggressive customers but management refused to view video surveillance to ban them Refunds couldn't be made to debit cards. Given that the displayed prices were sometimes off, this was a big problem. Had to climb up an unsteady latter to do get to storage. Work Safe ordered the company to have an engineer inspect it but to my knowledge this never happened. Coworkers did very unethical things. One example is a coworker sold things that we were supposed to give away for free with purchase with a specific product and pocketed the cash. Can management turn a blind eye to things like that and fire me for swearing? Are any of these points worth hiring a lawyer for? | No First, there does not appear to be unlawful discrimination: there is nothing to suggest that you are a member of a protected class and were terminated because of that. Second, you were given no reason for your dismissal so your employer is not claiming you were terminated for just cause. So, in BC, an employer "can end an employee's job by giving written working notice or pay" and this is perfectly legal. For someone who worked for "about 6 months", the notice/pay period is 1 week. So either they must give you 1 weeks work or pay you 1 weeks wages. | You do have freedom of conscience but you do not have a blanket right to refuse work you were ordered to perform. You have to perform work you were ordered to perform. If you refuse, you can get an Abmahnung (disciplinary letter). A second Abmahmung would be grounds for firing. The Abmahnung is invalid if the work you refused would have been unreasonable – but you'd have to litigate this. Your freedom of conscience does affect what work you can be reasonably asked to perform. You have the burden of proof to show that the work would have been unreasonable. You are required to alert the employer in advance. If you took a job where you could reasonably have been expected to know that it might come into conflict with your conscience, you should have mentioned this during the interview. Taking the job anyway effectively waives your freedom of conscience. Of course this doesn't apply if your job changed after you were hired. If you successfully claim freedom of conscience, you are not entitled for pay for the work that you didn't perform. Here, your claim of freedom of conscience does not seem to stand on very strong footing. It is normal for web development to include analytics, ads, and social integrations (what you seem to call “trackers”). This is a bit like taking a job as a nurse and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to perform blood transfusions” or taking a job at a defense contractor and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to work on weapons”. Your personal conscience may be more strict than applicable laws, but don't forget that there are laws. You might reasonably see it as your professional obligation to alert stakeholders of their compliance obligations. You have a stronger case for refusing work than the difficult to prove “freedom of conscience” if the work you are asked to perform would be illegal. You'd have a stronger argument for exercising your freedom of conscience if your work would endanger users that live under oppressive governments. | You are asking the wrong question: it is up to you to decide how to deal with your injury. The employer's role, if any, is limited to after-the-fact compensation. In Texas, workman's compensation coverage is not mandatory, so that is a variable affecting the details. If the employer has workman's comp, they are protected from various legal actions against time, but they also don't get a "vote" in compensation, which is provided by the insurance company. Assuming that the employer is a non-subscriber (as they are called), then the question of employer liability is resolved either by negotiation or lawsuit. You can read a breakdown of the legal essentials here. When you go to court, you would have to prove that the employer was at fault. Let's assume that you've proven that, then the remaining question is whether that loss is reasonably related to the injury that the employer was responsible for. There are multiple kinds of medical transportation available, ranging from patient self-transportation on the bus to calling 911. The laws regarding 911 calls are a matter of local jurisdiction, but the general rule is that you only call 911 for genuine emergencies. However, there isn't a clear, practical standard that distinguishes between an emergency vs. "something that you need to deal with eventually". Given your description of the injury, I will work on the assumption that this qualifies as a true medical emergency in your town. Now, typically, 911 EMTs make a professional judgment whether you need ordinary ambulance transportation vs. "Medic One" style transportation – this isn't decided by the employer. The one area where an employer could have a say in the matter is in accessing his personal or work phone, in order to call 911. Your description of the circumstances is not exactly clear: do you have a phone, or access to a phone? You do not have to have employer permission to make an emergency call on your phone. So to continue looking for ways to make this a problem for the employer, I will assume that you had no access to a phone of your own or any other employee, and the employer refused to let you use his personal phone or company phone to call 911, but would let you use his phone to call home (this is an entirely rhetorical assumption, but I have no evidence that the situation is otherwise). Now the question is whether the employer has a legal obligation to provide access to a work or personal phone in order to make an emergency call. Now we have a specific Texas law, Penal Code §42.062 which says in part that it is a crime when one knowingly prevents or interferes with another individual's ability to place an emergency call or to request assistance, including a request for assistance using an electronic communications device, in an emergency from a law enforcement agency, medical facility, or other agency or entity the primary purpose of which is to provide for the safety of individuals Here is a lawyer's talk-through of this law, which does not address to $64,000 question whether the law creates a "duty to assist" rather than a "duty to not interfere". The answer is tied to the basic lawsuit question of whether the employer is at fault. Under the common law, if a party has created a harmful situation, they have a duty to assist in mitigating that situation. So if you were horsing around on the job and you're at fault for the injury, then the employer is not liable and you have to shoulder the burden for treatment. If they are at fault, they also have to assist you in seeking emergency medical treatment. I doubt that the courts would find it to be a crime to refuse to call 911, but the employer could be civilly liable. | If you could successfully prove constructive dismissal (you probably could) then you have been terminated and would be entitled to the pro-rata bonus. Of course, if the company is not in a financial position to pay your wages, it probably can't pay the bonus either. | The fact that the employer has vicarious liability for acts of its employees "within the scope of employment" does not mean the employees are not also liable for their own acts. In reality, however, the employer is more likely to have insurance for such "acts or omissions" of employees. The plaintiffs can "sue everyone in sight" and let them figure out who actually pays when they are found liable. That way, when the employee's actions are (for instance) ruled a "personal frolic" or otherwise outside the scope of the employer's liability (in tort or contract), the case doesn't get dismissed for failure to name all the proper parties. One policy goal is to place financial liability as close as possible to the person most likely to have been able to avoid the harm, thus discouraging such risks, without placing the entire burden on individuals employed in hazardous occupations and without artificially limiting potential sources of compensation. | It's probably not unlawful to ask, but an answer cannot be required immediately. Per the Department of Labor, Susan has 60 days to elect COBRA coverage (the qualifying event here being the termination of Susan's employment): Your plan must give you at least 60 days to choose whether or not to elect COBRA coverage, beginning from the date the election notice is provided or the date you would otherwise lose coverage under your group health plan due to the qualifying event, whichever is later. It would be unlikely for an employer to discourage an employee from electing COBRA coverage due to costs to the employer, as you suggest: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because the company is struggling financially and is looking for every opportunity to save money. Susan electing to use COBRA coverage is unlikely to cost the company money, because the employer is permitted to charge her the entire cost of the coverage, plus 2 percent to cover the cost of administering it (additional DoL source). As far as privacy goes, I don't think anything illegal has occurred here. The most prevalent law regarding privacy of health information, HIPAA, generally does not apply to employers. Susan could, of course, request a private discussion, and any response from Emily could not rise to the level of illegal harassment or create a hostile work environment. | UK: For all I know you cannot be fired unless you are hired. They must hire you. Once a job offer is made and accepted, they must hire you. If they don't, call a lawyer. I personally know someone who got hired, and when he arrived for his first day's work at the new company, he found that the whole department that he was supposed to join had been laid of. The company had to hire him. PS. "Financial difficulties" means you call a lawyer urgently. Once they are bankrupt your chances of extracting money are not good. | Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice. |
What can the Chairman of the board do if he is on bad terms with the majority shareholders / directors Our (Australian Incorporated) company is growing and we have been suggested to hire an influential individual to be the Chairman of our board. He has a lot of connections, experience, old , mature and will be beneficial to our company's growth. He does not hold any shares of the company and only appointed by the shareholders/directors. Me and 2 other guys still hold controlling shares (55%) of the company Just a scenario.... say things get bitter between us, and the Chairman wants to assert his power for vengeful purpose. What authority does he have as the chairman of the board to make our lives or board meetings difficult? And what do we do if such a thing occur? | What powers does the company give the chair? Companies in australia operate in accordance with the Replaceable Rules in the Corporations Act or a constitution or both. The Chair can only do what these allow. A company can adopt a constitution before or after registration. If it is adopted before registration, each member must agree (in writing) to the terms of the constitution. If a constitution is adopted after registration, the company must pass a special resolution to adopt the constitution. Under the Replaceable Rules, the chair has the powers of a director (because they are one). This means they can manage the company and do anything that the company can do except for things the company can only do at a general meeting. For example, the directors may issue shares, borrow money and issue debentures. They also have the ability to chair directors meetings they attend. If they are not present at a meeting, the directors that are present must choose one of them to act as chair. Any director can be removed by resignation or by resolution of the company at a shareholder’s meeting. Under a constitution, anything goes subject to compliance with the law. | The first step is to file a formal complaint against the instructor. When your university-internal avenues have been exhausted, you would then need to hire an attorney to sue the university. There is virtually no chance that you will succeed with a lawsuit. If the university had failed to follow its own procedures, or had egregiously violated your rights, you might win such a suit, but the chances of that having happened are virtually zero. The essential problem is that there is no specific contractual right for you to receive an particular outcome in a class (based on my knowledge of rules & regs in various universities). For example, you might reasonably want to have written comments on assignments given within a week: but there is no rule guaranteeing that you will ever get written comments. (You need to look at the university rules to see what is an actual rule, as opposed to a "goal" for an academic unit). Since there is no such rule, the chairman has limited authority to penalize the instructor (he might for example decide to not assign that class to Prof. X in the future). The chair would not have the authority to raise your grade under the circumstances. As far as the courts are concerned, the university's judgment and resolution of the matter are final, unless they simply failed to respect your rights (exhibited racial prejudice, refused to follow their own procedures). In certain contexts, professorial negligence could be legally actionable, but that would only be, for example, if an EE professor physically harmed a student by negligently confusing milliamps and mega-amps. His (non)action is not negligent in the legal sense. | What would you suggest I should do in this situation? Do not sign the NDA and do not get intimidated by Mr A. Instead, think about how you can prove the terms you two already agreed. Mr A is trying to override the initial agreement with one which clearly is more favorable to him. Your problem is that proving the terms of a verbal agreement is quite difficult, especially once the counterparty's/partner's attitude has worsened that much. This is why you two should have signed a contract at an earlier stage. Hopefully at least some your communications with him are in writing, since the substance of those records might support your account of the facts and therewith a fact-finder could infer the terms of the initial agreement. In those communications Mr A might have inadvertently said something that weakens or defeats his legal position. Depending on how much your friend knew about the matter, you might also want to secure an affidavit from him, any written communications you had with him in that regard, and also ask him (in writing) to preserve records of any communications he has had with Mr A from the time your friend was making the connection that led to this partnership. That being said, it is important to emphasize that these lines of action will be unavailing if you agree to Mr A's new terms. | UK: For all I know you cannot be fired unless you are hired. They must hire you. Once a job offer is made and accepted, they must hire you. If they don't, call a lawyer. I personally know someone who got hired, and when he arrived for his first day's work at the new company, he found that the whole department that he was supposed to join had been laid of. The company had to hire him. PS. "Financial difficulties" means you call a lawyer urgently. Once they are bankrupt your chances of extracting money are not good. | Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache. | Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them. | The internal organizational documents and practices of the company would determine this in terms of actual authority and would vary from company to company even within the same jurisdiction of organization and entity type. For example, one company might give that authority to the general counsel, another to the corporate secretary, a third to the Vice President for Information Technology, and a fourth to their Chief Innovation Officer, yet another might allow any officer of the company to do so, or might allow any employee of the company to do so. Usually, the more often a company does something and the more routine it is to do that, the lower down in the organization the authority is allocated. Anyone who appeared to have the authority to do so to a reasonably third-party, however, could bind the company even if they didn't actually have the authority to do so. | Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job. |
Shared restrooms between students and staff Is an elementary school that does not have a dedicated restroom for (adult) staff putting itself at an elevated legal risk? In the current situation, with no dedicated restroom for adults, adults have no choice but to share the restrooms with students. The restrooms in the building are intended for several people at once, with 2-3 stalls and urinals where appropriate. They are labelled variously Men, Women, Boys, Girls ... But all are shared. Jurisdiction is state of Vermont, US. Further, am I risking liability by using a restroom shared with children? Does my employer (the school district) have a responsibility to provide a restroom that is not accessible to children? NB: I am aware that there are many new laws concerning gender in public restrooms but this question is specifically about the mixing of adults and children in one restroom. | Why would this be a concern? The adults have some duty in an elementary school setting to monitor the children in the restroom in any case. Separate restrooms are an employee perk, not a liability driven decision. | The answer seems fairly simple. ANY item not belonging in the room and NOT found in a waste receptacle must be brought to management and logged. i.e. if the hotel guest threw a crumpled scrap of food wrapper at the bin and missed, that item must be presented to management and logged. Then, it's management's decision to toss it. I imagine that the twelfth time that management has to evaluate whether a used condom is personal property or trash, they will revise their ill-advised little letter. Additionally, how does the guest know for certain that an item was actually left in room, and how does management know that a particular staff was the only one who could have encountered it? They'd have to implement key card logging or video cameras. i.e. the staff could simply deny that any items were found in the room, or perhaps they could demand that a manager must clear a room of possible guest property before entering. Put simply, how to prove a particular person had access to the room and exercised that access, AND that they encountered the wayward guest item? | This sucks. It is also legal. It's a private school, they can admit who they like (provided they don't discriminate on the grounds of protected characteristics like "religion" or "caste"). | The primary legal question is whether the resident (tenant) has breached a duty of care. There are all sorts of laws establishing duties of care, such as between doctor and patient, which may be created by a legislature or may be part of common law tradition. There is a duty of care imposed on a landlord w.r.t. the tenant, requiring that the premise be "secure", therefore a landlord might easily be held liable if the main door into the building was not locked. This duty is a specific instance of a general duty from tradesman/businessman to customer. As far as I can determine, there is no such statutory duty imposed on tenants in Washington state, and none from case law being revealed by a few cursory searches. In order to be subsumed under general "everybody has a duty to everybody else" law, the damage would have to be foreseeable. It is said that "If something is foreseeable, it is a probable and predictable consequence of the defendant’s negligent actions or inaction". This mean that a reasonable person would have known that, under the circumstances, the damage is likely to result. Circumstances vary quite a bit, and there is no general rule about holding the door open for another person. If there is abundant signage reminding tenants to never ever let in a stranger no matter that their excuse and/or if the premise is in a crime war-zone, the outcome is more likely to be considered to be foreseeable. | A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest. | "Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road. | In general, permission is not granted to enter the premises of another by climbing a fence unless it is explicitly granted. That the fence is on your property, but adjacent to the school's property, is a complication. The school, observing that there is a boundary fence, might reasonably rely on that to exclude people from entering other than at desired entry points. So it might be that your entry over the fence would be unauthorized and thus technically trespassing. If you were to put a gate in your own fence, the school's reliance is probably less reasonable. Or if you were to formally notify the school that you intend to enter the school grounds over your own fence. However, in practice, you are not trespassing until you are notified by the owner or owner's agent or someone with proper authority. If there is no sign, there can be no claim that you were notified by one. So until a school official or employee notices you using the fence and orders you to stop, there is no issue. | The nature of the meeting matters: I assume this is a private meeting, not a public meeting. Under RCW 9.73.030, you have to announce that the meeting is being recorded (the announcement must itself be recorded), or the recording device must be obvious. There is no exception regarding property status (such as "on school property; in a government-funded facility"). But it also matters if the conversation is "private". See State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255, which gives weight to the subjective intent of the parties, thus the primary question would be whether the school official intended the communication to be private. Given strong FERPA privacy protection of personal information about students and in light of the likely nature of the conversation, one might think that the administrator intends the discussion to be private. However, the administrator cannot discuss e.g. disciplinary issues with third parties, so that would not be a valid basis for expecting privacy. You would really need to get a lawyer, discuss the expected subjects with the lawyer, and see if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (even if this is not a public meeting). Your local ACLU chapter might advise you of your rights, though they would probably also advise you to not experiment with breaking the law (I don't see what legitimate purpose would be served by recording in secret). |
What prevents a business from separating the liability and revenue into two separate entities? I know holding companies are a common way to separate the liability of business operations from the assets of a company, but is there any legal reason why businesses don't take this a step further? Suppose we setup a parent Delaware corporation corpA and two child Delaware corporations corpB and corpC (both wholly owned subsidiaries of corpA). Every contract the business engages in is a multi-party contract where corpB agrees to do all the work required in the contract and the customer in exchange agrees to pay corpC. CorpC would also own all the business equipment and assets and would agree to allow corpB to use the equipment whenever needed for no charge. Question: What's wrong with that setup? Naively, it seems like this would be a nearly perfect setup with no value but all liability in corpB and all the value but zero liability in corpC. But that can't be correct otherwise every large enough business would do this. So why doesn't this work? Is there a Delaware corporation law which prevents liability and revenue from being 100% directly into two separate entities so that corpC would still be liable for things? Is there an IRS rule which makes the free usage of corpC's equipment by corpB still subject to taxes? Something else? Any insight on this would be much appreciated! Thanks! | If it is a multi-party contract, generally all parties to the contract have liability for its breach regardless of who is supposed to receive payment. It is possible to contractually negotiate for limitations of liability in a contract, but not all liability and only with clear language to that effect. Further, if the CorpA and Corp B and Corp C all anticipated at the outset that if there was liability that CorpB incurred that it would not be paid, that would constitute both common law fraud and a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act by everyone involved (entities and individuals) because one is anticipating incurring future liability in an entity with no anticipated capacity to pay it. The circumstances would also plausibly justify "piercing the corporate veil." | Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...". | A business owned by a debtor is not itself liable for the debts of its owners. But, a membership interest in an LLC is one of your assets and is normally not exempt from creditors, so legal process may be used to collect a money judgment obtained by a creditor in a suit against the membership interest owner from this asset. There are several ways of doing this that a creditor can utilize, each of which is discussed below. Charging Orders And Writs of Garnishment The presumptive way for a judgment creditor to collect a judgment from a debtor's LLC membership interest asset to do this is to either garnish any monies the LLC owes to you with a writ of garnishment (so that the LLC would pay the amounts due to the debtor to the creditor instead), or to impose a "charging order" on the LLC interest, which is like a writ of garnishment that remains in force until the full amount of the debt authorizing the charging order is satisfied. The downside of a writ of garnishment or charging order is that the people who control the LLC can often defer distributions to the members indefinitely, which deprives you of the funds that would otherwise have been distributed to you, but doesn't let the creditor have those funds either. Some LLCs require that certain distributions be made to owners and require that the LLC be liquidated under certain circumstances (e.g. the completion of a real estate development project). But, those LLCs are the exception rather than the rule. Normally, an LLC only makes distributions to its members when the people who control that LLC decide to do so by a majority vote of the managers or of the managing-members as the case may be. Writs of Execution Directed To Membership Interests There is a split in authority between states (with many states not having resolved the issue) over whether you can enforce a money judgment against the owner of a membership interest not just by collecting money due to the owner as a result of the membership interest and instead use a writ of execution to seize the membership interest and sell it in a sheriff's sale to whomever bids at the sale (much like someone might seize a parcel of real estate or a car to pay a debtor's debts to a judgment creditor). In most states, even if this is allowed, the buyer at the auction gets the right to distributions from the membership interest seized, but not a vote on how the business of the company is conducted, unless the other members agree to grant the new owner voting rights or the operating agreement of the LLC provides otherwise. All of the remedies so far presume that the asset to be collected out of consists of the ownership interest in the LLC (analogous to shares of stock) rather than the assets of the LLC itself. Reverse Piercing Seizing assets of the LLC itself, rather than merely the ownership interest in the LLC, is called "reverse piercing". Usually, reverse piercing is not allowed. But, there are some circumstances where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed. Almost all jurisdictions allow reverse piercing in some circumstances, but those circumstances vary considerably from state to state based upon both the language of the relevant LLC statute and the relevant case law. There are four main circumstances that justify reverse piercing. Single Member LLCs One is the case of a single member LLC where the creditor obtains ownership of 100% of the LLC. In these circumstances, courts have allowed creditors to dissolve the LLC and reach its assets, because neither the debtor nor any third party other than the creditor has any legitimate ownership interest in the property. Alter Ego Cases Another is the case where the assets of the LLC and the personal assets of the debtor are co-mingled or there is not clear documentation existing prior to the litigation establishing which underlying assets belong to the LLC and which belong to its owner. In these cases, reverse piercing is allowed because the existence of a company identity has been disregarded and there is no de facto distinction between company assets and personal assets. This justification for reverse piercing is sometimes called an "alter ego" theory. Fraudulent Transfers A third case where reverse piercing is allowed is where the contribution of the asset to the capital of the LLC was a "fraudulent transfer" from the individual debtor to the LLC (e.g. if the $1 million parcel of real estate was sold to the LLC for $100 at a time when the debtor was insolvent or rendered insolvent as a result of the transfer). Contributing an asset to the capital of an LLC in exchange for a membership interest with a capital account in the LLC's books set based upon the fair market value of the asset contributed to the LLC is usually not considered a fraudulent transfer, but could be in particular facts and circumstances where it has the intended effect of hindering creditors or concealing an asset. Equitable Reverse Piercing Based Upon Control Of The Entity A fourth case where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed is where the debtor does not own 100% of the LLC but has the ability to dissolve the LLC or force its assets to be distributed in kind to him, without the assent of the other LLC owners, because the debtor controls the LLC. Whether this is allowed or not is another issue upon which there is a split of authority and in many cases simply an absence of authority which would make such a case one of first impression in a state. | Controlling shareholders of a company have a fiduciary duty to other stockholders (see the section on controlling stockholder/company in the reference). That is, their decisions must be guided by the legitimate interests of the other stock holder, they can't privilege their own outcomes, or maliciously torpedo the interests of the other stockholders. If you think they have deliberately made bad decisions just to screw you, you can sue them for breech of their fiduciary duty. Of course their defense can be that they made decisions for perfectly rational reasons that respected their fiduciary duty, but simply turned out badly. You'd have to provide evidence that the decisions were reckless and/or malicious. | They aren’t The journalist is attributing a payment by the company as a cost to the shareholders. In accounting terms, that’s a fair equivalency - the shareholder’s equity will fall by the amount of the liability. In legal terms, it isn’t - the company is a seperate legal entity from the shareholders and a payment by one is not a payment by the other, even though for each shareholder, the value of their shares will change. However, markets being what they are, the change in value is unlikely to be exactly the same as the amount the company pays, the value may even rise if the market expected the costs to be bigger than they are. They may rise even if the actual costs are bigger than the expectation - markets prefer certainty over uncertainty even in bad news. Of course, the bulk of the actual cost is likely to be borne by PG&E’s insurers. | Do I need to create an LLC if I already own the domain? No. Can someone legally create an LLC with the same name as my domain? Yes. Just trying to understand what the difference is between an LLC and a business An LLC, a "limited liability company," is a kind of legal entity that has a separate identity from the members of the LLC. The members' liability is limited with respect to the company's liability, hence the name. A business is a commercial activity. The two concepts are independent. A person can have a business without forming a corporation, or indeed many businesses. A single corporation can also have many businesses. Back to the question about someone forming an LLC using your domain name, this raises the issue of trademark protection. In the US, at least, you can't register a trademark unless it is "in use in commerce" (15 USC 1051(a)(3)(C)), which means explicitly that you cannot use the mark "merely to reserve a right in" it (15 USC 1127). But there are many subtleties of trademark protection that are widely misunderstood by most people, so if you anticipate wanting trademark protection for a name, you will probably want to learn about how trademark protection works and likely talk to a trademark lawyer. | As the sole director and shareholder, the cleanest approach is to pay the invoice from the company account as if it were issued to the company's name. This way, you don't need to keep records (such as a director's loan account) to explain why the company is claiming a deduction for expenses paid from your personal account, and you are not paying income tax on the reimbursement. The problem with this approach, and the reason why larger companies don't use it, is that you now need to be able to prove that the invoice relates to a legitimate business expense. For a one-person company, that will usually be pretty obvious from the nature of the expenses and if not, you'll remember what happened, but this does not scale up for businesses with employees claiming reimbursement. | You’ve presented a number of different scenarios, without a lot of specifics, so I’ll start from the top, and from a US perspective. A very generic term that would come up in this situation is material misstatement. one might say that an account or line item is overstated or understated, or a misstatement could arise from the omission of a necessary note, because notes are an integral part of the financial statements. Financial statements are said to be materially misstated if the misstatement would affect the choice of a typical decisionmaker. There’s no explicit standard for what is or isn’t material, but in practice, auditors often choose some small fraction of net income as the threshold. Materiality can also be caused by positive vs. negative earnings, or other thresholds, like financing agreements which might oblige the company to keep its current ratio above a certain level, for example. In the US, the rules to which the statements have to be materially correct are known as GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and they are codified in the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Accounting Standards Codification (FASB ASC). Depending on how the scheme is arranged, issues in the realm of “buying stuff as a “customer” to make the business look good” include: Substance over form: it may not be appropriate to recognize as a sale at all. If the net effect is a transfer of cash from the owner or manager to the business, while the goods find their way back into the company warehouse, that could be considered as paid-in-capital, or even a liability, rather than a sale. Owner bought some product to inject cash, and put the goods back in the inventory? That’s cash from the stockholder, not a customer sale. Somebody in management moved a truckload of product to his storage unit, only to return it after year end? That might be more accurately characterized as a loan, not a sale. I don’t know of any specific terms for this exclusively, but there have certainly been cases where companies moved inventory to undisclosed warehouses in an effort to hide fictitious sales from their independent auditors. Edit: Another term for certain sales without commercial substance is a “roundtrip transaction” or “roundtripping.” Disclosure notes: even if there is commercial substance to the transaction, it may require disclosure notes, such as those for related party transactions, as required by ASC 850. Transactions with related parties must be disclosed even if they are not given accounting recognition (ASC 850-05-5). Examples of related parties are given in ASC 850-05-3, including “an entity and its principal owners, management, or members of their immediate families,” among others. Under the relevant definition, a person does not need a formal title to be considered a member of management (ASC 850-10-20). The related party disclosure is not required in consolidated financial statements, for transactions that are eliminated in the consolidation process (ASC 850-10-50-1). For sales from a public company to a bona-fide external customer, there’s also the major customers disclosure, but the threshold for that is 10% of revenue, which is much more than enough to materially impact the bottom line. Generally, transactions between a parent company and a subsidiary will be eliminated in the preparation of the parent’s (consolidated) financial statements (ASC 810). This means if the parent company A sells goods with a carrying value of $30 to its subsidiary, B, at a price of $50, A doesn’t recognize that $20 gross profit until B sells the goods to an outside party. Internally, B might carry the goods at $50 on B’s books, but A would have to cancel it out so that only $30 of that appears on A’s consolidated balance sheet. The consolidation method is applied when one business has a controlling interest in another, and in summary it means that the parent company reports A+B’s financials as if it was all a single entity. That means B’s assets and liabilities, revenues and expenses, are all reported as part of A. It also means any transactions between B and A are transactions within the entity; you wouldn’t recognize a gain or loss (nor revenue and GP) if your marketing department sold office equipment to your engineering department, and you don’t get to with subsidiaries either. Consolidation requires not only eliminating revenues, cost of goods sold, and excess carrying value of inventories on intra-entity transactions; it's also gains and losses on things like equipment, meaning the same transaction could require a consolidation adjustment twenty years later to eliminate excess depreciation expense. Long story short, ASC 810 deals with consolidation, and those rules apply when you create or purchase a subsidiary to buy your stuff, or use a subsidiary to pass the same $200,000 back and forth. When the parent entity does not have a controlling interest in the investee (the basic threshold is 50% of voting shares, or by some other agreement) but does have significant influence (representation on the board or other factors in ASC 323-10-15-6), then it will be treated as an equity method investment. Instead of adding the line items together, it's a single asset and A's portion of B's earnings are a single line item on the income statement, but the adjustments are similar to those in a consolidation. Another kind of revenue recognition game which companies used to play involved bill-and-hold arrangements, wherein the customer (or the “customer,” or a salesperson without any real input from the supposed customer) would place an order, and the company would send (or at least, prepare and book) an invoice (revenue), but not ship the goods until the customer actually asked for them. These days, the rules on revenue recognition are fairly guarded against these kinds of things, but some other examples of “sales” that aren’t really sales include consignment arrangements, repurchase agreements (could be a sale with right of return, or depending on terms could be effectively a lease or a financing arrangement), and the gross vs net revenue issue for principle/agent situations (airline and hotel booking sites are a popular example. If they’re an agent they’re required to report their commission on a net basis but would likely prefer to look bigger by calling it a $110 sale and $100 cost of goods sold, instead of just $10 revenue). If you’re interested in management schemes to mislead the users of financial statements, check out the SEC’s online archive of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) here. Some of them just deal with individual professionals who should know better, but they can be pretty interesting, whether they involve poor ICFR, or intentional deception on the part of upper management (it's on management either way). |
May I publish source code of my project without notifications about use of personal data and cookies and not break laws during it? I have created the demo software project (frontend and backend modules) for manage staff. I want to publish source code of the project on GitHub. I know that according to GPDR page must have notification about using cookies and of personal data. If project is running on server it can collect personal data and use cookies, but source code doesn't do this. Source code have no any notification about cookies and personal data collecting. I am not planning to run publish server with my project. If someone will use my code under opensource license it can create any notifications. May I publish source code of my project without notifications about use of personal data and cookies and not break laws during it? | I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software. | It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest. | Does GDPR apply if my web app stores personal data on the user's phone only? No. If you are not processing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) then the GDPR does not apply to you. This is what a web browser does when it asks to remember your username and password for this web site. You are providing a tool, the user is using that tool to process their own data. I do offer to back up the user's personal data At this point you are processing the users PII, and the GDPR does apply to you. Even though you do not have enough information to identify an individual, as it can be used with other information to identify an individual it is PII. From the ICO: Can we identify an individual indirectly from the information we have (together with other available information)? Even if you may need additional information to be able to identify someone, they may still be identifiable. That additional information may be information you already hold, or it may be information that you need to obtain from another source. When considering whether individuals can be identified, you may have to assess the means that could be used by an interested and sufficiently determined person. | I wrote a letter to the Eclipse Foundation. The consultant pointed me to section 5 in their FAQ. My case falls under the term "linking". He warned that he isn't a lawyer, but offered the following short answer: The Eclipse Foundation does not consider linking with EPL content to be a derivative work and so you are not required to disclose your source code. | No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to. | If you aren't including those libraries, then yes because it's entirely your own work. If you are publishing those libraries, then no because their licenses will limit how you can do that. GPL's and MIT's main features are restricting how you can distribute software that includes the licensed code, and they don't allow the "do whatever you want" of public domain. | There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access. | Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient. |
What can I do about the trash? I live at the corner of a 4 way intersection. There are houses on 3 corners, one being mine. The 4th corner used to be an open field, owned by the 7/11 that was on the street behind me. A few years ago, the 7/11 renovated to put in gas pumps and rebuilt the store further back. While not parallel with me, its close enough now that it has become mildly annoying. While not a lot, there is a steady stream of trash that now ends up in my front lawn, mostly being blown in by the wind. Every day, there are plastic bags, lottery tickets, cups, cans, wrappers, etc on my lawn. Needless to say, I dont like picking up other people's trash. I have spoken to the owner's of the 7/11 about this a few times. They are very friendly and apologetic. I do find that after the few times I mention it, the trash in my lawn lessens. I assume they instruct their employees to pick up the trash outside. Of course, that reprieve is brief. As I assume the employees stop caring and/or dont know due to the constant turnover. Also, the owners arent often there. Eventually, the stream of trash continues. While the trash originates from 7/11, I am well aware that the majority of the problem isnt 7/11's employees, but the customers who go to 7/11. They are the ones who litter. I see people constantly throw trash anywhere but in the cans. Sure, sometimes the cans are full, so people just lay their trash on top. Like I said, I like the owners and have no desire to sour the relationship, not that there is any advantage to it. However, I really am getting tired of the trash. If it came to legal action, is 7/11 responsible for their customers' litter? Any ideas, both legal or non? This is in Virginia. | Ask the local government to enforce the littering ordinances against customers. But, if the trash is put in trash cans and blows out, there is little that you can do legally. In the law there are some bad things that happen for which someone is legally responsible due to their fault or circumstances, but there are many bad things that fall in the category of "shit happens" and for the most part, this is one of them. | The legal position You are quite clearly not running a business and if the matter went to court you could easily prove this be e.g. getting testimony from the people at the party, your testimony etc. In any event, your landlord can’t “fine” you. Fines are a punishment and only government can punish people. They can sue you for breach of contract for damages (which are restitution not punishment) or to seek specific performance. The practical position Take the listing down. Rightly or wrongly, it's souring your relationship with your landlord and their relationship with their HOA. Is having this mildly amusing joke worth damaging these relationships, particularly if you might want to renew your lease? The landlord might feel that they are better off with a tenant who doesn't cause them grief with their HOA. Even if your landlord understands, the HOA might not. If they sue your landlord, they will have very little choice but to join you. Yes, you will almost certainly win your day in court but you will not get reimbursed for the time and effort you had to go to. this includes taking the day off work, subpoenaing all your friends to give testimony etc. Who has time for that crap? Further, whenever you go in front of judge or arbitrator who has the power to force a resolution of your dispute, you are rolling the dice. Sure, you may think you have great evidence and the other sides' is completely bogus but if they present theirs with skill and confidence and you screw yours up then they can walk away with a win. Real court cases depend on who the judge believes. If they believe your landlord's reasonable story about running an illegal bar and they don't believe your crazy tale of it all being a joke - you lose. Remember: free speech can't be restricted but it does have consequences. Further, anyone who bases relationships on legal rights and responsibilities is going to have very shallow relationships. | Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country. | Legally, they can kick you out for any reason that isn't illegal discrimination. They can't kick you out for being black. They also can't kick you out for being white. But they can kick you out for not liking your face. Now the question is: Who can kick you out? The store owner obviously can. Anyone who is given the authority by the store owner can. Actually, anyone with the apparent authority can kick you out. However, everyone other than the store owner has been hired to work towards making profits. If throwing you out is bad for business, then whoever did it would have to answer to the store owner. So the ex-friend can't go to court for throwing you out, but they might get into trouble with their boss about it. PS. I interpreted "kicking out" as saying "Please leave our premises. If you don't leave then you will be trespassing and I will call the police", not actually kicking the person with your foot which would be most likely assault. | Your description of the facts is vague enough that we can't offer an informed judgment, but to remedy this, I will paraphrase your account of the facts (you can decide whether this is what you were trying to say). I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today waiting for my step daughter to come out. While waiting, two police officers walked up to my car and asked me to turn off my vehicle and come inside. When I voluntarily went inside, the store staff said that they called the police because they had had some sort of problems with people applying for service and absconding with the phone to resell on the black market, and they thought that was part of some such criminal plan. Because of that, they refused to give her a phone or service contract. But then they also told us to never come back, threatening arrest for trespassing. I have never been in that store before. Were my rights violated? No, neither by the police nor by the manager. The police, or the store manager, can legally request you to come in for a conversation: what matters most is whether you were forced to come in against your will. By your report, you were not, so your rights were not violated. The police are irrelevant to the remainder of the question. What remains is whether your rights were violated because the manager told you to go away and never come back under pain of prosecution. The store is private property, meaning that the owner has wide latitude to grant or deny permission to enter. If they hate pink hair and your hair is pink, they can legally "ban" you. If they suspect you of involvement in a criminal activity, that can most certainly legally ban you. That does not mean that it was a righteous or justified decision on their part, or a good business choice, but it is their legal right. So, no, your rights were not violated. | There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass). | I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks... | While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance. |
Can your business have the same initials as a major corporation? By coincidence, if my company was “Internal brilliance method”(I just made that up) could IBM(international business machines) sue me over trademark infringement? In different industries different look, would they have a solid case? | No. A trademark is specific to an industry or type of products or services. And, while it is virtually impossible to get a new trade name with a three letter acronym because almost all of them are taken, three words that start with the same letters as a three letter acronym is not infringement on the acronym. You might very well be infringing if you used "I.B.M." to sell computer equipment. But, "Internal brilliance method", spelled out, would not infringe I.B.M., even in the computer equipment industry, and "I.B.M." in the food service industry, for example, would not be trademark infringement on the International Business Machines" trademark of "I.B.M." for good and services of the type that it offers. | Q1 and Q2 are definitely not copyright violations. Copyright protects original expression. Your questions are yours; the only things you are using are the names, and copyright doesn't cover them on their own. The quotation in Q3 might conceivably come under copyright. However in practice it is very likely to be fair use (unfortunately nothing is definitely fair use until a court rules on it, but I can't imagine a short quotation in a quiz being an issue). | The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation. | Registered Trade Marks aren't the only form of trade mark protection. You also have the law of unregistered trade marks. Basically (and this is an over-simplification), it works like this: a business starts using a trade mark for a specified product: beard comb. Let's say that they don't even register a trade mark. they start selling load and loads (thinks 100s of thousands of $ or £ worth) they become well-known in that market segment. They accrue "goodwill" in the (unregistered) trade mark. That trade mark is protectable in law. That's a summary of the law of passing off aka the law of unregistered trade marks. So, if the new manufacturer is still manufacturing them in the country that you want to sell them in, you'll probably have a problem. This assumes that that country has an equivalent of the law of passing off. The tip then has to be - check to see if the manufacturer is still selling them. If you think it's a good business opportunity and worth a small amount of risk capital - a few hundred $ or £, file the trade mark application is see if anyone does anything about it. You can always withdraw it and avoid a dispute. You might also do a search for registered design rights. They protect the shape of the products (not what it's called - which is what a trade mark does). | You cannot use a trademark in a way that may cause confusion that your goods and services are associated with or endorsed by the trade marked goods and services. If you are clear that they are not then you shouldn't have any problems on that front. You also cannot defame the brand: that is make derogatory comments that are not true. On a practical note, when Pepsi (for example) sends you a cease & desist notice, what are you going to do? They can go to the petty cash tin for $2 million to make your life a legal hell for 18-36 months: how much do you have to defend your rights? | I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B. | Attribution is not a legal requirement If company A owns IP (copyright and trademarks in this case), they can licence it to company N on whatever terms are mutually acceptable. They may require company N to attribute their IP or they may not. | On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article. |
What is a misrepresentation made after a contract is signed? Consider the following scenario: Consumer opens a credit card account with bank, signs cardmember agreement Consumer uses card regularly, pays bills Consumer calls bank and closes credit card account Bank does not disclose that account has a balance at time of closure Consumer fails to pay balance as a result of (4) Bank reports account to credit bureaus as delinquent What causes of action against the bank for (3)? Negligent misrepresentation? The consumer relied on the misrepresentation, but it did not induce them to enter into the contract, as it occurred after the contract was signed. EDIT: The contract states the customer "will receive billing statements" and that the customer agrees to "pay the minimum payment by the due date [on the statement]". The statement is furthermore the "official" record of the account. This suggests that the consumer's duty to pay by a particular date is conditioned upon receipt of a billing statement. The account agreement also states "You will receive a billing statement, if one is required, each month It will show your minimum required payment." "Required" is not defined in the agreement. Presumably it is a reference to the provisions of the Fair Credit Billing Act (statement required if balance >= $1). Customer claims they never received statements, before or after the account's closure. Customer notified bank that they did not receive statements repeatedly, with a record of such a notification occurring as late as one week prior to the account's closure. The customer is ultimately liable for the balance, of course. But that is not what is reported to the credit bureaus. Payments were reported, e.g., as "30+ days late". Can a payment be "late" when the due date is on a statement that the customer does not have? | There is no misrepresentation by the bank as you describe it, there is negligence by the account holder to comply with the terms of the account. The bank made no representation at all regarding a balance due. If you want the bank to be at fault, they the customer would have to demand a declaration as to the existence of a balance due (choose your words carefully), and the bank would have to have falsely asserted that there is no present or future obligation. This is not going to happen. All the bank can say is that they have no present record of charges. The customer's question might be something like "Do you guarantee that there will be no charges to this account as of now". Of course, the bank cannot know whether there is a forthcoming paper charge that was made at some mountain resort. If case they did make such a promise, you could disavow the debt, using your reliance on their assertion as the basis for denying the debt. There is no law requiring banks to warn people of their contractual obligations when they close an account. I've never encountered a credit card contract that includes such a clause, but I suppose some bank might include a mandatory-warning clause, in which case they could be in breach of contract. | No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions. | It depends on what state this is. In Washington state, there is a form that sellers must fill out, and section 3 addresses sewer connections. This matter could have been disclosed – the allowed answers are "yes; no; don't know" (or NA). These are sellers disclosures, and Zillow / Redfin are free to be unreliable (I personally know that they are wrong about square footage). A real estate agent also doesn't become liable for being misinformed. Assuming your state has this or analogous question, "No" means that you were told (doesn't matter if you didn't notice it), and "Don't know" means you're gambling. Let's say that the answer was "Yes". Still, you can't necessarily sue (and win): you would have to prove misrepresentation (fraud or negligence) and not innocent error. You could do this by, for instance, proving that seller had the septic tank cleaned out some years earlier. Perhaps an action against buyer's inspector is possible, since that's nominally what they might have been hired to find out. But that is only true if checking the sewer connection can reasonably be considered part of the deal, so you have to look at the contract with the inspector (and the inspector's report). | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | The question is a little confusing because it’s unclear why any of the payments should be refunded. If A has not provided the services, and B wants a refund, then B can sue A for breach of contract. A assigned its right to be paid to C, but it cannot assign its obligations to C (this would be a novation rather than an assignment, which would require both B and C’s consent). If C also agreed with A to perform A’s obligations to B (a subcontract), then A could sue C for any damages A was liable to pay B, but B cannot sue C directly. If A regrets its decision to assign the contract for £1, and wants to recover larger payments made by B to C in discharge of B’s contractual obligations to A, it can’t. A shouldn’t have assigned the benefit of the contract to C. If B has not paid, B can be sued under the contract which still exists between A and B. C can file this claim as assignee of the contract. While A could also potentially file the claim, it would be inconsistent with the assignment for A to receive any benefit from it, which would be held on constructive trust for C. | I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious. | To start with, this is a highly technical issue upon which different jurisdictions may differ, and in which different rules may apply in different circumstances either by agreement or by statute. Also, similar situations are sometimes treated differently in this regard in bankruptcy and out of bankruptcy. The majority rule is that the lender may choose which remedies - such as collateral and guarantee rights, to enforce, and the lender may choose in which order to enforce them. For example, most jurisdictions allow a lender to collect from a guarantor even when collateral is available to the lender, in lieu of foreclosing on the collateral. Sometimes, however, special rules apply. For example, if the guarantor is a government agency (e.g. the Small Business Administration or the Veteran's Administration), often the lender is required to take all reasonable efforts to collect from the borrower and recover the amount owed from collateral, before the guarantee can be invoked. Similarly, sometimes the law distinguishes between an accommodation party who receives no consideration in a transaction who signs as a direct debtor, and one who signs in a guarantor capacity. Those jurisdictions may require a good faith effort to collect from direct debtors (often including attempts to foreclose upon collateral) before attempting to collect from guarantors who sign as such. There are also arrangements, such as credit default swaps or a situation when a consumer provides a credit card payment authorization which a creditor can use in the event of a default (or the large dollar amount equivalent of such an arrangement called a "letter of credit"), in which the line between what constitutes collateral and what constitutes a guarantee can be blurred. | It is unlikely that you could successfully sue the bank for breach of contract, but of course the first thing you should do is carefully read the agreement and see exactly what they promised. It is understandable that you would like to get your money right now, but that isn't necessarily guaranteed under the agreement. Assuming there is no statement in the agreement as to how long it will take them to deposit the reward once requested, they would have "a reasonable time period". I located on of those agreements, which says that it will be deposited 90 days after completing the requirements. If that is what your agreement says and after 90 days still no money, then you should speak to the branch manager and request timely compliance with the agreement. It would cost more than $600 to sue them, and the court won't punish them extra for missing a deadline (assuming this was not a deliberate and willful refusal on their part). |
If a group of photos of apple is used as reference to paint a painting of an apple, does the painter infringe copyright of the photographers? Say, a group of photographers, Alice, Bob and Craig, take photographs of a non-copyrighted everyday object, an apple. Then, they decide to showcase it in public (without relinquishing any copyrights apart from taking a look). A painter, Peter, who never has seen an apple in his or her life, takes a look at these photographs (studies them). Then, s/he paints a painting of an apple. Does the painter, Peter, infringe copyright of Alice, Bob and Craig. One step further, if a creator, c, commissions the painter, t, who never has seen an apple in his or her life, to paint a picture of an apple by studying these photographs, do c and t infringe copyright ? What if, the painter, t, uses a mechanical device (drives a toy-car with tires wet with paint on a canvas using a remote control) to paint an apple after studying these photographs ? Edit 1 : I am asking applied AI/Machine-Learning context. So Jurisdiction that I want to know is US, Australia, Singapore and EU. Edit 2 : Even though I ask "copyright", I also want to know from Intellectual Property point of view. I want to know text of law, interpretation of law, precedence if any and your opinion. Edit 3 : removed the maths notations. | Under US law, and I believe under the laws of most countries, each of the various photographs of the apple would be protected by copyright. Thew initial owner would be the photographer, or perhaps the photographer's employer, in each case. Copyright protects expression, including both words and image. It does not protect ideas. The idea of an apple is not protected. The specific representation of a particular apple would be. If the painter imitates the specific feature of the apple shown in the photographs, to the extent that the painting is a derivative work of one or more of the photos, then the painter needs the permission of the copyright holder(s). Without that permission, creating the painting is infringement of copyright. However, if the painter merely took the general idea of an apple, and created a new expression of that idea, without using any of the specifics of the photos, there there would be no infringement. If the photos were instead images of an imaginary thing, perhaps a dragon, or some invented machine of building perhaps, with the images created by perhaps a compute animation program, or by photographing a model, the legal rules would be the same. If the painter simply used the idea from the photos, there is no infringement. If the painter used sufficient specific detail so that the painting is a derivative work, then permission is required. Exactly how much detail must be used for a work to be considered "derivative" is a matter of judgement -- ultimately the judgement of a court if the matter is disputed. There is no clear bright line making that distinction. That C has commissioned the painter T to create the painting is not relevant, unless C is the copyright owner of the photos, or has secured permission from the copyright owner(s). If C validly grants permission, then there is no copyright issue even if the painting is a derivative work. It does not matter what technique or technical means T uses to create the painting. T may use a brush, a pallet knife, a toy car, drips of paint, or a compute drafting program. If, by whatever means, T creates a derivative work, then permission is needed or else it is an act of infringement merely to create the work. If the work is not derivative, then no permission is needed. Copyright law applies no matter what specific technique the creator of an image uses, provided that human creativity is involved. | The mall is a privately owned public space At least while it’s open to the public. A photograph of architecture taken from within it would not violate copyright. However, photographs of other things (like art) do not have the public space exemption. Additionally, the owner can limit or restrict photography. This has nothing to do with copyright, just that an owner has the right to control what happens on their property (within legal limits). | You are in effect asking if this is a case of Fair use, an important US-specific legal concept in copyright law. Please review this question for an overview of fair use. See also This statement from the US copyright office Deciding whether a use is a fair use is always a fact-driven, case-by-case, process. No one ever knows for sure if a use is a fair use unless that specific use is challenged in court as infringement, and the fair use defense is raised and sustained or not. Courts evaluate fair use claims on a case-by-case basis, and the outcome of any given case depends on a fact-specific inquiry. This means that there is no formula to ensure that a predetermined percentage or amount of a work—or specific number of words, lines, pages, copies—may be used without permission. ("More Information on Fair Use" -US Copyright office) Factors Let's look at the fair-use factors in the case of this photo: Purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes: The use is apparently for clearly commercial purpose. This tends to weigh against fair use, but does not rule it out. Then the is the question of whether the use is transformative. The background image apparently serves its original decorative purpose. Whether making it part of an ad is transformative might be debated. Nature of the copyrighted work: The graffiti is an artistic and creative work, not a work of non-fiction or news reporting or factual information. This also tends to weigh against fair use. Amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: It seems that almost all of the work of graffiti, or at least a significant part of it, is being used. This tends to weigh against fair use to some degree. moreover, the work of graffiti is quite prominent in the background of the work, which ,means it makes a significant contribution to the final work, which also weighs against fair use. Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: If the work of graffiti is currently being marketed, the question does not say so, and i would suppose that it isn't. There could be a potential market: the artist could make photos or prints of the work and market them, for example. Even so, this image probably wouldn't affect such a market much. This factor probably inclines towards fair use, but it is hard to say just how a court would asses it. Case law In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) A poster of a “church quilt” was used in the background of a television series for 27 seconds. This was held not to be fair use. The court was influenced by the prominence of the poster, its thematic importance for the set decoration of a church, and the fact that it was a conventional practice to license such works for use in television programs. This case seems particularly close to the one in the question. In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) posters of Grateful Dead concerts were reproduced in a book. This was held to be fair use. The reduced size of the images, and their appearance in the context of a timeline were considered significant. In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) A modified photo of a Wisconsin mayor was reproduced on a Tshirt and used to raise money for an event. the photo was posterized, background removed, text added, and a lime green outline featuring the mayor’s smile remained. The resulting image of the mayor, the court stated, “can’t be copyrighted.” Defendants removed so much of the original that, as with the Cheshire Cat, only the smile remains. Defendants started with a low-resolution version posted on the City’s website, so much of the original’s detail never had a chance to reach the copy; the original’s background is gone; its colors and shading are gone; the expression in Soglin’s eyes can no longer be read; after the posterization (and reproduction by silk-screening), the effect of the lighting in the original is almost extinguished. What is left, besides a hint of Soglin’s smile, is the outline of his face, which can’t be copyrighted. (I take this to mean that the elements actually copied do not have enough original content to be a copyrightable wqrk.) In Kelly v. Arriba-Soft, 336 F.3d. 811 (9th Cir. 2003) use of thumbnail images in search engine results was held to be fair use. The reduced size and image quality were significant to the court. So was the transformative use of the images to help identify and index the pages. Conclusion This is not a clear-cut case, in my view, but the case for fair use does not seem strong to me. Copyright protection of Unauthorized Graffiti A number of comments and some other answers have raised the question of whether graffiti made without the permission of the owner or tenant of the location, and therefore illegally, are entitled to copyright protection. The first thing to say is that there is nothing in 17 USC (the US copyright law) that conditions copyright protection on the legality of the work, or of its publication. Case law on this precise issue is not easy to find, nor does there seem to be much of it. IPWatchDog's "Preventing a Graffiti Copyright Infringement Lawsuit" (2018) says: Several high-profile companies, American Apparel, Coach, American Eagle Outfitters and H&M who shot advertisements in public spaces, have found themselves inadvertently in the midst of such legal disputes with street artists. Even though an advertiser may have had permission from the property owners, even though the “artwork” was unsanctioned and unsigned or “tagged,” the graffiti artists have come forward after the ads were already in circulation, identified themselves and sought compensation and damages. It goes on to say that: These cases tend to be settled out of court, because regardless of the merit of an infringement claim, they are costly to defend and the unwarranted negative publicity can injure a company’s reputation. ... Also, from a legal standpoint, the question of whether the copyrights of illegally created street art are valid has not yet been determined – so there would be some element of doubt as to how a litigation would be decided. *The Atlantic's article "Can Graffiti Be Copyrighted?" about the case of graffiti artist David Anasagasti's case against American Eagle Outfitters for use of his work (and several other similar suits) quotes Philippa Loengard, assistant director of Columbia Law School’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media, and the Arts as saying: Given what I know of the case, this is one of the most blatant examples of copyright infringement None of the suits mentioned in the story seem to have resulted in a court decision as yet. In Falkner v. General Motors Company, the trial judge held that the art was not "part of" the building and thus the exemption for photos of architectural works under 17 USC 120 does not apply. However it denied plaintiff’s DMCA claim and his claim for punitive damages. The court held that: because the facts in the record tend to establish—if anything—the lack of a relevant connection between the mural and the parking garage, the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that the mural is part of an architectural work under Section 102(a)(8). Thus, it cannot reach the issue of whether Section 120(a) applies to the mural to permit photographs of the mural. In an article in the N.Y.U. Journal of IP & Entertainment Law "Protecting Artistic Vandalism" author Celia Lerman argues that copyright should protect unauthorized, illegal graffiti art. This article notes that: Graffiti pieces increasingly attract the attention of numerous collectors, gallery owners, publishers, filmmakers, and journalists. Pieces from famous graffiti artists have sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars in the art market. Graffiti pieces have even been given as diplomatic gifts. Galleries are seeing record attendance at exhibitions of graffiti works, and publishers have generated a boom of photographic books on graffiti and street art. (citations omitted) The article notes that Tattooed Walls a book by Peter Rosenstein about NYC Graffiti, reproduced images of many works of graffiti without permisison, the author believed that these were fair use because they were posted in public places. Several artist sued, a settlement was agreed to, and the book was withdrawn from publication. The article mentions a suit against Tony Hawk’s Pro Skater 2 Official Strategy Guide, by the author of a work of graffiti which was reproduced. The suit was initially dismissed for lack of copyright registration, but the court said that it “assumed, without deciding, that the work is copyrightable.” When the suit was refiled after registration, a motion to dismiss was denied, and the parties then settled, so there was no court decision on the merits. Other simialtr cases are mentioned. The article goes on to analyze the law and the purposes that copyright law serves, and give reasons why such works should be protected. But none of this cites an actual case where an illegal graffito has been held protected. The Falkner case will not produce such a ruling, because the art in that case was authorized, indeed invited, by the building owner. | No you don't. There are two copyright holders regarding the derivative work: yourself, for creating the original. the other artist, for creating the modified version. The other artist has received the right to use your original through the CC-BY license, under the condition that they attribute you appropriately. However, you have not received any rights to the other artist's work. | Regardless of the license associated with a document, there is no copyright protection on information. Copyright protection prevents copying "expression", e.g. the wording, but not the facts / opinions expressed through those words. The non-legal academic concept of "plagiarism" is where the notion of attribution primarily comes into play. There is a special exception under 17 USC 106A that imposes an attribution requirement for works of visual art. CC and other license schemes may add in an attribution requirement for actual copying of the expression (the "BY" attribute in CC). If a work is licensed under CC-BY, you may copy the actual expression provided that you follow the terms of the license, which primarily means that you have to attribute the work in the prescribed manner. This does not apply to extracting information from a work, because information is not protected by copyright. | One cannot use the works of others unless one of the following applies: The copyright holder has given permission, usually in the form of a license, often explicit, but sometimes implied. The work is not protected by copyright. This can happen in several ways, but the most common is that the work is old enough that copyright has expired. In the US, works older than 1927 are currently out of copyright. So are some others, the rules are a bit complex. In many countries, if the author or creator died more than 70 years ago, the work is out of copyright. In some countries this is a different number, between 50 and 100 years. This is not likely to apply to a file distributed with current software. If an exception to copyright applies. In the US this would most likely be fair use. In the UK it would probably be fair dealing. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions that might apply, including personal use in some. AS a comment by Jen points out "use" here refers only to those rights protected by copyright, such as making and distributing copied, making nd distributing derivative works, and the like. (Displaying and publicly performing seem unlikely to apply.) Now lets consider the specific situation, and which if any of the reasons for lawful use might apply. License or other permission. There is no explicit license. Since the program is distributed to be run, there is an implicit license to make the sort of use of the file needed to run the program. If the documentation describes how to employ the file as part of running the program, there is almost surely an implied license to employ it in that way. There is not, however, permission to make copies unless that is needed to run the program. There is surely not permission to make derivative works of the file or distribute copies to others, even if you do not charge anything. Expired copyright This pretty clearly will not apply. Fair use This might apply, or might not. There isn't enough info in the question to tell, not even to make a good guess. If any use would be non commercial, that helps fair use a bit. If the use would be for a different purpose than the one the developers used it for, that helps fair use a lot. If the use of the file harmed the market for the program, or served as a substitute, that lean against fair use. without knowing what the file is, what it does, and how it might be used, one really cannot weven guess. | is it plausibly the case that ownership of an original photograph would be awarded to the subject (or the subject's heirs) because the subject did not consent to the making of the photograph? No The photograph belongs to the person who owned the photographic plate. Copyright in the image belonged (it has long ago entered the public domain) to the photographer. Subjects (then and now) have no claim on either. Do Massachusetts laws indeed protect personality and publicity rights in photos more than 160 years old, if they were originally taken without consent of the subject, and are now used without consent from the subject's next of kin? No The people in the photograph may bring a suit. These people are long since dead and their estates have long ago been wound up. There is no longer anyone with standing to bring such a suit. Does the US 13th amendment give any private right of action to claim property obtained via ownership of slavery, or that may constitute a "badge of slavery"? No In its entirety, the 13 amendment reads: Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. It does not deal with the products of slavery at all. | US law simply prohibits copying, not possession of a pixel. If you copy 90% of a work, you are still copying, infringing on the creators exclusive right. Same is true if you copy 20%, and so on. The pertinent first question is, how do the courts decide if there has been copying? This is a factual matter decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Defense will argue, very persuasively, that it is more likely that the presence of an identical pixel in two works is purely coincidental (likewise, the appearance of the word "is" in two texts is purely coincidental"). We can imagine future technology with megabyte pixels, where the particular "white" pixel is unique to the original work, and no reasonable fact-finder could hold that the later word accidentally stumbled onto exactly that pixel. The second thing that has to be established is that the degree of copying "matters", starting with Perris v. Hexamer, so that to be infringing, the degree of copying must be more than minimal. Courts have long relied on the notion of "substantial similarity", where you know it when you see it, that is, ordinary observation would cause it to be recognized as having been taken from another work. There is no bright line drawn by Congress of SCOTUS regarding how much copying is "material". It is extremely unlikely that a reasonable line could be drawn that would render single-pixel copying "material". |
How are police powers subject to separation of powers? I recognized that finding a precise definition of police powers is a bit challenging. But, would it be reasonable to say that police powers are those powers of government reserved to the States by the 10th Amendment? To what extent that police powers are permitted to Federal government agencies? Are they limited to executive branch agencies? Are they limited to economic issues of interstate commerce? Does the existence of a statute (2 U.S. Code § 1966 - Protection of Members of Congress) permit the U.S. Capitol Police to exercise police powers throughout the U.S.? How does this statute fit within the concept of enumerated powers of the federal government? | I think you're being confused by two separate definitions of "police power." The police power under the 10th Amendment has nothing to do with "the police," i.e. people with guns and badges and uniforms who make arrests. It refers to the authority of a government to make rules for the general welfare. Police power is almost always exercised by the legislature, and when the executive exercises it (e.g. by issuing regulations) it's typically operating under conditions set by the legislature. The United States has police power in a few situations: DC, federal property and territories, US-flagged ships on the high seas, etc. Outside of those situations, the United States instead has enumerated powers. Congress has a power to tax and spend to promote the general welfare, but otherwise it can only legislate to achieve one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution. Now, courts have read Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce very broadly, but there does need to be some relation to enumerated powers. You're asking about the Capitol Police, but they don't have "police power" in the 10th Amendment sense. They have the power to carry guns and to arrest people for crimes committed against the United States. This power is limited based on geography and/or the nature of their task; for instance, they have nationwide arrest powers "[i]n the performance of their protective duties," but not when they're traveling outside DC on other official duties (e.g. to attend training). While there's no litigation I can dig up that's directly on point, courts have repeatedly ruled that Congress has the power to do some not-entirely-legislative tasks in order to protect its own functions. For instance, in Anderson v. Dunn (1821), the Supreme Court upheld an inherent power of the House to hold private citizens in contempt of Congress for disobeying its subpoenas and for the Sergeant at Arms to arrest them and bring them before the House. It seems likely Congress would also have the authority to protect its own members from physical violence. The GAO did an analysis when it was analyzing whether there was a constitutional problem with making Capitol Police IG personnel into special deputy US marshals, and it concluded that there was no issue with congressional employees exercising arrest powers in order to physically protect the legislative branch. | Because the courts or the legislature decide they have them There is no doubt that both the courts and the legislature in common law countries have the ability to find, create, or extend rights and this has been done in the past. This is, in fact, where legal rights were created. The US Bill of Rights was created by the people in 1791. If the people in 2191 want to grant rights to AIs then they can do this. This is legally possible. Whether it's a good idea is a matter of philosophy and politics. | The powers of the President are contained in Article II of the constitution; this is a fair summary. The power to make executive orders stems from Section 1 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." When the Supreme Court considers the legality of an executive order (which only happens when someone brings a case that the court agrees to hear) they use Justice Jackson's Test from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer (1952). The first amendment specifically forbids congress from making laws about these matters. Therefore the express will of congress (as the amendment required a 2/3 majority of Congress) is that there shall be no law about these matters. Since the President would be acting against the express will of Congress he would drop to the third limb of Jackson's test: When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Since, this is not a power that the President is given by the constitution it is likely that the Court would decide that he doesn't have such power. | Hot Pursuit What you're describing is a hot pursuit, and in the US, common law says that police officers crossing state lines while in hot pursuit is absolutely allowed. An active pursuit is considered an exigent circumstance, which gives police all kinds of temporary powers they don't normally have. | Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes. | There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France | Warrants You say: "Formerly if a person was NOT apprehended in the commission of a felony, but was merely a suspect, then the authorities had to INDICT the suspect to prove sufficient evidence." This is not true. What the authorities had to do was issue a warrant which required no prerequisites or even suspicion that the person was involved in the crime. If I had the power, I could issue a warrant any time I felt like it. The abuse of warrants was one of the grievances that led to the American Revolution and is the primary driver for the fourth amendment to the Constitution and the limit that warrants can only be issued on "probable cause". Needless to say, all Western democracies have similar protections. Statute law In common law jurisdictions, parliament/congress can overrule the common law by passing an act that effectively says "the law is now this". With the rise of professional Police starting with the Glasgow Police in 1800, the statutes that created (or regulated them) extended the power of arrest without a warrant beyond what the common law allowed. For example, in new-south-wales, the police power of arrest without a warrant is in s99 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002. The general power of arrest without a warrant is in s100 (which also broadens the common law power to allow arrest where a person has "just committed" an offence or has committed a serious indictable offence for which they have not been tried at any time in the past) and the power to arrest with a warrant is in s101. | Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence. |
Can Pfiser be sued for side effects of covid vaccine? The way I understand this CNBC video https://youtu.be/nJbd402xj0Q, Pfiser could not be sued because the covid vaccine was not FDA approved. This is how i understand it. Now that the Pfiser covid vaccine is FDA approved, does Pfiser has any responsibility for side effects? Pfiser was FDA approved on August 23. Question: if a patient got both doses before August 23, is this patient not covered for any side effect? Question: if a patient got the first dose before August 23, BUT the second dose after August 23, is this patient partially insured for the side effect? Question: if a patient got both doses after August 23, is this patient fully insured? If there are proven side effect 3 or more years down the road, then how does this FDA approval change plaintiffs chances to win a lawsuit? | CNBC's explanation is simply wrong. The law says that a vaccine manufacturer is immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued and there was a declaration under subsection (b). This immunity is not conditioned either way by being approved, indeed the declaration states To be a Covered Countermeasure, qualified pandemic or epidemic products or security countermeasures also must be approved or cleared under the FD&C Act; licensed under the PHS Act; or authorized for emergency use under Sections 564, 564A, or 564B of the FD&C Act The liability immunity is not perpetual, the declaration says: Liability immunity for Covered Countermeasures administered and used in accordance with the public health and medical response of the Authority Having Jurisdiction begins with a Declaration and lasts through (1) the final day the emergency Declaration is in effect, or (2) October 1, 2024, whichever occurs first. That doesn't mean that there can't be another declaration in the future. Immunity of a manufacturer to liability is not related to a patient being "covered". There are other ways in which a patient could be "covered". One of them is the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program and the other is the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which presently redirects you to CICP. | Per GDPR Art 79, you can sue data controllers if you consider your rights to have been violated. Where you have suffered damages due to GDPR infringements, you also have a right to compensation per Art 82. However, your rights may not have been violate as far as the GDPR is concerned. Under the GDPR any kind of personal data processing needs a clear purpose, and that purpose needs a legal basis. One possible legal basis is consent, but there also are others (such as legitimate interest). Just because you didn't consent doesn't mean that your rights have been violated. Where processing is based on legitimate interest, you can object to that processing of your personal data – but your rights must be balanced against that legitimate interest (Art 21). If your friends post a photo and you only appear in the background, your friends' legitimate interest to post that photo likely outweighs your rights. In practice, suing Facebook because of GDPR infringement is not a sensible way to achieve the outcomes that you likely want. First, this is expensive. Second, it is arguable whether Facebook or your friends should be the defendant. Third, removal of existing data won't prevent the processing of new data in the future. It would be more sensible to treat this as an interpersonal rather than a legal problem, and to talk with your friends so that they don't include you in their photos that they would like to share online. I've focussed on photos because their situation is fairly clear. Voice snippets might not count as personal data when you are not identifiable in them. Personal assistant apps should not be listening continuously, but only start recording when a wake-word is recognized. | Not necessarily. Let's say the victim delivered photos of a harm that were alleged to be done by the defendant. That's a crime in itself. But based on this item the DA orders investigation and finds evidence of a real crime. Discovering that the photo was faked can lead to dismissal (with prejudice), but even without the fake photo, there might be a strong case against defendant. Also, the photo could not even be used as evidence in the actual trial stage. A good defense attorney might manage to convince the judge, that the doctored photo should have been discovered such early in the investigation, but I doubt, that one could manage to make everything else in a proper investigation fruit of the poisoned tree unless police screwed up. | IANAL, and I don't live in America, but some of this depends on their intent. If they gave the drugs away by mistake, they probably have not broken any laws. If they were given away deliberately (and you would need to prove this – which might be hard) then yes, he has broken laws. Either way, I expect you have a right to compensation (i.e. $900) from the physician to "make you whole again." If required necessary you could file for that in your local small claims court: The physician will either come to the party pretty quickly and sort it out, or the court will award you the money you need to buy the replacement meds. (But you will need to evidence the replacement cost, for a start....) | Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction. | The "logbook" is required by federal law, part of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005. See 21 USC 830 (e) (1) (A): Each regulated seller shall ensure that, subject to subparagraph (F), sales by such seller of a scheduled listed chemical product at retail are made in accordance with the following [...] (ii) The seller maintains, in accordance with criteria issued by the Attorney General, a written or electronic list of such sales that identifies the products by name, the quantity sold, the names and addresses of purchasers, and the dates and times of the sales (which list is referred to in this subsection as the “logbook”), except that such requirement does not apply to any purchase by an individual of a single sales package if that package contains not more than 60 milligrams of pseudoephedrine. "Scheduled listed chemical" is defined in 21 USC 802 (45) and includes pseudoephedrine (the active ingredient of Sudafed). As you can see, no distinction is drawn between prescription and OTC purchases. HIPAA became law in 1996. I'm not sure whether HIPAA would normally forbid the keeping of such a logbook (it mostly restricts how a provider can disclose information, not so much how it can store information), but even if it did, CMEA was passed later, so it would take precedence. Thus there is no way to "enable HIPAA" to avoid CMEA's requirements. (The passage quoted above does indicate a possible way to avoid the logbook: buy less than 60 mg at a time. That seems to correspond to two standard tablets. However, it's conceivable that a pharmacy might decide it wants to put such purchases in its logbook anyway; it's not clear to me that HIPAA or any other law would forbid them from making that a condition of purchase.) There may also be specific laws in your state placing further restrictions on pseudoephedrine purchases. | As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible. | There is no real answer to that question at this point. If on filed such a suit, it would probably be under a negligence theory. You would sue: Forbes, because they're the website the user visited? The ad network that provided a vector for infection and didn't properly check their content? The makers of the ad, because they made the ad with malicious intent? and anyone else who might have been negligent. You then have to prove they were negligent. Can the user sue the responsible party for damages? You can sue anyone for anything. The problem is winning. Does it make a difference whether the user has taken due diligence with software updates and patches? It might. Contributory negligence would be an obvious defense to such a suit. |
Are cheater plugs illegal in the USA? I just recently moved into an older house with many two-prong outlets. I have a cheater plug available, which I could use to convert a two-prong outlet to a three-prong one, and intended to get more cheater plugs. According to an employee at Best Buy, however, they don't sell cheater plugs due to it now being illegal to manufacture them. Is it accurate that cheater plugs are illegal to manufacture in the U.S.? And if so, is it illegal for me to use the one I already have with me? | Such laws or rules most likely would be on a state-by-state basis. As an example, a rule in Minnesota (and the next part which can be accessed with the arrow in the upper right of the web page) requires that "all electrical equipment, including material, fittings, devices, apparatus, fixtures, appliances, and utilization equipment, used as part of, or in connection with, an electrical installation shall be listed and labeled by a testing laboratory." This rule only forbids use of unlisted cheater plugs, not sale. I have not found a law or rule that forbids selling them. Searching the usual places online, I see it is possible to find 3 prong to 2 prong adapters that are UL listed. I will add that essentially the same skills are needed to figure out whether a cheater plug is more or less safe to use in a certain receptacle as would be needed to replace the two-prong receptacle with a three-prong one, and a properly installed three-prong receptacle is going to be safer. | Currently there is nowhere in the USA where polygamy is legal. So regardless of their sexual or gender expression or orientation, being married to MORE THAN ONE person at the same time is illegal. If, however, it turned out that someone had more than one spouse at their death, I'm sure that property distribution would be a matter for the probate court to sort out. As far as legally-married "trans spouses", for lack of a better term, I don't see why that would that impact inheritance in any way? | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. | Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. | These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information. | The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed. | The legal issues are too black and white to have any meaningful impact on an ethics discussion. The IP belongs to A and B can't use it. A's not planning to build a product around the patent is irrelevant to the law and I do not see it bring up any ethical issue, but some people who do not understand patent law might. There might be ethics issues if A hired Josh with the specific plan to fire him as soon as the application was filed and intentionally misled him about these plans. Another issue might be Josh's duty to not disclose A's confidential information (the application does not become public right away), and Josh's duty to not draw B into developing an infringing product. | I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall ! |
What stops "free content" creators from suddenly making their content copyrighted, and suing everyone who has used their previously free material? For example, pexels.com has a lot of stock images, free for any use including commercial sales, without attribution. The content creators, i.e., photographers, know that by uploading their photo to that site, they give it away for free. But what stops them from suddenly deciding to re-license their photo to no allow commercial use any more then deleting the photo from the free website? Then suing people who have used those photos commercially? | It depends on the terms of the licence You can do X until I tell you to stop You can do X as long as Y You can do X forever are all valid licences. For the website you name, the licence is “worldwide, non-exclusive, permanently, irrevocable, royalty-free”. | You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.) | They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs. | Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue. | There are three questions relevant to this issue: Who owned the copyright in the first place? Was the copyright transferred? If not, was a license given to the site to use the content? In general, under most countries' laws, the person who creates an original work owns the copyright. The person with the copyright has the right to copy and distribute the work, and the right to prevent others from doing so. In some cases, such as where a work is created as a "work for hire" by certain employees under certain circumstances, the initial copyright is held by a third party. You will need a lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction and your circumstances to determine if this is the case. Finally, even if you own the copyright, you can license others to use your content. This may be in an express written document, or it may be an implied license--implied, for instance, by the act of posting it on their blog. The existence and scope of such a license is, again, something that will have to be determined based on your country's specific laws and your specific situation. The bottom line is: if you submitted articles to that blog, you can't complain that they posted them. Depending on the license in effect, you might be able to get them taken down, or you might not. You need a lawyer, not the internet, to tell you what your rights are in this very specific case. | People running web servers are generally liable for contributory culpability, when some user breaks the law by putting the material on the server. There are legal mechanisms for relieving the server guy from this burden. The best-known mechanism is "DMCA takedown", where you publish contact information so that an offended person can serve up a proper legal claim that you are distributing material that they own copyright to. If you follow the rules, you may enjoy "safe harbor" protection against contributory liability: one of the requirements is that you have to take infringing material down. The specific requirements can depend on the nature of the liability and jurisdiction, but generally involves a "hands off" involvement where the person has no knowledge of what's going on on his server. So just disclaiming responsibility does not work. There are other more serious violations, such as distribution of child porn or transmission of top secret information. Jurisdiction is not totally central to internet questions, and I could sue you (the server guy) in US courts, or (depending on the offense: copyright infringement of a particular item) in UK courts. Nailing this down specifically to Sweden is harder, but recall that The Pirate Bay had a whopping judgment against them. | First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not. | Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing. |
University Searching of Apartmenrs In the state of California, landlords cannot enter their tenants room except under a small subset of reasons. Would a University (excluding campus police) renting rooms to students be able to search the rooms or would this violate California Civil Code 1954. | You have two questions here. A search by the government must be reasonable, under the 4th Amendment, meaning that a warrant is required or exigent circumstances must exist. Simple entering (without searching) is governed by Civil Code 1954. The law governing residential rentals is not explicit, because a a dormitory might be considered not to be a "residential dwelling unit". Some states explicitly exclude university dormitories, but that seems not to be the case in CA. There are some specific exclusions where dormitories are excluded (such as 1946.2 regarding termination), so the lack of an exclusion for dormitories can't follow from an assumption that a dormitory is not a residential dwelling unit. Clearly, a normal apartment that happens to be owned by the university and is rented out to students (as exist in many universities) clearly is an ordinary rental. So it seems that a dormitory is not legally exempted from 1954: they can only enter with permission or in specific circumstances. | Nobody can say exactly what happens. I would assume that everyone in the house would be considered a witness. They might ask your friend "did you ever see your roommate carrying computers, monitors etc. into your apartment"; something like that would be likely. It's highly unlikely that she would be treated as a suspect since she doesn't work where things have been stolen. If the police comes with a search warrant, I would expect that the search warrant would extend to the roommate's room and all shared areas, like the kitchen, a common living room and so on. It's unlikely that a search warrant would allow searching your friend's room. She might want to move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like private photo albums) into her own room. She should definitely move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like drugs, goods that she stole, illegal weapons) into her own room. And obviously they can search your room without warrant and without your permission; they are not allowed to, but unless you have a locked steel door, they can. That would be a violation of your privacy, and any results of the search couldn't be used as evidence against you , but I think they could be used as evidence against your friend. | The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures. | It’s not a problem Is there any reasonable prospect that you or the landlord would argue in a dispute that you are not the tenant? No. Is there any reasonable prospect on all the available evidence that such an argument would succeed? No. Therefore, no problem. Where this can be a problem is if someone commences legal action in the wrong name (e.g. the landlord sues “Travis Parks” instead of “Parks Travis”] and there is a summary judgement (if there is a hearing the mistake will be sorted out). A judgement cannot be enforced except on the named person. It can also be a problem if the lease is in the name of a company. Because companies are ‘virtual’ people, they can only act through agents and their name (and number in some jurisdictions) is the only thing that identifies them. | Two factors are relevant. First, the language of the lease sometimes contains an abandonment clause that makes vacancy a default under the lease. This is common in a commercial lease, as vacancies can undermine the apparent viability of a strip mall or mall, but these provisions are less common in residential leases where the rent is current. Second, since this in New York City, there is an issue of rent-control. Rent-control benefits are available only for residential leases, and if you do not live there for long enough, it could be reclassified as a pied-a-terre and cease to qualify as a rent-controlled apartment. If your apartment is not a rent-controlled apartment, this isn't a concern, but if it is, further research related to continued qualification as a rent-controlled apartment in New York City is necessary. | A person's contractual rights and obligations remain valid past their death, so if the landlord dies, their heirs cannot then kick out the tenant, and likewise if the tenant dies, their estate still is liable for unpaid past and future rent. That means for example that the person cannot be evicted, the landlord cannot take their property or enter without permission save for the standard emergency conditions. The tenant (or their estate) remains liable for rent until the lease terminates. If the lease has a clause to the effect that the lease terminate at the end of the month when notice of death is given, that defines when the tenancy ends and therefore when rent isn't due – relevant to a yearly lease, and the question of whether the estate would be on the hook for a full year of rent (it also depends on whether subletting is allowed). | Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble? | Notwithstanding the current COVID-19 regulations, I cannot find any Scottish law, regulation or rule that prevents a lawful tenant from having long-term visitors. However, it may (or may not) be a breach of the tenancy agreement depending on its terms which is where one should look for a definitive answer. |
What kind of information is a police officer in Germany allowed to ask, in random situations on the street, e.g., during a traffic check? For reference: There is the well-known argument, especially in the U.S., that you should not talk to the police, like here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE in one of the extremest forms. There are lots of videos online of people being stopped in their cars and then going on for 30 minutes to "plead the fifth" while the cop asks the same question over and over again. For example, in the U.S., the key words seem to be "am I detained, am I free to go"; and by the way they are always used exactly like this, I assume they are not just randomly used, but with some kind of precedent. Question: What kind of information is a police officer in Germany allowed to ask, in random situations on the street, e.g., during a traffic check? Presumably name and address, and whatever is on the Personalausweis? Is there a particular (verbatim) sentence that can be used in German if you do not wish to answer a question, without making yourself suspicious? As a very concrete example: I was stopped in a generic traffic check once, late at night, in a very peaceful area where nothing ever happens, and was asked where I just came from. I truthfully answered "from the gym" or something like that and that was it. At the time, it seemed simply like small talk; they were friendly, I was friendly, they had a look at my documents, and we were done with it. But it certainly was the kind of situation those U.S. videos seem to be about; i.e. I could pretty easily have been forced into a situation where I had to lie or implicate myself, without even knowing. I know that there are political groups with very strong opinions in Germany who will tell us to not utter a single word to an officer, but would prefer to know what the judicative has to say on this. Are there well-known precedent cases? Are there official formulations which are recognizable to an officer to mean "I am aware of my rights, and would prefer not to make an issue of this, but don't want to keel over right away"? Or is this more of a cat-and-mouse game, usually? Is there a (publicised) policy about this in the police community? | The German Bar Association published an article about your rights in traffic controls (Polizeikontrolle: Das sind Ihre Rechte, July 2018) and an article about your rights in identity checks (Was darf die Polizei bei einer Personenkontrolle?, June 2018). Traffic check You do have to answer questions for determining your identity (see section about identity check). show the car registration document. show your driving licence. leave the vehicle (if asked to). show the legally required equipment (medical kit etc.). You don’t have to answer questions like "Why do you think you were stopped?" or "Where are you coming from?". admit a crime/offense. agree to a test (breathalyser, urine, blood, pupil reaction etc.). let them enter or search through your vehicle (unless in the case of Gefahr im Verzug, i.e., something like exigent circumstances). If you don’t want to answer a question, they recommend to say that you don’t want to answer. If you don’t agree to a test, the police may bring you to a police station where they may e.g. take a blood sample. Identity check You do have to answer questions for determining your identity, i.e.: name birthday birthplace home address nationality show your identity document (if carrying it with you). You don’t have to answer any other questions (e.g., where you are coming from or going to). If you don’t answer the questions for determining your identity, the police may bring you to a police station, and/or frisk you (only allowed in certain circumstances). | To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source. | In general, police have no special protection from being recorded; if it is legal to video or audio record a person in that jurisdiction then it is legal to record a police officer in that jurisdiction. Anything that it is legal to do with the recording of a person is legal even if that person is a police officer. As to if it is legal to record a person see: Is it legal to post a photograph that I captured of a stranger in the street? Model release for image without faces How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame? What are the legal repercussions of taking a stranger's picture in public? What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings? | Law enforcement activities are out of scope of the GDPR, though there is a similar right to access in section 45 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Access to police bodycam footage can be denied or restricted on various grounds, including to protect the rights and freedoms of others. A separate right to access information held by public authorities is part of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but it exempts the applicant's own personal data and refers to the DPA 2018 for further restrictions of this right – FOIA is just a fallback in case access is not regulated otherwise. If necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of party A, the footage released to B could be redacted in order to protect A. However, since A and B were both present the footage would not disclose information that B didn't already have. Therefore, redaction might not be appropriate. Given that there is no clear legal guidance and that all of this is context-dependent, I'd expect this to come down to the internal policies of the police department handling the access request. I see no grounds that would require A to be alerted when footage is released to B. A could also make a request to access their data, and should receive information about “the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data has been disclosed”, but this might be limited to protect B. | I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers | As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury. | There are various ways in which a minor cannot assist a police investigation, and it might be useful to say in what ways any civilian could do so (TV shows notwithstanding). A civilian cannot conduct a custodial interrogation, nor can most of them gather physical evidence (so that a proper evidence log is maintained including relevant information on method of collection, the evidence isn't contaminated etc. – stuff that requires a modicum of training). They cannot execute a search warrant. On the other hand, anyone can provide information that is useful to the police, and it can be done without giving your name or indicating that you are a minor. A minor can serve as a witness at a trial, and it can be helpful to police to know that they have a witness to a crime. A minor can also be used the same way an adult is used, as a confidential informant. There is not a lot of data on that practice given the confidentiality of juvenile records, but there is an article to read ("Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense". The article does suggest that parental consent may be necessary in some cases (such as wearing a wire to a drug transaction). There is a law in Washington requiring every county's prosecutor to have a local protocol for using informants, and there should be guidelines developed by a work group, however the results (if any) of that group's meetings are not available on the internet. It is possible that there are specific restrictions on the use of minors as informants in some jurisdiction. The article explores the subtle distinction between "informant" and "friend", applied to minors. California has a law that limits the use of minors – none under 15, those above with approval of a judicial officer and parent, though those 13 and older can be used as bait in a cigarette or alcohol sales case. New York does not have a blanket prohibition against using a minor as an informant, but there may be relevant guidelines for a particular department. | A police officer can lie, and lying does not render a statement inadmissible. But there is a separate area of law regarding self-incrimination and the right to a lawyer. The basic principle is that a person can always assert their 5th Amendment rights, whether or not they are under arrest. When a person is under arrest and has asserted their right to an attorney, questioning must stop and anything that results from further questions is inadmissible. There is no single factor that distinguishes ordering asking questions from custodial interrogation. For example if you have been dragged by officers to the police station and held in a locked room for hours in the middle of night, one would reasonably believe that you were taken into custody, and interrogation must stop once you request a lawyer. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, police contacted the defendant whom they suspected was involved in a burglary and they invite him to chat at the station. They lie and say they found his fingerprints at the scene (they did not). He then confesses, they read him his rights, and he confesses again. The confession is admissible, because this was not a custodial interrogation. The relevant question is whether "a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave". |
If I don't patent my invention, how closely can a competitor copy my product? Introduction: I had an idea for how to make a certain product much better. I'm currently in the prototyping stage for a product based on that idea. That idea (the solution to the problem of improving that product in certain ways) is patentable according to all the stuff I read about patents. But patents are really expensive: My primary market would be western Europe (member states of the European Patent Convention) and possibly later the US, that would cost a 4-digit USD amount upfront and in total a 5-digit amount within a couple of years, as far as I can tell. So I'm evaluating the possibility of just keeping my invention secret until I'm ready to sell a product based on it and then publishing the full details to make sure no one else can patent it. Question: But when I'm selling such a product: Would competitors need to design a new product based on my idea, involving all the prototyping and too easy to patent but still not trivial problems - or would it be legal to take my product apart, put the parts in a 3D scanner and produce the exact same product? Where is the border between what is allowed and what not, exactly? Hypothetical example: Say I found a new method to make car chassis more aerodynamic. There are certain equations and methods which are applied during the development process, and to keep anyone else from patenting them, I publish them (in my case, the invention is obvious from the final product). Are the competitors allowed to take the chassis I developed and use that, or do they need to design their own using my methods? | Without a patent, your inventions are not protected (except as trade secrets). If you publish your findings, anyone can use them. It is possible to patent the specific design of your chassis. Design patents, which cover the specific aesthetic design of something, can be less expensive than utility patents, which cover functional aspects. Although your chassis is designed with functionality in mind, it will also embody an aesthetic design. That said, enforcement of patent rights (or any other rights you might hope protect your chassis) is orders of magnitude more expensive (typically millions of dollars) than merely obtaining a patent. Thus, even if you do obtain protection for the chassis design or the method of designing it, your budget may make it impractical to effectively take advantage of those protections, unless a law firm is willing to take the case on contingency. | In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid. | Yes, technology patents are useful. Regarding the Amazon patent you referred to, it only covers Amazon's one-click ordering (and similar single-action ordering), and it is immensely valuable to Amazon. Their competitors (essentially, anyone who sells things online) would love to use a similar system, but to do so, they must either pay Amazon a licensing fee or risk being sued for patent infringement. Beyond the value that patents can bring in court or at the negotiation table, and the value that they can have in dissuading potential competitors from taking away your business, patents can also have great defensive value. Some technology companies amass vast collections of patents for defensive purposes. They do not necessarily plan to sue anyone for patent infringement, but if one of their competitors were to sue them, they have the arsenal to effectively countersue. | You have a false premise: "it offers the same conditions", and "MIT license is functionally equivalent to CC-BY". These premises are not true. CC-BY: applies to more than just software; it applies to artistic or literary work, databases, other material disclaims endorsement explicitly withholds moral rights explicitly does not license patent rights (MIT license gives anyone who obtains a copy of the software the right to use it, a patent right) prescribes the acceptable forms of attribution Those are just some of the differences. | "Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem. | Before the AIA in 2012 both companies could apply for a patent and if one of the applicants thought they were both trying to patent the same thing they could initiate an interference proceeding. In that proceeding before the board, they each present their evidence as to date of conception and diligent effort from that point to the date of the first filing. The board decided which application went forward. Now the U.S. is with the rest of the world in first-to-file. It doesn’t matter who conceived first unless one actually stole the idea from the other. There is a new derivation procedure to try to prove that. I don’t think it has ever yet happened. One of the "simultaneous" inventors could publish the invention, putting into the public domain. If published before the other's filing date, it would theoretically prevent the other from getting a patent. In any case a patent owner can stop the other from making their product or charge a royalty. There is a narrow case under the AIA where one company has been using a process that another later patents and can retain a limited right to keep using that process but can’t move or expand operations. This is called Prior User Rights. | Patenting a new invention doesn't extend the term of the patent on the old invention. The later patent covers the new parts of the new invention, but not the parts that were in the old patent. The whole point of patents is to provide protection against even independent reinvention for a limited time, after which the invention becomes free to use for everyone (and since you disclose how it works in the patent, other people actually can use it themselves). | A GPS trace of a car's path, on its own, is unlikely to be covered by copyright in the first place. It is primarily made up of facts (the locations of roads and lanes), and there is no creativity involved in its creation. A database of facts may be protected by copyright as a compilation if there is some amount of creativity in how it is assembled, but this does not extend any protection to the individual contents of the database (cf. Feist v. Rural). |
Can you be charged if police say you sold drugs to a person with no video of the sale Can an individual be charged with selling an illegal substance if they are not in possession and/or have not received money for an illegal substance? Is video evidence required for such charges? | can an individual be charged with selling an illegal substance if they are not in possession or received money for an illegal substance Yes. Testimonies, affidavits, receipts, fingerprints, and circumstantial evidence might conclusively establish that the individual engaged in illegal activity. | This is likely to be a matter of policy rather than law That is, it’s not likely there is a law prohibiting it but it is highly likely that the person’s training and their employer’s policy on the matter is that they must complete a ticket once they start it. It’s a pretty universal anti-corruption measure - it prevents the situation where they are writing the ticket, the owner appears and offers them half the value of the fine in cash to stop: well, they can’t stop so they can’t be tempted by the bribe. Of course, the bribe can be offered before they start but, when fighting corruption, you minimise the opportunities rather than eliminate them. I know that police and rangers (private people can’t issue tickets) in new-south-wales are so restricted. | Police can get a warrant, if the warrant is supported by "probable cause" to believe that evidence of a crime exists. A separate "probable cause" requirement is that to arrest a person, there must be "probable cause" that they committed a crime. However, the Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful to search "work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication", unless there is probable cause that the person committed the crime in question. There are similar laws ("shield laws") at the state level. Here is a map which gives you an indication what immunities exist in what states. | england-and-wales Usually, and assuming the smoker is aged 18 or over and there are no aggravating features, an arrest is not always necessary as what's referred to as "simple possession" is dealt with proportionately either by a: Cannabis Warning Which is: a non-statutory disposal. It can be used as a proportionate response to dealing with offenders found in possession of small amounts of cannabis. It is an informal warning, administered by a police officer, to adults found in possession of small amounts of Cannabis, consistent with personal use. ... First offence, no aggravating factors - Cannabis Warning; Second offence, no aggravating factors – PND (see below); Third offence – arrest. Or, a: Penalty Notices for Disorder (PND): You’ll be asked to sign the penalty notice ticket. You won’t get a criminal conviction if you pay the penalty (usually £60, but may be £90) You can ask for a trial if you disagree with the penalty notice. You’ll get a bigger fine if you don’t ask for a trial but don’t pay the fine. | You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe. | Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death. | Arizona does not license chemists, though they do license pharmacists. There is a law against possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of which is a felony. The law also says In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, the following: Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any drug. The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter. The proximity of the object to drugs. The existence of any residue of drugs on the object. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this chapter. Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use. Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use. National and local advertising concerning its use. The manner in which the object is displayed for sale. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of the business enterprise. The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community. Expert testimony concerning its use. The size of your equipment would be relevant in defending against such a charge; your publications in the field of chemistry would be relevant. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that you were using the glassware to make drugs. Paraphernalia is defined as all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a drug in violation of this chapter. so a garden shovel can be used to grow marijuana, but that is not enough. The prosecution has to prove that the items "are used, intended for use or designed for use" in drug making – not just that they could be so used. | As the answer by Paul Johnson says, if you had no criminal intent, there was no crime. As the answer by Dale M says, the prosecution would need to prove that criminal intent along with the other elements of the crime. Offering to make the call to the banks should be evidence that you had no criminal intent. Making the call and getting assurance from the bank should be evidence that you had good reason to think the cards were good, and thus has no criminal intent. That the cards were good subsequently (which could be shown by receipts or statements) would be further evidence to that effect. While such evidence might not strictly be required, it might help if a criminal case were brought, and mention of it might help persuade the authorities not to bring one. Of course, the bill must still be paid, but that is a civil matter where there was no intent to avoid payment. |
What determines whether a mistake is fundamental and ownership passes? This textbook doesn't expound how to determine whether a mistake is fundamental enough. Assume that A and D mightn't have contracted. Under section 5(4) of the Theft Act 1968: Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that obligation the property or its proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds. This subsection deals with the situation where the defendant has received property as a result of another’s mistake and is under an obligation to restore the proceeds or their value. A good example of where section 5(4) operates is Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1983),39 where a police officer was overpaid her salary by the police force. She was under an obligation to return the money (once she was aware of the overpayment) and therefore the money could be treated as belonging to another (the police force). DEFINITION Where A hands to D property on the basis of a mistake, four situations need to be distinguished: (1) The mistake is so fundamental that ownership does not pass. So although D possesses the property, in fact it is still owned by A. There is therefore no difficulty in establishing the ‘property belonging to another’ requirement if D is charged with theft. (2) The mistake is not so fundamental that ownership does not pass and so D owns the property. But the mistake is sufficient to mean that D is under an obligation to return the money or its proceeds. This means that, relying on section 5(4), the property belongs to A for the purposes of the law of theft and so D can be convicted. (3) The mistake is one that means that D holds the property on trust for A. In such a case A has an equitable interest in the property and the property belongs to A under section 5(1) of the Theft Act, so D can be convicted of theft (see e.g. Shadrokh-Cigari [1988] Crim LR 465 (CA); Hallam and Blackburn [1995] Crim LR 323 (CA)). (4) The mistake is not significant enough to give rise either to a claim that ownership did not pass, or to a claim that there is a legal obligation to make restoration. In that case the property will belong to D and no theft charge can lie, unless the transfer from A itself can be regarded as dishonest. In that case, after Hinks [2000] 3 WLR 1590 (HL), a charge of theft could be brought. Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2020 9 ed). p 525. | What determines whether a mistake is fundamental and ownership passes? Short answer: When the facts show it is a blatantly obvious error. For example: I park my car on my neighbour's driveway by mistake (maybe at night in a driving blizzard). Although my neighbour possesses the car as it's on his land, ownership does not pass to him as it's an obvious error on my part. If he treats the car as his own (i.e., dishonestly appropriates) then he may be guilty of theft. Long answer: The word "fundamental" does not appear in the cited legislation, but has been introduced by the courts to mean something akin to being crucial, pivotal or critical to, for example, a contract - which can be mapped across to the OP's theft scenarios with a similar meaning. Here are some examples of when a fundamental mistake has, or may be, considered by the courts (with thanks to Law Teacher lectures) In Strickland v Turner (1852) 7 Ex 208 Strickland took out an insurance policy on the life of Turner but, unbeknownst to him and the insurance company, Turner was already dead. Strickland sued for the return of his premium payments, and it was held that "a mistake to the subject matter of a contract must be fundamental and persuade each of the parties to enter into that agreement. Since turner was dead at the time the parties made the contract, this agreement was void." The perishing of specific goods will amount to a fundamental mistake, as per Section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Goods which have never existed at all will also amount to a fundamental breach, as in Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Credit du Nord [1989] 1 WLR 255 | A clause states "If the contract is breached you accept that you must pay for damages. We shall determine the amount." Will this hold up in court? A court is going to want to look for context and an interpretation that would make this provision make sense before invalidating it (which it might). For example, if there was a schedule of the amount of damages for various violations attached to the contract, a court might interpret this language to mean that the drafting, non-breaching party will invoice you for damages in amount that it determines in good faith to be the correct amount with reference to the schedule or some formula set forth in the contract (e.g. an interest rate on an open account loan), in much the same way that a landlord might dock your security deposit and send you a letter telling you what was deducted in what amounts and why, or that a credit card company might charge you interest and late fees on a monthly basis. A court would, of course, be unlikely to interpret the clause as affording final and binding legal authority to decide what is owed. In the face of a clause like this one, the other party could bring a lawsuit to dispute the amount determined to be owed by the drafting, non-breaching party (unless the contract is a third-party arbitration clause and simply doesn't read like one because it is out of context). | Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable. | I'm confident that there has been no successful breach of contract lawsuit on that basis: that is not the right legal basis. Actions against a shoplifter would either be under tort law or, much more likely, criminal law. Put simply, theft is a crime, encoded in the laws of all nations, and the government will shoulder the burden of punishing a shoplifter. Since the goal of criminal law is to guarantee a well-ordered society (not to restore the victim of the crime), a victim of theft may have to pursue their own legal case against the criminal, if they want to be restored for their loss (let us say that the criminal also ate the evidence). | I belive you have misread the linked article: "A Narrow Lane: Navigating Claims for Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing"/ It says thst all conrtreacts involve a duty of good faith: It is a settled principle of New York law that “all contracts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of performance.” 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 153 (2002) (collecting cases). Courts have described this covenant as a duty “encompassing any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included and which are not inconsistent with the contract.” It goes on to say that it is tempting for a plaintiff to include a bad faith claim in any contract dispute: After all, most plaintiffs probably believe that the defendant did not act in good faith and/or that the result was unfair. But it says that courts are reluctant to honor such claims in ordinary contract disputes: ... courts are loath to make rulings that might vary the terms to which the parties agreed. A party’s conduct either breaches the terms of the agreement or it does not; if it does not, that is generally the end of the line for a breach of contract claim. A party seeking to impose an additional duty on the ground that it is “implied” bears a heavy burden. In short, claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing fail far more often than they succeed. This article explores some of the nuances that make such claims particularly thorny. ... “[t]he law encourages ‘efficient breaches’”; that is, breaches committed based on the breaching party’s calculated determination that it “will still profit after compensating the other party for that party’s expectancy interest.” 28A N.Y. Prac. Contract Law § 23.2. Absent a specific provision in the contract that requires good faith, a “bad faith breach” is no different from any other. ... although a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that the parties have a valid contract ..., such a claim will fail if it is based on the same alleged conduct that forms the basis for a cause of action for breach of the contract’s express terms. See Kim v. Francis, 184 A.D.3d 413, 414 (1st Dept. 2020). So the article explicitly says that a claim for breach of contract does not automatically imply a breach of good faith. To the contrary, something more is required. | There isn't an automatic exclusion rule for all forms of improperly acquired evidence in the UK. I can't find the exact quote but there was a judgement from a senior court that said in terms: "it's not the court's job to discipline the police but to see that justice is done." However, judges have the discretion to disallow individual pieces of evidence if they think the interests of justice require it. Section 78 (1) of PACE (1984) has: In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. Senior judges have been reluctant to lay down general guidelines, holding the trial judge best placed to make these decisions (although of course, subject to appeal). The foundational principle is the accused's right to a fair trial, so in principle one could appeal to the ECtHR under Article 6. However it generally takes a similar line to courts in the UK: It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. PACE Section 78(2) is: Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence. The general principle in 78 (1) does not override specific prohibitions: for instance, intercept evidence is never admissable under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. | Florida Title XXXIX, chapter 687 of the 2022 Florida Statutes covers usury. The technical definitions of what it is are earlier, but the punishment is as follows (I skipped the couple of exceptions to it) 687.04 Penalty for usury; not to apply in certain situations.—Any person, or any agent, officer, or other representative of any person, willfully violating the provisions of s. 687.03 shall forfeit the entire interest so charged, or contracted to be charged or reserved, and only the actual principal sum of such usurious contract can be enforced in any court in this state, either at law or in equity; and when said usurious interest is taken or reserved, or has been paid, then and in that event the person who has taken or reserved, or has been paid, either directly or indirectly, such usurious interest shall forfeit to the party from whom such usurious interest has been reserved, taken, or exacted in any way double the amount of interest so reserved, taken, or exacted. So basically the lender can only collect the original amount loaned, no interest, and if they already collected some of the interest, they have to return that at a 2 for 1 rate. It's a civil law, so I don't know if that's what you meant by "breaking the law/illegal", but they can go to court to recover the interest doubled. The contract wouldn't change anything, as you can't enforce the terms of an illegal contract. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. |
HOA Prohibits "Large Families" My wife and I have found a vacant lot (this is in Utah, BTW) where we would like to build a house. However, the HOA that the lot belongs to does not allow more than four occupants, regardless of the size of the home. The CCR actually says (community name) is designed and intended to be for a specific lifestyle. Neither the Units nor the common areas are designed to accommodate large families. Permanent residents of (community name) shall be restricted and limited to families with no more than four person's related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Does the HOA actually have authority to enforce this? What happens if we build a house (with plenty of room), move in with our two kids, and then have another baby? | As stated, this is not a reasonable restriction and runs afoul of the Fair Housing Act. You cannot discriminate based on family status, with an exemption for "housing for older persons", and the act "does not limit the applicability of reasonable local, state, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" (let's leave aside HOA restrictions for a moment). The number of occupants can legally be restricted in terms of a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest such as parking availability, safety, noise or securing the property. A restriction based on square footage or number of bedrooms might be reasonable: a blanket rule "no more than 4 people" is not reasonable. This article notes some of the state complication in interpreting "marital status", in terms of "not being married to each other". | Joint tenancy (as opposed to tenancy in common) would accomplish all of these goals. Joint tenancy gives each individual the absolute right to occupy the property (each person owns the whole property). If one dies the property automatically passes to the other joint tenant(s), which is known legally as the right of survivorship. The child(ren) could never force the parent(s) (other joint tenants) to vacate the property; on the inverse, however, the parent(s) could not deny the child(ren) the ability to also possess the property during their lives, if they so chose to do this. I am assuming if the children ran into hard times and needed to live there, it wouldn't be a problem, but this should be specifically addressed with the client. For a valid joint tenancy to be created, you would simply need to have: a. Unity of title: whereby the joint tenants must hold title to the property under one document (i.e., the title deeds); b. Unity of time: the joint tenancy must start and end on the same date for all the joint tenants (end date being the death of the final joint tenant, who will/should have passed through will/trust to an heir the title interest; c. Unity of possession: all joint tenants have equal rights to possess the whole property (as mentioned above, the children could occupy); d. and finally, Unity of interest: joint tenants must have equal interests in the whole of the property. This is the simplest way to do this while meeting all objectives. | I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania, a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP): Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article. Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner. | A random example I found is 16 USC 363, which forbids anyone to own a bathhouse in Hot Springs National Park which has been granted a hot water supply, if they already own another bathhouse nearby. 42 USC 2061 says that the Atomic Energy Commission shall be the exclusive owner of all production facilities for special nuclear material (with certain exceptions), which effectively forbids any other person to own such a facility. | Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned. | Because an owner cannot tell another owner what they can and can't do with their own property The quoted paragraph clearly sets out some of the things the leasehold arrangement allows: "... set out the rights and responsibilities of the residents, such as funding the maintenance of the building and placing restrictions on antisocial behavior." When you own land, you own it; and no one can tell you what you can and can't do with it, not even your co-owners (governments excepted). Want to run chickens? Sure: it's your land. Spinal Tap your stereo to 11 at 2 am? Sure: it's your land. Become a hoarder? Sure, it's your land. When there's a single dwelling on the land, none of that is a problem. When there are multiple dwellings on the land, as in a block of flats (apartments for the Americans among us) then some of these are likely to be problematical. But they aren't problems the law cares about because you all own the property. Different common law jurisdictions have arrived at different solutions to this problem but the UK has particular difficulties because people have been owning land there for a long time. A lot longer than in the USA, Australia or New Zealand. This is quite an elegant solution: all the owners own the land but each of them have a lease over their own flat and that is a contract the law will enforce. | Disclosures are prescribed by state law. Fair housing, which is a federal concept, pertains to issues such as using prohibited personal facts to determine whether to accept an offer. (Hazardous materials disclosures are also mandated at the federal level, but are are included in state requirements which can get pretty broad). If you are buying in Washington state, RCW 64.06.020 says what and how you must disclose. The list of disclosures is very detailed, covering title and covenants, water, sewer, structure, systems and fixtures, environment, and mobile home related. The only one of the 86 questions about smoke is whether smoke alarms are present. Thus smell of smoke is not a legally material fact that must be disclosed, in this state. The California disclosures, even longer, are here, and there is likewise no "smells bad" disclosure. It is unlikely that any state in the US mandates such a disclosure, since it is somewhere between a subjective evaluation and a self-evident fact. Some people are very sensitive to certain smells while others do not care. The burden is on the buyer to pursue matters of personal concern (in writing!), such as whether any dog has been present in the house in the past 5 years (some people care). You have to look carefully at the response. "Don't know" is usually a safe bet, unless you actually have factual knowledge. From what I can determine, Massachussetts is on the opposite end of the spectrum from California. There are some requirements imposed on real estate agents, and there is the federal lead paint disclosure, but otherwise it appears that nothing is mandated by law. This form seems to be used by the real estate association, and there is a question about "history of smoke/fire damage to structure". The reasonable interpretation of that is "has the house caught fire and suffered damage", so "no" from a cigar-smoker would not be fraudulent. If the intent of the question were to reveal if someone has smoked frequently in the house, that would he the question they'd ask. You can check whether you have this form and see what it says, but "smoke damage" would not normally be interpreted as meaning "smells a bit funny". | A property owner can give you an easement for the air rights of their property, which can allow you to put your own structure over their property or prevent them from putting a structure over their property (depending on the terms of the easement). For instance, a railroad might sell the air rights to an urban rail yard to a private developer so that the developer can put buildings over top of the yard. A high-rise owner might buy an easement for a neighboring property that bans them from building above a certain height in order to keep the views from the high-rise unblocked. However, a property owner can't sell you rights that they themselves don't have. The US government has exclusive sovereignty over US airspace, and there's a public right of transit through navigable airspace (defined as airspace above minimum safe flight altitudes). While the traditional rule was that a property owner owned their land up to infinity, with the development of airplanes this rule has been changed to significantly limit the rights of property owners. The FAA doesn't limit how tall a property owner can build (although too-tall structures can be declared hazards to navigation, which can cause issues with planning boards or insurance companies). However, if there are no obstructions, the airspace above 500 feet in rural areas (in built-up areas it depends on local obstructions) is open for pilots to fly through. The only way to get obstruction-free airspace restricted is to try to get the FAA to issue a flight restriction. If you're trying to get large swaths of airspace restricted, this is extremely unlikely to happen. |
Can a court order a large asset to be sold if the defendent lost the case on a relatively small amount? Say a defendent owns land worth $200,000. The defendant lost the case and has to pay $9,000 He does not have any money to pay. Could courts order the land to be sold? My question is general, but just in case someone asks for a jurisdiction, I am in Australia. This would generally fall under small claims. | Can a court order a large asset to be sold if the defendent lost the case on a relatively small amount? Say a defendent owns land worth $200,000. The defendant lost the case and has to pay $9,000. He does not have any money to pay. Could courts order the land to be sold? In most U.S. law jurisdictions, yes, a high value assets can be ordered sold to satisfy a small money judgment or a small secured claim (i.e. a mortgage or the equivalent in real of personal property), subject to some exceptions that don't precisely target this concern but do alleviate it somewhat. Forcing a sale is mostly a decision made by the collection lawyer and the judge has very little discretion in the matter in most cases, so long as all formalities are observed. In most U.S. jurisdictions there are not minimum dollar amount of a debt that can be collected by execution and levy (i.e. seizure and sheriff's sale) on property of arbitrary value (although I am sure there must be at least one out there that does have a minimum dollar amount). Some kinds of property are completely exempt from creditors claims (e.g. defined benefit pension plans). Some kinds of property are protected up to a certain dollar amount of equity (most exemptions for household property and for homesteads, although a small number of homestead exemptions are unlimited). This allows courts and parties to disregard homes with little equity and low value personal property, focusing collection efforts on higher value property. There are also laws in some states require that creditors attempt to collect the debt from all other known assets with equity that can be collected through a formal process (other than a personal residence), before attempting to sell the personal residence (unless the debt is a voluntary mortgage or mechanic's lien on the personal residence and no other assets). There are several ways that the injustice of this can be avoided, if the debtor doesn't simply have the cash to pay off the debt. First, the debtor may be able to borrow the small amount of the debt owed from someone else to pay it off and avoid the foreclosure of the asset. Second, the debtor can take out a loan with the property as collateral to pay the debt, even if the debtor has few other assets. Third, the debtor can sell their own property to pay the debt probably producing a better price than would be obtained at a sheriff's sale. Fourth, someone other than the debtor and the creditor could bid at a sheriff's sale an amount closer to the fair market value of the property than the amount of the debt. Usually, the sheriff's sale price is still far below the fair market value, but it could be a lot more than the debt, and in those cases the excess goes back to the debtor. In some jurisdictions, bids for personal residences must be supported by appraisals that show what the fair market value of the property is and can't be less than that (apart from litigation costs and costs of sale). Fifth, someone could file for bankruptcy and negotiate a payment plan for the small debt in that context. | Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) – those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) – in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong – especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform – the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook! | It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be "what a reasonable person would conclude" (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to "Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes", which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is "an insignificant value". The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia). | A person's property cannot be seized in the US except by due process of law. There is no law that declares the property of a convicted person to be forfeit to the state. A person who is convicted might be subject to a fine, in which case a court could order seizure of property to pay the fine. Your property might also be seized as a result of a civil forfeiture proceeding (where the government sues your property for being the fruit of an illegal enterprise), but that only applies to property believed to be connected to a crime (e.g. purchased with the proceeds of a crime). Civil forfeiture doesn't even require that you be arrested. Barring that circumstance, the person retains their rights to their property. It is then up to them to make suitable arrangements for the protection or disposition of their property. | Leaving out who the shipper is for a minute, the primary loss would be the seller's (UCC 2-613) in that the loss would be total and the contract would void (so the buyer has not obligation to pay the seller, and the seller's stuff is nevertheless gone). The seller has a remedy against most shippers, so that UPS or Fedex would be liable to covering their loss (assuming buyer has not assume the liability by agreeing to delivery without signature). However, USPS has special immunity: the government is liable to tort claims, but 28 USC 2680(b) states that The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to... Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter Thanks to Nate Eldredge for raising the case Dolan v. USPS 546 U.S. 481 (2006), where it was held that USPS has very narrowly circumscribed immunity from liability. Under this provision, they are not liable for breaking contents when delivered negligently, but that does not mean that they are not liable for breaking things as a result of their deliveries (they broke Mrs. Dolan, in how they piled stuff on the porch). Although this case does not rule on the meaning of "loss" or "miscarriage", on a plain reading of the terms, theft results in a loss ("loss" is not restricted to "mysterious disappearance"). The court also observes that losses of the type for which immunity is retained under §2680(b) are at least to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal registration and insurance and the court explains that one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid “extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available” (that is, Congress opened the government to tort liability in just those cases where there were no remedies: but there has long been postal insurance). | The primary question is why the trustee is disposing of the asset at all. The trustee has a particular fiduciary duty (we haven't seen the document so we have no idea what that duty is). It could be justified because, for example, the grantor needs cash for a brain operation. Self-dealing (acting in one's own interest, which is a conflict of interest), is prohibited for a trustee. With real estate, "fair market value" is a fluid concept, but within limits one can determine that a sale (to self) at $900,000 undervalued the house and that a sale to another would have garnered $1,100,000, therefore this would be an illegal self-dealing. However, the simple act of a trustees purchasing an asset from a trust that he is the trustee of is not categorially prohibited. | You reach a settlement instead of a judge deciding a court case if both sides agree that a settlement is better for them than paying court costs, lawyers cost, the risk of losing, having embarrassing details published, distraction for a business, waste of time, and the stress of a court case. If the plaintiff wants to be able to publish details of the case, there is a lot less reason for the defendant to enter a settlement agreement. You complain that third parties miss out on possible information. That’s exactly why it isn’t there, because the defendant doesn’t want it to be there. The defendant might offer “I’ll give you $ 1,000 if you agree not to say a word about the case.” If the plaintiff says “I want $ 1,000 and tell the world about what happened”, then the defendant will likely say “take our offer, or take us to court and our lawyers will do their best so you get nothing”. The defendant will just not offer the kind of settlement you are looking for. And the plaintiff will do what is best for them, not what is best for anyone else. You have to remember that a settlement cannot be forced upon both sides, it must be something that both sides agree on. It's easiest to agree if you give the other side what they want if it doesn't cost you much, and then get things that you value more in return. As a plaintiff, not telling the world about the case is something that costs me nothing, but may have high value for the defendent. On the other hand, I value cash from the defendent a lot, while the defendent may be rich and can easily afford it. Because both sides have to agree, the terms are likely to incorporate something that both sides want. | The amount requested has little or nothing to do with the amount, if any, eventually awarded. Once can sue "for 100 million dollars" and be awarded 100 dollars, and although it is rarer, one can be awarded more than the amount asked for when suit is field. That initial amount now serves as a peg to hang sensational news stores on, and nothing more. The plaintiff, and the plaintiff's lawyer, may consider that such publicity serves them well. Such inflated amounts are not grounds to dismiss the suit, so there is no downside to including them, except possibly negative publicity if people mock the demand. |
Do local patents have precedence over foreign patents even if the foreign patent was granted first? Do local patents have precedence over foreign patents even if the foreign patent was granted first? Let's say that a patent was granted in 2010 after the application was made in the same year, but in the U.S. another company made an application for the same patent in 2020 and was granted the patent in 2021, does the patent in the U.S. have legal precedence in U.S. court over the foreign patent and why? | You may not have a clear understanding of patents. They are 99.9%* territorial. A patent issued by the USPTO is the only patent relevant to the making, selling, offering for sale, importing, or using a patented product in the U.S. And the same for all other countries. Of course U.S. companies not only file for U.S. patents; they also file for German, Chinese and any other places they see fit and have the funds to pursue. Likewise, Chinese companies file with the USPTO for U.S. patents. If a filing by by company A in any country occurs before a filing by company B in any country and A's filing makes B's not new, then B should not a patent in whatever place it has filed. Also, merely getting a patent does not violate someone else's patent, a product can infringe a patent. Actually a product can infringe many patents from many patent owners. And having a patent doesn't automatically allow for the production of a product practicing that patent. (the 0.1% is for odd corner cases at sea or involving importing of components of patented items) | If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens. | If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here. | Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff- | You need a nexus The company doesn’t operate in the USA. Therefore the damage they caused you can’t have happened in the USA. Therefore, no US court has jurisdiction. | To answer the specific questions you asked: Can I use the publication to perform ECC without being under patent protection? Can an academic publication be under patent protection? The answers are: No, that academic paper does not provide any protection from patent litigation. Yes, an academic paper can publish the details of an invention, and that in no way voids the patent. The issue is the timing of the publication; the patent was filed in 1998; the academic paper was published in 2002. Once a patent is filed, the inventors (or anyone else, for that matter) can publish the patent, and that in no way invalidates the patent. To provide any protection against a patent, the prior art needs to be "prior", that is, earlier than the filing date of the patent. Now, this particular issue is made a bit tricky because there does appear to be prior citations of this invention. The whole reason this invention is called the "Montgomery ladder" (not Montgomery multiplication - that's something else) was because it was first published by Peter Montgomery in 1987. One would think that would invalidate the patent. However, I'm not an attorney; I cannot advise you to proceed under that assumption. Instead, I would suggest you follow the advice of Joao; there are plenty of elliptic curve routines out there; use one of them. | If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. |
Can we presents Secret recordings as proof to the police? I recorded a call from my former roommate Who claims that I caused him to lose his deposit and he wants me to give it back (he apparently did some damage to the room we used to live in, and somehow after I left I caused the damage? somehow?) the important thing the conversation was like this: he: "I will find where you live and I will show you who really I am" me: "Is that a threat?" he:"Shut the Fck up Shut the Fck up or will break your fcking jaw I will break your Fcking jaw" so can I go to the police with this as evidence? mind you I live in Germany and such recording isn't allowed, but again I don't think the police will believe me if I claim this without proof | Recording other people without consent is a crime (§ 201 StGB). But so is threatening other people with violence (§ 241 StGB). Secret recordings and other acts can still be legitimate if they are necessary and appropriate to deflect harm (§ 34 StGB), similar to how hurting someone can be legitimate if you're acting in self-defense. If you're prosecuted for this, it will be up to the court to determine if your act was necessary and proportionate. But regardless of what you did, your recording can be used as evidence against the ex-roommate. German criminal law does not generally exclude illegally acquired evidence. The main risk of disclosing this recording is that you are also providing evidence against yourself for possible wiretapping charges (which may or may not be punishable as discussed above). | a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself. | The legal system is set up to alleviate the problem or conundrum of intimidation by perpetrators. In the US criminal system, the State is the plaintiff, not the individual. In the extant described situation, very likely all you would have to do is sign an affidavit that the recovered phone is your phone, and that it was removed from your possession by unknown means on or about a certain date. From your description given here you don't know if it was stolen...you appear to have perhaps dropped it or left it somewhere, and someone picked it up/found it. Clearly it didn't belong to them, but this is more like "recovered lost property" rather than "received stolen property." The craigslist poster might be entirely un-chargeable with a crime, though they might have to give up the phone to you. | It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down. | Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place. | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around. | What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? In short, yes. She shows up at a local police station, tells her side of the story including the whole bit about things getting destroyed and her getting kicked out, cites the missing persons report, and make it clear that she's not missing but an independent adult who is free and making her own decisions. Since she's over 18, she can do that. (Bringing proof of age might be helpful.) The mystery of the missing person will be considered solved from the police side. She does not have to give a specific address where she's living, just convince the officer that she's OK and making an intentional decision to create distance between herself and her mother. She could also try calling (the same local station which is convenient to her current location) before showing up to see if that satisfies the officer, and only go in if needed. Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. Shouldn't be a problem, as long as it's a mutually willing (non-coercive) relationship. Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Yes, you can reject it. You do not have to answer ANY question a police officer asks; you have the right to remain silent and/or to say only "I have the right to remain silent." To reduce the probability that they'll even ask questions, you might prefer not accompanying your girlfriend when she goes to clear the missing persons report, if she goes in-person. This adds more weight to her assertion that she's going there to clear it of her own free will, not because you're forcing her. |
Can a person defend himself after breaking into a home? Can a person defend himself after breaking into a home? Can a home invader stab a person as self-defense after breaking into that person's home, or can a home invader action can never be construed as self-defense no matter what the context is in the United States? | “Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen. | Illinois has a "Castle Doctrine" which includes dwellings and other qualified buildings, but not a general "Stand your Ground" doctrine. Normally, to claim self-defense one has to show that they were not able to retreat and had to use force, but in Illinois you do not have a duty to retreat if you are preventing criminal interference with a dwelling or with real property that you or a family member owns, or you have a legal duty to protect (see Ill Code 720-2 and Ill Code 720-3). In order to use deadly force in any case, it must be to prevent a forcible felony, which is defined as (720 ILCS 5/2-8): "Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. So, assuming you have no legal duty to protect the 7-11, you would not be justified in using deadly force against rioters merely on the basis that they were committing a forcible felony against the building. On the other hand, if you were in the store or could see someone in the store being attacked, you may be able to successfully defend deadly force used to protect yourself or that person. | Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that? | The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted. | So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense. | Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019. | Because your buddy routinely points loaded firearms at you First, you should probably get friends who don’t do this but, even though this is objectively a threat, you know that you are in no danger (barring accidents). Self-defence is not justified. This is why there is the dual requirement that the danger is clear to both: an objective observer, and the person under threat. | It is illegal to break into the house even if you don't steal anything. It is illegal to steal the drugs even though the owner of the drugs possessed them unlawfully. So that's at least two crimes. On top of that, the thief will be committing the crime of illegal possession of a controlled substance after the theft. |
In the UK, can documents obtained through Freedom of Information be shared with friends? If you have obtained certain documents from a government agency in the UK through a Freedom of Information request, are you allowed to send a copy of these documents to a friend who might also be interested in looking at these documents? Parts of the obtained documents have already been redacted by the government agency as they deemed necessary (to protect certain details, presumably). | united-states In the United States, information released through the federal Freedom of Information (FoI) process, or any of the various state-level versions of FoI, is considered public information. The person who receives it may share it at will, or publish it. Indeed many such inquiries are made by news reporters who intend to publish the information, and many others are routinely posted to various web sites. I suspect that the law on this point in the UK is similar, but I have not checked it. | Yes. The police have the power to seize your phone as evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Terrorism Act 2000. There are no caveats or defined circumstances other than having a reasonable belief that the data on the phone forms evidence against you. They do not require a warrant to access your phone, and many police forces in the UK are using commercially available software to bypass password/PIN protection on your phone 1. In the event you do not provide your password/thumbprint/facial scan/PIN to officers to unlock your phone, you can be served with a Section 49 Notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which compels you to provide that information. Failure to do so can lead to a conviction under Section 53 RIPA, in addition to any other offences you may be charged with. | The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time. | The Canadian law governing interception of communication (wiretapping and recording) is explained here. Canada is a one-party country, so as long as one party (you, for example) consent, this would not be a violation of that statute. That source also believes (not unreasonably) that is would not constitute the tort of invasion of privacy since under the act The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled … is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard to the lawful interests of others (bearing in mind that is it allowed w.r.t. Section 184(1) of the Criminal Code: that is, it is reasonable to do so). | It should not surprise you that copyright protects the right to (among other things) make copies. There are limited exceptions that are considered "fair use", like if you reproduce a limited amount of text for educational, reporting, or review purposes. Giving your friend a copy of a large portion of the text just because they want it would almost certainly violate copyright. Whether the book is available or out-of-print has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on who holds the copyright or whether your actions violate it. This is very different from giving your friend the book itself. The book itself is covered under the "first sale doctrine", meaning that by buying a copy of the book, you buy the right to sell, transfer, or dispose of that particular copy, but it doesn't give you the right to make more copies. I will note that in practice, it is vanishingly unlikely that the copyright holder would ever learn of your isolated instance of limited infringement in the first place (especially since it's out of print), much less bring legal action against you for making a single copy that did not affect their bottom line. | In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization. | In short, no. Article 20 of the GDPR covers the “Right to data portability”, which essentially says two main things: The data subject had the right to an exported copy of their personal data in a common format And The data subject has the right to have this data transmitted directly from one controller to another where technically feasible. Neither of these rights as stated in the GDPR require the data controller to provide a button to initiate either a data export or a transfer to another controller. | This question is framed such that it could include myriad different scenarios that could lead to a search of one's personal computer. You seem to gear the bulk of your inquiry toward when the government can search, but then move to when a corporate entity has the right to do so, which is a very different thing. These are different issues with different concepts and rules that dictate when this can occur lawfully. You might want to narrow your question a bit. By way of generalization: the citizens of the U.S. have an implied right to privacy as construed through the Bill of Rights, even though there is no explicit right written into the constitution. The most common way to conduct a search in the U.S. is with probable cause through a search warrant. There are questions and answers both on here, as well as resources all over the internet, pertaining to constitutionally accepted forms of search and seizure such that you could get that information fairly easily. However, as with the U.K., and despite any rights (explicit or implicit), there are many ways your computer could be searched by the government - both known to the owner and unknown - and even remotely, that use means less common to the standard search warrant. As you've probably heard from the revelations of Edward Snowden (Wikileaks), the governments of the world have been shown to search metadata and other electronic records without a warrant under laws aimed toward protecting national security. In the U.S. the Patriot Act gave wide reaching powers to invade the privacy of individuals that required no oversight or basis for doing so. Corporations that deal with the transmission of data work with government entities to to accomplish this end. As one individual has already noted, you subject yourself to search (which includes your computer) upon entry to the country through customs. There are many ways that the government can and does engender to search computers, computer files, emails, metadata, etc. A corporation may search your personal computer under a contractual relationship you create with it (for instance if you work from home and elect to use your home computer, and to do so you elect to agree to allow the entity to inspect your computer for their intellectual property in certain circumstances). They can also do this pursuant to a civil lawsuit, which can allow for the inspection of your computer through the process of discovery. These are just some of the ways your information can become subject to inspection (search) by government or corporate entities. Again, your question would need to be limited more to address any one situation more fully. |
Why is everyone affraid to give "legal advice"? What is the difference between legal advice and personal opinion? Why is it illegal to give your opinion/advice about a legal problem or case if you are not licensed or do not have a lawyer/client contract? Findlaw - What is Legal Advice page says it's ok if you are just a friend, or if you give general information but not to a specific case. The reason I am asking is because as I look at it for the first time, it sounds a bit in contradiction with the principle of free speech, or the right to engage in a free non-binding exchange of opinions. If the main reason is that you may be "dangerously wrong", why isn't the same logic applied to every other aspect of life like cooking, how to fix the foundation of your house.. etc? Putting wrong ingredients in your recipe can poison you. A weak foundation may cause your house to collapse and kill you. Edit: Why do many explanations about the meaning of "legal advice" include representing someone in court? To me, an advice is more like giving someone an opinion than actually doing something for them. | Why is everyone afraid to give “legal advice”? It may be illegal to give legal advice if you are not authorised to do so by the regulator. In New Zealand, providing legal advice without being a lawyer may result in a fine up to NZ$50,000. The person who received the advice could later claim damages for wrong/bad advice. They may not necessarily succeed in this claim but headache is guaranteed. What is the difference between legal advice and personal opinion? Largely depends on the jurisdiction, wording of the corresponding laws and circumstances of the advice/opinion. why isn't the same logic applied to every other aspect of life like cooking, how to fix the foundation of your house.. etc? Putting wrong ingredients in your recipe can poison you. A weak foundation may cause your house to collapse and kill you. The question "why" is not really supposed to be answered on this site. But because I am giving answers to the two questions above, I will comment on this one too: Laws are written by lawyers. They are often lobbied by lawyers too, especially laws about lawyers and who can give legal advice. Lawyers are directly interested in limiting general public access to the market of legal advice: it simply makes their job more comfortable and highly paid. | This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer. | A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law. | This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta. | Not only would it not be unethical to argue both sides of the issue, if the lawyer argued both sides of the issue and won on both sides, this would be proof that the lawyer is an excellent lawyer. Because the victory would be based on the lawyers skills and not on whether the law leans one way or the other. Speaking of ethics, I believe it would be unethical for a lawyer not to argue on behalf of one of his clients. A lawyer is required to represent each one of his clients zealously. If this means the lawyer has to argue both sides of an issue, as long as there is no conflict of interest between his two clients, then the lawyer must do so. Our system is an adversarial system. The system is designed to get a just result by having each side argue their own position in an adversarial setting. This means that the opposing lawyer could argue that the first lawyer is arguing both sides of the issue in different cases. However I believe a good judge would find that lawyer's argument to be irrelevant. Because the only arguments that are relevant would be the arguments based on the law and the facts of each individual case. In other words it would not be relevant for the opposing lawyer to argue that this lawyer frequently argues both sides of the case. As long as he is not doing so in this one specific case. | "Reasonableness" is meant to be vague, because what is reasonable in one case or contract or industry is not always reasonable in another. Generally, though, you'll probably find courts interpreting it to take into account normal practices in your geographic area, in your industry, and between you and the other party. If one party looks like they're trying to unjustly enrich themselves or is asking for something that people just don't agree to in the real world, it's probably going to be unreasonable. If people are asking for the fair value of their work on terms that are normally agreed to when they're the subject of negotiations, it's probably reasonable. Dropping the reasonableness language would probably leave the assigning party in a bad position, as they're not required to make the assignment, with no qualifications as to the terms. The assignee could argue that they're free to take the IP on any terms whatsoever, though courts often read in a reasonableness requirement anyway. This answer is based on U.S. law, but there will be probably be pretty strong parallels if you're in a common law jurisdiction. | Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law. | If you want to study the basics of law, where should you start? Don't try memorizing individual laws. That would be a waste of energy, in part because --as you rightly point out-- laws change. There are many introductory books. Law 101, by Jay M. Feinman, is an excellent starting point. The next step --broadly speaking-- consists of reading court decisions (aka court opinions). Opinions released by upper (aka reviewing) courts are available online for free. If you are interested in jurisdictions in the US, Leagle.com is one of many very good resources; EU cases are available here; and so forth. Acquainting yourself with court opinions is quite beneficial. First, court opinions [collaterally] teach how to formulate one's legal positions. Rather than merely being formulaic and a copycat, a litigant is to convey that his legal position is more consistent (compared to the adversary) with the laws and underlying doctrines. His points are easier to get across by adapting his presentation thereof to how courts are used to handle the legal principles involved. Second, court opinions identify the statutes that are relevant to the type of disputes that arise between parties. This is indicative of importance that a statute or procedural rule entails in relation to other laws. Third, court opinions reflect how statutes, rules, and doctrines are interpreted. Oftentimes the way how legislation is worded leads "laypeople" to have misconceptions on the interpretation of laws and rules, when in reality these are construed usually in a much narrower way. Law journals are a good source once you have gained some background in law and are interested in a sort of monograph about a topic that is new to you. But, as explained above, court opinions also serve that purpose (perhaps less scholarly). Having a legal dictionary is always a good idea. Courts in the US oftentimes quote definitions from Black's Law Dictionary for crucial terms which statutory law does not define. What is most applicable to real life? Without knowing whether you are interested in a particular field, it is safe to say that contract law is the most applicable. Entering contracts is part of our everyday life even if laypeople don't notice it when they purchase goods & services, reach an agreement, or engage in a course of conduct which reasonably fosters expectations. And good news is that the principles of contract law are largely similar among modern jurisdictions, including the America (the continent, not just the USA), many member states of the EU, and Asian countries. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is a very useful formulation of contract law. Courts in the US very often cite the Restatement for premising their decisions on contract disputes. In countries with a civil law system, the principles of contract law are usually formulated in one or multiple sections of the [countries'] Civil Code. Procedural law (aka rules of criminal or civil procedure) is also highly applicable: Large portions thereof apply to all disputes which are brought to court. To a great extent these rules are very similar across the jurisdictions of one same country, but the litigant ought too ensure his compliance with the rules lest he loses the case for a technicality. Lastly, procedural law can be remarkably boring unless the person anticipates he will be involved in litigation. |
What actions can I take for discriminating against me (a right wing conservative) on job applications? This question is hypothetical Say, I was denied several Jobs because of my beliefs as a right wing nationalist. I have made some comments in the past with regards to certain groups (mostly on Immigrants and Muslims). I've deleted those comments and all my accounts but somehow these comments are archived somewhere which the Company HR has access to. I've also been a registered member of some right wing groups until today, and somehow my membership is known. I recently knew about this when a company insider explained to me why my employment was denied. They say that they cannot take the risk of employing me. Their company had a significant number of non-native employees and clients. I live in the State of California. | As a adult of sound mind, you are responsible for your actions. Background checks for job applications are common place to determine suitability. The employers have the right (and responsibility) to choose what is in their best interest. If through your previous and present actions, they come to the conclusion that you will become a liability to their interests, they will determine that you are not suitable for the position. Not being suitable for a position is not a discrimination, but a determination of fact. Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. The same is true for the employers. They too have the obligation to act in their own that of their other employees that of their clients interests. In cases where a judge comes to a conclusion that the rights of others are being impeaded, they will most likely decide for that party. It is unlikely that a judge will assume that an individual is the center of the universe and that everyone else must revolve around that individual. | In fact, the immigration quotas do not discriminate. The described limit is that "No more than 7 percent of the visas may be issued to natives of any one independent country in a fiscal year; no more than 2 percent may issued to any one dependency of any independent country". All countries get the same upper limit. Additionally, anti-discrimination laws are subject matter specific: they exist because Congress passed a law that prohibits using race as a basis for employing a person (which Congress can do because of the Commerce Clause). Congress has not passed any such law pertaining to granting of visas. There is a path of reasoning that could lead to concluding that national quotas violate anti-discrimination laws, based on an "effects test" (disparate impact). It appears to be a fact that an applicant for a visa has a much higher probability of being denied a visa is their country of origin is China or India, as opposed to Sweden, which one could spin into a disparate impact argument. In order for this argument to become the law, there would have to be a case brought to the federal courts to the effect that national quotas are illegal, and as far as I know there has never been such a case. There are no provisions in anti-discrimination legislation that support a disparate impact doctrine in immigration, and pretty clear evidence that it was not congressionally intended since Title 8 Ch. 12 clearly calls for nation-based quotas. A final point: "national origin discrimination" is based on "an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group". A Swedish citizen of "Chinese national origin" is subject to the Swedish quota, not the Chinese quota, thus the discrimination is based on country of citizenship, not national origin. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them. | None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals. | First of all, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 584 U.S. ___ (2018) (Docket via Justia) was not settled on the merits. The Commission decision against the cake maker was overturned on procedural grounds, and no final decision on the merits has been made to date, to the best of my knowledge. And as Trish points out, the baker claimed that the law was, in effect, forcing him to use his individual artistic talents to make a statement endorsing a view that he deemed religiously wrong. Note that anti-discrimination laws are not an inherent right, they are statutes, created in the US by Congress and the state legislatures, and they prohibit just what the legislators have chosen to prohibit. For most of the history of the US there were no such laws, and Congress could repeal them tomorrow if it chose. So in a sense the only real reason why the laws grant certain religious exemptions is because Congress (or the various state legislatures) has said so. The actual exemption is found in 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–1 (a) which provides that: This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. Thus it exempts a "religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society" from complying with that part of the anti-discrimination law that refers to employment. That would particularly be 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2 (a) which provides that: (a) Employer practices -- It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (a) (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (a) (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. There is a further similar but more limited exemption in 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2 (e) It would pretty obviously violate the free exercise clause to require a religious organization to hire, say, priests, ministers, or other religious leaders regardless of religion. But the exemption goes farther than that. A church may discriminate on religion, or on race or sex, say, in hiring janitors or other people whose functions have nothing to do with religion. Nothing in the US Constitution requires that broad an exemption. But on the other hand, nothing forbids it either. That was the decision of Congress, and was no doubt in part the product of a political compromise. There is a long history in the US of providing churches and other religious organizations a degree of exemption from ordinary laws, and this is in line with that tradition. Beyond that, why this particular exemption and not a somewhat narrower one was chose, is a matter of politics, not law. The question asserts: Government sanctioned religions prayer is already illegal per "Engel v. Vitale". That is an over-broad reading of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In that case (as the Wikipedia article puts it): the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for state officials to compose an official school prayer and encourage its recitation in public schools, due to violation of the First Amendment. ... The Court held that the mere promotion of a religion [by the government] is sufficient to establish a violation, even if that promotion is not coercive. The case focused on the fact that the government had composed the text of the prayer in question, and that encouragement to recite it was a matter of official government policy. That is quite different from permitting private individuals or organizations to say voluntary prayers, or make hiring decisions based on religious distinctions. | Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status. | must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Consistent with others' answer, no, you don't need a lawyer. But your question in and of itself is indicative of the steep learning curve you would need to undergo in order to avoid "shooting yourself in the foot", as the saying goes. By this I am not encouraging you to get a lawyer (in fact, here on stackexchange and elsewhere I promote litigation in pro per). Instead, I encourage people to learn about the applicable statutes, procedural laws, how to conduct legal research, and to draft/present their arguments in court. Here are some suggestions regarding your response letter: Avoid sarcastic admissions such as "Right, for sure I am at fault for the employer's [fill_in_the_blanks]". If you ask for a clarification, clearly state that you expect reasonably sufficient detail as well as any and all records that substantiate the alleged damages. Although that won't strictly limit the allegations the employer can make in court proceedings, the attorney's reply might help evidencing the employer's vexatious approach later on. Avoid wording that may be misinterpreted as consciousness of guilt. Be assertive and truthful. Keep in mind the lawyer is gauging (1) how easily he can intimidate you, and (2) whether he can make additional claims to harass you via court proceedings. From now on, all your interactions with the attorney and the employer should be in writing (preferably email, given its reproducibility). When unethical individuals are aware that their position is devoid of merit, they are very tempted to indulge in false accusations (of threat, for example). Thus, communications in writing constitute objectively verifiable proof of who is acting unlawfully. Even if the attorney premises on your contract (or employment agreement/manual, or company's guidelines) the alleged damages, the clauses at issue might be illegal and therefore void. For instance, from 2007-2012 my former employer (an Indian IT intermediary) prohibited me --via contract-- to disclose my salary. The contract contained the typical lawyered babbling, but that doesn't mean that all of it was legal. In 2013 I realized that the prohibition violated Michigan law, and he had no option but to strike the entire clause. That being said, I didn't sue him for that, but for other more important matters which are currently pending review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Absent any further context in your inquiry, it is hard to make additional suggestions on how to proceed. |
If one was denied job due to remarks on muslims during job interview, can the company be sued for violating freedom of speech? This question is hypothetical. Say I go to a job interview. During the interview the interviewer says you will be dealing with a lot of middle eastern clients. I said, no problem. I can do this. I have dealt with many Muslims. Muslims are simple and straight forward people. Thats why all terrorists are muslims. The interview immediately caught attention to my last statement and said: "We do not accept this kind of attitude in the organization. This interview is finish" I recorded the whole interview session. With this evidence, can I successfully sue the company for violating freedom of speech? Thanks for your replies! | You don't explicitly say (this being an internationally visited and populated site), but based on your question, I will assume that you are in the US. For the question you asked: Is the company the government? If not, then NO, you cannot successfully sue a company (or person for that matter) for violating the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment to the US Constitution in any circumstances whatsoever. (Sorry, this is a pet peeve of mine). The US Constitution does not bind or restrict any private* individual or company, in any way. (Here "private" means "non-governmental; a "public(ly traded) company" is still considered a "private" entity in this context). The US Constitution exclusively deals with four things: How the US Federal Government operates, powers of the government, and restrictions of the government, and the definition of treason (which arguably is itself a restriction on the power of the government, by denying them the ability to define treason themselves). The First Amendment itself is explicit about this restriction: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech (emphasis mine). Note that, while the First Amendment does not mention acts of the President, this is because the President's Constitutional powers are quite weak and limited; What powers the President does have and usually uses are granted to the office by laws passed by Congress, and so the restriction comes with them, as Congress cannot delegate to the President powers that Congress themselves do not possess). As such, no company can be sued for violating the First Amendment (or any portion of the Constitution, really) because it does not apply to them. Now, there may be laws passed by relevant legislatures, but these are dependent on your jurisdiction (e.g. state). However, as a general rule of thumb this would be legal. Turning down a candidate based on what they say in an interview is the point of having an interview; Turning down an candidate for saying something in an interview that could potentially leave the company liable for a lawsuit under the theory of vicarious liability is only good common sense. | It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage. | The law does not say. It is up to the judgment of the judge to determine what constitutes "Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes". I would not have predicted that the act constituted "faire publiquement l'apologie", but if that expression can reasonably construed as meaning "indicating approval of", then I understand the conclusion. The law does not mention SSIDs, that simply falls under the penumbra of "publicly approving of terrorism", and there isn't a specific list of forbidden acts. Analogously, Holocaust denial is against the law in France, and there is not a specific list of things that you can't say, there is a general rule from which specifics can be inferred. Publicly saying "Free Kurdistan!" could be construed as supporting PKK and thus approving of terrorism, but that would be quite a stretch. Using the SSID Pkk21, on the other hand, could be a problem. | It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions. | Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them. | In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so. | The grain of truth is what you've read is that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 19 says No person shall, by intimidation or force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or continuing in the employment of any person This is referenced in a compendium of state laws loosely subsumed under the notion of "blacklisting". In Arkansas, this would be writing, printing, publishing, or circulating false statements in order to get someone fired or prevent someone from obtaining employment; in Indiana it is using any means to prevent a discharged employee from obtaining employment. The Massachusetts law only prevents use of intimidation or force to prevent a person from getting employed. In other words, "blacklisting" is not the same thing in all jurisdictions. | Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy). |
How is damage calculated in a civil suit against a company where there is said to be widespread gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment? California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) says that renowned game publishing studio Blizzard Entertainment, and its owner Activision Blizzard, have created a culture of “constant sexual harassment” and gender-based discrimination, in a new lawsuit filed Tuesday that claims top executives were aware and/or involved. And in the hours since the suit was revealed, numerous women have already stepped forward to corroborate the allegations. https://www.theverge.com/2021/7/22/22588215/activision-blizzard-lawsuit-sexual-harassment-discrimination-pay Because it involves the company and not individuals, I am wondering how much can a company be required to pay, especially if some executives are involved and not all executives including the CEO, and there's counter evidence that certain things were done according to internal procedures. I am not sure how a company can be held responsible especially if the internal documents show that the internal procedures for dealing with sexual harassment and discrimination followed the law, but it's certain executives who chose to not abide by those internal procedures (although I am not sure if this is the case, but I am extrapolating it is the case). | A company is liable for the actions of its agents This is known as vicarious liability and some well-established situations where this happens is in employer-employee and company-officer, "executives", if senior enough, would be both employees and officers. Without it, the concept of a company just doesn't work - a company is only a record in a database, it can only act through human agents. So, if an employee or officer of the company by act or omission causes harm in the course of executing their duties, then the company has caused the harm. It is not enough for a company to have adequate "internal procedures", it (which is to say the people with the power to act for it) must ensure that those procedures are followed and actually work. The allegations include that at least some senior personnel were aware that breaches of the law were occurring and they did not take steps to stop them - what they know, the company knows; what they do or don't do, the company does or doesn't do. | An employee is an agent of the employer when working and owes a duty of loyalty to the employer. One of the obligations associated with a duty of loyalty is to refrain from receiving anything other than the employer authorized compensation for the work, rather than benefitting personally from work done on behalf of the employer. By appropriating additional benefit from the customer in a way that is unauthorized by the employer (the employer would be within its rights to sanction and authorize this conduct if desired), an employee who does not turn the profit in this transaction over to the employer has breached a fiduciary duty to the employer for which the employer would have a right to sue the employee for the amount by which the employee was unjustly enriched in the transaction. Would it actually play out this way in real life for these sums of money? Probably not. The stakes involved wouldn't justify the time and money of a lawsuit. But, breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty to your employer in this context probably constitutes good cause to terminate the employment of the employee without paying severance that would otherwise be payable under Canadian employment law (in theory anyway, I've never seen a reported court case on point). | There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain. | You can either sue the company in the US, or in the Philippines. It would be easier for you to sue in the Philippines, but easier to collect if the trial is in the US. You need to hire a lawyer and provide more details. In both countries, it is illegal to refuse to pay an employee for work done, but it is not clear from your description that you were legally employees (this could be a breech of contract case). The Fair Labor Standards Act (which requires employees to be paid) may be applicable to the company: although there is a "foreign exemption" for word done overseas, this seems to relate to minimum wage, overtime and child labor, and not the basic obligation to pay wages. | The people on the show would be considered public figures, so if there was information that the fictitious writing was actually based on/about them, defamation must be proven to a different standard for public figures. Public figures, including officeholders and candidates, actors or musicians successful enough to be held in "the public eye," have to show that the defamation was made with malicious intent, which is a greater burden than defamation for the average person. Also, damages may be limited to actual (special) damages unless there is actual malice. Special damages being lost income or some other quantifiable measure of loss. If one cannot tell who it (the fictional story) is about because the name is changed, then Fox, or whomever, couldn't sue anyway because they need standing, which they wouldn't have if you called the person X, unless the story was so exact that it is obvious who you are talking about. For instance, the show Law and Order is often based on famous stories in the news, or criminal cases they dig up. Those fictional story lines often add or delete details. The case may be more or less damaging to the actual person it was based on. However, they make a statement before the show airs that says something like "Any similarity to real people or events is strictly coincidental. This show is not based on any real person or event, but is a work of fiction." If I were going to make a fictional account of a big network show, I would use some sort of disclosure like that to be safe. That said, if the statements or storyline is less damaging than the facts themselves, as revealed on the show, it isn't defamatory at all: Defamation necessarily must include the act of making untrue statements about another that damage their reputation. If it doesn't damage their "good character or reputation," than it's not defamatory. Keep in mind, however, that what you may consider less or more damaging may not be the same view held by the person it's loosely based on. That is why I'd use the disclosure. As to the question "would it protect you against a lawsuit?", if you mean would it protect you from being sued, the answer is always, anyone can sue file a lawsuit. That doesn't mean they'll win but it still means you have to defend. It may likely protect you in your defense. | The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime. | Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not. | In the case of McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, we can tell because that case has been legally decided. As the court says, there was a contract and "the patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules", and plaintiff "failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel". They did not "represent to her that a bonus would be available if she played the game", and did not "promise to pay the $41 million after the notice was displayed". The (very complex) rules of the game are easily available on the machine, and there is a prominent disclaimer that "MALFUNCTION VOIDS ALL PAYS AND PLAYS". Under the rules, the winning configuration stated that she was entitled to $1.85. The problem was that it also announced "Bonus Award - $41797550.16". This was due to an inexplicable software error which in communicating with the central computer awarded a "legacy bonus", which is no part of the game in question. The maximum legacy bonus is $99999.99; the manufacturer knows of the possibility of this kind of error and has implemented a fix that is thought to eliminate the problem. The first point then is that the casino didn't just claim there was a malfunction, they proved that there was one. Second, the terms of the contract hold: she was entitled to $1.85, and the extraneous message was not part of the contract. That is, she did not actually win the large payout, the malfunction was in saying that she received a bonus. If a patron could likewise prove that they had actually won but the machine malfunctioned to represent the situation as a loss, they would of course be entitled to the appropriate winnings. The problem simply resides in the difficulty of a patron proving that. |
Why are the owners of OnlyFans not arrested for profiting from child pornography? Over the last three months, the BBC has been reporting about children selling pornographic images and videos of themselves on British online platform OnlyFans. They also reported that it was easy to circumvent any age checks and set up an account as a minor. (see e.g. The children selling explicit videos on OnlyFans from May 27th) After these reports, employees of OnlyFans, who were hired to moderate the content, have come forward and revealed that they were asked to be lenient when they found illegal content by popular content creators who were bringing in a lot of money. They also talked about other types of illegal content, such as incest, bestiality and pornographic images and videos containing people who had not given consent to be photographed or filmed; the presence of such material on the platform has been confirmed by the BBC reporters. (see e.g. OnlyFans: How it handles illegal sex videos - BBC investigation from August 20th) The owners of OnlyFans, who receive a commission on all sales on the platform, have responded with the usual excuses that online platforms use: there is too much content being uploaded for them to be able to check everything, the illegal content is only a small fraction of the total content, all online platforms have this problem, etc. However, if I lent my laptop to a friend or colleague, and they noticed that I had been using it to sell child pornography online, and they alerted the press or the police, I would expect to be arrested within 24 hours, and not receive any lenience when trying to use excuses such as "I don't know what stuff is on my computer" or "it was only a small fraction of the files on my computer" or "everyone's doing it". So my question is: why are the people who run OnlyFans not (yet) behind bars? | Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this. | (Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action. | Presumably you are referring to works commonly called "fan fiction." Under copyright law these might be considered "derivative works" and therefore subject to the rights of the copyright owner. However, they might also qualify for exemption from copyright enforcement under "fair use." It appears that the legality of fan fiction is not settled law, and the outcome of legal challenges have turned on facts specific to each case. Decent background on the question is summarized on wikipedia. | The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal. | What is allowed and what happens are different things; this is why we have police, courts and prisons. If everyone followed all of the laws all of the time we would need none of these. The videos are copyright and without the permission of the copyright holder (the NFL) you cannot reproduce or distribute them. A defense to copyright violation is if the usage is fair use or fair dealing. What you see on line is: Done with permission of the NFL Fair use as it is being used to comment on or analyze the performance; like a critic's book review. Unlawful and not pursued (yet) because the NFL considers it not worthwhile. | In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say. | People aged 19 and 18 are "teens" and legally permitted to perform in pornographic videos. That's how it's legal. | The theoretical is that the domain slutsofinstagram.com does dilute or harm Instagram's mark because of the use of "Instagram" in the domain and because of the unwanted association of the parody story; that's the theory and "grounds" that Instagram would use in their lawsuit. Instagram would have to prove their theory of dilution or harm to the jury or judge, and convince either that the harm is not theoretical but real and financially damaging in order to win their case. The owners of slutsofinstagram.com would have to defend themselves and argue that they are not damaging Instagram's mark and their parody is a parody and is protected as such. Any actual court outcome is also theoretical. If Instagram won their case, one of the legal remedies could be the court ordering the owner of slutsofinstagram.com to transfer ownership of the domain to Instagram so they could simply park the domain and effectively take down the parody story. Or, the owner of slutsofinstagram.com could prevail because they argued the fact - and the court agreed - that the domain name and creative contents of the site is a parody and is protected speech and doesn't dilute Instagram's mark because any reasonable person could see that the site is a parody and not related to Instagram. In the US, a possible example of a parody not diluting a mark is L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), where Imitation may be the highest form of flattery, but plaintiff-appellee L.L. Bean, Inc., was neither flattered nor amused when High Society magazine published a prurient parody of Bean's famous catalog. The reality is that Instagram can contest the use of slutsofinstagram.com because they can; they have deep pockets and can take the owner of slutsofinstagram.com to court, like any other trademark holder can contest another's trademark. The owner of slutsofinstagram.com would have to defend themselves in court, or settle - possibly for monetary damages or the ownership of the domain or use of slutsofinstagram - and not go to court. It's possible that the SLAPP (Strategic lawsuit against public participation - Wikipedia) California law could help the plaintiff defend themselves against a deep pocket lawsuit designed to kill the parody site - as the suit would be "intended to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition" - which could happen because Instagram is part of Facebook and is incorporated in California. But basically, in the legal world, one man's litigation bully is another man's trademark protection hero. This concerns the US. As always, your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction and national/international laws and agreements concerning trademarks. |
French postal service's monopoly on industrial contract communications - legal basis? The government in France has a monopoly encouraged by law, whereby contracts can be opened digitally, but have to be cancelled through a signed paper letter paid to the government postal service. Every year 240 million signed letters are posted, at 1.2 billion euros. (yes i am French!) Code Civil 2016 Art. 1126. –Information requested for the conclusion of a contract and information provided to execute the conclusion of a contract may be sent by electronic mail (only) if the recipient has agreed that this means may be used.(>98% of companies refuse) In theory, customers could pre-emptively choose a company that accepts digitally signed cancellations (free, easy), but in reality absolutely no companies want or allow any clients to cancel digitally, they all only accept paid, postal cancellation. Comparatively, Microsoft forced people to manually download competing browsers, and it was a "choice" which was a lot easier than the La Poste 99% market on paid contract cancellations... is there not a strong case of market abuse by La Poste in EU law? It has 99% of the market, legally encouraged/ protected. Quote from Law.fr: In the absence of a letter with proof of delivery, the law can nullify the financial claims involved on a contractual basis (cohabitation costs, rental, etc) ... So, a signed for letter is often obligatory to end a contract: property rental mobile / internet assurance compte bancaire employment It's environmentally unfriendly to use envelopes instead of digital contracts. In European anti-monopoly law, does that not represent some kind of abuse and monopoly of communications? What is it like in other countries? | In European anti-monopoly law, does that not represent some kind of abuse and monopoly of communications? As a general rule, governments are allowed to award monopolies to individuals or private firms, or to governmental entities, and governmental entities are not, in general, subject to anti-trust liability. For example, governments may nationalize a particular industry, government may authorize a firm that is regulated as a utility to have a monopoly in lieu of using private competition between firms to provide utilities, governments can award patents to inventors which are monopolies, governments can establish a national health service, and so on. Anti-trust law is a create of statute and only prohibits what national governments decide to prohibit by statute, which rarely includes their own activities. In the E.U., this is somewhat complicated by the fact that the E.U., generally speaking, tries to put government contracts from within the E.U. but outside the country offer government contracts on an equal footing. But that does not, in general, prevent the government from nationalizing a good or service and making it an exclusively governmental function. The Postal Service is a governmental entity and/or regulated utility, so this would seem to be proper. In the same vein, across Continental Europe, notaries public have transferrable, non-exclusive license to a particular territory in the country (that can be bought and sold between licensed notaries) and only a small number are allowed in any jurisdiction. Anyone who wants to do business transactions that require notaries must deal with one of them and in low population areas there may well be a monopoly. Anti-trust law is generally directed at preventing unregulated anti-competitive conduct by private firms. Also, as noted in the original question, the use of means other than mail to cancel contracts isn't mandated, it is a choice of the parties in the context of laws that allow for alternatives. And, while the statutes disfavor electronic communications, the statutes do not, as a comment notes, state that contracts may not be terminated by a letter delivered by hand, signed in person and in presence, or delivered by another carrier providing traceability. The government post office means is presumably less expensive than a private courier providing hand delivery, but termination by hand delivery or courier of a signed dead tree paper letter appears to be allowed to cancel a contract without counter-party consent. So, it isn't a true monopoly. In the same vein, the law does not mandate that apartment leases require payment of a security deposit, but the prevailing legal rules create an incentive that makes this practice very widespread. | In a normal rental property, the tenant is in a contract with the telecommunications provider and landlord has no business listening to the communication. When the landlord does provide internet access for tenants, he/she gets into a complicated legal position. The owner of the internet connection is generally liable for things like copyright violations, hate speech, etc. coming from that connection. This law predates open-access wifi connections and even the internet. Legislation and legal precedent are only slowly catching up with that new reality. | united-states There is no general rule against one company or person buying both broadcasting rights and merchandising rights to a particular piece of content in the US. There are anti-monopoly/anti-trust laws, but those generally only apply if a particular entity holds a monopoly or a commanding market position in a whole market sector. If one firm held the rights to 80% of all online games, for example, an anti-trust action might well be warranted. But a single game or property is not generally considered to be a market sector for anti-trust purposes. Exactly what the proper market sector is in such cases is often a complex, technical, and highly disputed issue. The "original owner of the IP" can decide who s/he wishes to sell that IP to -- nothing requires, or forbids, that different sets of rights be sold to the same buyer. The original owner will attempt to get the best deal available. Sometimes that is a very lucrative deal, and sometimes it is far from that. As long as unlawful methods are not used to induce a sale, whatever bargain the parties make is generally acceptable to the law. I do not know who did, or did not, buy any of the rights to Squid Game, and that info might not be publicly available. But there is no law that I know of against the same party having both broadcast and marketing rights to it, and perhaps other rights as well. | is this absolutely required to be considered a valid document in most jurisdictions, most notably, the European Union? Not at all. There is no legal requirement that contracts, terms of service, and so forth be drafted, devised, or even validated by a lawyer. Law requires that certain types of contract be notarized. That refers to the moment where the parties sign/formalize the contract, which is different from --and independent of-- whether its terms were written by a lawyer. A messaging service like the one you have in mind definitely is not subject to such requirement either. | Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer. | How can a new business (especially a tech business) find its first few customers if not by cold texting in some way or another? Don’t know, don’t care. This is Law SE, not Marketing SE. Does PECR force new businesses to market themselves strictly in the public domain, e.g. on social media? Not at all. It prevents spam and is in line with similar laws in most of the World. You can call or SMS people (unless they are in a do not call list), use conventional marketing like radio, TV, direct post but you cannot send spam email. | The "letter" you quote says more than what Ionos says publicly, the latter not mentioning any date. The most obvious possibility is Treasury Department sanctions against Russia: while the sanctions don't necessarily prohibit servicing and any all Russian nationals or residents, Russia is subject to sanctions and that's what the TOS says. A problem is that the TOS refers to a "country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions", which is not legally defined. Here is the Treasury Department's explanation of that point (which is that there are very many types of restrictions: there is no legal category of "embargo restrictions"). One could then argue, in one's breach of contract arbitration hearing, that the clause cannot reasonably be interpreted the way the company (possibly) intends it to be. The force majeure clause does not seem relevant unless they see some way in which the invasion of Ukraine makes it impossible for the company to fulfill the contract with Russians. | Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company? Because a sender's opportunism regarding the bizarre contents of the autoreply preclude a finding that there is a meeting of the minds. Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., "Yes, I agree to the contract") was an autoreply? It mostly depends on the element of authorization to set up the autoreply that way. If the person who wrote the autoreply was authorized by the user of the email account to set it up that way, the contract binds the user. This form of blind and reckless formation of contracts is an extreme scenario of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). The contract might be null and void as unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and/or on other grounds. But a wide range of scenarios would fall short of warranting a nullification of the contract. (Disclaimer: I am affiliated with the linked site.) |
Does the term “significant value” in general have an amount associated with it? In relation to estate handling, the Petition for Letters of Administration form I’m filling out seems really vague about “other assets of significant value”. Some things make sense like boats, cars, jewelry, while others are obviously insignificant like a $10 lamp. What about items like a $1000 guitar or a $200 air compressor? How small can significant get before it’s insignificant? | It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be "what a reasonable person would conclude" (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to "Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes", which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is "an insignificant value". The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia). | Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that. | If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back. | The problem with "as soon as possible" is that one could then say "Well, I've got a lot of bills, so it's not possible to pay you until Uncle Bill dies and I get my inheritance". A good contract leaves no doubt about who does what, when. A specific date is best, though if there is a certain amount of backing and forthing, "July 30" could be "tomorrow", and therefore "within 14 days of acceptance" would still identify a specific date -- provided that the date of acceptance is there in the contract. (It usually is, but doesn't absolutely have to be). | If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected. | This is an amusing idea, but ultimately it seems frivolous: How does one establish the physical presence of a corporation in a car? Yes, corporations have some of the legal rights and liabilities of people, but they are not people. And there are plenty of rights a person has that a corporation does not. For example (at present) a corporation can't be a party to a marriage. The closest a corporation comes to any corporal presence is the address listed of their agents. | Your framing of the issue is basically wrong. There is an exemption, which varies from state to state, from unsecured creditors (but not creditors that take the goods as collateral) in bankruptcy and in debt collection outside of bankruptcy (not always the same exemption), for tangible personal property owned by the debtor which constitutes the debtor's tools of the trade, but that varies from state to state, is a creature of state statute (and the bankruptcy code), is not universal, and is usually limited in dollar amount. Moreover, the exemption only applies when the tradesman actually owns the tools of his trade which is customary in some professions, but not automatic. It is only the case when the tradesman buys his own tools. There is no generic v. non-generic distinction. In the software field, education and the public domain can always be accessed. But, intellectual property, that can be protected, that is developed for the employer, is usually work for hire and belong to the employer. This default rule is subject to the terms of the agreements between the parties entered into contractually. | Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability. |
What does it mean that a trial in a US court is "Public"? This question is based on this answer to Constitutionality of outlawing recording of court proceedings in the United States and relates comments. The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution provides, in relevant part, that: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, ... My question is, does the right to a "public trial" mean only that the trial is a matter of public record, its occurrence and verdict will be publicly available, and it will be carried out by the government, not some private group. Or does it also mean that members of the public may view the trial proceedings, at least those in the courtroom, and the defendant has a right to have the trial physically open to members of the public. (Obviously jury deliberations and in camera sessions are not open to members of the public, and these form part of the trial.) Also, does being a "public trial" in the 6th amendment sense imply that the trial may be reported on by the news media? | Overview It is the right of a criminal defendant to have the public admitted to a trial under the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution. It is the right of members of the public, and of the press, to attend both criminal and civil trials and other court proceedings under the First and Sixth amendments, which for state trials are applied via the Fourteenth. There are limited and rare exceptions to the rights allowed. Cornell Discussion The Cornell LII page on "Public trial" reads in relevant part: The Supreme Court has cited many civic and process-related purposes served by open trials: they help to ensure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence; they provide a public demonstration of fairness; they discourage perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality. Open trials educate the public about the criminal justice system, give legitimacy to it, and have the prophylactic effect of enabling the public to see justice done. {Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569–73 (1980) (plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger); id. at 593–97 (Justice Brennan concurring)}. Though the Sixth Amendment expressly grants the accused a right to a public trial {Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1965)}, the Court has found the right to be so fundamental to the fairness of the adversary system that it is independently protected against state deprivation by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.{In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960). Both cases were contempt proceedings which were not then “criminal prosecutions” to which the Sixth Amendment applied (for the modern rule see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968)), so that the cases were wholly due process holdings. Cf. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 591 n.16 (1980) (Justice Brennan concurring)} The First Amendment right of public access to court proceedings also weighs in favor of openness. {Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I)} (Content in {braces} was in the form of footnotes on the LII page -DES) Note the equation of a "public trial" with an "open trial", and the comments about "a public demonstration of fairness" and "enabling the public to see justice done". All of these imply that the actual trial proceedings are to be open to the public in person. In re Oliver (1948) This was a case involving Michigan's unique "one-man Grand jury" Proceeding. After hearing testimony while sitting as a Grand Jury, in secret, as Grand Juries normally do, the district Judge declared that the witness was being evasive and telling lies under oath. He sentenced the witness to 60 days in jail for contempt, still in secret, with no defense allowed and no chance for the person sentanced to consult his lawyer. In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268–70 (1948) the US Supreme Court wrote: Counsel have not cited and we have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in dispute. Summary trials for alleged misconduct called contempt of court have not been regarded as an exception to this universal rule against secret trials. This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law heritage. The exact date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long before the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. ... The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet. All of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to liberty. ... Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. ... In giving content to the constitutional and statutory commands that an accused be given a public trial, the state and federal courts have differed over what groups of spectators, if any, could properly be excluded from a criminal trial. But, unless in Michigan and in one-man grand jury contempt cases, no court in this country has ever before held, so far as we can find, that an accused can be tried, convicted, and sent to jail, when everybody else is denied entrance to the court, except the judge and his attaches. And without exception all courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged. In Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 85, 86, 48 S.Ct. 468—470, 72 L.Ed. 793, this Court assumed that a criminal trial conducted in secret would violate the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, although its actual holding there was that no violation had in fact occurred, since the trial court's order barring the general public had not been enforced. Certain proceedings in a judge's chambers, including convictions for contempt of court, have occasionally been countenanced by state courts, but there has never been any intimation that all of the public, including the accused's relatives, friends, and counsel, were barred from the trial chamber. In the case before us, the petitioner was called as a witness to testify in secret before a one-man grand jury conducting a grand jury investigation. In the midst of petitioner's testimony the proceedings abruptly changed. The investigation became a 'trial,' the grand jury became a judge, and the witness became an accused charged with contempt of court—all in secret. Following a charge, conviction and sentence, the petitioner was led away to prison—still without any break in the secrecy. Even in jail, according to undenied allegations, his lawyer was denied an opportunity to see and confer with him. And that was not the end of secrecy. His lawyer filed in the State Supreme Court this habeas corpus proceeding. Even there, the mantle of secrecy enveloped the transaction and the State Supreme Court ordered him sent back to jail without ever having seen a record of his testimony, and without knowing all that took place in the secrecy of the judge's chambers. In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our federal and state governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison. (footnotes, including citations, omitted) When the In re Oliver decision says "that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion" it is speaking of a trial which members of the public have a right to attend, not just read records of after the fact. When it says judges have considered "what groups of spectators, if any, could properly be excluded from a criminal trial" it is again discussing in-person attendance, and saying that at least some such attendance must be permitted. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980) In this matter a case was on its fourth trial. One previous conviction had been overturned on appeal, and then there hd been two mistrials. The Defendants lawyer asked that proceedings be closed. Representatives of two newspapers present said nothing at the time but requested thst the order be changed later that day. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569–73 (1980) the plurality opinion "concluded that the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608, distinguished." The opinion reads: But here for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration requires closure. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice.... ... In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. ... A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally—and representatives of the media—have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place. Mr. Justice BRENNAN, joined by Mr. Justice MARSHALL, concluded that the First Amendment—of itself and as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment—secures the public a right of access to trial proceedings, and that, without more, agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitutionally close a trial to the public. Historically and functionally, open trials have been closely associated with the development of the fundamental procedure of trial by jury, and trial access assumes structural importance in this Nation's government of laws by assuring the public that procedural rights are respected and that justice is afforded equally, ... Mr. Justice STEWART concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials, civil as well as criminal; that such right is not absolute, since various considerations may sometimes justify limitations upon the unrestricted presence of spectators in the courtroom; but that in the present case the trial judge apparently gave no recognition to the right of representatives of the press and members of the public to be present at the trial. Thus in the Richmond Newspapers case at least 6 justices of the court found that there was a right of public access to courtrooms and trials, although they differed as to whether it is based on the 1st or 6th amendments or both, and under what circumstances exceptions may be made. But they agree that this is a right of the public, and of the press, not just of the defendant, and that an agreement between the defendant, the prosecution, and the judge to exclude members of the public and of the press is not valid without specific findings of fact by the judge showing why this is required to preserve the rights of the defendant. This case has been much cited. Waller v. Georgia (1984) In Waller v. Georgia 467 U.S. 39 (1984) the Supreme Court held that closing a pre-trial suppression hearing, over the defendant's objections, violates constitutional rights: The opinion read: These cases require us to decide the extent to which a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence may be closed to the public over the objection of the defendant consistently with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a public trial. ... These cases present three questions: First, does the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extend to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the presentation of evidence to the jury? Second, if so, was that right violated here? Third, if so, what is the appropriate remedy? This Court has not recently considered the extent of the accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to insist upon a public trial, and has never considered the extent to which that right extends beyond the actual proof at trial. We are not, however, without relevant precedents. In several recent cases, the Court found that the press and public have a qualified First Amendment right to attend a criminal trial. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). We also have extended that right not only to the trial as such but also to the voir dire proceeding in which the jury is selected. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). In each of these cases the Court has made clear that the right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information. Such circumstances will be rare, however, and the balance of interests must be struck with special care. We stated the applicable rules in Press-Enterprise: The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. 464 U.S., at 510, 104 S.Ct., at 824. As noted, the analysis in these cases has proceeded largely under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public. The central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly, and "[o]ur cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant." Gannett, 443 U.S., at 380, 99 S.Ct., at 2905. Again the Court is clearly and explicitly protesting the right of public and press attendance at the trial, and the rights of the press to report the events of the trial. Conclusion These rights are not absolute, but may only be curtailed for good and specific reason, and only by the least restrictive means feasible. Access to trial transcripts after the fact will not normally be sufficient to satisfy either the 1st or the 6th amendment rights to a public trial. | The Sixth Amendment states that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy... the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him". You are not being criminally prosecuted, so the Sixth Amendment simply does not apply. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confrontation_Clause | You do not automatically have the right to trial by jury in traffic court. The government only requires courts to allow trials by jury when it is not a petty offense. Refer to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968): Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). ... In the federal system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine. Since most traffic violations do not involve jail time and do not exceed a $500 fine, most traffic violations are also not eligible for jury trials as defined by the government. Presumably the law is built this way so as not clog the courts with a bunch of people demanding jury trials for very minor infractions that need not be tried by jury. The Washington State Civil Rules you reference do not grant any further rights to trial by jury not already granted otherwise. It can be quickly summed up as saying that trial by jury rights cannot be revoked, and outlines how one should go about requesting a trial by jury. If you were fined more than $500 and were denied a jury trial, consult an attorney in the area about the situation. | I would say no, it's not the same. There's a reasonable expectation of privacy that you have in an office that isn't present when you're standing on a roadside or in a city park. In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit said "The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities" was in the spirit of the First Amendment. And this is not limited to police; an arrest "in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission" was found to be a First Amendment violation in Iacobucci v. Boulter (1st Cir. 1999). But a private meeting in an office is not a "public place" as it is meant in Glik (even if the building is owned by the government.) And the Glik decision says "To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions." | You can read about the obligation to access public records under Kentucky law here. This page is the Louisville PD' statement about what is available. They state that "Some items have been redacted, blurred or withheld for privacy or legal reasons", noting for example that the statute "exempts from disclosure under the Open Records Act information that, if disclosed, would create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Any further reference to redactions for personal privacy /concerns is also made pursuant to this law and/or HIPAA". The plaintiff's filing is not available and the police department has not commented, so we don't know exactly what is being demanded. However, the PD has not claimed that they are withholding the requested records for legal reasons, and the media alleges that the suit alleges that the PD lied about the existence of said records (note the double allegation). Body-worn cameras are specifically included here, and this part says that you can sue in county court. FOIA does not apply, because the Lousiville PD is not an agency of the US government. | In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria. | "public performance" is a term used in copyright law mostly for music, dance, drama, and audio-visual works, where it means to actually perform the work in front of an audience. For a book it could mean to read the book aloud in front of an audience. It is not largely used for software. I suppose that demonstrating or running the software in front of an audience would be a public performance. Running the software and using its output in a publication would not be a "public performance" as I understand it. As long as the user has the right to access the software, which normally includes the right to run it, the output may be used with no further or special permission. | How would jury selection work for a trial of Donald Trump? Just like it does for everybody else - using the rules for criminal procedure in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, in New York, each juror must be fair and unbiased: A juror who cannot provide unequivocal assurance or whose credibility about the assurance is in doubt would properly be excused for cause. Jurors (like judges) are not blank slates; they have opinions about all sorts of things. That doesn't matter. What matters is if they can set those opinions aside and make a decision based only on the evidence. It is not necessary for juror's minds to be empty, just that they be open. |
Where to find a European or American law that says children have right to know who their biological parents are? I have heard that there is a law somewhere in American or European legal systems that says children have a right to know who their biological parents are. Where can I find such a law and its details? | england-and-wales An adopted child can apply for their birth records once they are 18 years' old. There are different processes for doing this depending on the particular circumstances, and if they were adopted before 12 November 1975 they will need to attend a counselling session with an approved adoption advisor first. Source (detailing the different processes) Legislation | No. The custodial person that is meant by this are usually the parents or another court-appointed person that stands in for their parents. I think the common law term closest is "legal guardian". The details are defined in § 1616 ff. of the German civil code. | Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation. | It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK. | An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it. | According to http://info.legalzoom.com/divorce-am-responsible-kids-not-mine-20971.html Your stepchildren -- the biological kids, adopted children and stepchildren that your spouse acquired in another marriage or relationship before marrying you -- are usually not legally entitled to support from you after you divorce your spouse. However, if you signed a contract with your spouse agreeing to provide child support for a stepchild after a divorce, a court will likely compel you to honor the contract. | Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? The legal standard is a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. more likely than not) and there is plenty of evidence that can be offered in addition to DNA evidence, such as testimony under oath from people in a position to know who was having sex with whom at the relevant times. Contrary to a common misconception, testimony under oath is still solid evidence that can support a verdict on appeal. Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. It isn't that hard to prove. Q to Alice's physician: Based upon an ultrasound, when did Alice conceive? A: April 5-8, 2021. Q to DNA expert: Based upon the DNA test, who could the father be? A: Billy or Bob. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Billy between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Bob between April 5-8, 2021? A: Yes. Q to Billy: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Billy: Why not? A: I was at the Shuffleboard World Cup in Tibet, I have time stamped pictures. Q to Bob: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: -- if Yes, judge says he believes Bob and Alice and the case is over. -- if No, the judge decides who among Bob, Billy, and Alice the judge believes based upon other evidence. Ultimately, the judge has to rule between the two based upon non-genetic evidence and resolve credibility disputes just as in any other case that doesn't involve DNA evidence (which is the vast majority of cases). Also, the edge cases are few are far between. Identical twins are rare to start with, and few women have sex with more than one identical twin in the several day period when she could have conceived or didn't know which twin she had sex with. It has happened at least once in history (post-DNA testing), but you can probably count the number of times that it has ever happened on one hand. For example, presumptions from cohabitation, marriage, and claims of paternity often resolve paternity disputes without DNA evidence. Further, to the extent that there is good faith uncertainty (perhaps everyone agrees that the mother has sex with both twins on the only possible day of conception and nobody really knows), the downsides to a mistake in the larger cosmic sense of the overall paternity law system are minimal, as identical twins very rarely become deeply alienated from each other and instead tend to be close and intensely cooperative once they discover each other, and tend to be similar to each other in almost every respect depriving the child of little if the court gets it wrong. Realistically, identical twins are particularly likely to settle out of court so the judge doesn't have to decide. In one of the only two actual cases I could locate that went to trial (in Brazil), both twins were ordered to pay child support because the evidence showed that they actively conspired with each other to confound the mother and the court regarding who the father was, and conspiracies can support joint and several liability. The other case reported in a news story had convincing circumstantial evidence supporting one identical twin over the other that probably establish a presumption of paternity for one twin and not the other. One of the twins, who cannot be named for legal reasons, went to court last summer in the hope of forcing the mother to grant him access to the child. Although his name is not on the birth certificate, he claims he is the only father the boy has known, cared for him every other weekend, provided financial support and was even known to him as 'papa'. But then the man's relationship with his girlfriend broke down and the visits halted. When he began legal proceedings to prove his paternity, the mother made her claim that she had been sleeping with his twin at around the same time. The twins have said they knew they were both having sex with the woman, but argue that only one had sex during the period of conception. Both refused to undergo a DNA test: the complainant refused to pay the £335 charge while his brother, who has since married and fathered children, does not consider himself involved in the dispute. Now, however, Judge Jolin has asked the complainant to take a DNA test by 1 December to ensure he can claim even possible paternity, while his brother may also be tested. (The second case is in Quebec and the cost of the test in pounds is apparently a currency conversion value.) (It is possible in principle to distinguish even identical twins from each other with high coverage whole genome tests that would reveal a few random mutations in each twin out of billions of possible mutations, but it is currently prohibitively expensive to do so.) Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? Yes. This rules out all 4 billion men in the world minus two of them. It has great probative value, narrowing the list of possible fathers down to two. | Let's look at what they say: Pennsylvania does not have any statutory laws governing assisted reproductive technology. True Pennsylvania’s laws regarding sperm donors come only from case law that are specific to the facts of the case being considered by the court. True and trivial given the previous sentence. Pennsylvania courts have found sperm donor contracts to be legally enforceable. True, that's what Ferguson v McKiernan says in the first paragraph of the decision. Your statement that "PA case law falls strongly on the side of not respecting donor contracts" is, at least as far as the case you cite, flatly wrong. In other cases, the contract may or may not be enforcable indeed the court agrees with this specifically: Although locating future cases on this spectrum may call upon courts to draw very fine lines, courts are no strangers to such tasks, and the instant case, which we must resolve, is not nearly so difficult. This also directly supports the previous sentence. Therefore, even if you go through a fertility clinic, a contract between the donor and the intended parents would need to be in place before the conception. True, this is exactly what Ferguson v McKiernan says. You assert that Ferguson v McKiernan says "donation through a clinic does not make a sperm donor the legal father", however, it doesn't say that at all. The status of the doner as the father was never an issue - both parties agreed that he was the biological father and the court accepted that. What was at issue is if he had the rights and obligations of a father that had been removed by the contract. The lower courts held that the contract was unenforcable as being contrary to public policy because it removed rights from the children who were not parties to the contract. However, the State Supreme Court held that the contract was enforcable. TL;DR What they say on their website is not misleading. |
How do news outlets avoid defamation lawsuits when they publish articles about alleged criminals? News outlets are always publishing sensational stories about people who have not yet been convicted but just suspected of a crime..... The person loses his job and at worst, creates a 'Trial by Media' scenario. I'm wondering how do news outlets avoid defamation lawsuits by the alleged when they publish such article? | Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Section 2(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 provides: It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true. If a newspaper prints that a person has been accused of a crime and that person has in fact been accused of a crime, then the statement is truthful and there is no defamation. It would be different if the newspaper printed that the person had committed the crime (which implies they have been found guilty). If you pay close attention to such news articles you will see that they are usually very careful to use words such as "alleged", "accused", "is on trial for" etc. See the case of Christoper Jefferies for an example of a person who was accused of a murder, but subsequently found innocent, and who successfully sued various newspapers for defamation. In that case the articles had gone beyond mere statements of fact: He cited several examples of headlines and stories that had been published, including a headline in The Sun describing Jefferies – a former schoolmaster at Clifton College – as weird, posh, lewd and creepy; a story from the Daily Express quoting unnamed former pupils referring to him as "... a sort of Nutty Professor" who made them feel "creeped out" by his "strange" behaviour; and an article from the Daily Telegraph, which reported Jefferies "has been described by pupils at Clifton College ... as a fan of dark and violent avant-garde films". Jefferies launched legal action against six newspapers on 21 April – The Sun, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Star, the Daily Express, the Daily Mail and the Daily Record – seeking damages for libel. It was held that the media were quick to jump to conclusions regarding Jefferies's arrest. Being a retired English teacher who lived alone, whose physical appearance and "eccentrically unkempt white hair," made him stand out, led people to believe that he looked the type. Stephen Moss wrote in The Guardian: "The unspoken assumption was that no one could look that odd and be innocent." | Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this. | If your statement is true, it is not libel. But if it is false, it is libel. It does not matter if you directly name him, what matters is if he can be specifically identified by others. Not all others, but at least some others. | One example is Sweden. Ebba Busch, the leader of the Christian Democrat party, accepted an order of summary punishment for writing in a Facebook post that the lawyer of her opponent in a real estate dispute has a criminal conviction, which is true. She said, "I admit having committed a crime, that I in my soul and heart consider myself innocent of. [...] But in Sweden, even the truth can be libel." A professor of civil law commented: "I'm a bit worried that there could be a campaign for true statements on social media always to be permitted, it would amount to terrible consequences and a negative development. In Sweden, libel law has been used to counteract spreading of revenge porn and sex videos of young women. Truth is not unimportant, it is taken into account in the libel process. It would be a negative development if it became allowed to spread everything that is true, in that case you'd need a more precise proposal about how you would permit certain actions and not others." | "Cancellation" is generally a result of some statement or action a person made becoming public or having been made in public. Tortious interference requires that the defendant's actions are independently wrongful, such as defamation or criminal acts against the plaintiff. Truthful speech and opinions which do not allege facts are protected by the First Amendment (as well as state constitutions) and thus cannot be wrongful conduct. To apply that here, anyone can react to public knowledge about a person and call for that person to be fired, that is protected speech. As far as I know in this particular petition's case, RMS does not dispute that he made the statements they are attributing to him and using as evidence for their call to remove him from the board. | (Standard disclaimer: I am not your lawyer; I am not here to help you.) Under American common law, the distinction here would relate to the harm to B: either a damages issue or a "special harm" issue. The Restatement elements of defamation are falsity, publication, fault, and inherent actionability or special harm. See Rest. 2d Torts § 558. The last element captures the traditional doctrine that slander (not libel) is only actionable if it falls into one of four or five specific categories ("slander per se"), or if it actually causes economic injury. Your example doesn't seem to fit into any of the special categories. But see Rest. 2d Torts § 573 (imputations affecting business or office). If the statement to C is oral rather than written, and C doesn't believe it or otherwise nothing comes of the statement, B may not be able to prove special harm and therefore fail to recover anything. If D, on the contrary, avoided doing business with B, B may be able to show special harm supporting a claim. Similarly, C's disbelief or D's belief may be relevant to determining the actual damages B suffered and is therefore entitled to recover from A. | No But they aren’t suing over defamation against Trump; the are suing over (alleged) defamation of the campaign: the Campaign "assessed the potential risks and benefits of again seeking Russia's help in 2020 and has decided to leave that option on the table." | was there a good way to publicly shame Bob, and prevent him from getting his next job, without breaking Carol’s confidence? Apparently not. The conclusion that Bob's violations of company policy are short of breaking any laws leaves little to no reason for publicly shaming him. Details on the company policy, the facts, and the statements might make a difference, but your description is generic in that regard and would require us to speculate on what they could be. Could there have been grounds for a lawsuit? It largely depends on the terms of the publications, their veracity & import, and --if false or unfounded-- their effect on Bob's prospects and/or whether the statements are defamatory per se. Would a truth defense for a statement such as, “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct,” require disclosing the investigation? Yes. A defendant has the burden to prove the [affirmative] defense(s) on which he intends to premise his position. Note that the statement “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct” in and of itself is not really a truth defense because it is inconclusive as to whether Bob was found to have incurred misconduct. The sole fact that Bob was investigated does not justify imputing to him disreputable conduct. Would a defense that the investigation gave them legitimate reasons to believe that the insinuation they made is true require them to disclose it? Yes. Bob is entitled to gather from the defendant the bases for the latter's allegations. Otherwise defamers would systematically elude their liability by sticking to generic allegations only. Are there other good defenses that could have gotten the lawsuit dismissed as frivolous? That requires us to speculate because we are given no details about the underlying events, Bob's pleadings, the evidence obtained during discovery, and so forth. That being said, a prevailing defense does not imply that the lawsuit is frivolous. Would the identities of the witnesses have been redacted? No. The fact that Bob did not break any laws suggests that the matter does not warrant measures akin to witness protection. Nor does your description reflect that the communications are protected by some privilege. Is it credible that Ethan had a good legal reason to keep this “in the family” for Carol’s sake? That is unanswerable because, inter alia, it is not about the law, it is unclear what exactly "Carol's sake" entails, and the substance of the company's other scandals as well as Ethan's reason(s) are unspecified. Ethan's "good legal reason" does not necessarily have to protect or advance "Carol's sake". |
Can I compel a retailer to provide order details (serial number)? Around 10 months ago I purchased some ear buds from a very large and well known high street retailer. I have had gadget insurance for about 5 years and I am now trying to make a claim for loss for the first time. The insurance is arranged and marketed by my Bank (to whom I make monthly payments), and it is administered by a third party. I had registered the device with the third party and uploaded the proof of purchase. However, when I tried to make the claim the 3rd party refused it, saying that the receipt/proof of purchase that I uploaded did not contain the serial number of the gadget. Of course, buried deep in the fine print (but nowhere else) it does say that the serial number is needed in order to make a claim (although they registered the device online without querying it). So I contacted the retailer who told me that that since the order is now more than 3 months old they no longer have any details of it and cannot provide the serial number. Since the gadget and packaging are lost, I cannot find the serial number myself. I have had the same conversation with them 3 times now and it is incredibly frustrating - especially since it takes between 1 and 2 hours for the insurance company to answer their calls ! It took more than a month for me to get through to them at all because I kept hanging up the phone after 30 mins. It was last week that I had the time and patience to wait for an hour or more each time. I find it hard to believe that they don't keep any order records for more than 3 months. Sure, maybe their front-end customer service system doesn't hold them, but they must hold them somewhere right ? I mean, how can they be legally audited properly every year otherwise ? There must be some legislation that says they have to keep such records for a minimum period, and surely that period is more than 3 months ? Is there any way to compel (sorry if this is the wrong legal word) or persuade them to provide me with the serial number ? Or any other advice ? I realise I can log an official complaint, but that may take weeks/months to resolve, and I just feel like there should be a better way. According to my mobile phone carrier I have spent more than 1000 minutes trying to deal with this ! | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | You asked the rep about how to change some details on your account, and asked him about the cost. It is clear from the recording that you are not changing anything right now. I can't see anything where you state that you want to enter a contract right now, I can not see anything where the rep indicates they want to enter a contract right now. In other words, no contract has been formed. The rep did tell you that a name change will not increase the phone plan price. That was a promise. It was a verbal promise, and you have evidence that the promise was made. Your contract will determine whether the company is bound by such a verbal promise. If you change the name on the contract, with nobody mentioning a price increase, and the price increases, you can surely complain that you were misled and wouldn't have changed the name if you had known about the price increase. However, if you get told that the price will increase before the name change, and you quote the previous promise, I don't think that will force the company to allow a name change without price increase, because your phone conversation didn't create a contract. | The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X. | Is It Legally Binding? While their customer service sucks, your oral authorization of the charge is legally binding (I take payments that way almost every day in my own business, it isn't an unusual business practice in small professional businesses). You authorize oral authorization of payments over the phone in the credit card agreement that your credit card company sends you every year that you don't read and throw away. The provider has to collect more information for a credit card payment over the phone than they do for an in person swipe in a credit card machine (e.g. your credit card billing address) and they are fully responsible for wrongful charges if they deal with an imposter. By regularly checking your credit card statements, you can confirm that no incorrect charges are present. Tax Issues If you want to take a tax deduction for non-reimbursed medical expenses, you simply need to tote up the amounts your are entitled to from your own records, and put it in the appropriate box on your tax forms. You don't have to attach documentation to your return. If the IRS disputes your payment, you can offer up your credit card statements and your photograph of the receipts, and if necessary, medical records to show that you received the services, to show that the payment really happened and are deductible. Your credit card company's records, reflected in your monthly credit card statements, are considered very reliable for tax purposes. You have the burden of proving that the expense was incurred and is of a type that qualifies for a deduction by a preponderance of the evidence in the event that there is a dispute that is litigated, which means that you must show that it is more likely than not that you incurred a deductible expense of that kind in that amount in that tax year. Privacy Issues While there are financial information privacy issues associated with this transaction, HIPAA, which covers medical records, normally wouldn't apply to a credit card payment that indicates the person paid, the person paying, the account, the amount and the date, but not a description of the medical services provided or to whom they were provided, which is what is normally on a credit card receipt. The financial privacy issues are also partially addressed by the provider's merchant agreement with the credit card company which contains terms requiring them to maintain certain kinds of security with respect to your financial information (which is not to say that the provider actually follows all of the requirements of their merchant agreement scrupulously, which is why data breaches happen all the time in businesses both large and small). | My understanding is that this isn't a contractual term, but rather a warning that the items don't satisfy legal requirements for individual sale. The seller and manufacturer likely don't care whether you resell the items, but the government does. In the US, at least, regulations of the Food and Drug Administration require that (with certain exceptions) food items sold at retail must be marked with a Nutrition Facts label, showing calorie counts, fat and sugar content, and so on. The FDA has information on this requirement, including citations to the relevant sections of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). For example, if you buy a big multipack of tiny ("fun size") candy bars, the manufacturer usually won't have printed Nutrition Facts on each candy bar's wrapper (because it's too small). There will instead be a label on the outer bag. As such, you can't legally resell the candy bars individually, because they don't meet labeling requirements. In fact, in the FDA page I linked above, you can see that manufacturers are required to print "This unit not labeled for retail sale" on individual items if they don't have Nutrition Facts labels. See the 12th item in the table of exemptions. | The law of each country where you offer the app for download applies, and you have to consider: Privacy Policy (GDPR in EU, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, and more - check each country to be on the safe side) Disclaimer versus AGB/Terms and Conditions (e.g. Germany), not required but recommended Impressum (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) Value Added Tax (VAT) which is taken care of e.g. by Google Play for most countries but not all (e.g. not for Japan) in case the app is not free Consumer Protection Law - applicable (and different) everywhere There might be more, but these are the important ones I am aware of. | The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation. | I make a copy of any important receipt printed on thermal paper, since the terms of many sellers and manufacturers require receipts for disputes. But I'm not aware of any law that says they have to make it convenient to maintain a receipt or other proof of purchase. However, when a company makes their terms unclear, unexpected, or difficult to comply with it seems there is often a lawyer ready to step up and file a class action lawsuit. Here's one archive to give you an idea of what companies will settle. In the United States the FTC is also empowered by law to "protect consumers," which means that if "disappearing" receipts become a widespread problem for consumers they could take action on the government's authority: The Federal Trade Commission Act is the primary statute of the Commission. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress. Given the above, I wouldn't be surprised to see either a class-action lawsuit or FTC rule that requires retailers to provide "durable" receipts, or some convenient substitute. |
Are you allowed to disregard the spirit in which laws are written as long as you keep to the letter of the law? Jeremy Clarkson a renowned UK motor enthusiast once mentioned that he had to credit Mercedes-Benz for when they created the first of there hybrid supercars they created a car that could both do 200mph on the autobahn and also give you all the emissions tax benefits and rebates you got from buying a Pruis. In essence keeping to the letter of the law while blatantly disregarding the spirit in which it was written. Another example is how you can buy a decommissioned tank in the UK and because it carries more than six people and is powered by a diesel motor it counts as a people carrier and is therefore exempt from the London congestion fee. So I was wondering if this concept of keeping to the letter of the law but disregarding the spirit in which it was written has been discussed in the American justice system? | You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach. | In general, ignorance of a law is an excuse only when the law specifically says it is. There are extreme cases where a law has been found invalid because it did not give people enough notice. Actually, only one case I know of -- Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The city of Los Angeles passed a law making it illegal for anyone who had ever been convicted of a felony to remain in the city for five days without registering as a felon. Lambert was arrested on suspicion of doing something else, but convicted for being an unregistered felon. The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of Lambert's due process rights to convict her of a crime she had no way of knowing about, or even suspecting. This is a very rare, extreme case, and does not apply to things where people might be expected to suspect that there might be a law. Otherwise, notice of a law is only required if the statute says so; for example, if a speed limit law requires the posting of signs, but the signs aren't posted, the law may not be in effect. However, ignorance still isn't an excuse--if the sign is posted, but you just didn't notice it, you're still on the hook. | Washington state dedicated a section of their code to explicitly make this illegal (to install it, not just use it). RCW 46.37.685(1)(b) says It is unlawful for a person to have an installed license plate flipping device on a vehicle, use technology to flip a license plate on a vehicle, or use technology to change the appearance of a license plate on a vehicle. and it is illegal to sell them. Georgia does not seem to have a specific law on the topic, but the same effect holds under GA Code §40-2-41, which says: Unless otherwise permitted under this chapter, every vehicle required to be registered under this chapter, which is in use upon the highways, shall at all times display the license plate issued to the owner for such vehicle, and the plate shall be fastened to the rear of the vehicle in a position so as not to swing and shall be at all times plainly visible... It shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the license plate legible at all times. No license plate shall be covered with any material unless the material is colorless and transparent. No apparatus that obstructs or hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate shall be attached to the rear of any motor vehicle required to be registered in the state. We can start with the question of whether the vehicle must be registered: yes, it does. Then we can ask if "which is in use upon the highways" is true. This is not obvious, because that clause could be interpreted as meaning "which is at some time or other in use upon the highway", or else as "at those times when it is in use upon the highway". I strongly suspect that the courts would find in favor of the first interpretation, not the second, especially since the law also says that you must "keep the license plate legible at all times" (not "at all times when you are on the highway"). Finally, a plate flipper clearly "hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate", and the law prohibits the attachment of such device, not just its use. So obscuring your license plate is just not legal. | The state of Washington does not have an absolute requirement that vehicles must be registered. What it has is RCW 46.16A.030 (2): (2) It is unlawful for a person to operate any vehicle on a public highway of this state without having in full force and effect a current and proper vehicle registration and displaying license plates on the vehicle. Therefore you already have a means to comply with the law: simply refrain from operating this vehicle on any public highway of the state of Washington. In other words, don't drive or park it on public roads; keep it on private property. (In many states, "operating" includes parking; I could not immediately find out whether this is the case in Washington.) So now your question instead becomes: "What is the state's obligation to make it possible for me to lawfully drive this particular vehicle on the public roads?" And the answer to that is much more clearly, "none". Driving in general is considered a privilege and not a right, so your "personal liberty" is not at issue. The state is not doing a good job of providing a service which they generally do provide, which is certainly annoying, but is not a legal issue, and does not give you the right to break the law. I have considered proceeding with the restoration, and drafting an "Affidavit in lieu of registration" document detailing my numerous attempts to follow the process, and indicating a sincere desire to comply, but my concern would be having the vehicle impounded if/when I get pulled over. Yes, it probably would be. I have even considered asking local law enforcement to just issue me a citation so that I might appear in court and plead for an opportunity to be given the means to comply. (i.e. move to the head of the line...) You would still lose, unless the judge is particularly sympathetic. I have also considered writing to my state representative. That's a better idea - at least it doesn't involve violating the law. And legislators usually do make some effort to help constituents when they have problems with government offices. However, if the issue is simply that the State Patrol is overloaded with work, there may not be much they can do. Is there a statute of limitations for asserting ownership that might alleviate my concerns about proceeding with the project? The requirement to have an inspection before getting a title seems to be from RCW 46.12.530 (2): "The department may require additional information and a physical examination of the vehicle or of any class of vehicles, or either." So there is no exception written into statute. The implementing regulation looks to be WAC 308-56A-150. There are several criteria listed for when inspection is required, and I'm not sure which would apply to your vehicle. It may perhaps be "(g) ownership in doubt (WAC 308-56A-210)" which applies when you do not have the documentation described in WAC 308-56A-265. Or it may be the catchall "(c) One on which the identification number needs verification as requested by the department, county auditor, or authorized agent". You'll have to research this further. There doesn't seem to be any exception based specifically on the long time period that the car has been unregistered, or the fact that no theft is known to have been reported in the past 20 years, or anything like that. | Yes Under Texas law (and pretty much everywhere else) the driver of the vehicle is responsible for ensuring that it is roadworthy. This does not mean that someone else cannot also be liable - the mechanic who fixed the wheel and their employer would also be liable. The claim for damages from a motor vehicle accident lies in the tort of negligence and the standards that the driver has to attain to avoid liability is that of a reasonable person. A reasonable person is not an average person who (probably) just gets in a car and drives but a prudent person who considers the risks to themselves and others and takes reasonable steps to mitigate them. Like looking at the wheels of an unfamiliar car. If the defect were obvious to a layperson from a visual inspection, they would be liable if they had not conducted such an inspection. Similarly, continuing to drive when a car is making a "Knocking" noise even if you didn't know what it was is not something a reasonable person would do. If you knew what the noise was and kept driving we are now moving from negligence into recklessness and the realms of criminal liability like manslaughter. | While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance. | That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure. | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. |
Can a defendant challenge the constitutionality of the statute s/he is charged with violating If someone is accused of a crime in his or her state and s/he believes the statute s/he is being charged under violates one or more of his or her constitutional rights, say right to travel or free speech. Can the defendant raise an argument in his or her defense, move to dismiss, or appeal the decision under these constitutional grounds? Can he open a new case as a plaintiff against the state for enforcing unconstitutional laws? | Yes, certainly. A prominent example was Lawrence v. Texas. The defendants were charged in state court with "deviate sexual intercourse". They moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. Their motion was denied and they were convicted and fined; the denial was upheld by the state's court of appeals. They then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the statute was indeed unconstitutional. A defendant likely wouldn't have standing to sue the state for enforcing the law in general, only for enforcing it on the defendant himself. | No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the "Vagueness Doctrine" which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition. | No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act. | Amendments to the US Constitution are part of the US Constitution, and this includes the so-called Bill of Rights. The doctrine of applying parts of the US Constitution to states, known as incorporation, comes from the 14th amendment: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The scope of the doctrine of incorporation is logically limited to amendments because the original articles of the constitution state how the federal government is run, and does not guarantee any rights or privileges to individuals. Amendments 1,2,4,8 are fully incorporated against states, 5 and 6 are partially incorporated, third and 7th are not incorporated, and for 9th and 10th there is no ruling. This arrangement derives from decisions by the Supreme Court, interpreting the 14th Amendment and the concept of "due process". If a state were to passe a law forbidding criticism of the governor (violating the First Amendment), an individual could sue to have the law found unconstitutional. Because, under the 14th Amendment, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article", Congress can and has passed a law prohibiting violation of civil rights: 42 USC 1983. Since the state in this hypothetical scenario has violated federal law, the federal government (Dept. of Justice) has standing to sue the state for violating federal law. | In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense. | No There is some room for change of venue from, say, one county to another, or one municipality to another, within the same state. In certain circumstances this may even be constitutionally required. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (U.S. 1966) ("where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity"). But, there's no mechanism to move a state criminal trial to another state. A cousin of the scenario you're talking about is where D has committed crimes in multiple states. In such a situation the prosecutors from different states (and also the federal system) may meet and co-ordinate their strategies, and part of that will be deciding who charges what and who goes first. An example of this is the DC sniper case, which I remember pretty vividly because I grew up in the area. The Maryland and Virginia prosecutors reached an agreement to try them in Virginia first, and second in Maryland. | The First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech", so to the extent that such a definition serves to limit one's freedom of speech, it is unconstitutional. If would also be unconstitutional to reward "love speech" or any other viewpoint. Crimes, such as murder, arson, rape and so on, are not constitutionally protected. The government can therefore define various parameters of severity (various degrees of assault defined in terms of "wantonness"). Assault, arson and murder are not legal forms of "expression", so assault motivated by a viewpoint is not "protected speech" – it isn't speech at all. | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. |
In the US are you allowed to refuse a mobile breathalyzer test? If you are stopped by the police in the US are you allowed to refuse any test to prove your sobriety? I know you have to tell the police your name, provide them with identification, insurance, and driver's license but can you refuse to give them anything else? Or is this just handing them probable cause on a silver platter? | In the circumstance you describe, you can refuse a breathalyzer test ("opt to not take it"), and doing so would not constitute probable cause for an arrest (the results of the test can be probable cause). That is when you are on the roadside. This is Washington's "implied consent" law. One of the first things that the law says is that the test is "subject to the provisions of RCW 46.61.506", which includes the requirement that the test be performed according to methods approved by the state toxicologist and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the state toxicologist for this purpose. The state toxicologist is directed to approve satisfactory techniques or methods, to supervise the examination of individuals to ascertain their qualifications and competence to conduct such analyses, and to issue permits which shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the state toxicologist. There are other requirements regarding 15 minute prior observation. The legally required test is done in the police station by a specially trained technician, on an approved machine (the portable machine is not approved). The implied consent law also says that this test is "required" if arrested for any offense where, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor You are not required to take the Portable Breath Test, which is optional (when you have been stopped) – it's the post-arrest "evidentiary" test that is obligatory, using the approved procedure. Note that failing the optional test gives probable cause for an arrest, however there can be other grounds such as failing the line-walking test. If the officer just tells you that the roadside test is mandatory, that is a defense which can be used at trial ('cuz the optional test is not mandatory). Whether or not the portable test is admissible in court depends on the state: in Kentucky it is statutorily not admissible, likewise in Washington per court ruling. The other tests (often known as Standard Field Sobriety Test) are also optional, so ultimately it reduces to whether they already have probable cause, that is, if "the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of arrest would warrant a reasonably cautious person to believe a crime has been committed". It is just not clear to me what actual circumstances distinguish mere reasonable suspicion (driving slow) from probable cause, but watery eyes, slurred speech and alcohol smell will make probable cause. I don't know if driving slow and having watery eyes is probable cause – I would think not. Dunno about "smell of alcohol plus driving slow". In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ we find an example of a traffic stop with ample probable cause for an arrest (smell of alcohol, bloodshot watery eyes, driving into a ditch, failing the alphabet test and massively failing the voluntary breath test). The analogous North Dakota law is largely similar to Washington law, mandating only the "approved" more technical version of the test and not the roadside test. Defendant, in that case, refused the mandatory test. A crucial difference compared to Washington law is that while suspension of driving privileges follows from refusal under Washington law, refusal in North Dakota is itself a misdemeanor per N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. The issue for SCOTUS is whether a law criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test (but not a blood test) violates the 4th amendment: it does not. | There is no basis for the view that requiring a driver's license is unconstitutional. First, it's critical to realize that a right to travel has nothing whatsoever to do with licensing drivers. A right to travel does not in any way mean there's a right to travel in a particular way. Likewise, using a car does not mean you're traveling. Schactman is about the right to obtain a passport, which is a requirement to travel overseas. Kent is likewise about international travel. Freedom of movement means the government cannot, without good cause (like being on parole), prevent you from traveling within the US, living where you choose, or working where you choose. Likewise, there's a right to international travel that means that without good cause, the government can't stop you from leaving the US or re-entering if you're a citizen. Requiring a drivers license to use public roads doesn't stop you from doing that -- there are other ways to travel. The Thompson v. Smith decision explicitly supports the idea that requiring drivers licenses is allowed. To quote a more representative section from the case: STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen of Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles. -- The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles -- Police Power. -- The right of a citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the city in the interest of public safety and welfare; but the city may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. AUTOMOBILES -- Drivers' Permits -- Arbitrary Revocation. -- The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. While Chicago Motor Coach doesn't seem to be available online, searching it finds other sites stating that the real issue was a commercial operator licensed by the State of Illinois, and whether Chicago, as a municipality within Illinois, could require them to also be permitted by the city. Another line from it seems to be "Even the Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience." To quote more recent precedent, Miller v. Reed from the 9th Circuit (a federal court of appeals, not a state court) states that The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right. (incidentally: Drivers licenses are not required by federal law. They are required by state laws.) | Yes. The police have the power to seize your phone as evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Terrorism Act 2000. There are no caveats or defined circumstances other than having a reasonable belief that the data on the phone forms evidence against you. They do not require a warrant to access your phone, and many police forces in the UK are using commercially available software to bypass password/PIN protection on your phone 1. In the event you do not provide your password/thumbprint/facial scan/PIN to officers to unlock your phone, you can be served with a Section 49 Notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which compels you to provide that information. Failure to do so can lead to a conviction under Section 53 RIPA, in addition to any other offences you may be charged with. | I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions). | You don't know. You can't know. And you can't force the officer to tell you. Detention Status As a practical matter, you have no way of knowing if you are compelled to follow an officer's order because you are being detained unless the officer volunteers that information (your detention status) which they are not compelled to disclose and have every incentive not to disclose. Consider the situation when the officer does not have reasonable suspicion do detain you. If the officer instantly informs you that you are "free to go" then you are likely to leave and end the encounter immediately. However, if the officer says nothing, then you might stay and inadvertently say or do something that would give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain you from that point forward. Your behavior during that detention could lead to probable cause, arrest, etc. Every officer knows they have nothing to gain by being quick to tell you you are free to go. Deceptive Conduct To compound the issue, police encounters are particularly problematic because police officers have a lawful right to engage in deceptive conduct during an investigation including but not limited to lying. You, on the other hand, can be prosecuted for lying to the police conducting an investigation. (See this article for more information.) Hobson's Choice Therefore, all things considered, police encounters present a Hobson's Choice. Either comply with every order in an effort to end the encounter quickly. Or try to press the officer to determine whether you are "being detained" or "free to go." The former course of action voluntarily cedes some of your rights. The latter risks "provoking" the officer into making your encounter more difficult, painful or costly than it otherwise might be. Never Consent to Searches That said, you are never under any obligation to consent to a warrantless search of your home or vehicle. Typically, saying, "I do not consent to searches." is usually sufficient if asked. Evidence obtained from warrantless searches is barred from being used at trial unless you waive this right by consenting to the search. See this question (and answers) if you are concerned about the officer falsely claiming you gave consent if you didn't. Never Talk to the Police As a legal matter, talking to the police can never help your case in court. Anything you say to the police that might help your case (i.e., exculpatory) is not admissible as evidence because it's hearsay. On the other hand, anything you say to the police can and will be used against you. In fact, even if you are completely innocent of all crimes AND you are completely 100% truthful to the police, you can still give the police all they legally need to convict you of a crime simply by talking to them. Whereas, without your statement, they would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. See this Youtube video for more details and examples of how this can and does happen every day. Practical Matters The above analysis presents the reader with some practical concerns. You don’t want to risk being harmed by an officer in fear for his safety. You don’t want to be handcuffed and taken to the police station if you can avoid it. You must obey all unconditional commands of a peace officer. It does no harm to inform the officer that you are willing to comply with all unconditional legal commands and ask him or her if a given command is, in fact, unconditional. Some attorneys go in the opposite direction from the "never talk to the police" rule and advise that, say in the case of a domestic violence dispute, the best course of action is to answer police questions matter-of-factly, never lie and never admit guilt. That course of behavior can avoid a potential trip to the police station in handcuffs in the back of a police car even if you are never ultimately arrested. TL;DR: Police encounters are tricky. It's difficult to know what to do. The best course of action is to educate yourself about your rights and the law and apply judgment and common sense to guide your behavior to achieve the best outcome. I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. This answer is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to obtain proper legal advice. | Pennsylvania is one state sometimes cited as having such a law, but the law does not refer to "keys in the ignition", instead, An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol... Similarly in Washington, A person is guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug if the person has actual physical control of a vehicle within this state... California law is narrower, since It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage to drive a vehicle and this does not include being in physical control. See Mercer v. DMV which affirms that the person must have been driving, but it is not necessary to witness the person driving. Keys in the ignition can be evidence that you were driving, likewise a warm engine or tires, car is in gear, you're in the middle of the road. I doubt that any law is stated in terms of "keys in the ignition", more likely it reduces to actual driving, or being in control of the vehicle. | 2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me. | The only really authoritative source of answers is a court interpreting the laws on an as applied basis (and there are many U.S. traffic laws, one in every state and sometimes additional local ones, not a single U.S. traffic law). An answer from a government official or police department is not authoritative, although it may be informative of how the official in question would enforce the law. |
Would this seizure be lawful? If a search is deemed unlawful due to lack of probable cause does that invalidate all evidence against you obtained through that search or just the evidence specific to the case? Say, for instance, you are suspected to harbor a fugitive and they search your house and they find drugs in your house. If it comes out that the government had a lack of probable cause to search your house for the harboring a fugitive case would that also make the drug bust invalid? Can a lack of probable cause affect evidence of a separate but related case? | Conducting an illegal search does not amount to a permanent get out of jail free card ("does that invalidate all evidence against you". What is excluded is evidence derived from that illegal search, regardless of what crime they were searching for. It would include later evidence for an unrelated crime where the probable cause was uncovered by the illegal search. The doctrine is not absolute, so a grand jury can inquire about a matter brought to their attention via an illegal search ("the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons", US v. Calandra). Also, the doctrine excludes the product of a bad faith search without probable cause e.g. where the officer lies about the probable cause. There is also a "social cost" consideration, see Pennsylvania v. Scott. Utah v. Strief establishes three related doctrines. Unlawfully-obtained evidence independently acquired by officers from a source may be admittede. Evidence may be admitted if it would have been discovered without the unconstitutional source. Finally, since the poison fruit doctrine is intended to limit illegal police action, it may be admitted when there is a remote connection between illegal police conduct and gathering of evidence (e.g. the existence of an arrest warrant, discovered after the search). Nothing in your hypothetical points to an exception. The "social costs" consideration was specifically related to "social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large", but the potential for wider application is established (however, it is well-established that evidence of ordinary drug possession is excluded, from the myriad cases of such exclusions over the past century). | From a US perspective, in a word, "no". Firstly, "presumption of innocence" is in a trial, not in police interactions. Being arrested does not violate the presumption of innocence. Police do not need any reason to interact with you or ask you questions. Police can arrest you if they have probable cause to suspect you have committed a crime, but this is not always necessary. More on this later(in the fourth section). Secondly, I wouldn't describe requesting to see your ticket, or any document as a "violent communication", in general. It may be rude or insulting, but not violent. (Also "violent communication" is not a legal term. The closest legal terms, verbal assault and threatening communication, are also not this.) More over, there is no indication of am implication of lying in this request. Thirdly, there are many situations in which possessing a document or credential is not sufficient; one must legally display or present them upon request. For example, multiple occupational licenses such as liquor licenses and barber/cosmetology licenses require that the licenses be prominently displayed; whereas, in California at least, a vehicle driver on a public road must not only possess their driver's license and proof of insurance, they must produce them upon the request of any law enforcement officer (Source: https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffvr18). Fourthly, there are situations in which you can be legally searched and questioned without reasonable suspicion. Examples of this include boarder searches and sobriety checkpoints. Sources: (US Supreme Court rulings): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Martinez-Fuerte; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_Department_of_State_Police_v._Sitz A note on sources: bdb484 and I have opposing court case sources. My sources have binding precedent over all courts in the US, save the US Supreme Court, whereas theirs don't have any binding precedent, but are more directly on-topic. | Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree. | Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions. | I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers. | Different states vary on all of this stuff but many times the roadside breathalyzer is given to establish probable cause to arrest a driver. After that the driver is given another test on a computer-connected breath tester at the station (or wherever). It's these big testers that are usually used as the evidence and are the ones which are at the center of controversy in various states. As @Dale M stated, for roadside tests the officer can write the results in a notebook, some breathalyzers have printers, and other are connected to a computer. Whatever the case, there is usually a process that officers go through to ensure this stuff is accurate and complete. A lot of it is departmental policy and would only be revealed if challenged in court or perhaps via an open data request. But again, this record is to show probable cause for the arrest and the trip to the bigger badder test which is fully computerized and documented and witnessed. (In at least one state (NC) you have the right to have a witness present when you are tested.) EDIT: Oh, and if your plan is to challenge probable cause because the record-keeping on the roadside breathalyzer is mediocre, the cop can cite all sorts of other probable cause, like he saw you swerving, you were slurring your speech, he smelled alcohol, you failed the in-car test, and you failed the roadside walking, touching, dancing, singing test. | This is going to depend on what you think or know is on the phone, why you want to keep it undisclosed, and why the officer says s/he wants it. If one knows or has good reason to think that there is evidence of a crime on the phone, then destroying or hiding that evidence may be criminal. If one gets a court order, such as a warrant or subpoena, to turn over evidence, destroying the evidence or otherwise failing to comply may well be criminal contempt of court, or another criminal offense. In most circumstances an officer must have probable cause, and usually a warrant, to conduct a lawful search. But border searches are different. That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustaining search of incoming mail). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (opening by customs inspector of locked container shipped from abroad). The Congressional Research Service wrote: in the March 2021 report "Searches and Seizures at the Border and the Fourth Amendment" (pdf): The Supreme Court has recognized that searches at the border are “qualitatively different” from those occurring in the interior of the United States, because persons entering the country have less robust expectations of privacy, given the federal government’s broad power to safeguard the nation by examining persons seeking to enter its territory. While law enforcement searches and seizures within the interior of the United States typically require a judicial warrant supported by probable cause, federal officers may conduct routine inspections and searches of persons attempting to cross the international border without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of unlawful activity. But a border search that extends beyond a routine search and inspection may require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Recent years have seen legal challenges to border searches of electronic devices such as cell phones and computers, which often contain more personal and sensitive information than other items frequently searched at the border, such as a wallet or briefcase. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. Lower courts have generally held that government officers may conduct relatively limited, manual searches of such devices without a warrant or any particularized suspicion. The courts, however, are split over whether more intrusive, forensic searches require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Federal statutes and implementing regulations confer designated law enforcement officers with broad authority to conduct searches and seizures at the border and surrounding areas without a warrant. These searches commonly occur at designated ports of entry along the border, such as border crossing points.[1] But searches may also occur in other places along or near the border.[2] To enforce U.S. customs laws, federal law enforcement officers may inspect and search individuals, merchandise, vehicles, and vessels arriving at the border, as well as further into the interior of the United States and within U.S. waters. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1496, a customs officer may examine “the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein” and whether those items are subject to taxes or otherwise prohibited. Similarly, 19 U.S.C. §1467 allows customs officers to inspect and search the persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving by vessel from a foreign port (including U.S. territories). If there is nothing that could be evidence on a phone, erasing it should not be criminal destruction of evidence, but this will be hard to prove after the fact, and border officials have authority to insist on a search with no warrant or particular suspicion. Notes [1]: See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a “border search” as one that occurs at ports of entry where there is an actual or attempted border crossing);see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Border Security: At Ports of Entry (last modified Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry (describing U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s functions at ports of entry). [2]: See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (recognizing the government’s interest in patrolling inland or coastal waters “where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (noting that the Border Patrol conducts inland surveillance activities “all in the asserted interest of detecting the illegal importation of aliens.”); See also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., "Border Security: Along U.S. Borders" (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (describing the Border Patrol’s responsibilities along the border | If the pursuit is unlawful (which it almost always is except for police) and the pursued suffers harm in fleeing from the pursuer, then the pursuer is responsible both criminally and civilly. Being pursued would put a person in fear of harm: that’s the criteria for assault so the act of pursuing someone without lawful cause is a crime. Self-defence ceases to be a defence when the other person is running away - even if they are carrying your TV. You can use reasonable force to effect an arrest but a pursuit is not likely to be reasonable if it is of any significant distance or involves vehicles. Police pursuits are strictly limited and police have been successfully sued when they exceed those limits and harm comes to the pursued. If the pursed dies, pursuers can and have been convicted of murder or manslaughter. |
How far can a program's user interface be copied before it becomes copyright infringement? I want to create a program, to be specific, it's an IDE (Integrated Development Environment i.e.: a program that people can use to create programs, write code etc...) The features I want to implement, are standard for any program classified as "IDE". Given that there are may IDE's around and that they all pretty much do the same thing and have very similar interfaces, I'm sure that the functionality alone cannot be copyrightable. I love the way Microsoft's Visual Studio IDE looks and feels. I'm referring to Visual Studio Desktop (not Visual Studio Code). I would like my program to look and feel the same, if not identically, at least very close. My program would have nothing in common with Microsoft's product except for how it visually looks. To be more precise, I'm interested in knowing if copying any of the following is permitted by copyright law : Program layout : where various "sub panels or plugins or widgets" are positioned on screen. Colors : specific shades of various colors and combinations there of, color palettes etc... Fonts, however in this case, a user might obtain a font license for personal use, and configure the program to use that specific font, but it would be nice to integrate it. Look and feel of various User Interface elements for example buttons are rectangles with text, an optional image, they have a specific width and height, a specific border size and color. Panels top bar have text on the far left, a specific fill pattern in the middle and on the right there is the "pin" button, and the "close widget/panel" button; the program editor / text editor visually highlights text with specific rectangles, and transparency patters. The question is : How far can I go in copying the user interface before it becomes copyright infringement ? I'm asking because I've seen around many programs that emulate Visual Studio's look and feel, when opening them, a normal user would struggle to tell the difference. P.S.: I assume the answer is probably no, I can't copy everything and get away with it. However, how much can be copied before it becomes copyright infringement ? Related question : Given the nature of the program I want to create, and the fact that it can be configured i.e.: its look and feel as well as graphical behavior can be changed in the settings menu; Would creating a program with a different default look and feel that can be configured manually to look exactly the same as Visual Studio be allowed (in copyright terms) ? | united-states Functionality in general is not protected by copyright, although it may in some cases be protected by a patent. As the question noted, there are many IDEs and creating another one generally similar to those is not a violation of anyone's IP rights. The "look and feel" of a piece of software has been held by US courts to be protected by copyright. Broderbund Software. Inc., v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986), was a relativcly early case in which the visual display elements of a software program were held to be protected by copyright. In the decision it is said that; On the “Choose a Font” screen, no mechanical or practical factor compelled [defendant] to use those exact words (“Choose a Font”). He could have written: “Select a Font,” or “Indicate a Typeface Preference,” or “Which Type Style Do You Prefer,” or any combination of these terms. . . .The bottom line is that the designer of any program that performed the same functions as “Print Shop” had available a wide range of expression governed predominantly by artistic and not utilitarian considerations. Another relevant early case was Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F.Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). In this case, the Defendant "oftklone intentionally set out to "clone" or copy the functionality and interface of the popular program Crosstalk XVI (I was a user of thwt program many years ago). The court wrote: In the instant case, however, the arrange- ment of the status screen involves consider- able stylistic creativity and authorship above and beyond the ideas embodied in the status screen. It cannot be said that the idea of the status screen, i.e., using two symbol commands to change the operations of the computer program and reflecting that fact on a screen listing the computer program’s parameters/commands with their operative values, could not have been expressed in a large variety of ways. The defendants have never contended that they could not have arranged the parameters/commands in a wide variety of patterns without hampering the operation of their program. and found copyright infringement on that basis. Section 310 of Copyrightable Authorship: What Can Be Registered by the US Copyright office, says: The U.S. Copyright Office will not consider the so-called “look and feel” of a work. Invoking a work’s “feel” is not a viable substitute for an objective analysis of the work’s fixed and creative elements. See 4 MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON Copyright § 13.03[A][1][c] (2013) (criticizing the use of “feel” as a “wholly amorphous referent” that “merely invites an abdication of analysis”). The question asks: How far can I go in copying the user interface before it becomes copyright infringement ? There is no clear bright line on this matter. The more one copies interface elements and choices from a specific source, the stronger the case for infringement is. Using elements and choices that have become common industry practice in multiple works froim multiple developers and companies is probably safe. Clearly and extensively imitating the visual appearance and interface of a single specific work of software might well be infringement. One would be wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright law, and specifically "look and feel" issues, beforign publishing such a work of software. This issue is discussed extensively in Look And Feel In Computer Software (1993) by Jack Russo & Jamie Nafziger, published by Computerlaw Group LLP, which seems to be a law firm specializing in computer law. The Law of Look and Feel by Peter Lee (Professor of Law and Chancellor’s Fellow, University of California, Davis.) & Madhavi Sunder (Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.) is a 60-page law review article dealing with this topic. There is far more detail in these publications (and many others to be found on the net) than I can summarize in an SE answer. Configurable Interfaces The question asks whether the use of a configurable interface which could, but does not by default, imitate an existing interface would be infringement. I have not been able to find any case on point, or any discussion in a reliable source of this issue. Therefore, I am going to speculate. If there is a single choice between overall "themes" or "shells" and one of them imitates the interface from a protected program without permission, that would probably be legally the same as if the program shipped with that interface. It might or might not be infringement, depending on the details, as discussed above. If there are many settings, but the program is shipped with instructions advising a combination of settings that imitate another interface (or the developer or distributor provides such advice to users), that would probably be legally the same as if the program shipped in that configuration. If the developer provides a few preset configuration files which control these interface settings, and one such file results in settings that imitate another interface, that would also probably be legally the same as if the program shipped in that configuration. If there are many settings and there is no particular guidance or advice to a user on what combination to use, nor any predefined settings file, but users must discover (if they choose) a group of settings which imitate another interface, that is probably not infringement. I repeat that this section of the answer is based on general principals, but not on specific case law, nor on specific legal scholarship, and a court faced with this issue might rule otherwise. Before implementing this as a business plan, one might be wise to consult a lawyer with IP expertise. | You don't have to, but you probably want to for a couple of reasons: It's courteous, and in the spirit of open source It's someone else's work, and you're using it. The least you can probably say is "thank you." It will also probably help you stay in the clear: since you're using software in binary form, where the notice isn't immediately accessible, then by providing a copy of the license, you respect that licensing term in another way. It tells your users what's up with the program Let's admit it, having the license accessible to the users tells them what's in the program and so on. It's another way of providing attribution, like I listed in the first reason above. Many apps, desktop and mobile, have a screen or panel to indicate the projects and licenses that they use. They don't have to be straight in the user's face, they can be a little button in the "About" screen of the program. To answer a little confusion: the binaries are still a derived form from that source code. Analyse the heading: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. The software is still there, it's just there in a different form, a compiled form. Therefore, the copyright and permission notice should probably stick around, even if it's just a file somewhere. | Written down computer code is subject to copyright. If you do not have the permission of the owner to copy it you are breaching their copyright unless your use constitutes fair use/dealing. | What copyright or trademark law permits and what Google's terms of service permit may well not be the same thing. It is not "illegal" to violate the ToS unless they form a binding contract, which often they will not. Even when they do, unless some cognizable harm is done, a violation of the TOS is probably not enforceable by suit or in any other way. Embedding via an Iframe simply points the browser to another site, and probably is not legally different from including a clickable link. Using CSS to alter the display might be considered to be creating a derivative work, and thus to be a copyright infringement if done without permission. Somce the linked document says: "Don’t remove, obscure, or alter any of our branding, logos, or legal notices." making any such change woule violate the terms of the ToS, although this might not be an enforceable restriction. It is also IMO doubtful whether a "share" button constitutes part, of the "branding, logos, or legal notices." | Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.) | Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy. | The US does not provide copyright protection for font design. As long as you dont distribute font generating programs, that would themselves be copyrighted, you are not infringing. Your derived information is okay because it is derived from a non-copyrightable work and is therefore not a derivative work. https://law.stackexchange.com/a/25673/1340 | You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license. |
How close to, or how far from, copyright violation is the movie "Gattaca"? In 1942 a novel appeared: Beyond This Horizon by Robert Heinlein. The setting is a future time when it has become standard that people's genes are chosen from among their parents' genes by doctors, who try to pick the best among those available, but are forbidden to add any new genes not present in the parents. Those whose genes are chosen the old-fashioned way are looked down upon as inferior people. In 1997 the movie Gattaca appeared. The setting is a future time when it has become standard that people's genes are chosen from among their parents' genes by doctors, who try to pick the best among those available, but are forbidden to add any new genes not present in the parents. Those whose genes are chosen the old-fashioned way are looked down upon as inferior people. In 1953 the novel Starman Jones, also by Robert Heinlein, appeared. The protagonist falsifies his identity and work record to get a position in the crew of a spacecraft. The protagonist has memorized a book on navigation in space. In Gattaca, The protagonist falsifies his identity and work record to get a position in the crew of a spacecraft. The protagonist has memorized a book on navigation in space. But the story in Gattaca is quite different from those in either of the two Heinlein novels. In Gattaca, the spacecraft is on a bold mission of exploration; in Starman Jones it is a luxury liner that makes routine voyages carrying passengers and freight. In Gattaca the protagonist is one of those whose genes were chosen the old-fashioned way; in Beyond This Horizon he is is one whom the government wants to have many children to continue their eugenics program because he is considered of superior stock. He wishes not to have children because he thinks most humans are naturally unhappy and he would only be sentencing his descendants to unhappy lives. And some of his coevals are so unhappy despite their affluent lifestyle that they want to overthrow the fairly liberal government and replace it with a dictatorship. Heinlein is not acknowledged in the movie credits. How much do they need to lift from already published fiction before it becomes a derivative work with obligations to the owner of the copyright on the earlier work? | Under U.S. law (17 U.S. Code § 101 ) A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” But probably, focusing on this definition doesn't get to the heart of the question you seem to be asking. A more important matter becomes what protections does a copyright exclude? This is covered in § 102 (b), which says: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The similarities you describe seem to be more ideas and concepts rather than Heinlein's expression of those ideas. I have looked no closer than the description used in the question, but the movie seems unlikely to have violated a protected right. Others might disagree. | Arguably not (or, the example terms are not restricted by copyright, but not for the reasons given, which means this protection may not extend past the examples given in all cases). The protection for "stock characters" comes from the "Scènes à faire" doctrine, which protects elements that are elementary and near-required to be part of a genre. For example, a fairy tale is "obligated" to start with "Once upon a time" and end with "And they lived happily ever after". Character classes, by virtue of being character classes, do not qualify under this doctrine to me, simply by virtue of being "character classes". What matters are: a) the terms used for the classes are generic b) there is prior art to any claimed copyright, with uses of such terms in fantasy fiction stretching back at least hundreds of years and predating, for example, modern English. Note that the above is not universal to all character classes. For example, if you had classes whose names that directly related to various other copyrighted works IP (e.g. "Jedi Councilor", "Yogo Wardmaster", "Grey Warden", "Aes Sedai", "Asha'man" "Eversor Assassin"), those could still be infringing copyright. | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. | In general this kind of brief literary reference is not unlawful, and such things occur in both novels and commercial games with some frequency. Making such a reference a major part of the plot, such as by using a name from a previous work as a major character, particularly if other aspects of that character are also used, is far more likely to cause a problem. In the united-states this would be a matter of fair use. In general, when only a very small part of the source work is used, such a a single name; where the use is "transformative", that is used for a rather different purpose than in the source work; where the use does not harm the market for the original work; and where the use does not serve as a replacement for the original, it is likely to be held to be fair use. But fair use decisions are always fact-dependent, and are made case-by-case, so it is hard to be absolutely sure of one in advance. But the kind of literary reference described in the question is very unlikely to be held to be copyright infringement. | It is probably a word that can be used, but not definitively. Many words of general applicability coined by authors enter into the general lexicon. The process is similar, but not precisely identical, to the dilution of a trademarked term to become a generic descriptive term for anything in the category of items so trademarked. Early examples of originally trademarked words that entered the general lexicon are "elevator" and "escalator". For example, the word "grok" coined by Robert Heinlein, is now part of the general lexicon, as is the word "quark" coined by James Joyce (although its current meaning has shifted). The word "robot" from K. Čapek's play R.U.R. ‘Rossum's Universal Robots’ (1920), would be another example of a word coined in fiction that has entered general use. The scene a faire doctrine also authorized public domain use of tropes and terms that have achieved wide use in a genre. As a rule of thumb, if three different authors have used a term to mean the same thing, or an author who is no longer in copyright has done so, it can be used freely. For example, regardless of who originally used it, the term "mecha" would not be protected by the doctrine due to its used by multiple authors and commentators in a particular science fiction sub-genre. "Mentat" is a close case, because it is overwhelmingly used in a specific series of books written by Frank Herbert and his son with licensing from his estate, and because the series has produced so many published properties, not only in books, but in TV and movies, it has been close to maximally protected from an IP perspective by the Herbert Estate, his publishers, and his audio-visual licensees. There is at least a colorable argument that use of the term in a fictional setting would be a derivative work, intended to evoke and be derived from the extended series of creative properties. The best counterargument that the term has entered the general lexicon, or in any case is not a protected derivative work, would comes from use of the term in a non-fiction sense which is not negligible, even though it isn't terribly common. Wikipedia notes two (probably unlicensed) commercial uses, one as a trademark and the other as an IT company name, in addition to two minor fictional uses, one with a similar meaning and one with a somewhat shifted meaning. Further, to the extent that the non-fiction use was great enough to show that it entered the general lexicon, at that point, fictional use would no longer be a derivative work because the work could be derived from many sources in which the Herbert estate does not have copyrights. A Google N-gram search could be used to evaluate that argument empirically. The use of the word in the early 19th century (before Herbert was born) is particularly promising, although the senses in which it was used pre-Herbert would have to be evaluated, and the context in which it was used post-Dune would also have to be evaluated (if all the uses are in his licensed books, it hurts the cause). A quick scan suggests that in the early 19th century that it was often used as a Latin or French word used untranslated for foreign flavor in English language works, so there is an argument that it is really a loan word not specific to Herbert. Much of the modern use is in fair use commentary expressly referencing Herbert's works and in obvious misspellings of the word "mental". Particularly encouraging in the N-gram search are the uses of the word in independent science fiction novels including "The Search for Snout" (2014) by Bruce Coville, "Dorsai!" (2013) by Gordon R. Dickson, "Eye of the Storm" (2009) by John Ringo, and "The Ghost Brigades" (2007) by John Scalzi. Also, particularly notable is the use of the word in an independent non-Dune novel in "Clockwork Lives" (2015) by Kevin J. Anderson and Neil Peart, since Kevin J. Anderson was a co-author of some of the Dune novels and would have contractual obligations to the Herbert Estate as well as copyright obligations; signifying a concession of non-ownership of the term by the estate. This use in five independent fictional cases in the same genre in works published long enough ago for the statute of limitations for infringement to have lapsed (with late filed suits used to muddy the waters). This strongly advances the scene a faire doctrine validation of the word. The term is also used in a scientific journal article in 2008 in the Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, but in a related but not identical sense of the word. Another litmus test regarding whether a word is part of the general lexicon is whether it appears in more complete dictionaries, such as the OED, or Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, or in a notable published thesaurus, None of the dictionaries and no thesaurus that I have in hard copy have that word, but this could be because mine are dated. An updated dictionary and thesaurus search would be probative evidence of this question. A thesaurus search for "genius" or "prodigy" that came up with "mentat" listed would be a good thing to look for. A third issue for general lexicon v. derivative work analysis would be whether the word can be derived by obvious use of affixes and suffixes and retroflex letters from words that are in dictionaries. For example, a word plus -ology (for the study of), or -itis (for medical conditions) would not generally be beyond the scope of legally permissible public domain use. This again is a close call in the case of "mentat". Single words are also harder (but not impossible) to protect as derivative works, if not trademarked as well, than extended passages either verbatim or paraphrased or translated, which would weaken the derivative work claim, although it wouldn't be entirely without merit just because it was a single word. | The basic principle is that copyright never protects an idea, it only protects the expression of an idea. In the US, that rule is embodied in 17 USC 102(b) which provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. When significant, detailed, and specific plot elements are copied from a prior work, then that may make the new work a derivative work. Creation or distribution of a derivative work requires permission from the owner of the copyright (if any) on the prior work (source work). But the elements used must be significant and must be detailed. If all that is taken could be expressed in a summery contained in a single sentence or paragraph, this will not make the new work derivative. For example, such ideas as: Napoleon meets the Emperor of China and they form an alliance. [My idea] Sherlock Holmes helps to repel the Martian invasion described in The War of the Worlds. Conan Doyle's Professor Challenger is also involved. [Wellman's Sherlock Holmes's War of the Worlds] Aliens crash land on Earth in 1905, creating an alternate timeline. They seek to start WWI early, to stimulate technical development. [Benson's ...And Having Writ] would on their own not be enough to constitute a derivative work and thus infringement. But the more specific detail from the source work is used, the more likely it is that an infringement suit would win. By the way, the rule is the same whether the source work is a book, or a TV show, or an opera, or any other work subject to copyright protection. If the work is old enough, any copyright will have expired, but the format of the original does not matter, as long as it is "fixed in a tangible form" which includes video tape, DVD, computer file, or a script written on paper. About the only things that do not count as fixed would be an impromptu dance, song, speech, or story whch the creator performed or spoke without its ever having been written down or recorded in any way. | It would be copyright infringement. The script that you are planning to copy from is protected by law, so requires the copyright-owner's permission to create a derivative version (your own interpretation). If instead you write a completely different story inspired by the original book, you might not get sued. The problem is that there is a reasonable chance that you would accidentally duplicate part of one of the myriad adaptations, then the jury would have to decide whether it was just a coincidence, or copying. | If one is writing about a work of fiction, one may describe the work, and use terms from the work in doing so. One might write, for example: In Spaceman Sam the characters use "blasters" as weapons, while in Jack of the Galaxy "contragravity" is used to propel "aircars" These are facts, and copyright may never be used to protect facts. Moreover, such uses as reviews and criticism are particularly likely to constitute fair use under US law, or another exception to copyright under the law of some other country, even if some otherwise protected content is quoted. If something appeared in that sci-fi universe prior to me re-iterating it; does that mean it's fair game for me to use? If the "something" that appeared earlier is an "idea" or a name, it is indeed fair game. This is true whether it is obscure or well-known. In any case describing the facts of the fiction, even in detail, is generally not an infringement. If "re-iterating" something from an existing work in a new fiction involves an extensive quotation, or a detailed, point-by-point reuse of a fictional element, that might constitute infringement, unless fair use or another exception to copyright applies. Does intellectual law protect very specific plot concepts? No, it doesn't. A plot concept is an idea. In the US, 17 USV 103(b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Laws in other countries are similar on this point. This is sometimes known as the idea/expression distinction. This means that while the expression used to embody a concept is often protected by copyright, the concept itself never is. Are you allowed to borrow names of different generic sci-fi inventions that aren't super-important to the story. Yes. In fact even the names of fictional technological devices that are very important to a story may be, and often are, reused in different works by different authors. For example Ursula LeGuin used "ansible" as the name of a faster-then-light communicator, in fact an instantaneous communication device, in her "Hanish" series, particularly in The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed, and The Word for World is Forest. (She wrote that the term was derived from the word "answerable".) The term and concept were reused by Vernor Vinge in "The Blabber" and A Fire Upon the Deep, and by Elizabeth Moon in the "Sassanek" series and more centrally in the "Vatta's war" series starting with Trading in Danger. Moreover, the names of fictional characters are not protected. An author might introduce characters with names borrowed from Tolkien, Heinlein, or other well-known (or obscure) fictional works. US Copyright Office circular #33 "Works not protected by Copyright" says that "names, titles, and short phrases" may not be protected by copyright, and will not be separably registered. However, if a character has not only the name of a previous character, but a detailed, point-by-point similarity in distinctive elements to a character in a protected work, that may be enough to make the newer work a derivative work, and thus be infringing if permission is not obtained from the copyright holder on the source work. The same is true of the detailed reproduction of a distinctive setting from a source work. But a mere name and broad, general description is not enough tom make a later work derivative. The more details are reproduced, and the more distinctive and specific those details are, the more likely the newer work is to be found distinctive. |
By what power are High Courts in India able to direct the Centre? I keep hearing a High Court has directed the Centre to do something. See example. It's a good thing in my opinion. However, the jurisdiction of a High Court as I understand is within that state for that High Court, with few exceptions like Gauhati which has jurisdiction in three states. Which power (or clause) enables a High Court to direct the Centre? By the same analogy, can a district court direct the state where it's located? | This is a very straightforward point of constitutional law. Chapter and verse from the Constitution, art 224: (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. | Can a state make a law that deputizes individuals to sue individuals in other states? This question (apart from the question below that implicates federalism concerns about a sister state court process in the secondary question below) would be resolved by the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law. A state can have a law that authorizes a lawsuit for non-judicial system conduct against a non-resident of the state if it meets the requirements of "long arm jurisdiction." The most succinct description of this requirement is that the person being sued "personally availed themselves" of the laws of the state whose law authorizes the lawsuit, in a manner that would reasonably be understood to subject that person to the state's legal authority. This could involve a lawsuit against someone outside the state arising from an incident that took place in the state. It could also involve a lawsuit against someone who took tortious action directed at a state or people in a state that caused harm, or a lawsuit arising from a business transaction that could reasonably be considered doing business in the state imposing that law. Constitutional law requirements on "choice of law" require that the state or foreign jurisdiction whose law is applied to a question in a dispute must have some meaningful connection to the disputed issue (subject to the backdrop rule that the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum where a case is litigated is presumed to be identical to that of the law of the state where the case is being litigated if no party provides any evidence or legal authorities to the contrary). Case law on state level qui tam litigation (which involve statutes that empower private individuals to sue someone who has wronged the government on its behalf for a share of the amount recovered for the government), the case law regarding private criminal prosecutions that are available in a handful of U.S. states, and some California consumer protection laws (which authorize suits without personal showing of actual damages in some cases when there are fraudulent advertisements) might also be relevant. So would the authority granted to bail bondsmen that is similar to law enforcement authority but limited to people authorized a person posting a bail bond for a criminal defendant who is subject to that authority. Concretely, if the constitutionality of the Texas law was upheld<1>, Texas probably can authorize a lawsuit against a California resident who would be involved in an abortion that took place in Texas that was illegal under Texas law. And, a judgment from a Texas court in a case like that would probably be entitled to full faith and credit in California. But, Texas probably couldn't constitutionally authorize a lawsuit against a California resident in connection with an abortion that took place in California. There would be, of course, many edge cases with no close past precedents, where the application of constitutional jurisdiction and choice of law limitations would be far less clear. <1> The majority opinion by five conservative justices other than the Chief Justice deciding not to stay enforcement of the law specifically limits itself to whether the proper parties were joined to the request to enjoin the statute and states "this order is not based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the Texas law, including in Texas state courts." A decision that has not been resolved on the merits. The Courts have merely declined to stay enforcement of the law pending the current litigation over the law's validity. Upholding the law on the merits would require courts to overturn existing precedents related to abortion restrictions and other legal issues. Is there any extra legal barrier that would prevent states with pro-choice legislatures from passing laws designed to counter the anti-abortion deputies? For example, California could pass a law that deputizes private California individuals to sue people who sue abortion providers, and could reimburse their court costs up to $10,000. This seems to be a separate question from the question in the title. A law of this character would probably not be upheld. Basically, it would make a state authorized legal process in one state's courts, actionable as illegal in another state. Generally speaking, interference in another state's legal process would either violate the "dormant commerce clause", or the "full faith and credit clause", or constitutional limits on jurisdiction and choice of law, or constitutional standing limitations (even though they don't apply in the same way in state courts as in federal courts, or the "due process clause" of the 5th or 14th Amendments, or the "privileges and immunities clause." The exact legal theory isn't clear because there is really not history of litigation over this kind of legislation and you'd need to resort to vaguely analogous cases. The effort of Texas to litigate Pennsylvania election law administration following the 2020 election was recently dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing and that is suggestive of how this case might be resolved, even though it isn't strictly analogous. It is also informed by the long standing common law rule, that could conceivably have constitutional dimensions, that litigants participating in a court process in good faith are immune from collateral litigation in another lawsuit over their conduct in the original lawsuit. There isn't a lot of precedent one way or the other with laws having this kind of purpose, and none on a law exactly in this form. Indeed, a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by the Chief Justice and two of the liberal justices (with which the third liberal justice states he agrees without formally joining that opinion) stated that: The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unusual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The last time there was significant litigation of laws with a similar purpose that were adjudicated was in the pre-U.S. Civil War period in abolition of slavery oriented legislation. But, the post-Civil War amendments to the U.S. Constitution and subsequent development of constitutional case law would render most precedents from that time period infirm. | This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | No. As a superior sovereign, the United States can sue states in federal court without restriction. I’m not sure if that would apply in state court, but the federal government doesn’t generally file cases in state court to begin with. States can also sue each other in federal court, having waived their immunity to lawsuits brought by other states when they agreed to Article III of the Constitution (although Congress has said that these lawsuits must be filed directly in the Supreme Court). | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. | The Supremacy Clause. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. [emphasis mine] This is also known as the "Supremacy Clause" of the U.S. Constitution. It prevents any law of any state from acting contrary to the federal constitution. A comment correctly cites multiple cases that use this clause, in part, as the basis for SCOTUS' authority to review State Supreme Court decisions. So in your hypothetical, the federal issue in play is the clarity of the federal constitution which supersedes state law. | The theatre is a private place. You may enter it only with the permission of the owners. They are not obliged to grant you that permission. They have the right to refuse admission on almost any grounds they choose. I say "almost" because many jurisdictions have laws about things like race or gender discrimination. I suspect in India it would be illegal to say "You can't come in because you are Hindu." The point is though, that there is a short list of reasons which they aren't allowed to use. Any other reason is legal. |
Can a state suspend my license and not tell me about it? A Iowa-registered driver was on the highway in Indiana, US, going 26 mph over the speed limit. The driver was pulled over and was fined. The driver went and payed the fine in person and resolved the ticket. A few months later, when the driver went to the Ohio BMV to attempt to transfer his license to his new home state, he was informed (for the first time), that his license was suspended for the next 3 months. According to a phone call the driver had with the Iowa DOT, in Iowa, if a driver gets cited for going more than 20 mph over the speed limit, they must complete a defensive driving course within a number of days. If they don’t, they risk a 6 month suspension of their license. I wasn’t able to find this information in the Iowa’s Driver Manual. The Iowa DOT had sent a letter to the driver, which was returned to the sender. The Iowa DOT had a record of the letter being returned. They had not attempted to contact the driver further. Thus, the driver had no way of knowing of the requirements needed to keep his license valid. This seems like a problem in the Iowa DOT, and shouldn’t have afflicted the driver with the consequences it did. Is there any way to challenge this decision? What steps could be taken? | It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state. | The only specific prohibition of "backing" is at s. 157 of the Highway Traffic Act: 157 (1) No driver of a vehicle shall back the vehicle upon the roadway or shoulder of any highway divided by a median strip1 on which the speed limit is in excess of 80 kilometres per hour ... However, there is a careless driving prohibition: 130 (1) Every person is guilty of the offence of driving carelessly who drives a vehicle or street car on a highway without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway. And there is the Criminal Code's dangerous driving offence: 320.13 (1) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, is dangerous to the public. It would be misleading to say that it is absolutely "legal" or "allowed" to "drive in reverse on a non-divided road that has a speed limit of more than 80 km/h". It just isn't prohibited by s. 157(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. 1. Note that "divided" in the question was just a paraphrase of "divided by a median strip." There are many sections of road in Ontario that are not divided in that sense, with speed limits above 80 km/h, including much of the trans-Canada highway. | No, not for 1+ years See section 47 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988: (1) When a motor vehicle registered in one State has been kept in another State, for a period exceeding twelve months, the owner of the vehicle shall, within such period and in such form containing such particulars as may be prescribed by the Central Government, apply to the registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle then is, for the assignment of a new registration mark and shall present the certificate of registration to that registering authority: [...] Related: 1 2 | People in the UK (who are not subject to immigration control or other restrictions) do not have to carry any form of identification. This doesn't answer all parts of your question, but s164 Road Traffic Act 1988 is appropriate to the part about driving. a person driving a motor vehicle on a road ... must, on being so required by a constable or vehicle examiner, produce his licence and its counterpart1 for examination, so as to enable the constable or vehicle examiner to ascertain the name and address of the holder of the licence, the date of issue, and the authority by which they were issued. (s164(1)) So it makes no difference why you were stopped: a constable or traffic offiver can demand production of your licence if you were driving. The same power exists if you're suspected of having caused an accident or committed an offence, even if you're not driving at the time of the production demand. Non-production is an offence: If a person required under the preceding provisions of this section to produce a licence and its counterpart ... fails to do so he is, subject to subsections (7) to (8A) below, guilty of an offence. (s164(6)) However, it is a defence to produce the licence (or a receipt for a licence) within seven days of the demand (s164(7-8)). In practice, the officer will give you a 'producer' requiring you to present your licence at a police station within seven days, after which you will be guilty of the non-production offence. The implication of this is that it is not required that you carry your licence; merely that you have it available to produce within seven days. 1 Presumably the reference to 'counterpart' will go away when the counterpart is abolished on 8th June 2015. | The state of Washington does not have an absolute requirement that vehicles must be registered. What it has is RCW 46.16A.030 (2): (2) It is unlawful for a person to operate any vehicle on a public highway of this state without having in full force and effect a current and proper vehicle registration and displaying license plates on the vehicle. Therefore you already have a means to comply with the law: simply refrain from operating this vehicle on any public highway of the state of Washington. In other words, don't drive or park it on public roads; keep it on private property. (In many states, "operating" includes parking; I could not immediately find out whether this is the case in Washington.) So now your question instead becomes: "What is the state's obligation to make it possible for me to lawfully drive this particular vehicle on the public roads?" And the answer to that is much more clearly, "none". Driving in general is considered a privilege and not a right, so your "personal liberty" is not at issue. The state is not doing a good job of providing a service which they generally do provide, which is certainly annoying, but is not a legal issue, and does not give you the right to break the law. I have considered proceeding with the restoration, and drafting an "Affidavit in lieu of registration" document detailing my numerous attempts to follow the process, and indicating a sincere desire to comply, but my concern would be having the vehicle impounded if/when I get pulled over. Yes, it probably would be. I have even considered asking local law enforcement to just issue me a citation so that I might appear in court and plead for an opportunity to be given the means to comply. (i.e. move to the head of the line...) You would still lose, unless the judge is particularly sympathetic. I have also considered writing to my state representative. That's a better idea - at least it doesn't involve violating the law. And legislators usually do make some effort to help constituents when they have problems with government offices. However, if the issue is simply that the State Patrol is overloaded with work, there may not be much they can do. Is there a statute of limitations for asserting ownership that might alleviate my concerns about proceeding with the project? The requirement to have an inspection before getting a title seems to be from RCW 46.12.530 (2): "The department may require additional information and a physical examination of the vehicle or of any class of vehicles, or either." So there is no exception written into statute. The implementing regulation looks to be WAC 308-56A-150. There are several criteria listed for when inspection is required, and I'm not sure which would apply to your vehicle. It may perhaps be "(g) ownership in doubt (WAC 308-56A-210)" which applies when you do not have the documentation described in WAC 308-56A-265. Or it may be the catchall "(c) One on which the identification number needs verification as requested by the department, county auditor, or authorized agent". You'll have to research this further. There doesn't seem to be any exception based specifically on the long time period that the car has been unregistered, or the fact that no theft is known to have been reported in the past 20 years, or anything like that. | While this question may or may not have a theoretical answer, the practical answer is that you should slow down to 20 mph if there is any chance that the school zone speed limit will be in force at any time that you pass through it. If you do, you will definitely not be cited. If it is at all a close call (say within five minutes of being active), normal differences in time keeping between unsynchronized watches and a lack of any way to prove precisely when you vehicle was where and traveling at what speed, mean that the question of whether the school zone was in effect at the time you were cited will be a question of fact to be resolved based upon the credibility of the witnesses. The witnesses will probably be only the citing officer and you. As a practical matter, you are going to lose the credibility contest on this question of fact 95%+ of the time, and that credibility determination will not be an issue that could be raised on an appeal. Therefore, you should slow down before entering the school zone if it is remotely close to being time for it to be effective to leave a sufficient margin of error against traffic law enforcement officer inaccuracy, which includes any time that the school zone takes effect while you are in it. Even if you could perfectly prove that you were half way through the zone when the speed limit fell from 30 mph to 20 mph, the argument that you needed to break suddenly to comply doesn't cut it. Violating a speed limit is a strict liability offense and you have a duty as a driver to anticipate what you need to do to comply with the law at every stage of your journey. Even if your speed was legal when you entered the zone, you knew or should have known that it was on the verge of being triggered and should have slowed down in advance. | Illinois collects the fine; California treats it the same as if you had run a red light in California Both Illinois and California are parties to the Nonresident Violator Compact and the Driver Licence Compact. The former means that Chicago will forward the ticket to Illinois who will forward it to California who will forward it to you. You can contest the ticket in various ways including by mail but your prospects of success are slim. If you successfully contest, that's the end of the matter. If you don't contest or lose, you have to pay the $100 fine. The latter means that if the offence is upheld or not contested, California will apply 1 point to your licence. | The officer is saying that he believes the information to be correct, but a clerical error or typo isn't a question of saying something that you don't believe to be correct, it is a question of incorrectly putting what the officer believes to paper, often in a context where the mistake is obvious, without an intent to mislead. You would not prevail in court. Courts have broad authority to correct clerical errors even years after the fact. In civil actions in federal court this is authorized by Rule 60. But, almost all courts have this authority with respect to court process which includes traffic tickets. Since it is clearly a typo, it would not cast doubt on the integrity or accuracy of other statements in the ticket. A typo reflects fat fingers, not dishonesty. |
Copyright status of photographs published in 1924 by, and created by, the International Boundary Commission The International Boundary Commission is a permanent international organization headed by two commissioners: a Canadian and an American. In 1924 it distributed to the public its Report, which contained many photographs that were its own work. The report contains no copyright notice. The Commission's web site contains this paragraph: Permission to reproduce Commission works, in part or in whole, and by any means, for personal or public non-commercial purposes, or for cost-recovery purposes, is not required, unless otherwise specified in the material you wish to reproduce. I'm wondering about usability of these photographs in Wikipedia articles. As nearly as I understand it, Wikipedia's policy says works uploaded to Wikipedia that are not in the public domain must be subject to a license allowing anyone to use them subject only to the condition that authorship and copyright ownership must be acknowledged. Here is Wikipedia's policy on this. Are any claims to copyright forfeited by public distribution without a copyright notice? Would copyrights have expired? PS: Here is the 512-page report. Postscript on August 23, 2021: The one current answer does not seem to take into account that the U.S. federal government is not the author, but is merely one of the publishers, of this work (the International Boundary Commission is the author) and also does not explain how Canadian law does or does not apply here. That is why I have started a bounty here. | Wikipedia, at least the English-language edition of Wikipedia, takes the position that what applies to it is US copyright law. Under that law, anything published in 1924 is now in the public domain, and anything published first in the US, or simultaneously in the US and another country with no copyright notice prior to 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act) was never protected by copyright, but was in the public domain from the date of publication. See "Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States". Beyond that, the statement quotes would seem to be, in effect, a license permitting free but non-commercial use. That alone would not normally permit Wikipedia use, except under a claim of fair use. So Wikipedia use would be based on the date of publication, or the absence of a copyright notice, or both. As a long-term Wikipedia editor, I am confident that the images described would be usable in Wikipedia articles. They might or might not be up-loadable to Wikimedia commons, but I think they would be. The question of US Federal Government authorship is a distraction, this work would be in the public domain if the US Govt had no role in creating it. | Yes, you can do that, assuming that the pictures are really in the public domain (i.e. due to their age, and not only claimed to be). But you probably shouldn't, but you'll probably want to add a label to the images anyway (what it depicts, who the original painter is, etc). So adding a "public domain" tag to each image shouldn't be a big issue. You can do that on a separate page as well, giving the source for each. Note that while using pd images does not create a copyright violation, even if you blatantly say that you created them yourself, it could still be considered plagiarism. When writing a science book or even a thesis, this could get you into trouble. | "Only the owner of copyright in a work has the right to prepare, or to authorize someone else to create, a new version of that work." Copyright in Derivative Works and Compilations http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf So if you have not been granted authorization, you are violating the right of the owner. It's always recommended that you get permission. Practically speaking, if the owner does not give you permission, there is probably someone else with a similar photo who will! Pretty famous recent case: Barack Obama "Hope" poster | Copyright notice is not relevant to having a Copyright. 1 Copyright starts to exist the moment a work is created. When the pen touches the paper the first time or the hammer strikes the block to become a statue, the work is started to be created. At that moment 2, copyright is gained as it becomes a work, usually defined in the national laws. Publication for sure grants all the rights according to the Berne Convention rules - which are the absolute minimum standards. In the united-states the Berne Convention's agreement is for example codified as 17 USC §102 and uses the moment of creation to start rights: Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Similarly, the German Urheberrechtsgesetz does list what can be copyrighted and that the copyright is with the author, and presumes the act of creation creates the copyright for nationals, and publication for non-nationals: Section 1: The authors of works in the literary, scientific and artistic domain enjoy protection for their works in accordance with this Act. Section 2: (1) Protected works in the literary, scientific and artistic domain include, in particular: [List of items] Section 120: (1) German nationals shall enjoy copyright protection with respect to all of their works, whether or not they have been published and regardless of the place of publication. In the case of a work created by joint authors (Article 8), it shall be sufficient if one of the joint authors is a German national. Section 121: (1) Foreign nationals shall enjoy copyright protection with respect to their works published in the territory to which this Law applies, unless the work or a translation of the work has been published outside that territory more than 30 days prior to its publication within that territory. Subject to the same limitation, foreign nationals shall enjoy protection with respect to their works published in the territory to which this Law applies in translation only. There is no registration needed to have a copyright. However in the US you need to register a copyright to seek specific damages in the courts. 1 - Currently. In the past it had been very relevant, but laws have changed since then. 2 - Technically shortly after the moment that the first touch is done and the work gains some originality, but there already can be an artistic expression in a single brushstroke of a minimalistic piece or a single stroke calligraphy - and the absolute minimum originality needed is rather low: while putting ARD in a line in a specific font is not protectable under copyright (it's a trademark), a 6-tune jingle is enough to be deemed a protected work in itself! Under German law, this is the Kleine Münze | If they are public domain, you can copy them The relevant terms in the USA are: Works created before 1978 For works published or registered before 1978, the maximum copyright duration is 95 years from the date of publication, if copyright was renewed during the 28th year following publication. So, anything published in or before 1924 is definitely public domain. On 1 January 2021, things published in 1925 enter the public domain, 1 January 2022, 1926, and so on. Anything not renewed in its 28th year is also public domain - check the US copyright register. Trade mark infringement Irrespective of copyright, any trademarks (such as the names of ongoing publications like “Scientific American”) still exist and must be used in compliance with trade mark law. | Such an image is copyrighted, as part of the movie. You cannot legally use it without permission from the copyright holder, unless the use of the image falls under fair use (note that fair use is a strictly US legal concept. It does not apply anywhere else) or a similar exception to copyright, such as "fair dealing". There are multiple factors which must be considered in making a fair use judgement. No one factor ever totally controls the decision. It is a case-by-case decision. But several things about your proposed use suggest to me that it will not qualify as a fair use. The image is part of a creative work, not a work of non-fiction such as a news report or a textbook. That weighs against fair use. You seem to be using the whole image, although it is only part of the movie. That probably weighs against fair use to some extent. A use in "a social media post regarding a sales vacancy" sounds commercial to me. If so, that would weigh against fair use. The copyright owner might well wish to market images from the film. If so, and if many people used images from the film as you propose to use this one, that might harm the market. This weighs against fair use. You don't seem to be making any comment on the image, or using it in any significantly transformational way. That weighs against fair use. Use of the image does not seem vital or even important to the message you intend to communicate. That also weighs against fair use. In short, I think you would be wiser to use an image that you have or can get permission to use in this way. If you use this image, it is possible that the copyright holder would sue for copyright infringement, or issue a DMCA take-down notice, or both. | "Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI. | There is no copyright on the name of anyone. That certain people have been known as philosophers, and have put forth particular ideas are facts, not subject to copyright, as long as no one else's description of those ideas is copied or closely imitated. This is true in the US, and also in most of not all ,other countries. Rights in the image and likeness of a person vary among US states, and also between different countries. In most US states any such rights end with the persona's death, or only continue for a few years after death (10 years in some cases). The year of birth is not, as far as I know relevant. The exact length of such rights should be checked if any person being pictured is alive or has died fairly recently. Such rights can protect against the commercial use of even an original (not copied) representation of the person's likeness. About Einstein Greenlight claims to represent Hebrew University of Jerusalem and to hold marketing rights on images of Einstein for publicity purposes. This is mentioned in "Who Owns Einstein's Face?" From The Atlantic Hebrew University of Jerusalem sued GM over the use of an image of Einstein in an advertisement. However, they ultimately lost. As reported by CDAS: United States District Judge A. Howard Matz rejected Hebrew University’s claim that New Jersey common law provides for an indefinite duration of the postmortem right of publicity, or that it alternatively is coextensive with copyright law and lasts for a minimum of 70 years after a person’s death. Instead, the Court ruled that New Jersey common law postmortem publicity rights endure for no more than 50 years after a person’s death. Because Einstein died in 1955, the Court’s ruling means that Einstein’s publicity rights are now in the public domain. ... Judge Matz concluded that the New Jersey Supreme Court would likely limit the postmortem right of publicity under New Jersey common law to endure no more than 50 years after a person’s death. He noted that the New Jersey Legislature has twice declined to enact a statutory postmortem right of publicity, and given the sparse New Jersey case law on the issue, “it is likely that the New Jersey Supreme Court would perceive pitfalls in allowing an unlimited or lengthy term to the right of publicity.” Comparing the right of publicity to New Jersey’s common law right of privacy, the Court recognized that 50 years was a “reasonable middle ground” to allow a deceased celebrity’s heir to benefit from the right of publicity, while still respecting the “public’s interest in free expression.” Mercury News reported on the same case, saying: But the judge said descendants’ right to control someone’s image after his death must be balanced with the public’s right of expression. He also ruled any right Hebrew University had to sue expired in 2005 — 50 years after Einstein’s death — because that was the limit on copyright law in 1982, when Hebrew University acquired Einstein’s right of publicity. |
Is showing college material illegal? My question is the title, the rest is just an explanation. I'm a student at Penn State University in the US. Is it illegal for me to show course material to a public audience like on my YouTube channel? When I was in High School I always wondered how difficult college assignments would be and how they would look, so now I want to kill that curiosity for others by showing the entire class' assignments etc. etc. and stuff. To my knowledge I don't know of anyone who's done that except for outdated content like from the 1800s that no one cares about anymore. So, is it illegal for me to share course content online? | Course assignments, like practically every other piece of written content created in the past 100 years or so, are copyrighted. You cannot copy or redistribute them without the permission of the copyright holder. In most cases that would be the course instructor, but it could also be the university, or the publisher of a commercial book or other resource where the questions came from. The instructor might be happy to give you permission if you ask - many professors would be pleased to have their creations reach a wider audience. In any case, it is perfectly legal to talk about the assignment you were given, as long as you do not copy or replicate the text of the assignment itself. Reading it verbatim or with trivial alterations would be a problem, but describing it completely in your own words doesn't infringe copyright. A separate issue is what is allowed by your university rules. University rules aren't laws, but you can still be punished academically if you break them (grade penalties, suspension, expulsion, etc). The university might have a policy against sharing, or even discussing, assignments without permission. This might include forbidding actions that the law itself allows. In particular, they might forbid you from talking about your solutions to the assignments, which copyright law would have no problem with (your solution is your own creative work, and the copyright on it belongs to you). So again, ask your instructor what they would allow. Also, academic ethics (which again is not a law, but might be enforced by your university) would generally require that you give proper attribution to the author of the assignment you are discussing. Note that there are plenty of online collections of so-called "open courseware", where the university deliberately makes their course materials public, under some sort of open license such as Creative Commons. MIT's repository is one of the most famous. So if you can't get permission to use the materials from your Penn State courses, you could always make videos about MIT's assignments instead. | The question that you need to answer is whether, when you embed, you "copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content". It seems that you have done that, i.e. you didn't just "watch". The next question is whether you have "prior written consent of YouTube". Youtube requires a license from contributors granting users the right to "access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service". To fill the gap, you have to determine whether your act of embedding is permitted by the Youtube TOS. Their TOS states §2A that "The Service" includes the YouTube "Embeddable Player". It also says §4 YouTube hereby grants you permission to access and use the Service as set forth in these Terms of Service, provided that: (A) You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player). On the face of it and as long as you do the stuff that follows in B-I, you have complied with that requirement and therefore you have written permission from Youtube. | All Government produced documents in the United States are public domain, as they belong to the people. The company may be asking for license to use their film, which may include several other clips that they put in any order. Their film, specifically, including any explanatory dialog, commentary, or editing choices, are not fair game. However, the clip you are asking about is not copyrighted and is fair for any use. | It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do. | To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law. | The first step is to file a formal complaint against the instructor. When your university-internal avenues have been exhausted, you would then need to hire an attorney to sue the university. There is virtually no chance that you will succeed with a lawsuit. If the university had failed to follow its own procedures, or had egregiously violated your rights, you might win such a suit, but the chances of that having happened are virtually zero. The essential problem is that there is no specific contractual right for you to receive an particular outcome in a class (based on my knowledge of rules & regs in various universities). For example, you might reasonably want to have written comments on assignments given within a week: but there is no rule guaranteeing that you will ever get written comments. (You need to look at the university rules to see what is an actual rule, as opposed to a "goal" for an academic unit). Since there is no such rule, the chairman has limited authority to penalize the instructor (he might for example decide to not assign that class to Prof. X in the future). The chair would not have the authority to raise your grade under the circumstances. As far as the courts are concerned, the university's judgment and resolution of the matter are final, unless they simply failed to respect your rights (exhibited racial prejudice, refused to follow their own procedures). In certain contexts, professorial negligence could be legally actionable, but that would only be, for example, if an EE professor physically harmed a student by negligently confusing milliamps and mega-amps. His (non)action is not negligent in the legal sense. | I don't know too much about Mauritian contract law, but I'd assume you'd have to identify some legal obligation that the school breached. Here, the school offered you a full ride in its electrical engineering program, and has delivered on its promise. The fact that you don't like the program anymore probably doesn't make then liable for anything. In terms of false advertising, it's hard to say anything without seeing their advertisements. | There is nothing wrong with this requirement. The teacher or professor isn't requiring you to change your opinion. Instead, the requirement is simply to marshall evidence in favor of an opinion that you may not hold. Being able to do this is a valuable rhetorical skill (and a skill which lawyers must routinely employ). For example, in competitive debate, you often do not have the freedom to decide whether you will be arguing in favor or against a resolution, and may not even know which side you will be advancing until moments before the event starts. Freedom of conscience does not extend to freedom from understanding people who disagree with your deeply held belief. UPDATE: Requiring a whole classroom of students (possibly many classrooms of students) to advocate with multiple representatives for a bill does seem problematic, in terms of election laws and probably in terms of the legal requirements that apply to the university, and also possibly in terms of "forced speech", because in requiring the advocacy to be submitted to the official and take a particular position, goes beyond the "let's pretend" veneer that applies in most debate contexts. |
Why Should Anyone Form Official Club Organizations Anymore? With the rise of Facebook, and the "Groups" it enables it's users to create and join, I worry that the traditional club is now obsolete. A friend of mine formed a local car "group" on Facebook because he didn't want to pay dues for the local official club. Before he formed the group, which he expected to do things like "spirited" driving events, as well as other social events, he spoke to a lawyer to find out about his potential liabilities. The lawyer told him that because everyone was at his "events" voluntarily, and no one was paying dues, he held no liability whatsoever. I know that the local official car club that I am a part of has club insurance for our events, and we require dues to be paid each year (a very small sum). I don't know what the insurance actually covers, but if you can get away without being liable simply by not having dues, then are there any advantages to forming or joining an official club? Can Facebook group members legally receive discounts or gifts from organizations like the parts department of a dealership that likes the group? Is a Facebook group truly immune to legal action? What does club insurance typically cover anyway? Is a Facebook group immune to shutdown attempts by an official organization (eg. could the Porsche Club of America force the shut down of an unaffiliated Jonestown, MA Porsches Facebook group)? Are there any other benefits to an official club organization that I'm missing? EDIT I'm not sure what terminology to use here, so I made some stuff up. Specifically, I got questions about "Official Club Organization". I'm using this to describe an organization that is legally affiliated with and supported by the Manufacturer of the cars. An example would be the Porsche Club of America. | I think the question answers itself : what's being put forward as a problem (that official organisations can cover their members' liability at events) is actually their main advantage. Liability doesn't go away - assuming your friend's lawyer's advice was accurate, it might have been better phrased as "liability will be on the participants". I'm not sure it's entirely right (though it might just be overly specific) in the way it's been reported - if there was anything that could be considered incitement to, or encouragement of, unlawful activity, there may be an additional liability on the person whose name is attached to the group, and possibly the platform used (though this is a young area of law at the moment). What's covered by the insurance will be dependent on the policy, so that's not a question that The Bloke On The Internet can answer. In terms of discounts, I don't see any reason these couldn't be offered on a social media group - or that there would be a significant difference between a social media group, an official or unofficial website, or coupons published in a magazine or distributed in flyers on a street corner. It's worth bearing in mind that distributors don't do this out of kindness - it's just advertising. If an official club, or the associated manufacturer (the owner of the brand), believed there was quantifiable loss - primarily financial, but possibly reputational - there may be grounds to demand any unofficial group cease and desist, irrespective of where (social media, websites, physical premises) they had a presence. But perhaps the greatest advantage (though I'm drifting off topic for this SE) for an official group is that it can use whichever medium it considers most useful at the time, or a combination of several. One tied to a specific social media platform will always be limited in its longevity. | Per GDPR Art 79, you can sue data controllers if you consider your rights to have been violated. Where you have suffered damages due to GDPR infringements, you also have a right to compensation per Art 82. However, your rights may not have been violate as far as the GDPR is concerned. Under the GDPR any kind of personal data processing needs a clear purpose, and that purpose needs a legal basis. One possible legal basis is consent, but there also are others (such as legitimate interest). Just because you didn't consent doesn't mean that your rights have been violated. Where processing is based on legitimate interest, you can object to that processing of your personal data – but your rights must be balanced against that legitimate interest (Art 21). If your friends post a photo and you only appear in the background, your friends' legitimate interest to post that photo likely outweighs your rights. In practice, suing Facebook because of GDPR infringement is not a sensible way to achieve the outcomes that you likely want. First, this is expensive. Second, it is arguable whether Facebook or your friends should be the defendant. Third, removal of existing data won't prevent the processing of new data in the future. It would be more sensible to treat this as an interpersonal rather than a legal problem, and to talk with your friends so that they don't include you in their photos that they would like to share online. I've focussed on photos because their situation is fairly clear. Voice snippets might not count as personal data when you are not identifiable in them. Personal assistant apps should not be listening continuously, but only start recording when a wake-word is recognized. | I assume you're talking about corporations, not LLCs ("limited liability companies"). LLCs aren't corporations and don't issue shares of stock, and in any event Facebook is a corporation. Information relating to the shares of a corporation is typically outlined in the articles of incorporation, but practices and governing law varies by state and by corporation. Delaware, where most large US corporations are incorporated, requires the certificate of incorporation to list the total number of shares to be issued and the number of shares in each class, as well as information about the "powers, preferences and rights, and the qualifications, limitations or restrictions" of the share classes. See 8 Del. C. § 102(a)(4). Facebook's October 2010 articles of incorporation can be found here, and information about its classes of stock can be found in Article IV. | Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract. | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. | I think the concerns are more economic than legal, although legal concerns are sometimes present. You don't want people to trash the place. You want there to be an "authority figure" whose presence encourages order, deal with unexpected situations, and whom people who aren't tech savvy feel comfortable dealing with, and it can create a better customer service relationship. It really depends on the nature of the premises. There is not a one size fits all rule. There are situations where one doesn't have someone on the premises. There are bank vestibules with automatic teller machines in them. There are coin entry bathroom/shower facilities. There are self-storage facilities that work like that. There are deeply rural places with low traffic that rely on an honor system rather than trying to monitor use (e.g. some campsites). There are AirBnB type rentals. The are car repair shops with after hours drop off boxes. On the other hand, there are some situations where it is pretty much inconceivable that you wouldn't have someone one site monitoring the situation. I'm pretty sure that you have to have someone on premises for a pub. I'm sure it is necessary in places where you have unaccompanied minors (at a minimum, as a practical reality for liability purposes). There aren't many medical services that can be provided in that format (although there might be a few). | Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.) | As someone who is not a lawyer, but is familiar with FERPA and university policies as a former instructor, I would be more than willing to bet that you signed or otherwise agreed to some type of Terms of Service before being given access to that type of service. There are almost certainly numerous things you signed to become a student, as well as various policies you agreed to in first gaining access to the computer services, which would apply here. I can tell you with certainty that the school where I was a student had a policy that I agreed to that they would make certain information available to other students unless I chose for it to be restricted. However, my university did not have any photos of students that were viewable by other students in a directory. That said, there were also times I participated in extra-curricular activities where I was required to sign release forms giving the school the rights to video tape, record, and photograph me, and to do what they wished with those things. So, with that in mind, I suspect that's partly due to FERPA restrictions, but also largely due to their own privacy policies that go beyond what FERPA requires. All in all, I doubt they would be okay with you using their photos for your own private use - student privacy is something that is taken very seriously. |
Do judges really care about perjury? Much of what I have read gives the impression that Judges expect the parties in a divorce to lie. But if the lie is persuasive, it prejudices the Court. I do not see pointing this out to a Judge would be helpful. If perjury carries a sanction or charge of a felony, surely the Judge will think it is relevant. As the trier of facts, how can this be ignored, especially if it can be proved? | Perjury is more than a lie It is a knowing deceit undertaken with the express purpose of misleading the court on a material issue. It isn’t misremembering, or contradicting oneself (or others), or stating falsehoods believing they are truths, or lying about things that don’t matter. The fact that one party’s recollection of events are different from another’s is not perjury, that’s just humans being human. Memory is neither accurate nor immutable; the mere act of recalling a memory changes that memory. This is particularly so if there is a strong personal investment in that memory - such as if it might help you win a court case, for example. This is such well-established science that even the legal profession understands it. Remember, if the capital T Truth was obvious to everyone, there wouldn’t be a judge involved at all except to rubber stamp the agreement. The role of the trier of fact is to engage with the contradictory evidence decide which they believe, which they don’t and which they are unsure about and then weigh that against the required standard of proof to see if the party bearing the onus of proof has met their evidentiary burden. When someone does actually commit perjury, you bet that judges care. Marcus Richard Einfeld (born 22 September 1938) is a former Australian judge who served on the Federal Court of Australia and was the inaugural president of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. In retirement, he served two years in prison after being convicted of perjury and perverting the course of justice. In summary, he lied on a Statutory Declaration in order to avoid a $77 speeding fine. | Judges don't have timesheet entries (and are often expressly excluded from FOIA obligations). They get paid salaries and are expected to work hard enough to clear their dockets in reasonable periods of time, however long that takes. If you wanted a more direct evidentiary estimate, you could estimate that a judge and his clerk together probably work 90-120 hours a week, figure out how many trials and hearings of what length were conducted and deduct that time spent on that from the total, and then divide the remaining hours by the number of opinions one can estimate that the judge wrote (or better yet, a reasonable estimate of the number of pages of opinions that one can estimate that the judge wrote). Typically, a lot of the legal research grunt work and more boilerplate parts of an opinion are written by the law clerk under some general instructions from the judge, with the judge writing the more substantive sections personally and heavily (or lightly, depending upon the quality of the law clerk) revising the draft opinion as a whole. The longer the opinion, the more likely it is that a substantial portion of it was written by the law clerk. For similar kinds of legal writing (e.g. appellate briefs and motions for summary judgment and proposed orders or written closing arguments) one to six hours per page from all professionals working on the document would be in the right ballpark. Judicial opinions come with some efficiencies, because once a judge decides a point of law or reaches a factual conclusion it doesn't have to be belabored in the same way that a litigant who isn't sure if their reasoning will be persuasive or not must. But, judicial opinions also typically have to spell out a greater proportion of legal and factual foundation for the end analysis that isn't hotly contested, will summarize all of the material points from the evidence presented in the case, and will frequently also recap in some detail the arguments made by the advocates for both sides of the case before actually engaging with those arguments in an analysis section. On balance, those factors probably pretty much balance out. If the judicial opinion is shorter, elegantly written, contains pithy turns of phrase, and/or contains lots of legal citations or factual analysis not raised by either party, it is probably closer to five or six hours per page or more. If the opinion is longer, has a rote and mechanical feel to it, and has very little factual analysis or references to law not mentioned by the parties, it is probably closer to one hour per page or even less. When some of these factors go one way, and other of these factors go the other way, it is probably in between in terms of hours per page. This said, sometimes it takes a judge a long time to write an opinion, but the end product is very short and elegant. In these situations, often what happened is that the judge and the judge's clerk spent lots and lots of hours writing a long and detailed first draft, then got an insight that provided a much more efficient and succinct way to reach a resolution to the case. In those circumstances, there would be dozens or scores of hours of work that went into the discarded first draft, only to be superseded by a half a dozen or dozen hours devoted to a much shorter final draft. In those cases, the final draft of the opinion might be ten or twenty hours per page or more once you include the time spent on the discarded draft. Of course, another factor is that some judges are just more efficient legal writers than others, and some judges have more familiarity with some areas of law than others. A opinion that might take one judge twenty hours to write might take another judge presiding over the very same case and producing an opinion of the same length and quality a hundred hours to write. The opinion in Meads v. Meads was 176 pages. If I had to make a best guess, I'd estimate that it probably took about 600 hours to write, probably about two-thirds of which was law clerk hours and probably about one-third of which was judge time. | I will address only the legal issues. Prosecutors for very good public policy reasons are not required to prosecute every crime they have suspicions about. When exercising this discretion they consider: Is the act, in fact, criminal - many of the things you list, while reprehensible, unethical, and possibly immoral are not actually criminal. Do they have the resources (time, staff, money) to collect the evidence and run this case as opposed to the thousands of other crimes out there. There are always more crimes than can be prosecuted and these have to be prioritised in some way. Do they have enough evidence to gain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People can be fired or resign on suspicion, they can't be convicted on it. | The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se. | Prosecutions for falsely reporting rape are at least as common as perjury convictions (and usually don't count as perjury since the initial report is rarely made under oath), and even when charges are brought by prosecutors involving false statements made under oath, prosecutors tend to favor lesser misdemeanor false reporting charges over perjury charges. See, e.g., cases with news reports of such cases in Colorado and Wyoming on May 24, 2021, September 11, 2015, August 29, 2014, and March 18, 2008. This isn't to say that these cases are terribly common although they tend to generate headlines when they are brought. The State of Colorado commenced 1,801 felony sex offense cases in the 2021 fiscal year, for example, which was not atypical, and false reporting of sex offense cases are brought in Colorado maybe once every year or two. The conviction rate in sex offense cases that are prosecuted isn't 100%, but something on the order of 90%-95% of sex offense cases result in a guilty plea, and well over half of the remaining cases result in convictions at trial. As an order of magnitude estimate, perhaps one in fifty to one in two hundred cases where sex offense charges are pursued, but there is not a conviction, gives rise to false reporting charges against the alleged victim. Many acquittals and dismissals of charges that do occur are best characterized as cases where there is a reasonable doubt because jurors believe that it is reasonably possible that there may have been a good faith witness misidentification, or because charges were dismissed because a confession or evidence obtained in a search was unlawfully obtained and had to be suppressed. It would be very rare for a defendant to be acquitted (after a judge in a preliminary hearing found that probable cause was present) because the jury believed that the testimony of a victim was believed to be intentionally false, and there is no way to tell from the verdict itself that the jury reached this conclusion. The problematic aspect of charges of false reporting of sex offenses is the there have been famous instances of women being convicted for falsely reporting rape (see also here focusing on a different case), only to subsequently have the allegations for which the victims were punished confirmed to be true with DNA and other evidence. The number of cases where true allegations of sex offenses are made but not pursued because law enforcement finds the allegations to not be credible, almost surely greatly exceeds the number of cases where false reports of sex offenses are made to police, although this ratio varies greatly from one police department to another based upon the institutional culture of the police department in question. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted". | In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded. |
Can I include public domain pictures in my book, without explicit attribution/consent? Currently I'm writing a book, in which it would be interesting to include some relevant pictures. The pictures I'm planning to include are in the public domain. Here is an example. That picture, according to Wikipedia, is in the public domain. So I would like to simply download it, include it on a page of my book, and sell that book. Note that the picture serves a purpose of illustration within the book, which is actually original content written by me. Can I do this: By simply adding a "Disclaimer/Copyright notice" at the beginning of the book, stating something like "all pictures in this book are in the public domain, no copyright infringement is intended, blablabla"? Not attributing the image to any person that was involved in taking the picture, or uploading it to Wikipedia? Do the same with about 20 more images that are relevant to my book, each time not specifically mentioning the copyright info or in which country it is public domain, just the fact that "all images are public domain"? Thanks | Yes, you can do that, assuming that the pictures are really in the public domain (i.e. due to their age, and not only claimed to be). But you probably shouldn't, but you'll probably want to add a label to the images anyway (what it depicts, who the original painter is, etc). So adding a "public domain" tag to each image shouldn't be a big issue. You can do that on a separate page as well, giving the source for each. Note that while using pd images does not create a copyright violation, even if you blatantly say that you created them yourself, it could still be considered plagiarism. When writing a science book or even a thesis, this could get you into trouble. | Photographs of objects other than flat artworks, including pretty much all the things you list except in some cases oil paintings, involve creativity and originality in composition, positioning, lighting, and other aspects, and each such photo would be copyrighted by the photographer (or the photographer's employer in a work-made-for-hire situation). Such photos (or copies of them) could be sold if the copyright owner chooses to, just like any copyrighted work. If the object being photographed is itself a work of art, and if it is recent enough that it is still under copyright protection (See this chart for US rules on copyright terms), then the photo would be a derivative work, and the permission of the copyright holder on the original would in theory be required. But such a requirement could only be enforced by the copyright holder on the original work filing suit, and if the work is not clearly identifiable this might not be likely. If the photographer knows the name of the original artist, and the work seems likely to be still in copyright, an attempt to secure permission would be at least good practice, and quite possibly legally essential. For a flat (2D) work of art, such as a painting, if the photo attempts to reproduce the original exactly (a "slavish copy" ), then under the Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) decision, the photo will not be original and so will not be protected by copyright. See this question and its answers for more on Bridgeman A photo of a painting on a stand, showing the painting and its frame, and not trying to just reproduce the painting exactly, will not fall under the Bridgeman rule. This answer is quite US-oriented. Much of it will apply in any country which adheres to the Berne Copyright Convention but the details may vary, and if a different jurisdiction is intended, that should be stated. | The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use. | You've tagged this as both united-states and european-union, so this answer is about the United States. Before you can "license" someone to do something, you must first have the legal right to prevent them from doing it. Otherwise, your purported "license" is just a worthless piece of paper (technically, you might be able to sell those pieces of paper notwithstanding their lack of validity, so I suppose they wouldn't be completely worthless). If we imagine that the subject of a biography or autobiography wants to control the publication of that biography, there are a number of legal grounds that might be cited, depending on the circumstances: Copyright: The person who actually wrote the biography (who may or may not be the subject!) can prevent others from making copies or derivative works of it, as well as several other rights enumerated in 17 USC 106. Most publication agreements involve signing an exclusive license with the publisher. If the author has not signed such a license, then the biography is not going to be published in the first place. Regardless, copyright only exists once the work is "fixed in a tangible medium" (e.g. saved to a hard drive, written down on a piece of paper, etc.). If it's still "in your head," then you don't own anything. If the subject and author are different people, then the subject does not have any rights here at all; copyright belongs exclusively to the author. Furthermore, copyright only protects the individual work. It does not prevent someone else from writing a different biography from scratch, so long as this second biography is original and does not reuse any content from the first biography. The underlying facts belong to no one. Privacy rights are generally handled as a tort under state law. If the subject is a public figure (i.e. the sort of person who's likely to have a biography written about them) then privacy rights tend to be rather limited. However, they are not nonexistent, and invasion-of-privacy claims are occasionally raised, usually in cases where highly personal, sensitive information is disclosed against the will of the subject. This may also become relevant if the author of the biography obtains information in an illegal fashion such as by hacking or physical trespass. However, in most cases, the content would need to be pretty far beyond the pale before this would have a realistic chance of succeeding. Personality rights are usually considered an extension or variety of privacy rights. In general, they allow the subject to prevent their name from being associated with a commercial endeavor without their permission. However, it is likely that the First Amendment would bar the application of personality rights to a biography, unless the publisher tried to misrepresent a ghostwritten work as an autobiography without the consent of the subject. Libel is a tort under state law. Libel laws in the US are extremely limited, and the subject would need to establish at least all of the following in order to succeed (or else the claim is barred by the First Amendment): The defendant published a statement. A reasonable person would interpret that statement as factual (and not an opinion, puffery, etc.). The statement is materially false (i.e. the "gist or sting" of the statement is false, regardless of whether it is technically 100% accurate). The statement harmed the reputation of the plaintiff. The defendant knew the statement was false, or made no serious effort to verify it ("actual malice"). Not required unless the plaintiff is a public figure, but the subject of a biography probably will be a public figure. There may be additional requirements depending on the state, and the defendant will probably try to file an anti-SLAPP motion if state law allows for it. Of these four rights, copyright is by far the most commonly "licensed," followed by personality rights. Nobody gives out licenses to commit libel or invade their privacy. That leaves us with two ways of licensing your (auto)biography: Actually write it yourself, and sell it to a publishing company. You will give them a copyright license as part of the process (in exchange for royalties and an advance). Convince a publishing company to hire a ghostwriter for you, and then license your likeness to them. The public will be told that you "wrote" the book, and you will promote it in exactly the same way as if you did write it. Neither of these options will prevent someone else from coming along and writing their own biography about you, of course. | You don't say where you are located. Copyright laws are different in different countries, am going to assume US laws. Under US law, a faithful digitization of a book does not get a new copyeight, see Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) and thw Wikipedia article about that case (On the issue of mrequired originality, see also FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE COMPANY, INC. (No. 89-1909.) (1991) which dealt with copying a telephone directory.) The court in Bridgeman held that: It is uncontested that Bridgeman's images are substantially exact reproductions of public domain works, albeit in a different medium. The images were copied from the underlying works without any avoidable addition, alteration or transformation. Indeed, Bridgeman strives to reproduce precisely those works of art. ... The mere reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required originality for the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium.'" As discussed above, the law requires "some element of material alteration or embellishment" to the totality of the work. At bottom, the totality of the work is the image itself, and Bridgeman admittedly seeks to duplicate exactly the images of the underlying works. ... [O]ne need not deny the creativity inherent in the art of photography to recognize that a photograph which is no more than a copy of the work of another as exact as science and technology permit lacks originality. That is not to say such a feat is trivial, simply not original. The more persuasive analogy is that of a photocopier. Surely designing the technology to produce exact reproductions of documents required much engineering talent, but that does not make the reproductions copyrightable. The Bridgeman court was actually construing UK law, but the earthlier phase of Bridgeman i and the SCOTUS case of Feist show the same result under UIS law. Note that books and other works published before 1925 are now out of copyright in the US. Copyright can also be lost ion other ways, such as publishing without a copyright notice before the effective date of the 1976 act, and failure to properly renew a work published in the US before 1964. Assuming that the book is not under copyright, neither the library nor anyone else has a US copyright in the PFD. Unless the library imposes some additional restriction by contract, any such PDF may be copied or shared freely. It may even be sold or rented. And the validity of such an additional agreement would be questionable, but since the question does not mention such an agreement, I will not go into that further. | Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on. | These files are not public domain Read it carefully, it only says “public domain musical compositions in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) file format.” The compositions are public domain, the MIDI files aren’t - they are a derivative work (a translation) covered by their own copyright. Specifically, “© Copyright 2001 University of Arizona. All rights reserved” right next to a big “Contact us” link. Literary and artistic works that are derived (legally) from existing works have independent copyright even if the original no longer does. Mozart, for example, did not write his compositions in MIDI format. Now, it may be the intention of the University of Arizona that you can use it but, if so, they have not made this clear. It’s possible that the authors (mistakenly) thought that because the originals were public domain, their derivatives would be too. The music school should have talked to someone from the law school. All of the purposes that they talk about on the “Purpose” page are equally applicable to widely licensed (e.g. everyone) or narrowly controlled (e.g. staff of the University). Overall, a prudent person would assume that these works are copyright of the University of Arizona and can’t be used without permission or a fair use exemption. Your proposed usage is not fair use. However, there is a big “Contact us” link on every page so you can always ask for permission. | As far as copyright goes... Pixabay: Yes (with minor exceptions) Pixabay's license is quite broad, and allows for unattributed commercial use with a small number of exceptions. You can't "use images with identifiable brands to create a misleading association with a product or service" or "portray identifiable people in a bad light or in a way that is offensive," but otherwise it would allow for use in a video (there are other exceptions, but they wouldn't really apply to such use). Flickr: It depends on the license By default, images are not licensed for additional use other than viewing on Flickr. However, users are free to license their images as they wish, and Flickr explicitly supports various Creative Commons Licenses, many (but not all—particularly the NC licenses) of which would support such commercial use. Depending on the license, additional requirements, such as providing attribution, may apply. Note that there are non-copyright concerns that might come up in specific situations, such as trademarks (I mentioned one potential issue in my explanation of the Pixabay license) or model releases. Another answer to this question has some good information on these concerns. |
Is an email enumeration vulnerability a breach of GDPR? I'm a software engineer and I'm often asked to implement version of a user signup flow or login that can be summarised as follows: User inputs their email If the email belongs to an existing user, report this via an error message. This might be on submitting the form or immediately as the user inputs the email. The issue here is that an (unauthenticated) user can use this to determine what emails are in use in the system. From a technical perspective there are ways to limit the damage (e.g. rate limiting) but my question is what the GDPR implications are of such a vulnerability, and what responsibility does the developer/company have to avoid this? I'm aware the emails are categorised as PII, which leads me to believe that it is an issue. However, it's also very common to see this flow in the wild. For context I'm based in the UK and work for a company operating in the UK and EU. | This is a good question, as it raises an issue which places the controller's interest in providing a smoothly functioning customer sign up process against customers' right not to have their data leaked. Note that it is not necessary to consider "enumeration" here. Even just being able to check whether one person has a registered account raises the issue. The relevant provisions of the EU GDPR (or in the UK, the UK GDPR as defined in sections 3(1) and 205(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018) are (emphasis added): Article 4(2): 'processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction So, disclosure of the fact that a user has a registered account amounts to "processing". Article 6(1): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of these, only (a) and (f) are likely to be of any relevance: (a) is not too useful since it isn't feasible to design a sign-up system that depends on the user's consent (which they may not give). That leaves us with (f). As noted by the Information Commissioner's Office, "Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing.". The legitimate interest here would be that you need a sign up system which prevents duplicate registrations. Remember though that the processing has to be "necessary" for the purposes of the legitimate interest. One might argue that it is not since you could design the system to give the appearance of accepting the duplicate registration followed by sending an email to the account holder to inform them. On the other hand this will result in a less user friendly experience which could itself be a legitimate interest. Ultimately this is a balancing exercise and it is hard to say whether you have struck the right balance until someone complains to the ICO or the court and a decision is issued. The fact that the practice is widespread among well-resourced and large companies would tend to indicate that it is lawful albeit this is not conclusive in the absence of a court decision. I'm not aware of any cases involving this particular issue but would be interested to hear from others on this point. If the processing is unlawful then Article 18 is applicable: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies: [...] (b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead Where processing has been restricted under paragraph 1, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject’s consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. In other words, the data subject could ask you not to disclose their registration status via the sign up page, and you would be obliged to comply with the request. Separately from the above points, in order to be lawful you must provide the data subject with certain prescribed information at the time when the data is collected. Of particular relevance here are the following items: Article 13(1): Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information: [...] (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; So even if you conclude that the processing will be lawful you will have to give some consideration to the basis so that you can comply with the above provision. | a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days. | Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself. | The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization. | Per GDPR Art 12(5), “any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge”. The right to rectification is Art 16 and reads in its entirety: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement. Thus, I think it would be invalid to charge a fee for an address change if that change was made in exercise of your data subject rights. If you didn't invoke this right, it's debatable whether charging a fee would be proper. On the one hand, they can charge whatever service they want (provided that this was part of the contract you entered). On the other hand, they have an obligation to assist you with your exercise of data subject rights. This includes recognising a data subject request even if you didn't explicitly invoke the specific GDPR article. For example, refusing a request for erasure just because you didn't invoke some magic GDPR words would be clearly noncompliant in my opinion. If the company offers multiple customer service options, charging for some of them may be all right. Typically, the lowest-cost solution for a company to deal with GDPR requests is to offer an online self-service option. An email to the data protection officer would typically also be free. Charging for phone support might be fine though. In an insurance context, there could also be a legitimate claim that updating your address is not a mere correction of your personal data, but a modification of the contract (depending on what you're insuring). Another possible counterpoint (which I think is not valid though) would be that the company never stored inaccurate data and therefore doesn't have to satisfy a rectification request. | The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work. | The basic requirements for the effectiveness of valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 of the GDPR and specified further in Recital 32. There is no form requirement for the consent, so using a button is not a problem. However, I do not think the MailChimp-button you reproduce as an example is good enough. It asks for a blanket consent to stuff that is buried in MailChimp's “Anti-spam Policy & Terms of Use”. But according to the GDPR, what the data subject consent to can’t be buried in the ToU – it must spelled out in clear, plain language. Requests must be granular, asking for separate consent for separate types of processing. “When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them” (Recital 32). Blanket consent, as used by MailChimp, is not allowed. The other clear requirement from the GDPR is that opt-in is mandatory. Pre-ticked and opt-out buttons are explicitly banned: “Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent” (Recital 32). ‘No’ must become your data default, but if the user chooses to opt-in by clicking a button, this is valid consent. The MailChimp-button complies witrh this. The GDPR also requires you to keep a records of the consents given (so make that part of the user profile), and to withdraw consent at any time – so you make make provisions for that as well in your implementation of consent. | Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here. |
Is it legal to make a film that denies the Holocaust in the U.S.? There's a law in Portugal that makes Holocaust denial illegal. Article 240 section b states the following: b) defames or slanders an individual or group of individuals because of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, or religion, particularly through the denial of war crimes or those against peace and humanity; Now, I am wondering if the free speech Amendment overrides any law that would make it illegal to make a movie that denies the Holocaust ever happened. Knowing that it's legal to make violent movies, I am inclined to believe that it's legal, but not likely to happen for non-legal reasons. | Lying is protected in the United States You can make films (or write books etc.) denying the Holocaust, or stating that UFOs are alien spacecraft, or that one race/ethnicity/gender is smarter/stronger/better than another without fear of government sanction. Further, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that hate speech is protected in the United States - if you want to advocate that the members of [group] should be sterilized/deported/euthanased/violently murdered etc., feel free. What isn't protected is: "advocacy of the use of force" when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and is "likely to incite or produce such action". Broadly, "kill all [blanks]" is OK, "kill these [blanks] now" isn't. This also means that inciting a suicide is illegal, some types of false statements of fact, counterfeiting is not protected speech, obscenity/indecency, child pornography, fighting words, threatening the President, speech owned by others (i.e. copyrights and trademarks), commercial speech (e.g. false advertising). There are also limitations that the government may impose when it is acting in specific roles. For example, as an employer, the government can restrict the speech of its employees in ways that it can't for general citizens. Private individuals and organisations can sanction or ostracize you however they want. Holocaust denial is reasonably common among white supremacists and other anti-Semitic groups and they produce films and literature on the subject. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum devotes this web page to it. Of course, while it's legal to make these things in the United States, distribution of them in Portugal is against Portuguese law. | If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech. | Actually, there is not a government kill list, that is just a meme. The First Amendment says (starts) "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...". That means a number of different concrete things: there shall be no laws prohibiting any religion, or preferring a religion, not may there be laws impeding or promoting the practice of a religion. The government therefore cannot reward or punish a person for believing in skin walkers, nor for turning themselves into a coyote (if they can do it). The old practice of burning witches at the stake is illegal, similarly at least under current understandings of the law it would be illegal to punish those without a religion with a fine or death. The aforementioned person can thus practice witchcraft – up to a point. One cannot get away with murder by claiming that they are just practicing the Ásatru ritual of blót. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah is an example of how the government can not restrict a religious practice (banning animal sacrifices of a particular religion), Employment Division v. Smith is an example of a neutral prohibition which happens to impinge on a religion (outlawing certain drugs limits a religious practice). | According to the ACLU, in the U.S.: Taking photographs and video of things that are plainly visible in public spaces is a constitutional right—and that includes police and other government officials carrying out their duties. I.e., a law enforcement officer can never lawfully demand that you turn off a recording device. However the ACLU itself acknowledges that this right continues to be broadly infringed by government agencies and agents. The ACLU and other watchdog groups try to document and fight infringements of this right. Infringement is still so widespread that, in practice, there are many areas and circumstances in which you could expect to be detained, harassed, arrested, and even charged with various crimes for recording police, or for refusing police demands to stop recording. (The charges will not be for recording police, since that is not a crime, but will typically be "contempt of cop" type charges like obstruction, failure to obey, assault, resisting arrest, etc.) | The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering. | Making and sharing and using subtitles for movies is not legal. It is copyright infringement. I paint this statement with a very broad brush. The movies are copyrighted (they are original and fixed in tangible form). (17 U.S. Code § 102(a)) 17 U.S. Code § 106(2) provides that the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to prepare and to authorize to preparation of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S. Code § 101 defines derivative work as a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.... So we have established that the copyright holder has exclusive rights to authorize translations, but this exclusive right is limited by fair use. 17 U.S. Code § 107 provides some examples of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research If these subtitle files are not used for a fair use purpose (the examples cited are examples only, not an exhaustive list) then translation is infringement. If the files are used for one of the fair use purposes then § 107 also gives us the factors to determine whether that particular use is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. | Can a state declare: "any violence against insert a group here shall not be prosecuted," which is pretty much what Nazis and Communists did, and then claim non-involvement in the violence that would ensue? This would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. https://www.justice.gov/crt/guidance-regarding-use-race-federal-law-enforcement-agencies goes into exhaustive detail on the topic of what may constitute an illegal abuse of selective enforcement. A key quote is highly relevant to your question: [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. There is a lot of case law on this topic. This is frequently discussed in the context of race (especially profiling). | Yes The case you want to know about is Cohen v. California: A young man was arrested for wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" and SCOTUS decided, that that was First Amendment-protected speech and the arrest illegal. The phrase מנא מנא תקל ופרסין is in Akkadian or Aramaic language but Hebrew script (as opposed to the Akkadian Cuneiform) and can be transcribed as Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin. It is also known in German as "Menetekel" or in English as the "Writing on the wall". It stems from the biblical episode of Belshazzar's feast. Literally, the text would be read as "counted, counted, weighed, distributed". Its meaning elaborated in Daniel 5 is generally understood as "Your days are numbered; Your days are numbered; You have been measured and found wanting; Your kingdom will fall and be divided". While stemming from religious texts, in the depicted situation it is more likely meant as political speech, and in that fashion indistinguishable from a flag. It also does not call for imminent lawless action - the so-called Brandenburg Test after Brandenburg v Ohio - and thus remains in the protected speech area. Remember, that even preaching genocide can be First amendment protected, as long as that line of imminent lawless action is not overstepped. As this phrase does neither, it is protected speech. |
Do U.S. courts have to select a jury that's racially representative? Do U.S. courts have to select a jury that's racially representative? I am wondering if there's a legal obligation of that sort nationwide, or if it varies by state, or if no such consideration needs to be made when selecting a jury. | No. The government may not establish laws to keep members of a particular race out of the jury pool. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, (1879) (“The statute of West Virginia, which, in effect, singles out and denies to colored citizens the right and privilege of participating in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though qualified in all other respects, is, practically, a brand upon them, and a discrimination against them which is forbidden by the amendment.”). And once they are part of the pool, jurors may not be eliminated simply because of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986) (“The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race”). But there is no requirement that the jury have any particular racial composition when it is finally seated. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) (“Purposeful discrimination is not sustained by a showing that on a single grand jury the number of members of one race is less than that race's proportion of the eligible individuals.”) | One option would be for an attorney to spend one of their peremptory challenges, which they could do as long as the juror is not a member of a racial minority (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79). Even then you can, you just have to give a valid reason other than race. Otherwise, the side wishing to strike for cause has to show that there is reasonable doubt that the prospective juror can be impartial (basing their decision just on the evidence presented and the law as explained by the court). Turning the accused / juror relation around, one might be able to strike for cause if the stripper was accused of some form of grave immorality and if the spinster was a leader of a radically puritanical religious sect that held that strippers must fry for said grave immorality crimes. The underlying assumption is that any prospective juror will be impartial, unless they say (or said, or have done) something that shows otherwise. | See jury-nullification. I'm not a legal historian, so I can't say for sure what the laws on jury acquittals were at that time in that jurisdiction. However, when a jury has final discretion to acquit a defendant of a crime that's it: They can effectively ignore laws if they want to acquit someone. Such acquittals do not set a precedent or have any bearing outside of the trial in which they issue their verdict. | With only prosecutor(s) and a court reporter, are jurors at all instructed to not simply "rubber stamp" the prosecution's desire to indict? Not really. They are told their job and the legal standards that they are required to act according to, however, and the federal judicial branch does have a short handbook for grand jurors. Are the terms and concepts necessary for them to function as a jury (e.g. "preponderance of evidence") explained to them? Yes. But grand juries don't operate on a preponderance of the evidence standard. The sole evidentiary standard in a grand jury proceeding is the lower "probable cause" standard. Likewise, lots of evidence which would not be admissible in a criminal trial is admissible in a grand jury proceeding. The main kind of evidence not admissible in a grand jury proceeding is evidence which is "privileged" against court disclosure (e.g. attorney-client communications). If so, by who? The prosecutor and the handbook linked above. Is there a standard "script" or talking points for such instruction? Prosecuting attorney's offices in jurisdictions that usually use grand juries typically have a set of forms. In federal practice, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 is the primary source of guidance, and the Justice Department (which handles all or virtually all federal criminal prosecutions) has detailed policies and procedures for handling grand jury practice (and a 405 page practice manual) that his a matter of public record. There is some case law on what the content of an indictment must look like and on the grand jury process. Some state and local jurisdictions with routine use of grand juries probably have standard court forms for certain parts of grand jury process, and there may be some standard forms in local rules for some federal courts. But there isn't a national judicial branch sanctioned official set of court forms for grand juries in the federal criminal justice system. The rather lax supervision of grand juries reflects the fact that they are a road bump in the criminal justice process with a pretty low threshold to meet that faces sterner tests later in the process: Is there probable cause to support the charges requested by the prosecutor against the named defendants? About half of U.S. states allow prosecutors to do this without a grand jury approval, unilaterally. Every grand jury indictment must either be consented to by the defense, or approved by the court following a trial with a much higher proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, to result in a conviction resulting in the imposition of punishment. A judge in a separate hearing determines if there will be pre-trial detention or bail conditions prior to the criminal trial. | Almost none of this is written down anywhere in official court rules but there are some widely adopted standards for this practice. Most courts require that only one lawyer be in charge of speaking at any given stage of the trial. But, it wouldn't be unusual, for example, for one lawyer to question most of the witnesses and for a different lawyer who is more familiar with the specialized subject matter in question (e.g. electrical specifications), usually a junior lawyer, to question the expert witnesses in a case. Also, if the usually designated lawyer is absent for some reason (stuck in traffic, sick, etc.), the "second chair" lawyer can (and is often required to) take over the case for the client until the "first chair" lawyer is available again. Mostly, second chair lawyers (I've spent plenty of time over the years in this role) do the following (a non-exclusive list): take notes, pay attention to how the judge and jury are reacting to testimony, provide input into jury selection decisions, reminds the primary lawyer of points that still need to be covered in the examination of a witness, reminds the primary lawyer of exhibits that still need to be formally offered into evidence, scrambles to find rebuttal or impeachment evidence for unanticipated testimony, prompts the primary lawyer to make objections if the primary lawyer was paying attention to something else, identifies and has at the ready exhibits needs to present (or to follow the other side's examination), looks up points of law that are relevant or will need to be referenced that come up during trial, handles logistics for witnesses who are not on the stand (keeping them in the hallway if the witness is sequestered, trying to obtain the appearance of no show witnesses or reshuffling their order, saying thank you to witnesses who are no longer on the stand, etc.), carries some of the litigation team's stuff into and out of the court room, provides informed commentary and suggestions during breaks and working lunches, etc. Also, in addition to the usual "first chair" and "second chair" roles, often supplemented by a paralegal or legal assistant, there is a different kind of arrangement in which different lawyers for the same person can fully participate. This far less common arrangement happens when the person showing up in court is wearing "more than one hat" and has a different lawyer in different capacities. For example, suppose that someone is the President of a corporation and both the corporation and the President individually are both sued. There might be one primary lawyer for the corporation and one for the President personally, and both lawyers might participate fully. | Legally and safely? Have a good and true reason for being excused, and hope the judge accepts it. If being on a jury would somehow cause you legitimate hardship, you may be excused. If you're a felon, and haven't had your rights restored, many courts won't even let you sit on a jury. Don't "pretend" anything, though. If you intentionally deceive the court in order to avoid jury duty -- or, where it's possible, even to get onto a particular jury -- that is illegal in probably every court that has a concept of jury duty. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | Not necessarily. The right to a translator is derived from the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments, and the prohibition against discrimination based on national origin (the Civil Rights Act). However, SCOTUS noted in Perovich v. US, 205 US 86 that appointment of a translator is a discretionary matter for the court (this was simply mentioned, without details as to why a translator was asked for). There is a federal law (applicable to federal cases) that sets up an infrastructure for providing interpreters, but this does not create a right to an interpreter. In US ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F. 2d 386, defendant was not afforded a translator throughout the trial, and the court found that The least we can require is that a court, put on notice of a defendant's severe language difficulty, make unmistakably clear to him that he has a right to have a competent translator assist him, at state expense if need be, throughout his trial The question which the court has to ask and answer is whether the defendant is capable of competently assisting in his defense were the trial conducted in English. If a person is perfectly bilingual in English and Mien but decides to testify in Mien to be annoying, the court will not pander to the defendant's desire to be annoying. If the person has a weak grip on English and can more effectively testify in Mien, then (after cogent arguments to that effect) the defendant should be provided a translator. The question that the court has to address is necessity. |
Does an active case before an inquest jury give rise to contempt rules? The horrible Plymouth shooting has now led to an inquest into the deaths there, and an inquest jury will be summoned for the haring in coroner's court. If the gunman had survived and was to be criminally tried, there would be very strict rules about what anyone could say on social media because of contempt of court laws designed to protect the integrity of the jury's ruling. Do any such contempt rules apply to an inquest jury, or can I tweet whatever I like about what I think about the way this tragedy occurred? | Do any such contempt rules apply to an inquest jury? YES but only if section 2(3) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 applies: ... only if the proceedings in question are active within the meaning of this section at the time of the publication. Schedule 1, paragraph 12 of the 1981 Act identifies that an inquest becomes active once the coroner beings their investigation which in this case was on 19/08/21. Can I tweet whatever I like about what I think about the way this tragedy occurred? NO, one would be in contempt if the publication falls within section 2(2) of the 1981 Act so it... ... creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. This latter requirement allows for things like fact-specific reporting (such as my 19/08/21 link). | There is no answer to the question, as presented. The criminal law differs in various respects in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland: one cannot speak of 'UK law', because criminal procedure is really very different in the three separate jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the rules of criminal procedure are what govern the issue raised in the question, rather than the substantive laws relating to the various charges which might be brought; and while the substantive laws in England and Scotland are often fairly similar, the procedures are usually very dissimilar. In a trial at the Old Bailey, in London, a Jury has no role in the criminal procedure: once empanelled it performs its usual function of deciding the facts of the case, based upon the evidence presented, but it has no role in determining what charges are preferred against the accused (this is decided by a different court at a much earlier procedural stage), and the jury has no power to alter the charges on the indictment. Only the prosecution can decide what charges are made against an accused person. And if an amendment to the indictment is thought to be appropriate, only the prosecuting barrister can make such a change. If the case has come-on for trial, the permission of the Judge must usually be obtained to any alteration in the charges. The Judge might object to an attempt to add a charge carrying a more severe penalty at a late stage in the proceedings (as the case may of course have already taken many months to reach the Old Bailey). He will often be more accommodating to an application to reduce the charges, to a lesser offence, particularly if accompanied by an undertaking not to proceed on a more serious charge - e.g. due to a lack of evidence supporting it. Where several charges are brought in the alternative, then the jury has a function, since it can then convict of a lesser charge if the evidence on a more serious one does not satisfy it. But it cannot ask for the charges to be altered: the jury represents the layman, and jurymen are inevitably not legally qualified (at one time, being legally qualified was an automatic disqualification from serving on a jury). So the jury is assumed to be incapable of understanding the fine distinctions between different offences, and has no role whatsoever in deciding which offences shall be included on the indictment. Even the Barrister representing the accused has no role in determining which charges his client will face: that is purely a function of the Crown Prosecutor's office, and once the trial has come-on at the Bailey only the prosecuting Barrister and the Judge truly have a role in making any necessary amendments. The function of defending Counsel is to strike a plea-bargain, if he can, and where the opportunity arises: which is to say, if he can persuade his client to plead guilty to a minor charge (whether or not on the indictment), and can also persuade the prosecutor not to proceed on the more serious charge(s) on the indictment. A Judge will not usually object to a legally-represented defendant applying, by consent (i.e. through the prosecutor), to amend the indictment in order to enter a plea of guilty. He might refuse, if the accused has no legal representation, but not otherwise. The short answer, therefore, is that in England and Wales a defendant cannot be convicted on a charge that is not listed on the indictment, but a jury can convict of any charge on the indictment if the judge asks the jury to retire and consider a verdict - but the case may not get so far as that, if a plea-bargain is struck. There are rare occasions where a judge might withdraw a charge, if he desires, by directing the jury to acquit on that particular charge, but this only occurs if he considers that any conviction on that charge would be positively unsafe in all the circumstances of the case. | This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off. | When a judge decides a case there will be An order - e.g. "Smith shall pay Jones £100,000" Reasons for the decision - i.e. a description of the evidence, and the judge's findings of fact and legal reasoning. Sometimes a party, even though they have completely won, is nevertheless aggrieved by some things the judge has said in the Reasons (or in the way the judge has handled the trial - e.g. the judge's interventions). For example the judge may have said that the winning party was not a credible witness but they nevertheless won because of the evidence of other witnesses who were found to be credible. The rule in England and Wales is that you can only appeal orders. So if the order is completely in your favour you cannot appeal just because you don't like the reasons. | I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts. | The defence in a criminal case has no obligation to inform the prosecution of anything. The onus is on the prosecution to provide the evidence to convict and the defence doesn't have to and indeed shouldn't help them do it. The defence can and probably would use conflicting statements by a prosecution witness to discredit that witness in the eyes of the jury. These do not have to be material to the case: just showing the witness is inconsistent in general is helpful. | Probably not. I can't find the new text, but the existing law was probably just amended with a new category: "hate speech" based on race, religion, disability and "homosexual leanings, lifestyle, or orientation" was illegal – this new law seems to just tweak the categories. The Supreme Court has addressed the general law here in a race-based case, stating that expression of contempt is crucial to defining the crime ("to threaten or insult, or promote hatred, persecution or contempt" based on a protected category). The line that would be drawn is between reading the text, versus promoting hatred or contempt using the text as justification. You can't be prosecuted for hate speech in Norway by reporting the existence of racial etc. discrimination. | None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story. |
Are partner notification laws in conflict with HIPAA? HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) requires health care providers only share medical information with family members under the patient's consent. However regarding HIV/AIDS many states make it compulsory to notify sexual partners and / or needle-sharers of the diagnosed. (Source: CDC) Are they in conflict? Can anyone refuse to disclose to partners his HIV status by HIPAA? | No. HIPAA places no limits on who you may share your medical records with - only on those with who your doctors (et al) can share. The HIV laws you refer to, place a positive obligation on you to share the information. | No To declare that a parent is "unfit" in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called "child protective services" or "child welfare" depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations. | Certainly. A phone number is personal information (and on top of that, WhatsApp may provide some "profile info" from the people you contact). It is not difficult to identify a person by its phone number. So, sharing the phone number of the people affected should take into account the restrictions of GDPR. For instance, the Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, AEPD) established in its Resolution R/03041/2017 that the Town Hall of Boecillo had violated the GDPR because it had created a WhatsApp group of citizens. Those citizens had provided their phone numbers to be informed about town hall activities, but they had not agreed to share their numbers with the other members of the group. And that was a very generic group. Doing a "patients recovering from cancer" or "drug abusers under treatment" or "people who need food assistence" group would involve sharing personal information that gets the maximum protection (in some specific instancies it could be that your information sharing that information is illegal even if the users gave you full consents). So yes, creating a WhatsApp group could very easily lead to a GDPR violation, and in fact it has been ruled at least once that it has. The fact that people cannot send messages is irrelevant. It would not make the issue any better or worse. After all, if I send a message through WhatsApp I am implicitly giving permission to everyone in the group to read it. | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. | I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation. | Yes, GDPR applies: you are a data controller established/living in the UK or are offering services to people in the UK you fall under the material scope of the GDPR. The Art 2(2)(c) exemption for “purely personal or household activity” does not apply since you're offering the service to the public. You must consider GDPR compliance here. This is especially important as you are showing personal data to the public. Don't do that unless you have a very good reason, appropriate safeguards, and are clear to users how their information will be shown. On a high level, GDPR compliance involves working on the following questions: For what purpose are you processing personal data? Context: purpose limitation principle per GDPR Art 5(1)(b) What is the legal basis for processing? GDPR Art 6(1) lists the available legal bases. Here, consent, necessity for performance of a contract, or a legitimate interest could be a legal basis. They may have further obligations attached. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test that considers the data subject's rights and freedoms. Consent must fulfil the conditions per Art 7 in order to be valid. What is the minimal data necessary to achieve the purpose? Per the Art 5(1)(c) data minimisation principle, it is illegal to process personal data beyond what is necessary and adequate. You must provide data protection by design and by default per Art 25. Special categories of data per Art 9 such as health data are illegal to process outside of narrow exemptions. You must delete data once it is no longer necessary. What appropriate safeguards and security measures should you apply? Per Art 24 and 25, you are responsible for determining and implementing appropriate measures. This depends a lot on your specific context, so there's no checklist you can apply. Per Art 25(1) you must pseudonymize the processed information if that is compatible with the processing purpose. What further compliance measures do you have to consider? There are additional GDPR and non-GDPR compliance measures. From the GDPR side: Use the answers to these questions to write a privacy policy, including the information that you must provide to data subjects per Art 13. Consider whether you have to maintain a Records of Processing document per Art 30, or if you have to make a Data Protection Impact Assessment per Art 35. If you use third party services, figure out whether they are a joint controller or data processor and apply appropriate safeguards. If you have data processors, ensure that you have a contract in place that covers the items from Art 28(3). If you share data with other controllers (not processors) you need a legal basis for doing so. If you transfer data into a non-EU/EEA country (after 2020: non-UK country) you need a legal basis per Art 44 and have to cover additional items in your privacy policy. Ideally, the target country is covered by an EC adequacy decision per Art 45. For US-based companies, this is the case only when they have self-certified under the Privacy Shield framework. Non-GDPR compliance steps could include cookie consent banners, or showing a VAT ID. How can you prepare for data subject requests? Data subjects have various rights per Arts 15–23, subject to the modalities in Art 12. For example, a data subject could request that their information is erased from your website. The exact rights also depend on the legal basis you selected. You should figure out in advance how to deal with such requests. | Does the HOA's lawyer have a duty or is it standard practice to label documents (including) as privileged if it contains privileged information? While it is sometimes labeled, this is done by attorneys when it is done, mostly to prevent stupid clients from sharing the information and waiving the privilege. Usually, however, documents are not marked as privileged in advance and when documents are requested from a third-party this analysis is usually done by junior attorneys and paralegals working as a team for the first time. Formal designation is not required because the definition of what is protected is defined by statute and common law rules on a uniform basis. The duty to share information with HOA members does not generally extend to privileged information. If a document that would otherwise be required to be disclosed (like attorney invoices) contains privileged information, the usual course of action is to redact the invoice so that it contains only non-privileged information (e.g. a bottom line amount owed and the date of the invoice and the matter). In an HOA context, the privilege of the HOA as a client belongs functionally to the board and its officers, not to all of the members of the HOA. Does the Association's contractor who maintains the records have a duty to act as a gatekeeper to said invoices if they are not labeled? This depends upon the contract between the Association and the contractor. A well written contract would include this duty, and spell out the mechanics of how it is implemented, but not all contracts live up to best practices. A related issue is whether a release of privileged information by an independent contractor constitutes a waiver of the privilege by the client if the contractor is not in an agent-principal relationship with the Association, which is often a determination made only after the fact by a court. Some jurisdictions' rules of civil procedure provide a waiting period between the issuance of a third-party subpoena for documents and the earliest time that those documents can be delivered to a third-party, to allow objections on grounds of privilege or another basis to be raised prior to the disclosure of the documents. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 45, for example, has such a provision. I don't know what the rule is in Florida on that issue. | The nature of the meeting matters: I assume this is a private meeting, not a public meeting. Under RCW 9.73.030, you have to announce that the meeting is being recorded (the announcement must itself be recorded), or the recording device must be obvious. There is no exception regarding property status (such as "on school property; in a government-funded facility"). But it also matters if the conversation is "private". See State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255, which gives weight to the subjective intent of the parties, thus the primary question would be whether the school official intended the communication to be private. Given strong FERPA privacy protection of personal information about students and in light of the likely nature of the conversation, one might think that the administrator intends the discussion to be private. However, the administrator cannot discuss e.g. disciplinary issues with third parties, so that would not be a valid basis for expecting privacy. You would really need to get a lawyer, discuss the expected subjects with the lawyer, and see if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (even if this is not a public meeting). Your local ACLU chapter might advise you of your rights, though they would probably also advise you to not experiment with breaking the law (I don't see what legitimate purpose would be served by recording in secret). |
How someone could get a new legal identity For a character in a novel, I'm at an impass as to how someone could theoretically attain a brand new, legal, government issued identity that can be used for business, banking and so on. The specific situation that this character is in is that for all intents and purposes they have no prior history as a person, they will not be found in any government data base or on the internet. What they have going for them is a very wealthy benefactor, extensive physical trauma to the brain, and following their getting an identity this character will be comming into money due to the benefactor. So far, I've looked at applying for asylum and outright buying citizenship in a country. Edit: To clarify the situation and add an alternate question. This character is a stateless person, would citizenship be needed to do business, have a bank account, etc? For the first, this would stem from her feigning amnesia, knowing her name and how to do things but little else. It is enough for a search to be made and not find anyone matching her. To assist this she would have two gunshot wounds to the head that on a CT would confirm that she suffered extensive brain damage and survived it. So her claim isn't unreasonable. There are however issues assosciated with the plot that I would have to work around. The second option I looked at is approaching countries where citizenship could be bought, such as in the case of Malta and others. However, I believe that the conventional "buy citizenship in X country with an investment" would require prior documentation, a background check, and you wouldnt just be allowed to get creative while filling in your information. For this I am entirely uncertain if a larger "investment" into said country would be sufficient for them to overlook the character having no prior documentation. Ultimately this is Fiction, so there can be flexability and suspension of disbelief can be stretched a bit or the details left a bit ambiguous, however, I believe being grounded in realism is important to the immersion of the story. With that said, I'm looking for options from those more well versed in legal matters than me. | The main documents* needed to overcome money laundering regulations etc when opening a bank account are a passport and/or driving licence. Both have multiple anti-counterfeit safeguards so gone are the days of creating your own, and master forgers are the remit of organised crime groups. By far the easiest way is to get a Fraudulently Obtained Genuine Identity (FOG-ID). Your character could find someone of a similar age who has never had a passport or licence and use their details to apply for them with her own photograph - colloquially called "cukooing". This means she would have the cuckoo's name and address and, depending on her moral compass and propensity to violence, she made need to "remove" the risk that someone could find out and expose her. Note that in england-and-wales, under the Identity Documents Act 2010, she may face up to 10 years' imprisonment for the unlawful possession of these documents. Also, you could consider bribery and corruption. It's a fairly common trope that a corrupt government official can do almost anything by logging on to a computer but, to me, this stretches the realism too far as there are so many checks and balances and different people involved to be believable without the even more unbelievable conspiracy "that goes all the way to the top". *A National Insurance / Social Security Number would be helpful but not necessary if your character isn't on planning on seeking employment or state benefits - which I assume is the case if she is going to come in to a big pile of money. | The issues you describe have existed with signatures from the beginning of their use. There exists a tradeoff between ease of use and reliability, both of forgery and of people falsely claiming forgery. Originally, the closest thing to a signature was the use of seals and signet rings. While relatively hard to forge, it only showed that the possessor of the object agreed. Signatures, especially in cursive font, were developed later. They were in some ways easier to forge(you didn't need to get access to a physical device), but more difficult in others(the seal symbols tended to be used on everything and various improvements in technology had been made), and harder to falsely claim forgery(because most people can't alter their handwriting well). You were affixing your name to the document, indicating that you agreed. Often, the signatures were required to backed up with the signatures of other people as witnesses. They didn't have to agree to the document, they just had to agree to testify that you signed of your own free will. Because witnesses, especially trustworthy and independent witnesses, are hard to come by, some places have dropped that requirement, such as checks and signing a aper receipt when using a credit card. But for some important documents, certain jurisdictions still require witnesses, including large transactions (a document relating to a car insurance payout I recently had required a witness to confirm my signature) and marriages. However, with electronic media, the point of a signature is more to indicate deliberate acceptance of terms, with verification of an individual being left to other processes (e.g. IP address, MAC address, linkage to a specific email account, etc.), so forgery is less of an issue. I have also seen "signatures" amount to checkboxes and "I agree" buttons. Generally, the higher the stakes and "more legal" the agreement, the more likely to these have been the "typed signatures" that you describe, but this seems to be decreasing in frequency, suggesting that its purpose was to stop gap a hole in legal acceptance by judges/courts/laws with regards to electronic communications. Addendum: It should also note that the replacement of seals by signatures is not universal; for instance in Japan, seals are still used over signatures in the majority of cases. | There seems, to my ear, to be a degree of similarity between the first two works. The third does not sound, to me, very similar to either of the first two. That is not a legal question, and I am no expert. However, all of these seem to be simple themes of only a few notes, repeated, in one case with some variations. The history of music is replete with examples of short themes or figures duplicated without intentional copying. Generally, to win a copyright suit over a claimed infringement of a musical copyright one must show either proven direct copying, or identity of melody over a long enough passage that independent invention is not plausible. Normally access of the alleged infringer to the claimed source is also shown. How much identity is needed is a judgement call for the court involved, often based on expert testimony, but I rather doubt if the short themes linked in the question would be found to infringe one another. In any case, even if identity is proved, it is possible that both are copying some earlier source, perhaps one in the public domain, or one properly licensed. It is also possible that one of thee has obtained a license from another and so is perfectly legal. There is no way to know without the records of those involved. | I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws. | 18 USC §912 provides that: Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. I do not think that in the context of a movie, play or game the person portraying an FBI agent or other LEO is "acting as such", and surely this does not involved obtaining "any money, paper, document, or thing of value". The Wikipedia article on Police_impersonation says: Dressing up as a police officer in costume (e.g. for Halloween), or pretending to be a police officer for the entertainment purposes or a harmless prank toward an acquaintance is generally not considered a crime, provided that those involved recognize the imposter is not a real police officer, and the imposter is not trying to deceive those involved into thinking they are. Nevertheless, replica police uniforms sold in the UK must not be identical to the uniforms currently used by the police, and traders have been jailed in the past for selling on genuine uniforms. Many films and TV shows have portrayed FBI agents, in some cases actual agents by their real names. This goes back as far as the 1935 moviw G-Men starring James Cagney. Many examples are listed in the Wikipedia article Federal Bureau of Investigation portrayal in media, and many of them used realistic badges and depictions. They were not treated as criminal impersonations, even when the FBI or its officials strongly disapproved of particular movies. The somewhat similar US federal law 10 USC 772 prohibits wearing military uniform by persons who are not authorized, but paragraph (f) provides that it is permitted: While portraying a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, an actor in a theatrical or motion-picture production may wear the uniform of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force. A Vietnam-War-era court case held the restriction "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force" to be an unconstitutional restriction of speech, and held that unauthorized wearing of a uniform was only punishable if there was charged a proved an "intent to deceive". I would expect a similar limitation of 18 USC §912. That said, if the email was such that a reasonable person might well be deceived into believing that it really came for an actual FBI agent or other government employee, there might be a problem. The suggestions on that point in the answer by user hszmv seem reasonable to me. An imaginary "Confederal Department of Interrogation" say, keeps things firmly in an alternate reality. | It is not necessarily a crime to do this, but the gift to you and from you to Betty would be disregarded and treated as if gift directly from Alice to Betty, if the IRS knew all of the facts. A gift implies a donative intent directed at you. When there is an understanding that you are acting at Alice's direction, you aren't receiving a gift, you are acting as Alice's agent. This said, this scheme, or the alternative it seeks to prevent, has no impact on Betty, because gift taxes are imposed on the donor rather than the recipient of the gift. And, in most cases, a gift in excess of the $14,000 per person per year gift tax exemption will have only a minimal impact. This is because each person is entitled to make a combination of gifts in excess of the exemption during life and transfers to non-spouses and non-charities at death of $11,200,000 per lifetime (adjusted annually for inflation). Usually, all that is necessary if the limit is exceeded is for the donor to file form 706 (a federal gift tax return) at the same time as the donor's income tax return, and this form is very simple if the only gifts given are cash gifts. Transfers to a U.S. citizen spouse are gift and estate tax free, as are gifts to foreign and domestic charities. Spouses who file a Form 709 in a year may treat gifts given by one spouse as actually given half by each spouse. If someone dies not having used their entire $11,200,000 (adjusted for inflation) lifetime exemption, their surviving spouse, if any, inherits that unused portion and can use it at their death in addition to their own lifetime exemption. So, Alice and Betty are trying to evade a tax law that is easy and trouble free to comply with, and may provide future benefits by documenting the intent of the parties with respect to a large gift (so that someone doesn't later try to characterize it as a loan or contribution to a trust estate, for example). While it isn't a crime, it is ill advised and won't benefit them materially in the end. | I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered. | Yes, as long as it is clear that this is fiction. It is utterly common for fiction set in the current world to mention real institutions and people, and have them do and say things that they never really did or said, to fit the plot or just to provide background. Busman's Honeymoon by Sayers included quotes from the (London) Times about Lord Peter Wimsey's wedding, an event which of course never occurred. Rex Stout's Nero Wolfe novels frequently included imagined stories in the New York Times, as well as in the (fictional) New York Gazette. The Novel Advise and Consent by Allan Drury included many fictional stories by real papers (often the Washington Post) about its fictional events, as well as fictional acts and statements by many real political figures of the day. The list could be extended almost forever. As long as a reasonable reader would understand this to be fiction, there is no issue of defamation. Nor does any paper have a copyright on its name. As for trademarks, as long as you aren't trying to sell a fake paper under a real name, there is no legal issue. Go ahead, and I hope it is a great story. |
Report a website that violates Google copyright I found that a competitors website is using blatant screenshots of Google Maps satellite imagery, clearly violating Googles copyright. I'm not talking about an actual map, I'm talking about JPEG files of screenshots (from what appears to be a tablet) of satellite imagery. However, I can't find any way to report this to Google - if I go to report a copyright violation, I must be either the copyright holder or a legal council representing them. Is there any way to report a site that violates Googles own copyright to Google? | There's a legal issue, and a practical issue. If you witness a crime, you can inform the police and something may happen. The FBI does actually investigate criminal copyright infringement, but they also don't respond to concerned-citizen complaints, only complaints of copyright holders (and not all of them). You cannot use DMCA takedown to get the service provider to remove the content (or shut down the site, or whatever would be necessary), since only the copyright holder can make the required sworn statements. So you have no legal recourse. A practical solution is to tell Google. This link could have been a way to inform them, but it seems to always resolve to identifying plausible DMCA takedown requests, and if you truthfully answer the "are you the copyright holder" question, you are told to go away. Even if you lie at the preliminary stage, the procedure ends with you making a sworn statement, and you can't lie on one of those. This information might allow you to send them a letter, which they might read. They might simply not consider it worth their time. | No. You are correct in that this is not related to Copyright. Copyright is meant to protect expressions of an idea. An URL is simply an address, like a street address. Can you legally stop people referring to your home address? No. Can you legally stop people from passing by and looking at your house on the street? Also no. A famous case related to hyperlink is Ticketmaster v Tickets.com (2000). Tickets.com used information Ticketmaster's website and deep-linked to there. The ruling established that: use of information is not infringing hyperlinking cannot be copyright infringement because no copying is involved. deep linking is not unfair competition If you feel that it is necessary to avoid people linking to specific pages of your site, you may consider accomplishing this technically. UPDATE It does not matter whether your site is meant to be public or not. For example, an knowledge base meant to be shared internally in an organization, but accessible on the internet since staff are geographically distributed. Again, you may think of it like a street address. A private corporate building meant for employees only. An address, like Room C, 16/F, Example Corporate Complex, 4321 Lucky Avenue can be shared like any other address. You cannot demand people to never refer to your office address. You can, however, setup a security post at the entrance and only allow certain guests to visit you. In the case of a website, you may state in your terms that one cannot share access information to any external parties. This will include the sharing of any authentication data (e.g. password) which can be used to access content. | Stack Exchange have already covered this in a couple of places, from MSE's A site (or scraper) is copying content from Stack Exchange. What should I do?: When should I not report these sites? They follow all the attribution requirements. As mentioned before, there is nothing wrong with copying our content elsewhere on the web, so long as they are following all the attribution requirements given. There is no action we can take against a scraper who follows all the rules. And the old Attribution Required blog post mentions that the actual requirements are: Visually indicate that the content is from Stack Overflow or the Stack Exchange network in some way. It doesn’t have to be obnoxious; a discreet text blurb is fine. Hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) Show the author names for every question and answer Hyperlink each author name directly back to their user profile page on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/users/1234567890/username) By “directly”, I mean each hyperlink must point directly to our domain in standard HTML visible even with JavaScript disabled, and not use a tinyurl or any other form of obfuscation or redirection. Furthermore, the links must not be nofollowed | Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable. | I drafted this answer many days ago but did not complete it. My intention is to define red flag notice. However, I'm hitting Submit because I think it's a good question and hope this will inspire other answers. It seems like your immediate question, regarding the DCMA notices which Google is forwarding, is not a legal question. It is a question that can only be answered by Google and is dependent on their practices. Frankly though, it seems to me that Google search results might not be important based on the purpose of your proxy service. However perhaps your user base has evolved. You are a service provider under 17 USC 512(k)(i). If you aren't we need to clear that up! As for the copyright holders, you haven't received notice complying with 17 USC 512 (c)(3)(A)(i-iv). As such you don't have notice. Even if these notices don't qualify then we argue about whether you have red flag notice - based on facts and circumstances. (See Grokster) EDIT TO ADD: 17 U.S. Code § 512 - Limitations on liability relating to material online is one of the sections created by the DMCA. It is sometimes referred to as the safe harbor. You can read about it on Wikipedia® page for the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act. If you read that Wikipedia® page you will see a short section on Red Flags. They say it as well as I could: [In addition to notice from a copyright holder, the second way] that an OSP can be put on notice that its system contains infringing material, for purposes of section 512(d), is referred to the "red flag" test. The "red flag" test stems from the language in the statute that requires that an OSP not be “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The "red flag" test contains both a subjective and an objective element. Subjectively, the OSP must have knowledge that the material resides on its system. Objectively, the "infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances." The reason that notice is important is that the safe harbor provided is only available if you do not know that infringing is happening. Plaintiff's prove knowledge through the letter or through red flags. I am glad that you asked about Grokster, because that was the wrong case! The case to look at is Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, (2nd Cir., 2012). The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or “subjectively” knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvious to a reasonable person. The red flag provision, because it incorporates an objective standard, is not swallowed up by the actual knowledge provision under our construction of the § 512(c) safe harbor. Both provisions do independent work, and both apply only to specific instances of infringement. In other words, you lose your safe harbor protection if you know of facts and circumstances that would lead an ordinary person to know that infringement is happening. So the question for you is - do the letters forwarded by Google mean that you have knowledge and are outside of the safe harbor? Well that's the question that lawyers fight about! In fact Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir., 2013) is all about that fight. If you read that case you will see that Fung was doing a bunch of shit that totally made it completely obvious that he was infringing. And he was earning money directly from it. He was screwed from the start. Now again, this does not really help you with the google blacklist problem, but it should help you understand what you need to do as a service provider to not be complicit in copryright infringement. You really should read the Fung case and 17 U.S.C. § 512 - they will go a long way to help you understand the analysis a court will apply. EDIT Regarding your legal exposure, I always assume that a cease and desist letter will precede a lawsuit. With that said, only you know how much infringing is coming across your server. Fung made his money directly from the infringement. He attracted website visitors specifically because of the infringement. He had emails and other documents proving this. Diebold is interesting because they attempted to use copyright to control the spread of their emails. First the court said no commercial harm and no diminishment of value of the works. Then the court found that the stuff wasn't even subject to copyright. This is obviously not a typical case. But it sounds like you see yourself as OPG in this case. I don't see how you can become a plaintiff against bona fide copyright holders who follow the links as far as your server. As I understand it, you are a reasonable target of the the notices, that's the result of running the proxy. However, I might be getting out of my technical depth here. As I intimated earlier, you might need to seek out some strategic advice regarding dealing with Google and the specific steps you might take to stay in the right side of their enforcement. | These files are not public domain Read it carefully, it only says “public domain musical compositions in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) file format.” The compositions are public domain, the MIDI files aren’t - they are a derivative work (a translation) covered by their own copyright. Specifically, “© Copyright 2001 University of Arizona. All rights reserved” right next to a big “Contact us” link. Literary and artistic works that are derived (legally) from existing works have independent copyright even if the original no longer does. Mozart, for example, did not write his compositions in MIDI format. Now, it may be the intention of the University of Arizona that you can use it but, if so, they have not made this clear. It’s possible that the authors (mistakenly) thought that because the originals were public domain, their derivatives would be too. The music school should have talked to someone from the law school. All of the purposes that they talk about on the “Purpose” page are equally applicable to widely licensed (e.g. everyone) or narrowly controlled (e.g. staff of the University). Overall, a prudent person would assume that these works are copyright of the University of Arizona and can’t be used without permission or a fair use exemption. Your proposed usage is not fair use. However, there is a big “Contact us” link on every page so you can always ask for permission. | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. | It Depends If the person reusing the image (lets call that person R for reuser) is not complying with the terms of the Creative commons license, which include a requirement to provide attribution of the source work, then R cannot rely on the license, and the granting of the license ad the presence of a license declaration is legally irrelevant. R must have some other basis to reuse the image. This could be an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing. Or possibly the image is not protected by copyright, for example because its copyright has expired, or because it is a work of the US Federal Government being used in the US. In the absence of such a basis, R is infringing copyright. In much of the world copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author (or of all co-authors). In some different terms apply, ranging from life+50 to life+100. Sound recordings and photos get shorter terms in some countries. In the US the term is life+70 for recent works, but for work created and published before 1978 more complex rules apply, depending on the date of publication, and whether laws on notice and renewal were complied with. See the well-known chart Copyright Term and the Public Domain for the various cases and when copyright expires in each case. The question asks about fair use. This is a US-specific legal concept. It is designed to be flexible, an is highly fact-dependent. As a result it is rarely possible to say if a use will qualify as a fair use with certainty until a court passes on it. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more on fair use. Not providing attribution is itself often considered to weigh against fair use. The question does not give enough detail to make even a good guess as to whether such a use is likely to be held to be fair use. Identifying the kind of eagle has some educational value, which might favor fair use to some extent, but must be considered in light of the overall purpose of the use, which is not described. There is no indication as to whether the original work is creative or factual, or whether the reuse would be likely to harm the market for the original. Much use of images on social media does not stand up under a fair use analysis. Providing proper attribution might well help any fair use claim. See also Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons? |
Does derivative works law allow someone to create a new work based on an old one as long as they make modifications? How can I find out if extracting Microsoft Word 2019 thesaurus (for another person by a freelancer) is legal or (very likely) not? I tried searching in Google, but this question seems to be not very easy to answer. The client says that it is allowed by a "derivative works law", and that he is allowed to create a new thesaurus based on an old one, and he will be adding more words to it and taking some out. | Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe. | First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply. | You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article. | This answer to a related question sums up the relevant concepts regarding work for hire. Since, according to your description of your relationship to A, you are not an employee (Commun. for Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid 490 U.S. 730), and you do not a written agreement, under US law, this would not be a work for hire: thus you hold copyright to something. I presume Company A gave you the source code and you are rewriting it to fit some technical requirement, so you have been given permission by the copyright holder to create a derivative work. You do not gain copyright to the original code: you only hold copyright to what you wrote. You would therefore need the permission of the copyright holder (of the original program) to sell copies of the modified program (currently A, company B in the future once the transfer is complete). There isn't a special "signing-over" ceremony for permission to copy, but the situation you describe is very messy. Even without a written agreement, you do understand that they intend to make multiple copies of the resulting program which includes your contribution, and you have received something of value in exchange for your contribution. So, one would argue, you have at least given permission to copy your stuff, even without a piece of signed paper -- in hiring you, you have given them an implied license to use what they paid you to create. The unclarity would be in whether you transferred your property rights, or simply licensed them to use it. Hence the recommendation to get an IP attorney. | Derivative Works under US law and the Berne Convention US Copyright law defines "derivative work" in 17 USC 101 as: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. Article 2 of the Berne Copyright Convention reads, in relevant part: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. Under 17 USC 106 one of the things that a copyright owner has the exclusive right to do or authorize is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that under the US definition, a derivative work is one based on an earlier work, not one that merely refers to a derivative work. Merely mentioning or citing a previous work is not enough to make the later work derivative. It must, in some substantial way, use and be developed out of the previous work. The classic examples of a derivative work are: a translation into another language; an adaptation into another medium or form (such as making a novel into a play or film); and making a sequel. But derivative works can be derivative in various other ways. Examples from the Question Let us look at the examples mentioned in the question: an academic paper that cites or refers to other papers This is a mere reference and is not at all derivative. However a paper that contained little or no original content, but consisted almost entirely of such citations might be considered derivative. a discussion thread on Internet (or each comment or reply on it) about a work Discussion or criticism of a work, or a reply to it, is not normally considered derivative. Such comments are not derivative of the work under discussion, nor of the previous comments. Quotations of either are likely to be permitted fair use, and so not infringing, although that will depend on the exact details of each case. a fanart or a fanfiction This is likely to be a derivative work, depending on how much of the source work is used, and whether distinctive details are reproduced. Note that ideas cannot be protected by copyright. (See 17 USC 102(b) for this.) So the idea of a person who turns into an animal of a particular type, or has some special power or ability or characteristic is not protected by copyright. But the details expressed in the source work, such as the mannerisms or appearance of a character, or the specific nature of a setting, can be protected, and to draw on them may be infringement, unless fair use applies. metadata "Metadata" is a very general idea. Typically the kind of information included in metadata is not protected by copyright, but in some cases it may be. a review or a criticism A review, criticism of, or comment on an existing work is not normally considered a derivative work. Quotes used in a review or criticism are often protected by fair use under US law, but if the quotation is excessive, and particularly if it allows the review to serve as a replacement for the original and to harm the market for the original, it may be infringement. a work inspired by other works Again, this depends. If only the general idea is imitated, then the later work is not derivative If detailed, distinctive, and specific characters, settings or plot lines are imitated, then the later work may be considered derivative, and infringing if permission is not obtained. The Nichols Case In the case Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F. 2d 119 - Circuit Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit (1930) Judge Learned Hand, a famous judge, wrote a very influential and often cited opinion describing when two similar plays are, and when they are not, infringements of one another. It is worth reading to better understand this issue, even though it is over 90 years old. What makes a Work Derivative So in general a work is derivative when it uses significant, distinctive, and detailed elements of a previous work, or is a revised or altered version of the previous work. Copyright in a Derivative Work If a derivative work is made with proper permission, or the source work is out of copyright, the author of the derivative work has copyright in all the original parts of the derivative work. However if the derivative work is infringing, and was created without permission, the author has no valid copyright in it at all. Fair Use and True Parody If a work is held to be a fair use of the original, it is not infringing even if it is a derivative work, this is an exception to copyright in US law. It may still be important to note that the work is derivative, because the author has copyright only in the original aspects. If a work is a parody, it is likely to be held to be a fair use. Note that in copyright law a true parody is a work that comments on the source work by imitating or mocking it. A work that imitates a source work merely to be funny, or to comment on general social conditions, or to make some other point, but not to comment on the original, is not a parody in US copyright law. Courts often refer to such a work as a "satire", even though this is not the standard literary definition of "satire". A Satire will usually not be a fair use of the source, or if it is, it will be for other reasons. Addition (in response to an addition to the question) original work : poem "Eloisa to Abelard" by Alexander Pope(1688-1744) (potential) derivative work : film "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" directed by Michel Gondry The film's title is a quotation from the poem, and the quoted part is cited within the film. Does it make the film a "derivative work" of the poem? No. First of all, any copyright on the poem has long expired, it is in the public domain. Secondly, merely referring to a previous work in the title and citing it in the body does not make the later work derivative, it is merely a literary reference. A significant part of the earlier work would need to be used to make the film derivative. Unless much more was used than is mentioned above, this would not qualify even if the poem were still in copyright. Meaning of "Derivative" Like many other words of the English language, the word "derivative" has several different senses. The sense leading to the definitions: imitative of the work of another person inspired or motivated by something is mostly used in the context of criticism and review of works of art or literature. In copyright law, "derivative" is a technical term, defined by the definition section of the law, and by previous court cases. It is not unrelated to the meaning from literary or art criticism, but it is specific and by no means the same. The word "derivative" also has other specialized meanings, for example in chemistry, and in mathematics. | If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible. | If users were to copy dictionary definitions, for instance Oxford or Cambridge) and make the word lists public, is it a copyright infringement? If the dictionary entries are protected by copyright then your user has infringed that copyright by posting the dictionary entries. Am I responsible for this activity? No. But you may be responsible for removing it if you get a request. Can dictionary owners charge me against copyright issue? If you follow the procedures outlines in the DMCA you can be protected from liability. | If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract. |
Legally "give" Intellectual Property without explict charge? Summary: I'm an IT contractor, and have some self-made source code (my IP) to solve certain problems a lot of clients have. I want to legally "give" that IP to my clients, without explicitly charging for it (the fee for it is included in my day rate, and so already paid). If I do this, is it legally binding and/or does it open me, or them up for other problems? Long version: In my off-time, I've spent some time re-creating some of the clever solutions I've seen elsewhere. Typically this is done by reading a tonne of web pages, putting scraps of information together and iterating a bit to make a solution. None of the original is used to do this, other than my memory of what it was. These solutions are expressed as computer source code. I tend to try to make these "generic" such that they could be customised to fit any future client, so they're similar but different to the originals. I don't foresee any claim from previous clients over these works (or at least, that's not the subject of this question). Now working at a new client, I can "cut and paste" my solution into their environment. This saves me time, and so saves them money. I use this capability as part of my negotiation of day rates and such like. I'd like to formerly give rights to the "cut and pasted" source code that I've used at my new client. I of course want to retain ownership of my copy, but make it very clear that I've given them some of my IP and that they can do anything they like with it going forward. The purpose of this is partly legal, but mostly to make it super explicit that it's taken place - a bit of "PR" if you like. I'd want to hand them a legal document explaining what's happened, and a description of what it is they've received, why it's good for them, etc. My lawyer has "Assignment of Intellectual Property" templates (https://www.lawbite.co.uk/legal-and-business-documents/139/assignment_of_intellectual_property), which look to me like they'd work nicely. I can of course have the lawyers check over my edits of those templates before I send them. However, in that template there's a "schedule" of the items being assigned which is supposed to list the price I'm charging. My question is, can I either make the price £0, or else somehow express that the fee has already been paid as part of the day rate? Does doing so somehow have side-effects to me in the future? If I were to charge £0, would a (pedantic?) client require me to send in a £0 invoice or would they have to do something internally to account for this "purchase"? If this is (in principle) possible to do, then I can of course have my lawyers review the wording I use to express it - at this point I really just want to know if it's possible in law to do something like this. Any help much appreciated. Just to be clear (in response to comments): I'm asking about a legal principle/construct - to see if an idea is worth pursuing. I'm not asking for anyone to word a contract or agreement. Also in response to comments and answers: A license is probably a better expression than a transfer for what I'm looking to achieve here. | It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least. | How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved. | Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on. | The creator of the software doesn't provide any warranty. If you feel confident in the quality of the software, nothing stops you from providing a warranty. If the software doesn't meet your guarantees, you will have to pay out because you provided the warranty, depending on the terms. Not the creator of the software because they explicitly didn't provide any warranty. If that's what you want to do, go ahead. I wouldn't. You don't have to republish under the BSD license, which you wouldn't. You must attach the license terms, which clarifies the role of the original creators, and that they don't give a warranty. Doing this allows you to copy the software. It doesn't mean you can't provide a warranty. | You can make a derivative work if: the original is not under copyright, you are the copyright owner, you hold a licence from the copyright owner that says you can, or your usage is fair use or fair dealing as applicable. For your proposal, the image is copyright, you don’t own it, you don’t have a licence and what you propose is neither fair use nor fair dealing. You can’t do it and you can be sued if you do. | You are in breach of Copyright. Plain and simple. Certain websites allow you to use the website content as long as a link is made, but the website must clearly state that. You may also use a tiny portion of the content if it falls under Fair Use, where "Fair Use" does not mean "I want to". The best thing to do is not to do it. You can't copy anybody's work without consent. If you're thinking about Google specifically then they offer multiple APIs so that you can use their content in a wide variety of ways. | If you develop a program yourself and it wasn't a work made for hire, then the program is yours to do with as you please. You hold the copyright to it. Many developers choose existing licencing arrangements or they can choose to create a license on their own, or using an attorney. And sometimes they choose to release their programs into the public domain. If you release it into the public domain, you are essentially giving up your copyright. The IDE (Integrated Development Environment) you used to develop your program does not dictate what licenses you can use. There are some existing licenses that others use (which you are free to use or NOT to use) give varying protections to you regarding what you are allowing others to do; right of others to copy, right of others to modify, right of others to distribute, rights to sub-licence, and so on. One of the licensing schemes is the GNU General Public License (GPL). But there are many others, too many to list here. | This is a common issue when a contractor is hired to write a technical document. Under united-states law, at least, the answer is clear. The contractor owns the copyright unless there is a written agreement transferring the copyright. This may or may not be a work-for-hire agreement, and there are some significant differences in the effects if it is, but an agreement in writing there must be. Otherwise the author (the contractor) retains the copyright. If you were an employee, the result would be the reverse. Even though you hold the copyright, I think you should, at a minimum, change any identifying details. There might be an invasion of privacy issue otherwise, and there surely would be an ethical issue. However, you do not hold the copyright of any original version that the client wrote. The client holds that, unless there was a written agreement giving you the copyright. If your final resume is sufficiently close to the original as to be a derivative work then you must have the client's permission before publishing it. If this is in the US, the issue of the client's copyright on the original version might be avoided via a claim of Fair Use (FU), as a comment mentions. This is a specifically US legal concept, although some other countries have a somewhat similar but narrower concept of Fair dealing. There is no automatic formula for what use will be considered a fair use -- the specific facts of the matter must always be considered. The statute lists four factors to consider, but the court may consider others as well, and caselaw says no one factor is dominant in all cases, they must be balanced The four factors as set out by 17 USC 17 are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Here as the writer would be using the whole work, factor (3) , the amount of the work used, would tilt against FU. The use is not educational or non-profit, nor transformative, so factor (1) also tilts against FU. There is probably no market for the original, which tilts factor (4) toward FU. The original is highly factual which tilts factor (2) toward FU. There is no telling where a court would come out, and the OP doesn't want to rely on a risky issue. If anyone were to relay on fair use for this sort of thing, consulting an attorney who could look at specifics would be a good idea. |
Is keeping weed/ganja for one time usage (for one person) a crime in India? Is it illegal to possess an amount equal to a one-time usage for one person? Is there any specific law for this? | Is this illegal? YES Is there any specific law for this? YES: Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 says, inter alia, this: Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,-- [...] (b) ... possesses ... or uses cannabis, [...] shall be punishable,-- (ii) where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b),-- (A) and involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both... Note that these are maximum sentences, and that Section 2 includes ganja in its definition of cannabis. | Leaving Colorado with a Marijuana product is illegal. You cannot bring Marijuana to Denver International or any other airport in Colorado. You also cannot bring Marijuana into a Federal Park, reserve, ski slope or National Parks. Colorado has a site outlining these restrictions, so no, you cannot bring back Marijuana to your home state, even if you can legally possess it in that state. | The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime. | It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification. | Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property. | We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances. | I think this relates to individual stores interpretation of California's "ABC Laws": § 25658. Sale to and consumption by person under 21 years of age; Use by peace officers to apprehend sellers of alcoholic beverages to minors (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic beverage to any person under 21 years of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in Section 25667 or 25668, any person under 21 years of age who purchases any alcoholic beverage, or any person under 21 years of age who consumes any alcoholic beverage in any on-sale premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (c) Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishing, giving, or giving away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age, and the person under 21 years of age thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The last part is the part that scares business owners. Some interpret it as "if they furnish alcohol to you (a person over 21) and have reasonable suspicion that the purchase will be given to the minor, the person furnishing the alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor". This is absolutely true in the case of bar owners/bartenders. If they sell somebody a drink, even if that person is over 21, and that drink is then given to a minor, they can be (probably not successfully) held responsible in some form for any injury that person sustains or commits as a result of alcohol consumption. Some stores take this much more seriously (because a violation can mean the loss/suspension of the liquor license) than others, and it is at the stores discretion to deny the sale based on any suspicion, whether based in reality or not. | If such conversations are reported, it can place the suspect in a dilemma. Consider a man who appears to have overdosed on illegal narcotics. He is taken to the hospital, and the doctor asks what kind of drugs he took, in order to plan his treatment. If the man thinks that what he says could be used to prosecute him, he might lie to the doctor. Then he would not receive proper medical treatment, putting his health at risk. Lawmakers or police authorities might decide that it is better for society for people to always be able to speak freely to their doctors and receive proper treatment, even if it means that it will sometimes be harder to prosecute criminals. That would be one possible rationale for a rule like this. |
How to carry a gun across federal lands In America, the federal court generally rules that the second amendment of the constitution is implied to be more restrictive than liberating, so carrying a firearm on federal property is often illegal in states where there are relatively few restrictions on the right to bear arms, like in NH. The laws on firearm use, carry, and ownership are notoriously byzantine. I'm wondering how NH citizens who legally can carry as per NH law could legally and openly carry a firearm despite federal restrictions? Some locals want to pick up trash here in NH and openly carry pistols to normalize (make acceptable) bearing firearms. Is it sometimes legal to carry if there is a federal building along the way? The goal is to walk along the easement. Is it ever/always/never legal to use the easement of federal land along a NH road while openly carrying a pistol despite not being active duty military/police? If the easement is irrelevant, the same question applies. | Federal rules concerning carrying firearms generally apply only to federal buildings, military bases and Indian reservations. National Forests, BLM lands and National Parks are governed by state law. The Concealed Carry web site contains more detailed information summarizing the legal situation. | 39 CFR § 232.1(l) provides that: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, rule or regulation, no person while on postal property may carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, or store the same on postal property, except for official purposes. Police officers on active duty, enforcing the law at the request of post office employees, appear to be discharging "official purposes". | Firstly, yours is not a valid argument. What is meant by "generally accessible" is public places like plazas, stretches of green by the road, parks, parking lots, etc. The definition is kind of a negative and could be more easily phrased as: "You may camp at A) designated camping areas or B) private places where you are entitled to camp". This means you either have to find a camping area where you pay a fee for a period of time, or you may camp on private grounds that either belong to you, or you have been given explicit permission to camp, say in a private garden or field. Of course this is practically impossible if you don't know anyone in there. But, the screenshot explicitly restricts this rule with the leading prase "Im Gemeindegebiet" which means if you leave the legal boundaries of Werfen, Salzburg county law applies (Which may or may not be similar). Disclaimer: While I don't have legal background, I can tell from personal experience that local governments are touchy on this and striking up camp somewhere where you are not allowed to will at least (if detected) require you to leave the premises immediately and the police may charge you with trespassing. | Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most "common" crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries. | The felon-possession law is Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503, which distinguishes Category I restricted person and Category II restricted person, a complex definitions that distinguish felons in general and violent felons, as defined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5. In the case stricter case, the law says: (2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under the person's custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony. and in the less strict case: (3) A Category II restricted person who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. The law does not impose any restrictions unrestricted people. A "dangerous weapon" is defined in 76-10-501(6)(a) as "a firearm; or an object that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury". They add a bit of subjectivity to their definition of "dangerous weapon" (i.e. "we'll decide after the fact if the thing is a dangerous weapon"), because: (b) The following factors are used in determining whether any object, other than a firearm, is a dangerous weapon: (i) the location and circumstances in which the object was used or possessed; (ii) the primary purpose for which the object was made; (iii) the character of the wound, if any, produced by the object's unlawful use; (iv) the manner in which the object was unlawfully used; (v) whether the manner in which the object is used or possessed constitutes a potential imminent threat to public safety; and (vi) the lawful purposes for which the object may be used. The felon could not have a stun gun with the intent to use it as a dangerous weapon, but it is not prohibited for a felon to have one to use on for legal purposes. There are contexts where stun guns are held to be dangerous weapons (United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509. Some states define stun guns as dangerous weapons, but that is not the case in Utah. It is also illegal for an unrestricted person to "sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any firearm or dangerous weapon to any person, knowing that the recipient is" a restricted person, and in cases of flagrant negligence the court might find that allowing such a person access to a dangerous weapon constituted "transferring" the weapon. | The first passage quoted appears to be from the North Carolina General Statutes section 14-269.2 (Weapons on campus or other educational property) The roughly corresponding section of South Carolina law is SECTION 23-31-215 (Issuance of permits.) subsection (M) (5). It is quite different in both wording and content. I do not find the second quoted passage in an online search, and I presume it is of the school's own writing. If you were in elementary school "about 10 years ago" it would seem that you are probably in high school or college now. Rules for those institutions are often quite different from elementary school and from each other. I have no way to evaluate what the school regulations on such subjects might be, but it is probably safer to leave your empty casing at home, although no rule you have quoted or that I can find online would prohibit it. An expended cartridge or casing is not a "gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind" and so this provision of NC 14-269.2 would not apply, even in North Carolina. An expended cartridge is not likely to be defined as a "weapon" either, and so the second quotes passage should not apply, although it is possible that the school regulations define "weapon" differently so that an expended cartridge is included. I have no way to know what other provisions the school regulations might include that would be relevant. | Law Enforcement can return a firearm to its owner so long as the owner is not prohibited from possessing firearms, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A person can demand the return of property seized as evidence, if both: The property is not needed for evidence in a criminal trial. The property is not "contraband" (meaning illegal for the claimant to possess). If Law Enforcement does not agree to return the property then the owner can petition a Court of jurisdiction for an order that it be returned. | The general story is that one state does not have jurisdiction over an act carried out in another state. The Wiki on state gun laws claims that ownership in Illinois requires a permit, but the law is here, and in fact the law addresses possession and acquisition, but not ownership, for example 430 ILCS 65/2: No person may acquire or possess firearm ammunition within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Department of State Police under the provisions of this Act It is legally immaterial that the word "Owner" is in the name of the card. It is likewise claimed that Massachusetts requires a license to own a gun, but from what I can tell the requirements pertain to licenses to possess or purchase, and not just to own. So there seems to be no impediment to actual ownership in the US. |
How can a business challenge a law or town ordinance without breaking it? In many cases towns and cities have unconstitutional laws on their books. For example, recently the Supreme Court ruled that blanket give-all-records-to-police hotel ordinances were unconstitutional. Nevertheless, many cities and town have ordinances that require hotels to record extensive information on all their guests and to allow police to search those records whenever the police want without a warrant or even notice of any kind. So, the question is how can a hotel challenge such ordinances and have them voided by the courts without breaking them and criminalizing themselves? Update: I found an article on this subject dating back to 1967 (Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 7 (May, 1967), pp. 1490-1513 (24 pages)). So, answers to this question could be seen as modern extensions to this paper with specific emphasis on civil or regulatory law (not criminal and not private). | There are two cases to consider. If there is some evidence that the city intends to enforce the ordinance, then the business can go to court for an injunction preventing the city from doing so, if they can show that such enforcement would harm them (e.g. by making them impose a records policy they don't want). They don't have to risk arrest by actually violating the ordinance first. In granting the injunction, the court would likely rule that this particular ordinance is unconstitutional, which seems to be the "voiding" that you're looking for. If the city shows no signs of wanting to enforce the ordinance (e.g. they are well aware that it is unconstitutional and not legally enforceable), then a request for an injunction would likely be dismissed as not ripe. Courts do not want to waste their time on cases where there is no real dispute between the parties, or on issuing orders for an entity not to do something that they weren't going to do anyway. It's understandable that the business might wish for an explicit ruling anwyay, in case they fear that the city will change its mind tomorrow and start cracking down, but unfortunately for them, courts do not agree that this is worth doing. Note in either case the ordinance will remain on the books until such time as the town council (or other relevant legislative body) should vote to repeal it. Courts have no power to make that happen, no matter how unconstitutional the ordinance might be. So the business might find it more effective to petition the council for a repeal. | Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section. | Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel. | Police reports are treated as "Business Records" and are therefore not excluded by the hearsay rule, regardless of the availability of the declarant. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803: Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay Business Records Exception The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. I suppose a valid defense in this case would be to bring into question the "trustworthiness of the preparation" (via 803(8)(B)), but it is still admissible. Admissibility of Police Reports A number of courts have held that a police report otherwise excluded by Rule 803(8) is admissible under the hearsay exception for recorded recollection in Rule 803(5). On the other hand... At least one court has held that the recorded recollection exception does not allow the admission of a police report that is excluded by Rule 803(8). Offering another reason for the exclusion, the court observed that such reports, particularly when they concern on-the-scene investigations, are considered less reliable than records prepared by other public officials because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases and the likelihood of the report’s use in litigation. See United States v. Pena-Gutierrez, 222 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2000); see also State v. Harper, 96 N.C. App. 36, 40–41(1989) (recognizing this rationale in finding police report inadmissible under Rule 803(8); court did not address admissibility under other rules). Recognizes the conflict of interest police have when recording evidence against a defendant, so it may be possible to argue admissibility in that way, but it seems most courts do not follow this line of thinking. | Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible. | No, all text of the Canadian constitution is of equal force. The 1993 Supreme Court case New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly) makes this clear: It is a basic rule, not disputed in this case, that one part of the Constitution cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of the Constitution: Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148. So if the privilege to expel strangers from the legislative assembly is constitutional, it cannot be abrogated by the Charter, even if the Charter otherwise applies to the body making the ruling. This raises the critical question: is the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers from its chamber a constitutional power? The opinion went on to determine that the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers was an unwritten constitutional principle which could not be abrogated by the written constitutional Charter (though they did not specifically call it an unwritten constitutional principle at the time, this is retroactively so through Reference Re Secession of Quebec para. 52). Edit: Following Toronto (City) v. Ontario (AG) 2021 SCC 34, it's not entirely clear New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. is still good law as the majority relegated unwritten principles to interpretive aids and filling structural gaps of the written Constitution, without referencing this case. The rule that the (written) Constitution cannot contradict itself seems logical though, and the cited Reference re Bill 30 does indeed state at para. 62 that the written Charter cannot override other parts of the Constitution (presumably we should read that as specifically written parts, since that's what was at issue in the reference). | I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision. | The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts. |
Tiki torch along property line If I have a tiki torch placed vertically on my property next to the pole there on my neighbor's property, and it catches fire, am I legally responsible? | It may depend on the jurisdiction (although I can't readily think of one where this is not the case) but deliberately, recklessly or negligently putting a burning object next to someone else's property knowing that there is a real risk of it catching fire (and going ahead with it anyway) will almost definitely make one liable: especially if there is an ulterior motive. In england-and-wales This would be called arson - causing criminal damage by fire - an offence contrary to section 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 Cross posted with the jurisdiction defining comment | The customers are able to leave, so there's no reason it could be a crime. Even if they weren't able to operate the lock themselves, they are presumably able to leave by asking a staff member. There is no way this could be remotely considered false imprisonment. Depending on the layout and size of the store and presence/lack of other fire exits, this might violate fire safety regulations. | Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined. | You can sue anyone for anything. I will answer these on the assumption that the real question is whether there is a legal basis for such a suit. 1) Could someone open a civil action against the city of Las Vegas for failure to provide security? Or are city/county municipalities immune? And is the state of Nevada immune? This would not prevail. There is governmental immunity and there is no duty of care. And there is also no plausible argument, factually, that somebody in the government did something wrong. Note also that a comment accurately notes that the incident took place in the City of Paradise rather than the City of Las Vegas, and the question has been revised accordingly. Some states have a general victim's compensation fund that helps partially cover losses of crime victims, but I am not aware that Nevada has one. 2) Could someone sue the concert promoters for failures to provide safety? And/or was that safety limited to the actual physical area of the concert? No. The risks were unprecedented, unforeseeable, and there would have been no cost effective way to prevent them. 3) Could someone sue the hotel/casino for failure to provide general safety? What about failure to prevent the gunman from bringing weapons into the hotel/casino? The hotel/casino is not a guarantor of general safety. The trouble with "failure to prevent" is that the weapons were legally obtained and owned. While it could have raised suspicions, there was no crime or illegal activity to report due to the lax guns laws of the U.S. and Nevada. Notably, in a similar suit arising out of the Aurora, Colorado theater mass shooting at a showing of The Dark Knight Returns, a court dismissed claims of those injured against the theater because the crime was not foreseeable at the time and because the crime was an intervening and superseding cause of the harm. The precedent is not directly applicable, since Nevada is in the 9th Circuit and is a different state, while Colorado is in the 10th Circuit. But, the principles of law that apply would be very similar and persuasive to a court in Nevada. 4) What about the store that sold the firearms to the shooter? Even though those sales appear to have been legal in Nevada? No. As you note, the sales appear to have been legal. If someone could show that the sales were made illegally, or worse, were made illegally with knowledge that this was intended, that would be a different story. 5) Or one or more of the firearm companies themselves? No. The guns were not defective and were in compliance with federal regulations. Specifically, this is governed by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act which would also apply to the conversion kits that he purchased to make some of the firearms more like automatic weapons. 6) What about the shooter, his estate, and/or his family? I assume it can be alleged that they might have known of the shooter's plans and/or failed to intercede. Claims Against The Shooter The shooter is dead, so he would be hard to serve with process (i.e. you can't sue dead people, you can only sue their estates). Another way that crime victims often receive compensation is from restitution awards in a criminal case. But, in U.S. jurisprudence, criminal charges cannot be brought against dead people and are automatically dismissed if a defendant dies before he is convicted or after he is convicted but before the conviction is final. Claims Against The Family Family is not legally responsible for other family member's torts and crimes simply by virtue of being family members (although claims against a decedent's estate may impact them by reducing the inheritance that they might otherwise have received) and there is no plausible reason to believe that anyone, other than possibly his girlfriend, would have had any knowledge of his plans. He appears to have had a distant relationship with his brother who knew nothing, his parents are dead, he was not currently married, he divorced each of his two successive wives long ago, and he has no descendants. Claims Against The Girlfriend His girlfriend might have knowledge and involvement (her ID was used, but apparently without her consent while she was out of the country, and the $100,000 sent to the Philippines, probably for her, could be construed as a unilateral dying gift) and the FBI is investigating that, but there is no terribly good reason to think that she could foresee what was going to happen or acted negligently in some respect. She has denied having any knowledge in public statements made by her lawyer - she says she thought he was just breaking up with her when he asked her to take a trip to see family in the Philippines and there is no immediate reason to doubt her statement. There is also not a general duty to report crimes which one suspects that someone you know will commit in the future. One could argue that the shooter had an arsenal of guns that could have clued in the girlfriend, but so does about 3% of the total population, and a much larger proportion of the population that is wealthy and has a hunting hobby. So even if she'd told authorities about the arsenal, this concern probably would have been dismissed, and without causation there is no cause of action. The $100,000 sent to the girlfriend could probably be recovered for the creditors of his estate as a fraudulent transfer action against the recipient. This has nothing to do with the fault of the girlfriend. But, any gift made while someone has liabilities or anticipated liabilities in excess of his assets are voidable, and the tort liability anticipated in this case would have been far in excess of the shooter's assets. Claims Against His Estate Claims for wrongful death absolutely can and should be filed in his estate. He was a wealthy man and there should be enough to at least make some payment to every victim. It may be necessary for a public administrator or a creditor to step forward to open the estate as it is unlikely that the shooter's family wants that job. They would not want the job because the heirs will almost surely get nothing from his probate estate because his tort liabilities almost certainly exceed his net worth. But, it is important that someone step up to serve as the executor of his estate, because otherwise his assets could be depleted by failures to pay debts resulting in penalties and seizures of collateral, and by failure to collect property to which his estate is entitled such as rent and mortgage payments owed to him or to companies he owns. There is a strict time limit for asserting claims against an estate that can often be a short as three months after the date of death. The relevant statute is as follows: 147.040. Claims: Limit on time for filing A person having a claim, due or to become due, against the decedent must file the claim with the clerk within 90 days after the mailing for those required to be mailed, or 90 days after the first publication of the notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020. A creditor who receives a notice to creditors by mail pursuant to subsection 5 of NRS 155.020 must file a claim with the clerk within 30 days after the mailing or 90 days after the first publication of notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020, whichever is later. If a claim is not filed with the clerk within the time allowed by subsection 1 or 2, the claim is forever barred, but if it is made to appear, by the affidavit of the claimant or by other proof to the satisfaction of the court, that the claimant did not have notice as provided in NRS 155.020 or actual notice of the administration of the estate, the claim may be filed at any time before the filing of the final account. The period of 90 days prescribed by this section is reduced to 60 days if summary administration is granted under chapter 145 of NRS. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.040. It is possible, and even likely, that filing new lawsuits against the shooter or his estate after his death, other than by filing a claim against his estate in a Nevada state probate case, would be barred by Nevada probate law, so that claims are concentrated in the claims process. Also, while federal courts would usually have jurisdiction over a diversity lawsuit brought by an out of state plaintiff against an in state defendant, there is a probate exclusion from diversity jurisdiction that requires claims to be filed in the probate estate rather than in federal court. The hardest question for the estate once it is liquidated will be how to allocate the estate's limited assets among unrelated debts of the decedent, claims of the deceased victims and claims of those victims who were injured or suffered property damage only. There are, of course, rules to govern that in the Nevada probate code and in case law. The primary rule that applies is as follows: The debts and charges of the estate must be paid in the following order: Expenses of administration. Funeral expenses. The expenses of the last illness. Family allowance. Debts having preference by laws of the United States. Money owed to the Department of Health and Human Services as a result of the payment of benefits for Medicaid. Wages to the extent of $600, of each employee of the decedent, for work done or personal services rendered within 3 months before the death of the employer. If there is not sufficient money with which to pay all such labor claims in full, the money available must be distributed among the claimants in accordance with the amounts of their respective claims. Judgments rendered against the decedent in his or her lifetime, and mortgages in order of their date. The preference given to a mortgage extends only to the proceeds of the property mortgaged. If the proceeds of that property are insufficient to pay the mortgage, the part remaining unsatisfied must be classed with other demands against the estate. All other demands against the estate. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.195. Of course, often people end their lives and go on killing sprees when their situation is much worse than it appears and it could be that he has debts that left him on the verge of bankruptcy with nothing left for others to recover out of his estate. Claims Against The Shooter's Liability Policies The shooter almost certainly had comprehensive general liability insurance policies in his businesses and homeowner's insurance that cover him for liability for negligence. But, these policies are required as a matter of public policy, and do as a matter of commercial practice, have an intentional acts exclusion. So, there is no reasonable argument that he or his estate were covered by insurance for his acts. Claims Against The Shooter's Life Insurance Policies and Retirement Plans As a wealthy accountant, the shooter probably have life insurance and probably had retirement plans. If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was his estate, the analysis is unchanged (but the IRS has a priority claim for taxes due upon the distribution of the retirement plan assets). Also, the fact that he killed himself does not invalidate his life insurance policy if it is incontestable (which is usually defined in the policy to mean at least two years old). If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was someone other than his estate (particularly if the beneficiary designation is more than four years old, removing the fraudulent transfer act as a challenge to the designation), the default rule is that these assets are not available to his creditors including the shooting victims. Some states allow an insolvent estate to invade certain non-probate transfers. I would need to do further research to determine how this applies in Nevada, but his probate estate might have a basis to recover some of the life insurance and retirement asset proceeds with third-party beneficiaries for the benefit of the insolvent estate. (There is also a choice of law issue presented. Many life insurance policies and retirement plans state that they are governed by the law of a particular state. It isn't always clear if that choice of law provision, or Nevada law, would control the question of whether an insolvent probate estate may access funds otherwise payable in a non-probate transfer to another beneficiary.) The main statute in Nevada governing invalid non-probate transfers is Nev. Rev. Stat. § 155.093, et seq., and it does not allow an insolvent estate to secure those funds, but I am not an expert on Nevada probate law and there may be another exception that allows an insolvent estate to reach these amounts. A Nevada statute which could be applicable to override these beneficiary designations says: SB 454, § 51. Creditor claim: General power created by powerholder Appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or of the powerholder's estate to the extent provided in chapter 112 of NRS. Subject to subsection 1, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is not subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or the powerholder's estate to the extent the powerholder irrevocably appointed the property in favor of a person other than the powerholder or the powerholder's estate. Subject to subsections 1 and 2, and notwithstanding the presence of a spendthrift provision or whether the claim arose before or after the creation of the power of appointment, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of: (a) The powerholder, to the same extent as if the powerholder owned the appointive property, if the power is presently exercisable; and (b) The powerholder's estate, to the extent the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claim and subject to the right of a decedent to direct the source from which liabilities are paid, if the power is exercisable at the powerholder's death. As used in this section, “power of appointment created by the powerholder” includes a power of appointment created in a transfer by another person to the extent the powerholder contributed value to the transfer. Nev. Rev. Stat. § SB 454, § 51. The beneficiary designation could be reviewed as a power of appointment. Chapter 112 of the Nevada Revised Statutes is Nevada's Fraudulent Transfer Act. 7) And more of an opinion: could a group of victims attain class action status against any of those entities? Against the shooter's estate, yes. Against anyone else, there is not a valid cause of action unless new facts are revealed. On the other hand, since the probate claims process consolidates claims into a single case at a single forum before a single judge, it would usually be unnecessary to file a class action in this situation. Other Possible Plaintiffs and Defendants The Hotel The shooter damages the hotel's windows and his room, and he may not have paid his bill. These would be claims of the hotel in his estate. Criminal Enterprise Victims Josh Marshall at the Talking Points Memo is among those who have suggested that his spending was far in excess of his apparent source of income, and that he may have been engaged in some form of illegal activity which could conceivably even have caused him to decide to end his life. The shooter reported his source of income in real estate transactions as $1,000,000 per year from "gambling", which as Josh Marshall accurately points out, is pretty much impossible given the type of gambling that he engaged in which is overwhelmingly biased in favor of the House in the long run. Professional gamblers play games like poker where it is possible, at least in principle, to win in the long run without cheating. But, he didn't play those kinds of games with any frequency. One of the more plausible explanations for why he would gamble so much is that it is a form of money laundering that allows him to turn ill gotten gains that he would use to purchase chips at casinos into gambling winnings, in exchange for the house's inevitable net gains from his bets in the long run (which can be a pretty small percentage transaction cost, on average, compared to other forms of money laundering). If so, others may have claims against his estate, that compete with the claims of the shooting victims, under statutes such as RICO, based upon this conduct if there was any. Criminal Conspiracies Of course, if evidence came out that this was actually done at the direction of some criminal syndicate (perhaps to raise the price of gun company stocks?), that would be another thing entirely and one could sue the other conspirators (as well as prosecuting them criminally), but there is nothing strong enough to file a case in court that would survive an attorneys' Rule 11 obligations to file claims with a genuine factual basis at this point. It would be an avenue to investigate on the long shot possibility that this conspiracy theory was true. Such conspiracies are not entirely unprecedented. One mass shooting incident in Germany recently that was originally believed to be a terrorist attack turned out to have been motivated by a desire to influence the financial markets. Life Insurance Policies Everyone who has a life insurance policy that was killed could make a claim against that policy. The harder legal question is whether people who had only "accidental death" life insurance policies could make claims in this case. Worker's Compensation Claims Everyone who was killed or injured while on the job at the scene (e.g. roadies for the concert, security guards, police, photographers working the show) could make a worker's compensation claim against their employer's worker's compensation policy. This would include medical costs, lost wages and funeral expenses. Health Insurance Everyone with health insurance who was injured who was not on the job could make a health insurance claim for their medical costs. CGL, Auto and Homeowner's Insurance Claims Most comprehensive general liability insurance (CGL) policies of businesses would cover property damage in this incident. Most automobile insurance policies (but certainly not all) would cover damage to a car in this incident. Most homeowner's and renters insurance policies would cover property damage to property other than a vehicle in this incident. It wouldn't be unusual for a CGL policy for the concert organizers or the venue would have a provision that covers medical expenses up to a small dollar limit for injuries sustained by invitees (i.e. concert goers) at the concert or venue as the case might be. But, it wouldn't be unusual for there to be no such coverage. Travel Insurance Claims From the comments: Many tourists from the UK would have travel insurance. Other European countries probably as well. I checked the online terms of a random UK company, they would pay for the cost of hospital treatment or funeral in case of "unexpected injury", and I seriously hope they wouldn't claim that if someone fires a gun at you, an injury would be "expected". Plus travel related expenses, like transport home, just losing your flight etc. The one I checked wouldn't pay for disability except for "personal injury", that is something you caused yourself. And no compensation, just the actual financial loss. Tort Claims Of People Not Personally Injured The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress tort, which is recognized by Nevada, while by its terms applicable only to "negligence" cases not at issue here, allows recovery by someone who had a near miss with physical harm and suffers emotional distress as a result. There is a reasonable chance that Nevada courts would allow this tort to be applied to "near miss" cases of intentional physical injury. Pretty much anyone on the scene (roughly 22,000 people) could arguably make such a claim against the shooter's estate. Spouses of people who are injured can often make a claim for "loss of consortium" in Nevada for physical harm to their spouse, even if they are nowhere near the scene of the incident. These claims could be made against the shooter's estate. This would allow claims by several hundred people in this situation. Many of the wrongful death claims would be statutory claims of next of kin, rather than claims brought by their estates. these would be brought against the shooter's estate. Trivia Point If this had happened on certain Indian Reservations, there probably would have been federal liability to all Indians harmed in the attack, as the federal government has liability for all criminal harm caused by "bad men" on the Indian Reservations in question to Indians under the treaties creating those reservations. But, obviously, the Las Vegas strip is not in Indian Country, even though many casinos in the U.S. are in Indian Country. | It isn't precisely clear which jurisdiction you are located in (recall that this website handles matters from everywhere in the world). But, generally speaking, in the United States, you have no right to limit someone's existing tree on their property merely because it casts a shadow on your solar panels. The installer should have known better. A minority of U.S. states, including California, consider new construction that blocks the view of existing structures a form of "nuisance" that can be abated if it unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of the existing property. But, that protects existing structures, rather than new ones. In Japan, there are building code requirements designed to insure that key portions of every home get natural sunlight daily. Again, this only applies to the construction of new buildings. I know of no law that gives someone who newly installs a solar panel a right to remove or trim a neighbor's tree simply by virtue of doing so. And, without knowing whose law is involved it would be impossible to determine with any reliability. The property with the solar panel could seek to buy the right to an unobstructed view from the property with the tree, in what would probably be called a "view easement", but that would only happen if the terms were such that both consented and it was written up in a legal document to that effect. | This question is controlled almost entirely by local municipal and county ordinances. It is not a question of federal law that is uniform across the U.S. and in most cases it is not even a question of state law. So, there is no single answer to your question. Most localities regulate this with some combination of hotel specific building codes (usually incorporated by reference from a uniform building code promulgated by a private non-profit organization as a model building code provision) and hotel specific local zoning ordinances. | I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise. | This is not a place for specific legal advice, but you shouldn't be afraid of the small claims court; I'm doing that myself and it really is a low-risk and straightforward way to get money that is owed to you. Step 1: Get the boiler repaired or replaced as necessary. Keep the receipts. Don't be tempted to get an upgrade or anything else to push expenses that are legitimately yours on to the other party; find out what the cheapest thing is that you can reasonably do to fix the problem and then do that. Step 2: Write a letter to the seller in which you set out the facts of the case and demand the cost of the repairs. Also include any other expenses you have had to incur, like money for your time off work while the repair is done. End it with "If you do not agree to pay this money within one month then I will take action in the county court to recover the money". Send it by recorded delivery and include a copy of the repair receipt (NOT the original). Step 3: If you do not get your money then go here and follow the instructions. You have to pay an up-front fee to the court which gets added on to the amount you are claiming. That is the only money you are putting at risk if you lose. The whole thing is as informal and straightforward as possible, and is purposely designed so that you don't need a lawyer, nor can you or the other side claim for the cost of a lawyer if you win. This is why your lawyer is pushing you to do this by yourself: he knows that his fees would be out of proportion to the amount in question, and you wouldn't be able to get that money back even if you won. The only other wrinkle is if the other party has moved far away: in general if a hearing is needed then it will be held near them rather than near you, so you might have to travel. |
Is this a valid approach to ask consent under GDPR? I'm trying to figure out the best way to gather user consent to use third-party services in a mobile app for users under the GDPR. Let's say that I have an app that uses third party services (analytics, ads...) which collects personal identifiable information. In the first app launch a dialog would be presented to the user: This app uses tracking identifiers We use tracking identifiers to collect information about how you interact with our app. We use this information in order to improve your experience, for analytics purposes and advertising. You can find out more about our use of cookies in our Privacy Policy and change your preferences below. BUTTON: Accept BUTTON: Change preferences I offer a link to my Privacy Policy here. If the user accepts, everything is set up normally. If the user clicks on the change preferences button, it is directed to a privacy preferences screen: Preferences screen I don't have the exact texts, but here I would basically present a list of each third party service I work with, their privacy policy, how do they use the user's data, and a checkbox to enable/disable the data collection For the ads, here I state that if the user does not consent, the app will continue to show ads but no personalization will be done on them. The app would also allow the user to change their preferences at any time in the future. My questions regarding this implementation are: Is this overall approach correct, and fully compliant with the law? It is OK if I set all of the options to enabled the first time that the user goes to the preference screen (enabled by default) ? | How to properly ask for consent is an evolving issue. Your general consent flow is very common, but I don't think it's entirely compliant. Legal background on consent Consent is one of the Art 6 GDPR legal bases for processing. The ePrivacy directive (ePD) also mandates consent for accessing information on a user's device, where such access is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. For example, this means that analytics cookies require consent. Consent is defined in Art 4(11) as: any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her Further conditions for consent are given in Art 7, such as that “It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent”. The EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent provide extensive interpretation of the GDPR that should be considered as effectively binding. First layer: accept / change preferences The first consent layer provides general information about the purposes that consent is being sought for. This seems to be mostly compliant, but I have some doubts. Consent must be freely given, and withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. I would therefore recommend having a “continue without consenting” option that is given roughly equal prominence to the alternatives. Consent must be informed. Even in the first layer, you must give basic information. In the EDPB guidelines, the following items are identified: controller's identity purposes of processing what type of data will be collected existence of the right to withdraw consent if relevant: that the data will be used for profiling/automated decision making if relevant: possible risks if international data transfers are made under Art 49(1)(a) I think this makes it difficult to collected an “agree to all” style consent that covers all purposes. It would be better to clearly distinguish between the analytics and advertising purposes even in your first layer. Consent must be specific to a purpose. You try to make this possible via a second layer where granular choices can be made. This isn't entirely bad, since you also need to make the consent flow simple enough as to avoid click fatigue. But since you only have two processing purposes, it would be better to show them separately on the first layer. You cannot generally make access to the app conditional on unrelated consent. The statement “This app uses tracking identifiers” suggests that there is no choice. It would be better to make it clear that the user can voluntarily consent to such processing. Together, this would mean that a design like the following could be more compliant. Text in [brackets] indicates buttons or links. Your privacy choices To support and improve this app, you can choose to give us access for the following purposes: Analytics: understanding how you use this app We would like to collect information on how you interact with the app, and store cookies on your device for this purpose. [more information] [decline / agree] More relevant advertising We will always show ads, but if you want we can build an interest profile to show you more relevant ads. [more information] [decline / agree] You can always change your choices in the app settings, but past use of your data remains legal after withdrawing consent. ExampleApp is provided by ExampleDeveloper Ltd. [full privacy notice] [continue] Second layer: detailed information about all services Your second layer sounds good, as it provides granular controls and more detailed information. As already mentioned, I would move some of this to the first layer. But one of your questions pertains to the defaults on this screen: It is OK if I set all of the options to enabled the first time that the user goes to the preference screen (enabled by default) ? No, this is not OK. Consent means opt-in, and requires an affirmative action by the user. You cannot have pre-checked checkboxes. The default is that no consent was given. If you have an “enable all” button, I would also expect a “disable all” button. Else, consent might not have been given freely. You also cannot rely on the consent until consent has been actually given. So you must not start collecting analytics in the background while the user is still on the consent choice screen. In addition to being non-compliant by itself, loading pre-ticked checkboxes increases the risk that your application accidentally considers the consent as already being given, which could easily lead to illegal processing if there's a bug in your app. You might have processing purposes that are based on a legitimate interest instead of consent. These can be enabled by default, but you generally have to make it possible for the user to object. Your relationship with third parties When using third party services, it is crucial to understand if they are a processor who is contractually bound to only use the data on your behalf, or a separate processor. You must disclose processors (or at least categories of processors) in your privacy notice, but not really during the consent flow. The GDPR does not distinguishing between doing processing activities yourself versus outsourcing them to a processor. In both cases, you are the controller, and only you are asking for consent. Thus, it's also superfluous to show third party privacy notices. It's your obligation as the controller to provide all necessary information. If you are collecting consent for other controllers with whom you have joint processing activities, you must make this much more prominently. You would have to disclose in the first layer that you are sharing the data with other controllers who can use the data for their own purposes. This sharing is part of the processing purpose. This is quite tricky to do correctly when it comes to ad networks, since ad networks generally won't be your data processor and can have many intransparent members. Demonstrating consent As the data controller, it is your obligation to be able to demonstrate that valid consent has been given. This implies process-level obligations such as being able to show that your consent flow is non-coercive and makes it possible to decline consent. This also implies individual-level obligations such as being able to show when a given user has given or withdrawn consent for which purpose. If you have a backend anyway, it could be sensible to store information there about consent/withdraw events. When the user returns to the consent management screen through the app settings, you could show a timestamp like “you consented to this purpose on 2021-08-22 17:14:23”. I have recently written a more detailed discussion about demonstrating consent. | Yes, GDPR applies: you are a data controller established/living in the UK or are offering services to people in the UK you fall under the material scope of the GDPR. The Art 2(2)(c) exemption for “purely personal or household activity” does not apply since you're offering the service to the public. You must consider GDPR compliance here. This is especially important as you are showing personal data to the public. Don't do that unless you have a very good reason, appropriate safeguards, and are clear to users how their information will be shown. On a high level, GDPR compliance involves working on the following questions: For what purpose are you processing personal data? Context: purpose limitation principle per GDPR Art 5(1)(b) What is the legal basis for processing? GDPR Art 6(1) lists the available legal bases. Here, consent, necessity for performance of a contract, or a legitimate interest could be a legal basis. They may have further obligations attached. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test that considers the data subject's rights and freedoms. Consent must fulfil the conditions per Art 7 in order to be valid. What is the minimal data necessary to achieve the purpose? Per the Art 5(1)(c) data minimisation principle, it is illegal to process personal data beyond what is necessary and adequate. You must provide data protection by design and by default per Art 25. Special categories of data per Art 9 such as health data are illegal to process outside of narrow exemptions. You must delete data once it is no longer necessary. What appropriate safeguards and security measures should you apply? Per Art 24 and 25, you are responsible for determining and implementing appropriate measures. This depends a lot on your specific context, so there's no checklist you can apply. Per Art 25(1) you must pseudonymize the processed information if that is compatible with the processing purpose. What further compliance measures do you have to consider? There are additional GDPR and non-GDPR compliance measures. From the GDPR side: Use the answers to these questions to write a privacy policy, including the information that you must provide to data subjects per Art 13. Consider whether you have to maintain a Records of Processing document per Art 30, or if you have to make a Data Protection Impact Assessment per Art 35. If you use third party services, figure out whether they are a joint controller or data processor and apply appropriate safeguards. If you have data processors, ensure that you have a contract in place that covers the items from Art 28(3). If you share data with other controllers (not processors) you need a legal basis for doing so. If you transfer data into a non-EU/EEA country (after 2020: non-UK country) you need a legal basis per Art 44 and have to cover additional items in your privacy policy. Ideally, the target country is covered by an EC adequacy decision per Art 45. For US-based companies, this is the case only when they have self-certified under the Privacy Shield framework. Non-GDPR compliance steps could include cookie consent banners, or showing a VAT ID. How can you prepare for data subject requests? Data subjects have various rights per Arts 15–23, subject to the modalities in Art 12. For example, a data subject could request that their information is erased from your website. The exact rights also depend on the legal basis you selected. You should figure out in advance how to deal with such requests. | These kinds of cookie banners are typically noncompliant and useless since they are not clear and provide too little information to users. Careful: blocking a user who declines consent is usually a GDPR violation! Instead, only those aspects of the site that rely on this consent should be disabled. When cookie consent is needed Per the EU ePrivacy directive (PECR in the UK), information society services (websites, apps, …) are only allowed to store or access information on the end user's device if one of the following holds: the access or storage is strictly necessary for performing a service that was explicitly requested by the user; or the user has given consent Note: there is no “legitimate interest” exception for cookies. When is access/storage strictly necessary? For example, it is strictly necessary for a photography app to store photos on a device. It is strictly necessary for a website to store session cookies so that you can log in to the site. It is strictly necessary for an ecommerce site to store the contents of your shopping cart. It is strictly necessary to remember cookie consent status. And so on. It is not strictly necessary from the perspective of the user to have analytics cookies, ad personalization cookies, or cookies for features that the user doesn't actually use. Many websites that just provide the service the user expects will therefore not have to ask for cookie consent, even if they use cookies. It is worth noting that the ePrivacy definition is entirely technology-neutral. It doesn't relate specifically to cookies, but to any kinds of storage, including LocalStorage. Regulatory guidance considers any access or storage of information on the device to be in scope, even JavaScript APIs in a browser (for example to read the screen dimensions), and considers techniques like fingerprinting to be functionally equivalent and therefore subject to the same rules. It is also worth noting that these rules apply regardless of whether the information being accessed/stored qualifies as “personal data”. What consent is Consent is defined in Art 4(11) and Art 7 GDPR, and further explained in EDPB guidelines 05/2020. A defining feature of consent is that it must be freely given. The user must not suffer “detriment” for revoking or declining consent. And per Art 7(4): When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. This disallows making access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. For example, it would not be permissible for a website to exclude users who decline consent for advertising cookies. But: The EDPB guidelines discuss that there can be “permissible incentive” for consent. For example, courts and some DPAs seem to be of the opinion that a subscription website can offer free access to users that consented to personalized ads: consent-or-pay-walls can be compliant, whereas consent-walls alone would not. Sometimes consent is really needed for a processing activity, in which case it is OK to block that service until consent is given. For example, websites should not load third party content like YouTube videos or embedded maps until consent is given to share personal data with the third party. The rest of the website should still work, though. If consent was not freely given, if the user didn't have an actual choice, then the consent is invalid. What should the data controller in your scenario do? The data controller should reassess the role of the cookies for which they are trying to ask for consent. If these cookies are strictly necessary from the user's perspective, then it is proper to inform the user about them – but this should not be confused with consent. It is my personal opinion that purely informational cookie banners are confusing/misleading and should be avoided, but this could also be argued differently. If these cookies are not strictly necessary, then the phrasing “We need to use cookies to provide you with our service” is quite misleading. It should be made clearer to the user that they can opt-in to additional services/improvements if they want to. The user should be able to configure this on a per-purpose basis. Thus, more compliant cookie consent flows will typically give the user three options: continue with only strictly necessary cookies/purposes (must be default behaviour if none is selected) consent to all purposes configure purposes For example, I'm fairly happy with the current Reddit cookie notice: Why this is a good notice: it explains the data controllers (Reddit and partners) it summarizes the purposes for which consent is sought it links to more detailed information the presented options “accept all” an “reject non-essential” are less ambiguous that “accept/decline” Comparing this with the list of minimum required information for informed consent in section 3.3.1 of the EDPB guidelines linked above, the following information is missing though: the identity of the “partners” what (type of) data will be collected and used the existence of the right to withdraw consent | Keeping logs of chats would not necessarily be against the GDPR as you have suggested. For the IRC service provider/operator: these chats/logs would be within scope if EU-based users are involved and this means the data controller/processors would have legal obligations to comply with GDPR. The IRC service provider/operator would be the data controller and would be held ultimately responsible for the data stored/processed through the IRC service, including backups and logs kept etc, and this would mean any sub-processors they select (such as hosting provider) would also have to be GDPR compliant. Due to the nature of IRC chats being entirely public in the same way forum board posts and comments are public, the contract terms between the IRC service provider and the IRC users would need to be very clear that this is the case, and the IRC users would need to give consent for this processing (this is more complicated for children, see Article 8 regarding consent from the holder of parental responsibility). For IRC users (personal use): If you wish to keep the chat records for personal use only (i.e. not in connection with a business or your employment at a business), then an exemption applies: This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; ... (GDPR, Article 2: Material Scope, Paragraph 2(c), p.32) For IRC users (commercial/business use): In this case I don't think you would have any legal basis to store/process these chats/logs if they contain personal data without a legal agreement with the data controller which would require you to put in place the same protections they have to under GDPR but then allow your business to access the data for specific purposes. While the information may be published or considered to be in the 'public domain', for you to take a copy of it without permission and use it for a purpose they haven't consented to would not be allowed under GDPR. Additionally, to go through the process of removing personal data from the chats/logs would in itself be considered 'processing' under GDPR and therefore would be unauthorised without a legal agreement with the data controller. Practically therefore, your best options under this circumstance would be if: The IRC service provider implemented a 'favourites' feature to save within their own system the chat conversations you wish to retain and refer back to in future. Since they hold the data and you already have a user agreement with them there is no further complications (this is probably the best option); The IRC service provider implemented a feature to download an anonymized copy of a chat conversation (not ideal as there are no guaruntees a user will not include personal data in their messages, though the user agreement could state that message content will be considered to exclude personal data, in a similar way to how StackExchange do for this website, see the paragraph titled "Information You Choose to Display Publicly on the Network" on the StackExchange Privacy Policy). Your business considered an alternative communications solution, such as hosting its own real-time chat system or forum boards system, in which case your business would be the data controller, and while subject to GDPR you could then define the purposes for which the data will be used in your own user agreement. | It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK. | Article 4(11) says: ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; Recital 32 says (my emphasis): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement.2 This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data.3 Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. ... At the time of writing, the most recent guidance on consent from the European Data Board says: The use of pre-ticked opt-in boxes is invalid under the GDPR | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | The scope of the GDPR is entered when personal data is being processed in a structured manner. Personal data is any information relating to identifiable data subjects (definition in Art 4(1)). "Peter attended the meeting on the 14th" is personal data. "That woman with the blue handbag said she wanted to return on the 25th" is personal data. However, aggregate statistics do not relate to individuals, and are typically not personal data. "On the 14th, we had 25 attendees" is not personal data. Not all use of personal data is within the scope of the GDPR. For example, the GDPR would not apply if two organizers talk about who attended the meeting. However, Art 2(1) says the GDPR applies when personal data is processed wholly or partially with automated means (e.g. computers, smartphones), or forms a filing system or is intended for a filing system (e.g. keeping notes on attendees, keeping attendance lists) If GDPR applies, the organization would be responsible for ensuring compliance with its rules and principles, summarized in Art 5. Primarily, this means: having a clear purpose for processing selecting a suitable Art 6 legal basis for that purpose (e.g. consent or a legitimate interest) only processing the minimum data necessary for achieving that purpose determining and implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of the processing activities preparing for data subject rights, in particular by providing an Art 13 privacy notice when collecting data from the data subjects There are of course some complexities in the details. When the legal basis is "consent" (opt-in), the organization would have to ensure that this consent was freely given and sufficiently informed. Per Art 7(4), consent would not be freely given if that consent was a condition for access to the meeting. Using "legitimate interest" (opt-out) can be more flexible, but it requires performing a balancing test to show that the legitimate interest isn't outweighed by the data subjects' interests, rights, and freedoms. Roughly, relying on a legitimate interest is appropriate when the data subjects can reasonably expect the processing activity to occur. Regarding point 1, keeping general counts and aggregate statistics about attendees is probably OK since it wouldn't be personal data. If you are very conscientious about this, you could round all counts and use categories like "0-4 attendees, 5-9 attendees" for each facet, which makes it more difficult to make inferences about individuals. But the fundamental point is that all your data should relate to attendees as a whole, never to individuals. Regarding point 2 and 3, this is a question of legal basis. Since you gather names through informal conversations, I think that attendees would be weirded out if they learned that you kept detailed records on their attendance. So I think that you probably wouldn't have a legitimate interest here. However, being upfront with this and offering an opt-out could change this. On the aspect of keeping detailed notes on data from informal conversations, I'd like to point out H&M's EUR 35 million fine back in 2020 (summary on GDPRHub.eu). In a callcenter, managers used to have conversations with employees. These conversations touched on anything from vacation experiences to health problems, marriage problems, and religious beliefs. All of that is fine. What was not fine is that the managers went full Stasi and kept detailed notes about all of this on a shared drive and used that information for management decisions. This went on until a configuration error made those files accessible to all employees. This violated all the points in the basic compliance process outlined above: the records had no clear purpose, no suitable legal basis, contained way more data than necessary (and even Art 9 special categories of data like information on health or religious beliefs which have extra protection), did not have appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access, and did not fulfill data subject rights like the Art 13 right to be informed. In case this non-profit is a church or religious organization that had its own comprehensive data protection rules before the GDPR came into force in 2018, those can continue to apply per Art 91. This could probably address some issues of legal basis, but cannot circumvent the GDPR's general principles. |
Does preventing a murder justify breaking a "No Trespassing" law? If I see a "No Tresapssing" sign on a house door, but I hear screems for help from inside. The window was left open by mistake and I see a big guy beating an unarmed man and getting ready to kill him. Would I be justified in front of the law to break in and shoot for the big guy's gun? (I am also putting the big guy's life in danger by shootin but he comes out unharmed). Question: Assuming that my claims about the imminent murder having been about to take place prove to be correct, will the law, as it stands written, find me guilty of any of the 2 crimes that I have just comitted? The question is not about the morality or practicality of my actions. It is purely legal. | There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her. | Because your buddy routinely points loaded firearms at you First, you should probably get friends who don’t do this but, even though this is objectively a threat, you know that you are in no danger (barring accidents). Self-defence is not justified. This is why there is the dual requirement that the danger is clear to both: an objective observer, and the person under threat. | As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent. | I would just like to clarify, in addition to the other answers and what Dale M alluded to, one important detail: Unless you are carrying out the death penalty, no one under any circumstances is allowed to kill anyone else. What you are sometimes authorized to do, is to use deadly force. There is an important distinction between the two. When using deadly force, you are using extreme force to stop someone doing something, which may result in getting that person killed, but killing isn't the point, stopping whatever he is doing is. If instead of a knife you had a gun on the train, you shot the guy in the face, his crime spree came to and end, yet he was still alive but unconscious, and you decided to "finish the job" and shoot him some more, you'd be going to prison. The language is important. Even if in self defense situations, if you say that you were shooting to kill, you're going to be in serious trouble, but if you say you were shooting to stop, you're in the clear. | For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that. | Does the castle doctrine apply in getting them to leave? No Short Answer: Reasonable force may be used to remove the guest as they have become a trespasser - killing them in the circumstances described would be unreasonable and excessive force. Long Answer: The Texas Castle Doctrine, referred to as Deadly Force In Defence Of Person at section 9.32 of the State Penal Code, can only be used in response to another's use (or attempted use) of deadly force or to prevent certain violent crimes: (a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another: (1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31 [Self Defence - see below]; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary: (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery [...] Deadly Force is defined by section 9.01(3) to mean: ... force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury. Note that justification for the Self Defence provisions at section 9.31 expressly exclude such things as mere "yelling and cussing" but (if the circumstances are such) "acting very unpredictable" may be applicable if it meets the criterion for attempted unlawful force: (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. [...] (b) The use of force against another is not justified: (1) in response to verbal provocation alone; [...] However As the guest "will not leave" it can be safely assumed that their conditions of entry in to the house have been withdrawn making them a trespasser which is covered by the Protection Of One's Own Property provisions at section 9.41: (a) A person in lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property. [...] My links to the Penal Code may not go directly to the section described, so a word search using the section numbers may be required. |
Can you sue the courts and involved agencies for custody orders that proved harmful to you as a child? One of my friend's parents, we'll call him Jamal, were separated early on. While both of his parents fought vigorously for custody of him and his brother Rodney, the court chose to grant his mother primary custody, awarding his father the right to have them every other weekend. The problem was that his mother was absolutely awful. At home, he was frequently beaten and berated often, both by his mother, and his step-father. On more than one occasion Jamal's father took he and his brother to the police station to show them the bruises caused by their mother/step-father, but every time the police said there was nothing they could do. At his mother's house, the cabinets were often bare and they would frequently go hungry. The children were constant targets of their mother's drunken tirades, and years later Jamal realized that the small glass pipe he found in his mother's drawer was a meth pipe. Their mother only ever worked once for a very brief time in a bar she used to frequent; otherwise, she lived a parasitic lifestyle living off the system, other men, and finally an old dying man that helped her out. When at his father's house, Jamal and his siblings had a strict daily regimen. Jamal's father was a hardworking man who owned his own business, and commanded respect. Jamal and his brother fully respected their dad, because they saw how hard he worked to take care of them. Also at his dad's house, were Jamal's and Rodney's younger (half- though they would never make this distinction) siblings. Their dad expected his children to behave appropriately, and they did. Jamal and his brother respected and loved their dad, who never laid a finger on them. They would eat a home-cooked meal cooked by their (step-though again they don't make this distinction) mother. AT dinner, they would all sit around the table and catch up on missed time that their mother was robbing them of. In court, Jamal begged the court to allow him to stay with his father. Social workers were sent to both homes to determine fitness, but their mother was told about the visit beforehand with ample opportunity to prepare, so she had the children clean the house and she bought groceries beforehand. Finally, when Jamal turned 15, he was allowed to make the decision to live with his father. Jamal no longer speaks to his mother after she falsely accused him of hitting her. And, she did the exact same thing to her other son, Jamal's (half) brother. To me, the court was negligent in assuming the fitness of the mother over the fitness of the father. The court conducted no investigation into the fitness of the mother, despite the mother having an extensive criminal record, which saw her ordered to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, on more than one occasion. Conversely, their father had no criminal record, a means to support the children, and never harmed any of the children. To me the court, the social worker, and anyone else involved in the situation was negligent. And the result of that negligence caused a young boy to have to endure more than a decade of physical and emotional abuse, and neglect. The question is Can Jamal sue for the pain and suffering he had to endure all those years? Now, I am aware that judges cannot be sued due to immunity. But, can the California courts be sued as an entity? I imagine judges made sure they closed any loophole that would possibly hold them accountable, which I am sure is intentional, so I doubt this is possible, but I can't find anything regarding this situation online. What about Child Protective Services where they lived? Is there anyone who could be held responsible for such a gross oversight? Thank you. *** Quick note: Jamal is now 33, so I am certain he is past the statute of limitations. He turned out fine despite everything. This question is more of a hypothetical for others who may have been in similar situations. | The State of California is not responsible for injuries committed by private citizens Sorry to hear about your friend. Jamal may have a case (although the scope is narrow and timeframes are strict and tight) if someone employed by the state didn't do what they should have done. There is a whole raft of rules and regulations surrounding child welfare and Jamal would need to demonstrate exactly what they did that they shouldn't have done or what they should have done that they didn't do to have any basis for a claim. You will note that there is an obligation to make assessments -if they didn't make an assessment, they might be liable; if they made the wrong assessment, they aren't. Contested child welfare cases are difficult - caseworkers and social worlkers are presented with a lot of contradictory information and outright lies and the law accepts that if they make a good faith attempt to do their job, they haven't done anything wrong even if they make the wrong call. As for the court "assuming" anything, that is simply not true. The court would have heard the evidence (contested and contradictory no doubt) and made a judgement based on that evidence. It may have been the objectively wrong judgement but it was a perfectly legal one. In any event, you can't sue the court for a wrong judgement, you can only appeal it to a higher court subject to the time limits and your ability to pay. As a practical matter, child protection services are generally chronically underfunded, understaffed and overworked as are the courts that deal with such cases. A typical caseworker might have to deal with 50-100 cases similar to your friend every week - that gives them 5-15 minutes to (partially) read the file and try to decide what's best for the child. Sad to say, your friend is one of the lucky ones - came out the other end with a good relationship with one of his parents, isn't dead, isn't a drug addict and isn't homeless. And no, you can't sue the state for things being the way they are: that's what the voters want because if it isn't they'd elect politicians who would change it. | For clarity, in a divorce case in New York State involving children, the judge typically decides: (1) child custody, (2) child support, (3) alimony, (4) division of the couple's property, and (5) allocation of attorney's fees and costs associated with the case. The judge also terminates the marriage if the jurisdictional requirements for doing so are met. In New York State, there is both no fault divorce and fault based divorce, and in a fault based divorce, the judge decides if fault was present. Divorces are handled by the New York State Supreme Court (not, as one might suspect, by the New York State Family Court), which is a trial court of general jurisdiction in New York State. In a fault based divorce, marital fault is considered with regard to issues of property division and alimony, but not with regard to child custody or child support. If you are married and your wife has a child during the marriage, in New York State, you are presumed to be the father of the child. You can bring a lawsuit to prove that you are not the father of the child, but the deadline for doing so is fairly short after the child is born. After five years this statute of limitations would probably have run. But, it sounds like the infidelity is not alleged to have caused the wife to become pregnant, so that isn't really an issue. The extreme levels you would have gone to in order to spite your spouse and your hostility towards her, make it unlikely that the court would award you full custody or joint custody, although it would be required to award you some parenting time so long as you were legally presumed to be the father. If you are legally considered to be a parent of the child, custody will be allocated in the best interests of the child, and child support will be awarded based primarily on your income, your ex-wife's income, and the number of nights that the child spends with each parent. In all likelihood, you would be awarded little parenting time given your conduct and statements, and full custody would be awarded to the wife who would get child support from you based upon your income. (Assets are rarely considered in child support awards.) If you sign assets over to your brother, the court will probably treat you as if you still owned those assets for purposes of property division upon the divorce. If your assets exceed those of your spouse, the court will probably award all remaining assets to your spouse and require you to pay a property equalization payment to your spouse to make up for your inability to pay a full amount to your pre-transfer share of assets to your spouse. If the transfer to your brother took place after the divorce was commenced, the court would probably also hold you in contempt of court and put you in jail. Your transparent efforts to divest yourself of assets, and your unsubstantiated claim of infidelity would not in any way reduce you alimony obligation to your spouse, if under the facts and circumstances, such as the length of the marriage and the relative economic means of the parties, the court finds that an alimony award is appropriate. Unsubstantiated claims of infidelity will only make the court treat you more harshly. Most New York State divorces are no fault divorces in which infidelity is irrelevant, but New York State does have residual fault based divorces which could count against your ex-wife in a variety of ways (although not with respect to child custody or child support). But this is only if you can prove the infidelity in court. In reference to the linked case in Spain, it is worth noting that a New York State divorce judge has much more power and discretion than a Spanish divorce judge. The New York State divorce judge is allowed to equitably divide the couple's property rather than merely adhering to formulaic community property rules, and the New York State divorce judge has contempt of court power which the Spanish divorce judge lacks. | I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use. | Yes. This is clearly kidnapping. It is probably not a terribly aggravated sub-type of kidnapping, but it is kidnapping nonetheless. It is probably a felony. The fact that the victim does not press charges, or ratifies the conduct after the fact, does not change the fact that a crime was committed. The police decision to arrest the ex-boyfriend was entirely proper. It was not a false arrest. They had probable cause to believe that a crime was committed by the ex-boyfriend, and, in fact, a crime actually was committed by the ex-boyfriend. In the United States, the prosecutor has full authority to prosecute the ex-boyfriend to the full extent of the law for felony kidnapping for his conduct, over the objections of the victim. The decision to prosecute or not is entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor who brings criminal charges on behalf of the state and not the victim. Often the police and prosecutors will honor a victim's wishes, and this appears to be what happened in this case, but they are not required to do so, and could change their minds and bring charges in the future against the ex-boyfriend within the statute of limitations, if they wanted to do so. (This analysis does not apply in countries with Islamic law, but the facts of the question suggest that Islamic law does not apply in this jurisdiction.) | Usually and ideally, a GAL would take an active role in parenting questions, while taking a secondary role in property division and maintenance with the primary concern being that the economic arrangements are sustainable and don't subject the child to hardship when with the other parent (e.g. many divorcing parents fail to realize that maintaining two households will result in more child related expenses than one). I will assume that you are asking from the perspective of a party to the divorce and not from the perspective of a mediator, although the phrasing is not entirely clear. Some basics: Have a good command of the facts about your finances, your ex's finances, and the children's schedules and needs (assuming that there are children). For example, it would be good to have school calendars as far forward as they are available, to know the children's medical providers, and to have a firm command of their extracurricular activities, their friends and the requirements of any childcare providers. Often child support worksheets will be mandatory for a settlement to be approved, so get those worksheets and fill in the facts you know already. Bring a calculator so you can consider new assumptions and evaluate financial proposals accurately. If you think you have received inaccurate disclosures, be prepared to explain in detail what you think is inaccurate and why you think that this is the case. If domestic violence has been an issue, there are restraining orders that are or have been in place, there are abuse or neglect allegations present (including emotional abuse of a spouse or children), or the co-parents have had trouble coordinating and reaching decisions without outside assistance, be prepared to explain these situations in factual detail so you can avoid summarizing the situation in a vague way. Bring anything you might need to refresh your recollection about relevant facts with you to mediation. If you haven't received full disclosure of your spouse's finances, insist on receiving that, ideally before going to mediation and absolutely before reaching a deal. Spend time considering possible resolutions of property, maintenance and parenting matters in advance. Very early on in mediation each of you will be asked what you want and mediation shouldn't be the first time that you have thoughtfully considered the question. Spend time thinking about what you need on a non-negotiable basis to survive - to be able to meet basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. for you and your children, and also about what your ex needs and how your ex can achieve it. Proposing ways to achieve objectives that your ex hasn't considered that are viable is a good way to get a resolution. Ideally, attend a parenting class (mandatory in many jurisdictions before getting a divorce that involves children) before attending mediation. Keep in mind that children are not prizes or bargaining chips and that you need to consider their needs as well as your own. Your kids love both of you even though you can no longer manage to live with each other. Do not utilize the children as sounding boards for mediation stances and do not try to use them as decision makers or conduits for communication between the co-parents. Recognize that in most states, marital fault is irrelevant, and that starting a new relationship is natural and routine, even if it makes your skin crawl that your ex is starting a new relationship. Take an attitude of focusing on what the deal does for you rather than what the deal does for your ex. This is about you getting what you need, not about making your ex worse off. Be prepared to walk away from mediation without a deal if necessary, because your ex won't accept a reasonable deal. Maybe half of mediations end without a settlement. Recognize that it may be possible to reach partial resolution (e.g. splitting up tangible personal property; figuring out how holidays will be handled with the children; agreeing on schools that children will attend; figuring out who, if anyone, will continue to live in a marital residence; stipulating to the value of particular assets; stipulating regarding each party's income; stipulating regarding what is and isn't separate property where you can agree; agreements to disclose information), without resolving all issues. Partial resolutions reduce uncertainty and make it easier to prepare for and conduct a permanent orders hearing on the remaining issues. Even if you can't afford to hire a lawyer to represent you in the entire case, pay for an hour or two of a lawyer's time to evaluate what kind of property division, maintenance award and parenting arrangements are within the range of the possible and likely if you go forward to a permanent orders hearing. Be prepared to put the terms of anything that is agreed to at mediation in writing. Mediators will usually tell you if they need forms signed, payments made, or a "mediation statement" in advance. Do everything required on time. A "mediation statement" is a summary of the key facts and your position on a fair resolution and could be a couple to a dozen pages depending upon the complexity of the case. Be clear in a mediation statement about what is O.K. to share with the other side and what is for the mediator's information only. When a mediator asks for a mediation statement the main reason for doing so is to save time that the mediator is charging you per hour for 50-50. A mediation statement can make getting the mediator up to speed on the facts more efficient and less likely to omit important facts and the mediator needs to learn the key facts to be effective. | The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | Is it possible/feasible for the child to retroactively sue the father for the child-support that was not paid throughout the 90s and 2000s? No. Child support is owed to the custodian parent, not the child. If at all, your mother would have to sue. Chances are, your parents, had a child support agreement in place and as long as your father abided by the terms of this agreement, there is absolutely nothing to sue about. Is it possible/feasible for the child to sue the father to get him to pay for his Australian university fees/debts which have accrued (and continue to accrue) over the 2010s? No. There is no legal requirement for any parent (divorced or not) to pay for college education. Once you are a legal adult you are responsible for your own expenses and actions. That's what "adult" means. |
Can I prosecute another way if a states attorney declines to? Is there any way to prosecute someone and bring them before a judge if the states attorney office declines to? Or can I sue the states attorney and force prosecution? The state is Maryland if that makes a difference. | Is there any way to prosecute someone and bring them before a judge if the states attorney office declines to? No Or can I sue the states attorney and force prosecution? No. You can't bring a private criminal prosecution in Maryland. There are a handful of U.S. states where you can, but Maryland is not one of them. You can bring a civil lawsuit for money damages and/or injunctive relief against someone who has caused you injury as a private individual. | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. | Does failure to present a charge to a grand jury leave that charge open for future indictment? Yes. Indeed, even if the charge is presented to a grand jury and it declines to indict, exactly the same charge that one grand jury declined to indict upon can be presented to a future grand jury and produce a valid indictment. I understand that normally when a Grand Jury declines to indict for an alleged crime, prosecutors may not present it again to a future Grand Jury. (I believe this rule is statutory, not constitutional.) While I won't rule out the possibility that such a statute exists, I am aware of no state where that is the case. A charge upon which is grand jury declines to indict is often not presented to a future grand jury as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or prosecutor's office policy, but generally this is not a mandatory rule. One reason that it is not a mandatory rule is that there is no practical way that a defendant could enforce the rule if it was a mandatory rule. Grand jury proceedings are secret (at least until an indictment is produced and then only as pertinent to the defendant indicted on the charges producing an indictment). Generally, even the judges in the court calling a grand jury have no access to its proceedings until it issues an indictment, and then has only slightly more latitude to review its proceedings than a defendant in the case. | Probably not. It appears that in the case in question, your lawyers, while they were representing you, agreed to a protective order that kept certain information including settlement offers made to them by the opposing parties' lawyers (even if those offers were rejected) confidential. You are bound by the agreements made by your lawyers if they are your lawyers at the time, even they later cease to be your lawyers. So, if you were to make the disclosure of this information subject to a protective order, the court involved could hold you in contempt of court and issue sanctions (including fines and incarceration) for failing to honor the court order to seal the case, because this protective order was binding upon you, because you agreed to it through your lawyers who were acting as your agents at the time. The fact that you are no longer represented by those lawyers doesn't vacate the protective order. CAVEAT: This is an interpretation of the facts made with incomplete information. A truly reliable answer would require review of the exact documents in the case filed with the court which is beyond the scope of Law.SE. | What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination. | While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ. | Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here). | Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record. |
Is there a legal standard for the dimensions on a mailbox flag? I am specifically referring to the red flag on many curbside mailboxes, generally made out of plastic, which is toggled when mail is delivered. I'm quite certain, regardless, that any recognizable flag would be understood and used by a mailman; but what about the symmetries in traditional ones? Are there any constraints on their height, width, or depth? Is this a simple fluke of manufacturing, or did someone lay the dimensions down in law at some point? (As has been, rather dramatically, highlighted in the comments, I am from New Mexico, United States; I am, understandably, totally unaware of the postal standards in other parts of the globe, and they do not relate to the origin of my question. Additionally note the United States tag.) | Because you indicate that you're from New Mexico, I'm assuming that you're asking about the rules governing curbside mailboxes used by the United States Postal Service. If that's the case, there are constraints on the design of signal flags, but they are far more focused on function and ergonomics than on aesthetics, and they can be found at USPS STD 7C, which says: The flag must be mounted on the right side when facing the mailbox from the front. The flag must not require a lift of more than 2 pounds of force to retract. Additionally, when actuated (signaling outgoing mail), the flag must remain in position until retracted by the carrier. The color of the flag must be in accordance with the requirements described in 3.9. The operating mechanism of the flag must not require lubrication and must continue to operate properly and positively (without binding or excessive free play) after being subjected to the test described in Section 4. Optionally, the flag may incorporate a self-lowering feature that causes it to automatically retract when the carrier service door is opened provided no additional effort is required of the carrier. The self-lowering feature cannot present protrusions or attachments and must not interfere with delivery operations in any manner or present hazardous features as specified in 3.1. The regulations provide "preferred" designs -- generally the rectangle you're likely used to -- but say that other designs may be permitted if they meet the other requirements. As I read it, this means USPS doesn't care if you use a circle or a square or a triangle or a swallowtail, as long as at isn't too heavy to lift, too flimsy to stand up on its own, etc. | German perspective: In German law, there is the concept of Schöpfungshöhe (threshold of originality), which is required for authorship rights (Urheberrecht) to apply to a work. Basically, the idea is that a minimum of creativity is required for something to be protected. However, that bar is rather low. Thus, for example: Literary works are protected practically always. Maps are generally protected, even though you might argue they "slavishly copy nature", because the act of choosing what to show and what not is already creative. However, a faithful photographic reproduction of a painting is not eligible for Urheberrecht to apply (LG Berlin, AZ 15 O 428/15) So yes, a "slavish copy" of a work would not qualify for protection if there is no creativity involved. Note, however, that other types of protection apart from Urheberrecht might apply, such as Sui generis database right. | First, return addresses are intended simply to provide a mechanism by which an undeliverable or returned letter can be returned to the sender. If you have a practical concern then consider the following: I worked for the postal service and never experienced an instance where anyone cared whether there was an accurate return address except in the following cases: As mentioned above, a letter was refused or otherwise undeliverable, and an attempt will be made to return the letter to the return address. In cases of a false, unreadable, or non-existent return address, the letter will be marked undeliverable and likely destroyed or recycled. Someone is trying to scam the system by putting an identical address on each the delivery and return address of a mail piece, especially on mail pieces that have insufficient postage. If caught, this mail piece will go to the delivery address the same as any other case of insufficient postage, with a postage due requirement for the recipient. However, in this case this piece will be held and eventually destroyed rather than returning to sender, since it does not have a non-identical return address. The content of the mail piece is illegal (e.g. anthrax, drugs, etc. made apparent by forensic equipment or by a piece of mail being inadvertently opened/destroyed by a machine and discovered by a postal employee). In these cases the mail piece will be sent to the postal inspection service (most plants have one in-house). These postal inspectors might have use for a return address in the event that the sender was dumb enough to include an accurate return address on an illegal mail piece. 18 U.S. Code § 1342 penalizes those who commit crimes under false names, and uses broad language to include people who use pseudonyms to avoid detection, since these actions make the job of postal inspectors much more difficult. The final language also makes opening mail address to people other than one's self illegal, though this is likely described elsewhere, too. It does not pertain to false return addresses, unless someone were to open the letter upon return, despite that person not being the return addressee, or committing some other crime using the postal service. The only situations where I can see your hypothetical situation becoming a concern for postal inspectors or postal regulators would be: The mail piece masquerades as a certified, registered, or other special class of mail. There are many junk mailings out there that look surprisingly similar to the protected classes of mail, but are distinct enough to not raise any serious concerns (e.g. "CONFIDENTIAL", "URGENT", or various green or red markings). The penalty would probably be a fine in the amount of each identified letter times the price for the corresponding postal product. The return address is for a governmental entity, or possibly an annoyed person or company, but not actually sent from these locations. I suspect this is the possibility most relevant to your question. However, this is unlikely to raise any concern, unless a recipient or other affected party raises a fraud concern (18 USC 1341, 1342 & 1345; 39 USC 3005 & 3007) with the postal service. This would be taken on by the postal inspection service, which would investigate the content of the mailings for any signs of the actual sender, and they may attempt a variety of other methods (e.g. tracing letter meters, surveillance) to locate the source of the mail. However, the legal penalties would probably be fraud-related and might fall outside postal regulations per se, but could include federal laws about committing crimes that leverage the mail service, and various other laws if this is done across state lines (also this might invite FBI attention). | There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order. | This is an amusing idea, but ultimately it seems frivolous: How does one establish the physical presence of a corporation in a car? Yes, corporations have some of the legal rights and liabilities of people, but they are not people. And there are plenty of rights a person has that a corporation does not. For example (at present) a corporation can't be a party to a marriage. The closest a corporation comes to any corporal presence is the address listed of their agents. | Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options. | No. Such a marking is equivalent to a solid double yellow line, and passing is not permitted. These raised pavement markers are known as Botts' dots and are commonly used in California together with, or instead of, painted lines. A line of evenly spaced dots is meant to signify a solid line. Since here there is a double line of dots, it is a solid double yellow line. If passing were allowed, you would see a single yellow dashed line, which would be indicated with dots by a group of 3-4 evenly spaced dots, then a longer gap, and repeating. California Vehicle Code section 21460 provides as follows: (a) If double parallel solid yellow lines are in place, a person driving a vehicle shall not drive to the left of the lines, except as permitted in this section. [...] (e) Raised pavement markers may be used to simulate painted lines described in this section if the markers are placed in accordance with standards established by the Department of Transportation. The relevant standards are found in the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). On page 655, Detail 23, you can see a diagram showing exactly this configuration of dots and stating that it is an alternative to a solid double yellow line. It appears that current policy is to phase out the use of Botts' dots, so this question may become moot in the future. | It's based on the date the letter was received, not the date it was mailed. Since it's certified, it's not received until somebody signs for it, which starts the clock. The actual date isn't possible to calculate from the information on hand. The delivery receipt would have the date it was signed for, it would be prior to the end of the 30th calendar date from that date. Edit... Your new "twist" results in void service and doesn’t require action by the HOA. Certified mail is a service of the USPS, hand delivering or email does not legally count as "certified mail". If a contract requires service by a specific method (e.g. certified mail), then delivery by any other means is invalid and of no effect. |
If someone stops a potential murder by subduing a gunman, what would be the possible consequences? I'm writing a story and I wanted some accuracy on this matter, specifically for the consequences on the person to whom this would happen. Imagine an off-duty security guard, while walking home, finds a man pointing a gun at an unarmed man and child. The security guard physically fights, restrains and cuffs him, and calls for law enforcement, saving the victims from getting shot. Would the security guard be arrested for vigilantism? Will this go to trial or would they be let loose without needing to call an attorney? Would anything change if the would-be murderer was a rogue cop or soldier? What would realistically happen to this person, legally speaking? | He would be thanked and sent on his way. We don't generally punish people for preventing murders, even if they are rogue cops or soldiers. If you wanted him to plausibly land in legal peril, he'd probably need to do more than simply save someone's life. The most obvious possibility, I think, would be if he were to continue inflicting harm on the attacker after cuffing him. At that point, there's probably no justification for a continued use of force, so he could face assault charges there. Also possible would be that the way he handled the situation -- the amount of force he used, the failure to de-escalate, failing to call for assistance -- just violates some police or military policy. I don't know if that would jam him up in the way you're looking for, though. | No If you break the law you are legally responsible. Can you make it more difficult for law enforcement to find and prosecute you? Of course, that's why bank robbers wear masks. | Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough. | No If she has probable cause, yes. The question is whether "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts [Bob is a thief] are probably true"? Its likely that the answer to this question is yes. None No Charlotte listens to Alice, Charlotte asks Bob questions which Bob may or may not answer. Charlotte can ask Bob to produce the receipt, Bob doesn't have to. Charlotte can ask to search Bob, Bob doesn't have to consent. If Bob tries to leave, if Charlotte has reasonable suspicion the Bob has committed a crime (which she could certainly justify) she may detain him temporarily without arrest. If Charlotte has probable cause to believe that Bob has committed a crime (which she could probably justify) then she can arrest him. | The above is not quite accurate. First, assault. The correct definition is "a threat or physical act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact." Therefore, no attempt at a battery is necessary. Rather, simply making someone subjectively believe that you are about to commit a battery against them is enough for an assault charge. Please note the following two points. One, that apprehension does not mean fear. Apprehension means that the victim has to believe that the actor's conduct will result in imminent harmful or offensive contact. Two, it's not necessary that the victim believes such conduct will actually be effective - rather, he only has to believe the conduct is "capable" of making the contact. I can't tell if by "other security personnel" you mean, in addition to bouncers, say, security at concerts or if you mean private security guards, such as ones who guard warehouses or other businesses. Nonetheless, for the warehouse/business "guards," they do not have a special privilege above or beyond what any random person may do. That is, you may use force to the extent you reasonably believe necessary to prevent a felony, riot, or serious breach of the peace. You may use deadly force only if it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a "dangerous felony" involving risk to human life, including, for example, robbery, arson, burglary. However, if the private security personnel are operating under authority vested to them by local ordinance or the state legislature, then their rights (and also any attendant restrictions, such as those provided to citizens under the Fourth Amendment) would apply instead. So where's the difference? It comes about at the standard a situation must meet to allow use of deadly force. A police officer can use deadly force to effectuate an arrest based on a reasonable belief that a suspect has committed a felony involving the risk of physical harm or death to others (murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape or burglary) or if there is substantial risk that the suspect was dangerous to the point that he may cause serious physical harm or death to someone if the arrest were delayed. On the other hand, as a private citizen, you may only use deadly force when attempting to effectuate an arrest if the suspect did indeed commit such a felony. Police can base their action on a reasonable belief and even if that belief is wrong, they will be safe from prosecution. A private citizen actually must be right about the suspect having committed the requisite crime. No matter how reasonable the belief was of a private citizen regarding a suspect, if that suspect did not actually commit the crime, the private citizen who used such force will be subject to prosecution. Bouncers are afforded no more rights than private citizens. They can issue verbal warnings, ask a patron to leave the establishment, check identification, refuse entry, call the cops, protect bystanders from violence, break up fights, and respond with equal force if necessary. They may not strike an individual with a punch or kick, push or physically toss someone out of the establishment, restrain them using chokeholds or other submission techniques, or use weapons or pepper spray. | So, as you say, these witnesses who try to help their buddy out may be committing perjury. Also, D himself, by lining this up, is probably on the hook for conspiracy to commit perjury and being complicit in perjury. Aside from that, I think your question is: would getting people to testify in a way that implies they did the crime lead to an acquittal for the murderer? The answer is: maybe. The jury will either vote to acquit or to convict. If the jury votes to acquit, then it's over. Double jeopardy protects D from being tried for murder again. But, if the jury votes to convict, the fact that D had his friends testifying in the way you suggest isn't going to get the conviction overturned on appeal because "a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts." People v. Young, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Cal. 2005). I haven't done a trial yet, but it strikes me that that might not be the greatest trial strategy. I think generally defense lawyers would prefer to make their client look the furthest thing from gang affiliated as possible. Don't lie to a court or ask anyone to lie to a court for you. | If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question. | Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket. |
How do civil courts handle denial of evidence as forged, tampered, or claims that 'I did not sign it' or 'That's not me'? In a Civil Trial, how do courts handle scenarios when evidences presented are denied (by plaintiff/defendent) as forged, tampered, or claims that 'I did not sign it' or 'That is not me'? | Just like every other contested assertion They hear the testimony (evidence-in-chief, cross-examination, redirect), look at whatever physical evidence and submissions on the law that the party wishes to make. The other party will do the same. They weigh the evidence including such vital considerations as to whether they think one party or the other or both are full of shit and, if the evidence is such that the party has proved their assertion on the balance of probabilities, it is now a fact which bears on the judgement. | If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public. | Often, you aren't screened only for one trial, but for several trials. If you declare yourself biased for one trial, you might be asked to be considered for a second, or third, etc. If you continue to give answers that make yourself ineligible such that the judge does not believe you are telling the truth or acting in good faith, you can be held in contempt of court. | Convention in U.S. process is to: Attempt "in good faith" to "meet or confer" with the opposing party to try to resolve the discovery dispute directly. Failing step #1, file a Motion to Compel with the court. Rules of Civil Procedure (e.g., FRCP 37) typically have strict requirements for filing such motions. Judges generally frown upon discovery disputes lingering until the beginning of a trial. Which means the outcome of an objection or motion in limine on such matters can be abrupt and unpredictable. If the judge is inclined to side with the party requesting the particular discovery: He will most likely issue an order compelling compliance and continue the case (i.e., reschedule the hearing for a later date that allows time for compliance with its order). He could also grant or unilaterally impose sanctions if he feels the non-responsive party's behavior is "dilatory, obdurate or vexatious." A judge in a very bad mood could conceivably dismiss the case with prejudice or grant a summary judgment against the recalcitrant party. However if the judge concludes that the party requesting discovery was insufficiently diligent, or that the discovery is not reasonable or essential to the trial, he will probably overrule any objection and let the trial proceed. | Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence. | Generally speaking, witnesses are not legally represented at trial, unless they are also parties. While a witness may choose to seek legal advice about a request or order they have received to give evidence, they would generally be expected to take this opportunity before they actually show up at trial. A witness examination would not normally be adjourned because a witness said something damaging to their own credibility or to one party’s case, and would like to pause and obtain legal advice. One goal of cross-examination is to expose unreliable evidence by obtaining this kind of tactical advantage over a witness. It is up to the party whose case was damaged to try to fix the problem in re-examination or reply evidence. That party may not be particularly interested in protecting the witness’s personal interests. There may be exceptions in specific factual situations, when it becomes clear that a witness does not understand their right to object to giving evidence on the grounds of self-incrimination or some other privilege. A judge may choose to halt further questioning of the witness if there is a real risk of a mistrial or some other procedural unfairness, which can be addressed without unfairly depriving the cross-examiner of their opportunity to challenge the evidence. | Once a case has been commenced, you can definitely lose, or you can probably lose. If you decline to proceed, you definitely lose. If you proceed, the jury (or judge as the case might be), might find some witnesses more believable than others and might find that the forensic evidence is not as convincing as it seems. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal trials reach the correct conclusion in about 90% of cases that aren't resolved on an uncontested basis. Generally speaking, the Crown is only going to press a case where the prosecutor subjectively believes that they are correct that the defendant is, at least, guilty of something. So, a Crown prosecutor can also justify "rolling the dice" in a case with a low probability of winning, because at a minimum, a factually guilty defendant (whether it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not in a particular trial with a particular finder of fact) has to suffer through a trial which is a form of punishment (particularly if the defendant can't secure pre-trial release). Also, while the Crown prosecutor ultimately represents the state and not the victim, the victim of a crime is a quasi-client and sometimes a victim who often has personal knowledge of a defendant's factual guilt, really wants to have their "day in court" and a chance to present their case to the public for all to hear. Law enforcement officers working on the case may want it to go to trial for similar reasons. Strategically, bringing even weak cases to trial also makes a Crown prosecutors threat to go forward with a trial even in a seemingly weak case more credible and that can increase the prosecutor's negotiating power. Also, a trial always reveals information, and sometimes the information revealed in a trial that is lost can provide value in future law enforcement efforts. Finally, prosecutors are humans and people, in general, don't like to admit their own mistakes. So, they may go forward even when their case is weak because they don't want to admit that they were mistaken and would prefer to have somebody else say they were wrong than to admit error. The personality type that doesn't admit mistakes is pretty common in this area. | This appears to be covered by the Norway Criminal Procedures Code, of which an English version can be found here. Chapter 10 deals with witnesses. Here are some relevant sections: § 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. There follow a number of exceptions (spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, state secrets, etc). None of them seem to apply to your example. § 115. The court may decide that a witness who fails to attend or who leaves the place of sitting without a valid reason shall be brought before the same or a subsequent sitting of the court. In special cases the court may decide that a witness shall be detained in custody until he can be examined. § 128. Before the examination the president of the court shall admonish the witnesses to tell the whole truth without concealing anything. He shall inform the witnesses of the liability consequent on giving false evidence or making a false affirmation. § 137. If a witness refuses to give evidence after being ordered to do so by a legally enforceable court order, the court may by a new order decide that the witness shall be kept in custody until he fulfils his obligation. Nevertheless a witness may not be kept in custody for more than three months altogether in the same case or in another case relating to the same matter. So effectively, if the witness fails to show up voluntarily, he can be brought in forcibly. He can be ordered to testify, and if he refuses, he can be held in custody (probably a jail) for up to three months. However, the authority to compel testimony is limited to courts; the police cannot compel statements from witnesses. § 230. The police may take statements from suspected persons, witnesses and experts but may not order any person to make a statement. So in your example, it appears that the witnesses would be free to refuse to speak to the police. However, if the case came to trial, they could be ordered to testify, and could be held in custody if they refused. |
Providing an I-134 for a Diversity Lottery Winner If a US citizen or a US legal Permanent Resident is providing a US diversity visa lottery winner an I-134, could that person, in the future, provide another I-134 for a different person who's trying to immigrate to the US? And are there any down sides to giving someone an I-134 like someone's PR getting revoked (other than being liable for government aid the immigrant could take)? | [C]ould that person, in the future, provide another I-134 for a different person who's trying to immigrate to the US? According to the Instructions for Form I-134 (PDF, 371.05 KB) If you are sponsoring more than one foreign national, you must submit a separate Form I-134 for each foreign national. There is no mention, that I can see, prohibiting future applications. | Yes. Citizenship and immigration status are not factors that are expressly considered under Arkansas law in an award of joint custody. See Arkansas Code Section 9-13-101. This is discussed in a previous answer is here. | You didn't bother to state who this appeal is with or even where you are but I'm almost certain I know the answer. Just once. If the appeal is denied, you may be able to appeal to a higher body such as a higher court or an ombudsman. However, any group or court allowing the same appeal ad infinitum until you get what you want would be farcical. | The law is not settled and will shortly be before the High Court (sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns) but theoretically: yes! The provision on Disqualification is s44, specifically subsection (i): Any person who: (i) is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. Which, on the face of it, makes eligibility to sit in the Australian parliament dependent on the citizenship laws of every other country in the world: all 195 of them. Indeed, right now, any citizen of Australia (which is itself a qualification by virtue of s16 or s34), is allowed to live and work in New Zealand, and to vote after a year's residence - that is they are "entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject [but not a citizen] of a foreign power". Therefore, interpreted that way, no Australian is entitled to sit in parliament. Of course, a simple referendum1 could change the Constitution to fix that - except, a referendum must be called by parliament and we no longer have one. Personally, I think it is unlikely2 that the High Court will rule in such a way that would plunge the nation into a constitutional crises by deciding no one can sit in parliament or that who can sit is determined by the laws of foreign nations. Notwithstanding, at present there are 5 MPs who have been referred to the High Court (2 of whom have already resigned), 2 more who will be referred when parliament resumes in September, 21 known to have been born overseas who have not confirmed that they have renounced any foreign citizenship they might have and an unknown number who may have foreign citizenship by descent. Each of the cases is distinct: some were born overseas, some have foreign citizenship by descent, one is a 3rd generation Australian whose mother registered him as an Italian citizen when he was a child (17) and he claims he never knew. How the High Court will rule will almost certainly vary with the particular circumstances but its anyone's guess what they will decide. However, it appears that the drafters of the constitution intended that it should capture all dual-citizens, not just those who sought dual-citizenship by a deliberative act. If a person is found to be ineligible then different things happen depending on if they ware a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives. For a Senator, the High Court would recount the results of the election - because of the strange way voting works for the Senate, only educated guesses can be made about who would replace whom (especially since the same citizen issue may apply to other candidates on the ticket). For a Member of the House of Representatives, a by-election would be held - because the Liberal/National government has a majority of 1 and 3 of their members are in the gun the results will be ... interesting. 1 Referenda in Australia are not simple. The Australian Constitution is specifically designed to be difficult to change while at the same time granting broad powers to parliament. It takes a nationwide vote and must be carried by a majority of voters nationwide and a majority in a majority of the six states (i.e. 4 or more). Since federation in 1901 there have been 44 referenda of which only 8 have been carried. In is generally accepted that a referendum is impossible to pass unless it has bi-partisan support: and sometimes not even then. 2 And by "unlikely" I mean "impossible" - a conclusion that the constitution must be read in such a way that parliamentary democracy becomes impossible would be contrary to law. Update in light of the High Court’s ruling: No Providing a potential parliamentarian has taken “all reasonable steps” to renounce foreign allegiance they are permitted to serve even if the foreign power refuses to allow them to renounce citizenship. In practice, this means writing to the foreign embassy and renouncing citizenship. | If the purported husband (PH) has not attempted to enter the UK under false pretenses, and has not submitted documents containing false statements to the UK government, it is hard to see how he might be charged with a crime by the UK in connection with the invalid marriage. But since the PH is now said to have submitted an application for entry clearance based on the bigamous marriage, a marriage that it appears that he knew or should have known was invalid, he has submitted an official document based on a false statement. That is presumably an offense under UK law, and may well affect the PH's future immigration treatment. If the deceived wife has not knowingly made false statements to the UK government, it is hard to see how she would be charged in the UK. She would be wise to promptly inform the UK government that the marriage was invalid, to withdraw any statements or applications based on its validity, and to take legal steps to correct the record so that the marriage does not show as valid. This might be by annulment or some other procedure, probably depending on the law in the Bahamas where the purported marriage took place. (Under chapter 125, section 21(b) a prior marriage is valid grounds for an annulment or decree of nullity.) She might also want to notify the US authorities. The purported husband might have been guilty of bigamy in the Bahamas, depending on just how their law is written. Whether the authorities there will seek to extradite and prosecute him one cannot say. | There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule. | Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them. | It's not possible to marry the US citizen until the first marriage is terminated, and the F-2 status ends when the marriage is terminated. It's not the F-2 status that prevents the marriage to the US citizen; it's the continued existence of the previous marriage. It might be possible to file for change of status (to B-2 perhaps) in anticipation of the termination of the marriage, but it seems unlikely to be accepted by USCIS. It would certainly be unwise to attempt anything like that without the advice of an immigration lawyer. |
The Right to Vote In the past, at least in certain parts of the country, you had to own property to vote. I am thinking that was and still is constitutional. Would a law that says that if you do not pay Federal income taxes then you do not get to vote be constitutional? I am thinking that it would need to be passed at the state level. Am I right about that? Note: I am in the United States | Historically there were restrictions on voting that no longer exist: being white, male or property-owner are examples. For example, the 15th amendment prohibited denying the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; women got the right to vote under the 19th amendment; poll taxes and a requirement for paying any other tax were abolished by the 24th Amendment (this did not address state elections). In the case of property ownership, the property requirement was eliminated state-by state by 1856. Tax-payment was a requirement for a longer period, but again was abolished state-by-state. Later, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 SCOTUS ruled that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth | There is no law governing the 'number' of the president. Common sense suggests that a person can't be 45th and 46th; there must be someone in between having the presidency and they will become the 46th president. In the extremely unlikely scenario that a foreign power occupies the United States this year, eliminates the office of President, and a few years later the US is liberated and Donald Trump is re-elected, I guess people could name him the 45th and 46th President, but it makes no sense to speculate about this. | No The right to Due Process is a personal right of anyone who may come before a US court, or interact with an agency of any US government, Federal, State, or local. It is noit a national right, to be granted ort withheld depending on hoew US nationals are treated by a particular country. No one has authority to deny De Process to anyone who is physically within the US, nor to anyone who is interacting with any part of the US government/the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the Fedferal and State governments, respectively, to grant Due process to al, and congress may not alter this by law, nor authorize any poat of the government to deny Due Process to anyone for any reason. Due Process is a somewhat flexible concept, and exactly what process is required may vary in different circumstances, but the basic elements of Due Process are not optional. All this is true no matter ow unjustly the courts or other agencies of a foreign government may treat US nationals. Such treatment may be addressed through diplomatic channels, or through economic or political pressure. | There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state. | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. | You are mistaken: The U.S. governments (both federal, and states that impose income tax) assert a right to tax both: Income earned within their jurisdiction (e.g., "on their soil"), and Income earned by citizens (or residents, in the case of states). So it is perfectly legal for a resident U.S. citizen to operate a foreign business entity, earn profit, pay himself, and even bank the money overseas. However, a resident in such a situation would be in violation of tax law if he failed to report his interest in the foreign entity and his earnings, as prescribed by the IRS, on his tax filings. | I am unfamiliar with specifically US laws on this but under common law (which US law is derived from) there is the crime of "Theft by Finding", however, because you turned it over to the authorities who, after the required time period were unable to find the rightful owner, the money becomes yours. However, you still have to pay your taxes on it: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/03/found-money-is-awesomebut-must-pay-uncle-sam/ As far as I can see, income is income whether it comes as cash, diamonds or long lost antiques. As far as the money laundering aspect, that is something the authorities would need to prove - as opposed to you just being lucky. | Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.). |
Can you track those who denied tracking on a website? I'm coordinating a website project where we are implementing Analytics and a GDPR compliant Cookie Banner. I was asked if we had a way to track how many users have declined analytics in case we needed that information for an audit. We are, of course, storing a strictly necessary cookie to remember a decline decision on the user's browser (client side only). However, wouldn't collecting server side analytics about a user declining analytics (even if anonymous) be an inherit violation of GDPR. The more I think about this the more I'm getting a headache. Would a GDPR audit ever ask for this information or would we shoot ourselves in the foot by collecting this information? | I think you could count decline-events, but not track users who declined tracking. But I also think such information isn't useful for demonstrating compliance. Therefore, you should avoid storing extra data about people who do not give consent. When consent is required for analytics. The GDPR provides a general framework for processing personal data. The ePrivacy Directive (ePD) overrides this general framework when it comes to cookies and similar technologies related to accessing information on the end user's device. Per ePD, such access is only allowed when it is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by a user, otherwise consent is required. Thus, analytics cookies require consent and setting an analytics-declined cookie is strictly necessary. But this consent requirement relates specifically to storage cookies, not to collecting analytics data. Thus, you might have a legitimate interest in collecting data with cookie-less analytics, which could involve counting cookie-consent decline events. Unfortunately, most analytics systems collect very broad categories of data and cannot be limited to a necessary subset. Even such limited analytics (unless they are truly strictly necessary for operating the site) should support an opt-out. I don't think you could legitimately gather analytics about such opt-out events. GDPR audits. Your motivation for collecting statistics about consent-decline events is to be prepared for a GDPR audit. This is probably not necessary, but it depends. It might be useful to distinguish between internal/voluntary audits and data protection audits by the supervisory authority. You might voluntarily review your compliance to convince stakeholders that you're compliant, and such voluntary audits might be part of the appropriate technical and organizational measures a data controller has implemented in accordance with Art 24, Art 25, and Art 32 GDPR. You should collect any statistics you need for this purpose, e.g. to ensure that the opt-in rate looks realistic. But since you can set the parameters of this audit, it makes no sense to collect data “just in case”. Under Art 58(1), your supervisory authority can audit your data processing and can compel you to provide any information it requires. This is similar to how a tax authority can compel you to produce business records for auditing purposes. This is closely related with your general obligation to be able to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR (Art 5(2)). More specifically, the controller is required per Art 7(1) to be able to demonstrate that the data subjects have given valid consent, but does not prescribe how to demonstrate this. How to demonstrate that valid consent was given. For demonstrating that consent was given, there are no clear best practices. However, this topic is briefly discussed in EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent. They recommend that you retain records about the following: that a data subject in a given case has consented how consent was obtained when consent was obtained information provided to data subject at the time that the controller's workflow meets all relevant criteria for valid consent Some of these are process-level concerns about how you ask for consent. For example, you might record video walkthroughs of your consent management solution to demonstrate how consent can be declined, given, and revoked. You should definitely keep a version history of the text and information that was displayed to users when they were asked for consent. I think you should also be able to explain in your front-end code how the result from your consent management solution is used to load relevant features (and that they aren't loaded before consent is given). If a feature or service is made conditional on consent, it might be good to have a short written analysis that consent is still freely given under the requirements of Art 7(4). But other aspects relate to the individual data subject and the individual consent-giving event. Some consent management solutions send a small record about the consent to a backend server where it is stored with a timestamp, so that it can be later traced that and when consent was given. I've also seen consent management tools that show a timeline of events to the user (when consent was requested, and when consent for which purpose was given and revoked). I think such detailed insight into an pseudonymous individual's consent status is a very powerful way to demonstrate compliance. What is not relevant here is information about data subjects who declined consent in the first place. Consent means opt-in. The default is that no consent is given. To demonstrate that consent was obtained in a valid manner, information about data subjects who didn't consent isn't necessary or useful. So I expect that you would be fine in an audit without collecting such data. In fact, the lack of a clear purpose and necessity for collecting this data could be argued to be without legal basis and violate the GDPR's data minimization principle. And even when recording information about those data subjects who did consent, the EDPB guidelines remind us that this “should not in itself lead to excessive amounts of additional data processing”. | Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post: If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here. If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps. | Are my assumptions correct? Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that would fall under the purview of "the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party", as it fundamentally enables you to deliver the service to the data subject, and its also difficult to argue that "such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" given its a fundamental part of delivering the service before any consent can be given. Its not the intention of the GDPR to solely require a direct relationship between the data controller and data subject, its intention is to allow the data subject to control more of the relationship than they did previously - in some cases, that control remains with the data controller, which is why not all of the lawful basis for processing rest on consent. So long as you ensure that the CDN provider has a relevant privacy policy and is identified as a data processor in your privacy and data policy then you are good to go. In my mind, this is similar to the issue of how the data subjects packets get to you from their computer - we aren't including all of the network providers who carry the packets between the data subject and the processor (despite the fact that those providers will have access to much of the same information as the CDN, such as IP address, source, destination etc), even though in many cases we don't know that information (for example which route it will take over the internet). The only difference here is that as the data controller, you know about the CDN and can include it in your policies, so you should. | There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | The scope of the GDPR is entered when personal data is being processed in a structured manner. Personal data is any information relating to identifiable data subjects (definition in Art 4(1)). "Peter attended the meeting on the 14th" is personal data. "That woman with the blue handbag said she wanted to return on the 25th" is personal data. However, aggregate statistics do not relate to individuals, and are typically not personal data. "On the 14th, we had 25 attendees" is not personal data. Not all use of personal data is within the scope of the GDPR. For example, the GDPR would not apply if two organizers talk about who attended the meeting. However, Art 2(1) says the GDPR applies when personal data is processed wholly or partially with automated means (e.g. computers, smartphones), or forms a filing system or is intended for a filing system (e.g. keeping notes on attendees, keeping attendance lists) If GDPR applies, the organization would be responsible for ensuring compliance with its rules and principles, summarized in Art 5. Primarily, this means: having a clear purpose for processing selecting a suitable Art 6 legal basis for that purpose (e.g. consent or a legitimate interest) only processing the minimum data necessary for achieving that purpose determining and implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of the processing activities preparing for data subject rights, in particular by providing an Art 13 privacy notice when collecting data from the data subjects There are of course some complexities in the details. When the legal basis is "consent" (opt-in), the organization would have to ensure that this consent was freely given and sufficiently informed. Per Art 7(4), consent would not be freely given if that consent was a condition for access to the meeting. Using "legitimate interest" (opt-out) can be more flexible, but it requires performing a balancing test to show that the legitimate interest isn't outweighed by the data subjects' interests, rights, and freedoms. Roughly, relying on a legitimate interest is appropriate when the data subjects can reasonably expect the processing activity to occur. Regarding point 1, keeping general counts and aggregate statistics about attendees is probably OK since it wouldn't be personal data. If you are very conscientious about this, you could round all counts and use categories like "0-4 attendees, 5-9 attendees" for each facet, which makes it more difficult to make inferences about individuals. But the fundamental point is that all your data should relate to attendees as a whole, never to individuals. Regarding point 2 and 3, this is a question of legal basis. Since you gather names through informal conversations, I think that attendees would be weirded out if they learned that you kept detailed records on their attendance. So I think that you probably wouldn't have a legitimate interest here. However, being upfront with this and offering an opt-out could change this. On the aspect of keeping detailed notes on data from informal conversations, I'd like to point out H&M's EUR 35 million fine back in 2020 (summary on GDPRHub.eu). In a callcenter, managers used to have conversations with employees. These conversations touched on anything from vacation experiences to health problems, marriage problems, and religious beliefs. All of that is fine. What was not fine is that the managers went full Stasi and kept detailed notes about all of this on a shared drive and used that information for management decisions. This went on until a configuration error made those files accessible to all employees. This violated all the points in the basic compliance process outlined above: the records had no clear purpose, no suitable legal basis, contained way more data than necessary (and even Art 9 special categories of data like information on health or religious beliefs which have extra protection), did not have appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access, and did not fulfill data subject rights like the Art 13 right to be informed. In case this non-profit is a church or religious organization that had its own comprehensive data protection rules before the GDPR came into force in 2018, those can continue to apply per Art 91. This could probably address some issues of legal basis, but cannot circumvent the GDPR's general principles. | An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party. | Under GDPR, can I request to be forgotten and re-register for a trail? No (unless they are stupid.) The "right to be forgotten" does not mean they have to delete your data. They can keep personal data about if they have "legitimate interests" to keep these data. Stopping clients from abusing their "free trial" system is a legitimate interest. |
When does a person lose diplomatic status? Ahmed Ali Muthana, father of Hoda Muthana, "claims" that he was no longer working as a diplomat at the time of his daughter's birth, thereby insisting that his daughter was born a US citizen under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. His statement suggests that he was at one time employed in a diplomatic function (and that assumes that he had diplomatic "papers" because of his employ), how does one lose that status, and is there any action that he is required to take to relinquish that status? Further more, if he failed to take some action to relinquish that status, has he committed some crime? | His statement suggests that he was at one time employed in a diplomatic function (and that assumes that he had diplomatic "papers" because of his employ), how does one lose that status, and is there any action that he is required to take to relinquish that status? Diplomatic personnel with official diplomatic status under the relevant treaties and for purposes of U.S. naturalization laws are credentialed by the U.S. Department of State. When an embassy and consulate wants to bring in a new diplomat, it provides their credentials to the State Department, which must approve the grant of diplomatic status to the person, although this decision is given very broad deference in practice. The State Department could decline to credential someone due to an individualized history of prior misconduct (e.g. a known serial killer or war criminal who escaped prosecution due to diplomatic immunity), because the regime seeking to have the diplomat credentialed is no longer recognized as legitimate by the United States (e.g. the Assad regime of Syria), or because the total number of diplomats is excessive (e.g. if Luxembourg wanted to credential 1000 diplomats in the U.S.). Mostly, however, the credentialing process is important because a diplomat's credentials can be revoked. This is usually done either in response to the individualized conduct of a particular person (for example, the person is discovered to be a spy with a diplomatic cover who is actively stealing key secrets from the United States), or as a symbolic form of sanctions for conduct of the diplomat's country of which the United States does not approve. For example, many countries revoked the credentials of many Russian diplomats after Russia assassinated a former Russian spy in Britain. When a diplomat ends a tour of service in the United States, that diplomat's credentials are supposed to be withdrawn, in part, to prevent the number of credentialed diplomats from their country in the U.S. from being excessive. A credentialed diplomat is not required to be in the U.S. 24/7 while the credentials are in place. But, the country has some mild incentives not to have too many absentee diplomats. (The U.S. State Department could also unilaterally revoke the credentials of a diplomat known to be a long time absentee.) It isn't clear to me in this case, if this individual's credentials had actually been formally withdrawn yet, or if he and his family were in the gap period between terminating his employment in the U.S. with the embassy and formally having his credentials withdrawn by his home country. In the former case, his children born in the U.S. are definitely U.S. citizens pursuant to the 14th Amendment and U.S. citizenship and naturalization laws. In the later case, the rule is less clear and it may be an issue of first impression not resolved by any prior case law regarding an issue that is arguably ambiguous under the statute. Vox has a good description of the underlying facts in the case, in addition to a lot of analysis that I omit from the quoted material below: Hoda Muthana’s father, Ahmed Ali Muthana, came to the US from Yemen in 1990 to serve as a diplomat representing his home country at the United Nations, whose headquarters are located in New York City. However, he lost that job — and thus his diplomatic immunity — as the result of the Yemeni civil war in the mid-1990s. The question is exactly when he lost his diplomatic privileges — and whether that happened before Hoda was born, on October 28, 1994, or after. The US government has told Ahmed Ali Muthana (according to his lawsuit) that its records show he held diplomatic status until February 6, 1995 — that is, until after Hoda’s birth — and therefore that Hoda was born while he was still a diplomat and thus is not a US citizen, but a Yemeni one. Ahmed Ali Muthana, on the other hand, claims in a lawsuit that he surrendered his diplomatic identity card on June 2, 1994 — months before his daughter was born. Legal experts I spoke to said that that wouldn’t necessarily mean he officially lost his diplomatic status on that date, though. Steve Vladeck, a law professor at the University of Texas at Austin, said that under US law, ex-diplomats who are still in the country enjoy some “residual immunity” while they pack their bags and prepare to head back home. But the Muthanas weren’t just wrapping up their affairs before returning to Yemen; they were settling in the country for good. Since the Muthanas credentials with the State Department weren't officially withdrawn until February 5, 1995, after his daughter was born, the question of whether he was a diplomat or not when she was born isn't a cut and dried one. A lot of the argument in the case pertains to how the United States government treated this case before it was at issue when his daughter sought to travel to the United States as would be her right if she was a U.S. citizen. But, ultimately, all of this portion of the factual background is only pertinent to the extent that it sheds light on the official interpretation of the legal issues that the United States understood to be the case before the dispute arose. But, the United States government's interpretation of the law regarding when someone has diplomatic immunity, while it can be considered as persuasive authority, does not determine definitively if the United States government's previous interpretations of this law as applied to this case were legally correct. Either party is free to dispute any previous interpretation given to the law that was not established in a a disputed court case on the merits of the dispute. The facts are also illuminated and complicated by a point made by @user6726 in his answer which points out that UN representatives don't have the full diplomatic immunities enjoyed by other diplomats. Further more, if he failed to take some action to relinquish that status, has he committed some crime? He has not committed a crime. First of all, upon the termination of his diplomatic status, he could have received a tourist visa which is available for several months, as a matter of course, to citizens of many nations who arrive in the U.S. without prior issuance of a visa. Second, even if he and his family are present in the United States without any legal visa or citizenship authorizing them to be present in the United States, this merely means that as a civil (i.e. non-criminal) matter, he and his family may be deported. Overstaying a visa is not a crime. Also, even he had committed a crime because, for example, after his diplomatic status ended he trafficked sex slaves to pimps in the U.S. in a manner that evaded a port of entry after having previously been convicted of the same offense (which would be a felony), this would not prevent his child, born in the United States while he did not have diplomatic credentials from being a U.S. citizen. Birthright citizenship under the 14th Amendment is available even to people who are illegally present in the United States and are deportable and even if that presence arose from a crime. FOOTNOTE ON PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS Naively, this case also seems to raise some interesting issues of civil procedure and subject-matter jurisdiction. Most questions related to immigration and nationalization law are heard in the first instance in Article II (Executive Branch) immigration courts which are administrative law courts, subject to appeal to an appellate Article II administrative law court called the BIA (Board of Immigration Appeals). Appeals from the BIA, in turn, are to the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit, an Article III (Judicial Branch) intermediate appellate court, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court. A handful of questions related to immigration and naturalization law are, or may be, raised in the United States District Courts (an Article III trial court), subject to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit, an Article III (Judicial Branch) intermediate appellate court, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court. (I don't have the technical expertise to quickly and accurately summarize which cases belong in Article II immigration courts and which belong in Article III U.S. District Courts without considerable further research, but this isn't necessary to understand the jurisdictional conundrum posed by this case.) But, court cases in which diplomats are parties are also in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The pertinent language of Section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution states: The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Counsuls . . . In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. But, because the case law has held that this portion of the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court clause vests concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction over these cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, this is not the barrier that it would naively seem to be. Therefore, if the case were filed originally in the U.S. Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court could instead transfer the matter to another appropriate federal trial court, or could dismiss the case without prejudice on prudential grounds rather than because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear original proceedings in the case. If this had not been the case, it would have been tricky to resolve in this case, because the crux of the dispute is whether or not the father of the child was a diplomat at the relevant time, which is also the central fact that needs to be determined when one attempts to discern which court has jurisdiction over the case. (Also, had this been an issue, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104, the evidentiary rules that apply to a preliminary determination regarding whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction are different that the normal evidentiary rules that apply to subsequent reconsiderations of the subject-matter jurisdiction question and the decision on the merits.) Since the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding diplomatic matters is not exclusive, it does not raise complicated issues of subject matter jurisdiction, because both the U.S. Supreme Court and the ordinary trial court in cases like these both have subject matter jurisdiction. There is also no doubt that the questions presented in this case are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts as opposed to state and local courts, unlike most federal questions over which the federal courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. SECOND FOOTNOTE RE POSSIBLE LOSS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP Another potential issue in this case is whether the daughter took actions that amounted to a voluntary renunciation of her U.S. citizenship in as an adult in connection with her alleged involvement with ISIS and loyalty oaths that may have been taken by her at that time. If she swore an oath of loyalty to ISIS that included an express renunciation of all claims she might have to citizenship in any other country or to any other sovereign, that could operate as a renunciation of her U.S. citizenship even if she was a citizen at birth. So far as I know, the litigation has not yet progressed far enough for this issue to be ripe for consideration yet, because you can't determine if someone has renounced their U.S. citizenship until you figure out if that person was a U.S. citizen in the first place. | As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand. | You are indeed thinking of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. This codified a portion of existing customary international law on diplomatic immunity. It is the result of several years of legal negotiations at establishing a common set of rules that would be generally acceptable. The basic concept of immunity for ambassadors is very ancient, and there is still a body of customary international law that was not codified. For example, the 1961 Convention only deals with permanent missions, not temporary ones like for multinational summits. The history and practice are also helpful for interpreting the Convention itself, such as when considering the scope of diplomatic duties which are protected, as opposed to extracurricular activities which might not be. In the UK, the Convention is implemented by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. This mostly repeats the relevant parts of the Convention text, in Schedule 1, and also includes sections integrating those provisions with domestic law. As far as the courts, section 4 says that If in any proceedings any question arises whether or not any person is entitled to any privilege or immunity under this Act a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State stating any fact relating to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. This means that what happens procedurally in a UK court is that someone wanting to claim immunity must come with a letter from the Foreign Secretary attesting that they are a real diplomat and not just making it up. The court then considers, from that fact, what legal consequences follow, depending on the type of diplomat involved (e.g. heads of mission have broader protection), the nature of the case (criminal case where the diplomat is accused? civil case where they are the respondent?), etc. That is a matter of interpreting the Convention, plus maybe customary international law - it doesn't mean the diplomat gets to wave their certificate and end the proceedings. The purpose of section 4 is to avoid the court entering its own fact-finding process about whether someone is a real diplomat. That is felt to run the risk of the court causing diplomatic offence by accident - consider Israel and Palestine and China and Taiwan for potential pitfalls. The doctrine of "one voice" obliges the courts to follow the executive's lead. Prior to the Act of 1964, diplomatic immunity was covered by several other enactments, but with the same basic model for implementing immunities in court. There were different regimes for Commonwealth countries and others, which is not the case any more. The first such Act was passed in 1708 after an embarrassing situation with the then ambassador from Russia, who was imprisoned for his debts, angering the Tsar. In general, domestic courts in the UK can take account of customary international law if it is relevant. They can also look at treaty texts, even ones the UK has not signed, to help interpret international law. (In the same way, they can look at academic articles, travaux préparatoires, etc., which have no formal status as law.) If the UK signed the 1961 Convention but did not pass the 1964 Act, then courts might be able to treat the Convention as "background" - but would still be bound by the 1708-1955 Acts on the topic, as far as the actual procedure and rules to follow. A diplomat would not be able to avail themselves of their specific 1961 rights, unless perhaps there was some gap or ambiguity in the domestic law where they could squeeze in an argument that the Convention supplied the proper interpretation of whichever point of customary international law was involved. | The 25th amendment §3 says Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. Nothing in the Constitution deprives the Vice President of his powers / duties when he is also Acting President. Alternatively, the VP can become acting President under §4, without presidential cooperation, by declaration of the VP and a majority of the cabinet. Then either the President asserts that there is no inability, or Congress decides there is. But: unless the president dies or resigns, or is impeached, the VP is Acting President and actual Vice President, and therefore breaks ties in the Senate. Note that under §4, the VP plus cabinet must declare POTUS unable, and must do it again if POTUS denies the inability. That means that there must still be a VP, who along with the cabinet re-affirms the disability. | I have never heard of anything like this. I guess when you say "registered in that place" you are referring to Russian resident registration. The US doesn't have such a system, so this sort of certificate wouldn't even make sense. | Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials. | Let’s look at the full paragraph Neither the President nor Congress nor the Judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. So what it actually says is: you can’t unless you can. The Constitution says this to say about habeas corpus: The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. The case decided that military commissions (and the denial of habeas corpus) were constitutional where there was no civilian court available. Because Indiana had never been in rebellion and civil courts continued to function there, military tribunals could not be used. However, they could be uses in states that had been in rebellion. You can’t unless you can. This is specifically about rights guaranteed in the Constitution In this particular case, the right of habeas corpus. There is no equivalent right applicable to face masks so a law mandating them in certain circumstances does no more infringe a Constitutional right than mandating the wearing of clothes in public. You can’t unless you can. Breaking the law doesn’t cause you to lose your job The second quote, the origin of which is unknown and definitely not in the case, is total fantasy. Even if a law against face masks was unconstitutional, the authors of that law have overreached and the remedy is to go to a court to have it declared unconstitutional. They don’t lose their jobs as a result. Even if they wrote the law with criminal intent, they must be removed from office in accordance with the normal procedures such as impeachment for the President, by a two-thirds majority vote of their house for a Congressperson etc. | There is no internationally-enforceable mechanism regarding how other people call something, or what alphabet can be uses to write a word. I can legally call that country between Bangladesh and Thailand "Burma" or "Myanmar", I can call Україна Ukraine, The Ukraine, or Ukrainia (the latter seems to be old-fashioned, but it's still legal). As a diplomatic matter, the US government seems to have settled on certain designations so that it uses the version "Myanmar" for official purposes although it includes "(Burma)" in popular communications (State Department travel advisories). If it wanted to, the US could call The Republic of North Macedonia by the name "Macedonia", though there would be political protests. The EU, NATO, UN etc. can likewise set its own rules regarding names of countries. There are many additional complications in the case of countries that are not universally / widely recognized, such as Trasnistria and the Republic of Somaliland. If the president of the Republic of Somaliland sought to address the UN, his problem would not be what people would call his country, it is that the Republic of Somaliland is not "recognized" by the UN (it has no official status), or anyone else. The question of "sameness" of language is a prominent feature of nationalist movements. Claims are made that Flemish and Dutch are "the same" or "different", likewise Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin; Dari, Farsi and Tajik. Thus there is no real chance of litigating the matter of whether Moldovan and Romanian are the "same language" and which name should be used. But if the EU parliament wants to, it could rule that the language of Moldova is to be called "Romanian", or "Moldovan". |
Using instrumental portion of copyrighted song? I have this portion of Monsoon Br.eakfast. I’m planning to use it for an creepy intro animation I know that it is copyrighted, yet I have seen other people use it without the lyrics, and it seems like it isn’t copyrighted if you don’t use the lyrics. Like this According to what I circled, apparently it’s ok to mute the music and bypass copyright. But is it really? I need to know before I get in trouble with the law… | No, it isn't. A sound recording of a song has a few different elements that are distinct from one another, but they are each protected by copyright (unless the song is old enough to have passed into the public domain): the lyrics the melody and other aspects of the musical composition the instrumental arrangement the recording itself A sound recording is protected by copyright even if it is a recording of something that isn't protected by copyright. If you use a portion of the recording that has no lyrics, or if you use technical means to suppress the lyrics or filter them out, you still have to contend with the copyright protection of the other elements. But sometimes it is allowed to use copyright-protected material. There is a lot of discussion about "fair use" and other circumstances under which one can use copyright-protected material without permission. The most clear-cut way to use copyright-protected material without violating copyright, however, is to have permission in the form of a license. You can always ask. | The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected. | You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry. | There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly. | In general, a gameplay video would be either a partial copy or a derivative work, and in either case an infringement if created without permission. Such a video might be covered under fair use in US copyright law, particularly if made for the purpose of commentary on a game or instruction in how to play or design a game. In general, a fair use defense is more likely to succeed if only the minimum amount of the work required for the purpose is used, and sound tracks might not be required for such a purpose. Thus a maker of such a video might choose to omit the sound to improve the fair-use case. Moreover, when the sound track contains licensed popular music it would be subject to a separate copyright, and many music publishers are notoriously litigious, so prudence would advise omitting the sound. All that said, fair-use is a case-by-case determination, and if the makers of such videos have not been sued, they (and we) can only guess how a case would turn out. As to why game makers refrain from having such videos taken down (if they in fact do refrain) one can only speculate. Game publishers may consider the videos good advertising. Questions based on the absence of legal proceedings are inherently speculative, unless a copyright holder has announced a policy of not taking action and the reasons for it. | Game mechanics are not copyright able. However, the images, words used, description of the rules are all copyright. If the original games is the source of the video game then the video game is a derivative work. If the original game is only the inspiration and the look and feel is different then this is OK. Which is which will turn on the actual facts. | Copyright infringement requires that you actually copy elements from an earlier work produced by a different author. If you created a similar, or even identical, work independently, it is not copyright infringement. When considering whether or not infringement has occurred, the court is likely to consider whether the defendant could reasonably have had access to the plaintiff's work. If the court finds that they could have, then the defendant would be required to produce evidence of original authorship. Consider the My Sweet Lord/He So Fine case, where the court found the defendant had subconsciously copied the plaintiff's song. Had Harrison been able to produce evidence of original authorship, the judgment could have been different. In your example, it is unlikely that an suit in copyright infringement could be decided against you, as you've stated the text is generated randomly. However, more evidence of this randomness might be required to support your case. Of course, whether a computer or automated process can produce works independently is still questionable; I'm not aware of cases that have tried this. The US Copyright Office has said that Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable. Of course, whether this has a bearing on your particular scenario is undecided, and I'm not sure how it would be decided. It is almost certain that the worst case outcome would be an injunction requiring you to cease publicising the product, or perform reasonable checks prior to publication to ensure that the product of your program infringes on works; it would be unlikely that you would have costs ordered against you, especially if the program is truly random, and the random text was given as much, or more, publicity than the coherent text. | I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must. |
Do Canadian courts distinguish copyright infringement from scientific plagiarism? Do Canadian courts distinguish copyright infringement from scientific plagiarism? Since 1997, the Canadian Copyright Act allows plaintiffs suing for copyright infringement to elect to recover statutory damages instead of going through the exercise of quantifying actual damages that were suffered or incurred by the copyright owner or actual profits earned by the rogue. Where the infringement is for commercial purposes, the range of statutory damages starts with a minimum of $500 per work infringed and goes up to a maximum of $20,000 per work infringed. If the infringement is for non-commercial purposes, then there is a cap of $5,000 for all works involved. That cap is an attempt to discourage film and music plaintiffs from suing individuals for their home file sharing activities. For example, a content user (file sharer) who copies 1,000 songs for monetary profit would be liable for up to $2 million in statutory damages, while a content user who copies the same 1,000 songs for personal use only would be liable for up to $5,000 because of the cap. https://boyneclarke.com/blogs/what-are-statutory-damages-for-copyright-infringement/ It seems under Canadian law copyright infringement from scientific plagiarism can result in a $5,000 fine, but because you can sell your scientific articles it's possible it's actually $20,000, but is this correct and are damages from scientific plagiarism covered by a different Canadian law? | Plagiarism only marginally intersects copyright infringement. If I take an article published by Jones in an obscure journal and publish it to another journal under my name, with some light paraphrasing, that is both plagiarism and copyright infringement. If I publish that article under Jones' name, that is copyright infringement and not plagiarism. If I completely rewrite the ideas of the article and publish under my name (not crediting the original author, that is plagiarism and not copyright infringement). The essence of plagiarism is taking the ideas of another without giving credit. The essence of copyright infringement is copying without permission. So there is no legal penalty to taking credit for someone else's ideas. As for your economic question, an infringer may be liable for compensatory damages. Therefore, an author whose work would garner $50,000 in royalties would not seek the minimal statutory damages, he would go for the $50,000 in lost revenue. | In the United States, the protection of copyright is afforded automatically to authors of original works. You don't need to place a copyright notice, but it is desirable as protection against a defence of innocent infringement. The format of copyright notices for visual works is governed by 17 U.S.C. § 401 : (a) General Provisions.— Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by this section may be placed on publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. (b) Form of Notice.— If a notice appears on the copies, it shall consist of the following three elements: (1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word “Copyright”, or the abbreviation “Copr.”; and (2) the year of first publication of the work; in the case of compilations, or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. The year date may be omitted where a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful articles; and (3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner. (c) Position of Notice.— The notice shall be affixed to the copies in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. The Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, as examples, specific methods of affixation and positions of the notice on various types of works that will satisfy this requirement, but these specifications shall not be considered exhaustive. (d) Evidentiary Weight of Notice.— If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified by this section appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided in the last sentence of section 504 (c)(2). You'll notice that the wording of the law is broad, except that it gives the Register of Copyright the power to prescribe positioning of notice. A notice that falsely claims a later first publication year does not extend the term of copyright protection — if you first published an article on your website in 2010, a copyright notice that states 2015 does not extend the protection. So: You don't need a copyright notice at all, but it's helpful You can put a later year on the notice, but this doesn't protect it for longer Each of your examples would have the same effect. As pointed out, they don't designate an author. For some reason, I had mentally inserted them. However, for works published after March 1, 1989, copyright protection is automatic and no corrective steps are required. This may mean that a defence of innocent infringement may succeed. Oh, and also - All rights reserved has a different meaning, essentially addressed in the question What is the effect of saying "we reserve our (client's) rights" when writing to another party to a dispute? | There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly. | Addressing the question of programmer liability, generally speaking, a person who creates something that others use to infringe on copyright is not liable is liable if there are non-infringing uses for the thing (Sony). They can be liable if they intentionally contribute to infringement, viz Grokster one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. End-user liability is different. In order to legally download (watch) anything, you have to have permission from the rights-holder, and from the site operator. The site operator will have terms of service according to which you can access material: if you violate those terms, you are infringing on copyright (you didn't do what the permission to copy required of you). If the site-owner knowingly distributes material without permission, he is an infringer and you have no legal license to copy (watch) that content, so you too are an infringer. If the site-owner unknowingly distributed material without permission and generally complies with the DMCA safe harbor requirements, he is not an infringer but you the user are. Congress has not created an innocent-infringement defense where you can defend yourself against an accusation of infringement by proving that you didn't know that the material was distributed without permission (there is an option to reduce liability for statutory damages to $200 in case of unknowing infringement, but not make all liability go away). | There is a legal concept of de minimis: the idea that some offenses, civil or criminal, are too small to be worth prosecuting. For example, a photograph of a city scene that incidentally captured part of a copyrighted billboard in one corner of the image infringes the copyright on that billboard. But if the copyright holder were to sue, it's virtually certain the suit would be thrown out due to the minimal nature of the infringement. Technically speaking, yes, what you describe is a crime. But any prosecutor who tried to bring charges to that effect is likely to be chewed out by the judge for wasting everyone's time. (Incidentally, assuming the reporter and property owner are US citizens, the crime is failure to cross at a designated crossing point (19 USC 1459, a customs offense) rather than improper entry (8 USC 1325, an immigration offense).) | THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not. | Both the displayed site (including all text and images) and the html, css, javascript and other code that generates the display are protected by copyright. This is true in pretty much every country. You would not be able to reuse them lawfully without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. If no exception applies, and you have not obtained permission, this is copyright infringement. In most cases copyright infringement is treated as a tort (a civil matter), not as a crime. This means that law enforcement generally will take no action and have no interest in such a situation. The copyright owner could sue for infringement, and possibly collect money damages. In the US, statutory damages can be as high as $30,000, or up to $150,000 for "wilful" infringement, or as low as $750 (per work infringed). Or actual damages can be collected instead. In other countries, actual damages plus costs of suit are more likely, but the rule can be different in each country. The possible exceptions to copyright vary significantly in different countries. In the US the major exception is Fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? for more information In general short snippets of code can probably be used under fair use, but substantial parts of the code or the displayed site are less likely to qualify as fair use. And if it is illegal then why are there so many legal open source or paid software and applications for cloning of website like httrack, cyotek, webcopy etc? Most of these tools have legitimate uses, including learning how a site is constructed without distributing copied content; and cloning or partial cloning of a site with permission. Even if the tools were mostly used for unlawful copying, that might well not be a high priority for law enforcement, and cross-border law enforcement (which this in many cases would involve) is often much harder for the police and other authorities. | The other answers get at this somewhat obliquely, but to be clear your assumption 7, that there is no substantial similarity, implies no infringement. Substantial similarity is an element of infringement. But it is also often a disputed element. On your fact pattern, it might even be the only disputed element in the case, and in a close case in a technical area such as this (where it would likely seem to a judge that it could go either way), a jury would simply vote on it. That is, no oracle of copyright doctrine would be consulted for "the answer" to the question of substantial similarity; a jury would just hear testimony from both sides and get some instructions from the judge on the applicable standard (which are rarely much, if any, help) and vote. Substantial similarity - that is, similarity that appropriates "enough" of the original work to be actionable - is very difficult to assess in any objective manner. This aspect drives many creative people in copyright-intensive specialized disciplines (such as software and music) crazy. Often when people have expertise in an area, it may seem "obvious" to various individuals what ought to be actionable and what shouldn't. But it is rare to find complete conensus. (Most copyright infringement cases involving music - e.g. the one involving Katy Perry's "Dark Horse" or Robin Thicke's "Blurred Lines" - attract a lot of attention because juries end up voting on an issue that almost anybody who has heard two songs could form an opinion about, and maybe a strong opinion about.) A loose analogy to your question would be in the criminal context, where the fact pattern is, so let's say A kills B, but didn't intend to, did A commit murder? In most jurisdictions the formal legal answer to that question would be "no, of course not, because intent is an element of the crime of murder." But in many murder cases intent is a highly disputed element (sometimes the only disputed element) and in close cases a jury just gets to vote on what they think from their understanding of the facts, or at least what is presented to them as the facts in court. (The standard of proof in criminal cases is formally different but in practice I am not sure it is at all different.) As another answer suggests, the fact pattern you describe sounds kind of "fishy," and while that does not doctrinally matter, let alone settle the issue, it might matter to a jury. Two cases somewhat along these lines are Google LLC v. Oracle, Inc. (which involved basically this fact pattern, with Google in the role of "app b") and Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l., Inc. (with Borland in the role of "app b", although the copying that occurred was not at the level of source code). They were both ultimately decided on other grounds (and the relevant issues only got to a jury in one of them), but in a world where other statutory defenses had not been asserted they both could have been decided simply by jury vote. |
If a President voluntarily quits after the first month of his second office, can he run again as President in the United States? If a President voluntarily quits after the first month of his second office, can he run again as President in the United States? The limit is a 7 year office, but if you leave in your second term after a month do you still get to run or not? What if the President quits before the beginning of his second term? | The Twenty Second Amendment is quite clear on this: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice In your question, the President has been elected twice - unless of course the President was actually the Vice President (or elsewhere in the line of succession) at the start of the first term, in which case theres other limits: and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. So, someone who has held the office of President after being elevated to it rather than elected to it, but served no more than 1 year 364 days of that first term, could possibly, by the wording of the Twenty Second Amendment, be eligible to resign within their second term and stand again but only once more. | Yes, so long as you are still a US citizen, it does not matter if you no longer maintain residence in the United States. If you no longer have any sort of residence that can be claimed as a current residence, you simply register at whatever the last residence you used was when you lived in the United States (even if someone else lives there now). You would then have an absentee ballot mailed to you overseas. However, if you don't maintain any sort of residence in the United States, you will only be eligible to vote for federal offices (president, senate, house). You won't be allowed to vote in state or local elections. The keywords you'll need for voting are: UOCAVA, which is a program that allows for easier voting overseas (in some cases the ballot can actually be emailed to you and you are only responsible for printing it out, filling it out, and mailing it back). FPCA, which is the form you fill out. It actually doubles as a registration and an absentee ballot request, so you only have to fill out one form. The absentee request is good for all elections in the calendar year it is submitted, so you only have to fill it out once for both the primary and the general. | The Indiana constitution is phrased differently to the US constitution in such a way to exclude pre-emptive pardons: (Indiana) The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment (US constitution) he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. (my emphasis) The Indiana constitution explicitly states that the Governor may grant pardons after conviction and does not give the Governor the power to grant pardons before conviction. By contrast, the Supreme court has judged that the President may issue pardons after commission, that is after the offence has been committed, and potentially before the arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. They can't issue pardons for crimes not yet committed. The scope of pardons issued by the Governor is limited; this power is subject to regulation by law issued by the Legislature, and (if there is no regulation giving sole power of pardon to the president) the Legislature may form a council to review pardons. The council's advice and consent must be sought. In fact, the Legislature appoints the Parole Board to this role. So the Parole Board gives advice and consent to pardons issued by the Governor. In practice, therefore, the Parole Board makes these decisions, as Governors rarely refuse pardons recommended by the Board. Generally, though, pardons are rare, Mike Pence granted only three during his tenure as Governor. References: Constituion of Indiana Guide to pardons in Indiana | The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question. | Yes, the employee can choose not to accept the contract offered at the end of the probationary period and thereby allow the probationary period to end without accepting a long-term position. This is usually called "quitting". | The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that. | The pardons would stand and continue to be valid. There is a minority view that the "except in cases of impeachment" language in the pardon clause of the U.S. Constitution deprives a President of the pardon power after impeachment until there is a U.S. Senate non-conviction. But the majority view is that this clause merely states that the loss of political office and prohibition on seeking future political office resulting from a U.S. Senate conviction in an impeachment trial cannot be removed via the pardon power. In the majority view, a President has all of the powers and authority of the office, including the pardon power, until the moment of a U.S. Senate conviction following a impeachment by the U.S. House (or the end of his term of office due to resignation or expiration of the President's term of office). Neither view, of course, has ever been resolved authoritatively in the courts because it has never come up before historically. Also, a group pardon would not absolve the President himself of criminal liability. The majority view (again never tested because no President has ever attempted to do so) is that a President may not pardon himself at all. But all other persons who benefit from the pardon would be relieved of criminal liability as a result. | Yes, they just wait until he has served his time in most cases. The United Kingdom and the United States can agree that he can serve the time in the United States though. |
How does one find a judge for highly publicized issues? For example, suppose Donald Trump is brought to trial for inciting the 2021 storming of the United States Capitol. It's virtually inconceivable that there'll be any judge who hasn't seen that incident in the news. Therefore they already have some knowledge of the facts of the case and could very well have formed an opinion on it. Since judges are expected to recuse if they have personal knowledge of disputed facts, how would one find an impartial judge for the trial? NB: This particular case I would expect to be argued in the US Supreme Court, for which there are only 9 judges, but I am also interested in other well-publicized cases which are undergoing (or have already undergone) trial by media that might be argued in a lower court. | "Personal knowledge of disputed facts" doesn't refer to awareness of news reports or other facts available in the public record. That is public knowledge, not personal knowledge. It rather refers to private knowledge that the judge (or people who are closely related to the judge) might have of pertinent facts. For example, California Code of Civil Procedure 170.1: (a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true: (1) (A) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. (B) A judge shall be deemed to have personal knowledge within the meaning of this paragraph if the judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (2) ... | The warning notice is intended for viewers and participants, not for the court to make its own official record of the proceedings. Presumably, it was this court record that the judge released for educational purposes under his own Order via Twitter. In which case, there has been no contempt of court. | David Siegel's answer correctly explains how appellate courts consider laws and arguments not addressed in the courts below. To clarify on the comparison to the Court of Cassation, though: A trial court is generally limited to considering the facts that are properly introduced by the parties, though a court may also take "judicial notice" of certain facts that are highly unlikely to be disputed. On review, courts of appeal are generally limited to facts supported by the evidence in the trial-court record, though they may also take judicial notice of other facts. A party is generally unable to introduce new evidence during an appeal. It is not correct that an appellate court will not review factual determinations, as those reviews probably happen in more cases than not. But -- just as with legal determinations -- those reviews can happen with varying levels of deference. For instance, if a case is tried to a jury, an appellate court will be exceedingly deferential to the jury's factual determinations, on the theory that the jury is best positioned to evaluate the evidence, gauge credibility, make reasonable inferences, etc. A judge who makes a factual determination based on in-court testimony will enjoy a similar measure of deference. But if a court makes a factual determination based only on documents submitted in support of a motion, or otherwise lacks an opportunity to evaluate a witness in person, the appellate court will be more open to different interpretations of the evidence. Legal determinations are likewise subject to varying levels of deference. At one end is the abuse-of-discretion standard. If a trial court determines that evidence is admissible or inadmissible, for instance, an appellate court will apply the abuse-of-discretion standard, which (to oversimplify) asks not whether the ruling was incorrect under the controlling law, but whether the ruling was reached without regard to the controlling law. On the other end is de novo review, in which the appellate court gives virtually no deference to the trial court and undertakes its own independent legal analysis. Perhaps even more deferential is plain-error review, which asks (to oversimplify) whether the trial court's error is so apparent that it barely needs to be debated. If the error is obvious enough (and satisfies several other criteria), the appellate court may reverse the trial court. | Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.). | This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling. | Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See "Special Juries in the Supreme Court" by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of "contract judge" who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps. | By producing sufficient evidence at trial. In this case, the most likely sources of evidence would either be eye witnesses (if someone witnessed the forgery) or expert testimony (i.e., handwriting experts). Any experts would have done an analysis and would testify about the results of their analysis. Any eye witnesses would testify to what they personally observed. Judges are not handwriting experts. They don't evaluate signatures. Judges are law experts. They evaluate evidence. Sworn testimony (subject to cross-examination) by a qualified handwriting expert stating so would be evidence of a forged signature. The handwriting expert would conduct all the necessary analysis, then provide a conclusion and their testimony in exchange for a fee. Also, patterns of deceptive conduct (that can be found during discovery) could be introduced as evidence to impeach the credibility of the testimony of any witness (including your counterparty). I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. Please do not do anything based on anything I have written because I really don't know what I am talking about. I'm just stumbling around in the dark like everybody else. If you need help with a case, please hire a real attorney and even offer to pay them for their time and expertise. | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. |
Permissibility of ex-parte communication for judges in the US Watching some legal movies it struck me as odd where judges are portrayed talking to one of the parties in the absence of the other (ex-parte communication). Say in New Zealand, this amounts to judicial misconduct (Guidelines for Judicial Conduct at [30]): Communication between the judge and any party in the absence of the other party to the case is not permissible, except in proceedings properly heard ex parte. Some examples: In A Time to Kill, the judge is once shown walking down the street friendly talking to the state attorney/prosecutor (Jake and Oliver see them while sitting in a cafe just before Ellen Roark arrives). In another scene, the judge invites Jake to his house to tell him that his application for change of venue is denied. in Jagged Edge, Teddy just knocks on the Judge Carrigan's door and, although he says that he can't talk to her, she begs him and he lets her in. Funnily enough, they both pretend to be talking about a hypothetical case. In The Untouchables, Ness talks to the judge in his chambers, shows him a piece of paper where the jurors (as well as the judge himself) are listed to be on Capone's payroll, and persuades him to switch the jury. Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? If yes, how come? If no, do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Related: Ex-parte communication between a Judge and Prosecutor - ethical breach or canon violation? | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | The judge's instructions state: You have been allowed to take notes during the trial. You may take those notes with you to the jury room. You should not consider these notes binding or conclusive, whether they are your notes or those of another juror. The notes should be used as an aid to your memory and not as a substitute for it. It is your recollection of the evidence that should control. You should disregard anything contrary to your recollection that may appear from your own notes or those of another juror. You should not give greater weight to a particular piece of evidence solely because it is referred to in a note taken by a juror. There is a pattern instruction in Washington that addresses requests to rehear testimony: In making this decision, I want to emphasize that I am making no comment on the value or weight to be given to any particular testimony in this case. The testimony you requested will be [read to you] [replayed for you] here in the courtroom. You will hear it only one time. After you have heard the testimony, you will return to the jury room and resume your deliberations. When you do, remember that your deliberations must take into account all the evidence in the case, not just the testimony that you have asked to rehear. The notes on use state "Although judges have discretion in responding to these requests, the case law disfavors repeating trial testimony for deliberating jurors", followed by the state of the relevant case law. The central point in that discussion is: The concern addressed in the case law is that rereading requested selections from a trial transcript can lead jurors to give undue emphasis to the selected testimony. and an additional concern is that reading the trial transcript selections to the jurors could constitute an unconstitutional comment on the evidence. and finally jurors often request the testimony of a single witness rather than requesting balanced testimony from multiple witnesses that more accurately reflects the positions taken by both parties. If the judge grants such a limited request, then one party's version of the case might be unduly emphasized, yet if the judge expands on the request by repeating the requested testimony along with other relevant testimony, then the judge runs the risk of improperly commenting on the evidence. Minnesota criminal procedure rule 26 Subd. 20(2) addresses the matter of rehearing evidence, saying that the court can allow a hearing of specific evidence: (a) If the jury requests review of specific evidence during deliberations, the court may permit review of that evidence after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. (b) Any jury review of depositions, or audio or video material, must occur in open court. The court must instruct the jury to suspend deliberations during the review. (c) The prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant must be present for the proceedings described in paragraphs (a) and (b), but the defendant may personally waive the right to be present. (d) The court need not submit evidence beyond what the jury requested but may submit additional evidence on the same issue to avoid giving undue prominence to the requested evidence. This rule where judges have discretion is a change from an earlier rule where judges had an obligation to allow rehearing. When there is no obligation to allow rehearing, the "safer" path is to not allow rehearing. In State v. McDaniels, 332 N.W.2d 172, the appeals court notes that The judge reasoned that to read the requested portions of the two police officers' testimony would give undue prominence to that portion of the evidence. The prosecutor argued that three or four other witnesses had testified regarding Fifth and Royalston. The testimony was widely scattered throughout the transcript between direct and cross-examination. To locate all references would be burdensome and impractical thus reflecting the reasoning underlying the Washington instruction. In State v. Rean, 421 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 1988), the court turned down a request to rehear testimony, saying "You will have to rely on your memory of the testimony". The Supreme Court concludes that "To avoid giving undue prominence to the testimony requested, and in light of the difficulty of providing all relevant testimony, the jury's request was rejected". It then observes that "Simply because the jury apparently felt that it was at an impasse did not mean that the trial court was obligated to grant the jury's requests". The court rejected "the wooden approach of always granting a request, even an unreasonable one, if the jury says it is at an impasse" We do not know what objections the prosecution and defense raised regarding the request to rehear, but if one side would likely benefit from a rehearing, the other side is entitled to a "balancing" rehearing (the rules allow the jury to be directed to consider testimony that they did not request a rehearing of); and tit might have been onerous to assemble that evidence. | Yes, you can ask permission from the court. From this page (by a firm of solicitors): Recording a conversation in secret is not a criminal offence and is not prohibited. As long as the recording is for personal use you don’t need to obtain consent or let the other person know. [...] A private recording can be submitted as evidence, but with some conditions: A recording may be relied on in evidence if the court gives permission An application for permission should be made on form C2 The recording should be made available to other parties before any hearing to consider its admissibility. So yes you can probably use it, but you can't play Perry Mason and suddenly produce it in the middle of the court hearing. Talk to your solicitor. | Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court. | The Justices communicate by exchanging written memoranda, or at least they did during Justice Stevens’ time. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (2007), p 48: Outsiders tend to be surprised by how rarely Supreme Court justices speak to each other, one on one. Under Rehnquist, the nine spent a good deal of time together as a group. Argument days, most Mondays and Wednesdays when they were in session, were preceded by the traditional thirty-six handshakes, each justice with every other, and they had lunch together most of these days as well. There were also conference discussions every Friday during these weeks. After the conference, however, the justices tended to communicate with one another through memos, which were often drafted by their law clerks. (After e-mail became ubiquitous, the memos also circulated electronically, but always with paper copies as well; among the justices, only Thomas and Breyer, and eventually Stevens, were fully comfortable communicating by e-mail.) Some further detail about the distribution of these memos appears later in an anecdote about Bush v. Gore (p 170): Stevens drafted an order of just a few sentences remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for the setting of a statewide standard to continue the recount. He sent his messenger scurrying down the marble hallway to Kennedy and the rest of the justices. He heard nothing back, except from Ginsburg, who said she would join if it was a way of bringing the whole Court together. (The rush of events in Bush v. Gore strained the Court's technology, which was, in 2000, still rather primitive. As a security precaution, the e-mail system circulated only within the building. Plus, there was only a single, communal computer from which the justices and clerks could obtain access to the Internet. Because only Thomas and Breyer used computers regularly at the time, there was little pressure from the justices to update. For the most part, the justices communicated with one another by hand-delivered memos, which were typed by their secretaries.) | So, as you say, these witnesses who try to help their buddy out may be committing perjury. Also, D himself, by lining this up, is probably on the hook for conspiracy to commit perjury and being complicit in perjury. Aside from that, I think your question is: would getting people to testify in a way that implies they did the crime lead to an acquittal for the murderer? The answer is: maybe. The jury will either vote to acquit or to convict. If the jury votes to acquit, then it's over. Double jeopardy protects D from being tried for murder again. But, if the jury votes to convict, the fact that D had his friends testifying in the way you suggest isn't going to get the conviction overturned on appeal because "a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts." People v. Young, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Cal. 2005). I haven't done a trial yet, but it strikes me that that might not be the greatest trial strategy. I think generally defense lawyers would prefer to make their client look the furthest thing from gang affiliated as possible. Don't lie to a court or ask anyone to lie to a court for you. | Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH. | Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case. |
Do people have the right to comment or live blog professional sports in the United States? Do private persons have the freedom to live blog or comment on games on progress in professional sports? For example, can a web caster watch the game on TV and then give his running commentary and graphics showing the score on his web site or on Twitch TV? (Note I am not asking about rebroadcasting video, just about a person making their own commentary and graphics for the game. By a "graphic", I mean, for example, a box score in baseball.) | In the United States at least, the answer is clearly "Yes". Absent some restrictive agreement to which the would-be blogger is explicitly a party, a person has a protected right to comment or report on events and publish opinions of them. The question does not mention a location or jurisdiction, and I am not suren what the law on this point might be in non-US jurisdictions. | I am not a lawyer; I am especially not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; if you want legal advice, hire a lawyer. Idk. But probably not. The YouTube terms of service seem to prohibit this pretty clearly: You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player)... You agree not to access Content through any technology or means other than the video playback pages of the Service itself, the Embeddable Player, or other explicitly authorized means YouTube may designate. Now, were YouTube itself licensing the videos in question under the CC license, they might be prohibited from enforcing that term: You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. though I'm not sure if the language in question would apply. However, it seems likely that in most cases, YouTube is using the material in question under the license to which users agreed when they created their accounts, and therefore is not bound by the term in question. All that said, it's entirely possible that the clause in the YouTube ToS prohibiting downloading does not apply for whatever reason (unconscionable in a contract of adhesion, browsewrap agreement doesn't form a contract to begin with, it's superseded by either some other agreement (part of the API EULA, etc), it's contrary to some law in your jurisdiction, etc). Just to be very clear, though, there is no COPYRIGHT CONCERN preventing uses like the one you mentioned. | I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images. | There are no laws requiring that any company must publish all opinions from its customers. I'll admit it's fundamentally dishonest to only publish the positives, but there's no prohibition against it either. Look at movie advertisements, for example. They'll paraphrase or selectively quote a review, citing only what seems to be positive, yet if you read the review and quote in context, you'll understand the review quite differently. How exactly would you police it if you were to require companies to publish all reviews? Would you have some kind of litmus test to determine whether the critique is justified and fair? How often do people post false reviews (good or bad), and how would you account for them? Company web sites offering reviews form their own customers are doing nothing more than using the web as an extension of their marketing, so one has to expect some manipulation of the information in order to present products and services in their best possible lights. Why, for example, would I tell you how much someone hates my product when my goal is to sell it to you? This is why it would be better to use independent third-party review sites that have no dog in the hunt when it comes to honest feedback about the companies they cover. | No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia. | If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine. | That depends what is meant by "not allow". Such a blog author could certainly include a statement that the blog was intended only for female readers. That would not be enforceable. She could include a ToS provision requiring a user to agree to such a restriction. That might be enforceable in theory, but it would be a lot of work to try to enforce, as a blog author does not normally know who her readers are. Such an author could have the blog require registration and log-in, and as part of the registration process require registrants to provide evidence that they are females. That might work to keep (at least most) males from directly reading the blog. If we suppose that the author had such a registration process, and someone brought suit under a federal or state anti-discrimination law, what would happen? Such laws usually only apply to "places of public accommodation". Such laws have mostly been employed to address discrimination in hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar places. I am not aware of any case declaring a blog or any similar online service a "public accommodation". Such a finding would be needed for a suit in such a case to be won by the plaintiff. There are also specific laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and education. But those would not apply to this sort of case. So I am inclined to doubt that any such restriction, if imposed by a blog author, would be found to violate US anti-discrimination law. | It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work. |
Can a SCOTUS hearing on constitutional matters be hung? I'm assuming that constitutional matters at a federal level are decided by a panel of judges. Is it then possible for such decision to be hung like what can happen with juries? Are judges allowed to abstain from voting or is it as simple as being put to a vote and there always being an odd number of votes? | Constitutional matters can be, and often are, decided by a single judge in a garden-variety trial court. It's just that the judge's decisions may be reviewed and possibly overturned by a higher court, one of which is the supreme court. Furthermore, district courts are bound by precedent. If a case turns on a new statute, however, the trial judge can indeed find that new statute unconstitutional without a higher court first having done so. If a panel of judges is evenly divided on whether to overturn a lower court's ruling, the lower court's ruling stands, but no precedent is set. The supreme court often has an even number of justices hearing a case, whether because of a vacancy or because a justice has recused him or herself. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts. | In the US, if a person enters a guilty plea, a judge may proceed to convict and sentence the accused without any form of trial. In the case of minor offenses with possible penalties of less than six months in jail, there is no US constitutional right to a jury trial. and the accused may be convicted and sentenced after a bench trial with no jury. In the case of infractions that are not criminal, such as many traffic offenses, a judge or magistrate may make a judgment and impose a penalty after a brief and often informal hearing. In some non-US jurisdictions, there is no right to a jury trial even in serious cases. In most such jurisdictions some form of due process and some hearing or trial is required for conviction. However, in various authoritarian regimes, people may be "convicted" of "crimes" without anything like a trial before an independent tribunal. In short, this depends on the nature of the case, and the laws of the jurisdiction involved. | (The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights. | Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court. | To the title question, yes, of course, Justices are subject to the law same as anyone else is (at least in theory; whether actual practice bears that out is another matter). Chief Justice Roberts (and the rest of SCOTUS, and a good chunk of the judiciary to boot, and then some) was a named defendant in the case Shao v. Roberts that was appealed to SCOTUS. The Justices all recused themselves rendering the court short of a quorum and leaving the prior appellate court decision to dismiss the case sua sponte in place. However, Justices essentially police themselves. As the head of the judicial branch they are largely independent of Congressional or Executive attempts to control how they go about their business. Recent calls to create a legal code of ethics for Justices exist because such a code perhaps cannot, and currently does not, exist under the current constitutional order. As such Justices make their own decisions on when to recuse (see my answer here for further details). Your hypothetical justice would do the same, and the court would proceed as it always does whether they do or don't. | Your interpretation is correct. The constitution says that judges stay in office "until and unless they are impeached." That means that congress cannot impose a time limit on any judge's term of office. If it did so, it would be contrary to the constitution. The only grounds for removal are those to do with misbehavior. Therefore, judges have life tenure. |
Is a retroactive patent infringement possible? A software researcher (from an American university) published a new method/algorithm and then an implementation of it, licensed under the MIT license. I wrote to him to ask if he had filed a patent or if he intended to do so in the future and he told me that neither he nor the other authors intend to patent the method and that I don't have to worry about it (but I do it anyway). My doubts are: if I publish an application that uses this method (and/or part of the code), if one day the author patents the method (or sells the method to some company who then patents it), can I simply get out of trouble by removing the publication of the application or is there some form of retroactive infringement (does it make sense to speak of infringement if no patent existed when I published the software)? If yes, how much time do I have to unpublish my software before I can be sued for infringement (I mean, I can discover a bit later that a patent was filed!) how do I know if a patent is filed, since it may not have the same name of the publication? That is, how to find it? Thanks in advance. | If they have not filed before the publication, there will be no ability to later file in most of the world. In the U.S. there is a sort-of one year grace period to file after publication. You will not have a way to definitively know if there is an application pending until it publishes or issues. Normally an application publishes and is open for the public to see 18 months after the first priority filing. That applies to the rest of the world, but in the U.S. it is possible to opt-out of publication. In that case no one can see he application until the day it issues as a granted patent, if ever. If you are making, selling, offering for sale, using or importing an infringing process or product when a patent issues you could be sued for patent infringement. I do not see how this can be seen a "retroactive". As a practical matter, if you fold immediately upon the patent issuing it is unlikely you will end up with any liability. You can set a search in more than one search facility to trigger if a patent is issued to one of the known inventors or use with other criteria but this is not foolproof. Edited Of course your product could infringe any number of patents unrelated and unbeknownst to the party who published the software. That party not patenting has nothing to do with what others may have filed before they published. | Before the AIA in 2012 both companies could apply for a patent and if one of the applicants thought they were both trying to patent the same thing they could initiate an interference proceeding. In that proceeding before the board, they each present their evidence as to date of conception and diligent effort from that point to the date of the first filing. The board decided which application went forward. Now the U.S. is with the rest of the world in first-to-file. It doesn’t matter who conceived first unless one actually stole the idea from the other. There is a new derivation procedure to try to prove that. I don’t think it has ever yet happened. One of the "simultaneous" inventors could publish the invention, putting into the public domain. If published before the other's filing date, it would theoretically prevent the other from getting a patent. In any case a patent owner can stop the other from making their product or charge a royalty. There is a narrow case under the AIA where one company has been using a process that another later patents and can retain a limited right to keep using that process but can’t move or expand operations. This is called Prior User Rights. | Basically, statement 3 above is correct. The owner of the copyright in a work may release that work unmder different, even incompatible, licenses, as many times as s/he chooses to do. None of these releases cancels or invalidates any other. A person who obtains a work from a site where it is listed under a particular license, may rely on that license grant. The owner may (if the site allows) modify the license or remove the posted work, but this does not invalidate the license granted to those who obtained the work before any modification or removal. An incorrect or incomplete copyright notice does not, under current law. invalidate the copyright, and to the best of my understanding will not invalidate either of the license mentioen in the question. | You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code. | I'm not sure this would be a copyright violation. 17 USC 117 says: (a)Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner... Due to the shutdown of the license server, it is impossible to use the program without an adaptation. It is therefore an "essential step in the utilization of the computer program", and not infringing, in my opinion. | You are suggesting strict liability for software bugs. You haven't tried to show any negligence or incompetence on Microsoft's part, but just appear to have assumed that the existence of a bug that causes harm should create liability. Strict liability is rare, at least in the US, and does not in general apply to software. Given strict adherence to the best practice in developing software, there will be bugs, so a bug is not itself evidence of any sort of wrongdoing on Microsoft's part. In real life, if there was strict liability for software bugs, nobody and no business would write software for the use of others, because of the ever-present potential of being wiped out by lawsuits despite all they could do. | In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage. | Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability). |
Is there a restriction on who can inherit your wealth? Is there a restriction on who can inherit your wealth? For example, I doubt that you can donate money to the Taliban if you're a U.S. citizen, so I am wondering if the American laws specify what those restrictions are or if it's up to the judge to decide if a will is valid or not. Can you make sure that a foreign entity, or a citizen from a different country inherit your money? Assume that the question only applies for Americans. | Generally a person can leave money to any person or organization that the testator pleases. In some US states, a minimum portion must be left to family (spouse and/or children). Aside from that, there is no requirement and no exclusions. US law prohibits gifts (and other support) to a few specific organizations which the government has officially listed as terrorist, and I suspect the Taliban is one of these. Gifts by will would be covered by this law just as gifts from a living person. But if a living person in the US can lawfully make a gift to an organization, a similar gift may be left by will. Even if a particular bequest was unlawful, that would not make the will as a whole invalid. Edit: It seems that the Afghan Taliban is not on the list of terrorist organizations maintained by the US, and so there would be no bar to a US citizen leaving money to that group. There would be to groups actually on the list. The general principle above holds. | If the estate has not been settled, yes The executor is the legal owner of the house and does not need the beneficiaries' permission to sell it if they decide that is in the beneficiaries' best interests. They can consider their wishes, but they don't have to, and they don't have to follow them if they do. | The default choice of law rule is that intestate succession is governed by the law of the place of domicile of the decedent at death (i.e. by the law of the state where someone resides in the U.S. in this case), if there is no will and if no other consideration applies. Incidentally, the citizenship of the decedent is pretty much irrelevant. You don't need to be a a citizen of a place to be domiciled there. Similarly, where you happen to be when you die is also irrelevant to succession although other post-mortem processes like inquests are affected. Real property, however, is generally governed by the laws of intestate succession in the place where it is located. This requires a separate Mexican succession process, which would be called an ancillary probate in U.S. practice, but probably has a different name in Mexico because Mexico has a civil law legal system that follows the Spanish tradition for succession at death rather than the common law procedural process concept of a probate proceeding, and is often handled by a legally trained Mexican notary outside the court system. At the same time, common law legal systems give near absolute discretion to the testator in how they make their bequests subject to minimum immediate family support rules, while civil law legal systems are usually more limiting. Intangible personal property (e.g. a bank account) is usually deemed to be governed by the law of the place of domicile. Whether tangible personal property is governed by the law of the place of domicile, or by the law of the place where it is located at death, isn't an issue that is resolved uniformly in all jurisdictions. It would depend upon how the issue presented itself and in what legal forum it presented itself. Often, the reality that "possession is 9/10th of the law" and that tangible personal property often has little significant economic value, means that these issues are resolved without resort to the courts or formal legal process. (In England, in the early modern era, succession to tangible personal property was vested in the clergy and courts only handled succession to real property and intangible property.) Also, in terms of choice of law, in the U.S., probate is a matter of state law and is subject to a case law exception to federal jurisdiction that prevents it from being litigated in federal courts. Mexico also has a federal system, but I don't know whether Mexico's laws on intestate succession are state laws or federal laws (I believe that it is governed by state law but that there isn't much interstate variation). | It would be more common to leave a separate direction regarding the disposition of your body in a document other than your will, entrusted with your next of kin. This is because a dead person's body is usually disposed of in less than a week following death, but a determination that a will is valid and effective often has a minimum five day waiting period from death and can take months. Often, this direction regarding your own remains would not be phased in terms of a sale or gift. Instead, it would usually be a "direction" about their disposition. Someone else's remains would be property governed by a will. But, we don't normally think of body parts of a recently deceased person as becoming property, rather than a person, until they are processed in a way that makes them not a biohazard. This would not be the case, obviously, immediately upon your death when the direction regarding your remains is intended to take effect. Also, while selling already processed bones can be permissible, selling organs for transplantation is generally not permissible, although there can be reimbursement for any medical costs or similar out of pocket expenses incurred in connection with that process, again reflecting the distinction between an unprocessed dead body which is often not considered property, and a processed dead body part which often is considered property. | There might be some relevant state law. Michigan has a Social Security Number Privacy Act, which limits use of SS numbers, such as publically displaying an amount of a number, use it as an account number, require it to be transmitted insecurely over the internet, mail it etc. However, it is allowed under 3(a) to mail a number in a document if the purpose is to identify an individual, especially 3(a)(iv), to Lawfully pursue or enforce a person's legal rights, including, but not limited to, an audit, collection, investigation, or transfer of a tax, employee benefit, debt, claim, receivable, or account or an interest in a receivable or account. It would depends on your state, but it is highly likely that debt collection is an allowed purpose (even if it not a real debt, just a good-faith mistake). This gives a brief overview of state laws. | In the US at least, discrimination is legal (and sometimes even required) unless it is discrimination against specific, protected characteristics, and even then it is sometimes allowable if it is "necessary". Income, whether of an individual or that individual's family, is not in any list of protected characteristics. As such, discrimination upon it is fully legal. | A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it. | OK, I talked to a lawyer (in Massachusetts) and these are the answers I got. One can draft a confidential exclusion letter to state wishes regarding excluding certain people from being guardians. In the letter you can explain in detail why you think somebody is unfit to be a guardian. Execute this document as you do for your will and tell your family that it exists so that they can access it if you die (or give them a copy). The advantage of a stand-alone document is that it is not public, differently from the will which is public. The lawyer also suggested to also have a separate stand-alone guardianship document (and so to not include the guardian section in the will). The reason is that a will can be executed only if somebody is dead. But if somebody is e.g. in a coma (or missing), he won't be able to take care of his children and yet his will would not be able to executed. A separate guardianship document would instead apply also in these situations thereby minimizing the chances that somebody, whom you do not consider fit, becomes a guardian of your children. |
UK Immigration: Impact of excessive single-trip absence (pandemic & personal situation) on future Indefinite leave to remain application My wife intends to apply for UK Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) in Sep 2024 (10-year long residence route). However, there has been a recent big break in her stay in the UK due to personal & pandemic reasons. She departed UK on 05 Feb 2020 to home country, India, to spend time with family due to miscarriage after fertility treatment. She intended to return to the UK after 59 days around early April 2020. Quite unexpectedly, both India & UK went into pandemic lockdowns in Mar 2020. India has since suspended all scheduled international passenger flights indefinitely. Since Aug 2020, India has been running a repatriation flight program over several phases, but is not intended as a form of regular/scheduled passenger flight. As for me, I was stuck in the UK since Feb 05, 2020 & could travel to India only in Nov 2020. I intended to spend 3-4 months in India, spending time with elderly family there. In April 2021, India was put on the UK's red list, and both my wife & I scrambled back somehow to return to the UK on May 09, 2021. So, there exists a single-trip absence of 459 days. As per UKVI rules, in normal circumstances, this breaks the continuous residence requirements for the 10-year LR route (wherein a single absence should not exceed 180 days). However, I infer some possible exemptions through clauses CR2.3 (b) & (c) of the UKVI immigration rules: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-appendix-continuous-residence Will UKVI allow a concession for this specific situation? We have the NHS doctor's note for the miscarriage & fertility treatment, while pandemic-related travel disruptions are well known (and I presume no additional documentation is required). | Will UKVI allow a concession for this specific situation? Only your wife's UKVI caseworker can definitely answer this with any certainty, but as you say CR2.3 (b) does seem quite compelling but (c) less so - unless the medical records support her condition was "life-threatening" ...any period spent outside the UK will not count towards the 180-day limit if the absence was for any of the following reasons: [...] (b) travel disruption due to natural disaster, military conflict or pandemic; or (c) compelling and compassionate personal circumstances, such as the life-threatening illness of the applicant, or life-threatening illness or death of a close family member; [...] | Possibly. I wonder if you mean "convicted" rather than "arrested"? There is no way that he will be "arrested" because you don't accompany him ("arrested" is when he taken by the police before a trial). On the other hand, if he plans to call you as a witness for the defence, then your absence may mean he is convicted at his trial when otherwise he would be found innocent. The final possibility is that you might act as a character witness after conviction, and your absence may mean he is sent to jail rather than fined. It may be possible for you to write a witness statement describing what happened, and to have this notarized. On the other hand, the prosecution may well want to cross examine you. I am pretty sure you can write a character witness statement (saying, if true, that it's a first offence and that you have forgiven him, etc) and get it notarized. That might persuade a court to be lenient. I think you (as a couple) need to talk to his lawyer. | This is a tricky question on the intersection of visa and tax laws. It is tricky because every country can make its own rules that apply when you are in that country or do business in that country. Even within the EU, there is no uniform approach because freedom of movement merely covers the right to work in a country, but not the rules which have to be followed when doing so. Thus, you have to fall back to reading each individual country's rules and legislation. In general: Whether you are even allowed to work or which work activities are permitted depends on your visa or visa-free status. If you are a permanent resident or citizen of the UK, you can come to and work in every EEA country, until the end of the Brexit transition period, subject to the same rules as residents in that country. Often, visa-free visits or business visa allow some business activities such as attending meetings with clients or collecting information, but not performing actual work. If you're interested in what business activities the UK allows visitors from other countries to do, take a look at the visitor rules. Income tax may be due at the place of tax residency or where the income is generated/earned, in particular where you actually perform the work. There is a widespread belief that you only gain tax residency after staying in one country for 6 months, but this is misleading in the general case: every country makes its own rules, and income tax may be due even without (permanent) tax residency. The relevant countries (the country where you work and the country where you normally reside) might have a tax agreement that specifies where tax is due. Within the EU, it is fairly common that a person works in a different country than the one they reside in, so there is a well-developed network of tax treaties. Often, certain activities are exempt from local taxes, such as compensation for visiting researchers or regular employment. There's also a good chance that profit from independent work / business profits are only taxable at the place(s) where that enterprise has a permanent establishment – but it depends on the details. This section is based on the OECD model tax treaty (https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en) which most treaties follow closely. If no tax treaty exists that exempts your income from local taxation, you must consult the local tax laws. VAT rules are entirely different, and for B2B services are generally taxed at the location of the client (place of supply rules). But every country makes its own rules. Exception: within the EEA, cross-border B2B supply is always taxed at and by the client via the reverse-charge mechanism. So things can get quite tricky, and a business visitor should inform themselves beforehand what activities they are allowed to perform abroad and whether there are tax implications. is it any different from a UK author going travelling, taking lots and lots of notes, or even writing his/her next novel whilst in various locations, and publishing once returned to the UK? Here no tax implications arise because the travelling author is not paid during their travels, but they have to consider visa rules when performing their work. Such rules often have exemptions for artists. However, it depends on the rules of the travelled country. what basis does a government have for deciding "where" work was done? Each country is sovereign and can make its own rules. How would that apply if a team of software developers had a virtual "pair programming" session, with one in USA, one in UK, and one in the Far East ? "Where" has that software been written? It is not generally relevant where software was written, aside from copyright or export regulation issues which might have their own rules. Since each of the three programmers is working in their own country, no particular visa or income tax issues arise. However, if they have a common employer, the employer does have to consider the local employment laws regardless of where the employer is established, which may include paying some taxes in every country. | There is no general duty to carry your identity with you when inside the UK, nor to identify yourself to any official. Many UK citizens have no photographic proof of identity at all. (My parents did not for many years, until they obtained fresh passports.) I am confused where you could be stopped by immigration officers. If you appear at a UK Border without your passport, it is a real headache, but immigration can find your record on the computer and will, if you satisfy them you are a UK citizen, eventually admit you. (They have no power to deny entry to a British Citizen, and must be satisfied you are not a British citizen to deny you entry.) For clarity, in respect of some comments, I am not advising that anyone should do this, but I am saying in the worse case scenario if somehow you end up without documents you can still be looked up in the computer, and your identity can be checked at the UK Border without a passport. In general you are not required to identify yourself to a police officer, unless you are arrested. http://www.findlaw.co.uk/law/criminal/your_rights/500109.html If I am stopped and searched, do I have to give my name and address? Although the police will likely ask for your name and address, you are not required to give it unless the police arrest you or are reporting you for an offence. There are a small number of occasions when you may be required (by law) to identify yourself when you are simply going about your private business. If you are driving a vehicle the police may stop you and require you to identify yourself. If you do not have your driving licence, you may produce it at court at a later date; in the mean time the police can check your status by computer. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/part/VII/crossheading/powers-of-constables-and-other-authorised-persons/enacted?view=plain If you are travelling domestically inside the UK by air, the police can stop you and require photographic identification at or after the security check point under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7?view=plain) However, I travel within Great Britain by air several times a month and usually do not bring anything more than a credit card and a change of clothes, and I have never had any problems. Most airlines will "advise" you to bring photographic ID. If however you do travel between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, immigration staff are often interested in your status then. It is wise to have photographic ID on such a journey. | No The argument is vacuous in any event because AFAIK all jurisdictions that enforce sex discrimination laws have parental leave (paid or unpaid), not maternity leave so a man is just as likely to need it as a woman. This, of course, raises the issue of discrimination by marital status (on the basis that unmarried people are arguably less likely to have children) or age (on the basis that people outside 'childbearing' age are less likely to have children; fortunately these types of discrimination are also illegal. Notwithstanding, the loopholess you think there are in the laws are simply not there. For example s14 "Discrimination in employment or in superannuation" of australia Sex Discrimination Act 1984 starts with: (1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities: Later in s30 "Certain discrimination on ground of sex not unlawful" it says: (2) (a) the duties of the position can be performed only by a person having particular physical attributes (other than attributes of strength or stamina) that are not possessed by persons of a different sex from the relevant sex; If the job requires excessive strength or stamina, then you test your recruits for the level of strength or stamina the job requires. | With an exception for non-EU visitors to Northern Ireland, they can't since 1 January 2021 following the withdrawal of the relevant concessions and schemes. The H.M. Revenue and Customs Brief 21... ..confirms the withdrawal of “airside” tax-free shopping in the UK and the withdrawal of the VAT Retail Export Scheme (VAT RES) from Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) when the Transition Period comes to an end on 31 December 2020. Tax free shopping (extra statutory concession 9.1): The tax-free shopping extra statutory concession (ESC 9.1) is published in VAT Notice 48. It allows retailers of goods sold in ports and airports to zero-rate sales to passengers departing for non-EU destinations. ESC 9.1 allows the retailer to be regarded as exporters of those goods and consequently zero rate the supply for VAT purposes. This concession will be withdrawn with effect from 1 January 2021 throughout the UK. VAT Retail Export Scheme (VAT RES): VAT RES allows non-EU visitors to the EU to recover the VAT on purchases they make on the high street which they take home with them in their luggage. This scheme will be withdrawn in Great Britain. Retailers in Northern Ireland, including those at ports or airports, will continue to be able to offer VAT RES to non-EU visitors to Northern Ireland, under the terms of the Northern Ireland Protocol. | Basically: what Flup said in his last paragraph (and so upvoted accordingly). Every one of the practitioners you named has an undergraduate degree from the UK, and an undergraduate degree from Canada. This, presumably, is because you're not permitted to practise law in most jurisdictions unless you have some kind of qualification in the law of that particular jurisdiction. The laws of each country, and moreover, the way in which cases are decided and in which each country's legal system works, varies so tremendously that you need to study the particulars for each jurisdiction before you can practice there. Regarding Canada: from this site: You must complete a Bachelor of Laws (L.L.B.) program or Juris Doctor (J.D.) program in order to qualify for bar membership in any Canadian province or territory. This generally takes three years to complete. In England and Wales, you can now take a law conversion course in place of an undergraduate law degree as a first stage towards being qualified. I suspect, however, looking at the dates of the judges you list, that the law conversion course wasn't an option at the time they got their qualifications, so their only option was a full undergraduate course. So the answer is: they each have two undergraduate qualifications, one from each jurisdiction, so that they could qualify to practise law in both jurisdictions. | The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted. |
Are there any provisions for economic inequality in legal punishments? Suppose we have two persons, person-A and person-B and let's say they both commit the same crime and go to jail. The law, to my understanding, applies uniformly/punishes uniformly disregarding their economic class, status etc. But is this really fair? The person with greater resources could have a much smoother time serving their jail time and then reintegrating into society than the other person. Certainly, it must be unfair to punish/'serve justice' to all equally. Hence, I ask, are there any provisions for this type of situation in current legal systems? What is the name for them if they exist? | Under German law, if you are sentenced to a fine because you committed a crime, that fine is measured in Tagessätze (day fine). One day worth of fines is the 30th part of your monthly income, adjusted according to the criminal's personal and economic situation. Basis for that is Criminal Code sec 40 (§ 40 StGB). There is, however, no corresponding principle for prison sentences. The reasoning behind that is, that a wealthy person would hardly be able to "improve" their time in prison compared to a less wealthy one. In fact, they would "lose more money" in the meantime. | Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise. | Most criminals aren't rich... Suing someone who has nothing, won't get you anything... Sure they can be held liable for millions of dollars. But that doesn't make the money magically appear. A million dollars from someone who has no money and a dollar will get you a soda. TLDR: Suing the perpetrator of a crime is a waste of time/money if they don't have any. | united-states This answer analyzes the question under U.S. law, although it is really generally applicable in all countries with a common law legal system. I'm not familiar with how non-common law countries address this issue at this level of granularity. Given that Alice has been instructed by the court to stop publishing the data, and given that Mallory refuses to stop publishing the data, what might Alice be obliged to do to comply with the court? Very little. This is why courts very rarely issue orders like this one. Disobedience to a court order is enforced with a contempt of court proceeding against a party that allegedly knowingly and willfully failed to comply with the court order. But an inability to comply with the court order (at least if this is not due to sabotage by the party subject to the order after that party learns of the order's existence) is a complete defense to contempt of court sanctions. Contractually, this is why most non-disclosure agreements have liquidated damages and actual money damages remedies as well as the remedy of injunctive relief. If harm that can't be unwound results from conduct taken before an injunction is in place, or as a result of a breach of an injunction that the person who was ordered to do something can't remedy, then a court imposes money damages and/or punitively imposes a criminal fine or incarceration on a party who defied a court order. | Traffic tickets are not equity law. This said, equity has not been done away with. It has merged with law in almost all states, and in some states, equitable defenses are available to legal claims (although in others equitable defenses are only available to equitable claims). | This is largely a matter of state law. In California, for example, this would be plainly unlawful (my emphasis): All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51) Other states may define "business" more narrowly, or exclude professional services. Also, there is the question of professional ethics. Discriminating against a racial group will likely run afoul of the rules of the licensing board, the AMA, the APA, and other organizations. Finally, remind your friend that every racist has what they regard as good reasons for their racism, and your friend is not special in that regard. | The ECHR protocols are not meant (and not generally understood) to prohibit taxation or fines by the state in accordance with the rule of law. See e.g. this explanation by the Council of Europe. As to the specific question, this explanation enumerates shares and leases as property, and the text makes it clear that bank accounts or cash would also be covered: [...] in the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or penalties; [...] | As far as I understand, no one can jail anyone as a result of a civil matter. I can't just say, hey! You did this! I'm taking you to jail. You simply don't have the reason and authority to do so - and I doubt the jails would want random people coming in for random reasons. Courts also don't send people to jail for this. As far as I understand, you can only be jailed by a judge for a criminal matter. However, you can go to jail as a result of a civil matter. When this happens, you need to found guilty of a criminal offence, most notably Contempt of Court. You can be found guilty of that offence if you don't respond/comply to the court's instructions - such as failing to repay debts. In order to be found in contempt, the court needs to find that you also intended to refuse the court's instruction (this is known as mens rea). If you were found liable, the court would not send you to jail. They would instead tell you to repay the damages that you owed the creditor (the person who filed suit). Inability to do this does not result in contempt of court, however, you should generally let the court know of this. In terms of this, the court can allow the creditor to garnish wages, have scheduled payments... etc of the debtor. To answer the main question, the only time that the court will jail a person will be upon conviction of a criminal offence (such as contempt of court), and not a civil matter (such as liability). |
Using deepfake to create endorsment The radio station I typically listen to regularly has some celebrity endorsement along the lines of You are listening to song name on my favorite station station name With the improvements of deep fakes also in the voice/audio sector I was wondering, what would be the legal restrictions to use a deep fake audio trained on publicly accessible voice samples from a celebrity to have a machine generated endorsement sounding like said celebrity? I did find some papers on the topic of deep fakes, however they were about images/videos and usually had the conclusion, that the situation at the moment is ambigous at best regarding copyright law. | Sound recordings can be, and new ones normally are, protected by copyright. The copyright would usually be held by the person who made the recording, or that person's employer, not by the speaker if that is a different person. Use of such a recording without permission might well be copyright infringement. But more clearly and directly, broadcasting a statement: I am {performer} and you are listening to {song name} on my favorite station {station name } without authorization from the performer would in many jurisdictions violate the performer's right of publicity, giving the performer grounds to sue the station. It might well also be false advertising, implying that the performer had endorsed the station when s/he has not done so. That would depend on the specific laws of the jurisdiction where the broadcast was made. A suit over publicity rights or an action for false advertising would probably be simpler than a copyright suit in such a case. I think that most if not all such announcements are made with the consent of the performers involved, and are probably recorded directly by such performers. (For one thing it is usually in the performer's interest to cooperate with stations and networks that play the performer's work.) If such announcements were somehow artificially synthesized, but with the permission of the performer, and of any owner of copyright in any recording used, I don't think there would be any legal problem. If an AI was trained to create a good imitation of a person's voice with9ut diretly copying a recording, I am not at all sure if there would be any copyright infringemetn under current law. That may be an area where the law will need to change to respond to the technology. But if such an imitation were used without permission to make the kind of statements discussed above, the personality rights issue and false advertising issue would still be there. Those do not in any way depend on whether the announcement uses a copy of a recording or not, those are both about the use of someone's name and reputation without authorization. In fact, even if the announcement did not pretend to use the performer's voife, those woudl still bne an issue. Suppose the announcer saids, in his orm her own voice: {Performer} said to tell you that s/he is glad thit his/her song is being playing on his favorite outlet {station name}. There is no technical fakery there, deep or shallow, but if done without authorization it is still a problem, or would be in some jurisdictions at least. If technology is used to create a plausible imitation of someone's voice, but it was not distributed with any claim, direct or implied, to be that person, then the case is different. I suspect that in most jurisdictions there would be no grounds for legal action, just as celebrity imitators do not need permission as long as they don't fake endorsements. | How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved. | According to a blog post (written by a lawyer who actually has had multiple people ask about that), it depends on several things. The gist is that they're not getting away with this "brilliant plan" unless they take so many steps to make it look legitimate that it will, in fact, become a legitimate porn production enterprise — in which case, why bother with the ruse in the first place? To find you guilty of prostitution, a jury would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of prostitution and not just making porn. But putting a camera in the room doesn't necessarily make it First-Amendment-protected porn; sometimes it just means you're giving them evidence of your crime. Since juries can differ, there's not really a bright line. But some things look bad to judges and juries. If the director is also doing sexual acts in the film, that looks bad. If he's also never directed or acted in porn before, that looks bad. If a person in the film is paying for the "actresses" instead of getting paid for "acting", that looks very bad; see United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 1975). Having an actual script, on the other hand, may look good. Keep in mind that if the film is not just pornographic but actually obscene, obscenity laws could still apply even if you convince them it isn't prostitution. The First Amendment does not protect obscene materials. Additionally, if you claim it's porn, you will need to properly keep records of the names (and all former names/aliases) and dates of birth of your "actors" and "actresses", unless you want to be guilty of a federal felony. This includes making a copy of their photo ID. The records must also made available for inspection by the Attorney General and his inspectors for a minimum of 20 hours per week, with no advance notice given by them. Is everyone involved really going to be OK with all of this - especially since the law specifically notes that the records may be used as evidence in a federal obscenity prosecution? | In general, providing a false name or birthdate (DoB) is only actionable when there is a legal duty to provide the correct information, or when a provision of a contract to which the person agreed requires it. If the falsity is part of a common-law fraud, then it would be unlawful, and possibly criminal. In the cases listed in the question: Sign up for an online service with a false identity although the ToS requires an accurate identity: This would be a breech of contract. Whether there could be a successful suit for such a breech would depend on why the contract demanded an accurate ID, and what harm the lie did or might do. Use a false name at a restaurant or hotel, but with no intent to defraud or avoid payment. I don't think there is any duty to give an accurate name on a restaurant reservation. In some jurisdictions the law requires an accurate name be used on a hotel register, and valid ID presented. But such violations are rarely pursued, unless they are part of a fraud or some other criminal activity (theft, prostitution, or drug dealing, say). Giving a false name when opening a bank account or other financial account. In the US, and I think many other jurisdictions, the law requires accurate identification of all bank account holders, including a SSN, EIN, or TIN. It also requires a bank to make efforts to verify such IDs, and violation are prosecuted. There are legal ways to get an account under an alternate name such as a penname or DBA, but this must be disclosed to the bank and to the IRS. Other cases that occur to me: Giving a false name at a shop when not obtaining credit or avoiding payment: generally legal. Obtaining a credit card under a false name: Can be done legally if disclosed to the issuer. Giving a false name or DoB to a pharmacy for a prescription: unlawful if attempting to access the medical info of another, or rely on another person's history to get a prescription, but may be lawful if this is just an alias, such as a celebrity might use to avoid publicity. Unlawful if done to obtain a controlled substance, or if insurance fraud is involved. Putting a false name on a job resume: lawful, but if hired an I-9 form will require a valid name and SSN or TIN. Employers usually may not require that a DoB be provided. Giving false info as part of any credit application: usually considered fraud, even if there is no intent to avoid payment, as it can deceive the creditor as to the amount of risk involved; specifically criminal in some states. Giving a false name on a date: perfectly lawful, but may cause a problem if a long term relationship develops. Some states require a valid name on a marriage license. | It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on. | Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display. | For your example of items with Marvel characters on them for sale by people and companies not licensed by Marvel, Redbubble clearly states that We ask, rather we beg, that you remember this when you are posting work on Redbubble. If you make sure that all the works you upload consist of your very own, original ideas and are not infringing on the intellectual property or publicity rights of another... (from https://help.redbubble.com/hc/en-us/articles/201579195 ) and further, Redbubble has full contact information for the submission of Notice and Takedown Reports by each real trademark owner. There are many individuals who upload products which use unlicensed artwork in violation of trademarks, and Redbubble acknowledges this and gives recourse to the license holder to inform them so they can remove the items. It's not a perfect system, but Redbubble it seems makes every effort to help police their market. ( Teepublic has a very clear policy statement, too: https://www.teepublic.com/copyright-policy ) Many companies - such as Marvel - employ agents to regularly check such websites and issue takedown demands to the sites; the sites in turn remove the products, and in some instances, ban the individual from using the site again. In the case of Amazon, there can be two types of products sold that use trademarked artwork and characters: items sold by legitimate businesses that have license agreements with the trademark owners and who have the products sold by Amazon itself; and items sold on the Amazon marketplace by individuals who open Amazon Marketplace accounts themselves and don't have licenses. Amazon will be sure to check the products they sell; they will have a takedown notices system for their marketplace vendors. eBay is somewhat the same way; there is a mix of individuals and businesses on eBay, but eBay doesn't operate an umbrella sell/ship by eBay, like Amazon. It's kind of a whack-a-mole situation on the Interwebs. How much time/money does a company spend to chase down trademark infringement? Is it worth going to court for persistent violators? (These are, for the most part, civil cases, not criminal). Violators can always open a new account on sites such as Redbubble and eBay under a different name. And it starts all over again. | Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.) |
Is filing a legal document more than once a bad or a good idea? I will be filing a bankruptcy petition in the united states pro se. I have instructions for filing electronically via PACER, which indicate forms do not need to be signed as the user account used to submit takes the place of a signature: https://pacer.uscourts.gov/help/faqs/how-will-signature-documents-be-handled-documents-filed-electronically?page=9 I also see temporary instructions for filing via email due to COVID, which states "You must sign your document by either signing the document before you scan it or typing “/s/ [Your Name].” The Court will accept typed signatures in this format." In this case, would it be a problem to file both ways, or would there be no point and would it cause problems? If filing electronically does a physical copy signed in ink still need to be mailed or filed in person, or would that also just cause confusion? | would it be a problem to file both ways, or would there be no point and would it cause problems? File only once. Duplicate filing is likely to cause recurrent confusion and annoyance because everyone else will be uncertain as to whether both filings differ on anything other than the signature. If filing electronically does a physical copy signed in ink still need to be mailed or filed in person, or would that also just cause confusion? Filing electronically precludes the need for filing a physical copy. Even if filing a physical copy is allowed, it would impose on the clerk the needless burden of scanning and processing the physical copy. | There are three answers here. First, as is common on this site, you are using the term, "legal" and "illegal." Those are not legally meaningfully terms. A good lawyer won't use those terms to mean allowed or disallowed. We talk in terms of potential civil or criminal liability, or other sanctions and consequences. To say that something is "legal" does not communicate much. Second, all contracts are governed by a duty of good faith. That means that you cannot try to "trick" someone with the terms of the contract and expect to enforce that contract against them and you cannot try to skirt your obligations by finding a tricky form of compliance not within the mutual understanding of the agreement. As with all things, defining good faith is not easy, and depends on the specific context of a situation. It is worth distinguishing between the duty of good faith, and the duties one owes to a fiduciary; good faith is surely far less, but nevertheless still meaningful. Third, a defense to non-performance of a contract is that the agreement as written is unconscionable. A contract that is a grossly unfair deal where the contract was not actively negotiated (i.e. Blindly signing a bad form contract), may fall under this category. Note: I am not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; contact a licensed attorney in your area; do not rely on my statements; I merely am providing a general answer that is academic in nature. | The fact that it is possible to engage in fraud, doesn't mean that it is impossible to prove something. Usually, in a civil action, testimony that a business record says something and that it was not falsified is sufficient to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard (i.e. to establish to the satisfaction of a judge or jury that it is more likely that something is true than it is that it isn't true). It is easy to forge checks too (and hard to prove that a signature is fake), but that doesn't mean that you can't prove payment by check or that negotiable instruments are useless. | Don't be so quick to refuse; they are representing you, and working for your company. Ask the law firm and your work supervisor why the firm wants copies. Realize that the law firm and the lawyers are legally bound to work in your best interest in terms of immigration, your green cards and the security of your personal information. See California Bar - Rules of Professional Conduct. Such personal information is very likely to be secure with them, as it is punishable by law if sensitive information like SSNs is stolen or leaked, and could be a breach of rules of the California Bar, too. | Counter notices are described in 17 USC 512(g)(3). It starts with the requirement for "A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber" (and a statement under penalty of perjury...). Supposing that you can't get anywhere with finding the contributor even via a subpoena, then you're stopped there: you can't swear on behalf of someone else. Paragraph (f) also says that if a person files a false infringement claim, they become liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it but it's not immediately obvious that you would suffer damage by taking the material down (not immediately obvious doesn't mean obviously not true). A case could be made, but it's risky. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Diebold was hit with substantial damages basically for having made up a theory that certain email discussion was infringing when it was clearly fair use. If a person actually lies about being the copyright owner, that would probably be viewed even more dimly by the courts. Your 4th argument gives you no traction: if an infringer posts infringing material and transfers copyright on the web page, but they don't hold copyright, then that transfer mean nothing. As for the other arguments, your attorney will have to suggest an advisable course of action. S/he might advise that your evidence is so strong that you should just ignore the takedown; or that you should take the content down and then sue for damages; or take the content down and lobby your congressman for a change in the law. [Addendum] I will reiterate my recommendation to get a lawyer. I believe that under the law, the risk to you would be the situation where the person prevails in an infringement suit against you. Outside of the "mere conduit" safe harbor, you have to participate in the notice and takedown scheme in order to "stay safe" (also you have to do so quickly). You have identified a potentially huge flaw in the system. Theoretically, criminal charges of perjury and paragraph (f) damages would be enough to deter ordinary wrong-doers, provided that you can really prove that someone else is the copyright holder. But the cost of litigation is not zero and the chances of winning are not 100%. The law does assume that all parties tell the truth, indeed the law requires a "penalty of perjury" statement. Since counter-notice is also part of the legal dance, I would conclude that you do have to write yourself a counter-notice. Then if there is a suit, you have satisfied the requirements of the law. | This is allowed in Colorado. Colorado's version of the Uniform Probate Code authorizes such a document for tangible personal property which is usually called a "Personal Property Memorandum." This is authorized by Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. The section of Colorado's probate code states: Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. New York State Law NYS has a requirement that the Will is signed by 2 Witnesses and (I believe -- keep me honest) notarized. So I'm hoping this is a way for me to add items to the Appendix without needing to re-sign, re-witness and re-notarize every time I think of something else. Is this strategy valid & enforceable? This is generally not permitted in New York State The legal formalities for the execution of wills and trusts in New York States are among the most strict in the United States (Florida and Maine have been more strict from time to time). This cannot be done in a way that is valid and enforceable in New York State. One can determine this from a review of the relevant New York State Statute which is called the Estate, Powers, and Trusts Law (EPTL), that does not contain a parallel provision to the Colorado statutory section. Therefore, in New York States, all dispositive provisions of a Will related to tangible personal property must be executed with the same formalities as any other Will or Codicil (i.e. it must be signed by the testator and two witnesses, a notarization is not required). Oral and unwitnessed handwritten wills are rarely allowed in New York State New York State does recognize oral wills (called nuncupative wills) and wills in the handwriting of the person making them (called holographic wills) as well, but only in very limited circumstances. The pertinent provision of the EPTL state: (a) For the purposes of this section, and as used elsewhere in this chapter: (1) A will is nuncupative when it is unwritten, and the making thereof by the testator and its provisions are clearly established by at least two witnesses. (2) A will is holographic when it is written entirely in the handwriting of the testator, and is not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities prescribed by 3-2.1. (b) A nuncupative or holographic will is valid only if made by: (1) A member of the armed forces of the United States while in actual military or naval service during a war, declared or undeclared, or other armed conflict in which members of the armed forces are engaged. (2) A person who serves with or accompanies an armed force engaged in actual military or naval service during such war or other armed conflict. (3) A mariner while at sea. (c) A will authorized by this section becomes invalid: (1) If made by a member of the armed forces, upon the expiration of one year following his discharge from the armed forces. (2) If made by a person who serves with or accompanies an armed force engaged in actual military or naval service, upon the expiration of one year from the time he has ceased serving with or accompanying such armed force. (3) If made by a mariner while at sea, upon the expiration of three years from the time such will was made. Wills valid where executed will generally be honored If a Will accompanied by a Personal Property Memorandum were drafted and executed in Colorado while someone was domiciled there, and then was presented to a Surrogate's Court in New York State for probate, because the person who wrote it was domiciled in New York State when they died, however, the New York courts might honor the Personal Property Memorandum on the theory that the validity of the execution of a Will is usually governed by the law of the place where it is signed and not by the law of the place where it is probated. The alternative of a revocable trust in New York State A workaround somewhat similar to a personal property memorandum could be done with a revocable trust, but this has its own limitations. In New York State a trust or amendment to a trust not created by a last will and testament must be either (1) signed and notarized by the creator of the trust and also by the trustee if there is one separate from the creator of the trust, or (2) signed by the creator of the trust and witnessed by two witnesses in essentially the same way that a will would be witnessed. Unlike most U.S. states, New York State does not recognize trusts that are signed but are not notarized or witnessed, and unlike most U.S. States, New York State does not recognize orally created trusts. Trusts validly formed and amended outside of New York will generally be honored This is, of course, assuming in both cases that New York State law governs the formation of the trust. New York State choice of law rules, however, will generally recognize the validity of a trust formed with formalities that were valid in the place where it was executed if the person executing it was domiciled there. | This is fine. You can use initials, shortened names, common nicknames (Bob/Robert), omit middle names, and so forth without causing yourself any problems. Things can get more complicated if you sign by a name that is different from names that you normally use elsewhere - such as if you are called Christopher Smith and you sign as Donald Jones, having not used that name before - but there's no fundamental difference of principle. One example case is Scott v Soans [1802] 102 ER 539, where the defendant John Soans objected to the suit being made against "Jonathan otherwise John Soans". The Lord Chief Justice ruled that "Jonathan otherwise John" could be his name, and that if he'd signed a contract using that name then "what objection could be made to it?" There are several other similar cases from past centuries, some of which may no longer be reliable law since they turn on points of procedure that aren't relevant today, but the general thrust is that if you sign a contract under a certain name, then you can be sued under that name. (And you can sue other people using whatever name you like.) Mistakes in names can be corrected as part of the general process of contractual interpretation, called "rectification". This more often arises when dealing with company names, say when there are a half dozen closely linked companies with related names, and the issue is which one of them is actually meant to be named; there are some recent cases of this kind, such as Liberty Mercian Ltd v Cuddy Civil Engineering Ltd [2013] EWHC 2688 (TCC). Generally speaking, as Lord Denning said in Nittan v Solent Steel [1980] EWCA Civ J1023-4, We do not allow people to take advantage of a misnomer when everyone knows what was intended. Further, the doctrine of "estoppel by convention" means that if you sign a contract under whatever name, then act as if you were bound by the contract, you can't then wriggle out of it on the grounds that the name is not really your own. In Scots law, which includes certain doctrines imported from Roman civil law, there is a distinction between error in persona and error in nomine. The former means that you were mistaken about who your counterparty really was (such that you wouldn't have made the contract had you known the truth) and the latter means that you had the intended person but made a mistake about their name. The law of error in Scotland is not quite the same as in England and Wales, but in this case it gets to the same basic result: if you agreed on who was to be bound, that's what matters, regardless of the names used. | You can ask a law enforcement officer or district attorney to press charges. Generally, you cannot do so yourself. In practice, this kind of allegation is almost never criminally prosecuted. A prosecution would be particularly unlikely if the witnesses and/or notary confirmed his story that it was your father's signature or was authorized, and if the lawyer received no personal benefit from the will. Sentences for forging a will vary from state to state and sometimes depend upon the amount of personal benefit secured from doing so. Absent a huge personal benefit, it would probably be a minor felony punishable by a few years in prison or more likely, in the case of a lawyer without prior convictions, a deferred judgment, or probation and a fine. Proving that the signature is forged is extremely difficult and under certain circumstances a person trying to execute a will can lawfully have someone do it for them by directing the lawyer to do so in the presence of the witnesses (for example, if your father's hand was shaking too much to make it possible for him to sign his name due to a condition like Parkinson's disease). The witnesses to the will would be in a bad position to testify against him because they could face charges too if they witnessed the will despite knowing that it was not signed or authorized by the testator. You could contest the validity of the will due to an allegedly forged signature by raising a timely objection in a probate proceeding to have the will determined valid. In this proceeding, you would only have to show that it is more likely than not that this happened and the consequence would be that the will would be found invalid. In theory, you could sue the lawyer for damages to you caused by the alleged forgery, but only if you were harmed and realistically, only if the will was found to be invalid, which would eliminate any harm, unless the probate process has already been completed. Finally, you could complain to the attorney regulatory body in the state where the lawyer practices. If they found your allegations to be credible they would investigate. If they found that your allegations were probably true following an investigation and a hearing, they could suspend his license or disbar him. |
Is it possible that the prosecutor trying a case can become a witness of such case and be taken off it? I suppose they can be if the prosecutor has been a victim inside the case. | In every U.S. jurisdiction this is controlled by Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 which is modeled on the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, although the exact language is not perfectly uniform. It says: Advocate (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. (b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. In a criminal prosecution, exceptions (a)(2) and (a)(3) almost never apply. A prosecutor's fees are generally paid by the government without reimbursement from criminal defendants making (2) inapplicable, and there are almost always multiple prosecutors in the same prosecutor's office making (3) unlikely as well. In rare instances where every prosecutor could be disqualified as a witness (e.g. a crime taking place physically within an all office meeting of the prosecutors office where no one was absent), a prosecutor from another jurisdiction in the same state would be appointed as a special prosecutor to handle the case due to the de facto conflict of interest. Rules 1.7 and 1.9 are conflict of interest rules, which rarely apply unless a crime is directed at the prosecutor's office itself, or perhaps was allegedly committed by a prosecutor (in which case a special prosecutor is appointed to address the conflict). Otherwise, another lawyer in the same office can handle the case that the lawyer who was a witness cannot. So, in practice, in criminal cases, prosecutor testimony only concerns uncontested issues pursuant to (a)(1) (e.g. testimony that venue is proper because the city of Evergreen is located in Jefferson County, Colorado, or that the defendant was arrested on the date shown in the police report). Note also, that the lawyer-witness rule applies only to advocacy at trial. A lawyer who is trial witness can still participate, for example, in motion practice, in directing colleagues in trial preparation, in interviewing witnesses prior to trial, in making plea bargaining decisions, in scheduling conferences, and in appellate work in the case. Official comment number 2 explains the justification for the rule: The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. | In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't". | So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification. | How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent. | I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen. | The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. | Yes The Prosecutor for the local jurisdiction could formally file charges. No complaint by Rock is legally required, and given the video evidence available, Rock's testimony might not be as essential as a victim's testimony often is. But if Rock were to testify that the fight was staged, and no real assault occurred, the case would probably fall apart. That would not be good for the prosecutor's reputation, and might well be a reason not to proceed without a clear statement from Rock. See also: "Pressing charges" - is it needed to bring a charge? |
UK rental agency asking for full rent beyond the termination of its contract with the landlord I have a rental contract that expires on September 15th 2021. Now I have been told by the landlord that the agency will not represent him anymore from 1rst September 2021. Still the agent requires full payment of the month: I do pay on the 15th each month so 15 days are out of the contract between the landlord and the agency. The agent is pressuring me that I have to pay them, and the landlord says the agency has no right after the first of September (he terminated the contract allegedly cause the agency did not pay him). The agent is writing: 'if you continue to fail to communicate with the agency or pay your rent, as you have refused to pay we can proceed with a money claim against you.' Who is entitled for my rent after 1rst of September? Should I pay the agent? | Your contract is between you and your landlord. Separately, the landlord has a contract between himself and the agency. Your obligation to pay rent is owed to your landlord, not to his agent. Ask your landlord to send you an email (if you don't already have one) which requests you to pay rent from X date onwards to him directly. Then pay him the rent in the way he has requested. Barring some unusual terms of the contract (which you haven't provided a copy of), the agent will not have any grounds to sue you. | No, you don't need to physically be there. The landlord may be required to refund some rent if they rent it out early. They may also not be available for a walk through until your last day, so you may need to show back up. Technically if you pay rent for the month the apartment is yours until July 3. You can turn the keys in early. | The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not. | What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | A person's contractual rights and obligations remain valid past their death, so if the landlord dies, their heirs cannot then kick out the tenant, and likewise if the tenant dies, their estate still is liable for unpaid past and future rent. That means for example that the person cannot be evicted, the landlord cannot take their property or enter without permission save for the standard emergency conditions. The tenant (or their estate) remains liable for rent until the lease terminates. If the lease has a clause to the effect that the lease terminate at the end of the month when notice of death is given, that defines when the tenancy ends and therefore when rent isn't due – relevant to a yearly lease, and the question of whether the estate would be on the hook for a full year of rent (it also depends on whether subletting is allowed). | Ultimately yes, this can and does happen, but there are a few steps necessary before the bailiffs come to your door. In times gone by, the common law recognized a right to "distrain for rent", meaning that a landlord could come round to the tenant and seize some property as security (up to the value of the rent owed). If the rent is not then paid within a certain time, the goods could be sold. Various additional provisions of law covered the circumstances around forcing entry, breaking open locked cupboards, and searching off the premises for goods which the tenant had concealed. There were also special-case rules about what could be seized, such as a statute of the seventeenth century saying (among other things) that landlords could not harvest growing crops, but could take already-cut sheaves. Subsequent reforms for the protection of tenants have made it so that landlords cannot do this at their whim. They first have to go to the County Court for a judgement that there is an unpaid debt. (In fact, this and subsequent steps can happen with any debt.) On that basis, they can apply for a "warrant of control", under which an "enforcement officer", commonly called a bailiff, will take charge of collecting the money owed. There are quite a few steps and rules here, but the basic position is the same in terms of being able to take your stuff. And it is not the landlord walking around making those decisions, but a court-appointed officer. The previous common-law "distress" process is now totally abolished, for most tenants by the Housing Act 1988, and for everybody in 2014, because of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 section 71, which simply states The common law right to distrain for arrears of rent is abolished. Commercial property has its own legal regime since that Act, but previously functioned in the same way. So landlords can no longer seize your property on their own, but they can go through a few hoops and ask a court to do it. They also do not get to keep the specific property, but just get the money. As mentioned above, this is the general avenue for what happens when a court orders you to pay money, and you don't do it. The High Court has its own enforcement officers who are able to deal with larger amounts of money, as well as enforcing evictions. In Scotland, the same basic pattern applies but different words are used, and some of the detailed rules are different. "Attachment" is when a sheriff officer (= a bailiff) comes round to value your possessions and auction them off if you don't pay. There is also "arrestment" which is taking money out of your bank account. | Nope, the seller can't refuse "to sell". They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over. |
Anti-monopoly laws in the United States and Google I am trying to understand what are the circumstances under which a corporation in the US is deemed a monopoly and can face legal consequences for it. More specifically, I am interested in why Google is not considered a monopoly when it accounts for almost 90% of the search engine market share (https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/united-states-of-america). I have the following doubts: Is there a fixed threshold of market share above which you are considered a monopoly (for example, 80%?) How is a market delimited? Can Google elude accusations of being a monopolistic search engine by simply expanding its operations to other fields (automobile, consumer electronics) and define itself as more generic company? Can a company be legally deemed a monopoly but still not subject to any punishment because it is not using the power derived from this monopoly to influence market fairness? Referenced answers will be highly appreciated. | The relevant law is Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The elements for contravening it are: the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. Google is not an illegal monopoly primarily because its present market position is the result of "a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Whether it is a practical monopoly depends on how you define the market. I'll start by stating that there is no "search engine market" because the users of search engines do not pay for that service. The market that Google is part of is the advertising market. So, having decided that, how does one define the market? If you define it as the market for advertising on search engines then Google has significant market power. However, if you define it as all advertising - search-engine, website adds, Facebook/Twitter etc. feed advertising, print media, television, cinema, radio etc. then, while still a large player, Google is well short of a monopolist. As to your particular questions: Is there a fixed threshold of market share above which you are considered a monopoly (for example, 80%?) No. "Monopolize" is not defined in the act but the courts have held that a business is a monopoly when it can exercise monopoly power, primarily, that it can charge monopolistic prices because consumers lack alternative substitute goods or services. As such, there is no fixed percentage. How is a market delimited? Defining the boundaries of "the market" is a major part of these types of court cases. Modern decisions tend to be sophisticated and are based on answering the question: "If a consumer cannot buy this good or service, what alternative goods and services could they buy to achieve the same objective?" For example, sea freight, road freight and air freight might be a single market or they might be three (or more) different markets depending on what is being transported. For example, sea freight is not a substitute for air freight for highly perishable goods (like radioactive isotopes or fresh fish) and air freight is not a substitute for sea freight for very heavy items (like motor vehicles) but they might be substitute for other things (like smart phones). Can Google elude accusations of being a monopolistic search engine by simply expanding its operations to other fields (automobile, consumer electronics) and define itself as more generic company? No. Monopolies are defined market-by-market, not by how many markets a business operates in. Can a company be legally deemed a monopoly but still not subject to any punishment because it is not using the power derived from this monopoly to influence market fairness? Yes. That is the second element required before the operations become illegal; a monopolist must have either acquired their monopoly power willfully or, once acquired, use it in an illegal way. A "benign" monopoly does not fall foul of anti-trust law but it can still be broken up by legislative action. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. | The question mentions copyright, but corporate logos are more often protected by trademark law. There are significant differences in the protections afforded, and in where actions can be brought. Copyright Simple logos may not be subject to copyright protection at all. Individual words and short phrases, such as business names and slogans, are generally not protected. But let us assume that the logo in question is a graphic design of sufficient complexity and originality to be protected by copyright. Copyright offers essentially international protection, and the Berne Convention and the TRIPS agreement ensure that the rules are in many ways similar in almost all countries. One can sue in the copyright owner's jurisdiction, or in any jurisdiction where infringement occurred. If the defendant has a presence in the selected jurisdiction, collection of any damages will be significantly easier. Scenario from the Question If I have understood the question, the logo was originally created by P (or more likely by a designer hired or contracted by P) and P holds the copyright on the logo. But S has obtained the logo via B, presumably at a lower price than P would charge. Neither B nor S, I assume, has permission from P to use the logo. B's action in selling the logo to S would be copyright infringement (unless B independently created an identical or similar logo). S's action in using the logo without permission from P is also copyright infringement. P could sue S, or B, or both in Spain, or in its home jurisdiction (perhaps the US), or in other jurisdictions where the pirated logo had appeared. Actual damages, however, will be limited to the value of the logo (say what P would have charged) plus profits made from the use of the logo. But since S is not selling the logo, it will be hard to determine what part, if any, of its profits derived from the use of that particular logo. That is, how much smaller would its profits have been if it had used a different, non-infringing logo. In the US statutory damages are available, which can be as high as $150,000 per work infringed, if the infringement is proved to be "wilful". But that is the upper limit of statutory damages, and the judge has wide discretion to set the amount of the award between the upper and lower limits. (The lower limit is $750.) Modified Scenario Suppose that P had sold an exclusive license to U. U is a US-based firm that is actually using the logo to identify its goods, which are distributed world-wide. The actions of B and S have infringed U's licensed rights in the logo, and U could bring suit for copyright infringement, either in the US or in Spain, or perhaps in other countries. But U would have much the same problem as P, it will be hard to prove sizable damages. Which brings us to trademark issues. Trademark Claims Trademark law is usually used to protect words, symbols, and images used to identify products and services being sold or advertised for sale or rental. Unlike copyright, trademark protection does not expire if the mark remains in use. Also, unlike copyright, single words or simple images can be protected. For example, the "red dot in a circle" logo of the Target stores is too simple for copyright protection. But it has strong protection as a trademark. Trademark protection applies in any case where a reasonable person might be confused as to what the source of the goods (or services) really is. It also applies when the mark's use falsely gives an impression of approval or sponsorship by the trademark holder. Unauthorized use of a mark to benefit from the goodwill or reputation associated with the original product or its makers is infringement. Trademark protection, however, is national. A mark protected in one country may be totally free for use in another country. It is also usually limited to a particular category of use If, say "Scarlet O'Hara's" is used as a trademark for a restaurant chain, the use of "Scarlet O'Hara's" for an anti-virus program is not likely to constitute infringement. Copyright has no such limitations. In some countries there is no protection for a trademark unless it is registered. In other countries, use alone can establish a trademark. The US allows protection without registration, although registration brings stronger protection. Also, trademarks can only be protected when they are actually being used "in trade", that is, to identify or advertise goods or services, or for a limited time while a product is being developed and there is a declared intent to use the mark in the near future. Lack of use or cessation of previous use can cause a mark to lose protection. Scenario from the Question P is selling logos, not using them to identify or market products. Thus it is not using the logo in trade, and has no trademark claim. It cannot sue anyone for trademark infringement, because it has no trademark rights. Modified Scenario (see above) U is using the logo as a trademark world-wide. If it has registered the logo in Spain, or taken such other steps as Spanish law requires, it can perhaps sue S for trademark infringement. It has no trademark claim against B, because B did not use the trademark to identify any goods or services. For a successful suit agaisnt S, U would need to show that confusion between U's products and those of S had actually occurred, or was likely. It would need to show that the products where the logo was used were of a sufficiently similar nature. But if it prevailed, damages could be based on the value of the trade identified by the logo. If S did not sell or market its products outside of Spain, it could only be sued for trademark infringement in Spain. If U did not sell in the Spanish market (or perhaps the wider EU market) it would have no trademark claim. If S started importing its products using the logo into the US, U would have a claim under US trademark law. Thus the details of what logo is used, where and how, and on what products would matter to any trademark claim. | The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits. | The board rules. Companies usually go to great lengths to be sure the company owns the IP developed within and for the company. But the company is governed by its board of directors and that board can decide to take the company in a new direction where some IP that the company owns would no longer be a key asset for ongoing business. Selling that IP to another organization might, then, be logical. Boards are elected by, and represent, the owners of the company. | Companies that operate worldwide have to comply with the law everywhere they operate. Some jurisdictions consider mandatory arbitration in standard-form consumer contracts to be unenforceable - providing the out may overcome this. | However, this uses the text "rights in an invention"; does that cover copyright? Yes. (Is this the correct law?) It certainly seems to be. Does "Relate … to the employer's business" cover the entirety of software engineering, or just the particular software engineering my employer does? Imagine that you work for a company that writes trading software. In your spare time, you develop a photo editing tool. Do you think a court would find that your project "related to the employer's business"? I do not. Or does my employer own copyright on everything down to the love letters I write? Google does not own everything their employees create; they only claim to. If someone challenged them on it, a court would decide, and probably not in their favor. | Does this mean everybody using the Google Maps API is in violation of the terms of use? No. 'Incorporate' could mean several different things but clause 10.5(f) would be interpreted in its context. The other paragraphs within clause 10.5 relate to conduct by which you use Google's data to populate your own system or obscure the fact that you are using Google's system to provide a service. Accordingly, the kind of 'incorporation' whereby your software makes part of the Google Maps system's user interface appear as part of your software's user interface is not prohibited. The other key bit of context is the fact that Google Maps is obviously intended to be used. It would be absurd to offer a service and, in the terms of service, prohibit anybody from using it. A court would interpret the words such as to avoid such absurdity. See e.g. Dockside Holdings v Rakio [2001] SASC 78; Westpac Banking Corporation v Tanzone [2000] NSWCA 25. |
Does your will cover money held outside of the country? Does your will cover money held outside of the country? Let's say you are American, you die and you wrote a will in the United States, but you don't have wills outside of the American jurisdiction, but have money in South Africa and Pakistan. What happens to the money located there? I am asking the question, because I read there's something called: Expatriate Will for Assets Held in Canada. | Not necessarily The laws of each country will apply to the assets held in that country. In some jurisdictions, inheritance is mandated by law and there is no freedom for a testator to determine who inherits what: Pakistan is one such jurisdiction. In Pakistan, if the deceased is a Muslim, then inheritance proceeds according to Islamic law and the will is irrelevant. If they are not a Muslim, then the law of their domicile jurisdiction applies - so for a resident of say, California, Californian succession law applies including following a will if one exists. South African law recognises freedom of testation (subject to certain limits) so a foreign will will generally be followed. | FDIC Regulation 500 prohibits discrimination in making loans on the basis of "National origin" but not on the basis of immigration status. This story from The Nation says that Bank of America is denying accounts to non-citizens, and arguing that it is legal because of increased risks, although there are current court challenges to this. Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A is a case now pending challenging loan denials based on immigration status. This has particularly come up in regard to DACA recipients, rather than people with LPR status. The US "public accommodation" laws probably do not apply, as a bank is not usually considered a place of public accommodation. Any specific state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status might apply. In short, this is an issue still not clearly settled. There seems to be no law or regulation requiring banks to ask for citizenship information, much less to deny accounts based on it, and it would be well to seek a bank with a different policy if possible. The above is very US-specific. Many countries do limit banking access based on citizenship, i understand. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. Before challenging any bank action, you may well wish to seek advice from a lawyer. | Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice. | An executor executes a will according to the wishes of the will. This involves disposition of the estate. Almost certainly the mental state of humans is not material to the disposition of the estate. I'm unclear what you even mean by executor. The named executor of a will only has power after a person dies. Was the will executed 19 years ago? If so, the executor's power is long long passed. The chance of challenging a will 19 years later is practically zero. Elder abuse will be managed by the state. An interested party may involve the state to create an investigation as to what is going on. | In the US it's very simple: How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? They don't. Winning a lawsuit against a person is a legal confirmation that they really do owe you the money. It also gives you the ability to do certain things to try to collect: you could seize their assets or garnish their wages. If they don't have any assets or any income then you are out of luck. You can't take what doesn't exist. As the saying goes, "you can't squeeze blood from a turnip". A bit of legal jargon sometimes used here is to say that such a defendant is judgment proof. Even if you win a lawsuit against them, it won't do you any good, because they just don't have any money. If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives? No. People are not responsible for the debts of their relatives. | If you lived in a community property state, that would create responsibility for your late wife's debts (but Kansas is not one). If you signed a financial responsibility agreement you would be liable (but I assumed you did not). No matter what, her estate is liable, and that could eventually affect you (her debts must be paid first). However, there is one last criterion, the "doctrine of necessaries". This ruling notes Kansas recognizes the doctrine of necessaries, under which a spouse can be held liable when the other spouse obtains necessary items, like food or medical care, on credit. See also St. Francis Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Bowles for support that the doctrine survives in Kansas. | I think it is not possible to answer the question as is, but this document from the Indian courts lays out the relevant legal variables. A major split is between Sharers and Residuaries: a Sharers are all related by blood. A secondary split relates to testate vs. intestate succession (was there a will?). There are also special rules for West Bengal, Chennai and Bombay. A widow is generally entitled to a share of her husband's property, but if the husband dies before his father, the husband does not have his father's property. But then, if a Muslim marries under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, they are not treated legally as Muslim for purposes of inheritance. All told, it is most likely that the widow has no legal claim on the property, but still a person should engage an attorney who can assess the particulars of the case. | In essence, Schwab is stating that they are not a law enforcement agency and they have neither the interest nor the legal right to pursue criminals. They state that they will assist law enforcement but also tell you that, from their experience, law enforcement while they have the legal right also don't have any interest in doing so. This is completely correct. I'm not going to comment on what you should do to protect yourself from identity theft. With respect to the reverse transfer: you are on very shaky legal ground here - you transferred funds without authorization and you are not legally allowed to do this even to recover your own losses. If you had limited this to just recovering your own funds then you would be extremely unlikely to be prosecuted but by taking more than was yours you have technically committed a theft of your own. That said, it seems unlikely that law enforcement will be interested - Schwab are not making a complaint and I doubt that the original thief will - for obvious reasons. However, its possible (even likely) that this was not the thief's bank account - this is likely to be an innocent third party's account that the thief was using to obfuscate their crime. If so, the money you took (both the original amount and the extra $50) you took actually belongs to that innocent party - your money had probably spent very little time in that account. |
Is there any doubt about crypto-currency and like-kind exchanges? If I sell crypto, can I purchase new crypto and avoid paying capital gains tax on it? It seems the IRS is very clear about it, Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Section 1031 now applies only to exchanges of real property and not to exchanges of personal or intangible property. An exchange of real property held primarily for sale still does not qualify as a like-kind exchange. A transition rule in the new law provides that Section 1031 applies to a qualifying exchange of personal or intangible property if the taxpayer disposed of the exchanged property on or before December 31, 2017, or received replacement property on or before that date. Moreover, from Section 1031 which was amended years ago in 2017 the amendment says: 2017-Pub. L. 115–97, §13303(b)(5), substituted "real property" for "property" in section catchline. Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 115–97, §13303(a), substituted "real property" for "property" wherever appearing. Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 115–97, §13303(b)(1)(A), amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "This subsection shall not apply to any exchange of- (A) stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, (B) stocks, bonds, or notes, (C) other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest, (D) interests in a partnership, (E) certificates of trust or beneficial interests, or (F) choses in action. But from what I'm being told by biased and reputable sources in the cryptocurrency exchanges, the IRS blogs are not legally binding and that for crypto to be taxed like property it must be subject to to Section 1031. Take a look at this article on Forbes.com from 2019, "IRS Kills Tax Free Crypto Exchanges? Not Hardly" which says, Section 1031 provides that neither gain nor loss is recognized on an exchange of like-kind property This is simply untrue. It's not like-kind property, it's like-kind real property, the article goes forward to talk about how it's not settled whether or not bitcoin is an exchange or not. But why would that question even matter? Does anyone dispute that it's not "real property" which seems to be required to qualify for 1031? I'm just confused here, why is this even in dispute? | “Real property” is land and things attached to land Everything else (including Bitcoin) is personal property. Therefore, since the 2017 amendment, Bitcoin is not captured by the s1031 like-kind transfer exemption. However, the article you link to is discussing its treatment before the amendment. | The transaction you describe is a "taxable gift" to the extent that it exceeds $15,000 in fair market value (as of 2019) and that your significant other is not your U.S. citizen spouse now (special rules apply to non-U.S. citizen spouses and an unlimited amount of gifts can be made without being taxable to a spouse, including a same sex spouse). The first $15,000 of fair market value per donor per donee per year doesn't count, however (there is a $100,000 of fair market value per donor per donee exemption per year for gifts to non-citizen spouses, if a qualified domestic trust is not the true recipient of the gift). This means that the donor is required to report the gift on IRS Form 709 by April 15, of the year following the year in which the gift is made (or later if the donor files for an extension). But, each person is entitled to make up to $11,400,000 of tax free gifts (during life and at death combined) that would otherwise be taxable per lifetime, and this amount is indexed for inflation, so it goes up each year. So, in your situation, it is highly unlikely that any tax would actually be due in connection with your filing of Form 709, even though the donor is required to complete and file that form. In the event that both the annual and lifetime gift exclusions have been exceeded, the tax rate would be 40% of the fair market value of the gift (net of the mortgage debt to which the house is subject. For example, if the house were worth $40,000,000 and had a $10,000,000 mortgage and you were given a 50% interest in it, the amount of the taxable gift would be $14,985,000 of which at least $3,485,000 would be subject to a 40% gift tax, i.e. $1,394,000), if you didn't get married (the tax would be $1,360,000 if you were a non-citizen spouse of the donor). At one time there were some states with their own state gift taxes that had to be considered, but as of 2019, there are no such states. Also, upon a sale of the house, the donee would be subject to one half of the capital gain that the donor would otherwise have owed taxes upon (this is called a "carry over basis"). We paid with a loan from a family member which I helped to pay back. I also paid for work done on the home. This could arguably reduce the amount of the gift (which would ordinarily be valued at fair market value as of the date of the gift), but given the amount of the lifetime exclusion, that detail is probably irrelevant unless your home is a world class mansion or castle. | It means that you state the fact and represent that it is true If you make a material false representation in the formation of a contract and the other party enters the contract in reliance on that, then that contract is void. This would appear to be the case here. When a contract is void neither party can enforce their rights, nor are they required to perform their obligations under that contract. The practical effect for a cryptocurrency broker is they have your money and your crypto coin and you can’t sue to get either back. | Yes, You May According to this page from Invest-faq It is perfectly legal for non-resident aliens to trade equities on exchanges in the United States using US brokerage houses directly. (A “non-resident alien” (NRA) is the US government’s name for a citizen of a country other than the US who also lives outside the US.) ... Of course there are certain formalities concerning tax treatment of such accounts, and these formalities must be clarified with the brokerage house when the account is opened. Individuals who are not US citizens must complete a W-8 form, which is a certificate of foreign status, and return it to the brokerage house. The specific rules of how these accounts are taxed are described in IRS Publication 515 (Withholding of tax on non-resident aliens) and IRS Publication 901 (Tax treaties). The tax treaty is especially important. If the individual’s country of residence has an agreement (tax treaty) with the US government, those rules apply. The relevant Investopedia page says: There is no citizenship requirement for owning stocks of American companies. While U.S. investment securities are regulated by U.S. law, there are no specific provisions that forbid individuals who are not citizens of the U.S. from participating in the U.S. stock market. However, even if a non-U.S. citizen can legally trade U.S. stocks and bonds, it may still be required (in addition to being advisable) for them to consult with an investment firm and use the services of a professional. ... One of the goals of the Patriot Act of 2001, passed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was to prevent individuals with any links to terrorist activities from funding their illegal activities through the American capital markets. The act led to brokerage firms implementing more stringent requirements for verifying customer identities, particularly for non-U.S. citizens. Part of this legislation also requires stockbrokers to report any suspicious account activity to the U.S. government. However, these regulations obviously do not impact the majority of international investors because the vast majority of investors do not have any criminal associations. Some brokerage firms may require non-U.S. citizens to produce additional types of identification documents in order to comply with their individual policies. This can include visa information, a valid Social Security number, or a Certificate of Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding and Reporting form (also called a W-8BEN). Some brokerages may also require non-U.S. citizens to submit paper applications versus submitting online applications to open accounts. The Forbes article: "If You Trade Around The World, You Need To Know IRS Rules" says: Non-resident aliens are subject to tax withholding on dividends, certain interest income and sales of master limited partnerships like energy companies. They have U.S. source income — effectively connected income (ECI) — on real property and regular business operations located in the U.S. A non-resident alien living abroad can open a U.S.-based forex or futures trading account and not owe any capital gains taxes in the U.S. U.S. tax law has long encouraged foreign taxpayers to invest and trade in U.S. financial markets ... A non-resident alien living abroad can also open a U.S.-based securities account, but there could be some dividend tax withholding. If the non-resident spends more than 183 days in the U.S., he owes taxes on net U.S. source capital gains, even though he may not trigger U.S. residency under the substantial presence test. Thus having a visa of any kind is not required. Anyone anywhere in the world who is not associated with terrorism may trade on US exchanges provided they comply with the appropriate tax, identification, and other laws of the US in doing so. | The order itself is here. It applies to "any United States person", which includes citizens, LPRs, entities with a US basis, and any other person in the US including tourists. It applies to transactions, and not static possession. There is no exception to the effect that "you can trade as long as it's not on the NYSE", and it says Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited The order is not just directed at brokers, or the NYSE, it applies to everybody / everything everywhere, if you are a US person. Apparently there was some unclarity on the OTC question, which was clarified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to the effect that it includes OTC trading. | Less than zero dollars. An undertaking like this is usually categorized as either a hobby or a business. The official guidance is in IRS Publication 535, but a determinination takes into account lots of different factors, such as: how much time and effort goes into the undertaking; whether the taxpayer relies on the income for basic expenses; whether the taxpayer adapts his/her methods to increase profitability; whether the taxpayer has made profits this year or in years past; whether the taxpayer can reasonably expect to turn a profit in the near future. Even if you're losing money, the IRS may still say it's a business if all the signs suggest that that's what it is. | There are many ways that property can be owned other than by natural persons (not necessarily businesses). Property can be owned by entities and other legal personalities (such as corporations, corporations sole, limited liability companies, limited partner associations, nominees, non-profit corporations, cooperatives, partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited liability limited partnerships, trusts, business trusts, estates, conservatorships, governmental entities, unincorporated associations, tontines, funds, etc.), as well as by natural persons. Ownership of property by something other than natural persons dates, at least, to the Song Dynasty in China and to at least the 13th century in Europe. A good modern example is MERS which is the nominee holder of mortgages that are then traded commercially (often electronically, often in transactions not involving humans between entities). A similar example, is street name ownership of a publicly held security within which electronic trades are facilitated. Even when trusts are not created intentionally, they can be implied in law. In New Zealand, even a river can have corporate personality (an idea proposed in legal scholarship decades earlier) and thus has legal standing to sue and own property, through a representative appointed by a legal process. This river can bring lawsuits and own property. While these entities must be formed by individuals at the outset, some kinds of entities and trusts, such as non-profits and charitable trusts, do not have human "owners" in any meaningful sense. You can also have trusts that are for the benefit of animals or the graves of deceased people. The issue of "dead hand control" is a long standing one in the law, which was first addressed in the common law tradition in the Duke of Norfolk's Case of 1682 which gave rise to what is known now as the Rule Against Perpetuities (which now has many exceptions). There is also no prohibition on entities or legal instruments making decisions based upon formulas or programs, indeed, certain kinds of mutual funds (e.g index funds and exchange traded funds), which are generally organized as business trusts, are required to carry out their operational duties in a formulaic manner. Legal instruments such as deeds creating life estates and residuary estates, joint tenancy deeds, and beneficiary deeds have transferred real property by operation for law for hundreds of years without human intervention at the time of transfer, operating as simple "programs". Likewise, business transactions are routinely effected electronically without human intervention. Lots of e-commerce is conducted in that manner. For example, you do that when you use an ATM or go to a self-check out kiosk for a movie or at an airport or in a grocery store. Sometimes these programs are called "electronic agents" but they need not be agents of a natural person, they could also be (and indeed, usually are) agents of a legal personality that is not a natural person. Even before electronics were invented, vending machines mechanically effected business transactions, transferring title to the personal property contained within them, without human involvement. An early non-human device that conducted business transactions without electronics. (Similar devices have existed as far back as antiquity in classical Greece, dispensing Holy Water.) An entity could be formed that transacts principally via blockchain and that entity would not even have to have owners. It would have to have natural persons affiliated with it in some way, but its main businesses could be conducted by a computer system that these affiliated natural persons put into place for an entity that they form. Legal instruments like paper currency, checks, negotiable promissory notes, bearer bonds, negotiable warehouse receipts, and derivatives all have some of the features associated with blockchains (i.e. incorporating a third-party non-natural person's involvement in a transaction without active management by natural persons). In general, a blockchain is not a legal innovation and introduces nothing that is legally new or revolutionary. It is old wine poured into new skins. | Non-Profits Need Not Have Owners But Must Have A Lawful Purpose Any non-profit company, for example, a 501(c)(3), is ownerless and can be run by a self-perpetuating board if desired, rather than having delegates that provide an outside source for new board members. In that case you have to set forth a purpose of the company or trust, to which its assets and profits must be used, and it must be managed in accordance with that purpose. You can also have a "private foundation" that is effectively ownerless, again with a designated charitable purpose. Generally speaking, the law limits how much compensation can be paid to officers and employees of such a company and restricts self-dealing transactions by such a company. You probably cannot create a valid trust or business with no beneficiaries and no designated charitable purpose which is supposed to merely accumulate its profits and assets. Ownerless Cooperatives Are An Oxymoron Your reference in this and other posts to an "ownerless cooperative" is basically an oxymoron. A cooperative is an entity owned by a class of people who have a contractual relationship with the entity (usually consumers or producers) who are the owners of the company with voting control and who are entitled to an adjustment of their transaction prices with the cooperative via a rebate or surplus check proportionate to the dollar volume of their dealings with the cooperative (Northwest Mutual, must rural electric companies, and most credit unions would be examples of consumer cooperatives, Ocean Spray is a good example of a producers cooperative). An ownerless entity is pretty much by definition not a cooperative. An excellent overview of forms of entity organization other than investor owned stock corporations can be found in The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. The Life Of The Law Is Not Math Or Logic Honestly, it sounds like, in your several posts on the subject, that you are attempting the hide the ball of an ulterior purposes which is material to the legality and organization of an entity. The law is not like science or mathematics. You can't prove a bunch of isolated propositions and then string them together logically. The law operates on an entire comprehensive "fact pattern" and even if every step of your chain of reasoning to an ultimately result is supported by legal authority, this does not mean that this will be the result you get when you put all of the pieces together. That kind of logical reasoning doesn't work in a legal context. The heading of this section is a paraphrase of a famous statement about the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. from "The Common Law" (1881) at page 1. Blockchains Are Not The Legal Innovation That They Claim To Be Using blockchain technology to manage "tokens" of voting control in an entity is ultimately completely irrelevant. Blockchain technology is just another alternative to certificated shares, shares kept on an ownership ledger, or shares kept through secondary shareholding intermediaries or brokers. The technology used to keep track of voting control or economic ownership is irrelevant, and some common entities (e.g. homeowner's associations) have ownership that is basically determined via a crude public blockchain called the county clerk and recorder's records. People who think that blockchains provide any significant legal innovation into anything (e.g. here) are fundamentally misguided and typically are not people familiar with the law who have misconceptions about how the law works. Also, contrary to the hype, blockchains are not fraud-proof and indeed, involve serious systemic risks of instability because an error in an old transaction can disrupt lots of current claims. Claims such as those made here that blockchain transactions are irrefutable are naive and basically false. A block chain is a bit like a real property record system without an adverse possession rule to make ancient glitches irrelevant. Moreover, blockchains are a solution to a non-problem. Authenticating ownership and voting rights, economic entitlements, and corporate actions is something that has never posed a very significant economic problem ever since writing was invented. These are economic problems that were already effectively solved in the days of the Minoans, and widespread ownership of well authenticated entities by numerous ever shifting groups of owners was a problem well in hand by the days of the British East India Company. Anonymous Ownership Or Contribution Records Are Illegal Truly anonymous ownership, however, is legally prohibited, even though ownership need not be made a matter of public record. In the case of for profit entities, by securities regulation which requires disclosure for purposes of exercising voting rights and for disclosing large blocks of ownership as required by law, and for purposes of tax law. In the case of non-profit entities, it is prohibited by virtue of laws regulating private foundations that impose tax requirements when certain concentrations of contributions come from a small, related group of people. In the case of political organizations, campaign finance laws require disclosure. |
Can an employeer in California impose additonal limitations for emplyees on their 401k contributions? My wife works at one of the grocery supermarket chains in California. She was recently told that her 401k contributions cannot exceed $10,000 per year due to some labor-union agreement / equality of opportunities for everyone (such that those employees who earn more wouldn't get more benefits from 401k plan than those who earn less). How is it even legal? Does my wife have an option to override this limitation and contribute pre-tax money to her 401k plan up to a federal limit ($19,500 in 2021)? | As discussed in this investopedia article contributions may be limited for Highly Compensated Employees (HCE). This article discusses the Actual Deferral & Actual Contribution Percentage Tests (ADP/ACP) which are used to determine limits for HCEs. However, in a unionized company, there can be other considerations . Union Bargaining agreements can override the plan terms, and cause a reduction in the contribution limits. The article "Challenges of Retirement Plans with Union Members" says: Retirement plans at organizations where the workforce is largely unionized have the unique challenge of being obligated to negotiate plan terms with the union. It’s a process that can be very burdensome, experts say, but also very rewarding. When a retirement plan is run at an organization with a union, the collective bargaining agreements trump the retirement plan document, as specified by the National Labor Relations Act, according to David Kern, partner with the labor and employment practice and chair of the National Labor Relations Act team at Quarles and Brady LLP, in Milwaukee. “Any changes to the plan need to be bargained with the union,” Kern says. Retirement plans at non-union organizations typically have a provision that the employer has the right to modify the plan at any time, says Amy Ciepluch, chair of the employee benefits and executive compensation team at Quarles & Brady. At a union shop, however, “that type of language would not trump what a collective bargaining agreement guarantees. The collective bargaining agreement would govern.” However, the federal limit on total retirement contributions is unchanged. So an employee limited in 401K contributions can increase contributions to an IRA or other retirement account. | Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic. | could they make a realistic claim that I had voluntarily terminated my contract before the year was over? The employer's act would forfeit its entitlement to reimbursement of bonus. The clause clearly indicates that the triggering event is termination, not the anticipatory notification thereof. Furthermore, the employer's act would be a breach of the [contract law] covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That would be in stark contrast with your compliance with, and/or kindness in, giving a two-week notice. The employer's termination of your employment seems improper in equity insofar as it was aware of your notice and thus took advantage thereof. | Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck | Anyone who is an employee as defined in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 USC 201 et seq.(or parallel state minimum wage laws) and is not within the scope of an exemption to the minimum wage law, must be paid minimum wage. The relevant question is whether or not the person is an employee who is not exempt from the minimum wage requirement as defined in the FLSA. The question is a mixed issue of fact and law in which the characterization given to the relationship by the company and the person doing the work is one factor, but not the only or the controlling factor, in determining employee status. The exact nature of the work governs whether the FLSA's minimum wage requirement applies or not. For example, "employee" is defined for puroses of the FLSA at 29 USC 203(e) to exclude "any individual employed by an employer engaged in agriculture if such individual is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of the employer’s immediate family" and certain kinds of volunteers. Piecework pay is allows under certain limited circumstances by 29 USC 207(g) when the usual result is that reasonable workers earn the minimum wage. Tipped employees (which is a form of revenue sharing) also receive special treatment. Most of the exemptions are found at 29 USC 213. Most relevant to your question is 29 USC 213(a)(1) which includes an exception for an "outside saleman" who is paid on a straight commission basis, and 29 USC 213(a)(5) and (a)(6) which contain exclusions for certain farming and fishing occupations. Straight commission compensation without regard to the minimum wage is generally not permitted with regard to an employee who is an "inside salesman" (e.g. someone who works at a retail store in a mall or at a phone bank for a telemarketing company), or for anyone other than an outside saleman in non-agricultural jobs. Independent contractor status generally depends upon the degree of control that the company has over the manner in which the work is performed, the assignability of the contract to do the work, and the extent to which the worker does work for many different companies on a contract basis while complying with employment related laws for the contactor's own employees (e.g. worker's compensation). The working for many different companies on a contract basis prong of the test is frequently controlling in practice. Six of the main factors considered by the Labor Department in determining independent contractor status are discussed in Fact Sheet #13. A true independent contractor may be paid on a revenue sharing basis without regard to minimum wage, although in practice, if this results in the independent contractor earning less than minimum wage, there will be strict scrutiny of the practice. Typical independent contractor arrangements that would be allowed would include an attorney working on a contingent fee basis, or an independent broker or realtor working on a straight commission bais. More often than not, a true independent contractor is someone you couldn't even imagine being an employee subject to minimum wage laws of the company in light of the overall relationship and often this will involve a business to business contract, rather than a business to a non-professional individual contract with only personal services involved. There are some safe harbor provisions that if met can insure independent contract status, but it is very common for someone who legally is an employee to be misclassified as an independent contractor in an attempt (often futile if the matter is pressed by regulatory or tax officials) to avoid compliance with laws incident to the employment relationship. | In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted. | Can an employer apply one-off pay cuts via forced contributions? No. This type of issues pertains to state law, and many (if not all) jurisdictions in the U.S. have statutes prohibiting forced deductions that are neither ordered by court, nor pursuant to bargaining agreements, nor as required or expressly permitted by law. See, for instance, MCL 408.477 and .478. The case of the CEO's book sounds in clear violation of MCL 408.477(2) since the user who asked on Workplace SE mentions that the employees did not consent to that deduction. Even if an employee consents to the deduction, it is important to discern between (1) his altruistic consent, and (2) his concession for the sake of continuation of employment. Unless the consent is altruistic, the clause(s) allowing for the deduction might be rendered null and enforceable by virtue of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 178(1) in relation to the aforementioned statutes. Any form of deductions as a permissible sanction (as fining when the employee gets late to work) would have to be provided in the agreement between employer and employee. Otherwise it is unlawful. | It would not be valid in California. see California Labor Code § 2870(a). This will be state-specific and complicated. |
Can a legally sentenced but escaped offender be legally executed by a drone attack? Imagine the fictional situation: someone (e.g. a U.S. citizen) commits a capital offense, he is arrested and legally sentenced to death. Then he somehow escapes. His hiding place is discovered, and the only way to kill him is by a drone attack. Can it be done? Is it a legal execution? | No Law enforcement are allowed to use “reasonable force” to effect an arrest. They are also allowed to use reasonable force to prevent imminent harm to people or property. As described, the felon is not a danger to other people or property and a drone strike would be an ineffective means of effecting an arrest. The force used is not reasonable. Nor can the drone be used as a means of lawfully carrying out the sentence. An execution in the USA is a highly formalised legal process and must be done strictly in accordance with the law to ensure it is not "cruel and unusual". Blowing people up with high explosives which may or may not kill them is not an authorized method of legal execution. | He would be thanked and sent on his way. We don't generally punish people for preventing murders, even if they are rogue cops or soldiers. If you wanted him to plausibly land in legal peril, he'd probably need to do more than simply save someone's life. The most obvious possibility, I think, would be if he were to continue inflicting harm on the attacker after cuffing him. At that point, there's probably no justification for a continued use of force, so he could face assault charges there. Also possible would be that the way he handled the situation -- the amount of force he used, the failure to de-escalate, failing to call for assistance -- just violates some police or military policy. I don't know if that would jam him up in the way you're looking for, though. | I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision. | A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them. | As far as I understand, no one can jail anyone as a result of a civil matter. I can't just say, hey! You did this! I'm taking you to jail. You simply don't have the reason and authority to do so - and I doubt the jails would want random people coming in for random reasons. Courts also don't send people to jail for this. As far as I understand, you can only be jailed by a judge for a criminal matter. However, you can go to jail as a result of a civil matter. When this happens, you need to found guilty of a criminal offence, most notably Contempt of Court. You can be found guilty of that offence if you don't respond/comply to the court's instructions - such as failing to repay debts. In order to be found in contempt, the court needs to find that you also intended to refuse the court's instruction (this is known as mens rea). If you were found liable, the court would not send you to jail. They would instead tell you to repay the damages that you owed the creditor (the person who filed suit). Inability to do this does not result in contempt of court, however, you should generally let the court know of this. In terms of this, the court can allow the creditor to garnish wages, have scheduled payments... etc of the debtor. To answer the main question, the only time that the court will jail a person will be upon conviction of a criminal offence (such as contempt of court), and not a civil matter (such as liability). | I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty"). | Yes, there is a good chance. Ordinarily, the law as written is what is enforced. On occasion, the wording of the law is actually ambiguous, or vague, which means that the jury will need an instruction as to how to interpret the law. In fact, juries are not literally read the statute, they are given a set of decision-making instructions so that they can decide "If we find X, we must acquit; if we find Y we may convict". Your attorney will, if he is diligent, note the problem and strive for an instruction that favors the client. (The prosecution will of course object). Eventually, on appeal, a court will decide what the law "really means", and that decision might be strictly based on the letter of the law, or it might be based on a supposed spirit of the law, i.e. what the legislature "originally intended". That outcome is determined in part by the jurisprudential ideology of the prevailing justices of the appeals court. Usually, letter of the law prevails until a higher court rules that a particular "spirit" is what was originally intended. | The court will presume that. You say there is no doubt that he was the attacker but the matter isn't subject to opinion. It has to be proved in court, because if there should be a tiny bit of uncertainty, or some uncertainty, or a lot of it, then the opinion "he did it" becomes "trial by media" or other euphemism. Not just that, but Hadi Matar can plead "not guilty" to the offense as charged. The law might allow that he could be guilty of a different offense, but not what the charge is. A theoretical scenario: Hadi Matar ran onto the stage to shout at Rushdie, but someone in the audience threw a knife. Maybe it is "obvious" to you that it didn't happen here, but a criminal trial isn't about what is obvious, but the truth. Take another case where X commits a crime but frames Y for it, so it seems obvious to all that Y must have done it. The trial will follow a procedure, not the sway of opinion. The outcome of the trial might depend on Y showing that is was impossible to have committed the crime, but not know who X is. So the court will presume that Hadi Matar is innocent, unless proved beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty as charged. |
Why is Derek Chauvin considered a predatory offender in Minnesota? Derek Chauvin has recently been sentenced for the murder of George Floyd, and as part of the sentencing he will be required to register as a predatory offender upon release. However, Chauvin was sentenced for 3rd degree murder. According to an official Minnesota website: A person is treated as a predatory offender if the person has committed felony criminal sexual conduct or certain other designated sex crimes, kidnapping, or false imprisonment It seems clear that this is analagous to the status of 'sex offender' in most other states. Why is Chauvin required to register (as reprehensible as his crime obviously was), given that he was not convicted of a sexual offense, kidnapping, or false imprisonment? | (Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. "Predatory crime" means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of "problematic officers" being "shuffled" between departments; this would explicitly prevent that. | canada Principles of sentencing I question your premise that the country applies an "eye for an eye" principle to sentencing. In Canada, for example, the declared purposes of sentencing do not include revenge. The purposes of sentencing is listed at s. 718 of the Criminal Code: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. This is described in more detail in this Parliamentary research paper. It discusses the purposes of sentencing including non-custodial (out-of-prison) sentences. Prison abolition / decarceral options Regardless, many people are imagining and working towards a legal system with less imprisonment. This activism and research is characterized as "decarceral" or "abolitionist." Here is some material about this ("Intro to Abolition", noprisons.ca and their Syllabus: "Abolition in So-Called Canada"). | It seems like callous behavior which leads to a foreseeable death deserves a bigger punishment than just firing of the administrator. The starting point of the analysis is that no one is legally responsible, civilly or criminally, for a suicide unless that person intended that the person who committed suicide do so, which is almost certainly not true in this case. As a matter of law, a suicide caused by merely callous behavior not intended to cause someone to commit suicide is not foreseeable. And if the only actions brought are civil, then the University would be the defendant and the actual individuals who were involved would not themselves even face any trial. This is not accurate. It would be routine to bring suit against anyone personal involved (probably both the administrator and the gay student who allegedly colluded), as well as the University, and indeed, the likelihood of a recovery against one or both of the individuals would be greater than the chance of recovery against the University. To recover against the University it would be necessary to show that the Title IX violation occurred pursuant to an officially approved policy or practice of the University, but this case seems to have at its heart, a failure to an administrator to follow a policy of the University. It might be possible to sue the University or someone involved in the process for a violation of his civil rights, but generally speaking, his death would not constitute recoverable damages in a such a suit. Also, generally speaking, a Title IX claim requires that any party held liable to have had an intent to violate someone's civil rights, rather than that the person was merely mere inept or negligent in implementation or non-implementation of a bureaucratic policy or dispute resolution procedure. This is alleged by the Plaintiff, probably in part because it has to be to prevent the case from being dismissed on the pleadings, but is quite implausible that this really happened that way, and this is difficult to prove unless there is some really hard evidence backing up the alleged collusion. Generally speaking, the fact that a hearing board comes up with a wrong conclusion after allegedly not following proper procedure, is not actionable for damages and certainly wouldn't constitute fraud. UPDATED RESPONSE TO EDIT 2: there maybe other victims, in similar situations, who are not protected by the criminal justice system if nothing of what is alleged to have transpired is deemed illegal It is a common fallacy that if something is not a crime, that it is not illegal or that there are no remedies. A civil lawsuit is a common and often appropriate remedy for all manner of wrongs, and the compensatory and injunctive remedies for civil wrongs such as a breach of contract and torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress are often significant. This said, as a government entity, the University of Texas and its employees are probably immune to many tort causes of action that would be available against a private party engaged in the same conduct. In this case, probably the only viable causes of action against the University of Texas itself, as opposed to the responsible individuals in a particular case, would be for breach of contract for not actually carrying out its policies as impliedly promised, and for injunctive relief under Title IX insisting on new policies that would prevent misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. Generally speaking, a criminal law remedy is less victim oriented than a civil remedy and is outside the control of the victim, which can be traumatic for a victim who would prefer not to be involuntarily dragged into the criminal justice process. The notion that settlement is not possible in the criminal justice system is likewise mostly incorrect. There is a reason why we don't handle rapes (for example) in civil courts. Criminal justice system exists to make sure that, at least in theory, those who commit heinous acts cannot buy their way out of consequences of those actions. In fact, one can bring a cause of action for a rape in a civil court. I've done it. And, the lower threshold of proof, the lack of a right to remain silent without legal consequences under the 5th Amendment, the greater focus on compensation for the victim, and the greater level of control of the victim are all good reasons to pursue this route. Many cases of rape by people able to afford to pay compensation are also cases of actionable sexual harassment. In general, criminal law is the solution that is usually resorted to not so much because the acts committed are heinous, but because the typical person who violates a law that is criminally prosecuted is judgment proof and unable to pay compensation that is even remotely proportionate to the harm done, so a civil remedy does not discourage that behavior. Your typical rapist who is prosecuted in the criminal justice system isn't capable of paying meaningful compensation to a victim, although there are always exceptions. Preventing people from buying their way out of their wrongdoing is almost never advanced by criminal justice scholars as a reason for a criminal justice remedy. And, when I have clients who have been harmed, for example, by fraud, most would far prefer to receive compensation from the wrongdoer, than to see the perpetrator punished without receiving any meaningful compensation for their own injuries, which is the usual result in the criminal justice process. Most people think of the criminal justice system as more of a last resort when all other options fail than as a good first choice which it rarely is even when it is the least bad option. So back to the main question, what, if any, criminal charges can be leveled against the administrator and the false accuser if the alleged facts of the case can be confirmed to be true? In the fact pattern presented, where a public official at the University of Texas conspires with a student with whom the official has a pre-existing personal relationship to produce an intentionally inaccurate result in a University disciplinary hearing harming a defendant in that process, there are several university statutes that might form a basis for criminal action against either the public administrator or the conspiring student on the offense identified or conspiracy to commit the offense identified. In no case are any criminal charges against the University of Texas a plausible option in this fact pattern. Each of the offenses is a misdemeanor under Texas law. The best fit is "improper influence". Texas Penal Code § 36.04. This involves reaching an outcome in an adjudication for a reason other than one legally allowed due to someone's application of influence other than a bribe or kickback. The section states: (a) A person commits an offense if he privately addresses a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to any public servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law. (b) For purposes of this section, “adjudicatory proceeding” means any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Two other possibilities are "abuse of official capacity", Texas Penal Code §39.02, or "official oppression" Texas Penal Code § 39.03. These sections and a related one, read as follows in the pertinent or potentially pertinent parts: Sec. 39.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly: (A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or (B) governs the conduct of the public servant. . . . Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY. (a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly: (1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment . . . (b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. . . . 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION. (a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: . . . (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or (3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment. (b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity. (c) In this section, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. (d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor . . . Also, in all three of these cases, the fact that someone committed suicide afterwards is basically irrelevant legally. | In the US, people are not put in jail because they are "known for" committing a crime. Several things must happen, and at each stage there are ways for the process to be halted. Law enforcement must gather evidence that a crime has been committed by a particular person. There ids no duty to investigate every possible crime, so this will depend on the policy of the particular LE organization, and what evidence any investigation finds. If no investigation is made, no evidence will be found. A prosecutor (state or Federal) must decide to bring charges. There is no duty for a prosecutor to bring charges in every case where evidence is brought forward by law enforcement. A prosecutor is supposed to devote the limited resources of his or her office where it seems likely to do the most public good. Cases which probably cannot be won should not be brought. Moreover, most prosecutors are reluctant to bring cases which seem likely to do them political harm. The Prosecutor must formally bring the defendant(s) before a court to hear and respond to the charges (arraignment). At this stage the judge can dismiss the charges, but that almost never happens. The prosecutor must establish that there is probable cause to bring a case to trial. This can be done via a grand jury proceeding resulting in an indictment, an "information", a probable cause hearing, or a preliminary hearing, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of crime. For minor crimes, the prosecutor's sworn statement may be enough. There must be a trial, before a judge or a jury. If the defendant is found guilty, s/he will be sentenced under the appropriate law, which may include jail or prison time. There are various other stages to the process, but those are the major go/no-go steps in a US criminal proceeding. So it is possible in any given case that law enforcement has not tried to find evidence, or has tried but failed, or that a prosecutor has chosen not to bring charges. As to why any of that might have happened, it depends on the particular situation and its circumstances. There are always costs of time, effort, and money to pursue any particular case. If cops are looking for evidence of a celebrity's drug use, they are not looking for evidence in an embezzlement or murder case. If an assistant prosecutor is tying such a case, s/he is not trying some other case. Officials have wide discretion in how to allocate resources in such matters. | Is there something in the language of the act that makes sexual harassment a civil rather than a criminal offence? Yes. Laws that create criminal offenses have to have language to the effect of "violation of this law is punishable by up to X years of imprisonment or a fine of up to $Y", or "violation of this law is a Class Z felony." Sometimes it is not entirely clear if violation of a law can form a basis of a private civil lawsuit, or if it can only be enforced by government officials, from the language of the statute alone. When it is unclear the courts have to resolve that ambiguity. In rare instances, it may be clear that some parts of a statute have criminal penalties, but due to unclear wording and punctuation in the statute, it is hard to tell precisely which parts of the statute these criminal penalties apply to, and in those cases, courts also have to resolve that ambiguity. There is also some conduct that it is constitutional to punish with a civil penalty, but not as a crime that can result in incarceration. For example, it is unconstitutional in most states to incarcerate someone for failing to pay a debt, but there can be a civil penalty for failing to pay a debt. Courts decide if these constitutional limitations are violated. Similarly, while Congress can enact both crimes and civil penalties, there are some governmental bodies, like school districts or water boards, that have the power to enact certain civil penalties, but do not have the authority to create new crimes. Was that up to the lawmakers to decide, or is that just something that evolved out of the ways the courts and prosecutors responded to sexual harassment claims? And who decides such things in general? Generally, this is decided by lawmakers. Obviously, however, anyone can lobby legislators to take one position or another. Also, the fact that something has a civil penalty does not necessarily mean that prosecutors aren't the people who enforce the law. Sometimes violations of the law prosecuted by prosecutors have civil rather than criminal penalties. For example, many tax law violations are prosecuted by government lawyers with civil penalties, but only a small minority of tax law violations are prosecuted criminally. Further, it isn't uncommon for a type of offense, like securities fraud, to have both civil penalties and criminal charges available as remedies that can be enforced by prosecutors. And, when that happens, prosecutors get to decide which tool to use. For example, even if exactly the same conduct could be prosecuted with either a civil penalty or a criminal charge, prosecutors might prefer a civil penalty because the burden of proof is much lower, the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not apply (you can refuse to testify but that fact can be used against you in a civil penalty case), and a defendant in a civil penalty case doesn't have a right to a lawyer at government expense. Also, enforcing a civil penalty generates net revenue for the government most of the time, while criminal punishments normally cost the government more money to carry out than any revenue the government may receive from the person found guilty for fines and court costs. On the other hand, trying to enforce a significant enough civil penalty to discourage misconduct against someone who has no money or property may be a futile effort, while criminal sanctions could discourage misconduct from other similarly situated people in the future. | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). | I will use Washington law to lay the landscape for a rape charge. First degree rape is sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion, either with kidnapping, (apparent) threat of a deadly weapon, beating the victim, or feloniously entering the building of vehicle where the victim is. This is not the case under discussion. What does potentially apply is second degree rape, which is sexual intercourse by other types of forcible compulsion, or (b) When the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, or various similar descriptions of diminished capacity (a developmental disability plus perpetrator supervisory authority, etc). Subparagraph (b) is crucial here, and we turn to the definitionL "Mental incapacity" is that condition existing at the time of the offense which prevents a person from understanding the nature or consequences of the act of sexual intercourse whether that condition is produced by illness, defect, the influence of a substance or from some other cause. Also to be clear on "forcible compulsion", "Forcible compulsion" means physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped In the case of intercourse with an intoxicated person, the government must prove that the victim's condition prevented them from understanding the nature or consequences of intercourse. Now compare the law in Minnesota, otherwise analogous, but with a different definition of "mentally incapacitated" (subd. 7): "Mentally incapacitated" means: (1) that a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person's agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration; or (2) that a person is under the influence of any substance or substances to a degree that renders them incapable of consenting or incapable of appreciating, understanding, or controlling the person's conduct. (italics indicate the differences of interest). The second clause in the Minnesota definition states the same idea as the Washington definition, but also adds "inability to control" as a form of incapacity. The first clause states a different standard of inability, lowered from "incapable of deciding" to "lacking judgment", but only when the condition arises without the person's consent. The point here is that prosecution and conviction do not just depend on a generic and universal concept of "consent", it very much depends on the exact words selected by the legislature in establishing these laws. Minnesota's legislature made one set of choices, Washington's made another. The Washington legislature made another choice when it came to intoxication: per RCW 9a.16.090, No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his or her intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state. So an voluntarily drunk person cannot defend themselves saying "I was drunk, I didn't know what I was doing", but intoxication can be relevant to the important question of "knowledge" as an element of culpability. This is a principle of law specifically set by the legislature. Prosecutors don't decide based on a hypothetical "how drunk" scale, instead they compare the facts with what the applicable law says. There is no "knowingly" requirement for prosecution for rape, therefore one cannot argue that because of intoxication the accused "lacked knowledge" of their act owing to intoxication. Being intoxicated according to the .08 driving standard does not (generally) render a person incapable of understanding "intercourse". | No. The true accuser is the state and the state always has standing to enforce its laws. This is an injury in fact. The judge would laugh at you and probably then double the fine for your insolence. This defense would be considered frivolous. |
Can my landlord require me to agree to third-party terms of service if they install a smart lock on my door during my lease? I am in the middle of my current fixed-term lease and have always had a mechanical key-based lock on my apartment door. My landlord has announced that the doors of all apartments will shortly be converted to electronic "smart locks". The smart-lock maker's website says that any use of their product constitutes agreement to their terms of service. Is the landlord allowed to install this new type of lock? How does responsibility divide among myself, the landlord, and the smart-lock maker? My concerns are: Smart locks raise new reliability, security, and privacy risks versus mechanical locks. When I agreed to rent the apartment, mechanical locks were in use and no indication was given that they would be replaced. See this article on tenants who have objected to installation of smart locks. When the smart lock is installed, I will have no choice but to use it in order to access my apartment for the remainder of my lease. It seems unfair for me to be bound by the smart-lock maker's terms of service when my use of their product is non-consensual. If the terms of service are viewed as a contract, I see a few possible arguments: A. There is no meeting of the minds because I have no desire to use their product. B. The obligations imposed on me (and limitations on their liability) in the terms of service are void for lack of consideration because the ability to access my apartment, which the lock provides, is something I am already entitled to by my lease, i.e., it is being used to fulfill an existing obligation of the landlord. C. The landlord cannot require me to take on additional obligations to a third party in order to continue the enjoyment of the apartment promised by my already-signed lease, so the landlord must indemnify me from any such obligations. What are my rights and how can I assert them? If I cannot prevent the smart-lock installation, can I somehow establish that I am not bound by the terms of service despite what the smart-lock maker's website says? Would I simply wait until such time (if ever) that I have a dispute with the smart-lock maker, and then use my non-consent to argue that the terms neither protect them nor bind me? How strong would that argument be, and what if anything should I do now to document that non-consent? | Your lease states what your rights and obligations are: you cannot unilaterally change those terms, nor can the landlord. Providing a functioning lock on the door is a statutory obligation of the landlord, and the landlord gets to say what kind of lock is installed as long as the device functions, and isn't impossible for the tenant to operate. If the landlord replaces the lock with a no-security $10 entry door knob that yields to a screwdriver, they probably failed in their obligation to provide entry security. Failing such a concern, you don't have a legal right to refuse the landlord's choice of lock. You also do not take on the obligation to acquire the tools needed for installation, and so on. In short, you don't have a choice. Since you have no choice and you are not a party in this transaction (the landlord is not acting as your agent, he is satisfying a legal obligation that he has), the question of "agreeing" to someone else's transaction and contract is irrelevant. The landlord, as purchaser, must comply with the terms of the contract since he is a party to the contract. The seller might impose an obligation on the buyer and the landlord might hope to pass those terms on to the tenant via a lease term, but that can't be done unilaterally in the middle of a lease. | My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have. | You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner. | Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that? | It's hard to imagine a jurisdiction where this would be legal, assuming that the facts are as you present them. Mainly, it comes down to what the lease actually says. If the lease says something that implies that landlord permission is required, then the tenant has to get permission. You can call it a "dog permit", it just boils down to "landlord permission". Unless the lease also states "permission for a pet can be withdrawn at any time, sor any reason" or something to that effect, then the dog is permitted. At the end of the lease term, the landlord can refuse to renew the lease and/or can instead offer a no-dogs lease. The landlord's only recourse would be to petition the court for breaking the lease, in having a dog without permission, at which point the tenant would present whatever evidence they have that there was permission (hopefully something more substantial than a statement "I asked if I could bring my dog and the landlord said 'hmmmm' with an approving tone"). The courts will not give any credence to "Yeah but I rescinded the permission" unless there is a clause that explicitly allows it. | Simply being confusing is not enough to make a contract unenforceable. The law generally operates on the premise that people can understand statutes, regulations and contracts, and that if they don't understand a contract, they won't agree to it. Therefore, if they agreed, they understood: this is a fundamental premise of contract law. However, there are a couple of loopholes, "unconscionability" and "public policy", which could provide an escape. In the proposed scenario, we would assume that there is a huge difference in bargaining power between the customer and company, that some term is unfair (a highly subjective matter reduced to expressions like "shocks the conscience"), and the language of the contract is clearly confusing. "Public policy" generally involves a requirement in a contract that is statutorily prohibited: either the required action is itself illegal, or the law has banned any such clauses in a contract (very commonly, residential leases are statutorily prohibited from including clauses waiving statutory protections of rights). I think that if a contract for some internet thing (e.g. an ISP) had a clause that "unahitaji kukulipa $1 kwa kila siku unayotumia huduma zetu" (you must pay $1 for every day you use the service) that this is not a shocking price, so the contract would be enforceable, even if it ought to be a bit confusing. | No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to. | Before you go changing locks, you might want to hire an attorney. There is law in Ohio that governs "such" relationship, which are typically landlord-tenant relationships, but might not be strictly construed the way you'd prefer. In a classic landlord-tenant relationship, it is illegal to change locks on a tenant, and if you want a tenant booted out, you have to go through the court process and get the court to order an eviction (carried out by the sheriff). A landlord-tenant relationship need not involve a written lease, all that matters is having an agreement. On the face of it, it looks to me as though you agreed to let your son live there, and his attorney would no doubt point to whatever benefit you received from allowing your son to live there as "consideration" in this verbal (vague) contract. The exact terms of that contract don't matter: what matters is that state law limits what you can do. You can read ORC here on the topic of evictions. Actually physically removing a person is a crime (battery), so definitely don't do that. Lockouts have been illegal since 1973. You no doubt can show the court that your son is now effectively a trespasser, but he clearly did not break in without permission, so the bottom line is probably a visit to the court (unless a letter from the attorney resolves the matter). Alternatively, it could be simpler and cheaper to just go directly for the court process. There are professionally-written manuals for about $20 that spell out the procedures, and an attorney is not actually required to evict someone. You can just treat the situation as a standard landlord-tenant process, give the required notices (using legalese in a notice may well be sufficient). If you do have to file in court, there are a couple hundred bucks of fees associated with filing. It takes time. There is a 3 day notice requirement on your notice, after that you can file the complaint and a hearing is scheduled after that (county dependent: I hear it's about 3 weeks in Franklin). Defendant can stretch that out for a week or so by asking for a continuance to seek legal counsel, but eventually you will prevail unless the judge is too warm-hearted and orders family counseling (you never know, these days). They you apply for the "red tag", the bailiff posts it within a few days, and that gives him 5 days to leave. If that doesn't work, you call the bailiff for the physical removal, and they probably respond within a couple of business days. |
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