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My friend borrowed money but does not want to pay back. It was a 'buddy promise' with no pay back time stipulated My (used to be) friend borrowed some money from me but does not want to pay back. It was a 'buddy promise'. I have SMS, Email & Bank Transfer slips as evidence. Since it was done between buddies, no repayment time frame was stipulated. I have compiled written binding agreements in Text messages and email. The only thing missing is the time to repay. It has been more than a year now since he borrowed the money from me and I am thinking of suing him with all the evidences I have. The sum of money would put it under the small-claims-court category Do I have a strong case against him? My concern is that it was a 'buddy' contract with no time frame for payback stipulated.
If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the "written binding agreements" include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lien A lien is a form of security interest granted over an item of property to secure the payment of a debt or performance of some other obligation. So the garage might have held a lien on Wilson's car as a way to secure a debt that he owed them, such as payment owed for repairs. If so, it would have prevented Wilson from selling the car until the debt was paid. It would also have made it a little less clear who was truly in possession of the car if the garage had a security interest in the car. However, in this particular case, Wilson had a monthly credit account with the garage. I would assume that means he had come to some arrangement with the garage where they would do the work without demanding payment on the spot, and that he would pay what he owed at the end of the month, or something like that; perhaps on terms like net 30 days. They evidently trusted him enough to grant him unsecured credit, instead of demanding a lien on the car as security. So the issue of a lien did not come up in determining possession. This sort of arrangement would have been a lot more common in 1963, before credit cards were common, so I'm not surprised that your garage today doesn't offer it. Nowadays the garage is more likely to demand payment as soon as the work is done, but you can get much the same effect by paying them with a credit card; then you will have about a month before you have to pay your credit card bill (or begin paying interest on it).
If this requirement was not made before rendering the service, you are under no obligation to accept the term. You and the service provider must now find an agreeable method of payment. You still owe the provider but if you are compelled to pay then the provider will be compelled to be more accommodating in their allowed payment methods (cash, at least). As a general rule, if you are providing a service for any significant amount of money, you should require payment up front or at least a deposit and payments at milestones. Especially if you're 7,000 miles away from your client and put any restrictions on method of payment.
"One day and that day may never come" If a company never invoices me, am I obligated to do anything? No (given that they know how to contact you i.e. you are not evading being invoiced). That said, you will still owe the money. When/if they ask it to be paid, you will need to pay. But there is no need to proactively bug them to take the payment. Until invoiced, you can enjoy the money as a zero-interest loan.
a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.
The court in France would not enforce a debt collection against you; but the person who owed you the money could - very easily. They would apply to the court in Scotland to enforce the judgement of the French court, the Scottish court would look at it, say "yup, the French court has made a decision", and then tell you to pay up. After that, the French company has the same range of options as a Scottish company would. I think (but I could be wrong), that the decision of the French court might well not go on your credit record - but the corresponding decision of the Scottish court would. Note that a CCJ doesn't go on your credit record if you pay within a short period (seven days?). In your case though, the right thing to do is Pay the amount you don't dispute you owe Wait for them to sue (they may well not). Defend the case (probably in writing, not in person). If you lose, pay up straight away (at this point the court has decided that you were wrong, and you do owe the money. As such you should pay.)
Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed.
Yes You asked for work to be done in the expectation you would have to pay for it and they did the work - that’s a legally binding contract. It appears that you did not agree on a price and possibly not on a time for making payment. If that is so, you agreed to pay a reasonable price in a reasonable time. They have issued an invoice stating what and when they believe is reasonable. You dispute parts of that invoice. That’s fine, people are allowed to have disputes. You have paid the undisputed amount I hope? Notwithstanding, your negotiations with the other party can go back and forth and things can be put on and taken off the table. But you don’t have a deal until you have a deal. At any time, either party can walk away and assert their rights. Or make a take it or leave it offer, commonly called playing hardball. Since it is undisputed that you owe them something, they can refer the debt to “collections (be that internal or an external debt collector). You should pay the undisputed amount immediately and you can continue to dispute the remainder. They will make a deal, initiate legal action, or let the matter die.
How can you guarantee deletion of consumer data on the internet? I have a bit of conundrum in thinking of making a business directory site listing businesses and people in a community-driven/edited way (like Wikipedia). Say that a community of people add personal details of 10,000 business members online. One of those business people would like their name removed from the system. Okay we remove it. But what is to stop the community from creating it again? It seems there would have to be an endless cycle of adding/removing/adding/removing-request etc. The reason is, say you actually delete all traces of the user's record "Jane Doe, [email protected], @janedoe". Then someone goes to add a new person, "Jane Doe, @janedoe". We don't know that was a previously removed person, to prevent from being added again. So that's conundrum 1. The next conundrum is, say we have a hidden internal database of previously deleted people, so we can match against when people try to add new people, and prevent them from adding existing people. First off, there is no real simple way of being able to tell that "Jane Doe, @janedoe" and "Jane Doe, [email protected], @janedoe" are the same person. Perhaps they deleted their email address and someone else with the same name took it up. Or many other reasons it would be hard to tell. So we can't really prevent in that way. But we also still have this hidden internal database of previously deleted users. We need sufficient data for each user to know which users have been deleted, so we can optimally remove new users with the same identifying pieces of info. So then now it's basically, we have a private and a public database of users, the private one used to maintain security but requires detailed user info, and a public database that has whatever info we choose to make public. Also, having the "deleted user database" could be a security hole, whereby users try creating random addresses and usernames, until they get "locked out" of one of them, knowing they discovered a deleted account which must be a real account. So I don't really see a clear way to actually delete people's data in such a community-driven site, do you? What are the laws around this? Must Wikipedia delete the page of Barack Obama if he asks of it?
Neither the GDPR, nor the CCPA, nor any other data protection law that I am aware of, requires that when information is deleted on request, that similar information not be collected and stored in future. Under the GDPR Article 6 there would have to be a lawful basis for any processing, including storage, assuming that the GDPR applies to the directory in question. There could be a claim that such processing was lawful under article 6(e) "performance of a task carried out in the public interest". I do not know if any such claim has been adjudicated. Thus there is no need to hold a database of previously erased records to determine if a new record should be blocked as "previously deleted". The Wikimedia Foundation, which runs Wikipedia, I believe takes the position that the GDPR does not apply to Wikipedia, I am not sure of their detailed arguments. But surely articles on well-known people, such as a former US president, would be covered under the same provisions as would cover news reports and historical books about such a person. Perhaps that would also come under article 6(e)
Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.
Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.
There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.
Under GDPR article 6 paragraph 1 item (c) one lawful basis for processing personal information (PI) is: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; The obligation to attribute a reused work under a CC license is such an obligation. Moreover, the licensor has the option under any CC license to specify a pseudonym for attribution of that work, or to waive attribution totally. Not doing that while releasing content under a CC license that requires attribution could reasonably be considered consent to publish that name along with each re-released copy of the work, so there are at least two lawful bases for processing that name and making it public. In some jurisdictions the license has the status of a contract, which imposes an obligation to attribute the author properly under GDPR Article 6 paragraph 3, as described in more detail in the answer by amon. Also, usernames are PI if and only if it is reasonably possible to associate them with a specific natural person. If a person chose a user name for a single site, not used for any other, and did not post any info that allows the person's identity to be determined, it is not PI. Often, of course, the person can be determined.
The GDPR has a fairly broad concept of what it means for a data subject to be identifiable. The details are given in Recital 26: To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The good news is that this mandates a risk-based approach to identifiability. You don't have to prevent re-identification with absolute certainty, but you must make sure that re-identification is not “reasonably likely”. The bad news is that “identify” does not just mean “figuring out the real-world identity of the data subject”, but also “being able to single out the data subject”. Hashes of personal data are still personal data. The hashed password still allows you to single out data subject, since the hash now serves as an identifier that links multiple records. Equivalently, a random ID would serve as an identifier. Depending on the information in the linked records, this could reasonably likely also allow linking to a real-world identity. I'll also point out that the GDPR explicitly notes that “online identifiers … such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers” enable profiling and identification, and are thus a kind of personal data. Note that it seems you have a user database that includes a password hash. This database includes rich links between the password hash and other, more directly identifying, data. Alternatively, consider that the software that collects tracking information along with this tracking identifier would also receive other information about the data subject that could allow re-identification, such as the data subject's current IP address. It would be reasonably likely that such additional information could be used to identify or single out the data subject. For this analysis, it is irrelevant whether you have any intention of singling out users – it only matters whether, under an objective analysis, the relevant means to do so exist. Related: EDPB thinks hashed phone numbers are personal data. There has been recent debate by regulatory bodies on the question whether hashed phone numbers are personal data. This debate was published by the EDPB binding decision regarding the Irish DPC's fine against WhatsApp, which uses hashed telephone numbers to intersect user's address books. The question in the context of the fine was whether this represents processing of personal data of users who are not WhatsApp users themselves. Originally, the Irish DPC argued that such hashes were not personal data. However, the German, French, Portuguese, and Dutch supervisory authorities pointed out that the specific hashing approach used by WhatsApp does not provide anonymization, for example because there still is contextual information (such as the user's social graph) that would allow indirect identification (and because their hashing was pretty weak and reversible with reasonable effort). Such hashing would only be pseudonymization, not anonymization. The Hungarian supervisory authority makes the argument that WhatsApp could always re-create the hash from the original data, thus permitting re-identification of the hash. This is in line with my above argument that the hash allows singling out. Again, the hash should be considered pseudonymous, not anonymous. The EDPB upheld all these objections against the Irish interpretation as “relevant and reasoned”, and largely agreed with their merits. Some parts of the resulting analysis are specific to issues around phone numbers, in particular that there are comparatively few phone numbers. However, a recurring point is that the hashed data cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be viewed in the context of how it is created and used, and in the context of other data that the data controller has. Conclusion It is possible that in some cases the hash could serve as an anonymous token. But this would require careful analysis about how the hash is created and used, and about what other data you have available and could potentially link or correlate with this token. Unless you are extremely sure that there are no means that could be reasonably likely used to perform re-identification or singling out, you should consider such tokens to be pseudonymous data. Pseudonymization is a great security measure, but such data is still personal data. I suggest reading the WP29 opinion 05/2014 on Anonymization Techniques (WP216) (PDF link). It predates the GDPR and is slightly outdated in both legal and technical matters, but still contains highly relevant guidance on the matter of proper anonymization in the European data protection context. Aside from identifiability issues, I am concerned about using the password (or derived hashes) for anything other than authentication. Even in hashed form, this is fairly sensitive data. In most cases where you would use a password hash, you can likely use a random number instead.
You must get opt-in affirmative consent to process personal data, including tracking people's use of your site or providing targeted advertising. The banner on StackExchange is likely in violation of the GDPR. Do not copy it. It does not have an explicit opt-in, only an opt out which is onerous (leave the site, then manually go in and delete any cookies they set, which may be hard to identify if they are from 3rd parties). The sites you mention that have a gateway are a more correct implementation. Consent must be acquired before processing of data begins, and it must be explicit.
There are some problems with this kind of vandalism, one of them clearly that the internet is international and vandalism can be performed from everywhere on servers everywhere in the world. And so it may be (both technically and legally) difficult to get hold of the vandal. Therefore, most wikis primarily focus on blocking offending accounts or their IPs and hope that this helps at least for a while. Only if it doesn't and the vandalism continues for extended time periods, legal measures are considered. Legally speaking though, vandalism is prohibited by many jurisdictions and of course by the terms of use of the wiki operators. For instance, the Swiss criminal code Art 147 explicitly puts "abusing of data processing equipment" under penalty and hence gives website operators a legal backup for setting up rules for the use of their services. Computer fraud Art. 147 1 Any person who with a view to his own or another's unlawful gain, by the incorrect, incomplete or unauthorised use of data, or in a similar way, influences the electronic or similar processing or transmission of data and as a result causes the transfer of financial assets, thus occasioning loss to another, or immediately thereafter conceals such a transfer shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 2 If the offender acts for commercial gain, he shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units. Technically, the law even requires prosecution ex officio, even though without a hint from the operator, the police won't start an investigation. I'm sure the US has a similar law. The problem is, as with all internet crimes, it's practical application, particularly because often website operator and offender are not living in the same country. Edit After reading the exact text again (it was unavailable yesterday) Art 147 is mostly about fraud performed by computers (classical "hacking") but it shouldn't be difficult to argue that fighting and reverting vandalism requires significant (technical and personal) effort and hence the operator looses money. Additionally, there's Art 144bis which matches even better for the scenario here: Damage to data Art. 144bis Any person who without authority alters, deletes or renders unusable data that is stored or transmitted electronically or in some other similar way shall be liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender has caused major damage, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. The offence is prosecuted ex officio. Any person who manufactures, imports, markets, advertises, offers or otherwise makes accessible programs that he knows or must assume will be used for the purposes described in paragraph 1 above, or provides instructions on the manufacture of such programs shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for commercial gain, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed.
When is it illegal to lie? It occurred to me the other day that (in America) I could write book claiming that soda cures cancer, and there would be no legal consequence to that—free speech. But if I sold soda and claimed that it cured cancer, I'm pretty sure that would be illegal. So my (very broad) question is: When does it become illegal to lie—or to make wildly unsubstantiated claims—in American jurisprudence? Is there a single philosophical distinction that cuts across the law, or are there just piecemeal exceptions to “free speech” for things like libel, false medical claims, incitement to violence, etc.?
There are lots of times when it's illegal to lie. Among them: impersonating a federal agent (18 USC 912) lying to a federal agent (18 USC 1001); health care fraud (18 USC 1035 and 1347); mail fraud (18 USC 1341); wire fraud (18 USC 1343); perjury (18 USC 1623); False Claims Act (31 USC 3729-33); and libel and slander (common law). But you're right that these laws are all at least theoretically in conflict with the First Amendment rule that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." So why are some of them upheld against a First Amendment challenge while others are struck down? The Supreme Court explained its rationale a few years ago in U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). That case dealt with a federal statute making it illegal to falsely claim that you had won any medal that Congress had authorized to be awarded to the armed forces. The federal government said that false speech had no value and therefore was not protected, pointing to cases upholding laws like the ones listed above where the Court had used similar descriptions. But the Court rejected that argument, noting that the cases where it has upheld laws limiting false speech dealt with "defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement": In those decisions the falsity of the speech at issue was not irrelevant to our analysis, but neither was it determinative. The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection. Our prior decisions have not confronted a measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more. Even when considering some instances of defamation and fraud, moreover, the Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless falsehood. So that sort of gives you an organizing principle. It's not really a philosophical distinction, and meeting it doesn't mean that the lie is illegal, just that it may be outlawed. tl;dr: The First Amendment usually does not protect false statements when they are: made knowingly; and made with some corrupt purpose.
Willfully telling an untruth or making a misrepresentation under oath is perjury; the reason you do so or the substance of it is irrelevant. It is the act of perjury itself that is an offense and led to the impeachment.
In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English).
The term "defamation" describes an untrue statement that’s been presented as fact and causes harm to the character of the person it describes. In some jurisdictions an admittedly true statement can still be defamatory. See Can true statements or statements of opnion be libel or defamation in any country? If A claimed that B defamed A, but a court rules that there was no defamation, this might make A's statement legally false. But it will not be defamatory unless it also harms B's reputation. Statements made in court, and in legal filings, have absolute privilege and may not the be basis of a defamation action. Public statements by A accusing B of defamation might be the basis of such an action.
Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case.
Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.
Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.
Lying is protected in the United States You can make films (or write books etc.) denying the Holocaust, or stating that UFOs are alien spacecraft, or that one race/ethnicity/gender is smarter/stronger/better than another without fear of government sanction. Further, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that hate speech is protected in the United States - if you want to advocate that the members of [group] should be sterilized/deported/euthanased/violently murdered etc., feel free. What isn't protected is: "advocacy of the use of force" when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and is "likely to incite or produce such action". Broadly, "kill all [blanks]" is OK, "kill these [blanks] now" isn't. This also means that inciting a suicide is illegal, some types of false statements of fact, counterfeiting is not protected speech, obscenity/indecency, child pornography, fighting words, threatening the President, speech owned by others (i.e. copyrights and trademarks), commercial speech (e.g. false advertising). There are also limitations that the government may impose when it is acting in specific roles. For example, as an employer, the government can restrict the speech of its employees in ways that it can't for general citizens. Private individuals and organisations can sanction or ostracize you however they want. Holocaust denial is reasonably common among white supremacists and other anti-Semitic groups and they produce films and literature on the subject. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum devotes this web page to it. Of course, while it's legal to make these things in the United States, distribution of them in Portugal is against Portuguese law.
Can the U. S. Supreme Court take as much time as it wants until it renders a decision? I am wondering whether there is any formal (I could not find one) or informal (e. g. custom) limit on the time that the U. S. Supreme Court can take from the date when a case enters the docket (alternatively: from the time certiorari is granted) to the date when it renders a decision. Could a case theoretically remain on the docket for years before it is decided? Do the terms have any significance for this question - i. e. would it be strange if the court grants certiorari this term but only decides the case on its merits next term?
There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term.
There are great jurisdiction by jurisdiction differences in the statutes of limitations that apply to crimes. Some jurisdictions have no statute of limitations for any serious crime (e.g. Canada and if I recall correctly Virginia). Others have statutes of limitations for almost all serious crimes other than murder (e.g. Colorado). Where there is a statute of limitations, the primary issue is that the ability of the prosecution and defense to secure reliable evidence that will allow a jury to enter an accurate verdict. This potential to conduct a fair trial can be compromised by a delay in pressing charges. Alibi witnesses can die or disappear to someplace that they can't be located, the location of the alleged crime can change in ways pertinent to proof, memories of witnesses in general can fade. Records or correspondence that could show intent can be destroyed. This is particularly a burden for an innocent criminal defendant who did not know that he or she needed to prepare a defense and gather evidence to respond to criminal charges. Some states toll statutes of limitations during a period of a victims minority or incapacity when brining charges may not be feasible. Other states have a long statute of limitations in rape cases where there is DNA evidence available that can conclusively tie a defendant to the scene of the crime (lack of consent would still have to be established), but a shorter statute of limitations in other rape cases. Murder and fraud are the most common offenses to lack a statute of limitations, in the first case, because it is considered the most serious crime and because the victim is unable to report the crime, and in the latter case, because fraud, by its nature and by the perpetrator's design, may go undiscovered for very long periods of time. Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution? While I've given some examples of the considerations that apply, ultimately, this is a legislative and political decision and not a legal one. You can't determine by reason alone which classes of crimes will have a limited window for prosecution. Different legislative bodies make different decisions on the same issues at different times and in different places.
The appellate court gets the trial transcript which includes all the testimony (and exhibits or descriptions/photos of them) and the trial court's rulings. Also, each side presents an appeal brief, which will generally include a statement of facts, pointing out ones it thinks favorable to its views. In civil cases a jury may be asked/instructed to give yes/no answers to a series of questions, but this is not normal in criminal cases. An appellate court can (and sometimes does) rule that there was not sufficient evidence to permit any reasonable jury to convict; to that extent it can rule on questions of fact. But, as the comment by ohwilleke mentions, an appellate court does not hear new evidence. It can overturn the conviction and send the case back for a new trial, and in such a new trial additional evidence may be introduce at the trial court level.
The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.")
At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.
You don't say what jurisdiction's patent laws you're interested in, and priority dates can differ in different schemes. I'm answering as to U.S. law only. In the United States, under the current hybrid "first-inventor-to-file" system, the priority date--the date that determines who "wins" if there are multiple claims to a specific invention--is, with some exceptions that I won't go into, the date of your first application. In other words, the date that the PTO got it in the mail. Once your application is submitted, it is--again, with some limitations I won't get into--prior art for the purposes of any later-submitted application. They can't get another application later, grant it first, and then deny your application based on the later-submitted application. Your application date would still win out. Could someone in the USPTO slip your application out of the stack, fudge the dates, and convince some other company to submit a similar application to get priority over you? Not as a practical matter, no. The USPTO isn't one guy in a room; it's a large organization, and the person who opens the mail, types in your application details, and sends you a receipt, isn't the same guy who knows whether your invention is any good or not. And, frankly, very few patentable inventions are going to be worth someone risking their job and/or jail time over--especially when there would be significant evidence of the misconduct--for example, your patent agent's files. So what are the chances that the examiner on your patent: 1) Is a nefarious character who has lived a life of public service long enough and wants to go rogue; 2) Has a friend in the mailroom who is also an expert in the field of your invention; and 3) Has a conduct in industry who is willing to break the law for the rights to your invention? Slim to none. And if you have an invention that is really so revolutionary that it's going to be worth so many people risking so much to steal it, odds are there will be other evidence that you were the inventor.
Good decision-making may take some time. During the hearing the judges will hear/see what the parties say, and may: Come up with a decision and voice it right away; or Tentatively come up with a decision, but wish to deliberate/research it further to be sure; or Find it difficult to figure a decision. Extensive deliberations/research will be required. Those are the official reasons. In practice, if the court is not so independent or is corrupt, the judges may secretly consult whoever they see fit before reaching a decision (politicians, parties to the case who bribe them, and so on).
The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.
Can law enforcement dig up endangered plants to recover evidence of a crime? According to this meme if you bury a body underneath an endangered plant, it is then illegal for law enforcement to dig up the body. Is this true?
The Meme is Incorrect Law enforcement in the united-states may disturb or dig up plants that are listed as endangered species while unearthing evidence of a serious crime. 16 U.S. Code § 1538 subsection (a) ,(2) provides that: (2) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of plants listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title, it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to— ... (B) remove and reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass law; Digging up a member (or members) of an endangered plant species during a legitimate criminal investigation as part of a focused search for evidence would not be to "maliciously damage or destroy" them, nor would it be in "knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State". This notion (that evidence is safe if buried under endangered plants) misunderstands what is prohibited by the law.
I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks...
As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.
In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no crime under US law known as "despotism". However, many of the actions that might be called "despotism" are crimes, civil violations, or possibly violations of police regulations. "use of excessive force", "false arrest", "illegal detention",. and "deprivation of civil rights" might apply, as might various other charges or causes of suit. In particular there is 42 U.S. Code § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights often known simply as "section 1983". This provides that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. ... This means that if a police officer or other government official takes action based on his or her authority as a police officer or government official that deprives someone of rights, the person deprived can sue the police officer or official in court, and collect damages directly and personally from the officer. This is limited by qualified immunity. That says that is a point of law has not been "clearly established" police can not be sued for violating it. The exact limits of when qualified immunity applies is a complex topic that has been the subject of many legal cases, quite a few decided by the US Supreme Court. The rules have changed over time. But what has not changed is that clear violations of constitutional and statutory rights by the police and others can give grounds for a federal lawsuit against the people who committed such violations. qualified-immunity, section-1983
It occurred to me after that the fence would have been at the edge of the Canadian landowners property and the land between the fence and the border was a road allowance on crown land. This is one possibility, others are: The border post is in the wrong place The fence is in the wrong place Both are in the wrong place The US rancher owns land in Canada as well as the US Obviously the Montana Rancher is using Canadian land, but where is his fence supposed to be? Well, its not so obvious but anyway: Who says he has to have one? I am not aware of a law that requires a person to fence their property. Should it be right on the border? Assuming that is the edge of his land (which it might not be, see above) and assuming he wants to put a fence up (which he might not want to do) and assuming that he wants to put it on the edge of his property (because he could put it inside if he wants to) then yes. Or is there a strip of land there which is national land reserved for border patrol purposes? You don't know, I don't know - if you are really keen land ownership is public information; check with the governments of Alberta and Montana.
The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.
Yes, and sometimes it even makes perfect sense that such an activity would be a crime. For many crimes, attempting the crime is a crime. The attempt may have no actual effect on any person or property, but is still illegal. According to 16 U.S. Code § 1538(a)(1)(C) it is illegal to kill an endangered species on the high seas. A whale in international waters cannot really be considered anyone's "property" (and since it's in international waters there can't even be some weird theory of it being the government's property) but it is still illegal. 18 U.S. Code § 700 purports to prohibit the desecration of a flag, although this was found unconstitutional. 18 U.S. Code § 708 makes it a crime to commercially use the coat of arms of the Swiss Confederation, for some reason. And 18 U.S. Code § 711a makes it a crime to use the slogan "Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute" for profit, except as authorized. (But maybe that sort of thing counts as intellectual property.) 18 U.S. Code § 342 makes it a crime to operate a passenger train under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This really only affects people and property if the train is driven improperly as a result; if you make it safely, you'd probably never even know. But the driver would still be facing up to 15 years in prison if he was caught doing that. And finally, according to A Crime a Day on Twitter: 33 USC §1232(b), 33 CFR §401.101 & §401.94(a) make it a federal crime to violate the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations by not having a copy of the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations while you pass through the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Under the England and Wales Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, can a police officer enter a house without a warrant? Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 As the title asks. It's such intense legalese that I can't get my head around it!
Short answer Maybe Long answer s.61(1) empowers a "proper officer" to enter premises without a warrant for the health protection functions and purposes described in subsections a-to-d in order to search, take samples and measurements, inspect records and any other actions authorised by s.62(1A). A Proper officer is not a constable, but defined at s.74(b) as being a person appointed for a particular purpose (ie function or role) by the relevant authority. s.62(1) allows the proper officer to take with him anyone necessary, which can include a constable who may be required to facilitate a forced entry, prevent a breach of the peace, make a pre-planned arrest or perform any number of police-specific functions. However... s.61(2A) states that this power of entry does not extend to a private dwelling; which may or may not be the house referred to by the OP. Entry in to a private dwelling requires a warrant under s.61(3).
england-and-wales A warrant for arrest, also referred to as a bench warrant, is issued by a judge or magistrate to ensure a defendant (and sometimes a witness) appears before them. "Being circulated" means a suspect is liable for arrest for an offence (without a warrant) and their details are put on PNC with sufficient information to justify being arrested if they come in to contact with the police - assuming PNC is checked that is.
Yes, they can. There was a time when no warrant was required at all. There was a time when it was thought that the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant only applied to criminal cases. It was expected that administrative and civil cases did not require a warrant. For example, in 1959 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Frank v. Maryland that the conviction of a Baltimore City person who refused a warrantless search by a Baltimore City health inspector was valid. However, in 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in Camara V. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco which held: ...that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such search, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. The standard for issuing such a warrant, the court ruled, is probable cause. Further: Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g, a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. The court also held that nothing in their ruling requiring warrants would preclude a warrantless inspection in an emergency situation. Portland, Oregon describes on their web site their process for obtaining such a warrant.
Are UK Tier 4 rules law? Yes. The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/1374) has been amended by SI 2020/1611. Unfortunately, the amendment is only available as pdf at the moment and I can't copy-and-paste it on my phone for you. SI 2020/1374 and all subsequent amendments may be found here... https://www.legislation.gov.uk/primary+secondary?title=Coronavirus%20all%20tiers ETA: The Introductory Text to SI 2020/1374 states: The Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 45C(1), (3)(c), (4)(b), (4)(d), 45F(2) and 45P of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22/contents
Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction.
Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement.
It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.
Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that.
No Blinker in a Left Turn Lane: Is It Illegal? My question is simple, and pedantic: An intersection near my house has a marked left turn lane, and a marked straight lane. Problem is, the main road turns to the right at this roughly "Y" shaped intersection. This means the marked "straight" lane turns a shallow right, and the "left" lane goes straight ahead (when they have the light, of course). My Question: I don't use my blinker when in the "left turn lane" on the basis that if I'm not turning my wheel then I shouldn't need the blinker. Is this illegal under Ohio state law? This code seems relevant, but I can't make heads or tails of it.
It's legal The Ohio Court of Appeals has addressed a nearly identical situation in State v. Paseka. The relevant law is, as you noted in the question, R.C. 4511.39, which states, in relevant part: No person shall turn a vehicle or trackless trolley or move right or left upon a highway ... without giving an appropriate signal The facts in this case are directly on point—an intersection where continuing straight puts one on a different road, while the original road requires a turn to stay on it: Appellant was traveling west on State Route 6. At a certain point, Route 6 veers to the left. As appellant approached that area of State Route 6, he chose to maintain a straight-ahead course which automatically placed him on Wahl Road. He was stopped for failing to activate his turn signal in violation of R.C. 4511.39. The court ruled that this did not violate the law requiring the use of a turn signal: It is undisputed that appellant’s straight-ahead entrance onto Wahl Road did not require him to turn his vehicle, nor did it require him to switch into a different lane. As such, we fail to see how appellant violated R.C. 4511.39. Here's the intersection in question, via Google Maps: Imagery ©2021 Google, Imagery ©2021 Maxar Technologies, State of Ohio / OSIP, USDA Farm Service Agency, Map data ©2021
Good timing: I just got a new OBD II scanner yesterday. Since this might hit a wider audience, I'll take a foundation-first approach. Your vehicle is comprised of things like brakes, ABS, fuel injection, gear box. Nowadays, these parts are operated by electronic controllers. The physical path by which the controllers receive and transmit electronic signals is called a bus. (It performs the same function as the internal bus in your computer, which connects the CPU, memory, etc.) CAN is simply a protocol for how information travels on the bus. So it does all the things you'd imagine a protocol does (boring things like dictating message formats be 64 bits and exciting things like determining priority). Protocols are defined by standards. Prior to widespread implementation of CAN, there were other standards (four, I believe) used by various manufacturers. CAN is widespread, but it's important to note that it's only standard on lighter vehicles. 40 CFR 86.005-17(h)(3) Beginning with the 2008 model year and beyond, ISO 15765-4.3:2001 “Road Vehicles-Diagnostics on Controller Area Network (CAN)—Part 4: Requirements for emission-related systems”, (December 14, 2001) shall be the only acceptable protocol used for standardized on-board to off-board communications for vehicles below 8500 pounds. The statute goes on to discuss other standards for heavier vehicles. What's unique about CAN? It's faster, but more importantly, it's a protocol that doesn't require a central computer. All the controllers get all the messages. It's kind of like having a bunch of people in a room yelling things out: everyone hears everything. And that's what you want in a car. However, the messages have to be interpreted by the controllers themselves, and that requires a separate "higher-layer" protocol. Electronic components need CAN to function, and if you have a car with electronic components, you need CAN in order to make it run. On the other hand, a vehicle can run without OBD--it's just a nice secondary feature to help diagnose system performance (and problems). It obtains access to component information like speed, RPM, fuel trim, etc. Likewise, that pesky "check engine" light gets activated by a diagnostic code. CAN is not mandatory for OBD. OBD is designed to use a number of different standards, and CAN is one of those (remember, light vehicles makes beginning with 2008 use CAN, but OBD is in use in other types of vehicles, too). At it's heart, OBD II is just another protocol: it specifies message format and the connector's pinout. In the best teaching document I've seen on the CAN vs. OBD subject, Michael Wen mentions you can often deduce which signaling protocol is in use by looking at the pins in the connector (remember, CAN should be standard for light vehicles after 2008, but you might see one of the other four formats in older vehicles). How do OBD and CAN work together? OBD sends messages over the CAN bus (that is, the vehicle bus with the CAN protocol). OBD basically queries components by sending specially formatted messages via the CAN bus. The components respond via the CAN bus. That information goes either to a warning light on the dashboard or to a diagnostic scanner attached to the connector.
No, it is generally not legal. In most (maybe all) states, this would be vandalism. For example, see California Penal Code Section 594(1)(a): Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material. (2) Damages. (3) Destroys. For another example, see Kansas Statutes 21-5813. In your hypothetical, the pedestrian absolutely hit the vehicle, not the other way around, so the "fine line" you mention doesn't effect this conclusion. The practicality of proving the case against the pedestrian is a separate matter but the law favours neither the pedestrian nor the driver. The standard is the same no matter who the charges are filed against: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Highway Code is a Ministerial Direction that brings together in one place for easy reference legislational requirements (by the the use of "must" and "must not") and general guidance (by the use of "should" and "should not") for all road users. It's origins are section 45 of the Road Traffic Act 1930: Issue by Minister of directions for guidance of users of roads. (1)The Minister shall as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act prepare a code (in this section referred to as the " highway code ") comprising such directions as appear to him to be proper for the guidance of persons using roads and may from time to time revise the code by revoking, varying, amending or adding to the provisions thereof in such manner as he thinks fit. (2)The highway code and any alterations proposed to be made in the provisions of the code on any revision thereof, shall, as soon as prepared by the Minister, be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and the code or revised code, as the case may be, shall not be issued until the code or the proposed alterations have been approved by both Houses. (3)Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, the Minister shall cause the code and every revised edition of the code to be printed and issued to the public at a price not exceeding one penny for each copy. (4)A failure on the part of any person to observe any provision of the highway code shall not of itself render that person liable to criminal proceedings of any kind, but any such failure may in any proceedings (whether civil or criminal, and including proceedings for an offence under this Act) be relied upon by any party to the proceedings as tending to establish or to negative any liability which is in question in those proceedings. This Direction remains in force to this day by virtue of section 38(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988: 1)The Highway Code shall continue to have effect...
The national standard, found in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), indicates, in Section 2B.13 Speed Limit Sign: 03 Speed Limit signs, indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, shall be located at the points of change from one speed limit to another. It would not be legal to accelerate to the new speed before reaching the sign. All states were required to adopt the MUTCD no later than 2012. This standard is followed by all states.
Yes, you would be responsible. Maintaining the vehicle in a state that enables compliance with the law is the owner's responsibility, and it is a driver's responsibility to comply with the speed limit. There is no knowledge or intent requirement in a speeding violation. That said, a judge might show leniency if you came to court with documentation of a repair or recalibration of the speedometer after the citation.
Taking the stated facts at face value (i.e. you can prove them in court). Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-102 § 20-102. Driver to remain at scene -- Accidents resulting in bodily injury or death (a) Bodily injury. -- (1) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall stop the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident, without obstructing traffic more than necessary. (2) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall return to and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has complied with § 20-104 of this title. So, you must stay there until you have complied with § 20-104. Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-104 § 20-104. Duty to give information and render aid (a) Rendering assistance. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident and, if the person requests medical treatment or it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary, arrange for the transportation of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical treatment. (b) Duty to give certain information. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give his name, his address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to: (1) Any person injured in the accident; and (2) The driver, occupant of, or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident. (c) Exhibiting license. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give the same information described in subsection (b) of this section and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to any police officer who is at the scene of or otherwise is investigating the accident. (d) If no one able to receive information. -- If a police officer is not present and none of the specified persons is in condition to receive the information to which the person otherwise would be entitled under this section, the driver, after fulfilling to the extent possible every other requirement of § 20-102 of this title and subsection (a) of this section, immediately shall report the accident to the nearest office of an authorized police authority and give the information specified in subsection (b) of this section. So, not only is it legal to leave to seek aid, its required.
The NHTSA gives rules for the United States. Right of way goes to the first person to stop. So if a line of cars were at both stop signs, and all cars wanted to make the same conflicting turns, they would alternate. If the opposing cars stop at the same time then the one turning right has the right of way. (This is because a right turn falls under the "Straight Traffic Goes First" rule.)
Is it legal to use and/or share expired software that is still copyrighted ? Can people still be sued even if the company was bought or dissolved? Some examples of expired software: Macromedia Flash 8 : Macromedia company bought by Adobe Electric Rain Swift 3D : Electric Rain company went down / disappeared Is it legal to use and/or share expired software like this, that is still copyrighted ? If it is illegal, can people still be sued, even if the production company was bought or dissolved ? If yes, on what grounds ? Because... In example 1, the software being used is not built by Adobe, & Macromedia company no longer exist. the format being used (Flash/SWF) is no longer supported by Adobe, so there should be no monetary loss. In example 2, the Electric Rain company no longer exist, so there should be no monetary loss.
When a company is bought by another company, then all their intellectual property is usually transferred to the buyer. That means when Adobe bought Macromedia, then all the copyrights to all Macromedia products presumably went to Adobe. So Adobe can take legal actions when you violate their copyright on Macromedia Adobe Flash 8. I said "usually" and "presumably", because there might always be some contract clause in the purchase agreement between Macromedia and Adobe which says otherwise. And that agreement might not be public knowledge. When a company "disappears", then things can get even more complicated. When a company goes bankrupt, then their assets get liquidated. That means everything they own - material or immaterial - gets sold to the highest bidder. Who that bidder is is not always public information. So the copyrights might land somewhere where you wouldn't expect it. In fact there is a whole industry of "copyright trolls" who buy IP from defunct companies just so they can sue anyone using that IP. When a company is dissolved voluntarily, then any of its assets either get sold off to the highest bidder just like during a bankruptcy, or become the personal property of the company owner(s). Who might be private people or a parent company. Sometimes a company might "nominally" go out of business by sacking all employees and ceasing all business activity, but might still exist on paper. That means whoever owns the company could at any time decide to go back into business just to start a lawsuit. In some cases it might be hard to tell what actually happened to the IP rights to a specific piece of software. The information might be in some contract deeply buried in some file cabinet. Or perhaps there is no documentation at all, so finding out who owns what can become an immensely difficult lawsuit. Bottom line: Who owns the copyright on what is not public information. Just because you can't find out who currently owns the copyright to some intellectual property does not mean nobody does. And when you violate their copyrights, that person might suddenly appear with a lawyer and make all kinds of demands, including suing you for statutory damages (which does not require them to prove that you actually caused financial harm to them).
I am assuming that you are in the United States for this question. Please correct me if this is not the case. MathWorks still holds the right to take action, which may be anything from cease-and-desist letters up to litigation. You have followed the correct process in asking for permission to use a trademark. The owner of the trademark, MathWorks, has given you their answer, which is quite simply, "no". You may not feel that their reasoning is fair, but the default state of trademarks is that they are under ownership of whomever created them, and you do not have permission to use them. Things will remain that way unless MathWorks changes their mind. It doesn't matter if it feels dismissive of them; they are under no obligation to even consider requests to use their marks. If they didn't explicitly say, "sure, go ahead", or even, "yes, you may use it provided you follow a list of conditions", then using their trademark will be an unlicensed usage. If you still would like to pursue getting permission to use their trademarked assets, you will need to try to contact them again. Until they say otherwise, using their trademarks will be considered unauthorized use. (Edited to add this clarification brought up by @David Siegel): However, your usage might not be violation of trademark. The primary purpose of trademark restriction is to stop someone from misrepresenting a product as being from the entity that owns the trademark; this stops someone from, for example, selling a cola soft drink called "Coke-a-Cola". The reasons for this are manyfold, but the basic idea is that allowing that type of usage means that consumers might not be able to tell that your product is distinct from the original, and could then mistakenly attribute the quality and level of service of the previous brand with the new product. If your usage of MATLAB marks is such that you are identifying the products used as from MathWorks, and not yourself, and are doing everything in good faith to disassociate your website and/or offerings from MathWorks, it is possible that your usage would be considered correct usage of trademark. Even if it is legal usage, MathWorks still may decide to take action. If MathWorks believes that your usage is unauthorized and that it is trademark violation, they may decide to take action. This is regardless of whether it actually is; until you have this case in front of a court, you will not get a definitive answer. We cannot answer whether this is a legal usage of trademark. Ultimately, whether or not a usage of a mark is considered to be correct usage is a question that can only be answered by the courts, which means the only person who can give you concrete advice on a course of action is a lawyer. In lieu of proper legal advice, you will need to weigh the risk of MathWorks taking action against your usage with the benefit you receive from usage. (Edited to add this clarification by @Dale M): Regardless, you may be breaking copyright by using the logo. There is a separate issue besides just trademark at play here. The copyright for the MATLAB logo belongs to whomever created it/owns it (presumably, MathWorks in this case). Using the logo without permission is a copyright violation. The only case in which this would not be a violation is if the logo is released for use in general under a compatible license, such as Creative Commons; do note that these licenses typically have additional conditions, such as requiring attribution. If you are unaware as to whether there is a such a license, or if you fail to follow the terms of the license, usage of the logo almost certainly constitutes copyright infringement.
Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.
You are free to sell or not to sell to whoever you like (unless it is illegal discrimination, like not selling to white Christians), but it doesn't make a difference, because anyone who buys the software from you can legally sell it on to anyone they want. So you cannot control who ends up owning the software. If I want the software and you don't sell it to me, and I still want it, I'll just ask a friend to buy it and give them the money. Other people would just get a pirated copy if you refuse to sell to them (and would have very little bad conscience since they offered you cash and you refused to take it). You can put terms into a license, and in the USA this is binding. The customer may not agree with the license, and in that case they have the right to get a refund for the software. In the EU, I don't think a license is binding, so you'd have to sign a legally binding contract with the buyer. Apart from all that, you have very little chance to find out if the software is used against your wishes and to do anything about it.
Yes, it is legal to do that More exactly, it is not copyright infringement. Reverse engineering has been found to be a fair use under US copyright law in: Sega Enterprises v. Accolade 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).; and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In general pure reverse engineering is fair use when the reuser has not agreed to a contract limiting reverse engineering and has not obtained a copy through deception. But a file format is considered to be an idea or a method of operation, and so is not protected by copyright at all, and nothing that is done with it could ever be copyright infringement. See https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/windows/en-US/3269d4f3-8b39-4a2c-8205-1a55e0c6774d/are-file-types-copyrighted?forum=Vsexpressvcs and "Does copyright protect data file formats?" from Lexology, the latter citing EU law and the case of SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Thus there is no copyright infringement in reverse engineering a file format, or in then writing and distributing code to read, write, or, modify files in such a format. If a valid patent applies, that may prevent creating or using such software without a license from the patent holder. But my understanding is that in most cases a file format will not be subject to a patent.
Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible.
I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.
No This is not a copyright issue as you are not making a copy (save for a transient one in your cache which is allowed). You are allowed to record it for personal time-shifting as that is fair use/dealing. The broadcaster either owns the copyright (unlikely) or has a contract with the copyright holder that allows them to broadcast it. Assuming the broadcaster chooses or is not permitted to subsequently stream it, if you miss it, you miss it. Your contract with the broadcaster is over. Their obligation was to make the broadcast available to you, yours was to pay for it - nobody is obliged to watch it. You can, of course, seek the content from any other legal sources, complying with their terms including payment if necessary.
Are there ways of storing personal data beyond standard GDPR limitations? So GDPR harmonizes legal stance of personal data in the EU — mainly by limiting storage time of certain data, and by providing citizens with a procedure to request deletion of their personal data. However, there seem to be some exceptions: I suppose financial and medical institutions store data beyond limits of regular entities (this would stand to reason at least). But what interests me is another case, as described by the following principle: How long can we keep personal data for archiving, research or statistical purposes? You can keep personal data indefinitely if you are holding it only for: archiving purposes in the public interest; scientific or historical research purposes; or statistical purposes. Source: Principle (e): Storage limitation Suppose there was a service for finding out one's geneaology tree, but the information they provide themselves would be used for future geneaology research. Would GDPR allow that, or the standard provisions would simply supersede such an arrangement and allow people to withdraw the information later on? Is there a way to store such information permanently in an explicit manner (i.e. by overtly stating “we will store your data indefinitely”)? In other words, would that qualify as permanent retetion for research under the cited principle?
The GDPR does not set fixed retention periods. Instead, it says data may not be kept for longer than necessary. What is necessary depends very much on the specific context of the processing activity, in particular on the purpose of processing. The GDPR allows retention for as long as necessary. For example, businesses (including financial institutions) are required to keep financial records. This requirement stems from EU member state law, which also sets specific retention periods. If a business wants to keep personal data in financial records for longer than this retention period, they can't just point to the law to authorize this processing – they must instead find a different purpose why they need to keep the data, and then find a suitable Art 6 legal basis. In some cases, retention periods might not be coupled to a fixed duration, but to certain events. For example, personal data for online accounts should typically be kept until the account is closed, which is potentially indefinite. This follows directly from the GDPR approach of limiting data storage by necessity, not by duration. All processing needs a clear purpose + a legal basis. In the context of a genealogy site, the site should analyze carefully what data they collect for what purposes. These purposes might enable potentially unlimited retention. But such processing must also be covered by a legal basis, and I doubt that the site would have a legal basis to make such storage irrevocable. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(a) consent, then the data can only be used as consented to, and consent can always be withdrawn in the future. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract, then the data can be used for compatible purposes in the sense of Art 6(4), but that would require a new legal basis (e.g. legitimate interest). If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest, then the data can be used for Art 6(4) compatible purposes but the data subject has the Art 21 right to object to processing. While a genealogy site may have a legitimate interest in keeping supplied data in order to use it for future research, I think this is a fairly weak legitimate interest that can be easily overridden by an Art 21 objection, which in turn could require Art 17 erasure of the data. The genealogy site should also keep in mind principles like data minimisation and data protection by design and by default, so just keeping data for the off chance that it might be useful in the future is not GDPR-compliant. Data can only be collected and processed for “specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes”. The Art 89 privilege for research purposes also imposes conditions. There is a pretty big carveout in these GDPR requirements for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, and statistical purposes. Specific rules for this exemption are given in Art 89 GDPR. The main value of this exemption is that Art 89 research purposes are always considered compatible with the purpose for which the data was originally collected (cf Art 5(1)(b)), though this might not cover data that was collected under the legal basis of consent (cf Art 6(4)). Other GDPR rules stay intact, and Art 89(1) imposes extra steps to consider: Special attention MUST be given to the data minimisation principle. If the research purpose can be achieved without identifiable data, the data MUST be anonymized. If the research purpose can be achieved with pseudonymized data, pseudonymization MUST be used. Appropriate safeguards MUST be implemented (though this just re-iterates the general requirement in Art 24). In some cases, the research purpose stands in conflict with data subject rights like the right to be informed or the right to object. If so, EU or member state law can provide exemptions from the data subject rights, but can also impose further conditions or safeguards. It is not possible to rely on the Art 89 exception without taking member state law into account. Art 89 does not modify necessity-based retention. Now on to the main question: how long can the personal data be kept for research purposes? While Art 89 research purposes allow us to extend the retention period because we have a new and compatible purpose of processing, it does not affect the general principle that data may only be kept as long as necessary for that purpose. In a scientific context, it would be common to preserve many data sets indefinitely for the purpose of enabling reproducibility of the scientific findings. A privately-run genealogy service might not benefit from Art 89. This “research” angle doesn't seem to be a good fit for a genealogy site. Such a site would typically not be collecting personal data for specific research purposes. At best, it would be operating as an archive of personal data which can be mined by future generations of researchers. But the GDPR specifically only considers archiving purposes in the public interest, which might not cover privately run archives. Archives rely on specific privileges in national laws, and severely restrict access to the information. For example, I'm leafing through the law on public archives in a German state. It forbids access for 10–100 years, depending on the date of death of the data subject and on the age of the documents. This leads me to believe that a privately run genealogy site cannot reasonably rely on the Art 89 exemption, and must instead rely on an ordinary processing purpose + corresponding Art 6 legal basis. This doesn't directly prevent indefinite storage, but means that it will be easy for a data subject to invoke their right to erasure. It is not quite enough to say “we will keep the data indefinitely”, it is also necessary to have a clear purpose for this retention.
Art. 17 GDPR, Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) requires “erasure of personal data concerning him or her”. That’s all personal data. However, this only applies when this article applies. Section 1 details when this is and sections 2 and 3 detail limitations and exceptions to the right of erasure. For example, you would be allowed to keep financial records that you're legally obligated to keep. So, if they have the right, you have to delete all their personal data that is not exempted. Aggregate statistics and other anonymous data in the sense of Recital 26 are not personal data and don't have to be deleted. Whether the kinds of data you have mentioned would be sufficiently anonymous would require further analysis.
As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself.
Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area.
Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company.
Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient.
are there any GDPR considerations that must be in place when an EU company stores personal information from citizens outside of the EU? Absolutely. The territorial scope of the GDPR is specified at Article 3: Article 3 Territorial scope This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law. As specified in point 1, the regulation applies to controllers and processors located in the EU. There is no exemption of personal data based on the data subject's nationality or location. In fact, GDPR Recitals 2 and 14 explicitly mention that nationality or residence shall not be a factor: The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence, in relation to the processing of their personal data. […]
There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access.
How to satisfy GDPR's consent requirement for IP logging? Countless websites are served by webserver software (Apache, nginx, etc.) which logs the source IP address of every web page visit. The GDPR considers an IP address "personal data" that is subject to the GDPR. The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). How is a website owner supposed to acquire consent by way of the website if the very act of visiting the website page to acquire consent records the "personal data" about which consent is being granted? Obviously, the option is available to website owners to configure their webservers not to log IP addresses, but that has security implications. Do these security concerns suffice to absolve a website owner from requiring consent to log IP addresses? Is a prominent notice (on every page, until dismissed) sufficient? How is the GDPR supposed to be interpreted with respect to the extremely common and prevalant practice of IP address logging? (I have read Would GDPR affect my own personal website? and the answers at the time of this writing are not sufficiently satisfactory. Article 6, paragraph 1 does not make the question of automatic IP address logging without explicit consent clearly acceptable or not. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN )
In the question, you write: The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). No, it does not. To quote Miss Infogeek: GDPR DOES NOT MAKE CONSENT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ALL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA. Consent (Article 6 (1)a) is indeed one of conditions that can be used to comply with the GDPR requirement that processing must be lawful, but it is not the only condition available to the controller to ensure lawful processing – there are alternatives (before the list of conditions it says that "at least one of the following" must be satisfied). All the conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. One of alternatives are Article 6 (1)f. It says says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) As noted in the question, logging IP addresses for the purpose of security is an extremely widespread practice. It is a legitimate interest to comply with standard security practices. It is the default, and most (all?) web-sites do this. I.e. it is legal to do this without consent (if this is not the case, I am pretty sure the outcry had been heard all over the Internet by now).
You won't be able to get around self-doxxing yourself. § 5 Abs 1 TMG requires tele-media service providers like you to list den Namen und die Anschrift, unter der sie niedergelassen sind the name and the address where they reside or are established Similarly, Art 13(1) GDPR requires you to provide the identity and the contact details of the controller In a German context, it is generally accepted that both of these involve a ladungsfähige Anschrift, i.e. a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit (not a post box). These requirements exist for both natural persons and legal entities, and for both businesses and non-commercial activities. The TMG Impressumspflicht talks about “geschäftsmäßige, in der Regel gegen Entgelt angebotene Telemedien” but in practice this only requires that the service could be paid (not that you're actually making any money), and that the service is offered routinely/business-like (not necessarily commercially). It does not matter where your service is hosted as long as you live in Germany. The TMG and GDPR might not apply if the forum is run purely privately, e.g. if it is only made available to a few close friends or family members.
You are missing something. The fact that you have a tick box and its state is saved in the database is enough. The burden of proof is only "on a balance of probabilities", so someone arguing that they didn't consent would have to demonstrate that you falsified the database entry somehow. In terms of GDPR requirements in general you don't need a greater level of proof than this, the key thing is that you have a robust system in place to obtain proof (such as not allowing data into the database without a tick in the box).
GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Wrong. User consent is one of the ways that justify storing personal information, but there are others. You may check art.6 to see the several reasons that allow to store personal information. In this case, it seems reasonable to justify it under the paragraph f (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of course, that means that the data has to be used for this purpose. Avoiding spammers and other banned users would be such a purpose, but you should ensure that you do not send those e-mail address commercial information or even a Christmas greeting. In any case, be careful with anything you store. If along with the e-mail you stored more info, this could be interpreted as excessive and beyond the scope of paragraph f. For example, imagine storing "User wrote nazi statements" explaining why the e-mail is banned; EU laws are very restrictive about storing information about political or religious beliefs.
GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.
I think you could count decline-events, but not track users who declined tracking. But I also think such information isn't useful for demonstrating compliance. Therefore, you should avoid storing extra data about people who do not give consent. When consent is required for analytics. The GDPR provides a general framework for processing personal data. The ePrivacy Directive (ePD) overrides this general framework when it comes to cookies and similar technologies related to accessing information on the end user's device. Per ePD, such access is only allowed when it is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by a user, otherwise consent is required. Thus, analytics cookies require consent and setting an analytics-declined cookie is strictly necessary. But this consent requirement relates specifically to storage cookies, not to collecting analytics data. Thus, you might have a legitimate interest in collecting data with cookie-less analytics, which could involve counting cookie-consent decline events. Unfortunately, most analytics systems collect very broad categories of data and cannot be limited to a necessary subset. Even such limited analytics (unless they are truly strictly necessary for operating the site) should support an opt-out. I don't think you could legitimately gather analytics about such opt-out events. GDPR audits. Your motivation for collecting statistics about consent-decline events is to be prepared for a GDPR audit. This is probably not necessary, but it depends. It might be useful to distinguish between internal/voluntary audits and data protection audits by the supervisory authority. You might voluntarily review your compliance to convince stakeholders that you're compliant, and such voluntary audits might be part of the appropriate technical and organizational measures a data controller has implemented in accordance with Art 24, Art 25, and Art 32 GDPR. You should collect any statistics you need for this purpose, e.g. to ensure that the opt-in rate looks realistic. But since you can set the parameters of this audit, it makes no sense to collect data “just in case”. Under Art 58(1), your supervisory authority can audit your data processing and can compel you to provide any information it requires. This is similar to how a tax authority can compel you to produce business records for auditing purposes. This is closely related with your general obligation to be able to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR (Art 5(2)). More specifically, the controller is required per Art 7(1) to be able to demonstrate that the data subjects have given valid consent, but does not prescribe how to demonstrate this. How to demonstrate that valid consent was given. For demonstrating that consent was given, there are no clear best practices. However, this topic is briefly discussed in EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent. They recommend that you retain records about the following: that a data subject in a given case has consented how consent was obtained when consent was obtained information provided to data subject at the time that the controller's workflow meets all relevant criteria for valid consent Some of these are process-level concerns about how you ask for consent. For example, you might record video walkthroughs of your consent management solution to demonstrate how consent can be declined, given, and revoked. You should definitely keep a version history of the text and information that was displayed to users when they were asked for consent. I think you should also be able to explain in your front-end code how the result from your consent management solution is used to load relevant features (and that they aren't loaded before consent is given). If a feature or service is made conditional on consent, it might be good to have a short written analysis that consent is still freely given under the requirements of Art 7(4). But other aspects relate to the individual data subject and the individual consent-giving event. Some consent management solutions send a small record about the consent to a backend server where it is stored with a timestamp, so that it can be later traced that and when consent was given. I've also seen consent management tools that show a timeline of events to the user (when consent was requested, and when consent for which purpose was given and revoked). I think such detailed insight into an pseudonymous individual's consent status is a very powerful way to demonstrate compliance. What is not relevant here is information about data subjects who declined consent in the first place. Consent means opt-in. The default is that no consent is given. To demonstrate that consent was obtained in a valid manner, information about data subjects who didn't consent isn't necessary or useful. So I expect that you would be fine in an audit without collecting such data. In fact, the lack of a clear purpose and necessity for collecting this data could be argued to be without legal basis and violate the GDPR's data minimization principle. And even when recording information about those data subjects who did consent, the EDPB guidelines remind us that this “should not in itself lead to excessive amounts of additional data processing”.
Under GDPR Article 6 section 1(f), a lawful basis for processing is: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. It seems that informing a data subject of the availability of a possibly better-focused related site would be a "legitimate interest", and merely doing a broad geo-locate on the IP does not seem to impact the "interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" so it would seem this could be done without specific consent in advance. I don't know of any legal case on this specific point, however.
It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest.
Why are drug using celebrities free? I never understood how come celebrities, such as Charlie Sheen, are able to roam free while they're known for using illegal drugs. Can anyone explain this to me? I can provide many more examples if required.
In the US, people are not put in jail because they are "known for" committing a crime. Several things must happen, and at each stage there are ways for the process to be halted. Law enforcement must gather evidence that a crime has been committed by a particular person. There ids no duty to investigate every possible crime, so this will depend on the policy of the particular LE organization, and what evidence any investigation finds. If no investigation is made, no evidence will be found. A prosecutor (state or Federal) must decide to bring charges. There is no duty for a prosecutor to bring charges in every case where evidence is brought forward by law enforcement. A prosecutor is supposed to devote the limited resources of his or her office where it seems likely to do the most public good. Cases which probably cannot be won should not be brought. Moreover, most prosecutors are reluctant to bring cases which seem likely to do them political harm. The Prosecutor must formally bring the defendant(s) before a court to hear and respond to the charges (arraignment). At this stage the judge can dismiss the charges, but that almost never happens. The prosecutor must establish that there is probable cause to bring a case to trial. This can be done via a grand jury proceeding resulting in an indictment, an "information", a probable cause hearing, or a preliminary hearing, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of crime. For minor crimes, the prosecutor's sworn statement may be enough. There must be a trial, before a judge or a jury. If the defendant is found guilty, s/he will be sentenced under the appropriate law, which may include jail or prison time. There are various other stages to the process, but those are the major go/no-go steps in a US criminal proceeding. So it is possible in any given case that law enforcement has not tried to find evidence, or has tried but failed, or that a prosecutor has chosen not to bring charges. As to why any of that might have happened, it depends on the particular situation and its circumstances. There are always costs of time, effort, and money to pursue any particular case. If cops are looking for evidence of a celebrity's drug use, they are not looking for evidence in an embezzlement or murder case. If an assistant prosecutor is tying such a case, s/he is not trying some other case. Officials have wide discretion in how to allocate resources in such matters.
Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to.
The CDC does not authorize shots or vaccine distribution. The FDA authorizes vaccine distribution, or distribution of medicines in general. A medicine is authorized for use in a certain way, which is an "instruction" directed at the medical professional. So-called "off-label" use is discussed by the FDA here. Such use if legal, it simply stretches the limits of what the FDA was allowed to approve (e.g. was found to be safe and effective for X, was not similarly tested for Y). Patients are free to take whatever medicines they want if they can find them, and if they are not on the Controlled Substances list. Hence it's legal to take DMSO, but it's not legal to peddle it as a cancer cure. The prescription regime for covid vaccinations seems to be somewhat relaxed, in that it is likely that many people get a vaccine without a (meaningful) doctor's exam, instead, you show up and get the shot. This is normal with flu shots. The upcoming 3rd shot approval is addressed to doctors, so they can then recommend third shots.
It is a good idea for a story: that’s why it’s a trope It features (with drugs instead of guns) as the core plot point of 2019’s Knives Out. Shooting someone with a BB gun is problematic because it’s hard to see what legal justification there could be for that type of assault. However, if we instead thing of paint ball guns, C is a murderer and A & B have committed no crime. Real life examples: While performing a suicide scene in a production of Mary Stuart by Friedrich Schiller in Vienna, actor Daniel Hoevels accidentally slit his own neck, as the theatre company's order for the originally sharp knife to be dulled for the stage was overlooked; a police investigation never determined who was responsible, or whether it was due to negligence or a deliberate attempt to kill or injure him. The wound was almost fatal, but Hoevels quickly returned to the stage after emergency treatment in the hospital. Never treat a blank in a gun as harmless. They can maim or kill you. Anyone who says otherwise is not your friend. Read the article here on Gun Safety for more details. There have even been two sad cases listed in Fatal Method Acting: Brandon Lee, accidentally killed during The Crow because the crew left a cartridge in the barrel before loading the blanks, which then hit his spine; and actor Jon-Erik Hexum, who in-between takes of the show Cover-Up, goofed around with a gun and by firing it into the side of his head, had a blank cause enough trauma to shatter a quarter-sized piece of his skull and propel the pieces into his brain. More than 20 illusionists have been killed performing the 'bullet catch' trick. It is generally considered the most dangerous magic trick as so many things can go wrong. Some of those killed were murdered when someone (often their partner/assistant) substituted a live round for the blank or—in earlier days, when single-shot black powder guns were used—placed the ball back in the barrel after it had been removed.
"Does the needlessly obnoxious and antisocial manner in which they're behaving and clearly drugged intoxication create any kind of charge like disturbing the peace or something like that?" Probably. But you don't want to take the law into your own hands. Call the police and have them make the judgement. There is a lot of discretion involved; some police officers may simply tell the preacher to move on; others may detain him on public intoxication or being a nuisance, according to local and UK laws, as well as check for permits and licenses for street/public performances. Many people gathered around the busker to express support and appreciation for him as well as disgust toward the preachers unnecessary disrespect. That's well within rights, as long as the behavior doesn't degrade into the same type(s) that the preacher is exhibiting and possibly be a nuisance or worse (i.s., assault) as per the law.
TV shows like COPS will have the arrestees/suspects/bystanders/victims sign a waiver to appear on the show, along with anybody else that they film in the process, otherwise the faces will be blurred, or removed from the show entirely. Additionally you can tell the camera crews that they are not allowed in your home. If they do enter your home without permission, you can sue them for trespassing. It should be noted that those shows are often edited for drama, and as such seem much more dramatic than it is. The film crews may spend weeks or more (400 hours of video) just to get enough "good stuff" for a 22 minute episode, and then make it look like it all happens over the course of an evening. As for the moral/social acceptance of a lack of privacy, that question really isn't on-topic here. This should be the same for any other "COPS-like" TV/youtube show, but there are some shows out there that don't take the rules as seriously as others. Those usually operate under the "who we are filming probably can't afford a lawyer" mentality so they keep going until they get sued.
I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.
Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors.
Not depositing cash from business transactions Is it legal, in the U.S., to not deposit cash proceeding from business transactions, such as real estate rentals or restaurants, so long as those monies are ultimately declared as income to the IRS, although there is no paper trail verifying it from a third party (a bank)? In other words, are there laws that says cash proceeds, or a percentage thereof, must be deposited in a bank account to be used as official record for fiscal purposes?
No, it is not illegal There is no law that says a business must have a bank account, let alone that they must make deposits to it.
You have the legal (contractual) obligation to pay the amount that you owe for your meal. The restaurant can refuse to accept a particular kind of payment, such as check, cash, credit cards (generally or brand-specific), various cash-transfer programs, foreign currency, bitcoin or ridiculous numbers of pennies. There is no requirement that they do today what they did yesterday. If you have in your possession only a Discover card, and if they are unwilling to accept service barter as payment (washing dishes is classical), then you would have a debt to the restaurant which you must pay in a reasonable time, using an acceptable medium (such as cash, unless they don't accept cash). They cannot make it impossible or highly burdensome for you to discharge your obligation (e.g. they cannot demand Krugerrands or Mongolian ᠲᠥᠭᠦᠷᠢᠭ as the alternative payment, unless you are in Mongolia). You were given advance notice of this possibility of non-acceptance, yet you willfully proffered a card that you knew that they were not likely to accept a second time. Your hands were not clean, and if this had gone to court, you could not expect mercy from the court on the grounds that you were surprised that they didn't accept your card.
There is nothing wrong with paying in cash; there is something wrong about hiding a transaction that relates to a taxable event. Cash makes that easier.
Don't do it. So clearly tax fraud is bad and the state can prosecute this when tipped off. Alice is also clearly allowed to report the possible tax fraud to authorities and to serve as a witness if necessary. The problem is that Alice can expose herself to various liabilities, and could be sued by Bob or by the state. On what grounds did Alice snoop around in Bob's room? Even if they are roommates, Alice might not have a right to enter the room. Even if she has grounds to enter the room, she might not have permission to trawl through Bob's private stuff. A glance at a computer screen is also quite unlikely to show evidence of tax fraud, as even selling lots of stuff does not imply running a business.1 On what grounds can Alice collect and share personal data with authorities? There is no constitutional right for snooping and snitching.2 Alice must instead identify a legal basis for sharing such screenshots or pictures with third parties. Data protection law such as the GDPR does recognize that there might be a legitimate interest, but Alice is unlikely to have such a legitimate interest unless she is personally affected by Bob breaking the law. For example, some people have been sued for overly enthusiastic reports of parking violations. Footnotes: People can sell goods e.g. on eBay without running a business that would have to be registered with the tax office. A business in this context is any regular business-like for-profit activity. Thus, a registration might not be necessary for occasional activity, or if the activity isn't for profit. For example, a person selling their old stuff for less than they bought it for is not acting with a profit motive. Even if there is occasional profit, this can be a privates Veräußerungsgeschäft (private sale). Whether such a sale is taxable depends on the duration between acquisition and sale. If it is taxable, it has to be reported as part of income tax filings. Generally, the profit is free from income tax after one year. VAT is a different matter. Private sales don't involve VAT. When a sole proprietor registers a business, they can elect to ignore VAT until they reach certain turnover or profit limits (Kleinunternehmerregelung). This kind of tax fraud is typically not a crime, and more of an administrative offence. Thus, intrusive investigations are not proportional – and even then, they would be up to the state, not to individuals. It is worth noting that Germany has extremely poor whistleblower protections and has failed to implement relevant EU laws.
@Rick aptly answers your first question (and I totally agree with his answer including his conclusion that the cited provisions apply to single member LLCs). So, I'll touch on issues associated with your second one. Would there be anything legally wrong with my intentionally wasting the company's money or doing something similarly pointless and harmful to the business, considering I'm the only actual person (as in human, not legal person) who is harmed in any way? If the way you use the money wastefully is considered by a court to be a de facto distribution by the LLC to you, its sole member, and this renders it insolvent (as defined in ORS 63.229 (Limitations on distributions), you could have personal liability for the distribution to the company. See ORS 53.235. Creditors of the company could then garnish that obligation to collect their debts owed to the company from you (a garnishment is technically a right to obtain money or property from someone who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, usually a bank or employer, but not always as in this case). Intentionally wasting the company's money would probably constitute a "fraudulent transfer" on the part of the LLC which could expose you to liability to third-party creditors if those actions left the company unable to pay its debts as they came due, or with assets with a fair market value that was lower than the fair market value of its current and currently anticipated liabilities. This parallel liability would arise under the Oregon Fraudulent Transfers Act and related provisions of Oregon law found at ORS 95.200 to 95.310. If you were anticipating or in the process of divorcing, it could constitute economic waste that could be held against you (treating the wasted assets as if they still existed and were allocated to your in a property division). Likewise, if the waste reduced your income for child support purposes, a court would seriously consider imputing the income you could have had if you had not acting in that matter to the income you actually had, in order to calculate your child support obligation. And, you might be disallowed a deduction for the waste of the company's money, rather than having it treated as an expense, which could increase your income tax and self-employment tax liability. But, to the extent that you are the sole owner of the company, no creditor, spouse or child has rights impaired by your actions, and you don't claim the wasted assets as income tax deductions, there would be no one with standing to complain about your conduct in court.
When the buyer hears "to avoid sales tax" and hears the seller describing as a gift something that s/he knows was nothing of the sort, a reasonable buyer would know that this was at best suspicious, and would find out if this was legal. But assuming that the buyer accepted the seller's suggestion ignorantly and in good faith, the buyer can file a report of the transaction and pay any tax that should have been paid. The exact way of doing this will vary based on the laws of the buyer's jurisdiction (state-level if in the US) which is not given in the question. Such a report and payment might not prevent the local tax authorities from assessing an additional penalty. Criminal charges seem unlikely, but would be possible. If the seller was a used car dealer, the authorities might want the buyer to testify against the seller. They buyer might be wise to consult a lawyer with expertise in sales tax issues in the buyer's jurisdiction. Such a lawyer could advise on exactly what the buyer's legal obligation was, and how to avoid or minimize penalties or other consequences.
"...the listing ad of property is not a property of website." Why do you think that? Just because a website exists does not mean you can legally scrape it. Read the Terms of Service of the site; there is a good chance the TOS forbids scraping or copying of any part of the website in any manner, including scraping. If the property listings are from a third party service that provides real estate listings to websites, then those property listings are licensed to that website, and by scraping them you will likely be violating the TOSs of those two services. By illegally scraping the content of a website, you are opening yourself up to being involved in copyright infringement and/or being liable to be the subject of a civil lawsuit.
Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.
Can a person be extradited to another country even if the charges levied against that person were proven to be false in Canada? Meng is not being tried in the Canadian court. Authorities there are holding hearings to determine whether the US extradition request can proceed. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3107883/canada-court-investigates-pro-china-youtubers-video-about-meng Can a person be extradited to another country even if the charges levied against that person were proven to be false in Canada? I was reading about this and read that the document provided to get Meng extradited was fabricated and was missing a few pages that disproved the whole case against Meng? Provided that an extradition hearing is not a trial, can a person still be extradited even if the legal case against her is flimsy or if she can be proven to be innocent beyond a reasonable doubt under the Canadian legal system?
Under Canada's Extradition Act, extradition requires an agreement (which exists between Canada and the US), and the alleged act would be a crime in Canada. Canada does not criminally prosecute the defendant, so this is largely procedural, verifying that the request is legally stated and so on. However, they will also have a hearing on the sufficiency of the evidence to go to trial (by Canadian standards). The ultimate truth or falsity of the criminal allegations will only be determined in the US court system.
Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.
Your question is essentially this: consider a defamation lawsuit in which A alleges that B falsely stated that A did X (and it is not contested that B made the statement) also consider that B has done X in the past is it of any relevance to A's defamation suit that B has done X in the past canada Evidence must be relevant to a live, material issue In order for evidence to be admissible it must be "relevant to a live, material issue in the case" (this is from a dissent, but there is no disagreement about this point). Stage 1: Did B make a defamatory statement about A that was published - no relevance to this issue Defamation is prima facie proven if B's statement was published and if it tended to lower the reputation of A. The fact that B has done X in the past is irrelevant to this aspect of the analysis, especially when the defendant is not alleging that they did not say "A did X." Stage 2: Defences - there is a very narrow path for relevance on this issue Once defamation is prima facie proven, the burden flips to the defendant to establish a defence. Of all the possible defences, the only one in which I could see B having done X in the past being relevant is the defence of fair comment: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any [person] honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was [subjectively] actuated by express malice. The fact the B has done X in the past could be relevant to this defence if B were to use that familiarity with the activity X as part of the commentary on why they believe that A has done X. It could also be relevant (not on its own, but along with much more context) for an allegation of malice on B's part. Conclusion: Evidence that B did X in the past would likely not be relevant I see it very unlikely that B having done X in the past would be relevant. It would likely be treated as a collateral issue, unless B's credibility somehow became absolutely central to the litigation and if the judge was convinced that such acts relate to credibility. On the facts as described, and even for a fair comment defence, I don't see that being the case.
You're going to an administrative hearing overseen by an "Impartial Hearing Officer" (IHO). Your goal should be to present your case in as clear, concise, and compelling a manner as possible. If there are guidelines for the hearing then abide by those. Ideally, the IHO will be a real lawyer or judge, in which case they will likely be concerned with giving everyone a chance to advance their position and then efficiently achieving a resolution of the issue that appears most impartial and is least upsetting to everyone involved. Often, however, you will find the IHO is a bureaucrat who enjoys making up and enforcing procedural rules. In which case all you can do is ask, "What are the rules?" and do your best to follow them (or just start working on your appeal now). For example, if the IHO wants to make the hearing "court-like," then you could read your state's Code of Civil Procedure. But if you bring a copy and when the IHO says X point out the CCP says Y, then all you will have accomplished is to irritate the IHO: He'll either grudgingly allow Y, or declare that in his hearing it's X. That will not help you achieve your goal. Re-reading your question: It sounds like you're trying to make up rules for yourself. Remember that you are not a lawyer, and the hearing is not a court of law. If you assert evidence it should be accepted based on what a "reasonable person" would believe. You don't have to establish a forensic chain of custody. So tell your story, and if there's an email that documents it more compellingly – e.g., because you're recounting events from two years ago – then note that you're reading what you wrote two years ago as opposed to stating what you remember now, because that bolsters the credibility of your testimony. If there's evidence in an Email from B, and A knows something about those matters, you should be allowed to ask A about the substance informed by the Email, even if A can't address the writing or sending of that particular message. (But remember: Never ask a hostile party a question if you don't already know what their answer should be!) If you really want to prepare, find someone to play devil's advocate, and present your case to them. That's a good way to find and correct things that hurt or distract from your case.
It depends on the law in country B Some countries allow extradition of their citizens and some don’t.
Extradition is a special procedure that is tightly governed by statute - currently the Extradition Act 2003. That Act provides that, for extradition from England (as opposed to Scotland, etc.) to the United States (an example of a Category 2 Territory), an initial hearing is to take place before "the appropriate judge". This is, per s.139(1)(a), a designated "District Judge (Magistrates' Courts)". A DJMC sits in a magistrates' court, and is a professional judge as opposed to a layperson like an ordinary Justice of the Peace. The hearing is meant to resemble summary proceedings in the magistrates' court, but it has its own special rules. Those include a special appeals procedure which is different from the ordinary way that criminal cases can be appealed. Some things that could normally happen in a magistrates' court cannot happen here, such as varying an order at a later date (see R (Mann) v Westminster Magistrates Court [2010] EWHC 48 (Admin)). The way that this is phrased means that the jurisdiction is not conferred on the magistrates' court (which happens to have a DJ sitting in it), but on the DJMC themselves. The Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, Rule 17.2(a) are careful to say that when they say "magistrates' court" in this context, they are talking about the court that the judge has convened for the purposes of the Extradition Act. These rules are only applicable because the Act specifically provides for them in its s.210; they don't come in automatically as they would for criminal proceedings in a magistrates' court, because this is a special process with its own law, as expounded in the Explanatory Notes to the rules. In the Assange case, the DJMC was Vanessa Baraitser, including at Woolwich and the Old Bailey. The proceedings were under the Extradition Act as explained above. The court chose to sit in various buildings, other than Westminster Magistrates Court, for practical reasons due to the high level of public interest in the case, and related security considerations. The hearing was booked to last four weeks, which is very unusually long. Proceedings were live-streamed to other court buildings to allow members of the public and media to follow along. All of that does not mean that the proceedings were in a Crown Court or County Court. They were in buildings used by those courts, but took place before the designated DJMC according to the special procedure of the Extradition Act. That procedure, among other things, means that the extradition hearing cannot take place as a hearing of some other court, and there is no jury no matter how much the defendant wants one.
This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen*. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. *More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.
The main problem is that there is no court with authority to hear this case outside of China. It may be futile to sue in US courts, since China will not enforce US judgments. You can sue a Chinese company in Chinese court, under their Civil Procedure Law, but this pertains to contract breach. The question is whether there is any law under which the government of China can be sued for negligence – it is unlikely that that is possible (perhaps there is an expert in Chinese law here who can address that issue). This lawsuit is filed in US courts. It is based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Supposing that this lawsuit is successful in US courts, then the question is what enforcement actions are possible. Since the defendants are various governments and government agencies in China, execution of the judgment would have to be against those defendants – you can't seize the assets of every person with some connection to China. But given the nature of the Chinese government, it is possible that US courts could find that the assets of Chinese companies are effectively government assets. The short answer is, in fact a lawsuit has been filed, and I expect more. I also don't expect them to succeed in the long run.
When is a name other than a legal name considered "inaccurate information" for a Terms of Service? Some sites may ask for a first and last name or other personal information. Several sites have a condition in their Terms of Service that providing inaccurate information upon registration is not permitted. Does the name have to match a legal or commonly used name to be considered accurate, or only if the ToS states it directly? For example, if my legal name was John Doe, could I use nicknames (Johnny or Jack Doe) or a random name (Cool Man or James Smith, for instance)? A good example of this is Wix's Terms, which say: You must provide accurate and complete information when registering your User Account and using the Wix Services, to which you are the sole and exclusive rights holder. We strongly encourage you to provide your own (or your company’s) contact and billing details, including your valid e-mail address, as we may use it to identify and determine the actual and true owner of the User Account and/or User Content (as defined below) submitted to us. Or Weebly's, which say: In consideration of use of the Service, you agree to maintain and update true, accurate, current and complete Registration Data. If you provide any information that is untrue, inaccurate, not current or incomplete, or if Weebly has reasonable grounds to suspect that such information is untrue, inaccurate, not current or incomplete, we may suspend or terminate your account and refuse any and all current or future use of the Service or any portion thereof.
Depending on the circumstances, it may be irrelevant whether or not the the terms of service contain an express clause dealing with inaccurate information. For example, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, under section 2(1) of the Fraud Act 2006, if you dishonestly make a representation which is untrue or misleading with the intention to make a gain or cause someone a loss you will commit the offence of fraud. This could arise for example if you give a false name intending to obstruct the other party from being able to pursue you for any breach of your contractual obligations (e.g. non-payment for services). As for whether or not you would breach any clause in the contract requiring you to provide accurate information, it's very hard to say without seeing the exact wording and context of the clause.
Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.
When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.
We could start with what the statutes say (HSC 102425) (a) The certificate of live birth for a live birth occurring on or after January 1, 2016, shall contain those items necessary to establish the fact of the birth and shall contain only the following information; (1) Full name and sex of the child. It says nothing about the form of that name. Therefore, any prohibition of the letter Æ (or æ) etc. would have to come from the administrative interpretation of California Department of Public Health, Vital Records. There is a long handbook, which on p. 112 states the rule regarding child names. The rules note that The form must be completed using the 26 alphabetical characters of the English language with appropriate punctuation, if necessary. No pictographs (☺), ideograms (⇑), diacritical marks (è, ñ, ē, ç), or extraneous entries are allowed. So the short answer is, unless you feel like making a court case out of the matter and you have a lot of money, this name will not be allowed. The rule might be challenged in court as exceeding statutory authority, and might well be deemed to discriminate w.r.t. race and national origin. The rule could be defended on grounds of necessity, if we presume that the department is incapable of recording information other than the 26 letters and "appropriate punctuation" (undefined, presumably only apostrophe). It's not that in principle Unicode doesn't exist, it's that their system may not be capable of dealing with it (numerous problems would arise from the non-unique mapping from visual representation to Unicode number). There does not seem to be a court ruling on the matter.
There are several things going on with Akinator and their use of trademarked names and characters. If you look at akinator.com Legal Notices it says: 2 – Copyright – Reproduction rights All the content of this site falls under French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of this website, in any form or by any means is strictly prohibited without prior authorisation of the publications director. All products and trademarks mentioned are property of their respective owners. (emphasis mine) The fact that they mention that all trademarks belong to their respective owners is good, but it's a formality. What it appears the site really relies on for use of trademarked characters is what's called Nominative Use, which is a type of "trademark fair use." The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use Akinator has to use the names and trademarks to identify those names and trademarks. Akinator could possibly be sued to establish their type of fair use is not valid in their case, but it's probably not worth it for the companies to pursue. And, most companies would rather people use and see their trademarks in a marketing and money-making fair use sense rather than sue to stop their use. See In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement? for a full description of Fair Use. Now, when you get to the "answer" part of the game, you will see a "copyright" link. Part of that resulting page says Displayed pictures are accessible from the web. It is Elokence's policy to respond to notices of alleged copyright infringement that comply with applicable international intellectual property law and make the necessary changes. In respect of Elokence's Intellectual Property Policy, Elokence operates a complaints procedure accessible via the form below. So the company has given itself a further bit of protection by only using images on the web they can link to (at least in the web browser game; I don't know about the App), so that means the image is already "out there", uploaded by someone else, and Akinator can claim they didn't upload it. And, further, there is a contact form for trademark holders to send DMCA takedown notices for their work. It's a belt and suspenders approach to the use of trademarks in their game.
Of course it's legal. Hyperlinking to an unaffiliated website in no way "determine[s] the means and processing of data." The person who makes these determinations is the person running the website. If I link to Microsoft's website, that doesn't give me any control over how Microsoft processes data on the website.
This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code.
The question reads: I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Unfortunately for this view, the law normally sees an NDA as a private contract, except when it is alleged that it violates public policy. If an NDA explicitly or implicitly includes itself in the list of things not to be disclosed, then posting it would be a violation of the contract. In such a case the party posting the agreement would be subject to whatever consequence the agreement specifies for violation, unless that person had a valid defense. The operator of a web site where the document might be posted would not normally ne a party to the agreement, and so would not be liable for hosting it, unless some other limitation applies, beyond the NDA itself. An NDA can indeed be a significant limitation on the signer's freedom to discuss certain topics, and a person would be wise to consider it in detail, and perhaps consult a lawyer, before signing one. But that does not mean that the person should post or distribute it publicly, nor that the person is automatically entitled to consult NDAs that others have signed. There are sufficient sample NDA forms available that a person can compare an offered NDA with other possibilities, and get an idea if an offered NDA goes beyond the usual terms.
What happens to the debt owed due to taxes when living abroad if you renounce your American citizenship? What happens to the debt owed due to taxes when living abroad if you renounce your American citizenship? Does the debt get cancelled or not? I heard that U.S. citizens living abroad don't have to pay any federal or state income tax on the first $105,000 you make. There’s a special tax law that allows for US citizens who are working abroad to have their tax exempt as long as they pass the physical presence test. Let's assume that the person went above the limit by $1,000 before renouncing his citizenship, does he still owe the government $1,000?
Yes, of course you still owe it. There's no logical reason why ceasing to be a citizen should relieve you of existing obligations. The State Department mentions this explicitly Persons who wish to renounce U.S. citizenship should be aware of the fact that renunciation of U.S. citizenship may have no effect on their U.S. tax or military service obligations (contact the Internal Revenue Service or U.S. Selective Service for more information). In addition, the act of renouncing U.S. citizenship does not allow persons to avoid possible prosecution for crimes which they may have committed or may commit in the future which violate United States law, or escape the repayment of financial obligations, including child support payments, previously incurred in the United States or incurred as United States citizens abroad. I think the "may" is just to cover their butts - I can't find any indication of any provision that would forgive tax debts when you renounce. Indeed, renouncing your citizenship may cause you to owe more tax, because of the expatriation tax. Basically, all your unrealized capital gains are treated as if they were realized and taxed on the day before your expatriation, and you owe capital gains tax on them.
Paying taxes with cryptocurrency is a potentially taxable event under federal tax law. It is equivalent for federal income tax purposes, for example, to paying taxes in kind with IBM stock. See, e.g., this IRS FAQ. You can owe capital gains taxes on involuntary transfers. For example, if you own a rental property and don't pay property taxes and it is sold at a tax sale, you owe capital gains taxes and depreciation recapture taxes on the amount realized in the tax sale if it exceeds your basis in the rental property (which it usually would since third-parties bid at tax sales).
Don’t ignore the debt collects In most jurisdictions, your failure to pay can and will be recorded on your credit history. This may affect your ability to obtain finance or the rate you pay for it. For credit reporting, there is no need for the creditor to prove the debt before doing this. For example. In general, you are not legally allowed to default on a contractual obligation (i.e. not pay the bill) even if the other party has defaulted on theirs (i.e. failed to complete the work). It is not clear that you have explained to the contractor that you are withholding the remaining payment until they have fixed the alleged defects or if you have just not paid the money. When you have a contract dispute you need to be clear and take active steps to resolve it. Perhaps head office thinks all these items have been resolved. Perhaps you think they are defects or omissions but they are actually within normal tolerances or are exactly what you contracted for. Unless you talk to them, you can’t resolve it. When you have set out the disputed items, given them a time to fix them, told them you will pay when they are fixed, and possibly set out an alternative method of resolution (like you accepting the defects for a 5% discount) then you have a bona fide dispute. At that point you can tell the debt collector this and they must stop pressing you and remove your name from the credit reports.
Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages.
There might be some relevant state law. Michigan has a Social Security Number Privacy Act, which limits use of SS numbers, such as publically displaying an amount of a number, use it as an account number, require it to be transmitted insecurely over the internet, mail it etc. However, it is allowed under 3(a) to mail a number in a document if the purpose is to identify an individual, especially 3(a)(iv), to Lawfully pursue or enforce a person's legal rights, including, but not limited to, an audit, collection, investigation, or transfer of a tax, employee benefit, debt, claim, receivable, or account or an interest in a receivable or account. It would depends on your state, but it is highly likely that debt collection is an allowed purpose (even if it not a real debt, just a good-faith mistake). This gives a brief overview of state laws.
You have the legal (contractual) obligation to pay the amount that you owe for your meal. The restaurant can refuse to accept a particular kind of payment, such as check, cash, credit cards (generally or brand-specific), various cash-transfer programs, foreign currency, bitcoin or ridiculous numbers of pennies. There is no requirement that they do today what they did yesterday. If you have in your possession only a Discover card, and if they are unwilling to accept service barter as payment (washing dishes is classical), then you would have a debt to the restaurant which you must pay in a reasonable time, using an acceptable medium (such as cash, unless they don't accept cash). They cannot make it impossible or highly burdensome for you to discharge your obligation (e.g. they cannot demand Krugerrands or Mongolian ᠲᠥᠭᠦᠷᠢᠭ as the alternative payment, unless you are in Mongolia). You were given advance notice of this possibility of non-acceptance, yet you willfully proffered a card that you knew that they were not likely to accept a second time. Your hands were not clean, and if this had gone to court, you could not expect mercy from the court on the grounds that you were surprised that they didn't accept your card.
My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others.
There is a form here which you submit to USCIS – immigrated not before 1906, not for a living person. However, to apply for citizenship, one must have been a permanent resident for 5 years, so given the date on the card (and assuming your father did not marry a US citizen), he could not have been naturalized before departure in 1959.
Is it legal to sell scale models of buildings I have no affiliation with? If not, what is required from the owner of the building to have the rights to sell scale models of their buildings?
For the US: I believe 17 U.S. Code § 120 applies here: 17 U.S. Code § 120 - Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works (a)Pictorial Representations Permitted.— The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. So long as the building is located in or visible from a public place, anyone should be allowed to distribute models of the building Edit (more information, but I believe original answer still suffices): So we know from 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8), that architectural works are copyrightable, and the extent of this copyright protection extends to copyright over the blueprint itself and/or the right to produce the building. This seems to only mean that an architect would own copyright in a model of a building if he specifically creates a sculpture of the building and then copyrights it. It doesn't appear that designing a building or having blueprints of it grants the creator rights over a sculpture of the building, the rights to such a sculpture would have to be obtained seperately. TL;DR You should be allowed to sell models of a building so long as they are not models based off the actual blueprints of the building, and that these models haven't been manually copyrighted by the architect beforehand. (i.e making the building hasn't granted a copyright over models of the building beforehand)
This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement.
Compliance with acoustic standards does not necessarily mean that you will not hear noise from your neighbors. You have an expert opinion stating that the building complies. It is possible that the expert is wrong - the only way to find out is to have a different expert do their own analysis. This will cost you money and they will either agree with the first expert that it does comply or they won't. If they agree you will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that the developer did what they promised in their contract. You will have to come up with your own solutions as to how to deal with the fact that you find it too noisy. In these circumstances, this is an issue with you, not the apartment. If they don't agree then you have a basis for commencing legal action (in accordance with the dispute resolution clauses of your contract). How that will turn out will depend on which evidence the court/arbitrator/whatever prefers. If you succeed you may get compensation or remedial works (if these are possible) done. If you lose you will likely be paying some hefty legal fees. In the meantime, I would be very careful about what you say about the developer or the complex publicly. If you say things that are not true then you could be sued for defamation. The developer has already indicated that they are not happy with what you are saying - this doesn't mean it is defamatory but the developer may be willing to go to court to find out if it is, are you? If you sell the apartment you are not generally obliged to reveal anything to the buyer but you must answer questions they put truthfully. If they ask about sound insulation you can truthfully answer that it complies with NBN S 01-400-1. You are not required to disclose your personal opinion that its too noisy.
Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a "taking" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.
A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases.
I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.)
When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.
What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.
Can an employer require employees be Christian? One of the "essential duties and requirements" for this job posting on Stack Overflow is: Maintains a personal, active relationship with Jesus Christ and is a consistent witness for Jesus Christ Given that the job is with a Christian evangelical organization, this seems like a reasonable requirement: after all, it's in their interest to hire subject matter experts. But under what circumstances is that requirement legal or illegal in the United States, and specifically North Carolina?
There are exceptions to the Title VII prohibition, which "does not apply to discrimination by a religious organization on the basis of religion in hiring and discharge. The exemption applies to an organization whose 'purpose and character are primarily religious.'" In all other respects, a religious organization is bound by the law that everyone else must follow. The EEOC defines "religion" as "includ[ing] moral or ethical beliefs as to right and wrong that are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views", but that does not seem to encompass metaphysical beliefs (e.g. about reincarnation, who created the universe...). They also state that "Religious discrimination also includes discrimination against someone because s/he is an atheist". The wording there is of some significance, since it does not say that an atheist organization is a "religious organization" which would be entitled to discriminate in favor of atheists in hiring practices. The statutory definitions section of the law tells us that "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business which doesn't actually support the commission's decision to extend coverage to atheist employees. That interpretation comes from post-statutory case law, such as Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 773 F. Supp. 304, 305. What is unclear is what a "religious organization" is. The exemption comes from 42 USC 2000e–1(a): This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities but the definitions do not clearly state that an organization dedicates to denying religious beliefs is legally subsumed under the exemption. Billy Graham would be, dunno about an atheist organization.
united-states Absent an agreement to the contrary, the employer can make expert testimony a requirement for further employment, and the employee can quit if this is not acceptable. As a practical matter, employees almost always agree to do so without any serious objections to testifying as experts on behalf of their employers. Also, U.S. courts distinguish between retained and non-retained expert testimony. A retained expert is someone testifying solely because they were hired to do so in particular case. A non-retained expert is someone who has personal knowledge of the events in the case who has expertise in an area and is being asked to testify about that personal knowledge in a manner informed by that person's expertise. A non-retained expert can be compelled to testify by subpoena, even if an agreement for that person to testify as an expert voluntarily is not reached. Many employees asked by an employer to provide expert testimony would fall in the category of a non-retained expert who could be compelled to testify about the matter from their personal knowledge in a manner informed by their expertise, even if they quit. But, a non-retained expert can only be compelled to testify at trial, not to cooperate in preparing for that testimony with an attorney for the employer or preparing a written report in advance of that testimony. Incidentally, it would be the rare exception to the rule for the written report of a retained expert witness in advance of their testimony at trial or in a deposition to make that report stating that opinion under oath. Typically, it would be signed but not sworn to by the expert. the court requires (version 1) the company (version 2) someone with expertise from the company to provide a sworn opinion (something like "the process to do X is Y"), and answer questions in court. In U.S. cases, it isn't "the court" that is proactively telling litigants what evidence they have to provide. The law tells litigants what has to be proved. Sometimes, in U.S. non-criminal litigation, expert testimony from someone is required to proven or disprove an element of a case. For example, in professional malpractice cases, someone with expertise in that profession must testify that the professional did or did not perform the work which is the basis of the lawsuit in a manner that falls below the standard of care for a professional of that type. Other times, expert testimony is one means of many possible means to prove a fact in the case. For example, one could prove lost profits by showing that a specific contract was lost by someone's action, or one could instead hire an expert to show what profits could have been earned if something was done.
Unless your employer agreed in a contract to not discuss your employment, then there is no legal restrictions on them discussing anything about your employment. If they say things that are untrue you could sue them for defamation.
In england-and-wales there is no legal requirement, in the private sector, to advertise vacancies and employers can recruit whoever they choose as long as they do not commit unlawful direct or indirect discrimination and follow their own internal HR policies. Re: In the western hemisphere is it quite legal for employers to do things like... Exclude close family/marital relations of existing employees? YES Exclude internal applicants from consideration for jobs for which they have relevant qualifications? YES Hire non-local (here defined as those who can commute to work from their existing home) candidates in preference to local ones similarly qualified? YES Hire foreigners where they have suitable work permits? YES Summarily hire members of the business owner's family? YES as long as they are not "phantom" employees only put on the books soley to evade tax liabilities by, for example, paying a salary when they don't do any actual work.
The criteria used by the IRS suggest that for federal tax purposes, the cashier would be properly classified as a contractor. Behavioral Control: A worker is an employee when the business has the right to direct and control the work performed by the worker, even if that right is not exercised. There is probably some training involved here, but it seems negligible. Has the company actually retained the right to direct and control the cashier? Is he obligated to use their register, as they tell him to use it? Is his work evaluated for compliance with those instructions? I'd guess that in most cases, the company doesn't actually care about any of this. As long as the company got all the money it was owed, would it really care if the cashier just stuck the money in his pockets until the end of the day? I'd also argue that it isn't really the employer controlling the when and where of the contractor's work, but rather the circumstances. Classifying him as an employee because he has to be at the event doesn't really make any more sense than saying your plumber is an employee because he has to come to your house to do the job. Financial Control: Does the business have a right to direct or control the financial and business aspects of the worker's job? The investment in the cash register seems relatively nominal. The company probably does not reimburse the cashier for expenses incurred in getting the job done. The cashier is presumably free to offer his services to others. The cashier is presumably being paid a one-time, flat fee. As you noted, though, the fact that there isn't much profit-loss opportunity is one factor pointing in the other direction. Relationship: The type of relationship depends upon how the worker and business perceive their interaction with one another. The fact that this is a single, hours-long job is probably the strongest evidence that the cashier is a contractor. Further, the cashier's job is not a key part of the business, as it is only a minor portion of an event that the company has never performed before and has no apparent intention of repeating. I assume that the company is not providing health benefits, sick time, etc., and that any contract with the cashier includes no language suggestive of an employer-employee relationship. Conclusion: The employee-contractor distinction is pretty fact-intensive, but based on what you've provided, there seems to be a much stronger argument that the cashier would be a contractor.
This is a pretty good guide to the student's right to express their views on religion (for or against). For example you may pray in school, but you cannot compel others to listen to your prayers. You may discuss Jesus Christ and you may advocate a religious perspective, if it is on topic (e.g. in a class discussion abortion, but not in an algebra class). There are familiar ways of saying "Jesus Christ" which would be disruptive, but a general prohibition against uttering a name (on the grounds that the name is of a religious figure) is not a proper application of the separation of church and state -- as the ACLU statement says, SCOTUS did not make public schools religion-free zones. Whether or not the teacher was given the authority to forbid mentioning religious figures by some supervisor, that would not have been proper authorization. Official advocacy of religion in general, or a particular religion, is contrary to the First Amendment, as is official prohibition of religion in general, or a particular religion.
The law doesn't distinguish between two Christians with divergent beliefs, or between an atheist and a Christian (obviously with divergent beliefs). The law simply does not care what religion you have, or whether you have one. The law just says "follow the law!". The complication is that part of the First Amendment which says that the law is to be neutral as to religion also has what's known as the "Free Exercise Clause", the part that says "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof", which has been taken to refer to actions undertaken because of that belief. There have been various rulings on the conflict between religious doctrine and laws requiring or prohibiting certain actions (mandatory flag salutes, conscription, religious pamphleting). When a law conflicts with a fundamental right such as a right protected by the First Amendment, such a law is allowed only in narrow circumstances (known as strict scrutiny). It is up to Congress to state what kinds of First Amendment-based exceptions there are to laws. In a case involving the draft, SCOTUS held in US v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 that The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption This view underlies the current regulation on employment and religious discrimination in 29 CFR 1605.1 that In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which the issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. The question that EEOC or the courts would have to answer is, what fundamental life belief is being violated by compelling a certain action? Forcing Muslims to eat pork violates a fundamental belief of Muslims. Prohibiting Muslim employers from discriminating against pork-eaters does not violate those beliefs, because there is no fundamental life belief held by Muslims that it is a mortal sin to hire pork eaters. In this case, Ann is at a disadvantage because she can't maintain that being forced to hire Christine violates a fundamental belief of hers (it's like refusing to hire pork-eaters). If Christine was obnoxious in espousing her viewpoint in a manner that reflected badly on Ann's business, Ann can fire Christine. Ann might, on those same grounds, refuse to hire Christine if there was a well-justified belief that such damage to her business will result (you don't have to wait until your business is destroyed). The (implied) fact on Christine's resume is not sufficient evidence that Christine will cause a problem for Ann's business. Instead, it is a plain instance of religious discrimination, which is prohibited by law.
No - there is no general requirement to be fair to all applicants when selecting someone for a job. It's not even clear how this would work - you would need to define what "fair" means in this context, and there would be many competing definitions. Is it fair to prefer an applicant who has more experience because they received help from their parents with landing their first job? Is it fair to prefer someone with a certain look for an acting job? Is it fair to prefer someone who happens to have a similar personality to the person hiring? So if the employer finds it more convenient to use the same test every year, and if they do not mind that this gives some applicants an advantage, they are free to do that. The only exception is that discrimination based on certain, specific factors (often called "protected characteristics") is usually outlawed. The list depends on jurisdictions, but usually includes things like gender, race and age. However, even in that case discrimination is allowed if the business can demonstrate a genuine need - for example, when looking for an actor, it is allowed to hire based on gender.
May I volunteer for an individual? In the United States, specifically in Norwalk, Connecticut, where I live, may I volunteer for an individual, and may an individual use volunteers? For example, may I volunteer as a personal chef for a celebrity, ie, cook them meals for free, and may they accept my services without compensating me? My thoughts I think the answer depends on whether I'm an independent contractor or an employee. According to Nolo's Employee's Guide to Minimum Wage Rights and Laws, "independent contractors are not entitled to the minimum wage", but what if I'm an employee? According to the US Department of Labor: elaws - Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor, "employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers", but what about to individual employers? According to US Department of Labor: Fact Sheet #79: Private Homes and Domestic Service Employment Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, household employees "are covered by the FLSA". So I guess the answer to my question is yes if I'm an independent contractor and generally no if I'm an employee. Addendum 1 After reading ohwilleke's answer, I'd like to provide some more details. I made up the example above, but here are two actual scenarios I'm considering: Hiring a volunteer I post an ad to fairfield volunteers - craigslist asking for help decluttering my apartment, something I've been putting off for years. Independent contractor: If, eg, a professional organizer (who has other paying clients) offers to help me for free, then I think they'd be an independent contractor, so I don't think I'd have to pay them anything, since "independent contractors are not entitled to the minimum wage". Employee: If, eg, a college student (who isn't already a professional organizer, personal assistant, or the like) offers to help me for free, then I think they'd be an employee, and I think employees are generally entitled to the minimum wage. Working as a volunteer I post an ad to fairfield volunteers - craigslist offering to help others for free. Some of the services I could provide are tutoring, moving, and consulting. Some of my motives for volunteering are to help myself, help others, make connections, and enjoy life.
In the United States, specifically in Norwalk, Connecticut, where I live, may I volunteer for an individual, and may an individual use volunteers? For example, may I volunteer as a personal chef for a celebrity, ie, cook them meals for free, and may they accept my services without compensating me? I think the answer depends on whether I'm an independent contractor or an employee. The answer is not nearly as simple and straighforward as the employee v. independent contractor distinction suggested in the question. People who work for free fit in a number of categories, some lawful and some not, even though the definition of employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (regulations here) and parallel state legislation is facially very broad (people who suffer to let others work for them, more or less) and many of the exceptions are quite narrow. The nature of the categories is a nice illustration of how much social context and nuance is buried in a seemingly straightforward black and white legal rule like the minimum wage. Any time there are common practices that a statute doesn't expressly contemplated that aren't routinely the subject to litigation, you should doubt whether the statute really applies to them (although often enough it does), and courts are more likely in these circumstances than most to devise a definitional oriented, or implied, or common law exception to encompass the common practices as being lawful. The facts in the original question aren't rich enough in character to really determine which category applies, and those facts "smell fishy" as far as whether it would really fit in any legal category of unpaid work, in part, because the motives of the "volunteer" are very unclear. The legal categories include: People work for free in furtherance of their own charitable intent (e.g., working for free at a United Way fundraiser). People working for free who have bona fide donative intent (painting a mural on your boyfriend's wall as a birthday present). This is one possible category that the original question seems to be considering as possibility. Note that donative intent doesn't preclude an expectation that there will be unspecified, not legally enforceable, reciprocity in the future, in the form of reciprocal generosity, or in the form of owing someone an ill defined "favor" that doesn't amount to a true quid pro quo barter transaction. You might have donative intent towards a celebrity because you are a fan, because you appreciate their work or contributions, and because you desire to be part of the inner circle of a celebrity or wish to become a friend of a celebrity and want to do so out of friendship, since the celebrity is an awesome person that it would be nice to have in your life. This category could also include cases of moral but not legal obligation, or cases of seeking to do penance to the person for whom you volunteer out of non-legally binding guilty or shame (as distinct from a threat that you will be embarrassed). Family members doing chores for each other out of a duty of care and support on the part of a parent or spouse, or a duty to obey a parent arising at common law, on the part of a child, and similar family obligations. Closely related is unpaid work as a fiduciary (e.g. an executor, power of attorney agent, or trustee) with a donative or family relationship motivation. Parties to contracts remedying damage that they have done for which they would otherwise have contractual responsibility (e.g. cleaning your own apartment, or an apartment upon which you guaranteed someone else's lease, before the tenant moves out, so you won't have deductions from your security deposit, or so you won't be sued for damages). Similarly, work incurred to protect or add value to your own property. People who work expecting to be paid and have a legal right to be paid who don't get paid after the fact due to the insolvency of the employer, or discharge of the debt in bankruptcy, or the expiration of a statute of limitations or claims deadline in a probate proceeding. People performing court ordered community service and inmates in prison pursuant to a conviction. Self-employed business people who don't make a profit, either personally, or in a capacity as an officer or director of an entity owned by the self-employed person. But, if this involved providing services for no compensation, without a more involved business with expenses as well as receipts, as an alleged independent contractor, for a single other person, this is probably a case where the law would find that someone is actually an employee and not an independent contractor, and where the contract is void for want of consideration. The form over substance analysis that holds that is employment subject to the minimum wage for purposes of the FLSA and state law seems like the most likely scenario in the original question, but the facts aren't detailed enough to tell definitively. Unpaid interns and students learning while doing something of value (generally permitted, but the analysis of the FLSA and state law is rather involved). This is another category that plausible could apply to the original question. People within other express FLSA exceptions that are also present in state law. The illegal categories include: Slaves. These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish keeping slaves (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Indentured servants (basically slaves for a term of years who aren't allowed to quit, often to someone who paid a major expense such as travel costs to a new country for you, in order to repay the debt). These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish this practice (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Inmates in jails who have not yet been convicted of a crime, and who are awaiting trial, who are required to work without pay. People working for free due to duress or blackmail, not expressly authorized by law, and not merely the generalized economic duress of needing money to live (e.g. doing household chores for a bully because he threatened to beat you up if you don't). These cases, if they are litigated at all, are usually prosecuted criminally under extortion statutes. More generally, you are not a true "volunteer" if you work is in any meaningful sense involuntary, even if it does not support a provable case beyond a reasonable doubt of true criminal extortion. People in normal employment relationships who are paid for some work but required to do additional unpaid work as condition of employment. Most civil FLSA litigation involving completely unpaid work, involves this category of unpaid work. I'm sure that there are other possibilities that I have not considered and listed, but generally, the legality of working for free is evaluated on a category by category basis. Situations where payment is predominantly in kind (e.g. room and board and clothing) can be complex to analyze and these arrangements are frequently subject to special rules. The primary statutory minimum wage exemptions are as set forth in the exemptions provision of the FLSA: §213. Exemptions (a) Minimum wage and maximum hour requirements The provisions of sections 206 (except subsection (d) in the case of paragraph (1) of this subsection) and 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to— (1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools), or in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary, subject to the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, except that an employee of a retail or service establishment shall not be excluded from the definition of employee employed in a bona fide executive or administrative capacity because of the number of hours in his workweek which he devotes to activities not directly or closely related to the performance of executive or administrative activities, if less than 40 per centum of his hours worked in the workweek are devoted to such activities); or (2) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (3) any employee employed by an establishment which is an amusement or recreational establishment, organized camp, or religious or non-profit educational conference center, if (A) it does not operate for more than seven months in any calendar year, or (B) during the preceding calendar year, its average receipts for any six months of such year were not more than 331/3 per centum of its average receipts for the other six months of such year, except that the exemption from sections 206 and 207 of this title provided by this paragraph does not apply with respect to any employee of a private entity engaged in providing services or facilities (other than, in the case of the exemption from section 206 of this title, a private entity engaged in providing services and facilities directly related to skiing) in a national park or a national forest, or on land in the National Wildlife Refuge System, under a contract with the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture; or (4) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (5) any employee employed in the catching, taking, propagating, harvesting, cultivating, or farming of any kind of fish, shellfish, crustacea, sponges, seaweeds, or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life, or in the first processing, canning or packing such marine products at sea as an incident to, or in conjunction with, such fishing operations, including the going to and returning from work and loading and unloading when performed by any such employee; or (6) any employee employed in agriculture (A) if such employee is employed by an employer who did not, during any calendar quarter during the preceding calendar year, use more than five hundred man-days of agricultural labor, (B) if such employee is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of his employer's immediate family, (C) if such employee (i) is employed as a hand harvest laborer and is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) commutes daily from his permanent residence to the farm on which he is so employed, and (iii) has been employed in agriculture less than thirteen weeks during the preceding calendar year, (D) if such employee (other than an employee described in clause (C) of this subsection) (i) is sixteen years of age or under and is employed as a hand harvest laborer, is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) is employed on the same farm as his parent or person standing in the place of his parent, and (iii) is paid at the same piece rate as employees over age sixteen are paid on the same farm, or (E) if such employee is principally engaged in the range production of livestock; or (7) any employee to the extent that such employee is exempted by regulations, order, or certificate of the Secretary issued under section 214 of this title; or (8) any employee employed in connection with the publication of any weekly, semiweekly, or daily newspaper with a circulation of less than four thousand the major part of which circulation is within the county where published or counties contiguous thereto; or (9) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §23(a)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 69. (10) any switchboard operator employed by an independently owned public telephone company which has not more than seven hundred and fifty stations; or (11) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §10(a), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63. (12) any employee employed as a seaman on a vessel other than an American vessel; or (13), (14) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §§9(b)(1), 23(b)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63, 69. (15) any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysitting services or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary); or (16) a criminal investigator who is paid availability pay under section 5545a of title 5; (17) any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker, whose primary duty is— (A) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software, or system functional specifications; (B) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications; (C) the design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or (D) a combination of duties described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) the performance of which requires the same level of skills, and who, in the case of an employee who is compensated on an hourly basis, is compensated at a rate of not less than $27.63 an hour; or (18) any employee who is a border patrol agent, as defined in section 5550(a) of title 5; or (19) any employee employed to play baseball who is compensated pursuant to a contract that provides for a weekly salary for services performed during the league's championship season (but not spring training or the off season) at a rate that is not less than a weekly salary equal to the minimum wage under section 206(a) of this title for a workweek of 40 hours, irrespective of the number of hours the employee devotes to baseball related activities.
Is this work for hire? There is an arguable case to be made that you are an employee for copyright law purposes and, if so, the copyright belongs to the company. The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. Second, if you do own the copyright, there is clearly an implied licence with the company to allow them to use it. It is arguable that the licence is exclusive since the software is bespoke and made specifically for the company. Can you sign an agreement now Yes, but … It is clear that the purpose of signing the agreement is to screw the company over (with the compliance of 2 of the directors). That’s a contract entered into in bad faith and possibly for an illegal purpose and would likely be found invalid. You need to understand that the company is a distinct legal entity from its owners and it has its own rights. People make the mistake of thinking the owners are the company: they aren’t. The two rebel founders are on dangerous legal ground. Assuming they are the directors of the company, they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. That is, they must put the company’s interests ahead of their own. It is clearly not in the company’s interest to have a rival business start so they cannot plan to do that while they are directors - they need to resign first. You are not so much at risk - as an employee/contractor your duty is to follow the directions of the company (the company - not a faction within the company). However, if you aid the other two in what might be a crime, you could be in trouble.
No The intent of the proposed bill is to codify existing case law. You are an employee now and you will be an employee then. You are an employee now because a) you are not free from the company's control and direction or b) the work you are doing is the company's main business. If you read the bill you will find out that c) involves "an independently established trade, occupation, or business" so your business qualifies for this but you need to qualify for all three factors to be an independent contractor.
This is a well established model in the UK. One route is the umbrella company. Y here would be the umbrella company. A would then either be providing services to Y or be employed by Y. You may be wondering what use it is if A is employed by Y. The answer here is that whilst A may not benefit from the tax treatment, X does not bear the burden of running PAYE etc. Further, because of regulations such as IR35, it may be that there is a doubt as to whether employment tax apply even if there is a contract for service. Essentially disguised employment means taxes are levied on the employer as if an employment existed; however, in this situation X has the comfort that if this arises they will (normally) fall on Y rather than X. Another route is the service company, where normally A himself will own it (or it is owned between A and A's spouse), take a combination of salary and dividends out (using two allowances if owned between spouses), and he will bill X or Y; companies exist which will perform all the necessary paperwork to do this (in which case Y is called a managed service company), as opposed to a personal service company (if A sets it up himself). It's not clear where you are based, but if you are based outside the UK (and possibly if you are inside the UK) there are accountancy companies that specialise in setting all this up.
I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.
I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.
Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement.
Since Medicare and Medicaid are US federal government programs, I assume you are referring to US Medicare. What you describe is theoretically possible: a person has worked in the US but is 4 quarters short of the required 40 for Medicare eligibility (also, they do not gain spousal eligibility) because they have been previously employed. If they have earned income up to a certain level within a tax year, they would pay SS taxes thus qualifying for Social Security and Medicare. For 2020 that amount was $5,640 to get the maximum of 4 credits – it does not have to be stretched out over a year. You can earn those credits doing anything (certain government-sector jobs excluded). Then you pay income taxes and social security taxes on that amount. If the person earns the money as an independent contractor they pay the entire tax, if they are an employee the employer pays part of the tax (then the employer has to figure out what their obligation is, which the IRS is happy to tell you about). The employer also withholds the employee's contribution and pays it to the IRS, and the amount is reported on their form W2. These are mandatory obligations on the employer: you must pay the employer portion and you must withhold. It would be illegal to not make the required contributions. There is no law that prohibits employment of a person who has not already qualified for Medicare or SS (that should be obvious). There is no law that sets "usefulness" standards that an employee must meet in order to be lawfully employed. No untruthful statements are required in order to hire a person that just stands at the door and says "Hello". If it actually is the case that the employee does not even receive their wage, as you conjecture, then that would be a violation of state or federal labor laws. In connection with that, continued employment is not required to continue receiving SS and Medicare, and this might be a scheme to exploit a senior citizen into working for low wages when they don't have to.
Why did Google and Amazon win the argument against Perfect 10 regarding copyright of search engine images? I read all the Wikipedia pages related to this, especially Copyright aspects of hyperlinking and framing, where it says the seemingly completely ridiculous statement from the Ninth Circuit court (I am an experienced software developer BTW): Google does not have a copy of the images for purposes of the Copyright Act. In other words, Google does not have any "material objects … in which a work is fixed … and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" and thus cannot communicate a copy. Instead of communicating a copy of the image, Google provides HTML instructions that direct a user's browser to a Web site publisher's computer that stores the full-size photographic image. Providing these HTML instructions is not equivalent to showing a copy. First, the HTML instructions are lines of text, not a photographic image. Second, HTML instructions do not themselves cause infringing images to appear on the user's computer screen. The HTML merely gives the address of the image to the user's browser. The browser then interacts with the computer that stores the infringing image. It is this interaction that causes an infringing image to appear on the user's computer screen. Are they serious? So I (the search engine) write code which is strings of UTF-8 characters, dynamically generated from my server, sending the user a bunch of text as HTML. There I'm done with my work. I didn't copyright infringe anything. No, the browser then takes the strings of text which I sent, and interprets it on the user's behalf. The graphics engine then takes the series of computer instructions on transistors and converts it into pixels, which the user sees with their eyes. The light coming from the computer screen is the real culprit, so it is the monitor company which should be sued, not the one generating the HTML strings. Then the argument of actually storing the image on Google's computer... Notice this image: It is a base64 encoded string: <img src="" data-deferred="1" class="rg_i Q4LuWd" jsname="Q4LuWd" width="126" height="240" alt="Liam Neeson - IMDb" data-iml="1050.6000000238419" data-atf="true" > To me this means they have transformed their work (from whatever JPEG native format) into a base64 encoded string, and stored their work on their servers in derived format. There is no way they are dynamically fetching the original images for each of these images from the original site, base64 encoding them, and returning them to the end user that fast. They have to either be storing them locally, or caching them like in Memcached, which is also a form of local storage. Notice, too, the link of the image: https://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fm.media-amazon.com%2Fimages%2FM%2FMV5BMjA1MTQ3NzU1MV5BMl5BanBnXkFtZTgwMDE3Mjg0MzE%40._V1_UY1200_CR286%2C0%2C630%2C1200_AL_.jpg&imgrefurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.imdb.com%2Fname%2Fnm0000553%2F&tbnid=2-mCvxvX55ikGM&vet=12ahUKEwjvxOPK-rDyAhUQTlMKHRV_AXoQMygBegUIARDMAQ..i&docid=jw8_6rV2DPsIaM&w=630&h=1200&q=liam%20neeson&ved=2ahUKEwjvxOPK-rDyAhUQTlMKHRV_AXoQMygBegUIARDMAQ It is a Google link, not a link to the original site. The court cases say they must link to the original site, but clearly here they are not. What is the deal? Granted, the original URL is in that URL, but it's not the actual URL to the original image. I like the idea of being able to surface images in a search engine, but what they are doing doesn't seem legally sound. Why can't I just create a site and show copyrighted images, and call it a "niche" search site?
You might follow the Wikipedia links to the full holding. They did recognize that Google caches images, particularly thumbnails of images. Do a Find on "cache". From the 9th Circuit Holding - That local browser caching is fair use is supported by a recent decision holding that Google's own cache constitutes fair use.
No. The images are copyrighted, and you are using them in a way that would leave you with virtually no argument for fair use. The factors for fair use are set out in 17 USC 107, and they indicate that the courts would reject your use: The purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes: There's no indication that your use would be for nonprofit or educational purposes. The nature of the copyrighted work: Works of fiction and art are highly creative works at the heart of the policy for copyright protection. The amount of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: You are apparently copying entire images, though I suppose you could argue that each image is just one small portion of a larger book or website. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: You are trying to create a board game, putting yourselves basically in direct competition with the makers of D&D. I generally prefer a pretty liberal interpretation of what constitutes fair use, but this just has virtually nothing that would make me comfortable arguing in your favor.
"Doing the same thing" is very common. We even have names for certain categories of websites, such as "web shop" and "blog". Such concepts are not protected in general. Obviously, you can't copy the name of existing webshop, or their logo, but things like a "rectangular layout of products for sale" aren't original. There is of course a grey area here, because there's a continuum of similarity. In general, similarities that follow from technical justifications are acceptable (having an upload button is sort of the point for your website), similarities that are cosmetic only (same color choice) might be interpreted as intentional attempts to cause confusion.
Although the exact answer should depend on the country you are, in general private copies of copyrighted works are allowed. General rules are: You need to have got the work in a legitimate way. That is, that you have purchased a copy of the work with permission from copyright owners or you have got the work from an act of public distribution authorised by copyright owners - if you got it from a website that is not making a copyright infringement itself, you are in the second case. That you don't make a collective or commercial use of the work. (I took these rules from Spanish Intellectual Property law (article 31), but most countries have similar rules, specially in the European Union. Anyway, the exact limits of private copying exception may differ). Since private copying might have an economic effect, some countries collect private copying levies to compensate copyright owners - probably you have already paid for those when purchasing the printer. Therefore, you can print a book downloaded from a website (unless the site is hosting the work without authorization of the copyright owners, as pirate sites do) for your own use. You can't sell the copies or made a collective use of them. Although reach of collective use might be hard to assess, I would suggest that if you want all the people in your class have the book, send them the link so that any one could print their own copy. Update about the USA As the OP has now specified now their country I update the answer with a comment, although an additional answer by anybody more knowledgeable on US law would be great. I'm quite sure that for practical purposes the result is that you can print such a book anywhere in the world. However, I don't know which laws regulates that in the US. Google doesn't return meaningful results for "private copy usa", so I suppose it is know there by another name. Furthermore, statutes in common law countries tend to be less explicit and there might be no case law applicable. For example, I nobody printing a copy of a pdf for himself to read at home has ever been challenged in court in the USA, there might be no explicit rule about the subject.
To examine this further and answer your question, we need to look at Copyright (and fair use) as well as Defamation. Alas, I am unsure as to how taking legitimate headlines from around the world and attributing their source is 'fake news' - but I'll accept that it's 'fake news' for the purposes of exploring this topic. A lot of the potential (or motive) for a person or company to litigate against you will be context specific and detailed to how you have used their work and portray their journalists and characters - misquotes etc. As an exception to British copyright law, fair dealing is governed by Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which outlines three instance where fair dealing is a legitimate defence: If the use is for the purposes of research or private study; If it is used for the purposes of criticism, review or quotation; Where it is utilised for the purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) However, where you may come into problems is: A statutory definition for fair dealing does not exist; it will always be a matter of fact, degree and interpretation in every fair use case. Nor is there a percentage or quantitative measure to determine fair dealing. The Intellectual Property Office lists the key factors used to determine the validity of whether a particular dealing with a work is fair as follows: Has the use of the work impacted negatively on the market for the original work? If the creator or owner has lost potential revenue through the re-use of their work, it is not likely to be fair. Was it reasonable and necessary to use the amount of work that was taken? Also: Fair use for parody, caricature or pastiche The UK copyright law on fair use of works for the purposes of creating a parody or pastiche is also listed in Section 30A, Schedule 2 (2A) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. References to all here. Guidance from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) states that fair use needs to be “fair and proportionate” and does not protect an individual from any other rights an author may have. Those other rights may involve claiming defamation if this material creates fake news and uses the names of real journalists or companies etc - and if they allege that your AI fake news has caused serious harm in any way to their reputation - they could sue you for breach of the Defamation Act 2013. All of this is entirely contextual however as to how your AI might display or make fake news and how Google caches it and displays it - and if it could be portrayed as 'real' or believable for example. You are also doing this at a time where 'anti fake news' law is evolving... and even though you say it's fake news for AI experiment purposes - it's a growing field of concern for many. (see here) Copyright law is a vast and evolving area - and nothing is clear cut. It really depends if a major news company didn't like what you were doing and took exception to it and issued challenges on many areas of law based on that.
I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.
All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on.
The web-browser game was copyrighted the moment it was created by the individual. It did not need a copyright notice to be copyrighted, or a TOS to inform you of copyright. The individual was fully within the law to claim infringement and demand you stop disturbing your mod as an unauthorized change to their game. They should have had a TOS up when they started distributing the game, but that's their choice. The developer could - or have their attorney - send their own legal "takedown notice" of infringement directly to you rather than Tweet about it or approach Google. Google's takedown and your "copyright strike" is different than your original copyright violation and involves Google's TOS - Google Chrome Web Store Developer Agreement | Google Chrome - regarding copyright violations of apps and code under distribution. By your use of the store, Google reserves the right to remove your extensions when there are ...violations of intellectual property rights, including patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, or other proprietary right of any party,... And, the original game being free and your mod being free rarely matters in copyright law and in cases of infringement. That's something a court would decide on the case and in looking at precedent(s). ...can I get into legal trouble for this? You could be sued by the maker of the game in civil court; that's up to them. Google's recourse is to simply remove the mod from the store and possibly restrict your use of their service(s), according to their TOS. For more background, see the Law SE Meta post I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? .
Contractor liability (in U.S.) Say that you enter into an agreement with a contractor to fix something in your house. He assures you there won't be any repercussions until he can get to it in a couple of days, but before he comes the delayed repair has resulted in damage to your house. Having relied on his expertise to assess the situation, does he have liability for the damage and should his insurance or mine cover the repairs?
If the contractor's advice that delay would be safe was reasonable under the circumstances, and other contractors or skilled professionals would have given similar advice, then the contractor will not be liable just because the advice was incorrect. If the advice was negligent, and fell clearly short of what a skilled professional would advise in the circumstances, then the contractor may have liability for the additional damages. That is the detailed facts will be very important in placing liability. The contractor is not an insurer who assumes all risk, but the contractor is responsible for acting in a reasonable, professional manner.
The correct term for this insurance is personal liability insurance - it is neither compulsory nor common in common law jurisdictions. However, some aspects of it may be bundled with other insurances like homeowners, landlords and contents insurance. Liability for damage in common law flows either from a breach of contract or a tort. Of course, if you intentionally cause harm you have crossed the line from civil liability to criminality and no insurance will indemnify you. For your specific examples: [I]f, say, a candle falls over and I burn my flat? If your lease prohibited you from having open flames then this would be a clear breach of contract and you would have to pay for the damage to the flat (and your own property, of course). If your lease was silent on this, then you would be liable if you were negligent and each party would bear their own losses if you weren't (i.e. it was a pure "accident"). What if a flower pot falls from my windowsill and accidentally kills someone? The passerby has no action under contract as they don't have one. They can sue you, or the landlord, or the body corporate (or all three) for negligence - the landlord's and/or body corporate's insurance would respond and if it included a waiver of subrogation (most do), the insurer could not sue any of the other parties for their losses. What if my trolley bumps into an old lady at the supermarket and I break her hip? What if I walk on my friend's glasses and break them? You have no contract with either of these people so they cannot sue you under one. If they can prove negligence then you have to pay for the damage. If it is, instead a pure "accident" then they bear the cost. However, for the old lady, she is way more likely to sue the supermarket as they will have insurance. It is not as useful in the UK as it is in France due to the need for the plaintiff to prove a breach of contract or negligence. In the UK, you are not responsible for accidents you cause - only accidents you cause negligently.
The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.
Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.
The ultimate legal liability for the damage is probably theirs, although the jurisdiction where this happened would impact the result in principle. Your car insurance may or may not cover third party damage to your car, depending upon what your insurance policy says, probably with a deductible. But, your car insurance would have a right to subrogation which means a right to sue the person who is legally liable for what the insurance company paid, even if it does cover the law. The homeowner's or renter's insurance policy of the homeowner with the dog would be responsible for paying damages and hiring a lawyer for the dog owner if the dog owner was sued, but you might have to sue the homeowner to invoke his insurance policy if it refused to pay upon receiving a demand letter.
Your contract is the only relevant one in your relationship with your landlord If they have broken it you can sue for damages. However, you have to actually read the lease to see if they have broken it - if they are doing something the lease permits, they haven’t broken it.
Would I sue seller or manufacturer for a new appliance that does not function correctly? You have viable claims against both seller and manufacturer, and you may sue both of them in the same complaint. Hopefully the tech's assessment that you "should get a new machine" is in writing, since that evidence seems dispositive (i.e., decisive) and immune to manufacturer's potential denial. Regardless of what approach you choose, the award you might be granted is subject to the prohibition of double recovery. It seems that the seller's directions were purposefully dilatory. Coupled with its subsequent pretext about expiration of the 30 day period, seller's conduct is in violation of legislation regarding unfair and misleading practices. Your post does not specify which jurisdiction in the US you have in mind, but consumer protection laws are rather uniform all over the country. If the provision of 30-day return period is reflected in a document such as the invoice, or in seller's signs/advertisements, you also have a claim of breach of contract for seller's failure to abide by the corresponding clause or policy. A similar rationale applies with respect to the manufacturer. The manufacturer is not entitled to arbitrarily postpone compliance as to the warranty. Seller's 30-day deadline serves as comparison in your argument that the manufacturer's open-ended schedule is excessive, a schedule which is on top of the delay from the interactions with both techs. if I win, what do I do with the dishwasher? Wait for the party who reimburses you or replaces the dishwasher to determine whether it opts to take the defective dishwasher. That party is responsible for transportation costs and related expenses if it decides to pick up the appliance. If the party is not interested in retrieving the defective appliance, make sure it signs a waiver. Otherwise you would be at risk that that party maliciously tries to turn the tables by alleging that you unlawfully got a second dishwasher for free.
Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that.
Is there a minimum elapsed time required before a classified document can become declassified in the U.S.? Is there a minimum elapsed time required before a classified document can become declassified in the U.S.? I am wondering if any classified document can become unclassified at any time or not. I am thinking there's a minimum elapsed time, but I might be wrong.
No. A classification decision can be reversed by an original classification authority at any time, and the “declassify by” date on a classified document can be arbitrarily close. For instance, a military order might be set for automatic declassification once the operation is complete.
The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question.
Question 1. Are technical identifiers personal data? Yes. If they identify a person. For example an IP Address is considered personal data, because a person or household can be identified by an IP. Yes, I know that technically there are a lot of exceptions. But in general, if you have an IP, you can identify the subscriber given the right databases. So if your identifier, lets say a generated GUID, identifies a customer or something the customer can be linked to, it is personal data. Question 2. Can technical identifiers be stored in measurement devices? Just because something is personal data, does not mean you are forbidden from using it. As long as you need it to do your job, you can store it. The internet would not work, if everybody was forbidden from storing any IP address. So to summarize it: yes, it is personal data since it identifies a subscriber. However, it is needed for the job your subscriber asked you to do. So for as long as the job takes, it is legal to store it. Once your job is done, you would be required to delete it. But consent trumps everything. If your subscriber consents to you keeping all data of such incidents to improve your network and handle future incidents better, then it's legal. Just let them sign it with your other legal paperwork. Done. No problem. You could just periodically delete all records that have no consent for long term storage beyond the current incident. Lets say every 24h or 48h. You should get the details on the wording of the paperwork and the period that it is legal to keep the data as "current incedent related" from your data protection officer or legal department.
Your wife is legally obligated to attend the deposition. If she does not attend, the Court can summarily hold her in contempt of court, issue a warrant for her arrest, and hold her in jail until a deposition can be rescheduled and held. She can be required to answer questions under oath at the deposition for the duration shown on the subpoena, or if no duration is specified, typically for up to six or seven hours. It is not her job to decide if it is a waste of time or not.
I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.
As of present moment, under no circumstances. That said, the law may and probably will change around that. But the time has not come just yet. Trying to predict what the law will be is out of scope of this site.
I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.
The standard is different for some of the kinds of surveillance described than others. 24x7, door-step, snitching-neighbors doesn't require any justification at all, except to convince someone that the time and money is worth it. It is not, in a constitutional sense a "search". Cell phone monitoring (meaning wiretapping) requires a sworn statement demonstrating probable cause to believe that is a crime has been, or is in the process of being, committed. In the alternative, if the surveillance involves a non-U.S. person, and the motive for doing so is espionage, pretty much all that an intelligence agency has to do is say that it is interested.
Can someone Legally Require me to give an Item back to them (A Computer) I was recently given a computer, so I could perform certain tasks from my home. The computer is worth around $4200 and I have roughly $600 of my own money in it along with my Time/Labor to build the computer. I am no longer able to do the tasks, that they need from me(They are not a business). Do I have to return the computer to them. What legal rights do they have to the computer. I purchased the computer through my own accounts they just provided me a Card Number.
Based on your answers, it sounds like this transaction was most likely structured in one of two ways: (a) your colleague bought the computer with the intention that you would use it and then return it to him when you were done borrowing it for a task he hired you for; or (b) your colleague bought the computer with the intention that you would keep it as payment for the work he hired you for. In either case, it seems you would have to return the computer. In the first case, you received the computer only on the understanding that you would return it when you were done with the work. Because you are retaining it while your colleague owns it, your colleague could puruse a replevin action to force you to return the computer, or a conversaion action to force you to pay the value of replacing it. Scaffidi v. United Nissan, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1168 (D. Nev. 2005). In the second case, you would not be entitled to keep the computer because you failed to perform your contract. Because you are not going to complete the work you agreed to, you are not entitled to the keep the computer your colleague agreed to give you in payment.
Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.
What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.
In theory its only a crime if you know, or reasonably suspect, that it is stolen. The fact that you have to ask means that you have some level of suspicion, so that's not good to start with. In practice merely being investgated by the police will bring you a world of hurt long before it gets to trial. How much can you afford to spend on legal fees, and will you be able to make bail?
This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.
Ultimately, if they force you into bankruptcy, everything, except: tools of your trade household items (clothing, furniture), however, if these are worth significantly more than a replacement then they can be sold and you get given a replacement. Short of this they can: garnishee bank accounts garnishee wages and other income seize and sell personal property acquire liens over real property The cannot force you to borrow money pay them, however, this may be a better option than any of the above, particularly bankruptcy. If you are in such a situation you should seek advice on how to best deal with it. Most creditors are willing to negotiate over amounts and timing: something latter on is better than nothing ever.
You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.
No, this isn't legal. Had you authorized the purchase, then it would have been legal; this is similar to a store credit for returns without a receipt. But since you claim they charged you in error and you did not authorize the transaction, then they must refund the money directly to you (unless you agree to another method of compensation). In fact, a direct refund should have been the default unless they gained your permission to receive it in a different form. Why are you unable to contact the company? That seems like the simplest resolution so this.
What would happen to California’s recall effort if the governor resigned? In California a recall election of Gavin Newsom is underway. If he resigned during the voting, would the election be called off? Would the Lt. Governor become the Governor? If so, how late into the process could Newsom resign? Also, if Newsom lost the recall vote, would there be any credible legal appeal?
Section 11302 of the California Elections Code makes it crystal clear - as soon as an office becomes vacant, the recall election proceeds anyway, unless as of that moment there are not enough signatures to proceed to the vote. So the resignation tactic can only be used to stop a recall election while they are still in the signature-gathering phase - it will not work if they have already gotten enough signatures. California's recall law as it applies to statewide elected officials is, frankly, idiotic (it should be like an impeachment, next officer in line gets the post), but it is designed specifically to stop a shenanigan like you describe. The Lieutenant Governor would become Governor if Newsom resigned, but only subject to the results of the Recall - if Newsom is recalled (despite already having resigned), the person with the plurality on part two of the ballot would become the next Governor.
Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.
The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error.
In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.
It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.
I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.
In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it.
There are multiple police forces in the US: city, county, state and national, and each is responsible to a relevant executive. Typical "police" are city police, who are responsible to a chief of police, who is appointed at the municipal level. Counties usually have an elected sheriff, and a set of deputies; at the state level, they are usually called state troopers. The typical protocol is that decisions are made at the lowest applicable level, so Seattle police enforce or refuse to enforce laws within Seattle, and King County police enforce or not in remaining unincorporated locations in the county. Individual city officers do not then decide to ignore the chief of police and instead follow orders from the county sheriff or the governor. However, each state grants vast powers to their governor, so it is possible that in the case of a state of emergency, the governor can take command of all law enforcement in the state. Governors "can't" deploy police to oppose federal law enforcement in a shoot-out, except that they might actually do so on some theory that federal law enforcement officers are violating the law. In general, you are not immune to arrest for illegal acts just because you are a law enforcement officer. The governor of Washington could easily (in the legal sense) declare an emergency and order state troopers to prevent federal officers from effecting arrests. Of course, resolving these disputes in court is another option.
Am I allowed to opt out ADA privileges if my doctor allows it? I’m on ADA. My employer allowed me not to take the Covid vaccine and instead take weekly test for Covid as a reasonable accommodation. I’m receiving a treatment, and my doctor says if it goes well, he might consider allowing me to take the vaccine. Maybe in the future. My doctor says, right now, I should NOT take the vaccine, but it the treatment is successful, he may reconsider. Questions: If I hope, my treatment goes well, and my doctor reconsiders, then am I allowed to “Cancel my ADA”, and take the vaccine? Or is my ADA “non-cancellable, and I have to keep taking these weekly Covid tests, even if my doctor allows me to take the vaccine?
There's nothing to cancel. Your employer has made an exception for you, because of the ADA: you are not required to be vaccinated. That doesn't mean you can't be vaccinated. Once your doctor advises you that it's safe to be vaccinated, and once you are vaccinated, you no longer need the exception, but there's no need to cancel it. As far as the weekly tests, they are required as an alternative measure because you aren't vaccinated. Once you are vaccinated, there should be no more need for weekly testing. You may of course inform your employer that your doctor's advice changed that you were vaccinated, and that you therefore no longer require the accommodation that they offered. That should allow you to stop the weekly testing regime, but otherwise it should be the end of it, since at that point everyone should be satisfied.
Notwithstanding the current COVID-19 regulations, I cannot find any Scottish law, regulation or rule that prevents a lawful tenant from having long-term visitors. However, it may (or may not) be a breach of the tenancy agreement depending on its terms which is where one should look for a definitive answer.
The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.
Alabama has published an administrative interpretation of §32-6-7, §32-6-7.1, Code of Ala. 1975 regarding medical standards for driver licensing. This allows them to take medical conditions into consideration in denying, not renewing, or restricting a license. This includes, for example, the ability to consider the fact that a person has high blood pressure. The review standard basically says that if they review a person and determine that there is a significant medical impairment, they can restrict driving privileges. 760-X-20-.10 addresses MS and related conditions, which basically restates that. There is nothing in the statutes that requires a person to report a specific medical condition of theirs. A doctor could, however, report that a patient is not fit to drive, which could trigger a DMV evaluation. P. 13 of the state Driver License Manual sums it up saying When it appears that you have some physical or mental impairment which might affect your driving ability, you may be required to furnish a statement from a doctor showing your medical history and present condition as it pertains to your driving ability. This does not translate into a requirement to self-report medical conditions that potentially affect ability to drive. It is highly unlikely that any state singles out MS, but every state has the potential to restrict driving if a person is medically unsafe to drive.
According to an HHS guide entitled "Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information", HIPAA does entitle you to access your medical records; however, the medical provider has 30 days to respond to your request. See the section on "Timeliness". So if the doctor wants to withhold the information until your appointment in 3 weeks, it looks to me like they are legally entitled to do so. Massachussets law has some similar provisions which are linked from the state court system's page on medical privacy. But as far as I could tell, they also only set a 30 day window, and it only applies to requests that are related to a claim for Social Security or a similar program. It doesn't appear that the law is on your side here. You might have more luck just trying to reschedule your appointment for an earlier date, or letting them know that you would take an appointment on short notice in case they have a cancellation.
Conditions pertaining to cancellation of a contract are contained in the contract, that is there is no general "right to cancel a contract", apart from certain 3-day window rights in some jurisdictions. For example, Washington state has some specific cancellation laws, summarized here. If the contract does not allow for cancellation, then you can't cancel the contract. I assume that your contract does have a cancellation clause: then you could have to see what that clause actually states. As it turns out, Florida has a law (Fla Stat. 501.017) which regulates health studio (gym) contracts, requiring certain clauses above the signature box. One required clause per (1)(b)2 is that notice of intent to cancel by the buyer shall be given in writing to the health studio. However, If the health studio wishes to enforce the contract after receipt of the notice, it may request the department to determine the sufficiency of the notice. This means that if they want to enforce the contract after a cancellation, they may request "the department" (Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services) to rule whether the notice was according to the contract (as mandated by law). It will also contain under (1)(d) A provision for the cancellation of the contract if the buyer dies or becomes physically unable to avail himself or herself of a substantial portion of those services which he or she used from the commencement of the contract until the time of disability, with refund of funds paid or accepted in payment of the contract in an amount computed by dividing the contract price by the number of weeks in the contract term and multiplying the result by the number of weeks remaining in the contract term. The contract may require a buyer or the buyer’s estate seeking relief under this paragraph to provide proof of disability or death. A physical disability sufficient to warrant cancellation of the contract by the buyer is established if the buyer furnishes to the health studio a certification of such disability by a physician licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, or chapter 461 to the extent the diagnosis or treatment of the disability is within the physician’s scope of practice. A refund shall be issued within 30 days after receipt of the notice of cancellation made pursuant to this paragraph. It appears, then, that you simply need to give notice in the correct form (written, with a doctor's notice). In case the club does not have the required provisions in the contract, the contract violates state law and is unenforceable.
The government cannot force people to get vaccinated, without passing a law to that effect. When they do, they can. This was sorted out in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, when the Supreme Court, in 1905, ruled: The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States does not import an absolute right in each person to be at all times, and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint, nor is it an element in such liberty that one person, or a minority of persons residing in any community and enjoying the benefits of its local government, should have power to dominate the majority when supported in their action by the authority of the State. It is within the police power of a State to enact a compulsory vaccination law, and it is for the legislature, and not for the courts, to determine in the first instance whether vaccination is or is not the best mode for the prevention of smallpox and the protection of the public health. Nothing in that ruling is specific to vaccinations as opposed to other medical treatments. If a law mandating a certain vaccination exists in a state, the citizen's beliefs about the efficacy of the vaccination are irrelevant to the legal issue -- get the vaccination, or the punishment. If a state were to pass a law mandating snake-oil innoculations to prevent smallpox infections, the law could be challenged in court. In general, people have the right to go about their business without the government interfering in their fundamental rights, but fundamental rights are not absolute, they are attenuated in case of a "compelling government interest": which leads to a particular kind of judicial review, strict scrutiny. While preventing a virulent deadly disease is arguably a compelling government interest, snake-oil is not necessary to reach that end (it does not reach that end, so it is certainly not necessary to reach that end).
Welcome to LSE. Here are some answers to your question: No! It's not even close, but something like it is. The OSHA standard you cite is for mercury in the air in the workplace. You ask about "injections," which do not involve mercury in the air, so: this standard does not apply to injections. You ask about "injecting your employees with thiomersal." With only a few exceptions (for those helping diabetics, etc, and emergencies), all states require that licensed health care professionals administer injections, and then, only under a prescription. (For example, thiomersal is mostly used in vaccines. All states require licensed health professionals to administer vaccines.) So: Unless you are a licensed health professional with a prescription, you cannot inject your employees with thiomersal. However, OSHA has interpreted its rules and regulations to allow employees to require vaccines in some circumstances, such as a pandemic. To the extent these vaccines contain thiomersal, employers can require employees to get injected with thiomersal by a licensed health professional.
Is employer obligated to provide an option to “opt out from existing ADA privileges” to keep the job? My employer mandates vaccines for Covid. I have a medical exception. My doctor says there is a 50/50% chance I will have horrible consequence from vaccine based on my medical history. My doctor does not recommend it, but he says, it may go well (but probably it will not go well). Currently my employer wants me to test every week (ADA), which I’m happy to do (this is a part of their ADA accomodation). It’s all good for now. However, I’m a little worried, what if my employer decides they don’t want to continue ADA, do they have the power to fire me? I’m willing to take a chance and take the vaccine in order to keep the job. Question: is my employer obligated to give me an option to “opt out from the existing ADA accommodation and take the vaccine” to keep the job? Or my employer does not have this obligation? Is it even possible for me to negotiate “taking the vaccine even though I have a confirmed ADA accommodation”. I’m willing to take the risk in order to keep my job.
The ADA continues to apply, and an employer cannot simply withdraw an accommodation on a whim. You have established a medical need for an accommodation, and your employer must offer an accommodation if a rewasonable one is available. The EEOC page giving guidelines on COVID says (in section K.1) The federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19, subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations discussed below. These principles apply if an employee gets the vaccine in the community or from the employer. In some circumstances, Title VII and the ADA require an employer to provide reasonable accommodations for employees who, because of a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, do not get vaccinated for COVID-19, unless providing an accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business. Section k.6 further says: An employee with a disability who does not get vaccinated for COVID-19 because of a disability must let the employer know that he or she needs an exemption from the requirement or a change at work, known as a reasonable accommodation. To request an accommodation, an individual does not need to mention the ADA or use the phrase “reasonable accommodation.” ... Employers and employees typically engage in a flexible, interactive process to identify workplace accommodation options that do not impose an undue hardship (significant difficulty or expense) on the employer. This process may include determining whether it is necessary to obtain supporting medical documentation about the employee’s disability. ... The ADA requires that employers offer an available accommodation if one exists that does not pose an undue hardship, meaning a significant difficulty or expense. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(p). Employers are advised to consider all the options before denying an accommodation request. It is hard to see how having an employee get frequent COVID tests imposes an "undue hardship" on the employer, as it should impose little or no difficulty or expense on the employer. It seems unlikely that an employer who has accepted such testing as a reasonable accommodation would change its position and seek to deny that accommodation. Even if it did, any such employer still has a legal obligation to consider what would constitute a reasonable accommodation, and to inform the employee what it would accept as a reasonable accommodation before undertaking to terminate employment. If the employer insists that a vaccination is absolutely essential and no alternative will be tolerated (highly unlikely, even hospitals are not taking that position) it must offer the employee a chance to comply or to challenge the decision. Until the employer indicates that the accommodation of regular testing will no longer be accepted, there should be no reason to take significant medical risks to meet an issue that has not in fact arisen.
You must follow the lawful and reasonable directions of your employer As an RN you have obligations under the law that are independent of your employment. Almost certainly, one of these is not to practice in an area which you are not skilled or qualified to do so (unless you are under adequate instruction and supervision). Remember, as an RN you, personally, are legally responsible if your advice leads to harm and you were not acting reasonably. There are plenty of nurses who have gone to jail for delivering a lethal dose of medicine that was wrongly prescribed by a doctor. Even if your advice is unlikely to lead to this, you can still be deregistered - seems a waste of a lot of education just to become an Uber driver. Further, most jurisdictions make it illegal to mislead or deceive in trade or commerce. This one won’t send you to jail. So, it appears that the instructions are unlawful and it is not misconduct if you were to, politely, refuse them. This would not give your employer grounds to fire you. However, you should document your concerns and reach out to your union and possibly consult a lawyer.
Yes and no In Germany, the first case where vaccination was mandatory was Smallpox. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht had adjudicated back in Juli 1959 – I C 170.56 - that mandatory Vaccination (Impfpflicht) against Smallpox follows the Impfgesetz of 1874 (RGBl. S. 31) which was declared a) still good law and b) in line with the Grundgesetz and so enforced vaccination of everybody who had no counterindication was inside the law. Currently, the measles are under mandatory vaccination with the MasernschutzgesetzInformation, german aka IFSG § 20law, german (Measles are listed in Abs 8). The same rationale and legal basis from those two can be applied to theoretically any other vaccination - if it is comparably terrible. The Masernschutzgesetz declares that without MMR vaccination you can't work in some jobs, like as a medical care worker, teacher or in a Kindergarten, and you can't be enrolled in a school or Kindergarten, unless you have a counterindication. Note that you do need to visit a public school, so the Masernschutzgesetz is total mandatory vaccination against measles for kids. The 2020 update on the law of infectious diseases (Gesetz zur Verhütung und Bekämpfung von Infektionskrankheiten beim Menschen. short: Infektionsschutzgesetz/IFSG, see above) still (and actually did since the measles change in 2019) open the door to make some vaccination mandatory exceeding the measles in IFSG §20 Abs 6 - for especially vulnerable parts of the population: Das Bundesministerium für Gesundheit wird ermächtigt, durch Rechtsverordnung mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates anzuordnen, dass bedrohte Teile der Bevölkerung an Schutzimpfungen oder anderen Maßnahmen der spezifischen Prophylaxe teilzunehmen haben, wenn eine übertragbare Krankheit mit klinisch schweren Verlaufsformen auftritt und mit ihrer epidemischen Verbreitung zu rechnen ist. Personen, die auf Grund einer medizinischen Kontraindikation nicht an Schutzimpfungen oder an anderen Maßnahmen der spezifischen Prophylaxe teilnehmen können, können durch Rechtsverordnung nach Satz 1 nicht zu einer Teilnahme an Schutzimpfungen oder an anderen Maßnahmen der spezifischen Prophylaxe verpflichtet werden. § 15 Abs. 2 gilt entsprechend. The general gist of that paragraph is: Following a regulated process, people that are vulnerable and under a present and current risk of an epidemic and that do not have counterindication can be mandated to undergo prophylactic treatment, which can include or be a specific vaccination. TL:DR So yes, there is mandatory vaccination in germany, but currently not for everyone but based on certain criteria.
The first part of the question is trivial to answer - if all men consider the salary on offer to be insufficient, even though it's the same salary that's paid to the (female) employees, then that's the voluntary choice of those men. Bob in all likelihood cannot insist on the presence of a male employee in the meeting. Some countries might have rules for the gender of doctors; many have rules for police officers doing pat-downs. But those are much more personal interactions than meetings.
Such discrimination will in SOME cases probably be unlawful An employer refusing to hire a person because of obesity might be in violation of the California CFEHA, or the Federal ADA, or both. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (CFEHA) will in some cases prohibit such discrimination. Specifically, CA Code section 12940 says: It is an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California: (a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Emphasis added) CA Code section 12926 defines "physical disability": (m) “Physical disability” includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1) Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the following: (A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. (B) Limits a major life activity. For purposes of this section: (i) “Limits” shall be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medications, assistive devices, prosthetics, or reasonable accommodations, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity. (ii) A physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult. (iii) “Major life activities” shall be broadly construed and includes physical, mental, and social activities and working. (2) Any other health impairment not described in paragraph (1) that requires special education or related services. (3) Having a record or history of a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment described in paragraph (1) or (2), which is known to the employer or other entity covered by this part. (4) Being regarded or treated by the employer or other entity covered by this part as having, or having had, any physical condition that makes achievement of a major life activity difficult. (5) Being regarded or treated by the employer or other entity covered by this part as having, or having had, a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment that has no present disabling effect but may become a physical disability as described in paragraph (1) or (2). (6) “Physical disability” does not include sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs. Serious cases of obesity would probably be included in 12926 (m) (1). Less serious cases might be included in 12926 (m) (4) or 12926 (m) (5). In addition, the US Federal Americans with Disabilities act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101) provides in section 12112 that: (a) General rule No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (b) Construction As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term "discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability" includes (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee; (2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs); (3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; (B) that perpetuates the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control; The ADA defines disability in section 12102: Sec. 12102. Definition of disability As used in this chapter: (1) Disability The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)). (2) Major Life Activities (A) In general For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working. (B) Major bodily functions For purposes of paragraph (1), a major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. Whether a particular obese individual will be regarded as having a disability under either the CFEHA or the ADA is a matter of individual determination. Not all obese people will be considered to have a disability as defined by either act (and note that the definitions are quite similar). If a person is so regarded, then to refuse to hire that person because of that disability is unlawful. Note that if a person is unable to perform the essential duties of a job, even with a reasonable accommodation, an employer is free not to hire such a person. There are other limitations and exceptions in each act. To determine if a particular person is protected in regard to a particular job would require an employment lawyer or other employment professional with access to the specific facts of the case.
A company generally cannot compel an employee to agree to a non-compete, but they have a wide variety of alternatives for inducing employees to do so. Most obviously, they may threaten to fire employees who refuse, whether immediately or at the end of their current term, as another answer observes. Indeed, if Big Company makes an NC a condition of employment then they are likely to insist on the same for employees they obtain from Original Employer. Firing employees for refusing to sign does, of course, put them in the job market as potential competitors, but the company may well find it acceptable to do that on their own terms. In particular, Big Company can ensure that those who won't sign go out the door with minimal knowledge of Big Company's clients, trade secrets, etc. other than those obtained from Original Employer. And that leads into other forms of inducement. Big Company can do some or all of the following things, depending on the particular employment situation: offer bonus compensation for signing promote those who sign and / or demote / reassign those who don't change job duties for those who refuse to sign do all manner of nastier things to be unfriendly to employees who refuse to sign Some of those fit directly into Big Company's perceived interest in avoiding employees using Big Company internal information to jump ship and compete with them, and others could fit into Big Company policy about which jobs require an NC. Some are just pressure tactics, but that does not necessarily make them unlawful (nor are all variations on the others necessarily lawful).
What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.
Probably not. The impediment is the claim that you have a genuinely held religious belief. Changing the context a tiny bit, your employer is statutorily required to make an accommodation for the requirements of your religion, therefore they cannot fire you for refusing to work on the Sabbath, unless it would impose an unreasonable burden on them. If they fire you, you complain to the EOC and the EOC sanctions them. The employer's defense would be that you did not request a reasonable religion-based accommodation (you failed to explain that this was about Sabbath). The employer does not scrutinize the validity of your claim (does not demand proof of what your religion requires). In your planned announcement, you are not requesting a statutory accommodation from the government, analogous to requesting an accommodation from an employer, you are offering a defense in the case the government takes action against you for violating the law. There is a statutory exception to the prohibition against employment discrimination based on religion, that (roughly speaking) a church is not required to hire a rabbi instead of a mullah to deliver sermons. There is no statutory exception w.r.t. public accommodations and religious discrimination. Therefore, to implement your plan, you would have to have the law or the EOC's interpretation of it overturned as unconstitutional. To succeed in your argument, you would have to show that the law unconstitutionally restricts your free exercise of your religion. One part would be a demonstration that your religion prohibits... The least likely scenario is that your religion prohibits doing business with a person outside of your religion. I don't of any religion that maintains a requirement of absolute religious segregation, but that is hypothetically a path to argue – that you will burn in hell forever if you do business with a Christian, or a Muslim. I am maximally skeptical that the courts would ever take such a claim seriously. A more likely possibility would involve "compelled speech" as well, where you are forced under the law to express a viewpoint that contradicts your fundamental religious beliefs. You cannot be compelled by law to express a viewpoint. What is less clear is what constitutes expressing a viewpoint, see this. For example, there is a federal law withholding federal funds from schools which discriminate against military recruiters. Some law schools argued in Rumsfield v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights that allowing military recruiters amounts to forcing the schools to express a viewpoint, but the court held that "the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech". The upshot of 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis is that "The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees". A proposal to refuse to service Christians plainly does not fall within the penumbra of that ruling. Nor does a refusal to print books containing religious material (which you already created). You have to cater to Christians, but you do not have to create Christian messages. You could draw a line between a simple ISP who you pay to make available your religious website (you create it), versus hiring a company to design the website, which clearly involves "expression". The issue is simplified if you don't make a claim based on a specific belief system, instead rely on simple "compelled speech" doctrine. General beliefs do not enjoy the same "Free Exercise" protections that religions enjoy. What matters is what you are "expressing", not what you are doing (like, printing).
Is it legal for a college to ask for a 12-month financial history? I'm trying to pull together my in-state residency petition before my fall bill is due after finding out suddenly that my residency was listed as out-of-state while I was on scholarship. The petition requires providing proof of all your expenses, all financial accounts you have and their summaries, any family gift money, and proof of in-state car registration and housing contracts. It seems so extensive after I've lived in-state for two years, have an in-state license, paid taxes in-state for two years, and planned on staying in-state that I feel extremely uncomfortable about it. This level of information isn't even required for a government security clearance and a private sector employer would never be allowed to ask for this. Isn't there some kind of basic privacy law around a person's financial history?
It is legal, unless the laws of that state say otherwise. Governments are allowed to charge different tuitions to residents vs. non-residents. They can also require proof of residence (not just your say-so). Being physically present in a state for a couple of years is not proof of being a resident. That doesn't mean that the interrogation that you are getting is allowed by law, but it's at least consistent with the general pattern of out of state tuition laws in the US. If you have contradictory elements of "proof" (voter registration in another state), they can demand more evidence. It really depends on what the state laws are, so you could name the state. Also, the full financial disclosure may in fact not be related to tuition rates but to financial aid, where they can demand all sorts of things by way of proof.
You don't need to have an existing relationship with a lawyer to refuse to talk to the police. You can tell the police you want a lawyer before answering questions. Generally speaking, this should result in the police leaving you alone, giving you time to reach out to an attorney on your own timeline. This is of course a bit more complicated if you've already been arrested, but in most cases, you'll still be able to make calls out of jail to try to find a lawyer. If you have serious concerns about this kind of situation, having an attorney on retainer would be a good idea. The business end of the transaction is fairly simple. You would likely sign an engagement agreement with the lawyer in which you agree to pay a modest sum -- $500 or $1,000, imagine, and the lawyer would agree to take your calls when they come in and swoop in to deal with the police as necessary. The lawyer would be required to place your money in a trust account and not touch it until you call him to use his services. If you're expecting the lawyer to go further by actually appearing in court for you, filing motions, defending you at trial, etc., the retainer would likely be substantially higher.
Yes, so long as you are still a US citizen, it does not matter if you no longer maintain residence in the United States. If you no longer have any sort of residence that can be claimed as a current residence, you simply register at whatever the last residence you used was when you lived in the United States (even if someone else lives there now). You would then have an absentee ballot mailed to you overseas. However, if you don't maintain any sort of residence in the United States, you will only be eligible to vote for federal offices (president, senate, house). You won't be allowed to vote in state or local elections. The keywords you'll need for voting are: UOCAVA, which is a program that allows for easier voting overseas (in some cases the ballot can actually be emailed to you and you are only responsible for printing it out, filling it out, and mailing it back). FPCA, which is the form you fill out. It actually doubles as a registration and an absentee ballot request, so you only have to fill out one form. The absentee request is good for all elections in the calendar year it is submitted, so you only have to fill it out once for both the primary and the general.
I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely.
There is no state that requires you to show ID to obtain medical care. To the extent that this is done it is done at the behest of whoever is paying for the care to determine that you are someone who is authorized to benefit from this payment, and not an imposter, or as a matter of policy of the doctor. (An exception to this general rule applies when one wants to pick up a prescription for a controlled substance or a Sudafed product, where you must indeed show ID to show that your name matches a prescription or to insure that the right name is entered into the Sudafed database.) It might be more convenient for the doctor in terms of collection of bad debt, insurance policy claims (where an insurance card would normally be required, at least), protection against fraud claims from an insurer, and medical record keeping to have a name, so a doctor might make it a policy to require ID, but it is not required by law (except where a government benefit provider like Medicaid or Medicare is involved and has a regulation requiring it). For example, in the Las Vegas shooting, where there wasn't time to process paperwork, hospital triage officials simply assigned an alias to every incoming patient and wrote it in marker on their body to keep the medical records straight, and to allow that alias to track medical costs to be billed when the time came to get the proper intake paperwork filled out and the file sent to the accounting department. There are also other circumstances that do not involve emergency treatment (e.g. STD testing, methadone treatment at free clinics, and clinical trials) where an alias rather than a true name is sometimes used to keep track of patients.
I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?
If something small or relatively unimportant is incorrect in the document, would you sign it? if my reported debt is high and the bank is willing to give me a loan anyway, then this section of the document shouldn't matter to me. I would not consider it unimportant. The item at issue relates to debts you have (or admit), and it is part of a document whereby you seek to incur further debt. The fact that an inaccuracy of that sort seems immaterial to you does not guarantee that it will be inconsequential. For instance, the inaccurate duplication might be pigeonholing you as a high-risk exposure, allowing the bank to impose on you harsher restrictions now or in the future (especially in the event that you fall behind on the payments). Moreover, knowingly consenting to that inaccuracy could complicate your requests to correct errors (if any) in subsequent credit reports. The rating agency could refute your request by saying "This loan document with your signature on it reflects that you owe this high amount", and the loan officer will not be there to help you. There could be additional ramifications, but these are two I can think of right now. The loan officer's pretext that the inaccuracy stems from auto-populated fields means nothing if that explanation is not clearly stated by the bank in the document you are signing. The document constitutes (or is an important part of) an explicit contract between you and the bank. Others' carelessness about contracts they sign won't help you if things turn ugly later on.
No. Nor would the United States recognize your degree if you got them from the UK or France, or even from within the United States. The United States does not legally protect or sanction PhD holders as such, and has no role in the awarding of nor forming guidelines for PhD programs (other than funding, directly or indirectly, much of the research that is required). Your comments suggest that you think there are legal issues with falsely claiming to hold a doctorate; there are not, outside of normal fraud concerns for deception (wherein someone relies on you or your expertise to their detriment, based on your ), which can affect legitimate doctorate holder's as well (for example, someone with a doctorate in Music presenting themselves as an expert in Economics, for the purposes of soliciting investments, say). For example there are a variety of performers who do not hold doctorates, but legally have stage names containing "Doctor" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_stage_names has a dozen), because they are committing fraud in doing so (a claim of "I liked this song when I thought it was written by a PhD" would be laughed out of court, because holding a PhD has no bearing on musical composition). There are, however, legal issues with falsely claiming to be a member of certain legally regulated and licensed professions in the United States, such as lawyers and physicians. I believe that this is the source of your confusion, as these professions often have protected titles that contain the term "doctor", such as physicians (MD, for Medical Doctor, and dentists(DDS, for Doctor of Dental Surgery). It should also be noted that physicians are almost universally addressed as "Doctor", but very few actually hold doctorates, the MD being a non-academic professional degree that doesn't require doing any new research.
Are there any US laws that correspond to Proverbs 3:27,28,29, or 30? Proverbs 3 27 - Do not withhold good from those to whom it is due, when it is in your power to act. 28 - Do not say to your neighbor, “Come back tomorrow and I’ll give it to you”— when you already have it with you. 29 - Do not plot harm against your neighbor, who lives trustfully near you. 30 - Do not accuse anyone for no reason — when they have done you no harm.
Yes Quite a large chunk of the legal system deals with those general concepts. 27 - pretty much all contract law deals with when and how you must discharge your obligations 28 - ditto, although if it’s not owed until tomorrow … 29 - there are laws against criminal conspiracy 30 - making false accusations can be a crime and can give rise to defamation
I am not a lawyer and I have never even been to the UK. You will not go to prison if your neighbor's dog attacks you and it dies as a result of you defending yourself. You might go to prison and/or owe the owner damages if: You are somewhere you do not technically have a right to be. It can be shown you could have retreated from harm but chose instead to stand your ground. The force you used was deemed excessive - it showed intent to harm the dog more than necessary to protect yourself You contributed to the confrontation in a way that a reasonable person would think might cause trouble You might be able to protect yourself from problems by: taking pictures or videos of the dog behaving badly or aggressively note dates and times when you observe the dog behaving badly or aggressively formally contact the dog's owner with your concerns and/or evidence in which you assert your rights to access the areas you walk through and your right to defend yourself in the event that you are attacked by the dog if possible, change your route or schedule to avoid the problem entirely Good luck
It depends on the jurisdiction, but generally speaking, this will not permit you to evade criminal responsibility. In Ohio, for instance, the complicity statute treats the conduct you're describing as equivalent to soliciting another to commit an offense or to aiding and abetting another in committing an offense: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. The penalty for complicity is the same as for the underlying offense, so you don't really get any kind of break for running your offense through an innocent party; you just get a pissed off witness who can testify against you.
It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.
Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood.
If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.”
NDA over a video call Do I need to force participants in a remote video call to sign a paper NDA before the video call? Or is it enough to mention in the video call something like this after recording the video call: This video call is being recorded. By participating in this video call, you are implicitly bound to a NDA. If you're not willing to be bound to the NDA, please leave now. Can I use the recorded video as NDA evidence?
Sorry, what did I agree to? NDA means New Drug Application, right? Or is it Notre Dame Academy? Maybe it's Nebraska Dressage Association - don't want to cross those guys, their horses are mean. When you are trying to form a contract with someone, it's very important that you and they are talking about the same thing. What can't I disclose? That I had a phone call? What I said? What you said? Only the confidential bits? If so, what are they? Can I tell my business partner? My lawyer? My secretary? The IRS? Another important thing about making a contract is to agree on the terms. Post-facto contracts are not a thing After you paint my fence, you can't demand payment. We have to enter into a contract before the thing that happened happens. Elements of the call might be confidential anyway I am bound to respect confidences that were entrusted to me where a) the information is confidential b) it was imparted to me in a situation of confidence and c) disclosing it would cause harm. We don't need a Non-Destructive Analysis to document that.
The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.
The opt-out option is exercised by hanging up the phone. The federal wiretapping law 18 USC 2511 would contain any specific restrictions on recording federal employees, and there are no such restrictions. Each state has their own laws as well, so if either party is in a two-consent state such as Florida, consent from the other party would be required. The federal law only requires one party consent. It is possible that the individual expanded a separate rule that s/he may have heard of, one prohibiting recording of an IRS due process collection hearing that is conducted by telephone, as ruled in Calafati v. Commissioner. In that case, petitioner owed taxes and penalties and there was a process where the IRS was going to take his stuff, which requires a hearing. There is a federal statute 26 USC 7521 allowing the in-person hearing to be recorded, but no mention of recording telephone hearings. The Tax Court has taken the position that if it is not explicitly allowed, the IRS can forbid it: but this is in a very specific context, i.e. a specific legal hearing.
The subtitles would be protected by copyright, in general. In the US, temporarily downloading the subtitle text to create statistics would, I think, constitute a fair use. It is transformative, it does not serve as a substitute for the original sub titles, and it does not harm the market for the film or for the sub titles. The existence of the API for the subtitles might or might not be evidence for fair use, depending on who supplied the data and under what terms. In other countries that have an exception to copyright for analysis and criticism, such a download might be held to come under such an exception. One cannot be sure until there is case law on the point, and I know of none. The ruling might be different in different countries. Statistics (words and their counts) about the subtitles for a particular film or video would be facts, and as such would not be protected by copyright at all. A text discussing those facts would be protected.
united-states Is a personal text (like a diary), submitted without the consent of the author, admissible evidence? Usually, it is admissible evidence. There is no legal right to keep your diary private. Production of a diary may be compelled by subpoena and admitted into evidence subject only to general considerations regarding whether particular entries in the diary are inadmissible for some other reason (e.g. lack of relevance, they recite the contents of an otherwise privileged discussion, they contain hearsay, they recite the terms of a settlement offer, the recite inadmissible prior act evidence, etc.). If the diary revealed information that could place the diarist at risk of criminal prosecution, the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could arguably be claimed even in a civil case, but at the risk of an adverse inference to be drawn from that decision in civil matters. I haven't ever seen how that issue is resolved legally.
I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.
Generally you can back-date the effective date of a contract. Texas does not have any specific laws that prohibit it and in contracts law, this concept is called the "relation back" theory of contract effectiveness. See Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Bradley Real Est. Trust, 909 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990) for an explanation that back dating violates no general contract law principles and is "determined by the intent of the parties as deduced from the instrument itself." Aside from the obvious issues where someone is back-dating a contract to commit some type of fraud, back-dating raises a whole host of unforeseen consequences with regards to a party's performance under the contract as well as the rights of third parties. The best practice is to make it clear that the effective date and the execution date are different. This avoids confusion and ambiguity that could call the enforceability of the contract into question. Some of the issues that arise when back-dating a NDA are: Liability for disclosures the employee made between the effective date and when the contract is executed/signed. This is particularly troublesome if the NDA provides for liquidated damages or imposes other penalties. If the effective date and execution date are not clear, there might not be a “meeting of the minds.” (The essential elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, and meeting of the minds.) This is a problem for the employer more than the employee. Liability to third parties. Say an employer licensed some technology from a third party and everyone working on the project was required to sign NDAs. Employer could be on the hook here. Also, the employer and employee could both be in trouble if they were back-dating the contract to trick the third party into thinking it had been signed all along. The issue here is fraud. So, the bottom-line is that is generally legal/enforceable, but one should have a clear explanation for the difference in the dates.
As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).
Can't renounce my citizenship due to being a deserter; can I apply for German citizenship? I'm a Turkish citizen who is studying in Germany for the last 5 years. As one might not know, in Turkey, there is compulsory military service for every men. But, I don't want to do it (I don't want to be physically present on Turkish soil). There is also the option of paying ~€6000 and just doing your military service for 3weeks, but I don't want to do it either; I don't have that much money for that kind of thing. Now, I want to become a German citizen by naturalisation, but Germany doesn't allow me to have dual citizenship unless I have no other options. To do that, I want to renounce my Turkish citizenship but the government will be asking me to do my military service in a couple of months and I have no other excuse to give them, so I'll be a deserter, and the Turkish government doesn't allow anyone to renounce their citizenship if they deserted from their military service. So, long story short, there is no way I can renounce my Turkish citizenship. My question is, in 3 years, I'll be able to apply for a German citizenship but I won't be be able to renounce my Turkish citizenship (due to being a deserter). Will the German government recognise my situation and allow me to apply for German citizenship? Have there been similar cases before? If so, what was their result? Note that, criminals are not allowed to apply for a German citizenship, so I don't know whether the German government would consider being a deserter as a being criminal.
Note that, criminals are not allowed to apply for a German citizenship, so I don't know whether the German government would consider being a deserter as a being criminal. First of all, they would deny a criminal German citizenry, but that goes only for crimes, that are also illegal in Germany (Sec. 12a § 2 Nationality Act, § 12a Abs. 2 StAG). Were you - for instance - convicted for muder you couldn't become a German citizen. Desertion in that sense however is not a criminal offence in Germany, so you're good. Regarding double citizenship, Sec. 12 § 1 2nd sentence no. 2 Nationality Act (§ 12 Abs. 1 S. 2 Nr. 2 StAG) allows you to keep your original citizenship, if the country of origin "regularly refuses to grant release from citizenship", which should be the case here. Therefore, you could become a German citizen according to Sec. 10 Nationality Act (§ 10 StAG).
People often use "passport" as a metonym of "citizenship," but that should not lead one to mistake the two. Notably, many US citizens live their entire lives without having a passport. A fairly brief search didn't turn up an explicit statement from an official government source that passport revocation does not affect US citizenship, but that is quite clearly the case if one reads between the lines of the fairly sizeable statutory and regulatory provisions governing both. Nationality law is codified at 8 USC 1401 and following, with the sections governing loss of nationality beginning at 8 USC 1481. The regulations concerning nationality generally are found at 8 CFR 301 and following, but there are not many regulations concerning loss of nationality. Passport law is found in an entirely different title of the US Code, and titles are the highest level of division in the code. It is in 22 USC 411 and following. There are provisions that restrict eligibility for a passport scattered around in there without any section applying specifically to passport revocation. That is found in the related regulations. Passport regulations are codified at 22 CFR Part 51, with revocation being the subject of Subpart E, which is 51.60 and following. There may be an explicit statement in the regulations that passport revocation does not affect citizenship. I did not look very thoroughly. But a bit of logical reasoning shows why it must be so: The conditions for loss of US nationality are very well defined. They are also fairly tightly circumscribed by several decisions of the US supreme court in the decades following the second world war. The conditions for revocation of a passport are much less strict; as an example, a passport may be revoked under 22 CFR 51.62 and 51.60 if the bearer "is the subject of an outstanding Federal warrant of arrest for a felony, including a warrant issued under the Federal Fugitive Felon Act (18 U.S.C. 1073)." US nationality is required to hold a US passport, but US nationals do not need to have a US passport. Therefore, a US passport may be revoked for a reason that cannot lead to loss of US nationality, and, when that happens, US nationality is retained. The condition mentioned in point 2 is clearly insufficient for depriving someone of US nationality, not least because the subject of an arrest warrant is only suspected of having committed a crime. Depriving a suspect of their liberty is acceptable to the extent necessary to bring that person to trial, but further deprivations beyond that end would violate the constitution's guarantee of due process. A word on "nationality" and "citizenship" in US law is in order, lest the use of the two terms seem inconsistent or arbitrary. US nationality is broader than US citizenship. All US citizens are US nationals, so loss of US nationality implies loss of US citizenship. However, there are some people who are US nationals without being US citizens, so it is more precise to speak of "loss of nationality" than "loss of citizenship," and indeed that is the term used in US nationality law.
There are two models for citizenship, by location of birth and by the nationality of the parent. The US chiefly follows the first model, which is why only your grandma's father is American, and your grandma is not. By the same logic, you are not. Countries like Spain are far more lenient, and do allow you to request Spanish citizenship if you can show any of your direct ancestors are Spanish. That's possible because each country can make its own laws within reason. The international norm is that everybody should get at least a citizenship at birth; statelessness should not happen.
In germany, you are likely charged if you actively interfere. Let's preface this with the fact, that in Germany, people have a duty to aid in case of accidents, as long as you don't endanger yourself. The absolute minimum is to call the emergency service and not obstruct those that render aid. However, just not rendering aid is rarely charged. However, since a few years, people that slow down to make videos of crash sites or who stop to look at an accident, and in doing so block emergency helpers, are now almost routinely charged with obstruction of emergency workers, together with possibly other charges like assault and insult. One of the most prominent cases was in 2017, where the person attacked emergency workers and police. He was sentenced to 4 months for the various assaults and bodily injury. Based on this case (where the person was just sentenced for resisting police and assault), it ultimately lead to a new law. One of many cases that started in 2023 had a similar pattern but the charge is based on the new law: § 323 c Abs. 2 StGB - not delivering aid and obstruction of aiding persons. This law allows up to one year of prison time for hindering any person rendering aid. Also, creating pictures at accident sites that depict people or corpses and sharing them in a manner that is humiliating to the victims in itself can be a breach of § 201 a StGB - injury of privacy by means of photography. This can get a sentence of up to two years, and would most likely be joined by a charge of not delivering aid and obstructing helpers. Do note that this is not covering photos that were made for example as evidence of the situation or not shared with third parties. Being in peril yourself... When you technically are in peril yourself, you don't have to render aid. Being stupid like grabbing your carry-on luggage isn't technically covered by the law, and because the person is in danger themselves, it will be very hard for the prosecution to decide if they want to prosecute. If Alice just grabs her carry-on in panic and nothing happens as she evacuates, charging will be extremely unlikely, as in, the chance is nigh nonexistent. Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen. But Charly, who blocks the path of everybody because he wants to go to the other end of the plane to get his luggage and does not let anybody pass and thus increasing the danger of the situation (or even cause death) might break the threshold that the prosecution is willing to prosecute to make an example out of him. The more egregious his behavior was, the more they might look into if other charges can become applicable. However, those other charges are usually not from the blocking or inaction, but from an action against someone that is in the same peril as the actor. If Dora during the building fire grabbed a fire axe and smacked it over someone's head while he was trying to evacuate her, so she could get her items from another room, that would be dangerous mayhem (§ 224 StGB, Gefährliche Körperverletzung).
The DAAD has published a summary of the legal constraints when working as a foreign student in Germany. While the document is only available in German, it is complete and rather authoritative. I summarize the main points here. On a student visa, you are eligible for 120 full days or 240 half days in accordance with §16b (3) AufenthG. This is a legal constraint. It is not up to interpretation. Only mandatory internships constitute a right to further work. In individual cases, the Ausländerbehörde (foreign registration office) can grant authorization for additional work. The authorization will only be granted if the extra work will not jeopardize the purpose of your stay in Germany, which is studying full-time. In particular, work in a study-related job such as a student assistant will generally be eligible for an extension. This is up to the judgement of the office. Thus, there can be differences between different cities. If you intend to surpass the 120/240 day limit, you must get prior authorization. You are otherwise violating the conditions of your visa, which can result in fines and deportation. Additionally, no upstanding employer wants to provide illegal work as they would be subject to penalties themselves. Links: DAAD guidance on working in Germany (German): https://static.daad.de/media/daad_de/pdfs_nicht_barrierefrei/in-deutschland-studieren-forschen-lehren/daad-infoblatt_erwerbstaetigkeit.pdf §16b AufenthG (English): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/englisch_aufenthg.html#p0275
Does this mean that anyone who is born in the US is automatically a US citizen, whether they want it or not? Yes (subject to a couple of exceptions, namely the children of diplomats with full immunity and the children of a hostile foreign occupier). Or does this amendment just offer the possibility of requesting citizenship? In other words: is there an action to be made in order to become a US citizen when born in the US (and therefore one is not before this action is performed)? No. For someone who falls under the 14th amendment's citizenship clause, the only way to avoid being a US citizen is to relinquish or renounce it, which generally means that one is stuck with the US citizenship for at least 18 years. Most countries' citizenship laws, or at least all of those with which I am familiar, operate this way—automatically—for "normal" cases of acquisition of citizenship by virtue of the circumstances of birth. This is true whether the citizenship derives from the place of birth or from the parents' citizenship.
The U.S. Constitution merely requires that you be a U.S. citizen, that you be at least 30 years of age, that you have resided nine years in the United States, and that you currently reside in the state from which you are elected, to be a U.S. Senator. The courts have held that extra-constitutional qualifications for the office may not be imposed. The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed the historical understanding that the Constitution provides the exclusive qualifications to be a Member of Congress, and that neither a state nor Congress itself may add to or change such qualifications to federal office, absent a constitutional amendment. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 800-801 (1995); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). (Source: Congressional Research Service). Therefore, a dual citizen can be a U.S. Senator under U.S. law. This said, the oath of office involved in becoming a U.S. Senator is something that would be considered a voluntary relinquishment of the individual's non-U.S. citizenship by many countries. Under U.S. law: [W]ith the exception of formal denaturalization, a United States citizen can lose his citizenship only if he voluntarily performs an act that is “in derogation of allegiance to the United States,” 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 397, 400 (1969), and that was committed with the intent to relinquish United States citizenship. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1980). “[A]n act which does not reasonably manifest an individual’s transfer or abandonment of allegiance to the United States cannot be made a basis for expatriation.” 42 Op. Att’y. Gen. at 400. Although the Supreme Court has definitively held that Congress cannot provide by statute for involuntary expatriations, it has upheld Congress’ authority to prescribe by statute the types of acts that Congress considers to be generally “highly persuasive evidence . . . of a purpose to abandon citizenship.” See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 139; Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 261, 265. These acts are set forth in § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481. One of these specified acts is a “formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state.” 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6). Other specified acts include: obtaining naturalization in a foreign state; taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; serving in the armed forces of a foreign state; serving in an office or employment under the government of a foreign state that requires assumption of the nationality of that state or a declaration of allegiance to that state; or committing an act of treason against the United States. Id. § 1481(a)(l)-(4), (7). Thus, under U.S. law, the oath of office required to serve as a U.S. Senator if made to a state other than the United States (e.g. in connection with being sworn in as a Mexican Senator), would end the dual citizenship of the person being sworn in to public office, and make them only a citizen of the country in which that elected official held public office (in this example, of Mexico). Many countries cause dual citizenship to be relinquished under similar circumstances.
germany German Länder do not provide any citizenship-like benefits. You are a resident and that determines your administrative duties like where you register your car, which public school you can go to, where and which taxes you have to pay etc. Some places in Germany differentiate their services between "locals" and "others", for example beach access in tourist cities is sometimes locked behind a fee to non-locals (aka tourists). But that never depends on federal state, but on way smaller units. Residents of one beach town might be "tourists" 20km down the road at the next city's beach. It is more of a "the people whose taxes allow us to maintain this, go for free" approach. Outside of badly translated internet forms originally made for the US, I have never been asked for my Bundesland. The Bundesland is not printed on our national ID cards. Although anybody with a little knowledge of geography (or access to Google) can find out your Bundesland by just looking up the actual address that is printed on the ID card, the information of which Bundesland this is is really not important outside of government bureaucracy.
Can charities function as a bankruptcy shield? Take Bill Gates as a hypothetical example. He wants to avoid estate tax, bankruptcy or anything else taking his assets. He created a charity and his children can run it and collect a salary. If the Gates' estate is insolvent does the charity still function? Does it effectively provide an asset shield and allows his children to collect a salary?
Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Charity law A charity must only allocate its resources in pursuance of its charitable objects. Providing a "bankrupcty shield" to a donor is not capable of being a charitable purpose nor does it meet the public benefit requirement pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Charities Act 2011. Bill Gates as a trustee While a charity can pay a salary to its employees, it cannot usually pay its trustees a salary, and its trustees must avoid conflicts of interest. Where a trustee is related to an employee, there is a clear conflict of interest if that trustee takes part in any decision making process which sets the employee's salary. The standard procedure is that any conflicted trustees should sit out of such decisions. If the charity pays a salary far in excess of the market rate for the role, the trustees will open themselves up to being sued by the Attorney General (representing the public / beneficiary) for misallocation of charitable funds. Bill Gates cannot therefore lawfully use his position as trustee of a charity in E&W to ensure that money which he donated is received by his family members via artificially inflated salaries. Bill Gates as a donor If a charity intends to claim Gift Aid on donations then the donation must be non-refundable, pursuant to sections 414(1), 416(1), and 416(3) of the Income Tax Act 2007. In any case, a donor will have no power to compel a charity to return a donation unless the parties entered into a contract to that effect. If no such contract is in effect, then any money Bill Gates has given to the charity is unrecoverable and must be used to further the charity's objects. If such a contract exists, then the adminstrators of Bill Gates' bankruptcy will be able to recover the funds under the contract and use it to pay his creditors, so such an arrangement is useless. Insolvency Act 1986 Under Sections 339 and 441 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the courts can make an order to reverse any transactions at an undervalue (including a gift) which have taken place in the 5 years prior to a bankrupcty (in the case of insolvency) or in the 2 years prior (regardless of insolvency). There is a rebuttable presumption of insolvency under the 5 year rule in cases where the transaction involved an associate of the person. See section 435 for the definition of "associate" which can include relatives, beneficiaries of a trust, and [charitable] companies. This serves to prevent individuals from taking deliberate steps to distribute their assets in advance of a predicted bankruptcy. If the Gates' estate is insolvent does the charity still function? Pursuant to section 34(1) of the Charities Act 2011, a charity will continue to function so long as it remains charitable and hasn't ceased to exist or operate. A charity could cease to exist if the underlying structure no longer exists. In the case of a charitable trust this could happen if all the trustees die without replacement or in the case of a charitable company if it is struck off the register (e.g. if all the directors die and are not replaced). It is unlikely that Bill Gates' estate being insolvent will cause the charity to cease to exist or operate as it will almost certainly have or acquire independent trustees / directors to keep it operating.
@Rick aptly answers your first question (and I totally agree with his answer including his conclusion that the cited provisions apply to single member LLCs). So, I'll touch on issues associated with your second one. Would there be anything legally wrong with my intentionally wasting the company's money or doing something similarly pointless and harmful to the business, considering I'm the only actual person (as in human, not legal person) who is harmed in any way? If the way you use the money wastefully is considered by a court to be a de facto distribution by the LLC to you, its sole member, and this renders it insolvent (as defined in ORS 63.229 (Limitations on distributions), you could have personal liability for the distribution to the company. See ORS 53.235. Creditors of the company could then garnish that obligation to collect their debts owed to the company from you (a garnishment is technically a right to obtain money or property from someone who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, usually a bank or employer, but not always as in this case). Intentionally wasting the company's money would probably constitute a "fraudulent transfer" on the part of the LLC which could expose you to liability to third-party creditors if those actions left the company unable to pay its debts as they came due, or with assets with a fair market value that was lower than the fair market value of its current and currently anticipated liabilities. This parallel liability would arise under the Oregon Fraudulent Transfers Act and related provisions of Oregon law found at ORS 95.200 to 95.310. If you were anticipating or in the process of divorcing, it could constitute economic waste that could be held against you (treating the wasted assets as if they still existed and were allocated to your in a property division). Likewise, if the waste reduced your income for child support purposes, a court would seriously consider imputing the income you could have had if you had not acting in that matter to the income you actually had, in order to calculate your child support obligation. And, you might be disallowed a deduction for the waste of the company's money, rather than having it treated as an expense, which could increase your income tax and self-employment tax liability. But, to the extent that you are the sole owner of the company, no creditor, spouse or child has rights impaired by your actions, and you don't claim the wasted assets as income tax deductions, there would be no one with standing to complain about your conduct in court.
In general, no, if you make a will then you can revoke that will while ever you are still legally competent. Also, in general, this is a good thing. For your first example, you are ruling out all possibility of redemption - people change: a person who is a selfish a*$%^#@e in their 20s may be a kind, caring, dutiful and loving person in their 40s. For your second example, what if XXX gets demolished? Or you move cities? If you are truly serious, you can transfer all your assets to a trust, put your instructions in the trust deed and then nominate someone you really, really, really trust to be the trustee. This would prevent you modifying the instructions but you are then relying on the trustee interpreting them.
They fail as a business and the debt passes to another bank. There is a massive banking catastrophe and most banks fail. Companies do not cease to exist because they are in bankruptcy. Typically a caretaker management is set in place (elected either by the borrowers or the judge overseeing the bankruptcy) to avoid the loss of value during those proceedings. Usually a company in bankruptcy has to reduce its operations because it will find it difficult to get resources to continue its usual operations. But it could continue those operations that are still expected to provide a profit. It would not be unusual for the caretaker manager to ask more funds from the borrowers in order to ensure that they do not lose even more of the value of the company. I would say that debt collection is profitable enough to keep it running, at very least to cover the minimal legal requirements so that the debt does not expire. And at the very least, the debt can be sold to a debt collection agency or another bank, outside of the bankruptcy proceedings (then the net value of this sell is what will be passed on to the borrowers). It will give a small profit for the original company, but at almost no cost or risk for them. Also, the debt holder would have no incentive to collect if it was in bankruptcy proceedings and didnt own anything. You are confusing managers with owners. The people deciding what to do are the managers, and even in bankruptcy managers still owe fiduciary duty to their business. In fact, in general there is no need for the manager of the company to "own anything" of the company they manage, yet they have to work to improve its situation. If a manager negligently caused the company to cause value, he could be sued for it. Even if he is not sued, it would look very bad for him when looking for a new job. In any case, this is not different than the shop across the street going out of business. Have you seen any of them putting a sign telling "We no longer own anything, so come here and help yourself whatever you want for free"? No? A credit card company would not do that, either.
Good news: it behaves like a legal entity. An estate is a collection of assets and liabilities that belonged to the deceased. The collection behaves a great deal like an LLC or other legal entity, although states don't call it that. The collection is isolated from anyone else's collection of assets and liabilities. For instance, it's not part of the executor's personal assets, nor liabilities. That's very important because... If the collection is sued e.g. by a creditor, the suit can only make claims against assets in the "collection". That is to say, the executor's own assets are not at risk. That's very important if you're thinking about volunteering to become an executor or manager of a trust. You can do so without fear of personal liability. Asterisk here *, but don't panic, it's a harmless asterisk. The collection can buy and sell goods and services (more the latter generally). A typical service purchased by an estate is storage unit rental. The collection can hire, fire and generally do business. Consider an estate which owns an apartment building. Life goes on: rent must be collected, utilities paid, leaky toilets fixed, contractors and managers hired and fired. In this case, the estate is a going-concern business behaving a lot like an LLC. The collection/estate could potentially do business indefinitely, if the will of the heirs is to continue doing so. This might happen if splitting the assets equitably amongst the heirs wasn't possible (e.g. the estate of Leonard Cohen collects a lot of royalties)... or too complex to easily back out of (say: the deceased owned 5 McDonalds franchises and had bet the farm on opening two more; backing out now would bankrupt the estate, so the estate might oddly open two McDonalds.) The collection can also sue, and proceeds from the suit or settlement go into the collection. Asterisk again. * The collection has its own Taxpayer Identification Number (aka SSN or EIN). The collection files its own 1040 tax form, and may do so for years or even decades. The point of all these practical examples is that an estate looks, walks and quacks like a "legal entity". To the point where the IRS even calls it one. And to a boots-on-ground executor, manager or trustee, the reality is it handles like a legal entity, and the experience you have managing legal entities will largely apply, almost in full. Almost. * Now, that asterisk. Due to state court rules in many states, if you attempt to sue an estate, you have to use the right name. And that's what this question is all about. It's a naming convention, and that is all. And courts treat it as such. Take Roe v. Wade. "Roe" is an adaption of "Doe" as in "John Doe". Wade, however, was the district attorney of Dallas County at the time of filing. Wade wasn't being sued personally. It's just the quirky naming convention the court uses. What you have identified is a similar quirk in court rules, where instead of suing Estate of John Q. Example, the syntactically correct thing is to sue Jane Doe, in the capacity of, Executor of John Q Example's estate. And the italic parts are optional, because the court knows that. Why is this important? It's not important, and that's what the Florida Court of Appeals said in florida Spradley v Spradley 213 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017. The plaintiff had made exactly the above error: suing "the estate of" instead of suing "Derreck Spradley et.al. (implied: in their capacity as executor)". The judge threw out the case, saying in essence "You forgot to "dot an i". The appeals court said no, the distinction is trivial and the court should have simply let the brother "dot their i" and continue with an entirely valid case. In other words, it was a distinction without a difference. So if sued, the executor should not panic about being "named personally" in the suit - you're not personally liable. And it is a waste of time to pick nits over how the name of the defendant is spelled, so says the Florida court at least... and in my humble opinion that precedent would be well received in other state courts, as it avoids wasting docket time and citizen filing fees on an action that will simply be re-filed correctly the next day. Not a license to cheat, however. One way an executor can manage to create personal liability is to abuse or mishandle the role with extreme negligence. In that case, yes, the executor's personal assets could come under fire, basically as punishment for misdeeds. An executor who is careful, honest and gets help when needed won't have any trouble at all.
Whether or not the estate has an obligation to pay the mortgage is really dependent on the terms of the estate plan and the solvency of the estate. The fact that someone is on the deed to a property (whether a deed of gift or a transfer on death instrument) that automatically passes upon death of the original owner to a relative has little or nothing, really, to do with the estate plan. While it may have been part of the person's ultimate plan for the disposal of their assets in life and at death, that is different than being part of the actual estate plan, which deals with the disposition of assets upon death, setting out the wishes of the deceased as it pertains to all property. There are lots of people who end up in this position, even though the original person on the deed did not intend to purchase or leave the other any property. It happens a lot when say a child does not have adequate credit to secure a mortgage to buy a home, but has the money to pay a mortgage. So, in that scenario usually a parent or grandparent will put the mortgage in their name (the other will live there and pay the mortgage) and then in the event the "helper" dies, they have it pass to the other at death, either thru a "TOD" or a "joint tenancy", so that in the event they die intestate, or if the will is challenged, there will be no question who owns the house...the equity in it, anyway. It (the instrument) is its own separate entity, not subject to the will except to the extent the deceased makes it subject (I'm getting to that part). Like a life insurance policy, that pays on death but is not subject to any terms of the will, it can stand alone since deed is its own instrument, separate from any wills or trusts. Under federal law, the mortgage must be allowed to remain in effect without changes when it passes from one person to another because of a death. This negates any due-on-sale clause in the mortgage. Who pays for the remainder of what is owed, however, generally depends on the deceased's will. The will might stipulate, for example, that the heir receive the home, free and clear, with the estate to pay all monies due. In this case, the executor will either use liquid assets, or sell other non-liquid assets in the estate to pay off the mortgage. Other times, it will say that the heir get the equity, plus X amount of dollars, which the heir can put toward the home's mortgage or not. If the will is silent on the issue, it is the responsibility of the heir/person to whom the property transfers (they needn't even be an heir) to pay the mortgage upon its normal term due, or sell the property to satisfy the debt. In the event the property is worth less than the remaining mortgage, the bank will usually take the house in "deed in lieu of foreclosure" rather than seek overage from the estate.
The actions that constitute patent infringement do not depend upon whether or not the infringer is a nonprofit or not. Disgorgement of profits is one possible remedy for patent infringement, and if the entity made less profits than a for profit company might have under similar circumstances, from the infringement, that particular remedy would be likely to be smaller. But, this would not preclude other remedies such as a reasonable royalty or profits lost by the patent holder due to reduced sales, or injunctive relief.
Expanding on @Rick's answer, the UK government does not hold all of its money in an undifferentiated general fund (although much of it is held that way). In non-profits and government, one generally uses "fund accounting", in which particular pots of money can only be used for particular purposes and the government keeps track of how much money is held in each fund. In this case, credit in a fund for cabinet operations would be transferred to a fund for privacy violation fines whose disposition would be set forth either in the Data Protection Act (2018) itself, or in some other piece of legislation (perhaps statutes on court administration) setting forth how funds collected as fines are used. This said, the intuition of the question isn't wrong. When one part of the government fines another part of the government, especially if the fine has the impact of preventing the fined part of the government from carrying on necessary governmental operations, the economic effort of the fine can be swiftly wiped out in the next annual appropriations bill, or in an interim emergency appropriations bill, if necessary. And, if the individual offenders who committed the violations aren't penalized, this may not be a very effective incentive to bring about compliance with the law. Of course, even if the economic incentive that the fine creates to comply is negligible, this doesn't mean that the symbolic and political cost of holding a government agency accountable in the same way that a private firm would be held accountable, that indicates the magnitude of the wrong done, is meaningless for the politicians running that agency.
Which military ranks in the U.S.A. can be held by non-citizens? Which military ranks in the U.S.A. can be held by non-citizens? Might it be everyone except commissioned officers?
Might it be everyone except commissioned officers? Not necessarily Non-commissioned ranks require either a Green Card as per Title 10 U.S. Code § 504: (1)A person may be enlisted in any armed force only if the person is one of the following: ... (B)An alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)). Or (2) ... the Secretary concerned may authorize the enlistment of a person not described in paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that such person possesses a critical skill or expertise— (A)that is vital to the national interest; and (B)that the person will use in the primary daily duties of that person as a member of the armed forces. And Title 10 U.S. Code § 532 states that non-citizens cannot hold a commission: (a) ... a commissioned officer (other than as a commissioned warrant officer) in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, Regular Marine Corps, or Regular Space Force may be given only to a person who— (1)is a citizen of the United States... UNLESS they have a Green Card and a waiver: (f)The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) with respect to a person who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or for a United States national otherwise eligible for appointment as a cadet or midshipman under section 2107(a) of this title or as a cadet under section 2107a of this title, when the Secretary determines that the national security so requires, but only for an original appointment in a grade below the grade of major or lieutenant commander.
The names of such units are not protected by copyright, and never were. However their insignia would have been under Crown copyright See also Ministry of Defence Crown Copyright Licensing Information. Crown Copyright expires after 50 years for all published works, but lasts for 125 years after creation for unpublished works. Works obtained through archives, such as the Imperial War Museum, are often considered unpublished, unless they were previously published in some form. Use of an insignia on a uniform may not constitute publication. Some UK military insignia, including most current insignia, is also protected by trademark. But if the insignia are not used to advertise a product, nor to identify a product, nor in such a way as to imply sponsorship, endorsement or approval, trademark protection would not apply. In any case it is not at all clear that WWII-era insignia of now-defunct units are currently protected by trademark in the UK. If an insignia is still under copyright or trademark, the above linked licensing information describes how to apply for a license. Free licenses are available in some cases for use in books, but not, apparently, for "commercial products".
Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
Legal Representation: You have the right to represent yourself in a legal proceeding, but you cannot assign that right to anyone that you choose, only to certain approved individuals. Vote: You can vote, and you cannot assign that right to another. Jail Sentence: You can (indeed must) serve a jail sentence or be executed for a capital crime yourself, but you cannot allow another person to do that on your behalf. Military Draft: When we had the draft (most recently), you could not authorize another person to serve in your stead. Marriage: You can marry your neighbor's sister (if she is not related to you), but you cannot transfer that right to your neighbor (who is the brother of the intended bride). These are different things from committing suicide, but it's not clear exactly what concept of exclusive sovereignty you're getting at.
If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.
I think we're talking about In re Hennen, which dealt with the removal of the clerk of the district court in Louisiana: It all these departments power is given to the secretary, to appoint all necessary clerks; 1 Story, 48; and although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department. It would be a most extraordinary construction of the law, that all these offices were to be held during life, which must inevitably follow, unless the incumbent was removable at the discretion of the head of the department: the President has certainly no power to remove. These clerks fall under that class of inferior officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the head of the department. The same rule, as to the power of removal, must be applied to offices where the appointment is vested in the President alone. The nature of the power, and the control over the officer appointed, does not at all depend on the source from which it emanates. The execution of the power depends upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to administer it. And the Constitution has authorized Congress, in certain cases, to vest this power in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and all inferior officers appointed under each, by authority of law, must hold their office at the discretion of the appointing power. Such is the settled usage and practical construction of the Constitution and laws, under which these offices are held. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259–60, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839) (emphasis added).
There are two models for citizenship, by location of birth and by the nationality of the parent. The US chiefly follows the first model, which is why only your grandma's father is American, and your grandma is not. By the same logic, you are not. Countries like Spain are far more lenient, and do allow you to request Spanish citizenship if you can show any of your direct ancestors are Spanish. That's possible because each country can make its own laws within reason. The international norm is that everybody should get at least a citizenship at birth; statelessness should not happen.
This is a hard question, but a good question. The following relates to the issue from the perspective of the USA. You ask "...if the US wants to invade France, can they officially declare war by...", You have to make clear what you mean by "can". If you mean whether or not the US has the physical ability to do this, then of course they do. If you mean whether they are allowed, then this is another question. When you ask whether something is allowed, then you have to make reference to a moral code or a law that determines what is and what isn't allowed (legal). Normally each country will have laws that govern what is and what isn't legal for it's citizens to do. That hard part is how this applies to nations. There are two sides to the question. (1) What are the leaders allowed to do under their own laws, (the domestic laws) (2) what are countries as entities allowed to do? (the international laws) It sounds a bit like you are asking about the second thing. Here treaties govern what is and what isn't "legal". However, usually when someone breaks a law, other entities have the power to enforce that law and decide (judge) whether the person has broken the law. The question is: who decides whether a country has broken a treaty or an international law? And if a law is broken, what exactly can be done about it? This is hard to answer. Consider for example the conflict in Ukraine. Here many will argue that Russia has piratically invaded Ukraine. There should be war between the nations. But Russia denies this and other world powers have done little beyond imposing sanctions. This illustrates how hard it is to deal with this question. One question that comes up is what the purpose of international treaties are if a country can just violate them without much consequence. Pointing out two points about this. (1) If, for example, a president wants to convince his/her own congress that the country should engage in war, then it makes a stronger point if you can show how the country you want to engage has violated international trities. (2) After you have won a war, you might want to prosecute the leaders of the loosing power. Here you will stand stronger if you can make references to some international law that existed before the conflict started. This second point is illustrated in the Nuremberg principles. Here it was exactly stated that "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." According to the US constitution "Congress shall have power to ... declare War". That means that historically Congress has the power to decide where to wage war. The War Powers Resolution says, for example, that "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities ...". Note that this doesn't mean that the US has do formally declare war before going to war. Example: The Iraq War was authorized by Congress, but there never was a formal declaration of war. It is interesting that you ask about the timing for when the declaration should be given. The Japanese wanted to deliver their declaration of war just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But because of issues with decrypting the message from Japan to the Japanese Embassy, the declaration wasn't delivered until after the attack. Remember also in all of this that the winning party to a conflict, usually decides what was and wasn't legal! One good reference for more on all of this is the report by the Congressional Research Service called "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications". Here you can see more on what I have tried (and failed?) to say above.
Is it required to have someone on premises? Let's say I have a premises that one can enter to do fun activities, costing €5 to enter. I was thinking that you could use a turnstile and an automated payment system to allow guests to enter the premises. This means there wouldn't be a need for a manager/receptionist on the premises at all times (or at any time for that matter). I'm curious, however, if there is any legal requirement to have someone on the premises to keep an eye on things? Would there be any liabilities for a business if something happened that could have been avoided if someone was there? Regardless, CCTV could be used to monitor remotely. I'm specifically interested in the laws for Ireland, but answers for other jurisdictions would be interesting as well.
I think the concerns are more economic than legal, although legal concerns are sometimes present. You don't want people to trash the place. You want there to be an "authority figure" whose presence encourages order, deal with unexpected situations, and whom people who aren't tech savvy feel comfortable dealing with, and it can create a better customer service relationship. It really depends on the nature of the premises. There is not a one size fits all rule. There are situations where one doesn't have someone on the premises. There are bank vestibules with automatic teller machines in them. There are coin entry bathroom/shower facilities. There are self-storage facilities that work like that. There are deeply rural places with low traffic that rely on an honor system rather than trying to monitor use (e.g. some campsites). There are AirBnB type rentals. The are car repair shops with after hours drop off boxes. On the other hand, there are some situations where it is pretty much inconceivable that you wouldn't have someone one site monitoring the situation. I'm pretty sure that you have to have someone on premises for a pub. I'm sure it is necessary in places where you have unaccompanied minors (at a minimum, as a practical reality for liability purposes). There aren't many medical services that can be provided in that format (although there might be a few).
Has this contract been translated (badly) from another language because the construction of the clause is cumbersome and confusing? Does the contract say that I can have guests over 1 night without charge? Without charge, yes. However "Without Landlord's prior written consent, Tenant has no excuse to accommodate ..." so you need the landlord's permission for overnight guests. If so does it only start charging on nights after the first? No, if a person stays more than 1 night (with the landlords permission) then this triggers the landlord's right to charge. See below for how much they can charge. Is it supposed to be 10% of monthly rent $137 per guest per night? "With temporary commendation, day-based, and additional 10% of rent each person is applied." The term is ambiguous, I can see three ways that this would be interpreted: If you have a guest who stays more than 1 night in a month they can charge 10% for that guest for that month (i.e. 2 to 31 days all for the same price). For 2 people for 2 days this would be $1,400 x 10% x 2 = $280. They can charge 10% of the monthly rent per night that the guest stays. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2 = $560 As, 1 except the rent would be pro-rata. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2/31 = $18.06 Assuming that the landlord put forward this contract the interpretation adopted in the absence of other evidence would be the one least advantageous to the landlord i.e. 3. However, there is other evidence - the landlord accepts that the rate is pro-rata - he has just failed to account for the 10%, so 3. again. How is overnight defined? Well, is it defined in the contract or by the law where you are? If not, it would take its normal English usage - "for the duration of the night". If they arrive before sunset and leave after sunrise the next day then they have stayed overnight. What if they came over at 9am and slept in the day? It says nothing about requiring your guests to sleep. If they party overnight then they are overnight guests. If they sleep all day but don't stay overnight they are not overnight guests. What about 2 am? If sunrise is after 2am then this is not overnight.
They are probably not required to provide online access at all. They are probably required to provide some sort of written statement, unless you have waived that in favor of online or electronic versions. The exact requirements will vary in different jurisdictions.
Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police.
Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).
The primary legal question is whether the resident (tenant) has breached a duty of care. There are all sorts of laws establishing duties of care, such as between doctor and patient, which may be created by a legislature or may be part of common law tradition. There is a duty of care imposed on a landlord w.r.t. the tenant, requiring that the premise be "secure", therefore a landlord might easily be held liable if the main door into the building was not locked. This duty is a specific instance of a general duty from tradesman/businessman to customer. As far as I can determine, there is no such statutory duty imposed on tenants in Washington state, and none from case law being revealed by a few cursory searches. In order to be subsumed under general "everybody has a duty to everybody else" law, the damage would have to be foreseeable. It is said that "If something is foreseeable, it is a probable and predictable consequence of the defendant’s negligent actions or inaction". This mean that a reasonable person would have known that, under the circumstances, the damage is likely to result. Circumstances vary quite a bit, and there is no general rule about holding the door open for another person. If there is abundant signage reminding tenants to never ever let in a stranger no matter that their excuse and/or if the premise is in a crime war-zone, the outcome is more likely to be considered to be foreseeable.
First of all, cruise ships are not lawless zones. At all times, the law of their country of registration applies. In addition, if they are in sovereign waters, that country's law applies. Also, many countries impose their law on ships that depart from their ports until they dock in another country's port. And finally, international maritime law applies (IML). In many ways, ships are some of the most heavily legalised places on Earth. Actions can be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction and that court will decide which law to apply. For example, a UK ship en route from Sydney to Noumea is governed by IML, UK law and NSW/Australian law while in NSW/International waters and will also be governed by New Caledonian law when it enters New Caledonian waters. Second, cruise ships do have a brig where people can and will be confined. The normal practice when someone commits a crime (like boarding without paying) and or breaks their contract with the cruise company is that that person is confined to the brig or their cabin and put off the ship at the next port of call. If there was a crime involved, they would be handed over to local law enforcement for investigation, prosecution and possibly extradition. If not then they would just be left on the dock - they would need to find their own way home. Usually, the cruise company would hand them a bill for the cost of their confinement, food etc.; if they pursue this debt or not is a different matter. A person without valid travel documents may find themselves in trouble with local immigration as well. Finally, boarding a cruise ship at sea without the cooperation of the ship would be damn near impossible. Even small cruise ships have 10 or more decks with the places where the ship can be accessed 2 or more decks (say 6-8m) above the waterline. If the ship was stationary it might be possible to throw up a rope I guess but if it was cruising at 12 knots, forget about it.
In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important.
Is it legal to publish a game that already exists but it was 100% developed by me I am a lover of classic games and I've developed some classical games such as: Connect 4 Monopoly Trivial Battleship My main question is what will happen if I publish any of these applications in the existing app stores such as Play Store or App Store for Android/iOS. Can I create my own games and publish them? Or I will encounter legal problems because these games have been around for years and are protected by the creators. Should I use an exclusive design or can I rely on the designs of the original games? Nowadays, I can see most of these games are published by different developers than the original creator of the game.
It depends on the game and what you copy. Games are an utter nightmare when it comes to IP law as so many parts of them cannot be copyrighted. Game rules for example cannot be copyrighted, nor can the concept itself. Some things can be copyrighted or trademarked. You cannot use the following: Names Written elements- while the rules themselves can't be copyrighted, rulebooks can Artwork and other visual elements Miniatures designed for the game Original characters Try to avoid these and the Hasbro lawyers should leave you alone.
It's Problematic The castle is both copyright and trade mark of Disney. As a trade mark, you are not permitted to use it in a way that indicates that yours is a Disney product or affiliated with Disney - you are probably OK here. As a copyright, Disney has the exclusive right to make derivative works which is what your mosaic is. So, you either need Disney's permission or the work needs to fall under the fair use exemption. As a single domestic work which substantially changes the original it probably does but the only way to know for sure is get sued and win. If you go ahead I would ask your client to indemnify you, however, this is only effective to the extent that your client has the financial resources to defend the lawsuit or pay the damages. However, there is an alternative. The Cinderella Castle was inspired by real architecture, all of which is public domain. If you copy one of these castles (e.g. Neuschwanstein Castle) you have no issues with Disney and only a true fanatic would notice the difference.
The images as displayed are quite similar, similar enough that one could violate the copyright of the other. But that is not enough to know if there was in fact a copyright infringement. There are several possibilities: Although using different names, the developers could in fact be the same company. One developer might have obtained permission to use the image from the other. Both images might be based on the same 3rd-party image which both are using with permission. Both images might be based on a public domain image. Copyright is only infringed if a protected work, or a derivative version of the work, is used without permission from the copyright holder. Without knowing who the rights-holder is, and if permission has been obtained, one cannot know if an infringement has occurred. There is no independent or 3rd-party entity that checks for copyright infringements. By the way, the similarity here is close enough that there might also be an issue of trademark infringement. But again, infringement requires use of a protected mark without permission, and so some of the same possibilities arise. (The source of a trademarked logo doe not matter. On the other hand there cannot be trademark infringement unless the mark has been registered, or actually used in commerce. If the same image is used on products in very different industries, say games and hammers, there may or may not be infringement.)
united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app.
Copyright infringement requires copying. The inventor could very reasonably invent a device without any reference or even knowledge of the artistic depiction in the Portal games. If the inventor hasn't copied anything, they aren't infringing copyright. Also, with respect to 2d depictions of 3d objects, only architectural drawings are protected in that way: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_in_architecture_in_the_United_States With respect to your patent question, Valve hasn't publicly disclosed how to make a Portal gun, so an inventor of a Portal gun would not be blocked from patenting it. You can't get a patent without describing how to actually make the invention.
If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database.
A person who uses a name similar to an existing protected trademark may have committed trademark infringement. The trademark owner can sue, and possibly collect significant damages, and possibly also get an injunction against further infringement. Note that this is not a matter of a crime, but of a lawsuit by one person or business against another. (A point of terminology: A trademark, like a copyright, is said to be "infringed" when someone uses it without permission in ways that the law does not allow. The word "broken" is not used for this.) In many countries, only marks properly registered with the appropriate national registry are protected. In the US simply using the mark can lead to its being protected, although registration can give greater rights to the mark owner. Protection in one country does not give protection in another. In general, protection only applies in the same or a similar market area as that in which the mark is already being used. An electronic game may well be similar enough to a card or board game for protection to apply. A key question is how similar a mark can be and avoid infringement. The basic test is if a reasonable person could be confused into thinking that the products were from the same maker, or were affiliated, or that the maker of the original product or service endorsed the new one. This is always something of a judgement call. If a mark is similar enough that a judge or jury might think that some reasonable consumers would be confused or mislead, then there is risk of an adverse judgement. Note that even an unfounded suit may be costly to defend. If there is any question, consulting an experienced trademark lawyer may well be a good idea. I will not express an opinion of the similarity of "2oobbllee" and "Dobble". That would be legal advice. But if the OP were to change the name of the app, the whole matter would seem to be finished with no risk of court action. Note that the concept of a game, unlike the name, cannot be protected, neither by trademark law nor by copyright law,
The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.
Is it legal to get a 3rd booster shot unauthorized by the CDC in the US? I read that at least 1 million people in the US got 3rd booster shot unauthorized by the CDC. I wonder whether the fact that the booster shot is not authorized by the CDC has any legal ramifications in the US. Is it legal to get a 3rd booster shot unauthorized by the CDC in the US?
The CDC does not authorize shots or vaccine distribution. The FDA authorizes vaccine distribution, or distribution of medicines in general. A medicine is authorized for use in a certain way, which is an "instruction" directed at the medical professional. So-called "off-label" use is discussed by the FDA here. Such use if legal, it simply stretches the limits of what the FDA was allowed to approve (e.g. was found to be safe and effective for X, was not similarly tested for Y). Patients are free to take whatever medicines they want if they can find them, and if they are not on the Controlled Substances list. Hence it's legal to take DMSO, but it's not legal to peddle it as a cancer cure. The prescription regime for covid vaccinations seems to be somewhat relaxed, in that it is likely that many people get a vaccine without a (meaningful) doctor's exam, instead, you show up and get the shot. This is normal with flu shots. The upcoming 3rd shot approval is addressed to doctors, so they can then recommend third shots.
Whether or not the federal government can pass its own law mandating vaccination is a separate question. The answer to the question “can the Federal government of the United States force all U.S. states to pass a mandatory vaccination mandate?” is a straightforward “No.” Such action by the federal government is contrary to the Anti-Coercion Doctrine. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, the issue was a federal law, the National Drinking Age law, which withheld 5% of federal funds (initially, 10% every year thereafter) from a state that did not have a minimum drinking age of at least 21. The Supreme Court court upheld the law not because Congress has the power to withhold federal funds in order to get what they demand from a state but because the 5% loss of funds is not so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion In other words, pressure is legal, compulsion is not. The court did not set a dollar amount that distinguishes impermissible coercion from permissible financial incentive, but we can presume that 10% loss of related federal funds would be tolerated. In NFIB v. Sebelius, SCOTUS overturned a law that allowed Medicaid funds to be entirely taken away if a state did not change its laws with respect to Medicaid in a specific way. The court held that The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion... The Medicaid expansion thus violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expansion There is a possible law that Congress could pass that would give states an incentive to pass a law about vaccination, but Congress cannot force states to pass any law.
Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect.
If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.
Does this mean that anyone who is born in the US is automatically a US citizen, whether they want it or not? Yes (subject to a couple of exceptions, namely the children of diplomats with full immunity and the children of a hostile foreign occupier). Or does this amendment just offer the possibility of requesting citizenship? In other words: is there an action to be made in order to become a US citizen when born in the US (and therefore one is not before this action is performed)? No. For someone who falls under the 14th amendment's citizenship clause, the only way to avoid being a US citizen is to relinquish or renounce it, which generally means that one is stuck with the US citizenship for at least 18 years. Most countries' citizenship laws, or at least all of those with which I am familiar, operate this way—automatically—for "normal" cases of acquisition of citizenship by virtue of the circumstances of birth. This is true whether the citizenship derives from the place of birth or from the parents' citizenship.
Context is important. There is no law against taking a picture of a child who is entirely naked or exposing certain body parts. The laws in question such as 18 USC 2251 refer to the fact that the minor "engage[s] in, any sexually explicit conduct". Sexually explicit conduct is defined in 18 USC 2256, and would include "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" (which does not include nipples of anyone). Federal law does not define "lascivious", but the ordinary meaning of the word does not include the situation that you describe. The Justice Department, which goes after child pornographers, provides this guide to federal child porn laws. Georgia's child porn law is only marginally different, referring to "Lewd exhibition" rather than "Lascivious exhibition" , and including the "Condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained on the part of a person who is nude" (so a picture of a person holding a naked baby would technically qualify, but is highly unlikely to be prosecuted as production of child porn). These laws pertain to any form of child porn, including "private use only". Dissemination would be an added charge.
I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.
California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.
"Impressumspflicht" outside Germany for individuals This is another "Do I need an Impressum" question in a special case. I understand under German law, an impressum is required for all websites except strictly non-profit-oriented websites for private purposes. Assuming I'm a small musician of some kind from inside Europe but outside Germany. I've got a website in English and my native language where I offer bookings (for paid services). Would I need an impressum? (They don't pay on the website but there's a form to get in contact with me) Another assumption; I know Germany is pretty strict and they even go after bloggers who post personal content but use Google Ads (or similar ad services). They would require an impressum if they're based in Germany. Would this also apply for bloggers outside Germany if they're using Google Ads (to finance their website)? Are there known cases where German executive go after private individuals (such as bloggers that are placing ads on their site) in another country? Wouldn't this be an enormous effort?
If you operate from outside Germany but within the EU, it is generally sufficient to satisfy your own country's regulations. This is a foundational principle of the EU single market, though it's not quite realized yet and has exemptions for consumer protection purposes. However, the German TMG law which includes the Impressumspflicht explicitly enshrines this principle. So from the German Impressumspflicht perspective, you're good to go. However, you will not be able to operate anonymously, because of your country's laws. GDPR requires you to clearly state your identity and contact details in your privacy notice. If you engage in internet-based commerce, the EU eCommerce Directive will have caused your EU member state to pass legislation that requires you to disclose: your name the geographic address where you are established contact details incl an email address if applicable, registration numbers from trade registers or similar if applicable, your VAT ID Note that you must have a VAT ID for cross-border B2B sales within the EU. You state that you are not selling anything via your website, and are instead collecting payments via another website. What the consequences of this are would depend on the laws and caselaw in your jurisdiction, but you will have to make these disclosures on at least one of the two websites. About Germany going after bloggers who show ads: income from ads is taxable income, and operating a business requires registration. However, the German Impressumspflicht is rarely enforced by the state. Instead, other market participants (competitors) trawl the internet for potential violations and then send a cease-and-desist letter. They can do this because skirting legal obligations distorts the level playing field, which harms those competitors. There is a thriving cease-and-desist industry built around this, but it only affects businesses that operate within Germany.
It's not illegal to say things in your profile. SE requires you to license your content to them on a non-exclusive basis pursuant to CC BY-SA 4.0. "Non-exclusive" means that you can also license the material to others on some other basis, e.g. CC0. In that case, a person who uses your material can rely on the other license that you granted. If SE wanted to, it could prohibit putting licenses in a user profile, in which case you would have to promulgate your more generous license elsewhere.
That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money.
Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it.
I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.
Short preface: You might want to consult with a lawyer if what that website does really constitutes trademark infringement. But the question did not ask for that. It asked what to do if you want to send a C&D to a website without contact information. That's the question I will answer here. Whether or not the C&D letter itself has merit in this particular situation is another question, and probably one which would violate our "specific legal advise" rule. You can use a whois-database to find the public information on who operates a domain. Doing so for the domain in question yields that the contact information of the actual domain owner was "Withheld for Privacy Purposes". That means the domain was registered through a domain-by-proxy service. The postal address in Iceland you see in the record is the address of that service, not of the domain owner. But you can see the registrar which hosts the domain: "Name Cheap Inc.". So that's somewhere you can address complaints to. If you cause them enough problems, then you might be able to get them to take the website down. Those discount webhosters don't make nearly enough money per customer to fight their legal battles for them. Just reading a C&D letter already costs them more than hosting a website for a year. So they might just fire the customer to avoid the trouble of dealing with you. But then the website might just reappear hosted by some other company a day later and you are back at square one. The registrar should also be able to tell you the real identity of the person who operates the website. However, they will likely not tell you without putting up a fight, as revealing private information without being legally obligated to might make them liable for violating a bunch of privacy laws. Ask your lawyer if there is any hope to get a subpoena forcing them to give you the identity.
Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.
I don't believe GDPR makes a distinction between 'real life' and 'online'. It's all real life. You can tell anyone that they don't have consent to keep your personal data, but that doesn't mean they always have to delete it. There are six lawful bases for processing of personal data, so if an organisation is using and can justify one other than consent then they don't necessarily have to delete your data when they ask. The six bases are listed by the UK Information Commissioner's Office: (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/#ib3
Can I be taken to court over a favour? So, basically I used to work at an automotive parts dealer and I bought a car from the owner of the store. The car developed a gearbox issue before my ownership due to a mistake on the mechanics' part. I decided to buy the car since the owner promised to fix the issue. He decided to do me a favour and buy a new gearbox and that the broken gearbox gets fixed at a later date to avoid me being off the road for too long since that would’ve been my only mode of transport to and from work. He ordered the new gearbox and fitted it to the vehicle. Over time he started pressuring me into getting the broken gearbox fixed. He agreed to pay for all the parts and labour. I found a local garage and dropped the gearbox to them with his permission. It so happened that meanwhile the gearbox was at the garage, I decided to leave the job and work elsewhere. The garage disassembled the gearbox and sent a parts list to the owner. He wasn’t convinced that the garage were telling the truth and instead thought they were trying to con him. So he asked me to call them and tell them to cancel the job and put the gearbox back together so that it could be delivered back to the shop from the garage. I did so and the garage sent me an invoice for the time which amounted to £150. I sent the invoice to the owner and he has refused to pay the invoice and expects me to pay for it which in my opinion is unfair and he knows I’m unemployed so I’m financially vulnerable yet still expects that. My question is can he take legal action against me? What should I do as it’s a very stressful situation.
Legal action might be taken by the garage, because you had a contract to repair the gearbox which you cancelled (causing them some damages in time spent). You could hope that the store-owner will pay the invoice that you sent, but that seems to not be likely. The store owner can't sue you for sending him the invoice: the mechanic can sue you for not paying what the work billed for. But you do have a recourse, which is that you were acting on behalf of the store owner. I assume that you were in possession of the old gearbox, so it simplified matters if you took transported it to the mechanic, since the store owner was going to pay. In other words, you were acting as the store owner's agent: you were authorized to create a contractual arrangement between the garage and the owner. The one problem is that apparently the garage thought they were doing the work for you, and not for the owner. So they may sue you, and you may sue the owner. And suing anybody costs money. The owner is, perhaps, trying a strategy of not paying what he does actually owe, in the theory that the alternative of suing is too much time and bother (besides, it's the garage owner who would have to get the ball rolling – unless the shop owner first wants to sue to recover the gearbox). Given the information you have provided, I don't see a basis for the shop owner suing you. In order to sue someone, that person has to have caused you some damage. He could claim that he didn't authorize you to take the gearbox to the garage, or that you were negligent in making the arrangements with the shop (for instance if he said "but only if they will do the diagnosis for free"), in which case the court will have to decide whose story is more believable.
Your problem is not just that you don't have a working stopcock, but that you now know that you don't have one. Of course it's not illegal by itself, the problem is what is going to happen if you have an insurance case. Your home insurance most likely has to pay for accidental damage. But any damage that would be caused by not being able to close the stopcock, when you knew it wasn't working, they could claim that this is due to gross negligence. Whether they would succeed with that claim or not, I don't know, but fixing the stopcock seems to be a much, much cheaper solution. PS. Seems I made a wrong assumption here - that it was your home, owned by you. The same reasons that would have made it a good idea for you to fix the stopcock obviously make it a good idea for the landlord as well. So I would make sure that you tell the landlord as soon as possible. If something goes wrong, and the insurance doesn't pay, your landlord would be responsible for the damage. Whether it's legal to not fix the stopcock - that's a different matter. I thought you were the owner. You would have endangered yourself and your property. Nothing illegal with that. But with the landlord it's different; he wouldn't be endangering himself but someone else's property.
This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.
You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.
If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail.
Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line).
a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.
You are responsible It is unlikely that the arrangement you had with the sitter amounts to a contract. Even though there was consideration on both sides, at first blush it seems unlikely that both of you intended to create legal relations. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Notwithstanding, if there is a contract it is silent on who is responsible to for injury to the pet so it would fall back on the law of negligence anyway. For the sitter to be responsible, she must have been negligent. She wasn't. See Is there liability for pure accidents? Looking at the elements: a duty to the plaintiff, such a aduty probably exists. breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), she didn't (see below). the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm, no question that you have. the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of that harm, and that harm was foreseeable, probably it wasn't (see below). Here are the facts: She took the dog on public transport - not unreasonable, many people do. The fact that you wouldn't is irrelevant since you did not communicate this prohibition to the sitter. She took it to an off-leash park - not unreasonable, that's what they are for. She rode an escalator - it is unclear if she carried the dog or expected the dog to ride the escalator itself. The first is clearly reasonable, the second may or may not be depending on the size of the dog etc. She noted the injury and had it treated - eminentely reasonable. So, in general, she has acted as a reasonable person would. It is also far from clear to me how any of the decisions made would result in foreseeable harm to the dog. Remembering that the standard is would a reasonable person foresee that there was a risk of harm barring extraordinary circumstances. By the way, the legal reasoning is exactly the same if you had entrusted her with your child or your car.
Landlord gives 4 months notice to the rental agency which fails to give notice to the tenants I am renting and I have been given a 1 month and half notice from my rental agency. In UK at the moment the minimum notice is 4 months. The landlord actually says that he gave the agency full 4 months notice and so the agency did not communicate to the tenants promptly. In this case which notice is right? Should I have the right to stay following the date my notice has been given? Or the landlord notice to the agency is valid? Edit: in my specific case the end of the fixed term contract is 15 days after the 1 month and half notice. Still I believe it is unfair (I am a tenant in an HMO and the other tenants' contracts expired in 6 months time or more. So for the other tenants is actually more problematic)
If you were given a non compliant notice, you haven’t been given notice You can stay as long as you like or for 4 months after they give you the correct notice. The landlord’s legal obligation was to give you 4 months notice: not his agent, or the Queen, or some guy he was chatting with at the pub. Whether that causes other people with other contracts problems is a matter for them to work out, it’s none of your business. However, … The management agency is the landlord’s agent. That means, as far as you are concerned there is no legal difference between what they do and what the landlord does. If either of them had given you a valid notice, it is as though the landlord had done so. However, if the landlord says something to the agent, from your point of view, the landlord is talking to themselves. If the landlord has sold the property, it comes with any existing leases. If the landlord has promised vacant possession and can’t deliver it, then they have broken the contract with the buyer and the buyers can sue your landlord for damages or possibly terminate the contract or both. If that happens, and it was a result of the agent’s negligence, the landlord can sue the agent.
I assume this is "Managed Payment to Landlord" (MPTL) for the tenant's Universal Credit and/or Discretionary Housing Payment, as opposed to for "Housing Benefit" per se, since most people are now on UC instead of HB. But in any case the period of imprisonment is long enough to affect Bob's eligibility. Under the Universal Credit Regulations 2013, Schedule 3, Bob is no longer occupying the property since their absence is expected to be for more than six months; in fact, they lose UC entirely and are meant to reapply when they get out. If this is Housing Benefit then the entitlement ends for being expected to be in prison for 13 weeks or more; see the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, regulation 7. That's a generic rule for absence, whereas there's a 52-week allowance for pre-trial custody, and some variations for release on probation. DHP top-ups from the local authority follow the same rules. In any event, 2.5 years, even taking into account the anticipated release at the halfway point, is more than any of those thresholds. The claimant is meant to report changes of this kind, but since Alice are receiving the money directly, she is also responsible for informing the government of any relevant changes. See guidance at 10.2, Whilst a MPTL is in place the landlord must notify the department of any changes which a landlord can be reasonably expected to know which might affect the claimant’s entitlement to Universal Credit and the amount awarded. For example, the claimant changes address. When a claimant changes address the MPTL APA will cease from the end of the assessment period before the claimant changed address. If your tenant moves home and you need to end a MPTL, please contact the service centre immediately on 0800 328 5644. As noted below, and following the Social Security Administration Act 1992, sections 71 and 75, If the MPTL is overpaid due to a change that has not been reported by either the claimant or the landlord, the landlord may be asked to repay the overpaid benefit. Universal Credit payments are made every calendar month and take account of changes during that month. It may be that Bob has already done their side of things but the system hasn't caught up yet. In any case, Alice is not entitled to continuing payments and the government has various means to get the money back. Sections 111A and 112 of the 1992 Act (which applies to UC as well) make it a criminal offence for Alice to fail to notify the government about a change of circumstances that affects her right to receive payments. (Simplifying the statutory language a little - Alice is "the recipient" in the context of the full text and Bob is "the claimant", and there are various other conditions about your state of knowledge and intention.) This is not to say that it would necessarily be pursued as a criminal matter, but that possibility exists in principle.
There's good information at https://www.gov.uk/private-renting-tenancy-agreements/your-landlord-wants-to-end-your-tenancy. There are several types of tenancy with different rules, but in all of them, the landlord has to give you a certain amount of notice to move out, and it has to give a specific date. "Three months from when a buyer is found" doesn't seem to fit that, so I would say you have not yet received formal notice to move out. This statement may have just been a courtesy to give you more advance warning. So for instance, if you are in a tenancy that requires two months notice, the landlord may have intended this to mean "I plan to send you formal notice about one month after a buyer is found." Of course, this is not binding; he could send you formal notice tomorrow if he changes his mind. As far as I know, the sale of the house is really irrelevant in all of this. You don't automatically have to move out just because the house is sold; if you're not explicitly told to leave (with appropriate notice) then you don't have to, and you'll just start paying your rent to the new landlord. If you have a fixed-term tenancy, then the sale of the house doesn't shorten it. I am not sure what the point is of getting angry at the estate agents. Your tenancy is a matter between you and your landlord, and the estate agents have nothing to do with it. They work for your landlord, not for you.
By default, the tenant is liable for all rent until the end of the lease. E.g. if neither the tenant nor the landlord can find a suitable and credit-worthy replacement tenant (e.g. if the market has crashed), then the whole lease must still be accounted for by the original tenant, and the lost "rent" becomes "damages". However, there is also a concept of damage mitigation, and California Civil Code 1951.2 explicitly defines that it's the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. This means that the landlord cannot simply sit still and collect the rent on an empty apartment. Because of this, some smaller landlords in California outright have a policy that you can cleanly break the lease by paying for 2 months of rent as a penalty. (It appears that a good summary of various examples about landlord/tenant damage mitigation is available at UniformLaws.org.) However, when it comes down specifically to the SF Bay Area with the ever increasing rents and the lowest residential vacancy rates in the nation, and also especially with the corporate landlords that already have sufficient resources in place to readily advertise and promote an abandoned unit, it can probably be argued that, in practicality, requesting more than one month of rent (in damages) as a penalty for breaking the lease is simply unreasonable.
In any legal dealing, there is always some risk. The signature constitutes definitive proof that you have a contract, but you still have a contract, because you have mutual acceptance. A far-fetched scenario is that the lessor could allege that they did not agree to the terms of he contract with you (perhaps claiming that you obtained a blank contract form from them and filled in details, but they didn't agree to those details). However, if they allow you to move in, that is sufficient constructive evidence of a contract, so they could not argue "We didn't agree to this". The main risk would be your lack of proof that they ever agreed to lease the place to you (no emails, no texts, no witnesses, no legally-recorded conversations). There may be specific state laws about providing a copy of the rental agreement, such as this California law, where they must provide a copy to the tenant within 15 days of execution by the tenant. This provides a collection of relevant state laws, though you may have to dig a bit because this is a hook into all of the laws about leases and not just about providing copies.
he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.
In general, a German landlord needs to give at least 24 hours notice before he can enter a home, and allowance from the renter. The renter also has the "Hausrecht", not the landlord. There are exceptions, most of them to prevent damage from an ongoing danger threatening the house. A clear example would be a broken water pipe. 1 week notice also appears to violate tenant laws - I hope you have a written contract about the subletting.
No, for two reasons. First, your question seems to assume that the current level of (1) vacancy, and (2) rent, will continue unchanged for the indefinite future. A lot of people thought that in 1989, and 2000, and 2007, just before the last three Bay Area housing crashes. The purpose of a long-term lease is to create certainty for the lessor. As the lessee, you are on the hook for whatever damages you cause by breaking the lease. As you say, right now, the complex will probably be able to mitigate fairly easily. That will change next time the market crashes. If you break the lease, you're gambling that it's still 1987...but there's a chance it's 1989 instead. If it is, you are on the hook, because the landlord exchanged a lower rent for certainty. Second, you're thinking about what the landlord will be able to prove in court. This is almost never the most helpful thing to be thinking in a situation like this. If you get to the point where your lawyer is having to stand up in court and argue about the reasonableness of the landlord's efforts, you've already spent more than two weeks' rent (even at Bay Area prices) paying the lawyer. Realistically, if the landlord says it took six weeks to rent, and sends you a bill for six weeks, the cheapest thing for you to do will, probably, be to pay it.
Why was it formerly illegal to use the Swiss coat of arms in the United States? 18 U.S.C. § 708 formerly made the unauthorised commercial usage of the Swiss coat of arms (the white cross on a red field) a criminal offense in the United States. It was repealed this year, but why was it ever law in the first place, making it the only country or entity in the US ever to have protection for its heraldic devices?
I don't know any specific on the US law, but a special protection of the Swiss coat of arms is very widespread. This comes from a provision in Art. 53 § 2 of the First Geneva Convention 1949: By reason of the tribute paid to Switzerland by the adoption of the reversed Federal colours, and of the confusion which may arise between the arms of Switzerland and the distinctive emblem of the Convention, the use by private individuals, societies or firms, of the arms of the Swiss Confederation, or of marks constituting an imitation thereof, whether as trademarks or commercial marks, or as parts of such marks, or for a purpose contrary to commercial honesty, or in circumstances capable of wounding Swiss national sentiment, shall be prohibited at all times. Because of the connection of the Red Cross and the Swiss coat of arms the US is obliged by international public law to prohibit the commercial use of that arms. I'm surprised to hear that law was repealed. Maybe it was transferred to some other place in the code? Often it is regulated next to the prohibition of the misuse of the Red Cross.
Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.
Are political Flags ("Trump 2024") prohibited under the HOA's no signs rule? Why or why not? Probably. The Florida statute seems to imply that a flag is a type of sign and usually a political sign, even in the form of a flag, is still considered to be a sign. The Florida statute, in any case, only excludes the U.S. flag, not any other kind of flag. The First Amendment doesn't apply to an HOA declaration, although one could argue that FS 718 is a content based restriction of speech by exempting only the U.S. flag on particular days, and not other kinds of flags on other days, but that doesn't make a remedy clear. Allowing political signs isn't an obvious remedy for a 1st Amendment violation in FS 718.
Legality vs. illegality is determined by the specific jurisdiction. Almost every nation can legally declare war, except Japan due to Art 9 of the Japanese Constitution (there is a "work-around" which may or may not be legal, and only recently could defend itself). Thus the US can declare war under circumstances defined by certain aspects of US law, and engage in war-like activities under other legally-defined circumstances. Canada can as well, following Canadian law, similarly Norwegian law defines the ability of Norway to declare war. It is up to the individual nation to enforce such laws on themselves. In principle, an agreement i.e. a treaty could exist between certain nations that they will not engage in mutual war, in which case it might be illegal for A to declare war against B. This can give rise to a legal dispute, to be resolved in some trans-national court. The Hague Convention of 1904 attempted in Art III to require a "reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war", but that requirement is de facto dead. The UN Charter Art 2 can be interpreted as saying that members legally cannot engage in war, which is the main legal basis for saying that the war in question is illegal. This Congressional research document summarizes the present issue. Under the UN Charter, war is allowed in self defense, or to maintain or restore international peace and security. Availing itself of that exception, Russia has served the UN with a list of grievances to justify the invasion: a generalized threat from NATO relating to Ukraine; in collective self-defense of certain areas of Ukraine (Luhansk, Donetsk); finally, "genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime" against ethnic Russians. Apart from the legality or not of an attack on Ukraine, the conduct of the attack is also subject to legal scrutiny, for example limits on attacks against civilians, children, medical and religious personnel, aid workers. Theoretically, the UN could sanction / take action against Russia, but any binding action can be vetoed by Russia (as a permanent member of the Security Council).
You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.
The only real answer is that Congress hasn't (to the best of my knowledge) chosen to pass such a law. But the kinds of forgery that Congress might plausibly and constitutionally prohibit, such as forgery of checks, forgery of legal documents, and forgery as part of a fraudulent scheme are already crimes under state law, and the states handle such prosecutions perfectly well. There is really no need for a separate federal law on such issues. The kinds of forgery covered in the answer b grovkin would probably not be covered by a federal forgery statute, if one were to be passed. But that is speculation.
§1 states what the design of the flag shall be (§2 mandates addition of stars when a new state is added). In essence, 4 USC 1-2 define what the flag is, and the rest of that chapter addresses what you can do with it. These are laws (passed by Congress), not rules or customs. That is, it's not a custom that the flag is 50 starts and 13 stripes, it's the law. POTUS cannot unilaterally change the law. (4 USC 3 also specifies punishments for certain kinds of flag abuse, and this too is outside the scope of that the president can do by declaration). 4 USC 5 in fact states that "The flag of the United States for the purpose of this chapter shall be defined according to sections 1 and 2 of this title", and that The following codification of existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States of America is established for the use of such civilians or civilian groups or organizations as may not be required to conform with regulations promulgated by one or more executive departments of the Government of the United States. §§6-9 specify standard flag etiquette (violation of which incurs no legal punishment), and those are the rules that the president can rewrite.
A receipt is just a written proof that money was taken. It is hard to imagine a place on Earth where the legality of giving such a proof would be questionable at all so that you would need to talk about an "authority to issue receipts". Only if you find a place where money itself is illegal. Now, the real question here is whether such receipts (issued by private persons not registered as businesses) can be used for accounting purposes, e.g. to claim that your business, which transacted with those persons, incurred expenses. The mere fact that sole traders need to be registered to do business does not outlaw the use of receipts issued by non-registered persons. For example, your business could be buying old stuff from the public (used cars, electronics etc.) and refurbishing it. Provided that this activity itself is not illegal, receiving receipts from those one-off private sellers, and using them in your bookkeeping would be perfectly legal too.
Can a civilian legally take any action against a police officer if they witness the officer violating traffic laws? I saw this video where a civilian manages to pull over a police officer for speeding. I doubt pulling someone over as a civilian is legal, strictly speaking, especially since the guy had to speed himself to keep up with the speeding officer. I know there are some situations where officers speed within their right, even without emergency lights, under certain circumstances. But I was interested, for technicality sake, in learning what legal rights civilians have if they wish to take action against an officer they believe to be needlessly violating traffic laws for personal benefit. Lets say someone witnesses an officer turn on their lights and speed to pass traffic, then sees them pull into a doughnut shop a few blocks later and want to report that kind of misuse of power. I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. If a civilian takes a video of the officer speeding he'd probably be admitting to distracted driving, a crime in itself. If he looks at an ID number on the car and claims that was the car, it seems like it would be the civilian's word against the officer's. Wouldn't that just go the officer's way? Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? I've heard of civilian arrest but I know little about it. I'm curious to know if what this civilian in the video did (asked the officer to slow down) is even legal if he managed to stop the officer without speeding to do so. Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best?
I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.
This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider.
The only really authoritative source of answers is a court interpreting the laws on an as applied basis (and there are many U.S. traffic laws, one in every state and sometimes additional local ones, not a single U.S. traffic law). An answer from a government official or police department is not authoritative, although it may be informative of how the official in question would enforce the law.
The segment of the video I watched is wrong or misleading in several ways. The speaker apparently claimed to be performing a "citizen's arrest" on a police officer on the basis of s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The question above also talks about s.26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2013, which deals with an offence of improperly exercising the powers of a constable. Somebody who is not a police officer is allowed to arrest somebody else without a warrant only under tightly defined circumstances. These are given in s.24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (inserted by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005). The elements include that the offence be indictable, which does not mean as claimed in the video that "you can get sent to prison for it", but refers to the mode of trial. Some summary offences are imprisonable. Since the offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act is a summary one, rather than indictable, we fall at the first hurdle. A further qualifiction is that this power of arrest can only be exercised if the person believes it would be impractical for a constable to do it instead, and that the arrest is necessary to stop the arrestee from escaping, hurting themselves or someone else, or damaging property. In the video, the police officer does not look like he is doing any of those things, and there is another officer right next to him. Thus it would be hard to argue that there are reasonable grounds for arresting the officer in this way. Also, while members of the public may object to the conduct of police officers, that does not always amount to an offence under s.26 of the 2013 Act. The offence there is about corruption, exercising the powers of a constable for personal benefit. That personal element does not seem to be shown in the video. There are some other mistakes in the part I watched. A lawful arrest cannot be effected just by using the words "I am arresting you". The arrestor has to take or imply some directive action as well, or else there is no arrest at all: just two people continuing to stand awkwardly. This also goes to the point about needing to stop the arrestee from causing injury (etc.) - if you aren't actually taking steps to restrain them then you can't say you're preventing the harm. The point of the provision is to take the fact of an arrest (I am stopping you from getting away) and make it a legal arrest; it can't conjure up an arrest where none exists. In a citizen's arrest there is no need to give a warning about "anything you say may be used against you" or whatever. This is applicable to the police when they are questioning suspects, which is not what is happening here. Indeed, while the police can arrest somebody without warrant because they want to investigate whether they've committed a crime, a regular person can't. Although there is a statutory requirement to tell somebody why they've been arrested, coming from ECHR as well as domestic common-law principles, the police are not expected to cite the law with precision. It's OK to say "I'm arresting you for selling heroin" rather than "I am arresting you because I have reasonable grounds to suspect you of supplying a controlled substance to another without lawful authorisation, contrary to section 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971". While there are more rules that kick in during pre-charge detention or questioning, the law recognizes that the operational circumstances of an arrest make a briefer explanation more appropriate. Indeed, more formal language would defeat the point of the rule, which is that the arrestee should know what's going on. "You can only arrest a cop for an indictable offence" is not quite right. You (a non-constable) can only lawfully arrest anyone for such an offence, and if the other conditions are met. A constable can be arrested for any kind of offence: there's no special immunity for summary offences. As to the general question of "How can one arrest a police officer?", the usual way is to become a police officer yourself. Almost all arrests, especially those involving police misconduct, are done by the police. For corruption it is likely that an arrest would be made after a long investigation and after the issue of a warrant, rather than on the spur of the moment. As a normal person, wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty is an offence (Police Act 1996, s.89), and affecting an arrest may amount to assault on the officer. That does not make it impossible to arrest an officer in this way, just fraught with future difficulty.
Yes, you would be responsible. Maintaining the vehicle in a state that enables compliance with the law is the owner's responsibility, and it is a driver's responsibility to comply with the speed limit. There is no knowledge or intent requirement in a speeding violation. That said, a judge might show leniency if you came to court with documentation of a repair or recalibration of the speedometer after the citation.
Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.
Police are authorized by statutes to carry out the functions of law enforcement. I.e., they are granted by law the authority to: Investigate alleged or apparent crimes Detain and arrest individuals when there exists "probable cause" to believe they have committed a crime. There are a plethora of details encompassed by these general descriptions. For related inquiries see also: How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? search-and-seizure In the specific example you cite you are in a public place, albeit on private property. If the property owner asked the police to leave they would have to meet a higher statutory threshold to legally remain and pursue their investigation. In practice, however, they may do whatever they want. Publicized incidents suggest that the best chance you have of ensuring your rights are protected in a police confrontation are to: Have the incident recorded in audio and video in as detailed a fashion as possible, and seen by as many witnesses as possible. Avoid actions that could escalate the incident or serve as a pretext for escalation by the police. Try to get higher-ranking police on the scene. E.g., if you can safely access your phone you may want to both start video recording and call 911 to ask the dispatcher to send the officer's superior to the scene, while making it clear to the dispatcher that you intend to comply with all lawful requests but that you feel threatened or unsafe.
united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect.
Does double jeopardy prevent someone being tried twice for the same offence in both England and Scotland? Let us say someone (D) commits an offence under an Act of Parliament applicable to both England & Wales and Scotland, and the circumstances mean that both England & Wales and Scotland have jurisdiction (such as perhaps a cross-border fraud crime). The (Scottish) Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) charges D, and D is acquitted. Subsequently, the (English & Welsh) Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) charges D for the same offence under the same Act and the same set of facts. The CPS charges D, and D is acquitted. Subsequently, the COPFS charges D for the same offence under the same Act and the same set of facts. In either case, can the second prosecution against D be stopped on the grounds of double jeopardy, under English and Scots law, respectively?
england-and-wales Yes, double jeopardy applies The common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict apply equally to foreign offences; this is black letter law in Halsbury's Laws of England. Scotland is "foreign" for these purposes. There is no analogue to the odd US dual sovereignty doctrine. The general exception to double jeopardy regarding the re-trial of serious offences under Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply here, because of an odd anomaly created by the statute due to criminal justice being devolved to the Scottish Parliament. As a result, according to the Crown Prosecution Service: There are no provisions dealing with qualifying offences [for retrial after acquittal] in Scotland as criminal justice is a matter for the Scottish Parliament. At present, the law in Scotland has not been changed so that these provisions do not apply to acquittals that take place in Scotland.
Double jeopardy does not apply to different offences [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb... The Supreme Court has held that it means what it says - murder and rape are different offences and so the double jeopardy clause is not triggered. However, if an offence requires that the same elements (or a subset of them) be proved, then they are the same offence. So, for example, both murder and rape normally incorporate the elements of common assault - a person acquitted of either murder or rape cannot subsequently be charged with common assault. Further, the principle of res judicata applies to criminal cases as well as civil cases. Therefore any fact or issue of law that was decided in the first trial cannot be reagitated in the second.
The Crown Prosecution Service can always take over a private prosecution, regardless of whether consent was needed at an earlier stage. So they could always force it to proceed, or to stop (subject to whatever judicial control is in play for the stage of the proceedings). There are different ways of halting it depending on how far it has progressed and in which court, but the main point is that once the CPS has taken over, the original prosecutor is out of the picture. Where criminal proceedings are instituted in circumstances in which the Director is not under a duty to take over their conduct, he may nevertheless do so at any stage. (Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s.6(2); "the Director" is the Director of Public Prosecutions, who heads the CPS) But by current policy, the act of seeking the DPP's consent will mean that the CPS will either take over the prosecution and run with it, or else refuse consent so that it doesn't go forward anyway: If an offence requires the DPP's consent to prosecute, the private prosecutor must seek that consent. If the proposed prosecution passes the Full Code Test, the CPS will take over the prosecution. Conversely, if the proposed prosecution fails the Test, the DPP's consent to prosecute will not be given. The "Full Code Test" is an assessment of whether there is enough evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and of whether prosecution would be in the public interest. This appears to be functionally the same policy for offences that need the DPP's consent (which can be delegated to other officials) or his personal consent (which can't). Some offences can only be prosecuted with the Attorney General's consent. The AG also has power to halt any prosecution, by entering a declaration of nolle prosequi, so could certainly terminate a prosecution to which she had previously consented. Additionally, I would expect that if someone sought the AG's consent for a private prosecution, she'd also refer it to the CPS to take over. If she didn't, but then wanted it to proceed after the original prosecutor had changed his mind, she could contact the CPS at that stage.
While this isn't a simple and direct answer, it should point you in the right direction. There are countries which like the United States have parallel national and subnational court system, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. Different rules of procedure for different courts within a larger overall court system for a federal jurisdiction are not that unusual even in nominally unitary court systems. But, the division between them is on something of a continuum with fine shades of differences between them. Only a few are as close to the extreme of power sharing and a "federalist" approach as the United States, however. Also even unitary court systems (in a geographic and federalism sense) often have parallel court systems on subject matter grounds. For example, France has both ordinary civil courts and labor courts whose rulings could overlap, and England historically had courts of law and courts of equity with a complex relationship to each other (and also ecclesiastical courts with jurisdiction of matters now vested in the civil courts of law like inheritance of tangible personal property). Similarly, Northern Ireland has or has had what amount to different parallel legal systems for terrorism and non-terrorism criminal offense. Most countries also have parallel criminal and quasi-criminal legal systems for civilians and soldiers respectively. I've seen this tension between the two systems as a plot point in contemporary English police procedural dramas, for example. On the other hand, systems with a more unitary legal system rarely are so fierce in their defense of protections against double jeopardy as the United States, and the dual sovereignty doctrine in U.S. double jeopardy law can be seen as a safety valve in practice and as applied in cases where the double jeopardy rule as interpreted under the U.S. Constitution is too strong a bar to legitimate second prosecutions. A comparative analysis of double jeopardy concepts can be found here. It is tricky to reduce the subtly differences between the rules in different countries to a clear yes or no kind of answer. A square answer to your question requires detailed examination of a dozen or more court systems that someone felt the need to write a book about to explain. If I can find a more specific answer I will update this one.
Parliament in the UK is sovereign: Parliament [is] the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. If parliament passed a law saying that it was a crime for "a black American woman sat at the front of the bus" and provided that it repealed all existing laws that would invalidate that law (e.g. the European Charter of Human Rights); then there is no defence to that crime if the prosecution proves the elements beyond reasonable doubt i.e. that you are a) black, b) American, c) a woman and d) sat at the front of the bus. In the UK there is no higher law that can be appealed to like a constitution. Over the years, UK parliaments have passed laws limiting their sovereignty, however, any current or future parliament could (in theory) repeal those limits. Just like the USA could (also in theory) repeal the Bill of Rights amendments to their constitution (or even replace the Constitution as a whole); albeit the process is different and less likely to succeed. The limitations on this are political, not legal.
The US has jurisdiction because the systems that the accused allegedly attacked are in the US. To use an example with older technology, you can't escape criminal liability for defrauding someone in one country simply because you did so through the mail or by telephone from another country. The UK and the US have an extradition treaty. The UK might refuse to extradite the accused; in that case the US would most likely complain loudly. If too many extradition requests are refused on one side, the other side might start limiting cooperation in any of several areas.
Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice.
england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.
Working more than the yearly limit as a foreign student in Germany As a foreign student in Germany, one has a 120-full-days or 240-part-days work limit during the year. From my personal experience so far, I have also noticed (thought might be wrong) that some laws about foreigners not only depend on one's city but are moreover even open to interpretation by the foreigner's office. In other words, one can observe different behaviors for equal/similar cases. After an inquiry I was told that the main point behind this law was for the student to focus on his studies and the important bit was that the student made progress in his studies. My question now is, assuming the study process doesn't get harmed, would there be any consequences if one exceeded this limit? For instance if you surpass it to 130-full-days, what could happen?
The DAAD has published a summary of the legal constraints when working as a foreign student in Germany. While the document is only available in German, it is complete and rather authoritative. I summarize the main points here. On a student visa, you are eligible for 120 full days or 240 half days in accordance with §16b (3) AufenthG. This is a legal constraint. It is not up to interpretation. Only mandatory internships constitute a right to further work. In individual cases, the Ausländerbehörde (foreign registration office) can grant authorization for additional work. The authorization will only be granted if the extra work will not jeopardize the purpose of your stay in Germany, which is studying full-time. In particular, work in a study-related job such as a student assistant will generally be eligible for an extension. This is up to the judgement of the office. Thus, there can be differences between different cities. If you intend to surpass the 120/240 day limit, you must get prior authorization. You are otherwise violating the conditions of your visa, which can result in fines and deportation. Additionally, no upstanding employer wants to provide illegal work as they would be subject to penalties themselves. Links: DAAD guidance on working in Germany (German): https://static.daad.de/media/daad_de/pdfs_nicht_barrierefrei/in-deutschland-studieren-forschen-lehren/daad-infoblatt_erwerbstaetigkeit.pdf §16b AufenthG (English): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/englisch_aufenthg.html#p0275
The German law mandates minimum notice periods for work contracts. But there is no restriction on maximum notice periods, as long as the employee does not have a longer notice period than the employer (§622 BGB de|en). So yes, in theory you could negotiate that the company is not allowed to fire you in the first 4 years. But I would find it unlikely that they would agree to that. When the stock options are really your only reason why you want to avoid getting terminated in the first 4 years, then they are more likely to be open to negotiations about the stock option clause than about the termination clause.
If by "hire a worker" you mean hire you as their employee, then no. And that has nothing to do with Iran or sanctions. See https://expatriates.stackexchange.com/questions/23844/can-i-work-remotely-for-a-german-company-from-india-being-an-indian-citizen and just replace "India" with "Iran", or really "any non-EU country". The only way you can legally sell your work and get money from a German company in Germany when you don't reside in Germany with a German work permit is being an independent contractor or company and invoicing the German company for services provided. Whether this contract would be targetted by sanctions is a matter of that specific contract. It might depend on what work you do, and what you need to be given access to, while you work. That said, what a company legally "can do" might still not be what they do. Hiring a lawyer to navigate this (because people on the internet are not the best source of legal advice) might well exceed any benefits they have from hiring you. Even if it is legal in the end, it might still be too costly. Your best bet here is a company that already has dealing with contractors from Iran, already has lawyers for this on payroll and knows how to navigate this legally, not only in theory, but with their specific business dealings and services. In case you are actually asking on behalf of the Germany company, you should already know all this. You should also know that the real answer is "get a lawyer". But just in case you are just curious and want a sneak peek, you can go to the website of the "Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle" and see what they say and how your specific company and the specific contract you have in mind plays with the regulations. Warning: there is no easy answer I could summarize here, it is multiple pages of references to applicable laws and regulations. https://www.bafa.de/DE/Aussenwirtschaft/Ausfuhrkontrolle/Embargos/Iran/iran_node.html If your company has dealing with other nations, especially the US, you may want to check their conditions as well. Even though it might be legal in Germany, that does not really give you any protection from other countries sanctioning you in their juristiction or simply not giving you any further contracts because you don't play by their rules.
In fact, the immigration quotas do not discriminate. The described limit is that "No more than 7 percent of the visas may be issued to natives of any one independent country in a fiscal year; no more than 2 percent may issued to any one dependency of any independent country". All countries get the same upper limit. Additionally, anti-discrimination laws are subject matter specific: they exist because Congress passed a law that prohibits using race as a basis for employing a person (which Congress can do because of the Commerce Clause). Congress has not passed any such law pertaining to granting of visas. There is a path of reasoning that could lead to concluding that national quotas violate anti-discrimination laws, based on an "effects test" (disparate impact). It appears to be a fact that an applicant for a visa has a much higher probability of being denied a visa is their country of origin is China or India, as opposed to Sweden, which one could spin into a disparate impact argument. In order for this argument to become the law, there would have to be a case brought to the federal courts to the effect that national quotas are illegal, and as far as I know there has never been such a case. There are no provisions in anti-discrimination legislation that support a disparate impact doctrine in immigration, and pretty clear evidence that it was not congressionally intended since Title 8 Ch. 12 clearly calls for nation-based quotas. A final point: "national origin discrimination" is based on "an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group". A Swedish citizen of "Chinese national origin" is subject to the Swedish quota, not the Chinese quota, thus the discrimination is based on country of citizenship, not national origin.
Washington has such laws. RCW 28A.225.010 states the exceptions to the compulsory attendance requirement, which includes: is attending private school or extension program, receiving home schooling, unable to attend including is in jail, religion, over 16 full-time employed and with parental consent. Also, also has GDE or has already satisfied graduation requirements. It isn't clear what graduation requirements have not been satisfied, I assume that you still must complete 1 credit of Calculus to satisfy the requirements. Therefore, you must take attend school, even if you don't take that class. If you don't attend classes at the high school, the high school is required by RCW 28A.225.020 to provide written notice to the parents. Steps are taken to assure compliance with state law, i.e. phone calls and conferences with the parents, etc. It would be the responsibility of the school district to monitor the college's scheme that allows you to take high school classes at college. The primary legal mandate is imposed on the parent: All parents in this state of any child eight years of age and under eighteen years of age shall cause such child to attend the public school of the district in which the child resides and such child shall have the responsibility to and therefore shall attend for the full time when such school may be in session As described, the hypothetical child is not exempt, therefore the parents must compel the child to attend school, until the child becomes exempt. There is vast leeway in how that requirement can be satisfied, but it must be somehow satisfied.
Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line).
I can't help you with the UK but this would be 100% illegal in Australia. Unpaid trials are permitted of a reasonable duration sufficient to establish if the candidate has the requisite skills. For a hospitality worker 2-3 hours would be reasonable. Unpaid work experience is allowed if it is part of a program of education provided by a school or university. Unpaid internships are allowed provided the internship is for the education of the intern and their work output is incidental to that purpose. If the intern is doing work the company would otherwise have to pay someone to do it's not an internship. Other than that, all work including training must be paid.
Would this be legal? Probably at this scale. Not necessarily extrapolated to a large commercial operation involving more parties. At some point it becomes a payment system and a financial enterprise that becomes subject to financial regulation. Could her transfer be viewed as a donation as well? This is not a donation transaction and efforts to characterize it in that fashion would probably be disregarded by authorities. Could they be viewed as money laundering? The core element of money laundering is an effort to conceal the source of the funds for some purpose. It isn't clear if that would or would not be a motive. Other considerations A fairly common way to handle this kind of situation that is similar to what you suggest is called correspondent banking. Each side has an account in Russia and an account in Germany. Most day to day transfers happen by directing that money go from one German account to another German account, or from one Russian account to another Russian account. The big benefit of correspondent banking, aside from being transparent, is that it avoids currency exchange risks, fees and considerations for small, ordinary transactions. Of course, it simply isn't difficult or expensive to simply wire money from Russia to Germany, and vice versa, now and then. There are not strict currency controls, although there are some potential disclosure requirements. One reason for you, or authorities to worry about characterization of the transactions as money laundering is that if you have nothing to hide, simple wire transfers would be the usual and ordinary way of handling matters.
Is it against the law to deny service based on (young) age? My daughter was asked to leave a pet shop as she was unaccompanied by an adult and was under 14. She was in there with the intention of making a genuine purchase and there is no way she would have been doing anything that would be considered disruptive. Is it against UK equality laws for a company to have a policy like this? Certainly I can see it being so if it was, for example, a policy of no one over a certain age, or of a particular race, but I’m wondering if some kind of duty of care or health and safety consideration could trump this when it comes to younger people. In which case, my question is why 14? What makes it different for someone who is only 13 years and 364 days old versus someone who is 14 years and one day old?
I’ve managed to answer my own question. Age discrimination legislation only applies to over 18s: It’s only discrimination if a trader or service provider treats you unfairly because of: age - if you’re 18 or over disability gender reassignment pregnancy and maternity race religion or belief sex sexual orientation Source
You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.
This is largely a matter of state law. In California, for example, this would be plainly unlawful (my emphasis): All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51) Other states may define "business" more narrowly, or exclude professional services. Also, there is the question of professional ethics. Discriminating against a racial group will likely run afoul of the rules of the licensing board, the AMA, the APA, and other organizations. Finally, remind your friend that every racist has what they regard as good reasons for their racism, and your friend is not special in that regard.
Too old to be a lawyer? Legally: No. See Part 4 of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 which... ...makes it unlawful to discriminate against someone on the ground of age in respect of the following: (a) employment and related matters; (b) education; https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2020C00283
There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.
It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much.
While most states do not specify a minimum age in order to form an LLC, most states do specify a minimum age in which one has a capacity to contract and that age is 18. Here's a good explanation of capacity to contract at Wikipedia. It would be difficult if not impossible for a minor, acting alone, to create an LLC without a capacity to contract. Although, it could be quite possible that a minor could go through the machinations to form an LLC without ever being challenged on their age. I don't recall ever being asked my age when I created my LLC. It would be interesting to see what would happen if such an LLC were created and then the minor disaffirmed the LLC filings or any of the contracts to which the LLC was a party that bore the minor's signature. I have heard of suggestions elsewhere that a minor who wants to own an LLC have it owned by a trust where the minor's parents are the trustees until a specific age is attained by the minor, at which point the minor becomes the trustee. This would allow the minor to have an interest in the LLC that is managed via the trust. The trustees (the parents) would sign contracts for the LLC via the trust giving the contracts enforceability.
It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
Can a person be charged above the amount of damages by laws as a fine? Added after edit: Is there any clause in the Constitution of California that prevents a law from attaching fines that are worth more than the actual damage that was caused by violation of the law?Has there been any such cases? _______________________________________________________________________ The jurisdiction is : USA -> California The law used as example is: CCPA The CCPA states that if someone fails to respect a user's privacy rights, the website owner may be charged $7,500 per visitor or violation. Now, let's say a company has 10 million users from California. The website either fails to delete IP logs of the visitors or suffers a data breach. The company only makes $100,000 per month through ads, with operations costs of $10,000 per month. Can the company be given a $7,500 * 10 million = $75 billion dollar fine? Are there any laws that prevent this? In general, can any law just demand any amount from anyone?
Damages are (generally) not constrained by the defendant’s ability to pay The purpose of a fine is to punish the wrongdoer and dissuade others from offending. The purpose of damages is to restore the wronged party to their original position. In recent times, there is a tendency to link fines to corporate profits or revenues but that is generally as a means of increasing the fines rather than limiting them. If a fine or lawsuit bankrupts the defendant then it bankrupts the defendant.
In California, the small claims court has jurisdiction over claims up to $10,000. In order to have personal jurisdiction over him: He must have a summons and complaint hand delivered to him (or to certain other people such as an adult who lives in his household, or to his secretary if he has one). This is called "service of process" and there are professionals called "process servers" who can do this for you in most cities. The service of process can take place anywhere in the world and still be valid. The summons and complaint must be hand delivered by a person over the age of eighteen who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not your attorney. The events that form the basis of the lawsuit must have happened in California, not merely the United States (long arm personal jurisdiction), or he must have the summons and complaint personally hand delivered to him in the State of California (tag jurisdiction). If you win, either by default if he fails to respond by the deadline, or following a trial, you will get a piece of paper called a judgment that legally determines that he owes you $X, which you must then enforce. A judgment can be enforced, for example, by garnishing his bank accounts, garnishing monies due to him from an employer or from a sole proprietorship he operates, seizing tangible personal property that he owns with the assistance of a sheriff, or putting a lien on real estate he owns. A judgment from a California small claims court can only be enforced against assets in California. There is a relatively simple process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from any other U.S. state. There is a relatively difficult and expensive process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from England that only sometimes works because some aspects of the U.S. civil court system (like punitive damages) are considered to be against public policy in England and are thus not enforceable there. You cannot have someone arrested for failure to pay a civil judgment. Enforcing the judgment is likely to be much more difficult than getting the judgment in your case. It is also possible to make a criminal complaint if the acts genuinely constitute theft. If a prosecutor finds that there is probable cause to back up your claim, the prosecutor could obtain an arrest warrant from the court in the place where the theft took place and that could be served within California when the individual is present in California (i.e., he could be arrested in California, after which the criminal justice process would proceed). Generally, to constitute theft, it must be intentional and must not be a mere breach of an agreement, in which case it is a breach of contract rather than theft. Any theft small enough to be addressed in small claims court would probably not be considered serious enough for the government to request extradition from the U.K. for, a step usually reserved for serious felonies, but if extradiction was sought from the U.K., the process on the U.K. side is described here. Any extradiction request would be handled by the prosecutor's office and law enforcement, in cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies.
No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
Bankruptcy does not obliterate legal financial obligations (taxes that you owe, fines, etc.). Fines either do or do not (any more) accrue interest, depending on jurisdiction. Fines for criminal conviction can accrue interest. By law, no fine can be unreasonable, but there is no simple determination of what is reasonable versus unreasonable. The matter reduces to whether the penalty would be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Federal law suggests a upper-ballpark of $250,000 for an individual felony or $5,000 for an infraction, but there is no actual upper limit, for example a crime resulting in pecuniary gain may receive a fine of twice that gain, so fines can be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The government can seize property including wages in order to satisfy a legal financial obligation. However, you can not be imprisoned because of an unpaid fine, although you can be imprisoned for willfully not paying a fine when ordered to do so (there is no legal clarity as to what constitutes "willful" non-payment). As noted in this article, seemingly small fines can balloon to large sums (they cite an example of a 4-fold increase in initial fine owing to interest and similar increases.
If you commit a robbery but then return the money, can you be prosecuted? Yes. Similarly, if you breach copyright and then stop, can you be prosecuted? Yes, however, you will probably not be because: Your offence may not have been noticed by the copyright holder, and/or The damages they would get are probably not worth the effort.
There is no provision allowing monopolization "for the good of the consumer", regardless of your standards for judging that. The law simply says Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. It is not clear what actually counts as a violation is the law: it's not the fact of being the only game in town, per se, it's what you do that might bring that about, it's doing so through improper means. The Dept. of Justice, which may prosecute a case, has guidance on what the law could mean, in particular, the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident As you describe it, this is a clear violation of the law. "Noble intentions" is not a valid defense to prosecution. However, prosecution is discretionary, so a favorable government could reach an agreement to not prosecute, as was the case with AT&T (before WWI, not the breakup). Further however, under 15 USC 15c a state attorney general can also bring a civil suit against a monopolizer, so you'd have to get a lot of agreement to not take legal action.
The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.
In contract law in the United States, this is a "liquidated damages" clause. It provides that when one side breaches the contract, it has to pay a certain amount of money to make up for it. Normally this is done where it is difficult to calculate the actual damages in the event of a breach, or where the parties would rather avoid calculating the actual damages--a common example is where you put in an earnest money deposit on a house and then forfeit the earnest money if you do not buy. However, there are restrictions on what kind of damages are permitted. Notably, a "penalty" usually refers to an unreasonable amount that is unenforceable as against public policy. It would ordinarily be unreasonable to make someone pay a hundred million dollar penalty for breaking a ten thousand dollar contract, for example. Liquidated damages clauses frequently say "this is not a penalty" and "the parties agree this is reasonable" to make it harder to invalidate them on public policy grounds. Instead, if the liquidated damage payment is a payment meant to reflect actual damages that are just hard to calculate, it is much more likely to be enforceable. You would need to research liquidated damages and penalties in the state whose law governs the contract to determine whether the particular clause is permissible under state law. See https://www.google.com/search?q=restatement+of+contracts+penalty&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8
Is it against the constitution to require restaurants to only serve people with a vaccine certificate in the United States? I heard that New York is implementing a vaccine certificate for people who want to do certain indoors activities such as going to the cinema, eating and training, so I was wondering if that was against the constitution or not since I thought only restaurants can decide who they can discriminate against as long as the person doesn't belong to a protected class. Is it against the constitution to require restaurants to only serve people with a vaccine certificate in the United States?
NO Under the US Constitution, a public health authority could even make vaccination mandatory, and this was done in some historical epidemics. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) the US Supreme court held such mandatory vaccinations to be constitutional. The court wrote: The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States does not import an absolute right in each person to be at all times, and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint, nor is it an element in such liberty that one person, or a minority of persons residing in any community and enjoying the benefits of its local government, should have power to dominate the majority when supported in their action by the authority of the State. It is within the police power of a State to enact a compulsory vaccination law, and it is for the legislature, and not for the courts, to determine in the first instance whether vaccination is or is not the best mode for the prevention of smallpox and the protection of the public health. The highest court of Massachusetts not having held that the compulsory vaccination law of that State establishes the absolute rule that an adult must be vaccinated even if he is not a fit subject at the time or that vaccination would seriously injure his health or cause his death, this court holds that, as to an adult residing in the community, and a fit subject of vaccination, the statute is not invalid as in derogation of any of the rights of such person under the Fourteenth Amendment. ... persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State, of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be, made so far as natural persons are concerned. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 95 U. S. 471; In Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 137 U. S. 89, we said: The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is then liberty regulated by law. ... Whatever may be thought of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the Constitution. Nor, in view of the methods employed to stamp out the disease of smallpox, can anyone confidently assert that the means prescribed by the State to that end has no real or substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the public safety. The above decision was over a vaccination law during a smallpox epidemic, and the background is described in this "History Stories" article and in the Wikipedia article about the case Governments have the authority, in general, to pass laws (or impose regulations) that serve "compelling governmental interests" and are of general applicability. Such laws are valid even over most constitutional claims, depending on the claim and the detailed facts. Protecting the public health is a compelling governmental interest. Such laws might have to (and normally do) provide exceptions for people with medical reasons why they cannot safely be vaccinated, or with sincere religious objections to vaccination. In such cases alternate measures of protection, such as frequent testing for infection, might be required. Note that existing public health laws generally require wearing shoes and shirts in restaurants, and require restaurants to refuse service to those who do not comply. In Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional an involuntary quarantine law. in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a public school district's exclusion of unvaccinated students.
It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review.
California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.
If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts.
It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do.
https://bchumanrights.ca/mask-poster/ Technically speaking is wearing masks a law, a health order or the store policy as a result of the health order? Technically speaking it's a Ministerial Order made under the power delegated to the Minister by the Emergency Program Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 111, s. 10. Can a customer be denied service or entry for not wearing a mask even if they claim they have a medical exception? No, they cannot. If they claim they have an exemption, then as far as you are concerned, they have an exemption. Refusing service would be illegal discrimination on the basis of disability. Must they prove it with some sort of certificate? No. Some people have claimed that they do not need to show proof. Those people are right. If the customer is acting in a dishonest manner, for example if I see them wearing a mask before entering the store, does that make a difference? No. Does the quality of mask or the material it is made of make a difference? Yes. They must wear a face covering. "face covering" means either of the following that covers the nose and mouth of a person: (a) a medical or non-medical mask; (b) a tightly woven fabric; Some customers pull their shirt over their face and my coworkers tell them that is alright. Depends on the shirt: if it is made of "a tightly woven fabric" then it is alright.
Google is very helpful in this regard. I typed nyc restaurant bath and it suggested nyc restaurant bathroom law, the first result being http://www1.nyc.gov/nyc-resources/service/2360/restaurant-bathroom-requirements. It says: You can make reports about any food establishment with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was established after 1977. These establishments must provide toilets for their patrons. Food establishments that have been in operation since 1977 or before are exempt from this requirement. Food establishments with 19 or fewer customer seats are not required to provide bathroom access to the public. Food establishments are not required to allow public access to their employee toilets. Patrons are not permitted to use any toilets where the patron must walk through the kitchen or any food storage or food preparation area. Call 311 to report a restaurant with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was opened after 1977.
One thing that may prevent this is contract law: the employer may not have the power to impose new requirements on employees during the period of the current contract. For prisons that are run by government agencies, there may also be statutory restrictions on what the warden or Bureau of Prisons can compel employees to do without legislative approval (this is a general feature of government employment). There are additional disability and religion-based protections for employees. Apart from such legal considerations, the vaccine is not universally available, which explains why not all employers mandate that employees get vaccinated. It's not clear how prisons, specifically, are relevant: there's no general rule that "because it's a prison, normal law is suspended".
Miranda rights not given and refusal to contact parent during interrogation results in expulsion My son is 13 and in 8th grade. Sept 10th he was outside the school during a fire drill when his SLC (small learning community) director asked him to come with him to his office. After all I her students were back inside they went to his office. My son asked why he was there the director told my son that someone had reported that one of the bathrooms smelled of marijuana and that my son and another student were on video with going in or coming out of said bathroom around that time. Long story short, my son did have a joint in him and willingly gave it to his director. There ended up being 2 officers in the office in full uniform with weapons and cuffs. My son asked to call me 3 times and was told to hang on it in a minute. He was asked to leave the room for a few minutes and when they told him to cone back in, he was handed a paper and his director told him to write a confession. My son asked if the director already knew everything and had video why did he have to write it down and the director told him if didn't he'd be leaving in cuffs to which officer #1 agreed stating yes basically that's what's going to happen. He has a 504 plan but at the manifestation meeting they said his disability had nothing to do with his actions. Then they wanted me to sign a Waiver of Due Process Rights probationiinary Continued Education Agreement which said he could continue school through APEX which is online learning. With certain stipulations to avoid expulsion. But I want to challenge it all because of how they got his confession. He was suspended 14 days before this meeting (legally the school can only suspend 10 days), I never received any of this information prior to this meeting. When I picked up my son the day in question the director told me that I would be getting an email with everything I needed to know in the next day or two. Never came and I could only get a reply from the director if I emailed the counselor and CC him in NY email. Never got any real answers then anyway. And the director wasn't even present at the manifestation meeting, the assistant principle stood in for him. At the end when I told the assistant principal what my son told me of the interrogation he stopped me and said he'd have the principal call me to see what steps I needed to take and no one has called. What are my sons rights? Since they didn't tell him about his Miranda rights and refused his request to contact me, can't I take it to court and get my sons statement erased?
He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse.
No. You are a "person of interest" in a criminal investigation based upon a bona fide reasonable suspicion, even though they lack probable cause, and the government has not threatened to say anything that isn't true, so you have no cause of action against the government. You might have a claim against the school or your employer for wrongfully firing you (being a person of interest in an investigation isn't itself unlawful or even a meaningful mark of bad character), but you are probably an "employee at will" and thus may have no recourse against the employer other than to apply for unemployment benefits because you were fired without good cause. Your recourse against the school would depend upon the nature of that relationship.
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.
There is a defense of provocation This doesn’t apply in this instance because the provocation must be such that it would case a reasonable person to lose control. No reasonable person shoots a six year old.
The first sub-question here is whether (public) schools can compel (parents of) students to acquire internet service, a computer, and a webcam. The MA Dept. of Education maintains that public schools must purchase at public expense textbooks and other instructional materials and supplies intended for use and re-use over a period of years, and computers fall in the category of materials intended for schools to purchase and use and re-use. There is no legislative authority to compel parents to purchase equipment or sign up for internet services. If there is a choice between in-person and online instruction, the legal requirement to attend school can be satisfied by in-person instruction. The second sub-question is whether, if a child does have the technical ability to be connected to class via the internet, can they legally require the camera to be turned on? Every district has rules, so if there is a rule requiring parental consent in this situation, then parental consent is required. If it is legal at that level, there is still a legal risk to the school. Schools can generally do those things that are reasonably necessary for educating students as long as it doesn't infringe on fundamental constitutional rights, and the camera-on requirement is educationally reasonable. The risk to the school is violating the federal law FERPA, specifically a potential violation of the privacy requirements. Schools must protect personal information, which includes anything streaming from the camera (pictures, for example, are personally identifiable information). If you assume that they have an absolutely secure connection, then there is no risk of privacy violation. However, if you believe, even reasonably so, that a school practice creates a risk of breach of privacy, that still does not create a special right to avoid school.
In the US, detention does not add anything: we can generalize the principle to any time when a student is in the custody of the teacher (classroom, field-trip, sporting event...). One question, for the scenario that you describe, is whether the injury was foreseeable. Suppose the injury is an abdominal aortic aneurysm – this is not foreseeable. The question that the court would ask is whether a person exhibiting reasonable caution and care would know that there is a possibility that the child has some condition. The details regarding this condition "not being easily noticeable" are essential to the outcome of the case. A child coughing up blood should be immediately treated medically, it is not reasonable to assume that a child who sneezes (once) is in imminent danger. The teacher's response is also important, and again this is a very fact-intensive inquiry. A child who has a heart attack should not be told "go talk to the nurse" (let's assume that the teacher correctly notices that this is a heart attack happening), 911 is the correct (minimal) remedy. Perhaps using the auto-defibrillator also part of the reasonable standard of care for a teacher (assuming there is one, and that the teacher has been trained how to use it). Then finally, the teacher is not liable if their actions / inactions don't cause the injury. In the case where a student suddenly dies, the fact that the teacher didn't somehow prevent the death doesn't make the teacher liable. But if the child is bleeding and the teacher decides "We can deal with this when detention is over" and the child bleeds to death in the interim, we would conclude that the teacher's lack of care caused the child's death. The school might also be liable on various grounds, for example if the school has no nurse and has no practical way for the teacher to contact emergency medical services. Some school policy which unreasonably restricts the teachers exercise of reasonable care could make the school liable. At any rate, "the child died" does not cause absolute liability, what confers liability is the actions and inactions of a party.
First off: if someone in DHS is telling you this, your first, best, and really only option is to get advice from an attorney specializing in family law. Regardless of what we tell you here, without representation you will have a hard time with officials who believe otherwise. That said: I don't find anything exactly matching what you describe. The Uniform Adoption Code (AR Code § 9-9-200 (2014)) does not specifically address sibling groups at all. Adoptive parents do have rights to streamlined adoption of a sibling of a child they already adopted, under the Streamlined Adoption act (AR Code § 9-9-701 (2014)). In the section related to Placement of Minors (AR Code § 9-28-108 (2014)), however, is likely what the case worker was describing. Subsection (b) (2) reads, in part: (2) When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles, the department shall attempt to place: (A) A sibling group together while they are in foster care and adoptive placement This is discussing foster care and adoptive placement, of course. I think the key wording is When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles; that would be your argument (that it is not in their best interest). I see a 2011 case, for example, discussing a sibling group of four children not entirely different from yours; while there are not children with special needs, there is a child with major behavioral issues, and one of the (three) foster parents is considering adopting one of the children and "would be open" to considering others, but clearly isn't expecting to be required to do so. Note: I am not a lawyer, and particularly not one specialized in family law This is based on my reading of the 2014 Arkansas code. That is almost 2 years old. That said, I don't see any news articles or similar discussing limitations in sibling group placement in Arkansas recently, which is the sort of thing that usually would get attention. That said, this has also been something that HHS has been trying to encourage states to push for – more sibling group placement and awareness of sibling group issues – so it's entirely possible something could have changed.
Is it legal to use icons from other companies in my app? For all intents and purposes, if I were to develop an app that provides a service relating to already existing services, how legal would it be to download and use the third party's icons in my app? Several examples to illustrate my point: A trading platform - Displaying the icons which represent the companies (I.E. The Amazon logo for AMZN) A public transportation app - Displaying the icons of various bus/rail/metro lines (Operated by private companies with their own copyrighted logos). A password manager - Displaying the icons which represent the websites (I.E. the Google logo for Gmail accounts). A TV guide app - Displaying icons which represent the various channels on TV (I.E. the ESPN logo for the ESPN stream). A remote app - Displaying logos of various TV manufacturers. A similar question was asked here but unfortunately not all companies have a brand identity page with such guidelines.
A company's or brand's logo is often protected as a trademark. It may also be protected by copyright, unless it is so simple as not to be subject to copyright protection, unlike a name, which is normally not protected by copyright. But trademark protection is likely to be more important for the kind of use described in the question. One may not, in general, use a trademark without permission in such a way as to suggest that a product or service comes from the trademark owner when it does not, or is sponsored, endorsed, or approved by the trademark owner when it is not. One may also not use a trademark or any similar mark in such a way that consumers my reasonably be confused, thinking that the marked product or service is the one for which the trademark is normally used. This is know as passing off. In some counties a trademark is only protected if it is registered with the government. in others, like the US, some protection is granted simply on use of the mark, although registration may grant additional protections. Nominative Use It is, in most countries, permitted to use a trademark to refer to the product or service represented by the mark, without permission. This is known as nominative use, because the mark is used as the name of the product or service. Statements such as Our cola has half the calories of PeppyCola. Our GreatBattery is compatible with a Pear28 cellphone. However, valid nominative use usually requires using as little of the trademark as possible. In the US at least, this has been interpreted to mean that it is permitted to use the word or words which constitute the name of the product or service to be referred to, but not the logo or other graphic mark for that product or service. The uses mentioned in the question seem like nominative uses, and it should be fine to use thew name or text representation of the service to be linked to. For example "Buy on Amazon" might be the text of a link to an amazon page from a page advertising a book or other item. But using the amazon graphic logo probably requires permission. Stock Symbols Note that stock symbols are text, not graphics. Moreover, in registering with a stock exchange, I believe that a company explicitly permits the stock symbol to be used to represent the stock, so the trading platform example is a bit different from the other examples. However, use of graphic logos on a trading platform would have the4 same possible issues as other logo uses. Permission In many cases online companies routinely grant limited permission to use their logos to indicate links to their sites, or compatibility with their products. In other cases they may be willing to grant such permission on request. Any use covered by such permission is lawful, But only to the limits of the permission granted. any use beyond that would need to be justified by an exception to trademark protection, such as nominative use. Permission would normally cover copyright as well as trademark issues. Copyright Use of a logo protected by copyright without permission. would also be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright applies. In the US fair use is the most common exception, and would probably apply to most of the kinds of uses described in the question, which do not harm the market for the original copyrighted work, and fit the other fair use factors. In other countries, there are various exceptions to copyright which may apply, including "fair dealing". The exact scope of these exceptions will vary from country to country. Again, obtaining permission will prevent any such problems.
Apple has rules for publishing apps on the App Store, and either you follow the rules, or your app won't go on the App Store, simple as that. What you do is either not put your app on the App Store, or make the changes they ask you to make. Why are there conflicting statements? Because Apple and Google are different companies. Does Apple ask the other company? No, why would they spend their time on this, when they can ask you to make the changes? In the end, Apple has huge pockets, so they are not going to approve anything that might give a company a way to take money out of their pocket. What you want to do sounds very much like it could give some company a pretext to sue Apple; that's one thing that Apple won't let happen.
Yes it would be legal to do so. A full analysis would look at trademark law (where the bottom line is that the use of the Coke mark is not misleading since you are selling bona fide Coke), and copyright law. Whether it was non-infringing or fair use, is a closer call, but there is little doubt that one way or the other, this would be legal.
Yes, if you do not use the trademarked name. In the U.S. the graphical shape of fonts are not protected by copyright. See 37 CRF section 202.1 Typefaces are specifically excluded. Excluded are under (a) "mere variations of typographic ornamentation," and (e) "Typeface as typeface." The computer code that a font/typeface program uses to produce the shapes can be copyright. Importantly, fonts are protected by their trademarked names.
"Any perceived compliance or non-compliance of other developers’ apps does not have any bearing on the compliance of your own apps." Could this mean that Google Play's policies are applied differently for different developers or apps? No, it means that you can't break the rules even if others are breaking the rules or you think they are breaking the rules. I think it is worth noting that those apps are for the Indian market. I don't know which one you are in, but google will have different rules for different countries to comply with various regulatory requirements.
If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact [email protected] to request specific permission.
As usual with trademarks, the key question is "will reasonable people be confused about the source or affiliations of the product or service". Trademarks are, as you already know, limited to a particular industry or area of business, in general. Displaying user videos is not exactly the same thing as a particular popular song, but they just might be close enough for some consumer confusion tom occur. Whether reasonable people are in fact confused into thinking that the app is in some way sponsored by the makers of the song is a question of fact. A trademark suit would probably need to present some sort of evidence that confusion had occurred or was likely. It also may make a difference whether "Tik Tok" has been registered as a trademark. In the US, registration gets greater protection than mere use. (In some countries there is no protection without registration.) It is also possible that the app has already licensed the rights to the term from the trademark owner for the song. This would avoid a potential suit. It is also worth noting that the term "Tik Tok" is not original with the song. It dates back, in that spelling, to at least the "Oz" books by L. Frank Baum and others Tik-Tok of Oz dates from 1914, and the character of the Tik-Tok from the book Ozma of Oz (1907). Terms that are not original coinages are less strongly protected in trademark law, and the app could claim to be alluding to the Oz character, not the more recent song. A comment by ub3rst4r says that: the term "Tik Tok" is registered as a trademark in the USA by "Bytedance Ltd" (which is the company that operates the app). If that is correct, the US Patent and Trademark office (PTO) came to at least a preliminary conclusion that this trademark did not infringe anyone else's trademark. That doesn't meant that an infringement suit is doomed, but it would make any such suit harder and less likely. It seems that, as described in this news story a company selling watchs under the name "Tic Tok" was sent a cease and desist letter on behalf of the singer Kesha Sebert. The firm responded by filing a suit for a declaratory judgement. The case is Wimo Labs LLC v. Kesha Sebert, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:11-cv-02978. However, google does not show any resolution of this case, one way or the other. This was brought to my attention in a comment by StephanS. As this docket record shows, the case was dismissed by agreement without prejudice, apparently after a settlement (as stated in the comment by user muru). Thus there was no ruling on the merits of the case.
Yes. This is a frequently asked question on the foundation's homepage, and answered without ambiguity (source): Can I use a Raspberry Pi in a commercial product? This is a very common question, and the answer is yes! Once you have bought a Raspberry Pi, it's yours to do with as you wish. You would be in good company too, as in fact the Raspberry Pi is regularly used and sold for commercial applications third parties. Note that this the default consequence of a contract of sale in all jurisdiction I know of (but I am not a lawyer): The seller does not retain property rights in the particular item, and by the mere selling of the item implies there are no other rights that might prevent the buyer from using it as they wish. Apart from the particular computer now in your property, there are other legal requirements: "Copyleft" softweare: Large parts of the Raspbian software are licensed under "copyleft" licenses (importantly, versions of the General Public License, GPL). These licenses are meant to provide your customers with the means of reproduciing and building upon the "copylefted" software. You will need to provide your customers with the source code to those software items, the tools and documentation needed for building, and a written notice. Your own programs need not be licensed under a "copyleft" license, provided that you don't build on (distribute "derative works" of) "copyleft" software. The open source licenses involved are not meant to exclude commercial use, and there are helpful compliance guides available ( a, b ). Non-free software: Make sure to not include non-free software, like Mathematica or Oracle Java, which are not licensed for commercial redistribution. Trademarks: Your use of the words "Raspberry PI" or the raspberry logo is subject to restrictions, as is usual with trademarks. Speaking of the logos: You can request permission to use their "powered by Raspberry Pi" logo. Market regulations: You need to abide by regulations, for example safety and electromagnetic interference. Repackaging the Pi might mean you'll need to test and recertify your product, I'm not an expert. Video codecs: Some Raspberry Pis (up to 3) include specialised video decoding hardware. If you want to use it with the MPEG2 codec, you'll have to buy an activation key for small one-time fee per device - £2.40 for MPEG2, £1.20 for VC-1; other codecs are already activated. I don't think you'll need a license even for commercial, for-sale devices, but I am not your lawyer. Just to be clear, nothing prevents your buyers from cloning your software. (This is not a consequence of you providing the Raspbian source code - they can just clone the contents of your SD card.) While you can retain copyright in your own code, you'll probably have no effective means of detecting infringement. However, the physical design of the rest of your device will not be affected. Your business model needs to account for this fact.
What can a website Terms of Service require? I heard of a study where participants were asked to sign up for a fake social media platform with absurd terms (such as giving up your first-born child). I was curious as to what can actually be put into a ToS. For example, can I put in a clause like this: Upon signing up for this, you agree that I have the right to enter your house at any time without notice and use any motor vehicles you own without notice. Or something else like that.
This paper describes a website created to test the hypothesis that nobody bothers to read the TOS, and it contained a privacy clause saying that "we may share everything, and a clause that by agreeing to these Terms of Service, and in exchange for service, all users of this site agree to immediately assign their first-born child to NameDrop, Inc. If the user does not yet have children, this agreement will be enforceable until the year 2050. All individuals assigned to NameDrop automatically become the property of NameDrop, Inc. No exceptions. Since this was not a real webpage, there was no attempt to enforce. TOS is just another kind of contract, so the question is which kinds of contract conditions are enforceable and which kinds are not. It depends on whose laws you are operating under, which explains the use of expressions like "void where prohibited by law". There are innumerable conditions that could be included in a contract which are unenforceable. A contract requiring a person to commit a crime is unenforceable. Many jurisdictions have laws prohibiting a person from waiving certain rights, for example you cannot sign away your right to be represented by legal counsel in a dispute. There are related "unfair / deceptive" practices laws, which might include meta-conditions that any clause disclaiming liability must be prominently displayed. These are terms that a reasonable person would clearly know in advance are illegal and unenforceable. There is also a concept of "unconscionability", a finding that a certain condition favors the business to the point of "shocking the conscience", which may take a deeper legal analysis to evaluate. A requirement to litigate small disputes in California might be deemed unconscionable for a customer in an East Coast state, but it might not be. A typical characterization of an unconscionable contract is one that "leaves one party with no real, meaningful choice and is unreasonably advantageous to the other party", especially when due to asymmetrical negotiation power. For example, Ellis v. McKinnon , 18 Cal. App. 4th 1796 (employment contract for a salesman, commissions were forfeit if company had not received payment from the customer by the termination of employment). The main case law in the US in this area is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, where a customer bought furniture on credit, with a clause allowing repossession of all of the furniture in case of default by the customer. The doctrine is encoded in UCC 2-302. However, "unconscionable" does not mean "I don't like it". In lieu of statutory price controls, a customer probably cannot avoid paying an agreed on exorbitant price for a product ($100 for a dozen rolls of toilet paper). Here is a bit more legal analysis of unconscionability, which focuses on three factors: one-sidedness, oppressiveness, and likeliness to result in unfair surprise.
Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of.
No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though.
When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.
The so-called 'cookie law' obliges you to inform the user about the site's cookies (or use of Storage or such on the user's computer) and ask for consent for those that are not "strictly necessary for the provision of an information society service requested by the subscriber or user". It does not require you to seek consent for the use of any cookie no matter what function it has. "Strictly necessary" cookies include those necessary for the website to comply with the law. Per guidance from the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) in the UK (see the example box), a cookie set in relation to such consent or refusal is fine - it's for compliance with the cookie law. I would expect similar guides throughout the EU. You must consider its duration or lifespan: "For example, whilst it may be technically possible to set the duration of a cookie to “31/12/9999” this would not be regarded as proportionate in any circumstances." And consider including information about it in your cookie policy or such that users can find out more if they want.
I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.
TOS are a contract. If you have a contract through the App, you have incorporated the TOS as a term of your contract. Contracts mean what they say they do, what you are thinking of as "basic contract law" is actual just an ordinary and customary term that people in your industry usually make a part of the contract, not contract law itself.
The question reads: I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Unfortunately for this view, the law normally sees an NDA as a private contract, except when it is alleged that it violates public policy. If an NDA explicitly or implicitly includes itself in the list of things not to be disclosed, then posting it would be a violation of the contract. In such a case the party posting the agreement would be subject to whatever consequence the agreement specifies for violation, unless that person had a valid defense. The operator of a web site where the document might be posted would not normally ne a party to the agreement, and so would not be liable for hosting it, unless some other limitation applies, beyond the NDA itself. An NDA can indeed be a significant limitation on the signer's freedom to discuss certain topics, and a person would be wise to consider it in detail, and perhaps consult a lawyer, before signing one. But that does not mean that the person should post or distribute it publicly, nor that the person is automatically entitled to consult NDAs that others have signed. There are sufficient sample NDA forms available that a person can compare an offered NDA with other possibilities, and get an idea if an offered NDA goes beyond the usual terms.
When is misrepresentation and concealment allowed in negotiating contracts? Suppose I, or a company I own, want to purchase a domain name from an existing owner. Am I allowed to blatantly lie about the interests I represent and why I want the domain? Can I, for example, buy the domain from them (as an individual) under the pretense that I just think the name sounds cool, or because I'm raising money to found a co-op of the same name and the domain would be helpful, and then immediately shift ownership to my for-profit company (which is, say, a plumbing company)? What truths must I convey during negotiations? In what matters is misrepresentation allowed? E.g., is it illegal to tell them I'm acting on behalf of a charity or other entity that actually exists but with which I am unaffiliated? I am in the U.S. I'm curious about the answer to this question if the person with whom I'm negotiating is in the U.S., but also if they are not. And I'm curious if the answer is different when I'm representing a company from when I'm representing only myself.
The hypothetical situation would be a material misrepresentation of the facts, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation - both are grounds for nullifying the contract. Under your hypothetical this is almost certainly material and is certainly a fraudulent misrepresentation. A fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts pertinent to a contract occurs when one party, to a bargain for exchange, misstates a fact and either knows or believes that the fact is not true, or is not sure whether or not his statement is true but claims it to be true nonetheless. If a party to the contract relies on the fraudulent misrepresentation and enters into a contract based on that misrepresentation, the contract is voidable by the innocent party. A material misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that will induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract. If a misrepresentation is material to the contract, the contract will be voidable by the relying party even if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. So, in this scenario, the contact would be voidable because there is both a material misrepresentation, as well as a fraudulent one. If the other party suffers a monetary loss because of the deceit, you would almost certainly be held responsible for any damages that may flow from the inducement.
Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ...
Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.
The ultimate question is whether an obviously joke enterprise constitutes a real offering of securities or just performance art (a Ponzi scheme is one of many types of securities fraud). An unregistered offering of securities that does not fall within an exception is per se unlawful under federal law, but a security is generally defined as something offered with at least a prospect of making a potential profit for the investor which is not something that is true of this offering. (And if less than $1,000,000 are sold it might even be within an exemption to securities laws). State securities laws are divided into two categories. Most allow any offering of securities so long as proper disclosures are made and the offer is restricted to the right kind of investors. A minority impose substantive quality standards on offerings and this offering might violate the law in those states (although this still would present the question of whether a known money losing opportunity is really a security since there is no evidence of an intent to potentially make a profit from the investment). I do not believe that California imposes substantive quality of investment standards on public or private offerings of securities. Any deal whether or not it is a security is actionable if it is fraudulent. Normally an element of any claim for fraud is justified reliance upon a representation or upon a failure to disclose information. But, in this case, it is hard to see how anyone could say that they were justified in relying on any representation in making a purchase because they were told that they were being cheated. So, it is hard to see how a fraud claim would be sustained here either. I'm not sure that this cleanly falls into the category of gambling either, even though there is money at stake and the outcome isn't entirely certain. This doesn't really seem like a game of chance to me. Indeed, viewed as performance art, this scheme might even be entitled to First Amendment protection. Ultimately, I would not prioritize a civil or criminal action against this enterprise either from the perspective of a private lawyer representing an investor, or from the perspective of a government enforcement authority. And, while I would be a little nervous about running this enterprise, I wouldn't be quaking in my boots. In a civil lawsuit, any award would probably be minimal, and in a criminal case there would probably be an extremely generous plea offered.
It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial.
They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no.
Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.
"Reasonableness" is meant to be vague, because what is reasonable in one case or contract or industry is not always reasonable in another. Generally, though, you'll probably find courts interpreting it to take into account normal practices in your geographic area, in your industry, and between you and the other party. If one party looks like they're trying to unjustly enrich themselves or is asking for something that people just don't agree to in the real world, it's probably going to be unreasonable. If people are asking for the fair value of their work on terms that are normally agreed to when they're the subject of negotiations, it's probably reasonable. Dropping the reasonableness language would probably leave the assigning party in a bad position, as they're not required to make the assignment, with no qualifications as to the terms. The assignee could argue that they're free to take the IP on any terms whatsoever, though courts often read in a reasonableness requirement anyway. This answer is based on U.S. law, but there will be probably be pretty strong parallels if you're in a common law jurisdiction.
Can a USA federal employee use a prostitute in a Las Vegas where it is legal? We got into an interesting debate at work today after someone joked that a prostitute would be cheaper than dating someone. The crutch of the debate was whether Federal employees or military could use a prostitute if they went to Las Vegas. Prostitution is legal in certain parts of LV. However, the debate was whether there was a Federal law that would prohibit travelling to another state for the express purpose of using a prostitute. At least one person suggested it was illegal due to human trafficking's laws, though I'm not convinced that is accurate. So, could a Federal employee legally travel to LV with the intent of using a prostitute there? As a related question is it possible that it's legal, i.e. I won't end up in jail, but would be grounds for termination from Federal employment; though I realize the latter question may be more policy than a legal question.
Short Answer It is not illegal for a federal employee or anyone else, who is not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to travel to Nevada for the purposes of engaging the services of a prostitute in the counties of Nevada (Clark County where Las Vegas, Nevada is located is not one such county) where it is legal. But, this is an offense under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice applicable primarily to U.S. military personnel while serving in that capacity, even in cases where prostitution is legal under local law and the service member is not married. Long Answer Legal Prostitution In Nevada, In General As another answer correctly notes that in Nevada: Clark County, the county in which Las Vegas is located, has made prostitution illegal. . . . You also can't do it in Reno (it's illegal in Washoe County) and the nearby independent city of Carson City (Nevada State Capital). In fact, the law only permits counties with a population of 70,000 or less to do it per county law. And before you ask, you can't go to Rachel, Nevada (closest settlement to Area 51) for some extraterrestrial ladies of the night as well as Lincoln County, while qualifying for legalized prostitution . . . prohibits it. Of the 16 counties in Nevada, only 10 allow prostitution, all of which must be done through regulated licensed brothels only. Even then, only 8 counties have at least one active brothel in operation. Civilian Legal Considerations In The U.S. Not Involving International Travel It seems as if the concern of the original post might be with the Mann Act. The Mann Act (also known as the White-Slave Traffic Act of 1910) is a federal law that criminalizes the transportation of “any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.” (Source) This has been revised in a manner that, among other things, is now gender-neutral and limiting it to circumstances in which the act for which the prostitute is transported is illegal. It was the first federal human trafficking law in the U.S. This act applies to transporting the prostitute across state lines, not the prostitute's customer. Closer to the mark is the Travel Act: The Travel Act or International Travel Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, is a Federal criminal statute which forbids the use of the U.S. mail, or interstate or foreign travel, for the purpose of engaging in certain specified criminal acts. But, since the travel would be for the purpose of an act that is legal at its destination, it wouldn't apply. International treaties on sex tourism are inapplicable to domestic travel, and I don't try to analyze their applicability here. None of these relevant laws treat military personnel or federal employees differently. Prosecutions Under The Uniform Code of Military Justice The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides an internal means of prosecuting military service members who are currently serving and a small number of other persons, via courts-martial, which are quasi-criminal proceedings with quasi-criminal punishments. Article 134 of the UCMJ is its general provision which is a catch-all article barring anything "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces", and also certain unenumerated offenses which are illegal under local law where the offense is committed, or under federal law. Article 134 encompasses many sub-offenses which are enumerated in the Manual For Courts-Martial but not in the statutory language of the UCMJ itself. One of the offenses which the Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in the United States prohibits is adultery (which only a handful of U.S. states do and Nevada does not), so this would be an activity, if carried out, that would be subject to court-martial for a married member of the military who is currently serving in the military and thus subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Adultery prosecutions under the UCMJ are reasonably common even now. (A lesser included offense of adultery under the UCMJ is "wrongful cohabitation" which is akin to adultery and bigamy but does not require a showing a sexual intercourse.) Also, as noted in the comments to the question, while patronizing a prostitute is not a specific offense in the UCMJ in the statute itself, it is another offense that can also be prosecuted under Article 134. It has been DOD policy since at least 2006 to prosecute service members under Article 134 for engaging in prostitution, whether or not the service member is married, and whether or not prostitution is legal under local law. (Prostitution is not illegal under federal law other than the UCMJ.) This is not obvious from the language of Article 134 of the UCMJ (which is codified at 10 U.S. Code § 934), itself, which states: Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court. As used in the preceding sentence, the term “crimes and offenses not capital” includes any conduct engaged in outside the United States, as defined in section 5 of title 18, that would constitute a crime or offense not capital if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as defined in section 7 of title 18. But, the primary and authoritative interpretive authority for Article 134 of the UCMJ is the Manual for Courts-Martial, with the force of a law or validly adopted regulation. This indicates that prosecutions for pandering a prostitute under Article 134 does not require a showing that it is illegal to do so under local law.
Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.
This question is controlled almost entirely by local municipal and county ordinances. It is not a question of federal law that is uniform across the U.S. and in most cases it is not even a question of state law. So, there is no single answer to your question. Most localities regulate this with some combination of hotel specific building codes (usually incorporated by reference from a uniform building code promulgated by a private non-profit organization as a model building code provision) and hotel specific local zoning ordinances.
This was attributed to Dumblaws.com, which is now mercifully nonexistent. It is false, as is the supposed law against fishing for whales on Sunday (seriously? Whales in Ohio?). If someone makes such a claim and gives a specific citation like "ORC 1533.02", you can look that law up. Otherwise, you can go to the state's repository of laws, which is searchable (not all states are as enlightened). No laws mention "whale" or "housefly", and only 23 address "fly", only referring to insects in a couple of cases where e.g. bakery showcases must keep out dust and flies. You might take on this collection, hosted by a law firm. I haven't bothered to check if "It is illegal to drive a camel on the highway" in Nevada – that a least verifiably refers to a law that did exist.
Is it legal to retaliate against an employee who answered falsely when asked an illegal question? It depends. It is important to ensure we understand the distinction between (1) questions which are illegal in and of themselves, and (2) the illegality of hiring, discharging, or failing to hire based on a candidate's/employee's answer(s) or attributes. You yourself might have been aware of the difference beforehand, but your question is a good occasion for clarifying a general misconception. In instances of the first category, it would certainly be illegal to retaliate against the employee insofar as the falsehood is traceable to the employer's violation of the law. Examples of this category are sections 432.3(b) ("An employer shall not [...] seek salary history information, including compensation and benefits, about an applicant for employment") and 432.7 ("An employer [...] shall not ask an applicant for employment to disclose, through any written form or verbally, information concerning an arrest or detention that did not result in conviction") of the California Labor code. Scenarios of the latter category are more intricate, since an employer might prove that his decision to discharge the employee falls outside of conduct sanctioned by statute. For instance, 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) does not outlaw --at least at a federal level-- questions about the individual's protected categories (such as sex, religion, or national origin). It only outlaws the decision making that is influenced by the protected categories which are the subject matter of the interview questions. The example you gave ("what would your husband do if you got this job?") serves to illustrate the difference, putting aside that questions of that sort might be intended to indirectly ascertain the candidate's marital status. Let's assume that the employer seeks to hire a waitress, and that the jurisdiction at issue outlaws discrimination on the basis of employee's marital status but not the questions about it. The employer has a cognizable interest to avoid employing any waitress whose husband is an overly jealous person with propensity to attack male clients. The waitress's lie when answering that question (for instance, by fraudulently representing that she is single or that her husband is ok with her employment as waitress there) contravenes the employer's legitimate interest to protect its clients. In that context, the employer's discovery that the employee lied during the interview gives reasonable grounds for discharging that employee. After all, the employee's intentional misrepresentation only strengthens the employer's suspicion of being at greater risk (of liability toward clients) than the employee is willing to admit. For the employer to prevail at law, it would need to be proved that the reason for discharging the female employee was not her marital status itself, but the employee's concealment of a risk that is a matter of employer's lawful concern.
It is legal. 18 USC Chapter 17 contains laws regarding what you can/cannot do with US legal tender. It doesn't mention anything about buying, or selling US tender at or above the face value. And there are several businesses in the USA that do this (coin exchanges which purchase coins at less then face value and give you dollar bills in return, etc...). However I would be concerned that your action might look like money laundering to the customs official on your way back home. Or on the way going to the foreign country for that matter. Which could be very bad for you. I would talk to a lawyer about this.
Sexual contact that is not consented to is a crime. Physical contact where the receiver is under the apprehension of imminent risk is the crime of battery. However, spanking in the context of a consensual sexual encounter does not have that apprehension and is therefore not battery. It is akin to the consent given by people who take part in a contact sport. Contracts cannot permit criminal actions. The permission given by the submissive in this agreement would be valid only at that point in time that the contract was made and could be revoked at any time: such revocation could be explicit or implicit. As continuous consent is required for a sexual act and revocation of permission would introduce the apprehension of harm. Whenever the permission was revoked the agreement would be unenforceable. At best, you have a agreement that is enforceable when the permissive wants it to be and not otherwise: more likely, you have a totally unenforceable agreement. More generally, contracts that involve sex acts as consideration are enforceable to the extent that prostitution is legal in the jurisdiction. However, an order for specific performance would not be granted where either of the parties was no longer consenting to the sex act because that would be a court order to commit a crime. Other remedies for breach like damages would be available. For example, if you contracted with a prostitute and refused to pay for services delivered, you could be successfully sued for the fee, any damages, costs and interest.
You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.
Can a minor get a copyright registered in India? Can a person below 18 register copyright in India?
I have found no evidence to suggest that a citizen under the age of 18 can't hold, or register for copyright in India. The copyright rules (http://copyright.gov.in/Copyright_Rules_2013/index.html) do not seem to impose any restrictions which would prevent persons of any certain age from holding a copyright. The e-registration page (http://copyright.gov.in/UserRegistration/frmLoginPage.aspx) for registering a copyright does not seem to impose any age requirements, but it does require the person to setup an account. The account registration page (http://copyright.gov.in/UserRegistration/frmNewUser.aspx) does not seem to impose any age requirements. The site terms of use (http://copyright.gov.in/termsCondition.aspx) do not seem to impose any age restrictions for using the site or it's services. The registration form "Application Form for Registration of Copyright (Form-XIV)" (http://copyright.gov.in/frmformsDownload.aspx) does not seem to impose any age requirements.
Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.
Yes, you can grant any license you want to your larger work. With respect to Creative Commons, they provide guidance: May I apply a CC license to my work if it incorporates material used under fair use or another exception or limitation to copyright? Yes, but it is important to prominently mark any third party material you incorporate into your work so reusers do not think the CC license applies to that material. The CC license only applies to the rights you have in the work. For example, if your CC-licensed slide deck includes a Flickr image you are using pursuant to fair use, make sure to identify that image as not being subject to the CC license. For more information about incorporating work owned by others, see our page about marking third party content. Read more considerations for licensors here. With respect to MIT License for software, I don't think that many of the reasons for fair use apply to using someone else's source code in your project. If you're creating criticism, commentary, news, or educational material, you probably have more than just code. You should choose a more appropriate license for the complete work (like a Creative Commons License). Taking someone's software source code and trying to use it under fair use may also lead to issues when you consider other factors, such as the purpose of the use, the amount included in the larger work, and the effect of value on the copyrighted work. I'm not finding a lot of cases regarding fair use in software. Galoob v. Nintendo found that you can modify copyrighted software for personal use (not relevant to this discussion). Sega v. Accolade found that copying software for reverse engineering was fair use under certain conditions (again, not relevant here). If you are attempting to use anything under fair use, regardless of the license that you apply to your larger work, you do need to ensure that you do not give the impression that each individual piece of that work is also under that licence once extracted. That's why you need to clearly mark which portions are used pursuant to fair use. If those portions are extracted from the larger work, then the original restrictions to use apply. However, someone can use the larger work under the license you grant. I just wanted to add this brief section to be extremely clear. When you are producing a work, you can choose a license for that work. If you are incorporating someone else's work into your own work, there are two possibilities: You obtain the other person's work under a license. You must abide by this license and all of its requirements. Some licenses are viral in nature, which restrict the licenses that you can apply to the larger work. You use the other person's work under fair use. In this case, you need to properly attribute the work and identify that it is not available under the same license as the larger work. Someone that extracts that smaller portion must abide by the copyright of that work. If it's available under a particular license, they can choose to use that license or under fair use if they are able to. Someone using your complete combined work uses your license.
The relevant law in England and Wales is the Protection of Children Act 1978. Under section 1 of the Act, it’s a defense to distributing, showing, or possessing indecent images of children if you had a “legitimate reason” to distribute, show, or possess them. It’s also a defense if you had not seen the images, didn’t know they were indecent, and didn’t have any cause to suspect they were indecent. However, the 1999 case of R v. Bowden held that downloading a digital copy of an image counts as “making” an image. This is not subject to the “legitimate reason” defense by statute (although I don’t know if it’d count as “making” if you have no reason to know the contents, like if a computer repair shop backs up a customer’s hard drive without looking at what’s on the drive). However, it is explicitly still subject to defenses in sections 1A and 1B of the Act. 1A covers spouses and partners. If you are the spouse or partner of a child between 16 and 18, then with their consent you can legally make indecent images of them (although this doesn’t apply if anyone but the two of you is in the image). You can also possess those images with their consent and give them a copy. Section 1B covers criminal proceedings, investigations, etc., and was added after R v. Bowden. Because copying a digital image counts as “making” an image, it would generally be illegal for people to work with digital copies of indecent images even if done for a good reason. To avoid that, Parliament made an exception for making an indecent image when necessary to prevent, detect, or investigate crimes, as well as for criminal proceedings anywhere in the world. Parliament also exempted the UK’s intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) when carrying out their duties. These are specific statutory exemptions, so they can’t really be generalized to “if you have a legitimate reason.”
I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.
You can't Under clause 7(b) of the CC-SA-BY 3.0 the licence is irrevocable providing that the licensee complies with its terms. However, ... It appears that your work is part of a Collection (as defined and under clause 4(a), the licensee has this obligation: If You create a Collection, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the Collection any credit as required by Section 4(c), as requested. While you cannot have your work removed, you can have the attribution removed so that no one knows that it is your work - this would seem to meet your desire of having no association with the website. "To the extent practicable" should include anonymising you. As a bonus, if they don't do this "to the extent practicable" then they are in breach of the licence and it's automatically revoked - you can then proceed with DCMA takedown notices and/or sue for copyright breach.
Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue.
The copyright holder has the rights in whatever he created. If you have created something new based on his idea, the law will generally not be interested; but if your expression is recognisably a copy with a few changes, he can prevent publication or demand royalties. If you are uncertain which side of the line you fall, you should ask a lawyer (or, more cheaply, write to the author and ask if he objects).
Does LA's fireworks law include a religious exemption? So, I was doing an Internet search to determine the legality of bonfires in Los Angeles (for a roleplaying game character I'm planning), when I came across this page stating that owning and setting off fireworks in LA is illegal. However, it occurs to me that there are religions such as Taoism where setting off fireworks is a part of their religious activities (in the Taoists' case, they're used to scare off ghosts and evil spirits), and these religious activities should be protected by the First Amendment, right? Is there a religious exemption in LA's law that bans fireworks? If not, have any Taoists (or members of other religious groups that use fireworks as a part of their religious rituals) ever taken the city of LA to court over it?
Yes, there is a religious exemption. SEC. 57.5608.1.2. FIREWORKS. It shall be unlawful for any person to use, give, possess, sell, or discharge any fireworks in the City of Los Angeles. EXCEPTION : Patriotic, civic, and religious organizations may conduct fireworks displays under permit by the Chief and in accordance with the provisions of the California Health and Safety Code. https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/los_angeles/latest/lamc/0-0-0-351279
This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals.
You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries.
It's illegal to (temporarily) break an item The commercial car park owner may not aim the camera at Alice garden. However, even if it does so, breaking the camera or damaging it is still illegal - as one of the various forms of destruction/damaging of property colloquially called vandalism. Do note that the very article and the clasification of laser OP links to points out that *even a low-powered "pet-safe" IIIb/3R laser leaves out burnt-out pixels with a pinkish surrounding. These might not be enough to prevent identification when not aiming the laser into the camera, but they are damage to the sensor. The very article also describes how the camera damage progresses even after exposure, possibly due to the high power lasers. However, even if no such damage occurs, the owner of the camera is (temporarily) deprived of its legal uses while the laser is pointed on it, which is in many jurisdictions enough to count as theft.
What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area.
Your analysis is correct. Hobby Lobby would be irrelevant insofar as health benefits are concerned (although the general religious objection doctrine would still have relevance in other contexts, e.g. pharmacy operators), in a Medicare for all single payer system where health insurance did not involve an employer. And you are likewise correct that a government could not assert a religious objection, although the Medicare for All program could decide what it would and would not cover and would not have to cover reproductive health services at all.
As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent.
The city can do any of those things under any of the circumstances mentioned if a city ordinance duly adopted by the city council authorizes it to do so. A city may legislate by adopting any ordinances which do not violate its charter, state statute, the state constitution, or the U.S. constitution. If the city has any "rational basis" for its ordinance, which is an extremely low threshold that will not be found to be violated unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it has been violated, then it is constitutional, since it does not impair any particular constitutional right. Aesthetic concerns are a sufficient rational basis to meet the rational basis test for constitutionality. None of those sources in New York State prohibits a city from imposing a lawn and garden care ordinance, or forces a city to allow someone to grow food at their residence. Destroying a garden is not a "cruel and unusual" punishment for violating a city ordinance under the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution or its state constitutional equivalent.
Can a non-profit organization use a patent without paying a licensing fee if it makes no money on its own invention? Can a non-profit organization use a patent without paying a licensing fee if it makes no money on its own invention? Let's assume that the company designs a chip based on the x86 architecture and then makes the design open-source. Will the non-profit company have to pay Intel for using the x86 architecture or not? Assume that this is in the United States.
Patents give exclusive rights to their owner It doesn’t matter who wants to use it, they need the owner’s permission.
You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.
Electronic designs can be patented provided they meet the criteria for a patentable idea. But patenting a design using specific ICs is probably not a good idea as all someone has to do is redesign the same function using different ICs and they have worked around your patent. The best approach is to patent your circuit function using "functional blocks" that are more generic so that the overall circuit's function, which is the novel idea, it patented and not the specific implementation. Patents can be tricky to navigate. You might do well to consult a patent attorney who can advise you how best to protect your intellectual property.
united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app.
An investor can require, as a condition of making an investment, that key management and creative employees of the company agree to a non-compete agreement. If such employes choose not to sign such an agreement, the investor will not invest. This is quite common. If Alice has signed such an agreement, she may not be able to start a new company with such new applications without permission from the existing company. She can surely write such applications for the existing company and get it to modify its business to use them. If Alice (still) owns a controlling share, she can simply order the company to modify or expand its business model. If she has sold enough of the company that she no longer controls it, she must persuade those who do control it to adopt her ideas. Any non-compete agreement must be limited, both in the range of activities it covers, and in the tiem for which it is valid. Some US states impose specific limit on these factors. An agreement tht exceeds such limits will not be enforceable. If Alice was employed by the company at the time she wrote any of these apps, the code may well be owned by the company, either under the work-made-for-hire copyright rule (see 17 USC 101) or under a specific contract of employment. Investors are likely to demand that such a contract be signed before they invest in a tech startup. Alice will also have a duty not to act contrary to the company's interests while employed by it. In the absence of non-compete agreements, Alice might not be prevented from founding or joining a competing company, but may not be able to use work done while employed by the first company for the benefit of a new one.
An LLC can obtain a 501(c)(3) designation, but all its members/owners must also be 501(c)(3) non-profits. So if Red Cross and Habitat for Humanity and Goodwill got together to start an LLC, that LLC could obtain a 501(c)(3) designation. If a human person is a member of an LLC, that LLC cannot obtain a 501(c)(3) designation. I don't think there's any reason a for-profit LLC could not accept donations from Patreon or Kickstarter, but those donations would generally be treated as income, the same as money received in exchange for goods.
As @amon stated in a comment, copyright requires creativity. If the author of a tool wants to claim copyright on the output of that tool, then that output must contain something that required the creativity of the tool author. For a tool that just re-indents its input, the output is created from the input with a mechanical, non-creative, transformation and the output does not contain any creative content that wasn't already present in the input. For that reason, authors of such tools can't claim any copyright on the output. For a tool like bison, which was mentioned in the comments, the output contains a measurable amount of creative content that was not present in the input, but which was provided by the authors of bison. For that reason, the authors of 'bison' do have a copyright claim on the output of the tool (for which they give a broad permission to use). So, the basic question becomes, how much of the (creative) content of the output can be traced back to the tool itself and not to the input that the tool processed. For linters/formatters, that is likely to be very little. For code generators, it can be anywhere between very little and all of the output. The license restrictions on the code produced by the tool itself are by default the same as the license restrictions on the source of the tool, but the tool author can choose to apply any other license to the tool code that ends up in the output. If the output of the tool is, at least in part, dependent on an input file, then the authors of the input file also have a copyright claim on the tool output (as their creative work influenced the output), so the tool author can not claim exclusive ownership. The usual situation is that for tools that don't add creative content to the output, the author explicitly states that the don't have any copyright claims on the output. For tools that do add creative content, that content might be released under very permissive conditions (like, "you can use the output as a whole for any purpose, but you can only separate out the code that comes from the tool's codebase if you adhere to the <X> license")
I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account.
Is it valid to pass a law that cannot be upheld? Is it valid to pass a law that cannot be upheld? (Question applies to any jurisdiction) Example: Tax must be paid with legal tender. There is only so much money in the world that can actually be used to pay taxes, and I would imagine this is significantly less than the dollar-worth of all assets. Theoretically, the sum of tax billed to all citizens/entities could be greater than the amount of legal tender in circulation to pay this tax. I'm not sure what the total amount of legal tender usable for paying taxes is. Let's say hypothetically this is $100 trillion. Imagine some asset such as bitcoin currently has a market cap of $1 trillion. If people distrusted the government so much to the point where they refuse to ever sell their bitcoin, the USD/BTC pair could go close to zero, where BTC/USD tends toward infinity. In this crazy scenario bitcoin could hit a market cap of $1000 trillion. Of course this means nothing in the sense that these are unrealized gains. (No one actually plans on realizing them because of distrust in the government). Now imagine the minting of new bitcoin from mining is 33% annually. Assuming the market cap of bitcoin remains constant, this would amount to $250 trillion dollars of unrealized income after one year. Imagine this income was taxable at a 50% rate. Now all bitcoin investors would owe $125 trillion to the government at a single instant (assuming citizens are only due tax all at once at the end of the financial year). This is greater than the $100 trillion of actual money in existence that can be used to pay taxes. What happens here? One of the following? Something else? Such laws which cannot be upheld are allowed and all you can do is try to get these laws changed before you get into problems Individual citizens get into problems for not paying taxes since their individual amount owed is technically possible (even though the sum across all citizens is technically impossible to pay) The government is forced to reduce the income tax rate from 50% to something lower so that all these taxes can be payed In this specific scenario, these taxes are not required to be payed The tax laws are suddenly considered void and no one has to pay income tax anymore until these laws are fixed This is a flaw in the tax system and even though this hypothetical scenario did not yet occur, the laws could still be challenged right now as we speak in a court, and no one has to pay taxes until fixed Obviously that was a very specific example above (that's very hypothetical and probably contains many mistakes). A more general answer would be good to know.
A government can pass laws which cannot be fully enforced, or even widely enforced. Such laws are nonetheless legally valid, unless repealed by the legislature, or struck down by the courts in accord with the procedures in the particular country's laws. In common law countries, it is often a defense to a criminal charge that a law is impossible to comply with, but this only arises when there is an attempt to enforce the law, and it is in fact impossible for that defendant to comply with that law. If the defendant can comply, it is not relevant that other defendants might not be able to. If taxes were assessed that totaled more than all the legal money in circulation, the government might increase the money supply. Or it might not try to collect in all cases, or not collect the full amount. Otherwise many taxpayers might enter bankruptcy. In other cases of impossible laws, the results would depend on just how enforcement was attempted. The government cannot magically give people the ability to do things they cannot. A law requiring everyone to fly by flapping his or her arms would not secure compliance. It might put a lot of people in jail if people were arrested for not flying by hand. A law requiring everyone to register with a government agency before stepping outside would be foolish, and perhaps unenforceable under current conditions (but perhaps would be sensible in a Moon colony). Such a law would be legal (although it might fail a "rational basis test in the US) but an attempt to enforce it widely would lead to confusion or perhaps resistance. Most governments are not so foolish as to pass laws that cannot be complied with by large numbers of people, even if they have the legal power to pass such laws. A government that passed such a law might become unpopular, or even be overthrown. In some cases in history, laws that could not be complied with by particular groups were used as ways to persecute those groups.
Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this!
1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.
You ask them explicitly, maybe adding that you need that info specifically to calculate tax. IP address is not reliable because your customers could be using VPN, Tor, or be on vacation overseas. (By the way, "IP" on a website about law would more likely be understood as "Intellectual Property", not "Internet Protocol address".)
at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood.
The new law wins. That's rather the point of passing a new law-- the legislature wants to change the current law of the land whether that is based on statutes or court rulings. Of course, there are caveats. Prior judicial rulings may have relied on an interpretation of a source of law that supersedes the legislature in question (i.e. based on an interpretation of the state or federal Constitution or based on a federal law that supersedes the state law). In that case the new law would be found unconstitutional or ignored. Or the new law might have an ambiguous interaction with current law that courts would have to resolve. The new law might clearly make X illegal but there may be legitimate questions about whether it intended to make previously legal action Y illegal as well. It is, after all, very difficult to write a law that covers every possible fact pattern one would encounter in the real world.
I don't know of any reason one level of government would be prohibited from taxing itself, though I suspect it would not impose that kind of administrative burden on itself when it could simply re-appropriate funds to the desired locations. But governments can and do tax other layers of government. The Tenth Amendment likely prohibits Congress from taxing states in their capacity as states, though it may tax states on terms equal to private actors. For instance, in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), the U.S. Supreme Court held that New York was not exempt, as a constitutional matter, from paying a federal soft-drink tax for its sale of mineral waters from Saratoga Springs: By engaging in the railroad business, a State cannot withdraw the railroad from the power of the federal government to regulate commerce. Surely the power of Congress to lay taxes has impliedly no less a reach than the power of Congress to regulate commerce. There are, of course, State activities and State-owned property that partake of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations. These inherently constitute a class by themselves. Only a State can own a Statehouse; only a State can get income by taxing. These could not be included for purposes of federal taxation in any abstract category of taxpayers without taxing the State as a State. But, so long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution of the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a State. Whatever the federal government's authority to tax state and local governments, it has chosen to exempt them from taxation on any income "derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function." 26 U.S. Code § 115. As far as I know, most states follow the same basic rule, exempting any of their local governments from taxation on income from government functions. But not everything a goverment does is a "governmental" function. That term is generally distinguished from "proprietary" functions, which generally describes situations where the government is competing with private businesses in traditionally private markets -- like the Saratoga Springs example.
If the requirement for the debt is that the debt be paid in US dollars, absent some other stipulation to the contrary, $2 bills are US dollars and would satisfy the debtors obligation. It's hard to envision a situation where one would go before a judge or magistrate to enforce one's right to pay a debt with a $2 bill, but I suppose that effort would be successful. A debt that is to be paid in US dollars can be paid in $2 bill increments.
Laws without "or else" clause? I am reading through some of the recent COVID legislation in my state. Specifically, Utah HB1007. In the text, there are "you can't do that" type clauses... e.g. "An institution of higher education... may not require an individual to wear a face covering". However, there doesn't seem to be any "or else" type language that one typically sees in criminal-type-law, such as "impose a jail sentence of not less than 5 days" What is the point of laws with no "or else" clause? Does this just create some other kind of legal pathways toward "or else" via other vehicles? If so, how can I track down the "or else" resulting from these laws?
Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section.
While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.
Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).
This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.
Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.
Is such legislation that effectively overrules a court imposed sentence even allowable? Yes. Amnesty legislation is allowed. For example, the U.S. Congress recently passed such legislation with regard to crack cocaine sentences. Legislation changing sentences for crimes is presumed to be prospective only, but this presumption can be overcome with clear statutory language to the contrary. As a political matter, however, district attorneys usually lobby strenuously against amnesty legislation, feeling that it sets a bad (political) precedent. an existing NH truth in sentencing statute would seem to conflict with the notion that any such change is possible. In the event of a direct conflict between an older statute and a newer statute that can't be resolved by any other interpretive method, the newer statute prevails over the older one, even if this result isn't expressly identified in the legislation.
Breathalyzer tests are distinct from blood tests because the former does not "implicat[e] significant privacy concerns" (see Birchfeld v. ND). A cell phone is like a blood test, because it implicates significant privacy concerns, especially the level of electro-snooping that would be required to determine if someone had recently committed a phone-use offense. As the court held, Because the impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. A breath test might (but also might not) also satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception (waiting some number of hours for a warrant can easily result in the destruction of evidence), but a cell phone case could not give rise to such an exception. It should perhaps be noted that the "implied consent" laws are misnamed, because consent is not the issue. The 4th Amendment ban is on unreasonable searches, not unconsented searches. If you actually consent, it is reasonable for the police to search. I am not aware of any ruling to the effect that "because the defendant consented, the search is valid". In the context of breathalyzer law and case-law, an essential component of what makes the search reasonable is that it is incident to an arrest. With or without consent, or an implied consent law, Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Extending "implied consent" to cause-unrelated searches of cars, homes, or body cavities might not pass strict scrutiny. The state has a legitimate interest in public safety which justifies some minimal intrusion, but adding a provision that "when you drive, you give implied consent to searches of everything" is not narrowly tailored. But since driving is a privilege and not a right, the state has much more leeway to give you an ultimatum: if you don't cooperate with the search, you can lose your license. On the other hand, SCOTUS has not actually approved of this slogan about driving being a privilege. Something noteworthy from Birchfield is that the court also disapproves of blood tests because a less invasive method of achieving the result is available, and they grant that "Imposition of a warrant requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, given the enormous number of drunk-driving arrests, with little corresponding benefit". There being no less-invasive alternative means of realizing the legitimate state interest in stopping distracted driving, I actually expect that when this comes to pass and the matter ends up at SCOTUS, there will be another important change in search law (but "implied consent" will still be irrelevant).
In the state of Michigan, can an employer be legally liable if an intoxicated employee hits and kills someone driving into work? Under the doctrine of "respondeat superior", can an employer in Michigan be legally liable if an (intoxicated) non-salary employee hits and kills a person on their way to work? Would the employer's legal responsibility change if the vehicle was owned by the company?
Under the doctrine of "respondeat superior", can an employer in Michigan be legally liable if an (intoxicated) non-salary employee hits and kills a person on their way to work? Probably not. For most purposes, under principles originally established for minimum wage laws under the Portal to Portal Act, you are not at work and acting within the scope of your employment when you leave home to go to work (i.e. when you are commuting) or when you leave work to go home at the end of the day. Would the employer's legal responsibility change if the vehicle was owned by the company? Not on a respondeat superior theory. The employee still isn't acting within the scope of employment. But, Michigan does impose statutory liability upon vehicle owners which is vicarious liability even though it isn't respondeat superior liability, under a theory similar to (but broader than in some respects since it applies to non-family too, and narrower than in other respects since it is limited to vehicle owners) the common law family car doctrine. Specifically, Michigan Vehicle Code § 401(1) states (the balance of the section pertains to leased vehicles): This section shall not be construed to limit the right of a person to bring a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law. The owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of the injury by his or her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or other immediate member of the family. So, unless the employee had a company car without the express or implied consent or knowledge of the employer, the company is responsible for harm caused by negligence. There might be an argument that criminal activity (driving while intoxicated) which was intentional or reckless, is beyond what the employer gave express or implied consent to do and was not done with employer knowledge (I haven't reviewed the case law to examine that theory), in the same way that the employer would probably not have liability if the employee, while sober, intentionally murdered his ex-wife by driving over her with the company car. But, at first blush, it looks like the employer would be on the hook if it was a company car, since drunk driving is a traffic statute that was violated for which the negligence per se liability referred to in the statute would apply. The fact pattern of the question is notable because it catches a case where there is statutory liability in Michigan, despite the fact that neither the family car doctrine, not respondeat superior, nor a negligent entrustment theory would impose liability on employer at common law. (There are negligent entrustment cases at common law in Colorado and elsewhere where negligent entrustment liability is imposed when an employer allows a drunk employee to leave work in a company car that the employer could have forbidden the employee to use because the employee was drunk.)
once employed, if you revealed in conversation your true beliefs, and they ran counter to what you wrote down, could this give the employer just cause in termination? Texas is by default an at-will employment. Thus, absent a contract establishing termination for just cause, the employee may be terminated for anything (except when that contravenes public policy) or even for no reason at all. But you specifically ask whether the employee's eventual disclosure constitutes just cause. It depends on whether the employment contract specifies that "the employee would be employed for so long as he satisfactorily performed his duties". Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167 (1952). In that event, the sole discovery that employee lied about that at the interview is not evidence that the employer was dissatisfied with the employee's work performance. In a context of termination for just cause, Porter v. United Models, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 340, 344 (2008) states that where performance is to be the satisfaction of one of the parties, his dissatisfaction must be founded on facts such as would induce action on the part of a reasonable man. He may not act arbitrarily or without reason in the matter, and the law will say that he is satisfied with that with which he ought to be satisfied. Ultimately, an employer seeks to be satisfied with the employee's actual work performance, rather than with a screening process aimed at predicting the person's work performance on the basis of the employee's personal values.
The "felony murder" doctrine, which applies in most of the U.S. (including California), holds criminals engaged in "dangerous felonies" responsible for any deaths that occur during the commission of such crimes. In the given example, the hostage taker and anyone who is an accessory to that aggravated assault would, if convicted, also be guilty of murder for deaths that occurred in connection with the incident, regardless of their intent.
Yes Assuming you were assaulted (with or without battery) and you suffered injury (physical or otherwise) during that assault you are entitled to damages. The injury has to flow from the assault but not necessarily from the assaulter. For example, if you fled across the road and were struck by a car you could sue your attacker. Because assault is an intentional tort, it is not necessary for you to prove that actual financial loss was suffered - this is not negligence. The court can assess economic loss, non-economic loss and exemplary (punitive) damages.
In Michigan, the government says, there are circumstances where as a Michigan resident you can be sued, if you are in an accident with a non-resident driving a non-Michigan vehicle. Erie is a "compliant" company, which under MCL 500.3163(2) means that they have an upper limit of $500,000 in benefits to an out of state party (even though they don't write insurance in Michigan).
I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.
In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving.
Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.<1> While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.<2> Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of "the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights" that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a "novation" of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured<3>), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes <1> At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. <2> The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. <3> The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.
Data Protection Laws Some Co-workers of mine have been sending customer's personal information, that includes banking details through unsecured plaintext emails. This feels to me like it is definitely breaking laws/regulations but I am not sure what ones. This is going on in the US and in the UK Is this an illegal practice? EDIT: By unsecured email I just mean a normal email sent between employees over outlook, this is also used to send emails externally and there is no blocker for sending attachments to external emails if someone was to mistype an email address there is nothing to stop this being sent out. By Plaintext I mean what is sent and received is readable, no hashing, etc. I don't know if this is encrypted decrypted on the send but as the email can be sent externally and internally I doubt it
Article 32 of the GDPR requires companies to adequately secure their data when handling data belonging to EU citizens. This also applies to cross border scenarios where data is transferred between countries. Technically speaking, the GDPR doesn't set a standard for security: you don't have to encrypt your data, use AES or RSA encryption, or hash and salt passwords. It is your choice on how to secure your data, though the GDPR does mandate specific ways to secure data. However, not doing so opens yourself up to two consequences: The European data protection supervisor is tasked with the enforcement of regulations. A company can be forced to increase their level security if a valid complaint alleging that inadequate security measures are in place is made There is a significant amount of security risk, and if a data breach occurs, the GDPR allows authorities to levy heavy fines. Especially heavy fines may occur if it is found that the data was not securely stored. So the answer is: A complaint to relevant authorities can force the company to take action, or they will lose access to the European market.
The GDPR is about "processing" not "storing", so your actions definitely fall under the GDPR. Also you have stored the email address and the email you sent in your "Sent" folder. You need to reply with all the information you have associated with that email address. This will at least be the email you already sent. If you scraped the email address from GitHub then you have it in a table with (presumably) other information such as the repository where you found it, in which case send that row of the table with the associated column headers. If you really just have a list of email addresses then say so. If you merely saw the email address and then typed a fresh email then say so.
Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing.
It's not illegal to ask. Whether they can give it to you, and under what circumstances, is another, much more complicated matter. For instance, if the database contains health information covered by HIPAA in the United States, or personal information covered by laws like GDPR or CCPA, the customer's ability to share the database may be restricted, either requiring additional confidentiality obligations/use restrictions, or preventing sharing entirely.
According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses.
You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.
I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?
A NDA can only cover confidential information, that is information that is not in the public sphere, and that was transmitted to the recipient in confidence, that is it is specifically identifiable information that the recipient knew or should have known from the circumstances of the communication was confidential. For example, "marketing techniques" are not confidential information although the specific marketing strategy (pricing, promotion etc.) to be employed for a particular group may be confidential if the circumstances of the communication are such that the recipient should have known they were. Telling them "Hey, this marketing strategy is confidential" is best, however, the nature of the communication may make it implicit, for example, if it is only communicated to a subset of employees and contains information that would obviously damage the organisation if made public such as a price or client list. An NDA that states "all information given is confidential" is probably not enforceable even if exceptions are given because a) it is manifestly untrue (how can the location of the bathrooms or which day is pay day be confidential?) and b) it places an unreasonable burden on the recipient to determine what is and what is not real confidential information.
Can the Federal government of the United States force all U.S. states to pass a mandatory vaccination mandate? Can the Federal government of the United States force all U.S. states to pass a mandatory vaccination mandate? Or do the states have the ability to decide whatever they want to do regardless of what the Federal government wants them to do?
Whether or not the federal government can pass its own law mandating vaccination is a separate question. The answer to the question “can the Federal government of the United States force all U.S. states to pass a mandatory vaccination mandate?” is a straightforward “No.” Such action by the federal government is contrary to the Anti-Coercion Doctrine. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, the issue was a federal law, the National Drinking Age law, which withheld 5% of federal funds (initially, 10% every year thereafter) from a state that did not have a minimum drinking age of at least 21. The Supreme Court court upheld the law not because Congress has the power to withhold federal funds in order to get what they demand from a state but because the 5% loss of funds is not so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion In other words, pressure is legal, compulsion is not. The court did not set a dollar amount that distinguishes impermissible coercion from permissible financial incentive, but we can presume that 10% loss of related federal funds would be tolerated. In NFIB v. Sebelius, SCOTUS overturned a law that allowed Medicaid funds to be entirely taken away if a state did not change its laws with respect to Medicaid in a specific way. The court held that The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion... The Medicaid expansion thus violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expansion There is a possible law that Congress could pass that would give states an incentive to pass a law about vaccination, but Congress cannot force states to pass any law.
No. As a superior sovereign, the United States can sue states in federal court without restriction. I’m not sure if that would apply in state court, but the federal government doesn’t generally file cases in state court to begin with. States can also sue each other in federal court, having waived their immunity to lawsuits brought by other states when they agreed to Article III of the Constitution (although Congress has said that these lawsuits must be filed directly in the Supreme Court).
Many states have laws providing for a residence for their governors, but I know of no state that mandates the use of those homes. Oregon's previous governor, for instance, lived in Portland rather than the governor's mansion, Mahonia Hall. Some cities do the same. In New York City, Mayor Bill De Blasio lives at Gracie Mansion, but Mike Bloomberg never did. Although we don't always think of them as government officials, some government schools provide their presidents with state-funded residences, as well. At the University of Virginia, the president lives at Carr's Hill.
The answer is they are quite different. The SCOTUS found almost 100 years ago that the Several States have the power to require vaccinations. This is one of the "reserved powers" under the constitution. The Texas Heartbeat law creates a regulation on doctors (similar) and a civil cause of action (very different). However, the biggest difference is that the older case permits the state to require medical treatment while the Texas law requires a medical justification for treatment. It seems uncontroversial to require a doctor's services to perform an abortion. However, now the Texas legislation is in effect codifying the medical ethics requirement to "do no harm." Medical ethics do allow exceptions based on a specific situation, and so does the law. A mandatory vaccination law is almost the opposite. It guides doctors that the general risks of vaccination are not strong enough to be considered harmful when weighed against the benefits of the vaccination. But, of course, medical ethics would also allow exceptions based on specific situations, and so should the law. Fizz already cited the case: Zucht v. King https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/260/174.
It is generally understood that governments do have the right to quarantine citizens in case of epidemic outbreaks. In nations with a rule of law, the extent of quarantine regulations may be challenged in court. A challenge against the app has been filed, and trying to second-guess the court by reading sections of the constitution seems to be pointless.
Yes. The leading case relevant to the question is Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a self-executing bird migration treaty could override state law. It is also well established that a treaty may override a previously enacted federal statute. While there might be a requirement that the treaty not be a sham that really doesn't involve another county, or otherwise have an international component, as a practical matter, meeting this requirement is something that would almost always be possible. So, the President and a two-thirds majority of the Senate, in cooperation with a foreign country, by treaty, can accomplish legislative ends with which the House would not agree. As a practical matter, however, the two-thirds majority requirement for passage of a treaty in the Senate, the partisan organization of politics in the U.S., and the correlation of the partisan makeup of the Senate and the House, means that this observation is basically an irrelevant footnote. No treaty that could secure bipartisan support by two-thirds of U.S. Senators, and also be signed by the President, would not be able to be passed in the House. There has never been a time in U.S. history where one political faction has a two-thirds majority in the Senate and another political faction had a majority in the House. As a practical matter, it is almost always easier to pass ordinary legislation approved by majorities in the House and Senate, than it is to pass a self-executing treaty. The only scenario I could image where this might happen would be one in which an "old guard" President and Senate are in place, and then one election, some new political movement suddenly nearly sweeps the House and the U.S. Senate seats that are open due to some pivotal historic event, but there hasn't been more than a single Senate election or a Presidential election since that sea change in public opinion, something that very rarely has happened in other countries.
Businesses are not required to do what the card says, they are required to do what the card-holder says, to the extend that what the card holder says relates to giving or denying consent to be vaccinated. Since they don't vaccinate people who are unconscious, consent will always be directly obtained from the patient and the card has absolutely no effect. Also, control subjects are selected at random and the subject does not know what group they are in. Possession of such a card therefore has zero scientific effect.
Does this mean that anyone who is born in the US is automatically a US citizen, whether they want it or not? Yes (subject to a couple of exceptions, namely the children of diplomats with full immunity and the children of a hostile foreign occupier). Or does this amendment just offer the possibility of requesting citizenship? In other words: is there an action to be made in order to become a US citizen when born in the US (and therefore one is not before this action is performed)? No. For someone who falls under the 14th amendment's citizenship clause, the only way to avoid being a US citizen is to relinquish or renounce it, which generally means that one is stuck with the US citizenship for at least 18 years. Most countries' citizenship laws, or at least all of those with which I am familiar, operate this way—automatically—for "normal" cases of acquisition of citizenship by virtue of the circumstances of birth. This is true whether the citizenship derives from the place of birth or from the parents' citizenship.
Is it illegal to open carry Hinged Handcuffs? I just got a pair of Double Locked Handcuffs with a cuff carrier to put on my belt. I'm not part of any security, LEO, or federal division. I'm wondering if it is illegal to carry my handcuffs on my belt in public as a civilian. If so, if my, or someone else's life is in imminent danger, and I were to perform a citizens arrest, would I have to read them their rights, or are they detained and awaiting Authorities arrival? I am only asking the last question just in case and im not trying to be a hero.
Is it illegal to open carry Hinged Handcuffs? england-and-wales No, but there use may constitute an assault or false imprisonment if one cannot justify their application was reasonable, proportionate and necessary in the circumstances. A civilian can lawfully use reasonable force if the conditions of s.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 are met: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.
Indiana has no state law against carrying an expandable baton, a.k.a. asp. (Hard to prove a negative, but here's one reference in support.) NB: Batons are considered deadly weapons. NBB: Laws on these weapons vary tremendously by state, and sometimes even by city, so this answer should not be construed to apply to any jurisdiction outside of Indiana!
If you read the first link, every offense can lead to arrest without a warrant. Notwithstanding, you don’t have to be arrested to be charged and vice -versa.
Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person Obstructing a public officer, specifically "deliberately hindering a public officer from carrying out official duties". Trespassing.
The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.
The policeman ordered, right as he took a step out of his car "Turn it off!" - which is a lawful demand to prevent the biker from possibly kicking the gas and running. As the driver did not seem to comply (from the policeman's PoV) during his walk over to the bike, he enforced the order himself by turning off the bike and confiscating the key for the moment. Having made it safe that the driver couldn't leg it, he guided traffic around him so he could get to the side of the road. We don't know what happened after the driver reached the curb to be lectured and/or arrested, the bike could be impounded or the confiscation might be temporary. So all we can do here is discuss the action of demanding that a motor vehicle be turned off, the doing of such and taking the keys. Demanding a vehicle to be shut off is standard procedure in police stop, as it is ensuring the safety of everybody involved. In a somewhat recent case (trying to find it again!), a driver did not shut off the car and had to stand on the brake to keep it where it was. As commands came conflicting (keep your hands where we can see them, get out of the car!) and he could not comply or the car would jump forward and ram somewhere, things escalated and the driver was shot. But back to the first step. Was the stop lawful? ACLU in NY tells us: Police may stop and briefly detain you only if there is reasonable suspicion that you committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime. Don’t bad-mouth a police officer or run away, even if you believe what is happening is unreasonable. That could lead to your arrest. There was a crime committed: Splitting is illegal in NY (among others: Section 1122, overtaking on the right), so the stop was justified under NY CPL 140.50. From my own experience, it is not uncommon for bikers to try to evade police by swerving back into traffic and using their higher mobility to get away. On its face, this makes it reasonable to demand the bike be shut off as the policeman advanced, and I'd like to congratulate the officer for taking the less escalating step and just turning the bike off himself on the noncompliance instead of drawing his gun and possibly escalating it to a use of force. Most lawyers suggest to drivers pulled over to do things akin to "After you brought your car to a complete stop [on the curb], roll down your window and shut off the engine". Like this one. Possibly confiscating the keys might be an overreach by the policeman, but the demand to turn it off clearly is not.
It depends on where you live, but "restrain" doesn't mean telling a person that they have to stay put, it implies either a physical blockage (locking the door) or a threat of force, and neither of those are present or suggested by the sign. We don't know what the consequences are, for example they might report you to your parents or even restrain you if you are a minor (that's who is in most "gym classes"). If you are an adult, the consequence could be some contractual sanction (read the contract) or termination of the contract for breach (read the contract). You can simply ask a supervisor how they intend to enforce this restriction.
In most U.S. states, a citizen's arrest using proportionate non-deadly force is authorized when the citizen has witnessed the crime or has been asked by a law enforcement officer to assist in making an arrest. The U.S. Constitution is not violated by this authorization. For example, in Colorado, citizens arrests (not made at the direction of a law enforcement officer) are authorized by Section 18-1-707(7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which states that: A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. Generally speaking it is illegal in the context of a citizen's arrest to use: disproportionate force, force applied to punish rather than detain someone, or deadly force, although there are times when deadly force is authorized for reasons similar to those that would apply for self-defense in the absence of a citizen's arrest. Deadly force is generally not authorized to protect tangible personal property or most forms of real property, but some places authorize the use of deadly force to protect a residence. I've heard before that a thief have "right" to flee, and trying to knock him out is not justified because you can only use violence to protect your self, instead of your money. While it is understandable that you might think this based upon U.S. Supreme Court cases like Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the law is actually more nuanced and that case held that: when a law enforcement officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, the officer may not use deadly force to prevent escape unless "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." It was found that use of deadly force to prevent escape is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of probable cause that the fleeing suspect posed a physical danger. Thus, it is illegal to shoot to kill a fleeing thief or shoplifter, even though it is not illegal to restrain a shoplifter physically to prevent that shoplifter from fleeing the scene prior to the arrival of the police.
Has the selective draft been tested constitutionally and how has it been defended as being fair gender discrimination? This question is related to this one. What is the history of the selective draft and how has it's constitutionality been tested and defended? It is not as if women cannot be drafted, it is the case in the Israeli military, women serve in that military just as long as the men. In a country which enshrines equal rights for all how can such a thing be laden on just half the population? This seems like unfair gender discrimination to me.
The US armed forces have used a draft of some sort in the American Revolutionary War, the American Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. This draft has always fallen on men only. Since the end of the Vietnam War, men have been required to register or a possible future draft. There have been challanges to this as a violation of the Equal Protection clause because registration is only required of men, but none have succeeded as of July 2021 In National Coalition for Men v. Selective Service System No. 19-20272 (5th Cir. 2020-08-13) The 5th Circuit court off appeals considered a challenge to the provisions of current Selective Service act (50 U.S.C. §§ 3802(a), 3809) that require male US citizens of ages 18-26 to register for a possible future draft, but not women. The Fifth Circiut wrote: Because that judgment [the district court decision holding the law unconstitutional] directly contradicts the Supreme Court’s holding in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78–79 (1981), and only the Supreme Court may revise its precedent, we REVERSE. ... In Rostker, the Supreme Court held that the male-only Selective Service registration requirement did not offend due process. 453 U.S. at 78– 79. The Court relied heavily on legislative history showing that Congress thoroughly considered whether to require women to register. ... Women were then barred from combat, so the Court examined the constitutional claim with those “combat restrictions firmly in mind.” Id. at 77. The Court concluded: This is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situated groups. . . . Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft. The fifth Circuit opinion went on to cite State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) to the effect that a lower federal court may not overrule a previous Supreme Court decision, even when the facts have changed, undermining the reasoning in the prior decision. The Plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case and overrule Rostker, but it declined, in significant part because Congress is now in the process of deciding whether to alter or abolish the Selective Service System in light of women now being allowed to serve in all combat positions, and other changes since the Selective Service law was passed, a Congressional commission having recommended that registration be required for both men and women. The history is discussed in the Wikipedia article on Rostker v. Goldberg and in the article on Conscription in the United States. The article on "National Coalition for Men v. Selective Service System" is also relevant.
The protection lies in the fact that these sorts of restrictions are expressed in state laws, and states are Constitutionally forbidden from denying to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or from interfering with religion. The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids states from making any law impeding free exercise of religion, or having the effect of establishing a state religion. This means that any law that forbids people of any religious denomination (including atheists) from holding any office (elected or not) under any level of government is unconstitutional. See Torcaso v. Watkins. Moreover, Title VII's protected classes are also (with the exception of sex) suspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause. A state or local government may not pass a law discriminating against a suspect class unless it is a narrowly tailored law which is the least intrusive way to achieve a compelling state interest. In practice, that means a state can't pass a law discriminating on the grounds of national origin, race, or religion. Sex is a quasi-suspect class; government discrimination on the grounds of sex must further an important state interest in a way reasonably related to that interest; again, in practice this will tend to rule out laws saying "no women can be elected to this post." The Americans with Disabilities Act actually does not exclude elected officials. It defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." The Equal Pay Act doesn't apply to elected officials, but again, sex is a quasi-suspect class. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act also excludes elected officials, and this is the one case where a state really could discriminate -- the applicable test is whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, which is not an especially high bar.
There appears to be no general federal statute addressing the legality of a male entering a female-labeled bathroom, or vice versa, within federal jurisdiction. There are various regulations that touch on bathrooms, for example the OSHA regulations pertaining to sanitation require that "toilet facilities, in toilet rooms separate for each sex, shall be provided in all places of employment in accordance with table J-1 of this section", but "Where toilet facilities will not be used by women, urinals may be provided instead of water closets". These are regulations imposed on employers, and there is no provision for enforcement by employers, for instance no clause saying that the employer must call the police, or in any way intervene or sanction an employee, if a person enters a bathroom of "the wrong sex". It is apparently not a crime, as reflected anywhere in the US Code, for a male to enter or remain in a female bathroom, or vice versa. Building managers have some discretion regarding the operation of federal facilities, for example courthouses, which could extend to requesting a male to not enter a female bathroom or vice versa, but there isn't a practical way to determine what departmental regulations exist that would allow eviction of a bathroom-cross-user. Federal law does not protect against sex/gender discrimination in public accommodations. As for Maryland law, the owner of private property has the right to control his property up to the point that state law take that control from him, and therefore in principle he could call the police to remove a person trespassing in a bathroom (this article addresses the trespass angle in North Carolina). Maryland does not appear to have any case law or statutory exception to trespass laws related to labeling of bathrooms, so enforcement actions would be at the discretion of the owner. At the lower end of the political hierarchy, Baltimore has an ordinance requiring single-use bathrooms to be gender neutral, and a proposal exists to enact a state law with this effect. In other words, there does not appear to be any direct, enforceable legal requirement regarding bathroom entry and sex. Trespass laws could be used, but are at the discretion of the property owner (who might be civilly sued for his actions, but the police don't decide the merits of a discrimination suit before evicting a trespasser).
General case - legal or not? It is hard to prove a negative - however, as far as I can see: It is not illegal to state your opinion that the existence of the state of Israel is unjustified, or that the state should be dissolved. Such a position would be considered outrageous by most Germans, in particular it is against the stated position of pretty much all political parties, except for the extreme right or left, and of most other organizations. It is not, however, illegal. In general, the dissolution of a state is not in itself illegal according to national or international law, as long as it happens voluntarily. There are some precedents: For example, during the German Reunification of 1989, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) under the (old) Article 23 of the Grundgesetz. One could argue that the German Democratic Republic effectively dissolved itself by that accession. What would probably be illegal would be to call for a violent end of the state of Israel, or even for a war. The relevant laws: §130 Strafgesetzbuch -- Volksverhetzung (incitement to hatred) §13 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) and, only applicable to the state: Art. 26 Grundgesetz -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) Special case - civil servants Civil servants are citizens, too, so mostly the same laws apply to them. However, for civil servants specifically there are higher requirements when it comes to respect for the German constitution, specifically for the "freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung" (literally: "basic free and democratic order"). That means that opinions which are "extremist" but not illegal may not be tolerated. Applicable laws/regulations: §7 Beamtenstatusgesetz §9 Richtergesetz §3 of the Tarifvertrag der Länder (TV-L) As far as I can see, the rules for whether something violates these rules would be similar as above. Note that there are even some Israelis who think that the state of Israel should not exist, at least not in its present form, so such a position is not totally unthinkable. The Wikipedia articles Right to exist and Existenzrecht Israels (German) give a good overview.
Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so.
tl;dr My assumption: the U.S. government is considering whether to accept refugees and immigrants (given your Syria comment). The background section talks about State attempts to restrict entry. The answer is nuanced since there are different standards for an entrance decision than there are for someone who is already in the U.S. This is because foreign nationals in their home nations aren't "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and so laws like the Civil Rights Act only apply in spirit. What does that mean? We wouldn't expect to see the federal government discriminate based on religion, but we might expect to see decisions made about groups that incidentally share an common religion. This is because the federal government has wide latitude when it comes to alienage---which is just a formal name for policies related to non-citizens. While religion is afforded a high degree of protection, the federal government's alienage policies are governed by the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This implies a practical challenge: things like religion and national origin can be very difficult to disentangle from questions that pertain to the alienage category. For example, a policy might restrict some group's entry "because of" a particular alienage reason and "in spite of" the fact that most of the affected people happen to share a common religion. Background The Equal Protection Clause U.S. Const. Am. XIV § 1 prohibits States from denying any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the laws." The Clause is often applied to the federal government as well, via the Due Process Clause U.S. Const. Am. V. See, e.g. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In relation to the clause, laws are reviewed for their constitutionality using either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would mean that in order to distinguish based on a particular trait, the government has to have a compelling, narrowly tailored interest, and no less restrictive alternative available. Rational basis just means the government's interest is subject to a lower level of scrutiny (e.g. benefits exceed costs, or don't let in felons). Things like, race, religion, national origin, and some forms of alienage are suspect classes that merit strict scrutiny. This bit about alienage is important. As we'd expect from the above, when States enact alienage statutes, they're subject to strict scrutiny, and when those statues cross the line, the courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In other words, the federal government, not the States, decides whether various "aliens" are admitted. Note: State scrutiny levels when dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967). As such, the courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to the federal government's immigration policy. One reason alienage is interesting is that it tends to encompass things like national origin and religion. This doesn't imply the federal government makes its decisions on the basis of religion. In fact, it'd be hard to make an argument that they do. However, since the categories can be so closely entwined, many scholars have argued for a change in standard. Edit In hindsight, this topic seems quite forward looking. A couple weeks after the OP's question a U.S. presidential candidate (Donald Trump) came out in favor of a ban on entry into the U.S. by Muslims. That led to a flurry of activity, and to this insightful blog post by Professor E. Posner.
Although the constitution doesn't explicitly require your vote to be equal in strength, surely the founders intended with the word 'vote' that you at least get to choose who you vote for. Quite the contrary. The founders specifically intended that smaller states should have disproportionate strength - they knew exactly what they were doing. This was one of the major design goals of the Constitution and is reflected in several other areas (e.g. the structure of the Senate); the smaller states wouldn't have agreed to join the Union if such concessions hadn't been made. There's a general principle in law that "the specific overrides the general". You're not going to get anywhere by trying to read into the word "vote" when there is explicit text saying something different. If the founders intended the word "vote" to imply "equal power for everyone", then why would they have specified, in great detail, a system which does exactly the opposite? For that matter, the founders didn't particularly intend that the people be able to vote for president at all! Article II, Section 1 says only that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors..." There is no requirement that the state should hold an election to determine the appointment of the electors. According to Wikipedia, five states initially had the electors chosen by the state legislature, without having the people vote at all, and South Carolina continued to use this system until 1860. The 14th Amendment, section 2, appears to require that all eligible voters (male and 21 at the time, since modified by the 19th and 26th Amendments) be allowed to vote for their electors, but even there the wording is "any election" which appears to leave open the possibility of having no election at all. (It hasn't been tested as far as I know.) I think that your proposed lawsuit would be quickly dismissed, possibly as "frivolous".
Short Answer This account would be a fairly extreme outlier relative to normal practice in jury selection, but it is certainly something that could possibly happen (except for one small detail that isn't very relevant to the core issues that it raises; this detail is discussed below in the last heading of this answer). The substantive points made in the Facebook post about what the facts recounted say about the state of women's conditions and attitudes about women in our society, and the poster's skepticism that a judge who made decisions like these really acted appropriately, are well founded, fair, and appropriate to raise. These concerns are within the heartland of what the case law on these kinds of issues discusses and struggles with, although because of the procedural posture of this issue, there isn't a lot of case law on this issue. Long Answer My Sources Of Knowledge I have participated in choosing perhaps half a dozen juries in which I was counsel, and I have observed the process in other cases one or twice and have previously been in a couple of jury pools myself (I've never been actually selected to serve). I'm also familiar with accounts of others practitioners regarding their experiences with jury selection, I know what I was taught in law school about the process, and I am familiar with the academic and practitioner oriented literature about the process. I am answering based upon U.S. law, because I don't have intimate familiarity with petite jury selection in other common law countries, although the broad outlines of the process are similar. As a caveat to this answer, however, recognize that judges have very broad discretion in the jury selection process and that not all judges adhere to "best practices". Further, in many states, judges are partisan elected officials who tend to end up in there positions because of, rather than in spite of, their extreme views and positions of legal issues over which they have discretion relative to the average lawyer or judges in places where the judicial selection process is less partisan. Your Questions How often are jury members subject to separate examination by defense counsel (or prosecution counsel) during jury selection? This usually happens in any case more serious than a simple traffic offense. It would be unusual to examine every single member separately in a separate room, but normally quite a few jurors a questioned separately on one point or another. This process is called voir dire (a situation in which U.S. legal terminology borrows from French rather than Latin). How frequently are jury members dismissed in the presence of other members? Jury members are usually dismissed in the presence of other members, but the specific juror responses to the reasons for doing so may or may not be discussed in the presence of the other jurors. Less sensitive questions (e.g., do you still live in this county, are you a U.S. citizen, do you speak English, do you have scheduled health procedures during the anticipated trial or a trip with a non-refundable ticket or similar issue, and a few other "categorical" exclusions) are usually discussed in the presence of other members, as are responses to general questions that are unlikely to be grounds by themselves for a dismissal for cause, but could inform peremptory challeges of jurors. The better and more common practice is for sensitive questions, such as a previous incident of being assaulted, to be discussed out of earshot from the other panel members, but in the hearing of the judge, at least one lawyer for each side and the court reporter who includes the bench conference in the trial transcript. Alternatively, how often are dismissed jury members informed of the selection or elimination of fellow jury members? Normally, jury pool members leave the courtroom and get on with their day once they are dismissed. But, if they choose to stick around, they will learn who is selected to serve on the jury, and who is eliminated from the jury pool. Is the defense counsel able to eliminate (all twelve) jury members from consideration (for cause) without objections by prosecution counsel? Terminology First of all, here and in your prior questions it is important to distinguish between the jury pool (a group of randomly chosen people who might end up being jurors) and the jury (a group of people ultimately selected to decide a case after challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are complete). The Voir Dire Process There is, in principle, no limit on the number of members of the jury pool who can be dismissed for cause, and if they run out, everyone goes home for the day and comes back the next day with a supplemental batch of jury pool members. In an obscure civil case or minor low profile felony case, the jury pool would typically be 30-60 potential jurors. In a death penalty case or case that has famous parties (e.g. a civil case involving Taylor Swift held in Denver recently), the jury pool would typically be several hundred people and the first round of voir dire would happen over the course of several days or even weeks. Any time that either party requests that a juror be dismissed for cause, the other party can choose to not object, or can object and argue that the juror should not be dismissed for cause. The judge doesn't have to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike the juror for cause and not infrequently will refuse to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike a juror for cause. This is because the judge has an institutional incentive to discourage jurors other than the one that a party has moved to dismiss from the jury pool from giving a lame excuse to try to get out of jury duty, even if the parties, who don't have that institutional concern, don't care about that. Why Might A Prosecutor Fail To Object? The downside of objecting to a request to dismiss a juror for cause is that it creates an almost automatic appellate issue for the party seeking to dismiss the juror if the juror is not dismissed. So, a prosecutor might not object to a questionable request to dismiss a juror for cause in order to reduce the likelihood that a conviction obtained by the prosecutor would be reversed on appeal. Giving the defense the jury it wants also makes it more likely that if the case starts going badly that the defendant will agree to a plea bargain mid-trial rather than risking a conviction by the jury, because any conviction obtained is more likely to hold up on appeal. A defendant may appeal a ruling denying a motion to dismiss a prospective juror that is denied after a conviction, if any, is entered. If the jury acquits the defendant (the unfavorable outcome the prosecutor would like to avoid by not having a juror dismissed for cause), the prosecutor can't appeal the case, and if the jury hears evidence, the case can't be dismissed without prejudice or retried unless there is a conviction that is reversed or there is a mistrial (the mistrial rules are bit complicated). So, if the prosecutor was really appalled by the dismissal for cause of so many women and felt that this would impair the prosecution's chance of obtaining a conviction materially, the prosecutor would have to dismiss the criminal charges so as to vacate the trial, before evidence was presented to the jury, and then refile the charges (assuming that this would be possible consistent with statutes of limitation and speedy trial requirements). But, this would be an extraordinary move with high stakes, because the prosecutor has a long term strategic interest in not pissing off a judge in any case because that could cause the judge to exercise the judge's discretion against the prosecutor in future cases. The judge and prosecutor may have to deal with each other in future cases for decades and will do so on a regular basis every few weeks or months. A judge is likely to be pissed off in this situation because dismissing a case ready to go to trial and scheduled for trial with a jury fully selected because the prosecutor was unhappy with the judge's rulings on motions to dismiss jurors for cause would not be appreciated by the judge who naturally believes that the rulings made on those motions were sound even if that belief is unreasonable. I strongly suspect that this was the reason that the prosecutor allowed all twelve women in the jury panel to be stricken for cause in the case that you describe (assuming, of course, that the Facebook account is factually accurate, which is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case – even if the gist of the account was accurate, it wouldn't be surprising if some technical details or nuances were incorrectly recounted). It Would Not Be Normal For A Prosecutor To Not Object In This Case Despite these procedural considerations, it would be very unusual for a prosecutor to not object to striking all twelve women on a jury panel for cause in these circumstances and it would be very unusual for a judge to agree to strike all twelve women on the jury panel for cause in these circumstances whether or not the prosecutor objected. Generally speaking, merely having had a prior experience of having been assaulted would not be sufficient to strike a prospective juror for cause. Normally, the prosecutor and/or the judge would ask the prospective juror if this experience made it impossible for that particular juror to be impartial in this particular case, and normally most of the prospective jurors asked that question would say "no". Usually, in that situation, the judge would not agree to dismiss that prospective juror for cause. Most prosecutors would expect their objections to a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in this situation to be taken seriously by the judge and for only a few of these requests that cast the most doubt on the impartiality of a potential juror to be granted. And, most prosecutors would not consider the appellate risk involved in opposing a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in the typical scenario that I outlined above very troubling, because a judge has fairly broad discretion on dismissals of jurors for cause in the face of a marginal fact pattern. The fact that the judge allowed this also suggests that the prosecutor may know that the judge is very unenlightened and has misogynist leanings and that fighting the judge's ruling in this case would be a lost cause that is hard to appeal. (Of course, if any of the women had previously been assaulted by the defendant in this particular case and personally knew that defendant well, that would normally cause the potential juror to be dismissed for cause.) After Challenges For Cause Keep in mind also that after dismissals for cause are completed, a certain number of jurors equal to the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the prosecution and defense combined plus the number of jurors who need to be left over to decide the case would be put in the second stage of narrower jury pool. In this second stage, during which the narrower jury pool is honed to the actual final panel of jurors who will hear the case, each side exercises their allocated number of peremptory challenges (normally alternating back one forth, one juror at a time). While peremptory challenges can generally be made without good cause, you can not make a peremptory challenge solely based upon a potential juror's race or sex. If a side dismisses all women, or all men from the jury pool, there is a presumption that this is what was done by the party striking the jurors that must be overcome with convincing reasons not based on race or sex. The same analysis, strictly speaking, doesn't apply to motions to dismiss jurors for cause because in those cases a non-discriminatory reason has been definition been advanced by the party seeking to dismiss the prospective juror and accepted by the judge as convincing based upon the voir dire evidence. One reason not to fight very hard to dismiss a juror for cause is that many of those jurors who seem most favorably inclined to your case, although not necessarily all of them, are likely to end up being dismissed in a peremptory challenge in any case. A Footnote on Ex Parte Proceedings Ex Parte Voir Dire Is Improper The author of the OP also clarified that: When I asked, "How often are jury members subject to separate examination […]?", I meant that only one party (or counsel for one party) is examining the jury at a time. E.g., first the judge and prosecution counsel examines the jury (without defense present) then the judge and defense counsel examines the jury at some other time. Normally, the judge asks boilerplate routine questions first, then one side asks questions, then the other side asks questions. But, it would be almost unheard of (and it would be improper and unethical) for this to happen without lawyers for both sides present to see what transpires during the other side's questioning, even if the prosecution wasn't planning to make challenges for cause, so as to gather up information needed for the preemptory challenge phase of jury selection. To have a proceeding without both sides having a lawyer present is called an ex parte communication with the judge which both the judge and the lawyer doing so have an "ethical" duty to avoid in this part of the jury selection process. An ethical duty means that the judge could be, in theory, kicked of the bench or temporary suspended or public reprimanded or require to take a judicial ethics class for doing so; and that the lawyer could similarly be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or publicly reprimanded or required to take a legal ethics class for doing so. Conducting the proceeding ex parte could also be grounds for a mistrial ruling that would not prevent the defendant from being retried (because it would have been done at the request of and for the benefit of the defense counsel), or for an appeal in the appropriate cases. (There are ex parte proceedings which are ethical and permitted such as applications for search warrants and arrest warrants, but juror selection is not a proceeding to which an exception to the general rule applies.) The Prosecution Could, In Theory, Waive The Right To Participate In principle, the prosecutor could waive the right to be present while the judge and defense lawyer examine prospective jurors, but this would be almost bizarre conduct that would only happen if someone was calling about an incredibly urgent development that threatened to shut down the courts or put the prosecutor or co-workers or family at immediate risk of physical harm happened. For example, a prosecutor might waive a right to be present if the prosecutor wasn't planning on objecting to any jurors for cause and was learning that the 9-11 attacks were underway, or that a mass shooting at the prosecutor's offices had happened or was in progress, or a prosecutor having a spouse who the person they stepped out to talk with was in a newly discovered hostage situation, or the prosecutor suddenly feeling an intense need to vomit or being on the verge of passing out or feeling like a heart attack might be in progress. Even then, however, it would be more common for a judge to call a recess for a little while in any of those circumstances. The Case Description Is Probably Incorrect Or Misleading On This Point The ex parte examination of prospective jurors, which was apparently described, would be so far outside the norm of typical jury selection conduct, that I suspect that this part of the account is inaccurate or was confusingly worded. For example, the post's wording arguably misleadingly implied that there was an ex parte proceeding as part of the jury selection process, but it wouldn't be necessarily inconsistent with a scenario in which a prosecutor was already present with the female jurors "before the remaining candidates were led into a room to meet the judge and defense attorney." For example, it could be that what really happened was that a member of the prosecutors office was introduced to the in the jury assembly room, and led the prospective jurors to the correct courtroom without making any comments to them, and then they met the judge and defense counsel, which would be entirely proper and not unusual.
Could someone avoid legal responsibility by transferring crypto coins multiple times between wallets before making an illegal purchase? Suppose the following scenario. Someone creates two different crypto wallets without leaving an online trace that links their real identity back to the wallets in any feasible way. Then purchases some amount of cryptocurrency from a public crypto exchange organization with US Dollars and transfers the corresponding coins to one of their wallets. As a legal duty in most countries, the crypto exchange organization must make a private copy of the transaction (to later be provided to the legal authorities when asked). Thus, forming a permanent connection between the person and the crypto wallet that is used in the exchange from a legal-proof point of view. Suppose this person then moves the coins into their secondary wallet and buys illegal stuff with it. Blockchain technology makes a permanent record every time a transaction is made, right. Therefore, the coin that went to illegal stuff could easily be traced back to the first wallet, hence to the person. Could the person avoid legal responsibility in the act of buying illegal stuff by stating I just bought some food from someone with the relevant coins and transferred the coins to their wallet. I'm not responsible for the acts that happened afterward pretending that the wallet that is used in the illegal purchase does not belong to them (the secondary wallet)
No If you break the law you are legally responsible. Can you make it more difficult for law enforcement to find and prosecute you? Of course, that's why bank robbers wear masks.
I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.
In my opinion, your question is no different from "If I steal money from a bank to pay off my credit card in the same bank, can I be held liable for stealing". I think the obvious answer is yes for both your question and the modified one, for exactly the same reason.
I am unfamiliar with specifically US laws on this but under common law (which US law is derived from) there is the crime of "Theft by Finding", however, because you turned it over to the authorities who, after the required time period were unable to find the rightful owner, the money becomes yours. However, you still have to pay your taxes on it: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/03/found-money-is-awesomebut-must-pay-uncle-sam/ As far as I can see, income is income whether it comes as cash, diamonds or long lost antiques. As far as the money laundering aspect, that is something the authorities would need to prove - as opposed to you just being lucky.
Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.
To answer the last part of the question: Jurisdiction would be where the copied media is being producted and where it is being consumed/sold. Moving media from one jurisdiction with ineffectual protections to another jurisdiction is part of product piracy. The scheme you suggest might shield the company producing the counterfeit goods, leaving the importers holding the bag. If the importers and manufacturers are controlled by the same person, courts in jurisdictions with strong protection might hold that person liable for the whole criminal enterprise. There is a widespread assumption that the internet is 'beyond national laws.' That is wrong. Enforcement may be difficult in some cases, but the laws apply. If you try to make profits by skirting the edges of law, you need really good, really professional legal advice.
No, it is illegal in this case. Article 313-1 of the Criminal Code Fraudulent obtaining is the act of deceiving a natural or legal person by the use of a false name or a fictitious capacity, by the abuse of a genuine capacity, or by means of unlawful manoeuvres, thereby to lead such a person, to his prejudice or to the prejudice of a third party, to transfer funds, valuables or any property, to provide a service or to consent to an act incurring or discharging an obligation. Fraudulent obtaining is punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €375,000 In French: L'escroquerie est le fait, soit par l'usage d'un faux nom ou d'une fausse qualité, soit par l'abus d'une qualité vraie, soit par l'emploi de manoeuvres frauduleuses, de tromper une personne physique ou morale et de la déterminer ainsi, à son préjudice ou au préjudice d'un tiers, à remettre des fonds, des valeurs ou un bien quelconque, à fournir un service ou à consentir un acte opérant obligation ou décharge. L'escroquerie est punie de cinq ans d'emprisonnement et de 375 000 euros d'amende.
You are in a tough spot. The main risk is "civil forfeiture" of the duplex if you have sufficient knowledge that it is being used for purposes of drug dealing and take no action. See, e.g., a case from October 1, 2021 when a house was seized on this basis. But the tenant has property rights under a lease that you can't abridge unless you can prove that there is a violation of the law. And, it isn't obvious if you know enough to trigger civil forfeiture exposure based merely on uncorroborated statements from another tenant that observe only conduct often associated with drug dealing and not deals themselves. Still, the knowledge you do have might trigger a duty to inquire if you want to escape civil forfeiture liability. Under the statute, to defeat a civil forfeiture action (assuming it has been used for drug dealing), you must show: (e)(1) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section if the owner of such interest or interest holder establishes that the owner or interest holder: (A) Is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur; (B) Had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arm's length commercial transaction; (C) With respect to conveyances for transportation only, did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture; (D) Does not hold the property for the benefit of or as nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired the interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; and (E) Acquired the interest: (i) Before the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or (ii) After the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture: (I) As a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; (II) Before the filing of a lien on it and before the effective date of a notice of pending forfeiture relating to it and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this article; and (III) At the time the interest was acquired, was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this article. (2) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section for a violation involving only one gram or less of a mixture containing cocaine or four ounces or less of marijuana unless said property was used to facilitate a transaction in or a purchase of or sale of a controlled substance or marijuana. The language in bold is the most threatening part that effectively establishes a duty of inquiry and a duty to take action if your inquiry establishes that drug dealing is going on. If you can't establish that you were ignorant of wrongdoing, and reasonably so, under the circumstances of being told by one of your tenants that something is going on, you are at great risk of losing the duplex to civil forfeiture if the DA can prove that drug dealing is taking place by far less than a reasonable doubt standard. You might want to hire a private investigator to look into the situation carefully, and to try to evict the allegedly drug dealing tenant if the private investigator corroborates the fellow tenant's claims.
Can I use a product that already exists to make another product? In short, I want to start a small internet shop (think like Etsy) that sells an idea I have for a handmade item. Something I would need to make the item is hair dye, and I've done TONS of research and I can't find anywhere to buy ingredients for hair dye because the process of making hair dye is something that must be done by a chemist. So my question is, if my item involves adding hair dye to several other ingredients, is it legal to put a branded hair dye in my item?
Yes That’s what construction companies do. And manufacturing companies. And car companies. And coffee shops. And restaurants. And …
Probably yes. But it is only a trademark violation when used in connection with a sale of good and services in a manner that is suggests affiliation with the programming language. Thus, you can have a bar named "C++" but not you own programming language or updates to an existing programming language.
Plagiarism is an academic concept, not a legal one. The issue you are concerned about is copyright infringement. A work based off of another copyrighted work is a derivative work. This requires permission of the copyright holder. Simply listing your source and saying "no crime intended" does not help. However, recipes are generally not copyrightable (at least in the UK/US). This is because they are a list of ingredients and instructions which is not sufficient for a creative work. The presentation of the recipe can be copyrighted, as can any descriptive text surrounding it. If you're just taking the actual recipe, making a better recipe from it, and presenting that recipe in a better way, you should be fine.
I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead.
Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html
You cannot use a trademark in a way that may cause confusion that your goods and services are associated with or endorsed by the trade marked goods and services. If you are clear that they are not then you shouldn't have any problems on that front. You also cannot defame the brand: that is make derogatory comments that are not true. On a practical note, when Pepsi (for example) sends you a cease & desist notice, what are you going to do? They can go to the petty cash tin for $2 million to make your life a legal hell for 18-36 months: how much do you have to defend your rights?
The code and the “look” of the user interface is protected by copyright - you can’t duplicate either. You can create your own app with the same functionality.
Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.
Do vaccine mandates amount to religious discrimination? Inspired by this answer, do vaccine mandates amount to religious discrimination? Could a restaurant refuse to serve unvaccinated individuals, even including those with sincere religiously-founded anti-vax beliefs? What about if this mandate is just company policy, not legally required?
Do vaccine mandates amount to religious discrimination? The term "vaccine mandate" is not sufficiently clear to tell, in a vacuum. Is it a mandate to get a vaccine? A mandate not to serve an unvaccinated individual in a public place? A mandate to vaccinate children that attend public schools? A mandate to serve unvaccinated individuals at public accommodations? Or what? The details of the mandate, how it was enacted, and the circumstances under which it is being challenged, are all critical to determining its legal validity. As noted in the linked answer (text reordered for clarity): Under the US Constitution, a public health authority could even make vaccination mandatory, and this was done in some historical epidemics. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the US Supreme court held such mandatory vaccinations to be constitutional. . . . In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a public school district's exclusion of unvaccinated students. . . . In Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional an involuntary quarantine law. Likewise, facially neutral health and safety regulations of businesses are generally valid even if they disproportionately impact members of a religion, under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and as it is applies to state and local governments under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 tips the balance somewhat to make accommodations in some circumstances to facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact the free exercise of religion, but still does not prohibit facially neutral laws that serve a compelling public purpose from burdening the free exercise of religion. The core language of that Act which sets forth the substantive standard in those cases states that: SEC. 3. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED. (a) IN GENERAL.—Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). (b) EXCEPTION.—Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. (c) JUDICIAL RELIEF.— A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution. The standards referenced in the act tap into well established case law that was previously applied less broadly than under the Act, when the U.S. Constitution alone, unaided by the Act, was implicated. Could a restaurant refuse to serve unvaccinated individuals, even including those with sincere religiously-founded anti-vax beliefs? Yes. Usually, businesses can establish facially neutral rules even if they have a disparate religious impact. Generally, private businesses do not have an affirmative duty to serve anyone. Certainly, it could do so as a matter of company policy, if the law did not forbid discrimination specifically on vaccination status (which it currently does not in most or all places in the U.S., although there may be recent legislation on this of which I am not aware). For example, it is legal to operate a restaurant that only serves bacon cheeseburgers and operates 7 days a week, all year long, without holidays (in many places that lack blue laws for restaurants), even though this effectively denies service to strictly observant Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and (on Fridays during Lent) to observant Catholics, and could make it an uncomfortable place for such workers to work. The harder question is whether the restaurant could serve an unvaxxed individual when the business and the customer both want to do so, and both have sincere religious beliefs that cause them to feel that they must do so (the business owner might have sincere beliefs about serving everything, the customer might have sincere beliefs about being unvaxxed for religious reasons). Even then, when religious people aren't singled out for being religious, this requirement might be upheld if there was no alternative that meets the public health goals of the requirement, although the case that there could be some alternative that is less restrictive might be pretty good.
A business owner can normally refuse service for any reason unless anti-discrimination law, or some other specific law, applies. "Critic of the business" is not a protected class. Whether a business would act in such a way I cannot say if it would risk significant negative publicity. But I see no legal reason why they could not.
The answer is they are quite different. The SCOTUS found almost 100 years ago that the Several States have the power to require vaccinations. This is one of the "reserved powers" under the constitution. The Texas Heartbeat law creates a regulation on doctors (similar) and a civil cause of action (very different). However, the biggest difference is that the older case permits the state to require medical treatment while the Texas law requires a medical justification for treatment. It seems uncontroversial to require a doctor's services to perform an abortion. However, now the Texas legislation is in effect codifying the medical ethics requirement to "do no harm." Medical ethics do allow exceptions based on a specific situation, and so does the law. A mandatory vaccination law is almost the opposite. It guides doctors that the general risks of vaccination are not strong enough to be considered harmful when weighed against the benefits of the vaccination. But, of course, medical ethics would also allow exceptions based on specific situations, and so should the law. Fizz already cited the case: Zucht v. King https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/260/174.
I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you.
You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries.
You don't have to interact with people if you don't want to If you don't want to talk or otherwise interact with somebody in a personal capacity, you don't have to. Your reasons for doing so are your reasons. Some of the congregation may have roles that require them to interact with Jane in what I will loosely call an "official" capacity. For example, if one of the congregants is a government employee and government business requires the interaction, they would have to do so. It gets a little tricky when there is not a clear legal duty to interact. For example, if a congregant is an employee of a company with which Jane has business and who would normally be the person to interact with Jane, they might reasonably claim that they have a religious belief that prevents them from doing so. Anti-discrimination law may require the employer to make reasonable accommodations for that belief, for example, by getting a different employee to interact with Jane.
The employer might be liable for a discrimination claim, under the doctrine of disparate impact. See Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc and references cited therein. The idea is that an employer can be liable absent proof of intentional discrimination when a practice disproportionately affects protected classes of individuals, and the practice is not justified by reasonable business considerations. So it would depend on why this particular state of affairs in employment came about. There is a test known as the 80% rule which attempts to quantify the notion of "under-representation" as evidence of discrimination. This test (not widely respected by the courts these days) might constitute evidence of discrimination, if a protected class is demonstrably under-represented. The current standard seems to be by comparison to random selection. In EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, the court found that a grooming policy had a disparate impact on members of a religion (Sikhism), and was thus contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although a requirement to shave does not obviously discriminate on the basis of religion. This points to an important element of a successful disparate impact claim, that there has to be a policy with a causal effect. In the above scenario, there is no proposed policy that has this effect. Note that the burden of proof is on the person suing for relief – they must have a theory of something the company does that causes this hiring pattern, a practice that is discriminatory. The identified policy (whatever it might be) could be justified by a business necessity defense (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424), by showing that the practice has a demonstrable relationship to the requirements of the job. That, b.t.w., would not excuse a racially or religiously discriminatory hiring policy for a factory manufacturing menorahs or kinaras. If a company recruiting locally in Boise ID had a 75% black work force, it would be reasonable to suspect that something was up. But legally, without showing that this results from a unjustified policy of the company, mere statistically anomalous distribution is does not sustain a claim of discrimination.
I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.
Indirect relationship with trademarks or software Suppose that a person Amy wants to make wall posters based on cheat sheets and selling the posters online. For example suppose Amy has a cheat sheet (based on console commands or key bindings) with description for Adobe Photoshop or another piece of software. Amy wants to put text and graphics on the posters. (Her main purpose is education). Cheat sheet example Does she need to get approval from software owners? Can she use their logo or name of product on her posters? Such as using the Linux or PHP logos.
Amy may use the names, and possibly the logos, of software products and their makers in producing instructional and educational materiel about such software. This is an example of nominative use. (Product names are not protected by copyright, and so copyright infringement will not be relevant. Trademark protection will be.) Nominative use means using the trademark as the name of the product or service associated with the mark. This is generally permitted. In many jurisdictions nominative use is limited to the use of the smallest amount of the trademark that will severe to identify the subject. This often means that use of the text name is permitted, but use of the logo, and the trade dress (the specific colors and fonts used on a name to make it a recognizable trasement, suh as the srylized script used for "coca-cola") is nort permitted withotu permission. The question says that "Amy has a cheat sheet (based on console commands or key bindings)..." If any wrote the cheat sheet herself, there is no problem. If she copied it without permission, that is quite likely to be a copyright infringement on its own, unless the sheet is a list of facts in a natural or obvious order, with no creativity involved in its creation.
Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected.
A trademark must be used australia Use is inherent in the definition of a trademark: “the owner intends, and does, use the trade mark to distinguish its goods or services from goods or services dealt with or provided by others.” Anyone can apply to have a disused trademark deregistered. The application can be opposed by the owner who bears the onus of proving it is still in use. An owner who made a public announcement that they would no longer use it would have a hard time proving they still were. Also, they might be estopped from opposing the application at all.
Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.
On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.
I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you.
Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.
Of course another applicant can use that language. What they can't do is register the same trademark for the same goods or services. If the goods or services protected by a trademark were required to be unique, there'd be no point in having trademarks. Instead, we would have state-sanctioned monopolies. To put it another way, the point of a trademark is to identify the commercial source of particular goods or services. Suppose you sell oranges under the trademark-protected name "Jerzy's oranges," with a goods and services description reading "the sale of oranges." Your registration does not prohibit others from selling oranges; it prohibits them from selling oranges using your name. Any competitor can register a unique trademark to use in the sale of oranges, however, with an identical goods and services description of "the sale of oranges."
Can courts resolve disputes using a legal system outside their location? I am wondering why there would be a need for an "attornment" clause as well as a governing law clause. For example Governing Law; Attornment. This Agreement shall be construed, interpreted and enforced in accordance with, and the rights of the Parties shall be governed by, the laws of the Province of Québec and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein (excluding any conflict of law rule or principle of such laws that might refer such interpretation or enforcement to the laws of another jurisdiction). The Parties hereby irrevocably attorn to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Province of Québec, judicial District of Montreal, with respect to any matters arising pursuant hereto. Is it possible that a court of one jurisdiction would apply the laws of another jurisdiction? For example could a case heard in France (by a French court) apply the laws of the US? If no, then what is the point of such clauses? Also do such clauses go by other names than "attornment" clauses? This article points out such a name is specific to Canada.
Is it possible that a court of one jurisdiction would apply the laws of another jurisdiction? For example could a case heard in France (by a French court) apply the laws of the US? If no, then what is the point of such clauses? Yes. This can be done and the example you provide could happen. This is done in civil cases, but not in criminal cases. The other main exception is that a court will not apply another jurisdiction's tax laws, although this is less absolute and the other jurisdiction's tax laws may still be considered as relevant to a civil dispute, so long as they are not enforced. For example, I have litigated a case where the events took place in France in a U.S. Court where the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the relevant choice of law rules pointed to French law. The overarching principle of that the law of the place with the most significant connection to the legal issue decided applies. But there are many subsidiary rules that provide clarity in some areas (although the clarity was reduced with the effect of making forum law apply more often, in the 1960s-1980s after a previous regime of more black and white rules). A clause like this is generally effective if it the parties have any connection to the forum chosen. It is a close cousin, although not nearly so strongly preferred in the law, of an arbitration clause. Also do such clauses go by other names than "attornment" clauses? This article points out such a name is specific to Canada. Yes. In the U.S. an "attornment" clause is a provision that requires a party to a contract to affirmatively declare upon notice from the other party if the attorning party claims that the other party is in breach of the contract or has unfulfilled obligations (with the attorning party waiving any claims for breach of contract not identified at that time). An "attornment" clause is normally found in a lease or secured promissory note and facilitates the transfer of the leased property or secured debt in a way that the new owner can know that there is no risk that it is already in default apart from the transferor's representation. Otherwise, the aggrieved party wouldn't have to mention anything until the statute of limitations arrived. All of the meanings, including the Canadian one, go back to the notion of affirming the existence of certain rights in advance of a dispute arising between the parties. This Agreement shall be construed, interpreted and enforced in accordance with, and the rights of the Parties shall be governed by, the laws of the Province of Québec and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein (excluding any conflict of law rule or principle of such laws that might refer such interpretation or enforcement to the laws of another jurisdiction). The language above is a choice of law clause. The Parties hereby irrevocably attorn to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Province of Québec, judicial District of Montreal, with respect to any matters arising pursuant hereto. The language above is a choice of forum clause, a.k.a. choice of jurisdiction clause, a.k.a. choice of venue clause.
Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.
No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria.
Different jurisdictions have different laws about arbitration and there can be a distinction between domestic and international arbitration. Notwithstanding, most jurisdictions use the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as the basis for their domestic law so there is a lot of commonality between jurisdictions. 1. Can I be compelled to arbitrate? No, arbitration requires the agreement of all parties to the dispute. However, you may have given your consent to arbitration when you entered a contract or agreed to terms and conditions; if so, then that agreement is binding and you will be required to arbitrate. If a matter for which there is a valid arbitration agreement is nevertheless brought before a court, a party can argue that the proper venue is arbitration and the court will almost certainly agree and refuse to hear the case. Arbitration agreements are subject to what is called the "severability" principle which means that they remain binding even if the contract they are contained in is ultimately found to be void. So it remains within the power of an arbitrator appointed by a contract to validly decide the contract that appointed them is void. 2. If I don't think the tribunal has jurisdiction, what can I do? You make submissions to the arbitration tribunal on jurisdiction and they are required to consider if they have it or not. This is the "competence-competence" principle: an arbitrator is competent to decide if they are competent to hear the dispute. Depending on the size of the matter, the tribunal may rule on their competence in the final decision or issue an interim ruling. If a party thinks the tribunal has wrongly decided they do or don't have jurisdiction then they can, within the limited time usually allowed, ask the court to review the decision - in the meantime the arbitration continues. 3. If I disagree with the award, what can I do? Not a lot. Arbitration is intended to be a final and binding method of dispute resolution. Because, unlike a court summons, it was agreed to by all the parties (see above), the legal attitude is "you made your bed, you lie in it". Article 34 provides that a court can set aside the decision for: incapacity in the arbitration agreement. Since the arbitration agreement is itself a contract it can be void for all the same reasons a contract can (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) that you weren't told about the arbitration that the dispute is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement that the arbitration tribunal wasn't composed as agreed the matter is not subject to settlement by arbitration by law (e.g. workplace disputes are often excluded from arbitration) the award is against public policy (e.g. the award requires illegality) Article 35 provides that a court can refuse to enforce an award for all of the reasons above plus if a court has set the decision aside under Article 34. Appeals are rarely allowed and even more rarely successful. For example, stats from the UK under s68 and s69 of their domestic Act (equivalent to Article 34 and 35 respectively) indicate that success rates for challenges are about 3%.
Nothing prevents firms from putting clauses like that in the disclaimer. If you're talking about goods (rather than services), much contract formation is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which 49 states have adopted (and which Louisiana has adopted part). However, the real question relates to whether that kind of language will be enforceable in court. A common way to attempt to avoid litigation is to insert a clause that requires arbitration of disputes (instead of litigation). The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), so this can be successful. Contracts that have class-action arbitration provisions are a little dicier, but in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Conception, 563 US 333 (2011) , the court held the FAA preempts state laws that disallow class arbitration.
The companies agree to resolve the dispute with a neutral arbitrator. This is similar to a court action, but instead of a judge or panel of judges, there is an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. The two parties to the dispute must agree to this in advance. For more information, you can consult the rather thorough Wikipedia article on the subject: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitration
However, if a website is based in the US and the terms of service say that the law governing the terms is US law, how can GDPR have any affect? It is unlikely that the EU will be able to enforce financial penalties against a company with no presence in the EU. But they could for example block your website in the EU, depriving you of your EU user base. The actual measures that they could or would take against such a company are still unclear, since the GDPR is quite new, and there has been no action under the GDPR against foreign companies. I'm not a lawyer, but I've signed many contracts in my life and nearly all of them have some form of "governing law" clause. The governing law clause in a contract identifies the law that will be used to interpret the contract and to resolve any disputes arising from the contract. The law identified in the clause does not become the sole law governing every aspect of the relationship between the parties, however. For example, a business in New Jersey could have a contract with a client in New York with a clause specifying New Jersey law as the governing law of the contract. But that does not mean that New York's consumer protection law doesn't apply to the transaction.
In the event of a dispute, the person resolving the matter, probably an arbitrator in the case of a commission dispute between two realtors and either an arbitrator or a judge and jury depending upon what your listing agreement says about that issue, would hear the testimony from both parties and decide. The intent of the parties is supposed to govern in cases of clerical errors, but a signed document has a lot of weight, especially in such a prominent term. It is a little hard from the way the question is posed to determine who is willing to correct the typo and who insists on enforcing the contract containing the typo.
Does precedent support Florida School district local officials deciding public interest health decisions? Florida has the highest number of confirmed pediatric hospitalizations from the virus, according to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Health and Human Services. DeSantis press secretary Christina Pushaw, “The State Board of Education could move to withhold the salary of the district superintendent or school board members, as a narrowly tailored means to address the decision-makers who led to the violation of law.” While it would seem that much of this is posturing and saber-rattaling. If financial pressures were applied as said, is there precedent that would enable locals to prevail and reverse said action?
The relationship between a school board and the other state officials is purely a matter of state law. Generally speaking, a state can impose generally applicable regulations that govern public school districts, and to a lesser extent, so can the federal government. Whether this particular remedy is available in Florida would depend upon the relevant statutes. But, I very much doubt that this particular tactic is authorized by law. Instead, the normal course of action would be to apply to a state court for injunctive relief compelling the school district to follow the law, or to withhold funding for the school district as a whole. Normally, a state school board cannot directly control compensation of school board members or school district administrators. Of course, there could be some obscure provision of Florida law that authorizes this of which I am not aware. It is worth noting that Governor DeSantis, the incumbent Governor of Florida, has a track record of "not coloring within the lines" of what the law states that he has the authority to do.
You have a third option: Sue the district for violating state or local law. There are lots of recent news stories about people doing just this and winning. The US Constitution Can't Help You: The school district is not violating your constitutional rights by installing lights at the stadium. The only constitutional protection remotely connected to your situation is the "takings clause" of the 5th Amendment. It says, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Unfortunately, the "takings clause" only applies if there is a "taking." A "taking" is generally understood to be exactly that -- you lose your property. The loss can be literal -- the government takes title to your house and turns it into a football field or freeway on-ramp -- or figurative -- the disturbance from the football field or on-ramp is so pervasive that your property becomes worthless. Since having the lights on will not destroy the value of your property, the takings clause does not apply to you. As one Justice said in a related case, the lesson here is simple: "the federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable." State or Local Law Might Help You: Even though you don't have a constitutional claim, depending on what state and city you live in, you may have a claim under state or local law. (These might be statutes, regulations, ordinances, or even your state constitution.) For example, in 2010 a group of home owners in Atherton, California who lived near the local high school sued when the school announced plans to install stadium lights. The suit claimed the lights violated local height limits, and that the night games would violate noise ordinances. The suit, plus a savvy pr campaign, got the school to agree to limits on night games. Atherton is not alone. All the way across the country, in Greenwich, Connecticut, neighbors upset about stadium lights sued and got an agreement about the use of lights. A search using high+school+lights+neighbors+sue turns up plenty of other examples. You will have to talk to a local attorney to find out what state or local laws you can use.
Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.
The Board of Estimates still gave small boroughs like Staten Island more representatives per voter than large boroughs like Manhattan. Therefore it violated the one man, one vote principal which is evaluated with respect to all representatives having votes in a body, not just those that hold a majority. The analysis is to take all at large seats that don't violate the one man, one vote rule off the table and look at the fairness of the allocation of the remaining seats. This was an easy case, not a hard one, for the U.S. Supreme Court. The leading case are: First, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not exempt from judicial review under Article IV, Section 4, as the equal protection issue in this case was separate from any political questions). As Wikipedia explains (links to selected full text opinions added): The "one person, one vote" doctrine, which requires electoral districts to be apportioned according to population, thus making each district roughly equal in population, was further cemented in the cases that followed Baker v. Carr, including Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) which concerned state county districts, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) which concerned state legislature districts, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) which concerned U.S. Congressional districts and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) which concerned local government districts, a decision which was upheld in Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). Evenwel v. Abbott (2016) said states may use total population in drawing districts (as opposed to eligible voters).
Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..
No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal.
First of all, even if it is not allowed to test them, you can also refuse to service someone untested - and that is not illegal discrimination, as "untested for COVID 19" is not a protected class. Public Schools however are not companies in the normal way, and the CDC can only advise in the rulemaking of local legislators and executives. And in the current health crisis, the school board and health authorities can order things for the protection of others and this can be enough justification to exclude individuals or several people from groups. After all, being teste or not is clearly not a protected class under the Civil Rights Act, and neither is easily regarded as a form of first amendment speech - unlike a black armband (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community). Being untested is much more akin to being a person on a ship and then attempting to disembark in a quarantine zone - which was decided in Compagnie Francaise & Lousiana Board of Health (there are two of those btw). The majority opinion in the SCOTUS case (1902) writes (emphasis mine): 24 True it is that, in some of the cases relied on in the argument, it was held that a state law absolutely prohibiting the introduction, under all circumstances, of objects actually affected with [a contagious] disease, was valid because such objects were not legitimate commerce. But this implies no limitation on the power to regulate by health laws the subjects of legitimate commerce. 34 [A]ssuming that all the treaties relied on are applicable, we think it clearly results from their context that they were not intended to, and did not, deprive the government of the United States of those powers necessarily inhering in it and essential to the health and safety of its people. Using a similar vein as in Compagnie Francaise, the public health interest might be enough for even a public school to only allow presence in the building with a test and otherwise demand online or remote learning (which isn't always an option) or even just suspend people that are not tested until such a time their presence is deemed safe. A private school is vastly more free in rulemaking, and as even a public school can muster strict scrutiny regarding presence teaching, a private school surely will get away with it. But nothing can force a private school to suspend teaching, switching to online classes or demand to test, unless they like to or their accreditation hinges on it - and here religious schools come in: There are religious groups that to an extent of not allowing medical procedures on their members, including COVID-testing. Those schools could ban people from attending that are tested. Endnote Public Health Interest is a hammer that can be rather heavy. It can't be used to discriminate against HIV, as that doesn't spread from touch and sneeze, but it can be used to ban people from buildings that have Communicable Diseases. While nobody classed COVID 19 as such yet, having such an illness [Plague, Cholera, Botulism, and others] allows the government to isolate you under strict scrutiny or even has been used to quarantine whole areas in the past (see the Compagnie Francaise case). And as you see in the current pandemic, legislative bodies globally do dish out rules for schools and public places in short order, some of which include testing strategies, and ways to overwrite consent via a state order. Some are struck down: some of them on procedural grounds (e.g. wrong body), others on grounds of equality (e.g. religious bias).
No There is some room for change of venue from, say, one county to another, or one municipality to another, within the same state. In certain circumstances this may even be constitutionally required. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (U.S. 1966) ("where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity"). But, there's no mechanism to move a state criminal trial to another state. A cousin of the scenario you're talking about is where D has committed crimes in multiple states. In such a situation the prosecutors from different states (and also the federal system) may meet and co-ordinate their strategies, and part of that will be deciding who charges what and who goes first. An example of this is the DC sniper case, which I remember pretty vividly because I grew up in the area. The Maryland and Virginia prosecutors reached an agreement to try them in Virginia first, and second in Maryland.
Forum shopping in US Federal courts: is scheduling a factor In filing a hypothetical federal civil case, it seems like some forum shopping may be possible. Might one of the reasons to select a particular court be to seek a speedier or slower trial? How would one find out which federal courts have the shortest and longest delays?
You would probably want to start with the Administrative Office's case-management statistics. I haven't been in there in a while, but I believe they'll have the data you're looking for. Note, though, that even if you can figure out which districts are fastest and slowest, it's still going to be a crapshoot, as there are going to be several judges in most districts, and there's basically no way of controlling which one you get; in my home district, for instance, we have a judge who we expect to do basically nothing with new cases for close to a year, another judge who we know will put us on a "rocket docket," and plenty more at different points along that spectrum.
The exact procedure varies from one district to the next, but generally speaking, it is essentially by lottery. The procedure is typically spelled out in the court's local rules. Jump to page 105 of SDNY's local rules for an example. The lottery system is not entirely random, though. Frequently it is weighted to make it more likely that a case is assigned to a judge from the district's courthouse nearest to the parties, or to make it less likely to be assigned to the chief judge or a judge on senior status. There are then various other rules governing assignments of cases to new judges or visiting judges, but those typically don't happen when a case is originally filed.
Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.
The time spent on death row is largely due to appeals, habeas proceedings, and a growing backlog. The time between an actual final appeal and execution is not astonishingly long. (However, "final" appeal is hard to pinpoint because a death row inmate can file successive habeas petitions at the federal level). To highlight the relatively quick turnaround between a "final" appeal and execution, Richard Glossip lost an appeal to the US Supreme Court (Glossip v. Gross) on June 29, 2015 and was scheduled for execution in Oklahoma on September 30, 2015, a delay of 93 days (Mary Fallin Executive Order 2015-42). Due to unavailability of a particular drug, the execution has been further delayed until November 6, 2015 (ibid). The rest of this answer explains the long delay between initial conviction/sentencing and eventual execution, using California as an example. In California, since 1978, approximately 20-40 people have been added to death row per year, while fewer than 10 per year are executed. (California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice Final Report, p. 121) There are generally three different appeals available to the defendant: a direct appeal to the state Supreme Court, a writ of habeas corpus to the state Supreme Court, and a writ of habeas corpus to the federal district court. (ibid) The federal district court ruling regarding the habeas petition can be appealed to the 9th Circuit. That Circuit's ruling can be appealed to the US Supreme Court. (ibid) The Commission identified several points that are responsible for the long delays in California (ibid): delay in appointing counsel for direct appeal (3-5 year delay) delay in scheduling a case to the California Supreme Court (2.25 years between application and oral argument) delay in appointing counsel for the state habeas petition (8-10 year delay) delay in deciding the state habeas petition (22 months) delay in deciding federal habeas petition (6.2 years) delay in appealing the federal habeas petition to the 9th District (2.2 years) The US Supreme Court also publishes a primer on the death penalty appeals and the habeas process (see especially pp. 8-10).
This would be virtually impossible to do from scratch. If you had the guidance of someone who successfully pursued a similar legal action it might be possible. In theory you should be able to pursue grievances in court by becoming well versed in the applicable laws and rules, having impeccable attention to detail, exceptional deductive and writing skills, and getting lucky enough to run your filings through patient clerks who will tell you every time you're missing something or doing something wrong. New York Courts even offer this encouraging CourtHelp website for pro se guidance on common actions. But if you really want to attempt a pro se civil action, especially against a government entity, or other entity with essentially unlimited legal funds, you not only need all of the above but also some sort of assistance from somebody who knows the system. I would spend as much time looking for sympathetic advocacy groups and lawyers offering pro bono service as I would reading relevant law and procedure. (One more thing: The word "quick" is never used in conjunction with formal legal actions, except in jest ;)
It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.
Short Answer This account would be a fairly extreme outlier relative to normal practice in jury selection, but it is certainly something that could possibly happen (except for one small detail that isn't very relevant to the core issues that it raises; this detail is discussed below in the last heading of this answer). The substantive points made in the Facebook post about what the facts recounted say about the state of women's conditions and attitudes about women in our society, and the poster's skepticism that a judge who made decisions like these really acted appropriately, are well founded, fair, and appropriate to raise. These concerns are within the heartland of what the case law on these kinds of issues discusses and struggles with, although because of the procedural posture of this issue, there isn't a lot of case law on this issue. Long Answer My Sources Of Knowledge I have participated in choosing perhaps half a dozen juries in which I was counsel, and I have observed the process in other cases one or twice and have previously been in a couple of jury pools myself (I've never been actually selected to serve). I'm also familiar with accounts of others practitioners regarding their experiences with jury selection, I know what I was taught in law school about the process, and I am familiar with the academic and practitioner oriented literature about the process. I am answering based upon U.S. law, because I don't have intimate familiarity with petite jury selection in other common law countries, although the broad outlines of the process are similar. As a caveat to this answer, however, recognize that judges have very broad discretion in the jury selection process and that not all judges adhere to "best practices". Further, in many states, judges are partisan elected officials who tend to end up in there positions because of, rather than in spite of, their extreme views and positions of legal issues over which they have discretion relative to the average lawyer or judges in places where the judicial selection process is less partisan. Your Questions How often are jury members subject to separate examination by defense counsel (or prosecution counsel) during jury selection? This usually happens in any case more serious than a simple traffic offense. It would be unusual to examine every single member separately in a separate room, but normally quite a few jurors a questioned separately on one point or another. This process is called voir dire (a situation in which U.S. legal terminology borrows from French rather than Latin). How frequently are jury members dismissed in the presence of other members? Jury members are usually dismissed in the presence of other members, but the specific juror responses to the reasons for doing so may or may not be discussed in the presence of the other jurors. Less sensitive questions (e.g., do you still live in this county, are you a U.S. citizen, do you speak English, do you have scheduled health procedures during the anticipated trial or a trip with a non-refundable ticket or similar issue, and a few other "categorical" exclusions) are usually discussed in the presence of other members, as are responses to general questions that are unlikely to be grounds by themselves for a dismissal for cause, but could inform peremptory challeges of jurors. The better and more common practice is for sensitive questions, such as a previous incident of being assaulted, to be discussed out of earshot from the other panel members, but in the hearing of the judge, at least one lawyer for each side and the court reporter who includes the bench conference in the trial transcript. Alternatively, how often are dismissed jury members informed of the selection or elimination of fellow jury members? Normally, jury pool members leave the courtroom and get on with their day once they are dismissed. But, if they choose to stick around, they will learn who is selected to serve on the jury, and who is eliminated from the jury pool. Is the defense counsel able to eliminate (all twelve) jury members from consideration (for cause) without objections by prosecution counsel? Terminology First of all, here and in your prior questions it is important to distinguish between the jury pool (a group of randomly chosen people who might end up being jurors) and the jury (a group of people ultimately selected to decide a case after challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are complete). The Voir Dire Process There is, in principle, no limit on the number of members of the jury pool who can be dismissed for cause, and if they run out, everyone goes home for the day and comes back the next day with a supplemental batch of jury pool members. In an obscure civil case or minor low profile felony case, the jury pool would typically be 30-60 potential jurors. In a death penalty case or case that has famous parties (e.g. a civil case involving Taylor Swift held in Denver recently), the jury pool would typically be several hundred people and the first round of voir dire would happen over the course of several days or even weeks. Any time that either party requests that a juror be dismissed for cause, the other party can choose to not object, or can object and argue that the juror should not be dismissed for cause. The judge doesn't have to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike the juror for cause and not infrequently will refuse to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike a juror for cause. This is because the judge has an institutional incentive to discourage jurors other than the one that a party has moved to dismiss from the jury pool from giving a lame excuse to try to get out of jury duty, even if the parties, who don't have that institutional concern, don't care about that. Why Might A Prosecutor Fail To Object? The downside of objecting to a request to dismiss a juror for cause is that it creates an almost automatic appellate issue for the party seeking to dismiss the juror if the juror is not dismissed. So, a prosecutor might not object to a questionable request to dismiss a juror for cause in order to reduce the likelihood that a conviction obtained by the prosecutor would be reversed on appeal. Giving the defense the jury it wants also makes it more likely that if the case starts going badly that the defendant will agree to a plea bargain mid-trial rather than risking a conviction by the jury, because any conviction obtained is more likely to hold up on appeal. A defendant may appeal a ruling denying a motion to dismiss a prospective juror that is denied after a conviction, if any, is entered. If the jury acquits the defendant (the unfavorable outcome the prosecutor would like to avoid by not having a juror dismissed for cause), the prosecutor can't appeal the case, and if the jury hears evidence, the case can't be dismissed without prejudice or retried unless there is a conviction that is reversed or there is a mistrial (the mistrial rules are bit complicated). So, if the prosecutor was really appalled by the dismissal for cause of so many women and felt that this would impair the prosecution's chance of obtaining a conviction materially, the prosecutor would have to dismiss the criminal charges so as to vacate the trial, before evidence was presented to the jury, and then refile the charges (assuming that this would be possible consistent with statutes of limitation and speedy trial requirements). But, this would be an extraordinary move with high stakes, because the prosecutor has a long term strategic interest in not pissing off a judge in any case because that could cause the judge to exercise the judge's discretion against the prosecutor in future cases. The judge and prosecutor may have to deal with each other in future cases for decades and will do so on a regular basis every few weeks or months. A judge is likely to be pissed off in this situation because dismissing a case ready to go to trial and scheduled for trial with a jury fully selected because the prosecutor was unhappy with the judge's rulings on motions to dismiss jurors for cause would not be appreciated by the judge who naturally believes that the rulings made on those motions were sound even if that belief is unreasonable. I strongly suspect that this was the reason that the prosecutor allowed all twelve women in the jury panel to be stricken for cause in the case that you describe (assuming, of course, that the Facebook account is factually accurate, which is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case – even if the gist of the account was accurate, it wouldn't be surprising if some technical details or nuances were incorrectly recounted). It Would Not Be Normal For A Prosecutor To Not Object In This Case Despite these procedural considerations, it would be very unusual for a prosecutor to not object to striking all twelve women on a jury panel for cause in these circumstances and it would be very unusual for a judge to agree to strike all twelve women on the jury panel for cause in these circumstances whether or not the prosecutor objected. Generally speaking, merely having had a prior experience of having been assaulted would not be sufficient to strike a prospective juror for cause. Normally, the prosecutor and/or the judge would ask the prospective juror if this experience made it impossible for that particular juror to be impartial in this particular case, and normally most of the prospective jurors asked that question would say "no". Usually, in that situation, the judge would not agree to dismiss that prospective juror for cause. Most prosecutors would expect their objections to a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in this situation to be taken seriously by the judge and for only a few of these requests that cast the most doubt on the impartiality of a potential juror to be granted. And, most prosecutors would not consider the appellate risk involved in opposing a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in the typical scenario that I outlined above very troubling, because a judge has fairly broad discretion on dismissals of jurors for cause in the face of a marginal fact pattern. The fact that the judge allowed this also suggests that the prosecutor may know that the judge is very unenlightened and has misogynist leanings and that fighting the judge's ruling in this case would be a lost cause that is hard to appeal. (Of course, if any of the women had previously been assaulted by the defendant in this particular case and personally knew that defendant well, that would normally cause the potential juror to be dismissed for cause.) After Challenges For Cause Keep in mind also that after dismissals for cause are completed, a certain number of jurors equal to the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the prosecution and defense combined plus the number of jurors who need to be left over to decide the case would be put in the second stage of narrower jury pool. In this second stage, during which the narrower jury pool is honed to the actual final panel of jurors who will hear the case, each side exercises their allocated number of peremptory challenges (normally alternating back one forth, one juror at a time). While peremptory challenges can generally be made without good cause, you can not make a peremptory challenge solely based upon a potential juror's race or sex. If a side dismisses all women, or all men from the jury pool, there is a presumption that this is what was done by the party striking the jurors that must be overcome with convincing reasons not based on race or sex. The same analysis, strictly speaking, doesn't apply to motions to dismiss jurors for cause because in those cases a non-discriminatory reason has been definition been advanced by the party seeking to dismiss the prospective juror and accepted by the judge as convincing based upon the voir dire evidence. One reason not to fight very hard to dismiss a juror for cause is that many of those jurors who seem most favorably inclined to your case, although not necessarily all of them, are likely to end up being dismissed in a peremptory challenge in any case. A Footnote on Ex Parte Proceedings Ex Parte Voir Dire Is Improper The author of the OP also clarified that: When I asked, "How often are jury members subject to separate examination […]?", I meant that only one party (or counsel for one party) is examining the jury at a time. E.g., first the judge and prosecution counsel examines the jury (without defense present) then the judge and defense counsel examines the jury at some other time. Normally, the judge asks boilerplate routine questions first, then one side asks questions, then the other side asks questions. But, it would be almost unheard of (and it would be improper and unethical) for this to happen without lawyers for both sides present to see what transpires during the other side's questioning, even if the prosecution wasn't planning to make challenges for cause, so as to gather up information needed for the preemptory challenge phase of jury selection. To have a proceeding without both sides having a lawyer present is called an ex parte communication with the judge which both the judge and the lawyer doing so have an "ethical" duty to avoid in this part of the jury selection process. An ethical duty means that the judge could be, in theory, kicked of the bench or temporary suspended or public reprimanded or require to take a judicial ethics class for doing so; and that the lawyer could similarly be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or publicly reprimanded or required to take a legal ethics class for doing so. Conducting the proceeding ex parte could also be grounds for a mistrial ruling that would not prevent the defendant from being retried (because it would have been done at the request of and for the benefit of the defense counsel), or for an appeal in the appropriate cases. (There are ex parte proceedings which are ethical and permitted such as applications for search warrants and arrest warrants, but juror selection is not a proceeding to which an exception to the general rule applies.) The Prosecution Could, In Theory, Waive The Right To Participate In principle, the prosecutor could waive the right to be present while the judge and defense lawyer examine prospective jurors, but this would be almost bizarre conduct that would only happen if someone was calling about an incredibly urgent development that threatened to shut down the courts or put the prosecutor or co-workers or family at immediate risk of physical harm happened. For example, a prosecutor might waive a right to be present if the prosecutor wasn't planning on objecting to any jurors for cause and was learning that the 9-11 attacks were underway, or that a mass shooting at the prosecutor's offices had happened or was in progress, or a prosecutor having a spouse who the person they stepped out to talk with was in a newly discovered hostage situation, or the prosecutor suddenly feeling an intense need to vomit or being on the verge of passing out or feeling like a heart attack might be in progress. Even then, however, it would be more common for a judge to call a recess for a little while in any of those circumstances. The Case Description Is Probably Incorrect Or Misleading On This Point The ex parte examination of prospective jurors, which was apparently described, would be so far outside the norm of typical jury selection conduct, that I suspect that this part of the account is inaccurate or was confusingly worded. For example, the post's wording arguably misleadingly implied that there was an ex parte proceeding as part of the jury selection process, but it wouldn't be necessarily inconsistent with a scenario in which a prosecutor was already present with the female jurors "before the remaining candidates were led into a room to meet the judge and defense attorney." For example, it could be that what really happened was that a member of the prosecutors office was introduced to the in the jury assembly room, and led the prospective jurors to the correct courtroom without making any comments to them, and then they met the judge and defense counsel, which would be entirely proper and not unusual.
In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!
Could I get the money I paid to park back? Hypothetical question. I was in Madison, Wisconsin last week. I parked in a municipal lot, paid at the automated kiosk, and got a receipt. When I returned, about 20 minutes before the end of the time that I had paid for, I found I had been ticketed for parking at an expired meter. The time stamp on the ticket was five minutes after the time on my receipt, so my assumption is that the data from the meter hadn’t caught up with the people actually doing parking enforcement when they came through. I followed the appeal process, and included photos of my receipt and the ticket. Within a day, I got an email and PDF letter stating that the ticket had been voided on review. So, happy ending. However, during this process, my brain had been playing a whole series of “what if” scenarios for the appeal being denied. The one I couldn’t come up with an answer for was: Given that I had paid for parking before the ticket was written, would denial of my appeal mean that I could file a claim against the City of Madison and get the money I paid to park refunded? Or, at least, counted as a credit against the expired meter fine? It’s been 30 years since I lived full-time in Wisconsin, and my knowledge of Wisconsin Statutes is limited, to be generous. From what I was able to look up online, I don’t think that the claim is specifically barred by State statute, and the City of Madison’s website makes it very easy to start the claim process. I did find that for claims against the State, the Claims Board won’t hear a claim for damages of less than ten dollars, but that only applies for claims against the State of Wisconsin itself and not local governments. So, would I have a leg to stand on with this hypothetical claim? Thanks!
No. A ruling denying your appeal would imply a ruling that your evidence was not credible and that they concluded that you hadn't paid for the parking time, or that the time you had paid for had expired when the ticket was given (e.g. because either the meter or the parking ticket printer hadn't updated to daylight savings time).
If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.
If the landlord has a right to charge a late fee (and that late fee is not a penalty) then that right accrues from the instant that the rent is late i.e. any time after 5:00:00 pm precisely if that is the time stated in the lease. If only a day is stated then it would be midnight. For case law on the penalty doctrine see PACIOCCO & ANOR v AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED [2016] HCA 28 which involved a challenge to a bank charging late payment fees on credit cards.
A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from).
The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.
Is this something for small claims court Yes. The explicitness of your prior leases overrides the statutory variations that might exist among jurisdictions in this regard. And the total of 50$/month for six or seven years indicates that you would have to pursue recovery in small claims court (at least if the landlord refuses to reimburse you). In Wisconsin, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. See 893.43. Statute of limitations means the lapse of time upon which claims of certain type are no longer actionable. Thus, you would only be able to recover the fees of the latest 6 years except for this year's lease, since your current lease no longer specifies that the landlord will cover that cost. For more information on small claims courts, see chapter 799 of the Wisconsin statutory law.
You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not.
Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer.
How are expert witnesses motivated? As a party to a court case, how can one motivate to testify a person who has the wanted expertise? Offer them $$$? (Let's not consider those expert witnesses who make living by testifying / actively seek to be engaged. Those are motivated already, but the choice of areas of expertise is very limited) A typical potential expert witness this question is about may have never been in a courtroom or even engaged a lawyer in their life. When someone approaches them asking "I see you have well-recognised experience in X, would you be interested to be an expert witness in a court case? The question for you would be <specific question about a certain aspect of X>" — they may not even have an idea whether they would or not. They would perhaps like to hear some legal advice about it, but why even bother seeing a lawyer? So, their instinct tells them to just pass as it is totally unknown area to them with unknown risks. Especially if the case they are asked to testify in is a criminal one. So, how to get those people motivated? How to entice them? How do lawyers do it? (I have approached about a dozen of Labrador retriever breeders/trainers asking them to testify whether a Labrador retriever would typically chase/attack ducks just by iteself — as opposed to having to be encouraged/commanded to do so. I made it clear that they would be paid and have all expenses covered. Yet only 2-3 of them even bothered to reply, and all those replies were along the lines "not interested", excuses like "I'm not an expert" etc.) Related: How do lawyers find expert witnesses?
It’s their job Or, at least, part of their job. For some, like state-employed medical examiners it’s an explicit part of their job description that they will give expert testimony when required. For others, it can be something they choose to do as part of their business, either as a side-gig to their “day job” (most experts). Or because their primary business is dispute resolution, this includes many professionals who become arbitrators or expert determiners and offer their services as expert witnesses. In both cases, it’s a job for which they get paid, and usually, paid handsomely. For example, all the engineering companies that I have been part of charge 3-4x their normal fee for legal work partly because it’s demanding work that distracts from their core business but mostly because of market economics - people will pay more for an expert witness than they will for a consulting engineer even when they’re the same person. It’s also difficult and nasty work - no one enjoys writing reports that they know are going to be attacked over every inconsistency. As for giving evidence and being cross-examined? Even at $500/h, you’re getting a bargain. Other people may be motivated by the noble ideal of a just cause. Me? Here’s my bank account, make sure the money’s there before I testify. So, how much were you offering?
In the U.S, at least for some time in our not too distant history, there were a substantial number of jurisdictions that allowed people to "read in" to a law degree, meaning exactly what @cpast said in his comment - that people who were so inclined and with the intellectual aptitude to understand old english common law and modern stare decisis (essentially, appellate precedent), as well as statuary and regulatory texts, could simply study their way to a law degree. It was assumed (quite rightly) that if one could manage to pass a 2-4 day bar examination that they should be considered eligible to apply for a license to practice through admission to the bar just as legitimately as those people who earned their juris doctorate. This is keeping in mind that passing the exam does/did not guarantee licensure/being sworn in, as in depth background checks and ethical fitness analysis are also conducted which form the final determination for fitness to be admitted. California was, for a long while, known as the most challenging state's bar exam to pass. For a long while, it was a true "read in" state, meaning anyone had the right to take the bar exam. Because of this, the California Penal system actually turned out quite a few amazing street-smart criminal lawyers; men, who spent years in prison reading the law, who came out to take and pass the bar exam. It is also true that in CA, as well as other states, conviction of crime (even felonies) does not necessarily mean exclusion from licensure based on failure to pass the background/fitness inquiry (it can, but it isn't automatic if you can establish rehabilitation). Excluding crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury, embezzlement, certain thefts where a fiduciary duty existed (those were the only crimes that were considered automatically exclusionary), one could be allowed to make a plea of rehabilitation to the Board of Bar Overseers ("BBO"). Crimes that account for the bulk of prison sentences, like aggravated violence, drug dealing/trafficking, etc. are not crimes of moral turpitude. However, there are no longer any states in the U.S. where you can truly "read in" to the law. @Jason Aller is exactly right, that in the early 80's the ABA, as well as the association of accredited legal institutions (not to be robbed of their mortgage of the mind) lobbied and cajoled the practice right away. There are still the states that allow an education of apprenticeship, whereby rather than being self-taught, you are allowed to be mentored by a senior attorney with a certain level of experience, where they would attest that you worked a certain number of hours (usually each week or month – typically something akin to full time) under their tutelage. Each of the states Jason Aller cites has some form of this. After a certain number of years, those individuals are allowed to sit for the bar. However, that does not mean they can be lawyers ... even if they pass. I recently read a journal article discussing how each year more and more states seem to further delimit who can be lawyers, for the sole purpose of not wanting to create too much competition in the profession. Background analysis now puts a great focus on financial responsibility: meaning if one's credit score isn't up to par they can be shut out of the practice because it's argued that if they cannot be financially prudent with their own finances, they cannot be trusted to manage client funds. About a quarter of all people who take the bar on the first shot fail. Those who don't pass by the 3rd try usually never do, and if they do, they are unlikely to practice as they are unlikely to get jobs (unless they hang out a shingle, so to speak). Most states require having graduated from an accredited law school. Massachusetts has at least one unaccredited law school (it was two, but I believe one just got accredited). A grad of that school can only be licensed in MA, nowhere else, except maybe one or two other states. More and more states are also deciding not to let lawyers from other states practice in their jurisdictions by "waiving in", which is where you can pay to get licensed and transfer your scores (instead of experienced lawyers having to take the bar again) from reciprocal states. It is a club where membership is purposely limited and continues to be more and more exclusive (and not in a good way). You can probably see from all these trends that there is a big push to keep people out, for no other reason than fear of competition. If this trend holds, it seems likely that the apprentice's right to "read in" will sooner, rather than later, become altogether a thing of the past too. Law school education is undoubebly valuable in that it teaches you how to learn in a socratic way. It shows you how to spot issues and understand archaic text, and helps you to understand the rules of procedure in a theoretical and comprehensive way. However, for most, what it does not do is teach you how to practice law. When I was in law school, I was lucky enough to go to a school with the choice of a clinical semester or year (I also broke the rules and worked full time as a law clerk, year round, from year one). Many schools had no clinical programs. Students who weren't able to do these things didn't know what a pleading was or how to draft one, had never seen a motion for summary judgment, had no idea how to take or defend a deposition &ndash all things lawyers must be good at doing and that are not taught in law school. At that time, over a decade ago, the machination of legal scholars had contemplated adding yet another year to law school curriculum, to require a clinical year, so that graduates did have a clue what practicing law was all about. Opponents argued that instead the 3L elective year should just be traded from classroom to clinical (rather than adding another year and another 40-70 thousand tuition dollars). Neither side could agree so neither has become the norm. But what has happened since then is that more and more states have limited the right to take the bar exam by right, from having learned the law thru the practice of "reading in", which had already become the highly regulated practice of "documented apprenticeship". My guess would be that those persons who learned by apprenticeship may not be as adept at picking apart cases or legal research as a law school grad (but may be), but they would almost certainly be more informed in the actual practice of law. Here is a fairly comprehensive article about the U.S. states that allow it, and what their rules are for completing the apprenticeship "degree". It cites that of nearly 90k people taking the bar, 60 took this route. From the perspective of a practicing lawyer with what I like to call "a mortgage of the mind", I find this trend pretty disheartening. One shouldn't need to pay a quarter-million dollars to gain the knowledge and right to sit for the bar.
Yes. This is very common. A persnickety lawyer or judge could insist on an actual "yes," but generally speaking, everyone expects witnesses to talk like normal people.
Normally, initial identification is conducted by a police Dog Legislation Officer: ...or an officer trained in dog-related legislation with a good knowledge of the identification of the prohibited types of dogs. Who will normally: provide an expedited streamlined forensic report on the dog type and will almost certainly be the prosecution expert witness. Where the police are not the prosecution’s expert witness, they will identify an expert witness from a suitable organisation... One such organisation is the British Veterinary Association, but other expert witnesses with the requisite knowledge and understanding are available. Where the defence challenge the identification / type of dog: the court may direct the experts to serve a statement on what they agree and what they do not agree Although DNA testing is possible, in my experience the identification is based around the dog's appearance and physical characteristics. For example, Annex 2 of this Guide(pdf) gives a starting point for identifying Pit Bull Terrier (PBT) types.
Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581.
An expert witness must be independent A former (or current) employee of a party is not independent. The court may accept their independence if the relationship was decades in the past but not otherwise. If you want the said psychologist to testify about things that happened in the jail they aren’t acting as an expert witness anyway - they are acting as a witness of fact.
If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.
An adult is normally assumed to be competent to enter into a contract unless there is some reason to think otherwise. It is not usual to demand evidence of competency unless there is something in the appearance or actions of a party that raises such a question, or something about that party, such as a history of mental illness, known to the other party, that raises such a question. I have heard of a party being medically examined just before signing an important document, to provide evidence of competence, but generally in connection with a will, and generally when the signer is elderly and in poor physical condition, and even then such a procedure is rare. If competence is disputed, medical evidence is required to resolve the question, or more exactly to establish lack of competence. In the absence of such evidence, competence will be presumed. That was the conclusion of the MA Supreme Court in FRANCES M. SPARROW vs. DAVID D. DEMONICO & another, 461 Mass. 322* (2011). The court held: without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence will not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. It was a significant part of the court's reasoning in that case that a reasonable person might well have entered into the agreement in question, and that the party was represented by a lawyer, and acted in accord with the lawyer's advice. That does not, however, seem to be a requirement; merely additional evidence of the reasonableness of the action.
Is there such a thing as minimum wages or labor rights for prisoners in the United States? Is there such a thing as minimum wages or labor rights for prisoners? I know that slavery is legal in the United States if it involves prisoners, but I am wondering if there are certain rights prisoners enjoy as forced labor. What are some of the rights that prisoners enjoy as forced labor in the United States if they have any?
The primary source of minimum wage and hours laws for the United States as a whole is the Fair Labor Standard Act. Generally courts have held that prisoners are not employees within the meaning of the act. The amount paid for prison labor is a matter of state correctional system policy, and some states, such as Texas, pay nothing to prisoners for their labor, while others pay a tiny fraction of the federal minimum wage. The main rights of prisoners who are detained pursuant to a conviction is to be free of physical harm arising from deliberate indifference to their well being, or to be free of punishment beyond what they were sentenced to for their crimes. Prisoners who are detained awaiting a trial have greater rights. I know that slavery is legal in the United States if it involves prisoners The 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit this but some state constitutions (e.g. Colorado's), and some state laws, do prohibit it. So the law in the United States is not uniform on this subject.
Some states (including California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, New York and Oregon, per the website below) have recently passed legislation outlawing pay secrecy requirements. Check online to see if the state you will work in is among them. Also see http://www.npr.org/2014/04/13/301989789/pay-secrecy-policies-at-work-often-illegal-and-misunderstood and https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/Pages/Proposed-State-Laws-Address-Pay-Secrecy.aspx
england-and-wales Can military necessity override POW rights? NO. The Geneva Conventions Act 1957 provides prisoners of war with certain fundamental guarantees for humane treatment at Article 4 of Part 2 of Schedule 6: 1 All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors. 2 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: (a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c) taking of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts ... 4 If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so deciding. Q1 What shall he do? The humane and fair treatment of prisoners of war takes primacy, so if the commander cannot complete his mission without properly securing the prisoners it should be aborted until he can. Q2 Is it legal to release him? Shoot him? There is nothing to prevent a prisoner being released (para 4) but shooting him will probably amount to murder and may well be a war crime. Q3 What should they do? As combatants, they should guarantee the prisoner be treated humanely and without distinction - a lack of amenities does not necessarily equate to inhumane treatment, although it may depend on the particular circumstances. Q4 Are they allowed to kill him? No, the prisoner's liberty has been restricted so the fireteam must treat him humanely, which may mean aborting the mission if they cannot safely release him - killing him will probably amount to murder and may well be a war crime. I assume the united-states has similar, if not identical provisions
Yes. American descendents of African slaves filed several lawsuits in the early 2000s seeking "monetary relief under both federal and state law for harms stemming from the enslavement of black people in America," i.e., reparations. Those cases were consolidated into a single case heard in Chicago, where the judge ruled there was no standing to bring the cases, given the many degrees of separation between the defendants' conduct in the 1800s and the 21st Century plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: If there were a legal wrong, it would not be a wrong to any living persons unless they were somehow the authorized representatives to bring suits on behalf of their enslaved ancestors. With some exceptions to be noted, the plaintiffs are suing to redress harms to third parties (their ancestors), without being authorized to sue on behalf of those parties. It is like a suit by a descendant of a Union soldier, killed in battle, against a Civil War era gun manufacturer still in business that sold guns to the Confederacy in violation of federal law. A federal court could not entertain the suit because the plaintiff would be unable to prove a harm to an interest of his (such as his bank account) that the law protects. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit permitted one very small portion of the case to proceed, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case.
This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey.
In germany, this is called Friedenspflicht. Both employers and employees (and their unions) are required to refrain from strikes and lockouts in disputes on issues which are covered by a currently valid collective bargaining agreement. The agreement may also stipulate that there will be no labor actions on issues which are not covered, as long as the agreement is in force, but that is not necessary. Example: There is a collective bargaining agreement on wages, which is still running. Strikes for higher wages are prohibited. Strikes to get better staffing for the night shift would be allowed, if the agreement doesn't say how many employees should be on duty even during slack hours.
Most U.S. states provide zero compensation of any kind in this situation, although there are a few states that are exceptions. (Far more states provide compensation from conviction to release for a wrongfully convicted person.) Even in those few states that provide compensation to acquitted defendants, the compensation is typically set by statute and is frequently much less than what a middle class person would earn and certainly does not capture the full extent of the defendant's economic loss.
Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."
How can a person sue oneself? Either in USA California or in India (choose whichever you like) can a person sue oneself back for damages? Has anyone ever defamed themselves and then sued themselves for defamation?
https://www.mwl-law.com/how-to-sue-yourself-and-win/ Yes, and there can be cases this is profitable. You negligently killed someone in a car accident. You need to sue yourself to use your insurance. The victim is dead so their estate goes to you. So you sue yourself on the estates behalf, the estate wins, and you get the estate. Directly suing yourself is impossible however.
No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A.
In California, the small claims court has jurisdiction over claims up to $10,000. In order to have personal jurisdiction over him: He must have a summons and complaint hand delivered to him (or to certain other people such as an adult who lives in his household, or to his secretary if he has one). This is called "service of process" and there are professionals called "process servers" who can do this for you in most cities. The service of process can take place anywhere in the world and still be valid. The summons and complaint must be hand delivered by a person over the age of eighteen who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not your attorney. The events that form the basis of the lawsuit must have happened in California, not merely the United States (long arm personal jurisdiction), or he must have the summons and complaint personally hand delivered to him in the State of California (tag jurisdiction). If you win, either by default if he fails to respond by the deadline, or following a trial, you will get a piece of paper called a judgment that legally determines that he owes you $X, which you must then enforce. A judgment can be enforced, for example, by garnishing his bank accounts, garnishing monies due to him from an employer or from a sole proprietorship he operates, seizing tangible personal property that he owns with the assistance of a sheriff, or putting a lien on real estate he owns. A judgment from a California small claims court can only be enforced against assets in California. There is a relatively simple process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from any other U.S. state. There is a relatively difficult and expensive process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from England that only sometimes works because some aspects of the U.S. civil court system (like punitive damages) are considered to be against public policy in England and are thus not enforceable there. You cannot have someone arrested for failure to pay a civil judgment. Enforcing the judgment is likely to be much more difficult than getting the judgment in your case. It is also possible to make a criminal complaint if the acts genuinely constitute theft. If a prosecutor finds that there is probable cause to back up your claim, the prosecutor could obtain an arrest warrant from the court in the place where the theft took place and that could be served within California when the individual is present in California (i.e., he could be arrested in California, after which the criminal justice process would proceed). Generally, to constitute theft, it must be intentional and must not be a mere breach of an agreement, in which case it is a breach of contract rather than theft. Any theft small enough to be addressed in small claims court would probably not be considered serious enough for the government to request extradition from the U.K. for, a step usually reserved for serious felonies, but if extradiction was sought from the U.K., the process on the U.K. side is described here. Any extradiction request would be handled by the prosecutor's office and law enforcement, in cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies.
The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation.
In the US, it is not illegal to lie in general. This includes lying about someone: it's not illegal per se to lie about them. What is illegal is slander and libel: lying about someone in a way that hurts their reputation. The defamation doctrine in the US is generally a common-law doctrine (i.e. the rules and limits are based on court decisions, rather than on laws passed by legislatures), although it may differ state-by-state. Depending on the state, some defamation may be criminal; there is no federal criminal defamation. US defamation law is largely defined through its interaction with the First Amendment. While libel is not constitutionally protected, punishment for libel is seriously limited by the need to avoid either punishing protected speech, or chilling potential protected speech (i.e. discouraging people from saying something that would in fact be protected, because they aren't sure whether or not it's protected). Libel in the US only applies to a false statement of fact, or an opinion which implies some false fact. If it can't actually be proven incorrect, it can't be libelous in the US. The question of whether it's a statement of fact doesn't just depend on the literal speech; it includes things like the context, and is a question about what a reasonable person would think. If I were to claim that someone was "literally Hitler," for instance, no reasonable person would think I was seriously claiming that the person was the former leader of Nazi Germany. Now, no reasonable person who is familiar with Twitter would ever assume that the tweet meant Obama literally stood up in front of the UN and said "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan." So, it only counts as libel if a reasonable person would think it implies some fact. But a reasonable person familiar with Twitter would most likely think Miesel is saying "The president's pollution plan is a pointless piece of political puffery planned to placate principalities and potentates." This is basically a matter of opinion. Even to the extent that it's not a matter of opinion, public figures in the US cannot win a defamation suit unless they show "actual malice:" the speaker must actually know or actually strongly suspect that their statement is false in some material way. It's not enough that a reasonable person would think "this might not be true;" the speaker themselves must doubt the truth of it (they must be reckless, not just negligent). Courts are also extremely deferential to defendants in these cases. While it is technically possible for a public figure to prove defamation, it is exceptionally difficult. If the person didn't know they were falsely attributing the quote, and honesty thought it was correct, they're in the clear. If the quote isn't supposed to be a statement of fact, but it implies false facts, but the speaker honestly thinks those facts are true, they're in the clear. Private figures don't have to meet the actual malice standard to prove defamation. They still need to show that the statement is a statement of fact or something implying false facts; if it's obviously a summary of something they really said, possibly with added editorial comment, they can't prove defamation.
Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface.
It is not required that you sue each defendant in their own courts. Two of the defendants are natural persons living in the US (Utah, Florida), one is a US company (Utah and California), one is a Norwegian company, and one is a Norwegian natural person. This is one case, not five unrelated cases. If the court find against Carlsen, the plaintiff would need to go to Norwegian courts to enforce the claim. This is helped by the Norwegian Enforcement Act of 26 June 1992, the Dispute Act of 17 June 2005 and the Arbitration Act of 14 May 2004, which basically say that if you're found liable for a tort in US courts, you can collect via the Norwegian courts. Here is a more detailed analysis of the Norwegian legal situation. It is possible that under Norwegian law the US judgment against Carlsen would be reduced, depending on how big the award is. The suit involves, in part 15 USC Ch. 1 (antitrust law) where the US has asserted jurisdiction if there is a nexus to the United States (not just American companies), and under 28 USC 1367, plaintiff asserts that federal courts have supplementary jurisdiction over the state claims.
There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.
How does Colorado law protect victims of odometer fraud? I'm trying to understand how Colorado law regards odometer fraud, and also what actions may be taken (and when) to follow up on odometer fraud. First question: Is odometer fraud a felony or a misdemeanor? This site describes odometer fraud as a felony: (https://www.justice.gov/civil/case/federal-odometer-tampering-statutes) However, my best interpretation of Colorado Statute 42-6-203 (https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2020-title-42.pdf) seems to indicate this is only a misdemeanor (Class I). Which one is applicable? It seems to possibly be a conflict between Federal and State law, in which case I'd assume State law takes precedence. Second question: Are there exceptions where this may not be enforceable? This site (https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/odometer-fraud) indicates that the requirement for a written disclosure of odometer roll-back is not applicable for vehicles over 20 years old (also pre-2010 models, which seems a bit more restrictive). I'm having a hard time nailing this particular restriction down in the Colorado Statutes. Can anyone point out where this law is defined? Are there other cases that may nullify a case against odometer fraud? Third question (and answer, I think): What is the statute of limitations to pursue crimes of odometer fraud? I think this is answered in Colorado Statute 13-80-102(j) (https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2020-title-13.pdf). This seems to indicate this type of fraud has a 2-year timeline. Does this apply from date of purchase or date of discovery?
Is odometer fraud a felony or a misdemeanor? It's both: a felony under federal law, and a misdemeanor under Colorado law. There's no conflict; each of those sovereigns can enforce its laws independently. Someone who tampers with an odometer could be prosecuted in federal court, and convicted of a felony; or prosecuted in Colorado court, and convicted of a misdemeanor; or even both. In practice, it sounds like the federal authorities are most interested in prosecuting large-scale odometer fraud schemes, and would generally leave one-off cases to the state authorities. Are there exceptions where this may not be enforceable? This site (https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/odometer-fraud) indicates that the requirement for a written disclosure of odometer roll-back is not applicable for vehicles over 20 years old (also pre-2010 models, which seems a bit more restrictive). I'm having a hard time nailing this particular restriction down in the Colorado Statutes. Can anyone point out where this law is defined? As far as I can tell, Colorado law simply incorporates the federal requirement: CRS 42-6-202 (5): It is unlawful for any transferor to fail to comply with 49 U.S.C. sec. 32705 and any rule concerning odometer disclosure requirements or to knowingly give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by such law. 49 USC 32705 (a)(5) permits the Secretary of Transportation (i.e. the federal Department of Transportation) to make regulations that carve out exemptions from the mileage disclosure rules, which can be found at 49 CFR 580.17 and include the 20-year and 2010 rules. So these same exemptions apply to the state requirement. (Incidentally, the Colorado title forms do not mention this exemption.) Note, however, that this is only an exemption from the disclosure requirement. There is no exemption from the general law against odometer fraud. It is illegal to tamper with an odometer no matter how old the car is. What is the statute of limitations to pursue crimes of odometer fraud? I think this is answered in Colorado Statute 13-80-102(j) (https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2020-title-13.pdf). This seems to indicate this type of fraud has a 2-year timeline. Does this apply from date of purchase or date of discovery? 13-80-102 is a statute of limitations for civil actions, and it does indeed cover actions for odometer fraud (see (1)(j) which references CRS 42-6-204). This would apply if the buyer wanted to sue the seller in civil court. But that's unrelated to the criminal statues we discussed above, which would be prosecuted in criminal court by the state or federal government. The limit is two years "after the cause of action accrues", which is defined in 13-80-108(3): A cause of action for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit shall be considered to accrue on the date such fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. For criminal prosecutions, the Colorado statute of limitations for misdemeanors is generally 18 months, from the time the offense was committed (CRS 16-5-401). For some crimes, it is defined to start instead when the offense was discovered, but odometer fraud doesn't appear to be one of them; still, it could conceivably be prosecuted under other fraud statutes. As for federal law, the statute of limitations is generally 5 years from commission (18 USC 3282).
U.S. answer only. Are there a few database-like resources that would allow me to easily search for such cases? It is balkanized. It also isn't entirely clear what information about the cases interests you. Almost all federal court filings (but not administrative law decisions) are in a database called PACER. Each state has its own system. Some are almost completely unified, and in others, there are many databases. In Colorado, for example, the Colorado E-Filing system has all filings in state courts, but courts outside the state court system, mostly the Denver County Court and municipal courts, as well as some major private arbitration firms, are on their own and most subcontract the job to a division of LexisNexis, a private firm. In both cases, access to these filings is not free except to parties, and has lots of data with access restricted to parties and the court. Published appellate court decisions are also available at an Internet based source. None of these covers administrative law decisions in Colorado, however. Administrative law decisions are usually kept by the agency and also often by a commercial firm that compiles them. Some of them do not give the public access to the decisions in the absence of a FOIA or open records act request. Commercial firms like Westlaw and LexisNexis and several less well known firms (including a free one run by Cornell University), keep databases of published decisions of appellate courts plus a somewhat random assortment of unpublished decisions, with federal court trial court decisions getting much more heavy coverage than state court trial decisions and unpublished state appellate court decisions. But, these are only key court orders, not all filings in the case, and are not the true source documents. There is also a non-profit consortium that maintains a database of court records from the 75 most populous counties in the United States, and there is a private firm that keeps selective track of jury verdicts to the fullest extent that it can obtain them. Some credit reporting agencies (both consumer credit and business credit agencies) maintain databases of judgments and liens.
Obviously the police isn't checking all the time that all the speed limit signs are still where they should be, so in practice you would get a speeding ticket, which the police officer would give you with a good conscience. And you might very well think that you missed the sign, and pay the fine without complaining. If you are sure there was no sign, you could say to that officer "I didn't see any speed limit sign, where was it? " and hopefully he or she would tell you where that sign was supposed to be. Then you might go back, find the sign on the ground, take a photo, take it to the police officer who would then take action to get the sign back up, and would most likely make that speeding ticket invalid. There are exceptions: A speed limit sign can actually allow you to go faster than you would be allowed without the sign. For example in a town the normal speed limit without any signs might be 30mph, and the sign said 40mph. If the police officer stops you going 45, you have no excuse because without the sign the limit would have been 30. Or you have one sign 30, followed by a sign 40. Same situation if the "40" is taken down. Or the police should have put up repeating signs every two miles, but put them every mile. If one sign is down, they could still be within the legal limits. And last, assuming the police didn't put the sign up just for fun, there is probably something making it unsafe to go 60mph if there was a sign 40mph. If that is something you should have seen, and doing 60mph was dangerous for reasons you should have seen, then you might get a ticket for driving at an unreasonable speed. Even if there never was a speed sign. You are never allowed to drive at a dangerous speed.
The Limitations Act of 1980 and its predecessors apply to civil actions brought by private individuals. It is not a criminal statute of limitations. I will answer with regard to civil cases, rather than criminal ones. Section 40 of the Limitations Act of 1980 incorporates by reference a schedule of transition provisions that govern this question, and when a cause of action is not governed by the 1980 Act it usually defaults to the predecessor 1939 Act. The problem is both bigger than just the fraudulent breach of trust unlimited statute of limitations under Section 21 of the Act, since the deadline only runs from when an action accrues that can be long after the act giving rise to the claim actually happened, and smaller, because the act (and also its predecessor 1939 act) allow statutes of limitations to be extended for equitable reasons under certain circumstances. The 1881 Limitations Act, Section 27 had an exception to the general rule for concealed fraud tolling the statute so long as it was concealed, which probably carried over into the 1939 Act. Section 9 of the transition provisions states in the relevant part that: (1)Nothing in any provision of this Act shall— (a)enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act or (as the case may be) by the Limitation Act 1939 before the relevant date; The 1939 Act limitations ran from when the act was committed, not when it was discovered, until the 1963 Act changes that. A full analysis of the breach of trust issue is found in this law review article.
Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) – those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) – in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong – especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform – the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook!
Under Florida law (316.0083), an officer can view the infraction and issue a notification of infraction "to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation". Thereupon, the owner has the right to remedies under §318.14, which include arguing that the owner did not commit the infraction. The camera evidence may sufficiently prove that an infraction was committed, but not necessarily that the vehicle owner committed the infraction. This is a civil matter, so the official who disposes of the appeal must determine whether it is more likely than not that the owner committed the infraction. That effectively means that in the face of evidence that the owner committed an infraction, some evidence is needed to show that the owner did not commit the infraction. Thus proof that he was not driving (I suppose witnesses to his whereabouts in Timbuktu on the day in question) would suffice, and there is no requirement that the owner prove someone else did the deed.
1.a) Is there any states in the U.S. where stolen property is statutorily (and/or by case law) mandated to be returned to the legal owner from an equitable owner in the above scenario or in cases where the victims’ footings are more balanced? Yes 1.b) Which are they? All of them. The relevant cause of action is the common law tort of detinue: The gist of an action in detinue is that the defendant is wrongfully in possession of personal property which belongs to the plaintiff ... In modern practice, detinue has been superseded almost entirely by statutory actions for the recovery of personal property. 2.a) Is there anything else whatsoever than the law (statutory or decisional) that Alice may plead to bind the court to issue a mandatory injunction ordering Charlie to return the violin to Alice if Alice is willing to forgo any and all damages in return of such injunctions? Alice is not seeking an injunction for the return of the violin; she is seeking a judgement ordering the return. An injunction is an interim order to preserve the status quo. She might seek an injunction that Charlie be restrained from using, damaging or disposing of the violin while the case is ongoing and that might be granted but one ordering the return where ownership is yet to be established would not. However, given that monetary damages are a suitable recompense for Alice's loss in this instance, the court might not issue an injunction. 2.b) If there is, how does it overcome Ebay? Ebay is not applicable to the final judgement. If the violin is found to be Alice's, the court will order its return (not an injunction). If Alice does seek an interim injunction, then Ebay will apply. Hence why I suggest that some types of injunctions might be granted and others will not. 3.) Which states, if any, in the U.S. punish the knowing possession of stolen property as opposed to punishing the knowing receipt thereof? None as far as I know. What is happening between Alice and Charlie is not a state punishment - it is the resolution of a civil dispute about ownership. Most states do have forfeiture laws that might allow them to confiscate the violin irrespective of if Alice succeeds in proving ownership but, again, that is not punishment of Charlie - his loss was at the hands of Bob, not the state or Alice.
I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)
"Discrimination" due to COVID-19 Certificate requirements Many European countries issue COVID-19 Certificates (with varying names), that indicate whether a person is vaccinated, has recovered or has been tested. Access to some locations (restaurants, cinemas, discos, etc - varies by country) is only allowed if you present such a proof. Now people that don't want to get vaccinated call this discrimination, because they need to get tested very often to keep the right to visit those locations (as a test is only valid 48 to 72 hours, while a vaccination is currently valid a year). But can this really be called "Discrimination"? I thought that the term was defined for a fact that one cannot change or has been given by birth (such as color of skin, sex, origin or religion). Except for a small minority which cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons, everyone has the ability to change one's vaccination status. (This seems to be backed by https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diskriminierung)
"Discrimination" is in some way treating people differently from other people. Much discrimination is a sound idea. Not letting someone fly a plane who does not have pilot training is discrimination, but not a bad kind. So is not allowing someone to do surgery who has not trained as a doctor. Unlawful discrimination is discrimination that a particular law in a particular country declares to be forbidden. Different countries have different laws for what kinds of discrimination is unlawful under what circumstances. Discrimination on a basis not forbidden by law is legal, even if immoral. For example, a restaurant could, in most if not all countries, ban left-handed people from being served there. This might be immoral, but would not be illegal, because no law has made it illegal. Commonly, discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or political opinion is unlawful. In some jurisdictions discrimination on the basis of disability is unlawful. Other bases may be unlawful in some places. There may be exceptions. Employment discrimination may not have the same standards as housing discrimination, and admission to public places or ability to run for public office may be different yet. All this will vary based on the particular laws of particular places. Note that some of these protected classes are things about which people have no choice, such as sex and national origin, others are matters of choice such as religion and political opinion. Laws may create a protected class on any basis. Note also that many things about which people have little or no choice, such as height, handedness, or intelligence, are not protected categories in most places. To the best of my understanding being vaccinated or not is not a protected class in most if not all of Europe, so legal distinctions may be made based on vaccination status. In such jurisdictions, discrimination in favor of those who are vaccinated is legal, although some may think it wrong. A few US states have made it unlawful to restrict various public or private services or access to places on the basis of vaccination status. I am not aware of any country in Europe that has such a law.
ADA is about "disabilities", and not being vaccinated is not a disability under the law. Applicability of HIPAA is very complex and unclear. The Privacy Rule refers to and restricts the actions of Covered Entities. Healthcare providers and insurance companies are Covered Entities. The regulation 45 CFR 160.103 defines "covered entity" as (1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter 45 CFR 164.512 lists instances where authorization to disclose is not required, saying that "A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information without the written authorization of the individual". The employer is not likely to be a "covered entity", so these permissions are irrelevant. Furthermore, included in this section is a provision where disclosure is allowed in the case of (v) An employer, about an individual who is a member of the workforce of the employer with various conditions following such as (A) The covered entity is a covered health care provider who provides health care to the individual at the request of the employer: (1) To conduct an evaluation relating to medical surveillance of the workplace; or (2) To evaluate whether the individual has a work-related illness or injury However, these permissions apply to covered entities, not employers. ("Work-related" is not defined, but having a dangerous contagious disease does clearly relate to the workplace, thus it would be reasonable but not guaranteed to consider such a disclosure to be connectable to this section). 45 CFR 164.510 says that A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information, provided that the individual is informed in advance of the use or disclosure and has the opportunity to agree to or prohibit or restrict the use or disclosure, in accordance with the applicable requirements of this section §508, covering required authorization ("explicit yes") says Except as otherwise permitted or required by this subchapter, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information without an authorization that is valid under this section. There is no applicable provision whereby the proposed employer policy would clearly expose the employer to legal sanctions, since HIPAA does not purport to regulate everybody, only those entities where Congress authorized it to do so, via the concept of a "covered entity". Furthermore, the employer is not directly revealing any personal medical information: the employee (the other employee) is. A vaccinated employee is allowed to wear a sticker that says "I was vaccinated". An imaginable application of HIPAA to vaccinated employees would be a policy of requiring a vaccinated employee to advertise that they were vaccinated. One can reasonably guess that a person who does not wear a mask, given such a policy, has been vaccinated, but it is not a reasonable inference that a person who wears a mask has not been vaccinated (many vaccinated people continue to wear masks out of an abundance of caution). There is no legal basis for penalizing an employer who allows vaccinated employees to do things that weakly suggest that other employees have not been vaccinated.
In addition to the above, mandatory quarantine (self-isolate) means you must: go directly to your place of quarantine, without stopping anywhere, and stay there for 14 days do not go to school, work or other public areas and community settings monitor your health for symptoms of COVID-19 arrange to have someone pick up essentials like groceries or medication for you Emphasis mine. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Travel restrictions and exemptions
Note that while a person can request a specific accommodation, an employer or potential employer is not required to grant the specific accommodation requested. Some other accommodation which (the employer claims) will meet the expressed need can be offered instead. Also no accommodation need be offered if it would impose an "undue burden" on the employer. The normal expectation is that there will be a back-and forth until the employee (or applicant) and the employer agree on an appropriate accommodation. Where there is agreement but the agreement is then violated, the normal first response is to make such adjustments as will restore the agreed accommodation. Only if that fails will a legal complaint be heard. There is no automatic penalty for violation of an accommodation agreement, it will depend on the facts ass assessed by the Commission and perhaps later by a court. Possible penalties can include an order to employ or reinstate a complainant, back pay, costs and legal fees, and money damages, which can be up to $75,000 per violation, as the court deems just. The relevant law is 42 U.S. Code § 12112. This provides (in relevant part): No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The section goes on to define “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” as including any of several acts, including: (b) (5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; ... (7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure). 42 U.S. Code § 12111 defines "Reasonable accommodation" and undue hardship” as follows: (9) Reasonable accommodation The term “reasonable accommodation” may include— (9) (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (9) (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. (10) Undue hardship (10) (A) In general The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B). (10) (B) Factors to be considered In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include— (10) (B) (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; (10) (B) (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (10) (B) (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (10) (B) (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. Under 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–5 and subsequent sections informal measures are normally first attempted to remedy any violation. If those fail, remadies can include injunctions against continued discrimination, awards of back pay (not relevant when the person was never an employee) orders to employ a person, awards of costs and legal fees, and other damages. No specific remedy is automatic, there is wide discretion.
Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant.
According to the Michigan Dept. of Labor & Economic Opportunity, there are expanded eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance during the COVID-19 crisis. This expansion of unemployment benefits was part of the Federal CARES Act passed in late March. These expanded criteria may cover your wife: Individuals are eligible for PUA [Pandemic Unemployment Assistance] if they do not qualify for regular UI benefits (including self-employed workers and independent contractors) and cannot work because they: Are diagnosed COVID-19 or have COVID-19 symptoms and are seeking diagnosis; Have a member of the household who is diagnosed with COVID-19; Are providing care for a family or household member diagnosed with COVID-19; Are the primary caregiver for a child whose school or care facility closed, due to COVID-19; Are unable to reach their place of employment due to an imposed quarantine, or because advised by medical provider to self-quarantine, due to COVID-19; Were scheduled to start new employment and cannot reach the workplace as direct result of COVID-19; Became the major breadwinner because the head of household died from COVID-19; Quit their job as a direct result of COVID-19; Had their place of employment closed as a direct result of COVID-19; or Meet any additional criteria specified by U.S. Secretary of Labor. Individuals are not eligible for PUA if they can telework or are receiving paid sick leave or other paid leave benefits (regardless of meeting a category listed above). According to this fact sheet, you can apply for PUA if you are denied regular benefits: When and How to File for PUA New claimants or claimants who have been denied regular state unemployment benefits (as of January 27, 2020) may apply online using the PUA application available in the Michigan Web Account Manager (MiWAM) at michigan.gov/uia.
Yes and no In Germany, the first case where vaccination was mandatory was Smallpox. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht had adjudicated back in Juli 1959 – I C 170.56 - that mandatory Vaccination (Impfpflicht) against Smallpox follows the Impfgesetz of 1874 (RGBl. S. 31) which was declared a) still good law and b) in line with the Grundgesetz and so enforced vaccination of everybody who had no counterindication was inside the law. Currently, the measles are under mandatory vaccination with the MasernschutzgesetzInformation, german aka IFSG § 20law, german (Measles are listed in Abs 8). The same rationale and legal basis from those two can be applied to theoretically any other vaccination - if it is comparably terrible. The Masernschutzgesetz declares that without MMR vaccination you can't work in some jobs, like as a medical care worker, teacher or in a Kindergarten, and you can't be enrolled in a school or Kindergarten, unless you have a counterindication. Note that you do need to visit a public school, so the Masernschutzgesetz is total mandatory vaccination against measles for kids. The 2020 update on the law of infectious diseases (Gesetz zur Verhütung und Bekämpfung von Infektionskrankheiten beim Menschen. short: Infektionsschutzgesetz/IFSG, see above) still (and actually did since the measles change in 2019) open the door to make some vaccination mandatory exceeding the measles in IFSG §20 Abs 6 - for especially vulnerable parts of the population: Das Bundesministerium für Gesundheit wird ermächtigt, durch Rechtsverordnung mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates anzuordnen, dass bedrohte Teile der Bevölkerung an Schutzimpfungen oder anderen Maßnahmen der spezifischen Prophylaxe teilzunehmen haben, wenn eine übertragbare Krankheit mit klinisch schweren Verlaufsformen auftritt und mit ihrer epidemischen Verbreitung zu rechnen ist. Personen, die auf Grund einer medizinischen Kontraindikation nicht an Schutzimpfungen oder an anderen Maßnahmen der spezifischen Prophylaxe teilnehmen können, können durch Rechtsverordnung nach Satz 1 nicht zu einer Teilnahme an Schutzimpfungen oder an anderen Maßnahmen der spezifischen Prophylaxe verpflichtet werden. § 15 Abs. 2 gilt entsprechend. The general gist of that paragraph is: Following a regulated process, people that are vulnerable and under a present and current risk of an epidemic and that do not have counterindication can be mandated to undergo prophylactic treatment, which can include or be a specific vaccination. TL:DR So yes, there is mandatory vaccination in germany, but currently not for everyone but based on certain criteria.
Do vaccine mandates amount to religious discrimination? The term "vaccine mandate" is not sufficiently clear to tell, in a vacuum. Is it a mandate to get a vaccine? A mandate not to serve an unvaccinated individual in a public place? A mandate to vaccinate children that attend public schools? A mandate to serve unvaccinated individuals at public accommodations? Or what? The details of the mandate, how it was enacted, and the circumstances under which it is being challenged, are all critical to determining its legal validity. As noted in the linked answer (text reordered for clarity): Under the US Constitution, a public health authority could even make vaccination mandatory, and this was done in some historical epidemics. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the US Supreme court held such mandatory vaccinations to be constitutional. . . . In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a public school district's exclusion of unvaccinated students. . . . In Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional an involuntary quarantine law. Likewise, facially neutral health and safety regulations of businesses are generally valid even if they disproportionately impact members of a religion, under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and as it is applies to state and local governments under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 tips the balance somewhat to make accommodations in some circumstances to facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact the free exercise of religion, but still does not prohibit facially neutral laws that serve a compelling public purpose from burdening the free exercise of religion. The core language of that Act which sets forth the substantive standard in those cases states that: SEC. 3. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED. (a) IN GENERAL.—Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). (b) EXCEPTION.—Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. (c) JUDICIAL RELIEF.— A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution. The standards referenced in the act tap into well established case law that was previously applied less broadly than under the Act, when the U.S. Constitution alone, unaided by the Act, was implicated. Could a restaurant refuse to serve unvaccinated individuals, even including those with sincere religiously-founded anti-vax beliefs? Yes. Usually, businesses can establish facially neutral rules even if they have a disparate religious impact. Generally, private businesses do not have an affirmative duty to serve anyone. Certainly, it could do so as a matter of company policy, if the law did not forbid discrimination specifically on vaccination status (which it currently does not in most or all places in the U.S., although there may be recent legislation on this of which I am not aware). For example, it is legal to operate a restaurant that only serves bacon cheeseburgers and operates 7 days a week, all year long, without holidays (in many places that lack blue laws for restaurants), even though this effectively denies service to strictly observant Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and (on Fridays during Lent) to observant Catholics, and could make it an uncomfortable place for such workers to work. The harder question is whether the restaurant could serve an unvaxxed individual when the business and the customer both want to do so, and both have sincere religious beliefs that cause them to feel that they must do so (the business owner might have sincere beliefs about serving everything, the customer might have sincere beliefs about being unvaxxed for religious reasons). Even then, when religious people aren't singled out for being religious, this requirement might be upheld if there was no alternative that meets the public health goals of the requirement, although the case that there could be some alternative that is less restrictive might be pretty good.
Can you sue a foreign company in a civil suit even if it doesn't operate within the country in the United States? Can you sue a foreign company in a civil suit even if it doesn't operate within the country in the United States? Let's say you decide to sue a company headquartered in another country and that only operates in that country. Can you still sue that company from the United States?
You need a nexus The company doesn’t operate in the USA. Therefore the damage they caused you can’t have happened in the USA. Therefore, no US court has jurisdiction.
The "Air Company"-airline can't really do a whole lot other than sue for damages. If they do internal investigation, they can provide all the evidence to the appropriate authority (if the airline is based in Serbia, this is the Military Intelligence Authority "AOV"). Otherwise the airline would work with the appropriate authority in their country of registration and that of the accused (if known). After they are found they can (again, depending on the country of the airline and that of the accused) file a civil case for compensation.
Bulgaria is one of many countries in which intellectual property can be protected with a single international patent filing, in lieu of a Bulgarian specific filing. In generally, you should assume that any patented idea likely to have international application, such as Internet based software, which is patented in the U.S. is also the subject of international patent protection, unless you specifically know that this is not the case. Virtually all patent lawyers know how to make this filing and most would recommend doing so in this case. So, yes, it is something you should worry about, and the better practice, by far, would be to obtain permission from the patent owner if the app is likely to have any meaningful commercial value. Now, if you were sued, there is a good chance that it would be in Bulgarian courts under Bulgarian patent law, which may be somewhat less harsh in some respects like damages awards than U.S. patent law. But, the basis for patent liability for an infringement in Bulgaria would be very similar.
You are mistaken: The U.S. governments (both federal, and states that impose income tax) assert a right to tax both: Income earned within their jurisdiction (e.g., "on their soil"), and Income earned by citizens (or residents, in the case of states). So it is perfectly legal for a resident U.S. citizen to operate a foreign business entity, earn profit, pay himself, and even bank the money overseas. However, a resident in such a situation would be in violation of tax law if he failed to report his interest in the foreign entity and his earnings, as prescribed by the IRS, on his tax filings.
The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory.
Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer.
Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant.
However, if a website is based in the US and the terms of service say that the law governing the terms is US law, how can GDPR have any affect? It is unlikely that the EU will be able to enforce financial penalties against a company with no presence in the EU. But they could for example block your website in the EU, depriving you of your EU user base. The actual measures that they could or would take against such a company are still unclear, since the GDPR is quite new, and there has been no action under the GDPR against foreign companies. I'm not a lawyer, but I've signed many contracts in my life and nearly all of them have some form of "governing law" clause. The governing law clause in a contract identifies the law that will be used to interpret the contract and to resolve any disputes arising from the contract. The law identified in the clause does not become the sole law governing every aspect of the relationship between the parties, however. For example, a business in New Jersey could have a contract with a client in New York with a clause specifying New Jersey law as the governing law of the contract. But that does not mean that New York's consumer protection law doesn't apply to the transaction.
Can you buy a luxury car with cash? Let's say, hypothetically, you try buying a luxury car or expensive jewelry using cash (100 dollar bills in a bag!). Would that be legal? Will IRS or FBI or anybody come knocking on the door asking about origin of that money or its taxes or whatever?
You can purchase any expensive item for cash, if the seller will accept it. In the US and many other jurisdictions, a seller is not required to accept cash, but many will. In the US and many other jurisdictions banks are required to report large cash deposits to government authorities, to help combat money-laundering, drug-dealing, and tax-evasion. Such a report may trigger an investigation, and during that investigation a person who bought an expensive item for cash may well be asked about the source of the cash. Whether an answer is legally required will depend on the law in the particular place. But even if it is not legally required, refusing to answer such questions may trigger additional investigation.
at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood.
A receipt is just a written proof that money was taken. It is hard to imagine a place on Earth where the legality of giving such a proof would be questionable at all so that you would need to talk about an "authority to issue receipts". Only if you find a place where money itself is illegal. Now, the real question here is whether such receipts (issued by private persons not registered as businesses) can be used for accounting purposes, e.g. to claim that your business, which transacted with those persons, incurred expenses. The mere fact that sole traders need to be registered to do business does not outlaw the use of receipts issued by non-registered persons. For example, your business could be buying old stuff from the public (used cars, electronics etc.) and refurbishing it. Provided that this activity itself is not illegal, receiving receipts from those one-off private sellers, and using them in your bookkeeping would be perfectly legal too.
Two people exchanging goods or services on a commercial basis and then pretending it was two gifts is tax evasion. It's not a gift. It's a commercial sale that you lie about by 'putting' a different 'label' on it. Sometimes two people will give mutual gifts, e.g. if you come to my wedding: I give you dinner, you give me some kitchenware. Yet there's nothing commercial about it. So that's not income for either party. However, if you're talking about two businesses making sales to each other, that is very much income, regardless of what you badge it.
Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.
Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.
In theory its only a crime if you know, or reasonably suspect, that it is stolen. The fact that you have to ask means that you have some level of suspicion, so that's not good to start with. In practice merely being investgated by the police will bring you a world of hurt long before it gets to trial. How much can you afford to spend on legal fees, and will you be able to make bail?
If it looks like a gift and sounds like a gift and there is no evidence that it should not be considered a gift, well, what else could it be? Given the value of a house and depending on jurisdiction, there may be a gift tax involved. This is normally an obligation placed on the giver, not the receiver. It is unlikely to be a concern to you but a separate check would be wise for your own sake. If all ownership documents are clear that you and you alone own (and pay regular costs of, and maintain) the house, it is extremely unlikely that any private individual can take it away from you, regardless of their relationship to you. There doesn't appear to be any legal basis for their claims; they are hoping you will bow to social and emotional pressure. Your best course of action is to call their bluff. Request a written statement (ideally through their lawyer) that identifies the reason for their claims of ownership or otherwise why the property should be transferred to them (ideally checked by your lawyer) and proceed from your lawyer's advice.
What type of protests are currently allowed in NSW, Australia? Australia was recently in the news for restricting the right to protest during a surge in COVID cases: Hundreds of fines have been issued and dozens charged in Sydney after anti-lockdown protesters marched and clashed with police in what one deputy commissioner called “violent, filthy, risky behaviour”. The Australian prime minister, Scott Morrison, said on Sunday the previous day’s protests – in which thousands breached the region’s coronavirus measures to protest – were “selfish and self-defeating”, adding: “It achieves no purpose. It won’t end the lockdown sooner.” What type of protests are currently legal in NSW? From smallest to biggest: Posting "I disagree with lockdowns" on Facebook (virtual protest) Starting a video stream from home protesting the lockdowns Hanging a "I disagree with lockdowns" poster on your balcony Wearing a protest shirt outside your house, within the 5km travel boundary Standing outside alone, with a mask, holding a protest sign, while within the 5km boundary Gathering in a group of people, everyone masked up, 6 feet away, and only traveling within a 5km radius from ones home The article seems to imply that all forms of protesting are now illegal, is this interpretation correct? Or did they only get penalized for violating the 5km rule and not wearing masks?
The main restrictions that affect protests are set out in the Public Health (COVID-19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order 2021 (NSW). Clause 20 of that order requires "affected persons" (basically everyone in Sydney and lockdown areas in regional NSW) to not leave their homes other than for permitted reasons. The 5-10 km boundary applies to prohibit people from travelling outside the boundary for outdoor exercise or obtaining goods and services (both permitted reasons to leave home). So in relation to the scenarios listed, if conducted in Sydney or other lockdown areas: 1-3 would not be prohibited 4 would be prohibited if "outside your house" is outside your place of residence, as protesting is not a permitted reason 5 and 6 would be prohibited as protesting is not a permitted reason
There is and never has been a single “age of majority” The law treats people of different ages differently for a wide variety of reasons. Just a small sample of typical limits (jurisdictions vary): you must be 4 to go to school you must be 10 to be criminally responsible you must be 11 or 13 to get a job in the australian-capital-territory but there is no specific age limit in new-south-wales you must be 15 to attend an M-rated movie alone (your rating system may differ) you must be 16 to get a learner driver permit and 17 to get a provisional licence you must be 18 to attend an R-rated movie at all you must be 14-17 years old to have sex depending on the age and relationship with your partner. you must be 16 to 21 to buy and consume alcohol (jurisdictions vary a lot on this) you must be 18 to marry without the consent of the court but can be as young as 16 with that consent you must be 18 to legally take and post sexually explicit pictures of yourself you must be 18 to get a tattoo you must be 18 to join the defence force you must be 18 to vote you must be 35 to stand for President of the united-states So tell me, when is the age of majority. There isn’t one - there is simply a long period where an individual is granted progressively more control and responsibility over their life. Now, as to why some things happen at particular ages, that’s a political question, not a legal one.
Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined).
No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.
Revised for clarity in light of comments State and local police can arrest anyone who they have probable cause to believe is breaking state or local law. Like all LEOs, Federal LEOs can break some state and local laws while enforcing Federal law. When they grab someone off the street and hold them in a cell, they are detaining them, not kidnapping them, and so on. However, to avoid arrest, the Feds have to identify themselves. That's because state and local LEO who know they are dealing with Feds on federal business no longer have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed. State and local police can arrest Federal LEOs who they: a) have probable cause to believe are breaking state or local; and, b) have no reason to believe are Feds enforcing Federal law. In other words: Any Fed who refuses to identify herself to a local LEO can be arrested if there is probable cause. State and local police cannot, however, arrest Federal LEOs just because they are not wearing insignias. That is because: a) there are no federal statutes requiring federal LEOs to identify themselves; b) the Supremacy Clause says federal law takes precedence over state and local law that conflict with it; c) at least in Portland, the feds were not operating under any sort of formal agreement with Portland or Oregon officials that required them to have identification. While it is hard to prove a negative, the question of whether Federal LEOs are required to identify themselves has been looked at recently by reputable sources. They all agree there is no such law. For example, the answer from Lawfare: Broadly speaking, law enforcement officers do not have a legal duty to disclose either their identities or their agencies of affiliation, even if asked directly. Certain municipalities require police officers to identify themselves if asked, but there is currently no federal statute requiring officer disclosure of such information. The article points out that the two main types of cases involving police identifying themselves really don't apply: police who are working undercover, notably in sting operations, and police searching and seizing property. They go on to point out: Separate from the question of federal law, several states have adopted laws and regulations requiring law enforcement to identify themselves. For example, under New York City’s Right to Know Act, a broad set of police reforms that went into effect in October 2018, officers must tell civilians at the start of some interactions “their name, rank, command, and shield number.” (Also, many departments have policies that generally require officers to identify themselves, although with exceptions. You can see examples of the policies here.) Again, these local laws do not apply to Feds because of the Supremacy Clause. NOTE: As several of the news stories note, the lack of identification will make it very hard to hold Federal LEOs accountable for their actions. Accountability requires identity.
The United States enforces laws on its citizens. This is not true and never has been in the United States or pretty much any other country. Countries exercise authority over anyone in their territory, and over their citizens even if outside their territory. Sometimes countries agree to waive their authority over a tiny number of diplomats voluntarily while retaining the right to expel them from their country, but that is the rare exception and not the rule. So, which country comes closest to actually preserving people’s right to opt out of the state and have a natural right to at least some land? There really aren't any, and the claim that this is a "natural right" is, at a minimum controversial and not widely held. Many countries have areas that they control which are subject to different regulations than most of the country. For example, until recently, Hong Kong was subject to different laws by different authorities than the rest of China, and there continue to be some laws generally applicable in the rest of China which are not applicable in Hong Kong. Until recently, the Panama Canal Zone was a similar example of control of territory within one country being temporarily ceded to another sovereign authority. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is a third example. Similarly, and with some of the same conceptual framework behind it, the laws that apply in places such as the Channel Islands or the Cayman Islands or Scotland, which are subordinate in legal and political theory to the same King as England is, are permitted by the King and treaties and organic statutes established with the King's symbolic approval, to have laws that are different from those that apply in England. Ultimately, this is simply a form of federalism, although when the extent that the central government's otherwise generally applicable laws can be disregarded quite completely is high, it feels like something more than mere federalism, and is often called a dependency or colonial relationship. Similarly, many countries have "free ports" or "duty free zones" in which their usual taxes don't apply. For example, the U.S. taxation regime that applies in Puerto Rico is different from the U.S. taxation regime that applies within U.S. states. But, even in these cases, there is not an individual right to opt out of laws, there is permission granted by a higher level government for a subordinate level government to adopt laws different from the generally applicable laws of the higher level government. Sometimes the alternative government is democratic, sometimes it is not. Hong Kong, for example, was not self-governing in a meaningful sense until not long before China regained control of the territory at the end of a 99 year concession to the United Kingdom. Some jurisdictions give people subject to their jurisdiction more ability to reach their own legal arrangements contrary to the default rules of law than others. For example, Delaware affords people who create limited liability companies there more authority to deviate from Delaware's default rules of law for limited liability companies than any other U.S. jurisdiction. But this is a far cry from granting people subject to Delaware's jurisdiction generally, freedom to displace mandatory rules of Delaware law in other legal domains such as criminal law. Similarly, sometimes the government will tolerate deviation from binding national laws even when they technical still apply. This has been the story of marijuana legalization in the U.S. and of prostitution legalization in Perth, Australia. But, again, this is an isolated act of tacit toleration in a single subject area, and not a general disavowal of legislative authority.
The only time cops are violating the law for cowardice is when they fail to intervene in misconduct by another cop, see, e.g., here at page 10 (two police carry out a blatantly unlawful arrest, but there is also liability for the two other junior officers watch and do nothing about their superiors' misconduct), or when an arrested or incarcerated person has been placed in peril by the cop, see, e.g., here (police arrest woman and put her in a squad car on train tracks and fail to try to rescue her when a train is about to and then does smash into the squad car where she is helplessly handcuffed and locked in). This said, cops are routinely disciplined or fired for cowardice as an employment matter (see, e.g., here where a policeman who fails to rush in to stop a school shooting in progress was "suspended in the immediate aftermath of the attack and later resigned" and also here in a similar case). But, they are rarely disciplined or fired for being too aggressive even if it crosses the legal line unless the facts are unequivocally clear.
Staff at polling stations have been told to stop people taking selfies - even though it is not against the law. The Electoral Commission fears the craze for taking self-portraits on phones and posting them on social media threatens the secrecy of the ballot. Anyone who inadvertently reveals how someone else votes in Thursday's local and European elections could face a £5,000 fine or six months in prison. Staff have been urged to put up "no photography" signs in polling stations. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-27486392 Its not illegal to take a photo of your own ballot paper, it is illegal to reveal how someone else voted without their knowledge. Thats where Section 66 of the Representation of the People's Act comes into play. This law hasn't been updated since the 2014 BBC article, so the articles claims about lawfulness are still valid.
Is a real life story subject to copyright by those who lived it? The title basic summarizes my question. Is a real life story subject to copyright by those who lived it? Or could someones create a book or movie about the history without contacting those who actually lived it? To make the question more concrete, consider the recent soccer team rescue in a thai cave and some intentions to create a movie about it. Could potential movie producers create a movie about a football team trapped inside a cave for 18 days without contacting anyone (or their legal representatives)?
No. Copyright protects expressions of ideas, not ideas themselves and not historical facts either. Conceivably, the persons written about might have a commercial right to use of their person or image, but the doctrine there is not copyright and the analysis is different.
You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.)
Yes, if the book was published in 1913, the copyright has expired. You can freely scan it in and publish it. But note you have NO copyright to the material. You didn't write it. Copyright law gives rights to the AUTHOR of a work. It doesn't matter how much effort you went to scanning it in and formatting it. Nothing in copyright law says that that gives you any rights. If you add anything creative of your own, you would own the copyright to the new material. Like if you drew new illustrations and added them to the book. Or if you included your own commentary. Or you added explanatory footnotes. That still wouldn't give you rights to the original text, but you would own the new material. But in the same vein, if the book was originally published in 1913, but the copy you have includes material added by a later editor, that later material might still be protected by copyright. Just a side thought, it occurs to me that if I was going to republish a public domain book, a good idea would be to add footnotes. If my footnotes appear on almost every page, then no one else could just take my electronic files and sell them himself. He'd have to go through page by page and purge out all the footnotes. Make it hard for someone to "borrow" your work and you might scare them off.
No B holds no right to a copyright, if his work infringes on A's right to X. So he can't win against A and neither C or lawfully demand a C&D from C. See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 especially IV A 4: Since Anderson's Work Is An Unauthorized Derivative Work, No Part Of The Treatment Can Be Granted Copyright Protection Stallone owns the copyrights for the first three Rocky movies. Under 17 U.S.C. section 106(2), he has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on these copyrighted works. This Court has determined that Anderson's treatment is an unauthorized derivative work. Thus, Anderson has infringed upon Stallone's copyright. See 17 U.S.C. section 501(a). [...] Plaintiff has written a treatment which is an unauthorized derivative work. This treatment infringes upon Stallone's [*31] copyrights and his exclusive right to prepare derivative works which are based upon these movies. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). Section 103(a) was not intended to arm an infringer and limit the applicability of section 106(2) on unified derivative works. As the House Report and Professor Nimmer's treatise explain, 103(a) was not intended to apply to derivative works and most certainly was not an attempt to modify section 106(2). Section 103(a) allows an author whose authorship essentially is the arrangement or ordering of several independent works to keep the copyright for his arrangement even if one of the underlying works he arranged is found to be used unlawfully. The infringing portion would be easily severable and the scope of the compilation author's own work would be easily ascertainable. Even if this Court were to interpret section 103(a) as allowing an author of an infringing derivative work to sue third parties based on the non-infringing portions of his work, section 106(2) most certainly precludes the author of an unauthorized infringing derivative work from suing the author of the work which he has already infringed. Thus, the Court HOLDS that the defendants are entitled to summary [*32] judgment on plaintiff's copyright claims as the plaintiff cannot gain copyright protection for any portion of his work under section 103(a). In addition, Anderson is precluded by section 106(2) from bringing an action for copyright infringement against Stallone and the other defendants. Note that any change to a work - even a single stroke or word, or cutting out a single frame - makes something out of necessity a derivative work. No alteration whatsoever makes it a pure copy. And using figures from a work in a different setting makes them, by necessity, a derivate, as in Anderson v Stallone. However, even if B's work was licensed or fair use (which can be done by critically recutting a work as in the h3h3 case or in Akila Hughs v Carl Benjamin aka Sargon of Akkad) and thus doesn't infringe on A's right, C still doesn't infringe on B's work: C's work is a (recreated) copy of A's original work, making it an infringement of A's work, but not B's altered work. Fair Use is explicitly not infringing under 17 USC § 107
No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads "There should be more detail and complex lines over here" What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?
Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.
I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law.
I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States.
Is it illegal to ask someone to commit a misdemeanor? What is this called? In my Googling, I learned that (at least in most of the U.S.) a defendant cannot be an accessory to a misdemeanor. What about someone just nagging and insisting on it?
This is called solicitation. A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime. Model Penal Code § 5.02.
Such things are in fact legal in some US jurisdictions, as part of plea bargains. In fact such pleas are not uncommon. More usual is the case where a person pleads guilty to a lesser crime, so as to qualify for a lower sentence, when all involved know that the lesser crime was not committed by anyone. It is simply a device to get a compromise sentence and avoid a trial. In some jurisdictions the Judge, in the course of accepting a guilty plea, requires that the accused admit specific facts that form a minimal legal basis for conviction of the crime pled to. In others no such admission is made. But even where such an admission is made, the truth of such an admission is not usually checked. The Judge will generally make sure that the accused understands the effect of a guilty plea, the rights given up by such a plea, and the possible range of sentences that will result. If the Judge believes that the plea constitutes a miscarriage of justice, for example that a totally innocent person is yielding to improper pressure from the prosecutor, the Judge can refuse the plea, but this is very rare in practice.
The 1975 ban by the attorney general prohibited prosecutors from offering to reduce charges, dismiss counts, or request a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. (Ad hoc exceptions were allowed, initially only by the AG, later by the head of each local office. For a while, there was also judicial bargaining). The AG's ban was on quid pro quo arrangements by his office, and the AG has absolutely no power over the plea by an accused, so that is how an accused could still plead guilty. The following quote is from the first page of Rubenstein & White: On July 3, 1975, the Attorney General of Alaska, Avrum Gross, issued written instructions forbidding all district attorneys and their assistants from engaging in plea bargaining. This prohibition extended to all felony and all misdemeanor prosecutions filed as of August 15. They could not offer to reduce charges or dismiss counts in multiple-count complaints, informations, or indictments as a quid pro quo for guilty pleas. Nor could they request the court to impose any stated sentence; they could only recite the facts. I can't locate a copy of the actual memo, but also see this quote, esp. "...negotiations with defendants designed to arrive at an agreement for entry of a plea of guilty in return for a particular sentence...". A guilty plea is much cheaper for a defendant than paying an attorney and getting convicted, so if you're actually guilty and the evidence is good, it could be a wiser move to plead guilty. There is little reason to engage in a futile act. It apparently also caused a change in the prosecutorial standard for charging, from probable cause to beyond a reasonable doubt – consequently, the chances that the accused is actually guilty goes up. The re-evaluation study also found evidence some evidence that sentencing was lighter in the case of a guilty plea, and it would be sufficient for the accused to believe that he could get a lighter sentence as a reward for a guilty plea to nudge a person in the direction of a guilty plea.
Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED
The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.
I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.
I'm not sure there would be any need - or any ability to bring - any civil action. Forgery would appear to count as a Category D felony under Section 205.090 and, "In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.", so person "a"'s damages should have been met under the process of the criminal prosecution of person "b" for forgery, with nothing further to claim. Person "c" will have stolen a car. Whether that car was legitimately owned by person "a" may only be relevant if person "c" is using their belief that it belonged to person "b" as mitigation (for example recovery of a debt - though it won't help much as this should have been done through proper channels), which again would be a criminal proceeding.
Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.
Is there a special class of refugee in the United States for climate refugees? Is there a special class of refugee in the United States for climate refugees? If the United States had to take in climate refugees under what legal class of refugee would they be brought under? Political refugee or something else? I am wondering if there's anything the law says in that regard or legislation is required to make it clear.
The US does not "have to" take in any refugees. There is a provision under US law pertaining to asylum. First, the person has to be in the US, including "having arrived at". The principle underlying a grant of asylum is that a special exception is made if not allowing the person into the US and repatriating them to their country of citizenship would make then "unsafe" in specific ways. If that can instead be repatriated to a safe third country (e.g. were granted asylum in Norway then decided to move to the US), then they are not eligible for asylum in the US unless the Attorney General determines that it is in the interest of the US. There are various provisions whereby a person from Eritrea (for example) would not be admissible, such as having participated in the repression or being a criminal. This article gives a detailed analysis of the criteria for asylum, which reduce to unwillingness to return to one's home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion You would have to decide what a "climate refugee" is to see how the law applies. For example, if you mean "a climate-change denier who is subject to persecution for expressing their skepticism", that would be covered by the protected category of political opinion. The actual climate in a country is not grounds for granting asylum.
They can't take his citizenship... Since he claims to be a born citizen, he has citizenship by birthright and nothing CBP can do can possibly revoke it. He can voluntarily renounce his citizenship, but he has to do that through the State Dept. (which CBP is not part of). And that is an elaborate and expensive process that can't even be done inside the United States. If someone could do it merely by entering without papers and asking for a self-deport, lots of expats would save a lot of money - and that's not gonna happen :) ...but they could put him to serious inconvenience In this particular case, CBP found his documents suspect. Probably because (if it's the case we've seen documented elsewhere) he was with two other people whose entry was illegal, and they had forged documents. So most likely, if he agreed to self-deport, CBP would use that as prima-facie evidence that he is not a bona-fide citizen, and therefore, that his papers are faked. They certainly will not give fake papers back to someone who has tried to pass them. So the victim would be obliged to go back to SSA, the state, etc. and re-acquire his identity documents. From outside the country. It's a pretty big chore.
Foreign citizens are just as entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as American citizens are. The case you cited was, in fact, a South Korean citizen who successfully had evidence suppressed from an unjustified border search.
In the US it is not a crime to be in the country illegally. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. Arizona v US So it's illegal, you get a state induced consequence (deportation) but it doesn't make you a criminal e.g. you don't go to jail for it. I have no idea if that's what's going on over there but it's a plausible explanation.
In theory, this should be protected by the UN Dec. of Human Rights: Article 13 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Since it does not specify the type of movement, or restrict its dimensions, this could be construed to include freedom of movement through time as well as space. Other than that things like this there is no real law regarding this.
As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.
As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.
I'm not aware of any any IRC provision allowing a deduction for those suffering from "natural disasters," but there are several provisions allowing preferential treatment for income and losses linked to a "federally declared disaster." IRC section 165 defines "federally declared disaster" as: any disaster subsequently determined by the President of the United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Because the governors for all states and territories have requested and received disaster declarations under the Act, retroactive to January 20, 2020, COVID-19 is a federally declared disaster for tax purposes, according to the IRS.
Is Web Wed legal? My question is very simple: are marriages arranged through Web Wed legal? Specifically: Are such marriages fully recognized in the United States? With the apostille service, are such licences fully recognized in all countries? For this part of the question, I am particularly interested in the case where neither spouse is a United States resident or citizen. If there are some countries that are known to or expected o not recognize Web Wed marriages, I would appreciate the clarification. EDIT: I am aware of the new laws (sometimes temporary) put in place because of Covid-19 restrictions, but I am not asking about that. Web Wed claims that they have been arranging weddings since 2015, so apparently their legal framework has nothing to do with the temporary Covid-19 provisions. My question is about if Web Wed as a specific company provides legally recognized services (with or without Covid-19 allowances). Web Wed explicitly claims that their arrangements are NOT proxy marriages, so my question is about the legality of the alternative approach that they take. I am hoping for answers more specific than generic "this is not possible" responses without knowing Web Wed's specific approach (such as the answers offered to Quora's question on the same topic, not posted by me).
According to an article in Bride's "Zoom Weddings Are Now Legal!" dated April 2021,several states including California, New York, Ohio, and Colorado have made temporary arrangements to make it legal for weddings to take place over video conference in response to the pandemic. Several also permit remote applications for marriage licenses. According to the June 2021 article "Is it legal to have a virtual wedding?" from Wedfuly states permitting such weddings include New York, California, and Illinois. However, in Florida, Hawaii, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas the article says that both parties to the wedding, and the officiant must all be physically present in the same place, although the wedding may be displayed on video for people at other locations. According to the New York Times article "Why Virtual Weddings Are No Longer Legal in New York" dated July 16, 2021, on June 25, 2021 Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo ended the executive order he originally issued in April 2020 allowing couples to be married online. According to that NYT article new legislation would be required for such weddings to be legal in New York again. Other states might cancel or change their temporary rules allowing "virtual" weddings at any time. The New York decision apparently came as a surprise, causing a number of scheduled weddings to be canceled or changed to in-person events. One planning such a wedding would do well to check current rules in the state involved. Citizenship or permanent residence should not matter to the validity of such weddings, as it does not matter for in-person weddings. However, it seems that both parties and the officiant must all be physically present within the same US state or other jurisdiction for the marriage to be valid. Not all countries recognize the validity of such "virtual" marriages. It is specifically mentioned that the UK does not. Also, it seems that while such weddings were lawful in New York, the temporary rules required that both members of the couple, and the officiant, be physically within the state of New York for the wedding to be legal. Other states seem to have similar rules. If the members of the couple are not in the same state, it seems that the wedding becomes a "proxy wedding". This is a process where one person is not present at all, but is represented by a "proxy". Proxy weddings have been lawful far back in history, at least as far as the middle ages in Europe, and perhaps farther. They are currently lawful in only a few US states. According to the Wikipedia article linked above these are: Texas, Colorado, Kansas, and Montana. Such weddings are invalid in all other states. Some of those states limit proxy marriages to active members of the US Military on deployment. The service Web Wed seems to claim that members of a couple may be located anywhere or the virtual wedding, but this appears incorrect. They also claim a patent on some forms of this process, and seem to say that they are the only legitimate provider of virtual weddings, but the articles linked above quote various officiants and services that have performed hundreds of such marriages. Under the "full faith and credit" clause of the US Constitution, marriages that are legal under the laws of any US state must be recognized by all other US states. Other countries may or may not recognize such marriages, depending on their own laws. I do not find any court case in which such a wedding was challenged and a court ruled on its validity, one way or the other. Additional info An answer by user Roberto says that Web Wed does this by having an officiant in Utah County, Utah. The Utah County Clerk's office page on Web Ceremonies does say that the counter permits weddings by video conference as long as the "host location" is in the state of Utah. However, it does not mention WebWed specifically, and some of the information does not match. WebWed's site says: Once you have the license, there is no rush to perform the ceremony. Once issued thru the courts the marriage licenses never expire, so once you have it you can get legally married whenever you wish. However, please note that each state expiration is different. You must adhere to that specific state policy. In most states, you have 30 days to get married after the license is issued. Utah marriage licenses are valid for only 30 days and are not issued by a court, so that does not seem to be what WebWed is talking about. The public pages of their site do not seem to mention Utah specifically. The WebWed site also says: A state issued marriage license is required to use this service. Please note that it is the registers/users responsibility to verify and abide by state, county, and armed forces marriage laws prior to using this service. WebWed's site advises government officials to reject any online marriage not preformed through their service. If such marriages are lawful and valid, they will be available to anyone that follows the proper rules. US states do not grant exclusive rights to specific commercial services in such cases. US Federal Law 8 U.S. Code § 1101 which is the Definitions section for CHAPTER 12— IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY, says that: (a) As used in this chapter— ... (a) (35) The term “spouse”, “wife”, or “husband” do not include a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated. "consummated" is not defined in this section, and so presumably has its normal meaning in regard to marriage, that is, that the parties have had sexual relations at least once after the marriage occurred. This section would apply to proxy marriages as well as to "virtual" marriages, but applies only in the context of immigration law. Normally US Federal law leaves the issue of marriages to the states, except where there is a claim that Federal constitutional rights are being infringed, such as in the cases of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) which forbade states to prohibit interracial marriage, and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) which forbade states to prohibit same-sex marriage. Utah Law Section 30-1-6 of the Utah Code provides that: 30-1-7. Marriage licenses -- Use within state -- Expiration. (1) No marriage may be solemnized in this state without a license issued by the county clerk of any county of this state. (2) A license issued within this state by a county clerk may only be used within this state. (3) A license that is not used within 32 days after the day on which the licensed is issued is void. Note that 30-1-6(2) says that any such marriage shall take place "within the state". Nothing in this section, or any other section of chapter 30, specifically authorizes a marriage by video conference where one or both parties are not within the state when the marriage occurs. It is not clear on what basis the Utah County clerk's office considers such marriages valid. Section 30-1-8 of the Utah Code provides that: (b) Each applicant and if an applicant is a minor, the minor's consenting parent or legal guardian, shall appear in person before the clerk and provide legal documentation to establish the following information ... However that may be relevant only when one or both parties to the marriage is a minor. I can find no other provisions of the Utah code which control applications for a license by web, or specifies where a marriage may or may not be held, or who is or is not required to be physically present at a valid marriage ceremony.
Yes One could certainly put up a site whose only content was a link to another domain. And I can't find any law which this would violate. If the link is a "deep link", and if it bypasses a log-in page, while the other site is so designed that all access is intended to go through the login, I believe (but cannot at the moment verify) that the owner of the other site could claim that this violates their copyright. In any case it is not a good idea.But a link to an appropriate page should have no problem, nor should pointing your domain at an appropriate entry page. Therefor, since simply re-pointing a domain should have the same effect as simply linking, in those cases where it works at all, it should be legal. Doing it with an iframe, which would truly open another site within your site, may not be if the other site forbids such use, as in the ToS. The case law on that is not settled, but many sites object to it, as the answer by @BlueDogRanch points out. I don't see a good reason why one would want to do this, but that isn't the question. Copying the HTML of another site and modifying the URLs while keeping the content the same would pretty clearly be a copyright infringement, besides being a lot of work to little obvious point. It also isn't what the question asked about. Building a one-page site that has only a simple link or a redirect would clearly be legal, and would serve the purpose of causing your domain to lead a user to another site, but it isn't, strictly speaking, what was asked about either.
No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR.
I suspect that US voting records would fall under Article 2(2)(a): Article 2 Material Scope ... This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; I doubt it would be possible to argue successfully that a foreign election is anything other than "an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law." Even the territorial scope could be questioned. This is set forth in the next article, on "territorial scope," the second item of which says: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. It is probably arguable whether processing absentee ballots from EU residents constitutes "offering services to data subjects in the Union," but in this case it's likely to be more difficult to resolve that question than to determine whether the activity falls outside the scope of Union law.
General Answer I have not found any law or regulation that specifically says that an immigration applicant or the applicant's sponsor (spouse) must disclose a prenuptial agreement if one exists. But immigration officials have broad discretion in interviews, and might well ask about such agreements. If asked, it is very unwise to lie or evade the question. There is no law forbidding a prenuptial agreement in such a case, or making a would-be immigrant who has signed such an agreement ineligible. However, if the immigration officers believe that the marriage is a "sham" designed largely to evade immigration laws, they might declare the marriage invalid for immigration purposes. This is likely to significantly hinder the application, if not end it. If the agreement makes it appear that the parties contemplate that the marriage will be short-lived, and that an end to the marriage will occur in the near future, that makes it look like a sham marriage. If it appears that the prime reason for the marriage was financial, and particularly if the US party has apparently been paid or subsidized for entering into the marriage, that also makes the marriage look like a sham. If the terms of the agreement support either of these assumptions, that may cause a problem. It will be helpful if the agreement is carefully drafted to make it clear that the marriage is one of affection or love, and is intended to be lasting, with the agreement only present to help deal with issues in the possible case of the marriage not lasting. Affirmation of Support (I-864) Also, it is often requires that the sponsor/spouse sign an Affirmation of Support (I-864). This is an agreement by which the sponsor promises to support the applicant at at least 125% of the US Federal poverty level. The sponsor also shows resources sufficient to provide such support. The obligation under this agreement last6s until the applicant has become a US citizen, or has been credited with 40 quarters (10 years) of Social Security earnings credit. Under federal law and case law, a prenup cannot waive or reduce the obligations under an I-864 agreement. A prenup that purports to do so would probably be a significant negative indication for an immigration official. Parties must Understand a Prenup Also if it appears that the non-US spouse (the applicant) does not understand the nature and effect of a prenup, that might also be a negative indication. This is one reason why it is often a good idea that each party should be represented by a separate lawyer in the drafting of a prenup. Such a lawyer should be able to draft the prenup agreement in such a way as not to raise suspicions with an immigration officer. Disclosing a Prenup We here at Law.SE cannot advise whether an applicant should disclose the existence of a prenup at an immigration interview. Such agreements are not normally registered with any government agency, nor are they normally searchable on any web site. But an applicant should probably assume that a question about such an agreement might be asked at an interview, and be prepared with an answer. Sources and Quotes The page "Can a nuptial (prenup) agreement waive rights under the Form I-864?" states: [F]ederal courts have squarely held that a pre- or post-nuptial agreement cannot waive rights under the Form I-864. Even if a sponsored immigrant has signed a document saying that she forfeits all rights under the I-864, that agreement is meaningless in federal court. It is very common for sponsored immigrants to sign a nuptial agreement. Often this happens before the person completes the immigration process. For example, someone might come to the U.S. on a K-1 visa, then be forced to sign a prenuptial agreement before getting married. Usually these nuptial agreements will contain broad language that the immigrant waives all right to “alimony” or spousal maintenance. But sometimes the agreements will also specifically cross-reference the Form I-864. Federal courts see two main problems with nuptial waivers. First, these agreements undermine the purpose of the I-864. Or at least they try to. Congress created the Form I-864 so that immigrants would be guaranteed basic financial support of they need it. More specifically, the I-864 ensures that a sponsor rather than American taxpayers provides the immigrant with support. If nuptial agreements could waive support, it basically leads to the following situation: the sponsor promises the U.S. government that it will provide support, then turns around and creates a document with the immigrant that says, “but I’m not actually going to provide the support.” It would be a bit crazy if a federal statute could be undermined in that way. Here is how one court in the District of Utah put it: To permit a sponsor to unilaterally terminate the Form I-864’s financial support obligation through a separate agreement with the immigrant would ignore the interests of the U.S. Government and the benefits of taxpayers and charitable donors. It would also defeat the Form I-864’s purpose of preventing admission of an immigrant that is likely to become a public charge at any time. Therefore, nuptial agreements will not terminate a Form I-864’s financial support obligation. The second reason that courts disregard nuptial agreements is the text of the I-864 itself. The I-864 contract lists five “terminating events” that ends a sponsor’s support obligation. These include the immigrant becoming a citizen or being credited 40 quarters of work. (You could count the sponsor’s death as a sixth terminating event). But those terminating events are the only thing that ends a sponsor’s obligation. Signing a private nuptial agreement isn’t on the list of terminating events, so that simply isn’t a thing that can end a sponsor’s obligation. The page "Can a prenup protect me when marrying a non citizen?" from Joleena Louis Law reads: One of the most obvious concerns for people marrying non-citizens is how having a prenup will look to immigration officials. You don’t want to give the impression that the marriage is happening for financial reasons and it does help to show co-mingling of assets. However, legitimate marriages have prenups, and a well-drafted agreement that is fair to both parties and makes sense for the situation won’t necessarily give a bad impression. Another thing to keep in mind is that you may need to sign an Affirmation of Support for your spouse, which in which you are acknowledging that you have the means to financially support your spouse at a minimum level of 125% of the federal poverty threshold and accept legal responsibility for their financial support. A prenup cannot absolve you of this obligation and you are not released from this obligation until your spouse becomes a United States citizen, permanently departs the country, or is credited with forty quarters of coverage via the Social Security Act. The page "Do Prenuptial Agreements Affect Spousal Immigration? from Family Law San Diego reads: Federal immigration law provides for a U.S. citizen to sponsor the immigration of their foreign spouse. The married couple must apply for a family-based immigrant visa allowing a spouse from a foreign country to enter the United States and obtain Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status—also known as a “green card” holder. Among the various immigration forms that are required to obtain a visa for an immigrant spouse is an Affidavit of Support (Form I-864). By signing and submitting an Affidavit of Support, the U.S. citizen spouse enters into a contractual agreement with the United States acknowledging that they have the means to financially support their spouse at a minimum level of 125% of the federal poverty threshold and accepting legal responsibility for their financial support until their spouse becomes a U.S. citizen or earns credit for 40 [quarters] of work. Importantly, getting a divorce does not relieve the citizen spouse of their obligation to provide the required amount of spousal support to their spouse. Furthermore, the affiant [sponsor] is responsible for reimbursing government agencies for the cost of any “means-tested public benefits” that the immigrant spouse receives. Spouses who have been married for less than two (2) years will receive what is known as “conditional permanent resident” status. This means that the couple must prove that they did not get married for the purpose of avoiding federal immigration laws. If USCIS concludes that a couple entered into the marriage to evade federal immigration laws, their marriage will be deemed invalid for immigration purposes. As a result, the spouse seeking to immigrant to the United States will be denied entry or removed from the United States. The citizen spouse may also be subject to civil or criminal penalties. A prenuptial agreement is a contract into which prospective newlyweds enter, governing their rights and responsibilities as married spouses concerning matters such as spousal support and the distribution of marital assets at the end of their marriage, whether due to divorce or death. The provisions of a prenuptial agreement go into effect when the couple gets married. Although there are few legal requirements to form a valid premarital agreement, the judicial enforcement of its provisions may be questionable depending on the circumstances of each case. Generally, a prenuptial agreement is not enforceable if it was not the product of mutual voluntary assent to its terms. As a result, circumstances that suggest that party did not understand the contract, or would not have reasonably agreed to its terms if they had a meaningful choice, call the enforceability of the agreement into question. Spouses with conditional permanent resident status should be careful about the potential effect of a prenuptial agreement. Evidence indicating that a party did not understand the terms of a contract may endanger the enforcement prospects of its provisions, especially if English is not their first language. Additionally, terms that reduce the immigrant spouse’s property rights may suggest that the couple had a deal to have the citizen spouse sponsor the foreign spouse’s immigration into the U.S. Importantly, provisions purporting to govern the couple’s rights and responsibilities regarding spousal support are effectively superseded by the terms of an Affidavit of Support. This is because a prenuptial agreement is a contract between the spouses, whereas an Affidavit of Support is a contract between the citizen spouse and the U.S. government. The Page "Why Should You Get a Prenuptial Agreement with a Foreign National?" from DiPietro Law Group reads: If your new spouse does not intend to work in the United States, you may need to sign an Affidavit of Support. This contract requires you to maintain a standard of living for your new spouse exceeding 125 percent of the poverty level. You are not released from this obligation until your spouse becomes a United States citizen, permanently departs the country, or is credited with forty quarters of coverage via the Social Security Act. Your prenuptial contract does not automatically absolve you of this support. In a notable 2014 case, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland indicated that prenuptial contracts could not waive Affidavits of Support. Prenuptial contracts can occasionally backfire in green card cases. Immigration officials look for signs that a marriage occurred for financial or citizenship reasons, and not for love. Officers often seek evidence of commingled assets, which may not be available among couples with prenuptial agreements. The pager "How do Prenuptial Agreements Affect Immigration?" by Jared Leung from JCL Immigration Attorneys, reads: A prenuptial agreement is a legal contract that outlines how assets will be divided in the event a marriage ends in divorce. These agreements also discuss the obligations of a spouse to provide financial support for the other party in the event of a divorce. In general, both parties must fully understand all of the terms of a prenuptial agreement in order for the contract to be binding. If a court finds that one party was unaware of what he or she was signing, or if the agreement is so one-sided as to be deemed unfair, the provisions held within can be invalidated. How do prenuptial agreements impact immigration? When a United States citizen sponsors the immigration application of a foreign spouse, the couple needs to file for a family-based immigrant visa, often called a “green card.” Part of this process involves filing an Affidavit of Support, a document that demonstrates that the citizen has the ability to support the other party at a level at least above 125% of the poverty threshold until the applicant becomes a United States citizen. This obligation remains in place in the event of divorce. The provisions of a prenuptial agreement should not give the appearance of a “deal” between parties for the purpose of circumnavigating immigration rules. There can also be challenges if the foreign spouse does not speak English well enough to understand the details of the agreement. However, having a prenuptial agreement does not necessarily casts doubt to the truthfulness of the marriage. Individuals with decent net worth or prior debt may use prenuptial agreements to protect oneself and/or the spouse-to-be. The existence of a prenuptial agreement should be considered with other factors in the marriage to determine whether it would cause problems in an immigration application Case Citations Cases in which Federal courts have held that a prenup does not void an I-864 agreement: [Erler v. Erler 824 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2016). Golipour v. Moghaddam No. 4:19-cv-00035-DN-PK (D. Utah Feb. 7, 2020) (granting and denying in part cross-motions for summary judgment). Anderson v. United States, No. C17-0891RSL (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2019) (dicta). Toure-Davis v. Davis, No. WGC-13-916 (D. Md. March 28, 2014) (memo. op.). Shah v. Shah, 4:12-cv-4648, (RBK/KMW), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4596 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2014) (memo. op.) Cyrousi v. Kashyap, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1278 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that waiver is not an affirmative defense available to sponsors) Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (same).
If an F-1 student in the US, gets married with a US citizen, how can he protect his money if a divorce happened in the future? Specifically if he has a plan to establish a company and run a business after he graduated, how can he keep all the rights and money/stuck/profit he will earn from his company and won't share it after a probable divorce? Should they wright something like "we promise we won't have any claims about each other's money after the divorce" before they get married? A prenuptial agreement is possible, and only an idiot or fool would draft one himself. An agreement drafted without legal representation would be highly likely to be invalidated in an effort to enforce it in the event of a divorce. Generally, both parties should have separate counsel. This must be accompanied by full financial disclosure by both parties, at least an opportunity to confer with legal counsel providing full informed consent regarding the rights given up in the agreement, and no undue pressure to sign it on the eve of a wedding. It cannot impact child support or child custody. It must also not be unconscionable to either spouse, either at the time it is executed or at the time of a divorce. If the company makes millions of dollars over the course of a ten year marriage, a court would not enforce the agreement according to those terms. In the case of an immigrant marrying a U.S. citizen, having a prenuptial agreement is usually a significant barrier to obtaining a spousal visa, which may be the only visa available after the marriage, on the grounds that this is considered a "yellow flag" that the marriage may actually be a sham for citizenship purposes only. A typical immigration officer who would read a post like this one or hearing an explanation for its purpose in an interview in those words would seriously consider denying a spousal visa or U.S. citizenship on the ground that the marriage is a fraud. The notion of a "probable divorce" in particular would almost certainly doom visa approval or a citizenship application, and would also, at the margins, make it less likely that it would be enforced at all. This is particularly true in the event of the very one-sided agreement proposed when you have a young couple that doesn't have established assets and children from prior marriages, or a pre-existing substantial amount of inherited wealth. Why else would a spouse agree to it?
Article 41.3.3 of the 1937 Irish Constitution said: No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved. Until this section was changed by the 2019 amendment. I can find no source to show how "but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law" was interpreted, but it seems that a person divorced in or prior to 1940 under US law would not have been permitted to marry in Ireland after 1937 until 2019 under this provision. It should be noted that although Finnegans Wake by James Joyce was published in full in 1939, much of it had been written and published in sections by 1926. It is not at all clear just when it is set. In the 1920s, the constitutional provision quoted above was not yet in effect.
The specific venue requirement is ORC 3101.05 which says that Each of the persons seeking a marriage license shall personally appear in the probate court within the county where either resides, or, if neither is a resident of this state, where the marriage is expected to be solemnized. If neither party is a resident of this state, the marriage may be solemnized only in the county where the license is obtained. To possibly make things worse, An applicant for a marriage license who knowingly makes a false statement in an application or affidavit prescribed by this section is guilty of falsification under section 2921.13 of the Revised Code. If they lied on the application regarding the venue, that's a large problem. Otherwise, violating 3101.05 is a minor misdemeanor, which could be a fine up to $150. There is no provision that would invalidate the marriage, other than specified prohibited marriages (not nearer of kin than second cousin, already married).
The refusal of a public body to allocate a male due to not having a male worker, would this be discrimination or...? Bob requested, from the public service company dealing with child issues, the presence of a male employee as he felt discriminated and intimidated with the way the female employees were leading meetings and there was never a male with them. When requesting this, the female employees started to laugh at Bob and an employee said there are no male employees available in the whole region and Bob can meet only with women. Bob asked why there are no male employees. The female employees said that men look for higher paying jobs claiming that they earn less. Regarding the employees: Wouldn't this be a discrimination against male employees? Because the company is not willing to offer a higher pay to allow the company to have the correct gender balance and not have a female-centric service? Regarding Bob receiving the service from the company: Would the refusal of the service to provide a male employee for Bob to meet with have a different scope of discrimination or what?
The first part of the question is trivial to answer - if all men consider the salary on offer to be insufficient, even though it's the same salary that's paid to the (female) employees, then that's the voluntary choice of those men. Bob in all likelihood cannot insist on the presence of a male employee in the meeting. Some countries might have rules for the gender of doctors; many have rules for police officers doing pat-downs. But those are much more personal interactions than meetings.
No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant.
Your description of the facts is vague enough that we can't offer an informed judgment, but to remedy this, I will paraphrase your account of the facts (you can decide whether this is what you were trying to say). I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today waiting for my step daughter to come out. While waiting, two police officers walked up to my car and asked me to turn off my vehicle and come inside. When I voluntarily went inside, the store staff said that they called the police because they had had some sort of problems with people applying for service and absconding with the phone to resell on the black market, and they thought that was part of some such criminal plan. Because of that, they refused to give her a phone or service contract. But then they also told us to never come back, threatening arrest for trespassing. I have never been in that store before. Were my rights violated? No, neither by the police nor by the manager. The police, or the store manager, can legally request you to come in for a conversation: what matters most is whether you were forced to come in against your will. By your report, you were not, so your rights were not violated. The police are irrelevant to the remainder of the question. What remains is whether your rights were violated because the manager told you to go away and never come back under pain of prosecution. The store is private property, meaning that the owner has wide latitude to grant or deny permission to enter. If they hate pink hair and your hair is pink, they can legally "ban" you. If they suspect you of involvement in a criminal activity, that can most certainly legally ban you. That does not mean that it was a righteous or justified decision on their part, or a good business choice, but it is their legal right. So, no, your rights were not violated.
Normally, an employer can decide whether someone is allowed to go on leave or not. If someone has a covered disability, that must be accommodated, except to the extent that the disability makes the person unable to perform a bona fide job qualification that cannot be accommodated by any practical means. Employers have some latitude and discretion in evaluating this question and a doctor's opinion, while it is relevant evidence that an employer should consider, isn't binding on the employer. This is because physicians can differ in their opinions on a particular case, and because physicians don't necessarily know exactly what is and isn't necessary to perform a job satisfactorily. Business owners are entitled to decide what duties go with a job, and within reason, what kind of performance of those duties meets their standards. As the case summary linked to in the comments explains: "Counseling is a medical appointment and the determination as to whether it can be required for employment is dependent on whether it is “job related” and consistent with a “business necessity” as described in the ADA." Under the circumstances described in the question, it is likely that this requirement would be found to have been met. Also, an employer could place an employee on medical leave without requiring counseling or therapy as a requirement to return, so long as some other performance standard was established for the employee. On the other hand, the employer's discretion is not unlimited. If a judge or jury finds that an employee was clearly capable of performing the job in a satisfactory manner (e.g. by noting that the disabled employee outperforms many non-disabled employees in the same position who are not put on leave), then that finder of fact could conclude that the employer had engaged in illegal discrimination based upon disability, rather than legally exercising an employer's discretion. There are, inevitably, gray areas, and no one doctor's opinion is enough to resolve that question definitively.
Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.)
Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence.
Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful.
You do have freedom of conscience but you do not have a blanket right to refuse work you were ordered to perform. You have to perform work you were ordered to perform. If you refuse, you can get an Abmahnung (disciplinary letter). A second Abmahmung would be grounds for firing. The Abmahnung is invalid if the work you refused would have been unreasonable – but you'd have to litigate this. Your freedom of conscience does affect what work you can be reasonably asked to perform. You have the burden of proof to show that the work would have been unreasonable. You are required to alert the employer in advance. If you took a job where you could reasonably have been expected to know that it might come into conflict with your conscience, you should have mentioned this during the interview. Taking the job anyway effectively waives your freedom of conscience. Of course this doesn't apply if your job changed after you were hired. If you successfully claim freedom of conscience, you are not entitled for pay for the work that you didn't perform. Here, your claim of freedom of conscience does not seem to stand on very strong footing. It is normal for web development to include analytics, ads, and social integrations (what you seem to call “trackers”). This is a bit like taking a job as a nurse and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to perform blood transfusions” or taking a job at a defense contractor and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to work on weapons”. Your personal conscience may be more strict than applicable laws, but don't forget that there are laws. You might reasonably see it as your professional obligation to alert stakeholders of their compliance obligations. You have a stronger case for refusing work than the difficult to prove “freedom of conscience” if the work you are asked to perform would be illegal. You'd have a stronger argument for exercising your freedom of conscience if your work would endanger users that live under oppressive governments.
Can a lawyer question you about your religious beliefs during a trial? Can a lawyer question you about your religious beliefs during a trial? I've heard that the U.S. census asking about your belief is illegal in the United States. It has been against the law since 1976 (Public Law 94-521), allegedly because collecting such information on a mandatory basis would violate the First Amendment. So I am wondering if a lawyer can ask about one's religious belief if it's relevant to the trial at hand.
The only religious matter I'm aware of that are inadmissible are for special circumstances where one's religious beliefs may be compromised if asked in court. The classic example tends to be clergymen/women being subpeonaed for information against a defendant in court. Conversation with clergy is protected in the United States and is one of a few times cops are not allowed to listen to your one phone call or visit. The typical invocation of this would be a criminal, who confesses his sins to a Catholic priest, and may confess to a crime while receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Since Catholic Priests are bound by the "Seal of Confession" to not speak about the identity of the sinner or nature of the sin. The Priest can be excommunicated if he does this. However, if the religion of the witness is relevant to the case (say a discrimination case) it might be prudent to inquire into the witness's religious beliefs. Suppose a major employer has a special menu in their cafeterias for Hala and Kosher observers but does not offer a fish or non-meat option for meals on Fridays in Lent, then a Catholic's belief in this practice might be called into question.
There is no such law in the US, although there many laws prohibiting specific forms of harm, for example laws against murder, theft, assault, arson. All laws are predicated on the idea that an illegal act causes harm, but I don't get to deem, for example, that you are harming society by opposing Satan. There are no laws prohibiting any belief in the US, and such a law would be unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment). So being a Satanist could not possibly be illegal.
Documents are not protected under the 5th Amendment, so a person can be compelled to produce documents that may incriminate them. The person cannot be forced to testify against themselves, however – they can invoke their right to not testify against themselves. The attorney-client privilege canon has some exceptions, for example (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules or (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services (bearing in mind that POTUS is required by law to turn all documents over to the national Archives, so turning the records over is "compliance with the law" and a think that an attorney would do for their client, though this event is quite belated). No subpoena was issued and no testimony was given, so the Fifth Amendment is irrelevant.
The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't "tipped off" by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for "good cause." Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers.
There are certain situations where the law may require you to provide some information -- particularly when you've been pulled over for a traffic violation -- but it is typically limited to basic identifying information. Beyond that, it is legally advantageous to refuse to answer questions. If you are doing so, though, you should explicitly invoke your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and your Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Invoking the Fifth prevents the police from using your refusal to answer as evidence, and invoking the Sixth requires the police to stop asking you questions. It may, however, be practically disadvantageous to refuse to answer questions, as there are cops who are just looking for a reason to act like a psychopath.
Testimonial Privilege There is a tradition, embodied in law in many jurisdictions, that a religious confession, is not subject to compelled disclosure in court or to other legal process. This arose from the Catholic practice of confession, but has been long sine extended to the similar practices of other religious organizations. Note that in most jurisdictions this applies only to confessions that a person makes about his or her own actions. It does not apply when a person reports some other person's actions to a religious authority. It also usually applies only to a formal, religiously mandated or authorized communication, not to an informal chat or counseling session. In the US this is usually a matter of state law. Let's look at the relevant law in California, which is tagged as the relevant jurisdiction. (Laws in other US states are usually similar on this subject.) Such a privilege usually applies only to actual testimony under oath, in a court or as part of court proceedings such as a deposition. The law concerning an initial report of possible child abuse is different. According to the California Evidence Code, Sections 1030-1034: Subject to Section 912, a penitent, whether or not a party,has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a penitential communication if he or she claims the privilege. Subject to Section 912, a member of the clergy, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose a penitential communication if he or she claims the privilege. This means that neither the clergy-person, nor the person disclosing information to the clergy-person (the "penitent") can be required to provide court testimony about the content of the confession. (Note that this is part of the evidence code which governs what evidence is admissible in court.) Also, the penitent may forbid such testimony from the clergy-person. Note that the privilege must be explicitly invoked, it is not automatic. Questions may be asked about the confession, and only if the penitent or the clergy-person objects and invokes the privilege does it apply. The previous three sections (included in the linked page) limit the privilege somewhat. Section 1030 states that: a "member of the clergy" means a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or of a religious denomination or religious organization. Section 1031 states that: "penitent" means a person who has made a penitential communication to a member of the clergy. Section 1032 states that: "penitential communication" means a communication made in confidence, in the presence of no third person so far as the penitent is aware, to a member of the clergy who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the clergy member's church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear those communications and, under the discipline or tenets of his or her church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep those communications secret. So the privilege only applies when the communication or confession was made one-to-one, with no other person present, is part of the regular religious practice of the church or group involved, and the clergy-person has a religious duty to keep the communication secret. All this is normally true of Catholic confessions. It may or may not be true of confessions or communications in other religious organizations, depending on their traditions and practices. Also code section 912(a) provides that: the right of any person to claim a privilege ... is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to claim the privilege Mandated Reporting In recent decades laws have bee passed requiring people in various positions of trust, or positions where such people are likely encounter evidence of child abuse, to report to law enforcement when they know or reasonably suspect such abuse. Such people are called "mandated reporters". A failure by a mandated reporter to make such a report when the mandated reporter has knowledge or reasonable suspicion of abuse is a crime. Note that, in most jurisdictions, mandated reporting applies to all forms of child abuse, not just sexual abuse, but also physical and emotional abuse and neglect. Therefore in this answer "abuse" is not limited to sexual abuse. In the US, this is a matter of state law. What positions carry mandated reporter status, what circumstances trigger a mandated report, an what the penalties are for failing to make a report all vary significantly from state to state. Mandated reporter (MR) status is separate from the testimonial privilege described above in this answer. However, circumstances that would trigger the testimonial privilege may also trigger an exception from mandated reporting. Mandated Reporting in California In California Penal code section 11165.7 (a) (32) and (a) (33) list clergy members (defined as " priest, minister, rabbi, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church, temple, or recognized denomination or organization.") and "any custodian of records of a clergy member" as mandated reporters (MRs). However section 11166 (d) (1) provides an exception. Knowledge or suspicion acquired "during a penitential communication" need not be reported. For this purpose a "penitential communication" is defined as: a communication, intended to be in confidence, including, but not limited to, a sacramental confession, made to a clergy member who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the clergy member’s church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear those communications, and under the discipline, tenets, customs, or practices of the clergy member’s church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep those communications secret. Note that only if the "church, denomination, or organization" imposes on the clergy member a duty to keep the communication secret is the communication a "penitential communication". If there is no such duty, the exception does not apply. Normally, a "penitential communication" concerns the actions of the person making the communication, not of some other person. However in the course of a communication about him- or herself, a person may mention the actions of another person. That mention would, as I understand this law, be part of the penitential communication and thus subject to the exception in section 11166 (d) (1). When is a Report Mandated? Section 11166 (a) provides that: (a) Except as provided in subdivision (d), and in Section 11166.05, a mandated reporter shall make a report to an agency specified in Section 11165.9 whenever the mandated reporter, in the mandated reporter’s professional capacity or within the scope of the mandated reporter’s employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect. ... [The paragraph goes on to define the time and manner of reports.] Section 11166 (a) (1) defines "reasonable suspicion": For purposes of this article, “reasonable suspicion” means that it is objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts that could cause a reasonable person in a like position, drawing, when appropriate, on the person’s training and experience, to suspect child abuse or neglect. “Reasonable suspicion” does not require certainty that child abuse or neglect has occurred nor does it require a specific medical indication of child abuse or neglect; any “reasonable suspicion” is sufficient. For purposes of this article, the pregnancy of a minor does not, in and of itself, constitute a basis for a reasonable suspicion of sexual abuse. 11166 (a) mentions a MR's knowledge of or observation of the possibly abused child. It is not clear to me if a discussion with a third party, such as another adult, would be sufficient to raise a "reasonable suspicion" such that a MR would be required to file a report, if there is nothing that the MR has personally observed that would raise or tend to confirm such a suspicion. However section 11166 (g) provides that: Any other person who has knowledge of or observes a child whom the person knows or reasonably suspects has been a victim of child abuse or neglect may report the known or suspected instance of child abuse or neglect to an agency specified in Section 11165.9. For purposes of this section, “any other person” includes a mandated reporter who acts in the person’s private capacity and not in the person’s professional capacity or within the scope of the person’s employment. {Emphasis added.} Thus the person who makes a penitential communication to a clergy member may (but need not) report directly to Law Enforcement, and the clergy member may urge such a person to do so. Note that 11166 (i) (1) provides that: (i) (1) The reporting duties under this section are individual, and no supervisor or administrator may impede or inhibit the reporting duties, and no person making a report shall be subject to any sanction for making the report. However, internal procedures to facilitate reporting and apprise supervisors and administrators of reports may be established provided that they are not inconsistent with this article. An internal policy shall not direct an employee to allow the employee’s supervisor to file or process a mandated report under any circumstances. Note that 11166 (i) (3) provides that: (i) (3) Reporting the information regarding a case of possible child abuse or neglect to an employer, supervisor, school principal, school counselor, coworker, or other person shall not be a substitute for making a mandated report to an agency specified in Section 11165.9. Specified Scenario In a comment on an earlier version of this answer, the original poster of the question (OP) asks: So if there was a situation where church member X tells to a religious leader L (no other persons present) that church member Y has abused a child, then the legal responsibility for the leader to inform authorities depends primarily on state law and secondarily on what the religious traditions of that religious org state? Would this be correct? Yes, the responsibility of L in that situation depends on both the state law of the state where this occurs, and on the rules and traditions of the the church or other religious organization are. There are several questionable points in that scenario under California law: When X tells L about the abusive actions by Y, is that a "penitential communication" under the traditions of the relevant religious organization? For instance, in Catholic practice, a confession is about oneself, and any mention of the misdeeds of others is not confidential unless it would reveal the contents of the actual confession. Does religious law, tradition or practice impose a duty of secrecy on L? If not, the exception does not apply and a report is mandated if the other conditions for a report apply. My understanding (not confirmed) is that the Catholic church, for example, has in recent years changed its canon law so that a persistent course of action, showing no indication of repentance nor effort to stop the sinful action where there is a likelihood of future harm to others relives a priest from the duty of secrecy. When there is no religious duty of secrecy, the exception does not apply. Does the report by X give L "knowledge" or "reasonable suspicion" of abuse? If not, no report is mandated. If there is not at least corroboration through direct observation of the child in question, then the wording of 11166 seems to me to imply that no report is mandated, but I have not found case law confirming or opposing that conclusion. Also, under 11166 (a) (1) suspicion must be "objectively reasonable" to trigger a mandated report. If X is known for making unfounded accusations, X's report might not be grounds for "reasonable suspicion". Thus the detailed facts about the situation, and about the rules or traditions of the church or religious organization will matter.
It would be unconstitutional for there to be a law against (public) schools having a field trip to a church or other religiously-centered building. The First Amendment requires government action to be neutral with respect to religion. This means that a public school can neither promote nor condemn religion. A field trip where the venue was a church is not per se the promotion of religion in general or a particular religion. A pattern of activity, and associated facts, could, however, establish that a seemingly innocent event is in fact religious proselytizing. If for example the teacher actually says "I want to make churches be a happy experience, so that students would be inclined to convert", that would cross the line from neutrality to advocacy. If there were many possible venues for such field trips and yet only the church is chosen, that might be evidence of non-neutrality. It really depends on the totality of facts. If the church has the only stage in town, that would be a perfectly reasonable basis for repeated trips to that church.
Is there a way for a person born in the US to Chinese parents to retain Chinese citizenship? It is well known and often repeated that China does not tolerate dual citizenship, except in the case of its citizens who have right of abode in Hong Kong or Macau. The Chinese Nationality Law is clear about this: Article 3. Article 9 clarifies that Chinese nationality is automatically lost upon naturalization in another country. The law is not clear about the case of people born to Chinese citizens (who normally would qualify for Chinese citizenship: i.e., the parents are not settled abroad) in a country such as the US which would automatically grant citizenship to that person by virtue of their birth there. It appears that according to Chinese law, that person is a Chinese citizen. Chinese law cannot take away the person's US citizenship. At the same time, the person has not "been naturalized as a foreign national" and has not "acquired foreign nationality of his own free will". From what I've read online, it seems that such individuals often get caught by Chinese immigration officers upon leaving China to return to the US: the officers realize that the person doesn't have a US visa in their Chinese passport, so they deduce that the person must have a second passport that they are using to enter the US. At this point, their Chinese passport is revoked. I suppose they take the point of view that once you apply for a US passport, you've elected to keep the US citizenship and not the Chinese citizenship. What if the person wants to retain Chinese citizenship and is willing to give up US citizenship (or to legally keep US citizenship but not "use" it)? What conditions would have to be met?
It is well known and often repeated that China does not tolerate dual citizenship, except in the case of its citizens who have right of abode in Hong Kong or Macau. The Chinese Nationality Law is clear about this: Article 3. This is not true and you misunderstand what Article 3 says. Article 3 says (depending on your translation): The People's Republic of China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national. The only way I think this can be interpreted is that, if a person were to statutorily have both Chinese nationality and foreign nationality under each country's respective laws, then the PRC would only recognize their Chinese nationality, and not recognize their foreign nationality. This article does NOT mean that nobody can have dual nationality under the law. In order to "recognize" or "not recognize" something, it presupposes that the thing exists. If nobody had dual nationality under the law, then this article would be meaningless, as there would be no point to "not recognize" something that nobody has anyway. This article only matters to someone who truthfully has dual nationality under PRC and foreign law. Given someone who truthfully has dual nationality under PRC and foreign law, since dual nationality is not recognized, which nationality is recognized and which is not? Since Article 3 says "Chinese national", it implicitly recognizes the person's Chinese nationality, which means it's the foreign nationality that is not recognized. (This, by the way, is essentially identical to the US position -- the US only recognizes the US nationality of a dual national.) It is true that true dual nationality of the PRC and a foreign country is uncommon, but that is mainly due to Articles 9 (which says a Chinese national naturalizing abroad automatically loses Chinese nationality) and 8 (which says that a foreign national who naturalizes to get Chinese nationality shall not retain foreign nationality). It is not because of Article 3. By the way, when I say someone who has dual nationality of the PRC and a foreign country, it does not include a Chinese national who has naturalized abroad, who is subject to Article 9 but continues to use/obtain PRC passports and/or continue to exercise the rights of a Chinese citizen. De jure, this person no longer has Chinese nationality, even if the PRC government is not aware of it yet. When discovered, they will be treated as only a foreign national, and that is consistent with my explanation, since this person does not de jure have Chinese nationality. Any documents issued to them reflecting Chinese nationality after their foreign naturalization, were issued in error. Article 3 is irrelevant for such a person since there is no question of "recognizing" dual nationality for a person who does not legally have dual nationality. So who are the people who truthfully have both PRC and foreign nationality? There are several cases. First, as you noted, this is possible for many people in Hong Kong and Macau, due to explanations of the PRC nationality law for those territories. For example, in the one for Hong Kong, items 2-4 say that Chinese of Hong Kong are Chinese nationals despite holding foreign passports. They do not have foreign consular protection while in Hong Kong and the rest of China, (unless they choose to apply for change of nationality to foreign nationality, effectively renouncing Chinese nationality). It says their foreign passports can be used for traveling to "other countries and territories" (implying that they cannot be used to enter Hong Kong or the rest of China). This supports my explanation of Article 3 above, that the PRC only recognizes the Chinese nationality of a dual national, and does not recognize their foreign nationality. Another case is a child born in China to one Chinese citizen parent and one foreign national parent who meets the conditions to automatically pass on foreign nationality to the child at birth according to that foreign country's law. According to Article 4, a child born in China to at least one Chinese citizen parent is automatically a Chinese citizen, without regards to whether the child also has foreign nationality at birth, or anything else. Any person born in China whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. And finally, we get to the case you mentioned, for children born abroad. Article 5 deals with children born abroad, and it says that a child born abroad to at least one Chinese citizen parent automatically has Chinese nationality, except when at least one parent is a Chinese citizen who has settled abroad, AND the child has foreign nationality at birth, in which case the child will not have Chinese nationality. Any person born abroad whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have both settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality. Because they wrote it with an "and", it means that children who had foreign nationality at birth but where neither parent was a Chinese citizen who has settled abroad, will have Chinese nationality at birth. If they had wanted to make it so that children born abroad could not have both Chinese nationality and foreign nationality at birth, they could have written it with an "or", but they didn't. Unlike some other countries, the PRC nationality law does not require that children born abroad be registered at a PRC consulate with a declaration that the child does not have a foreign passport in order to get Chinese citizenship. Nor does the PRC nationality law provide that dual national children lose their Chinese nationality if they don't renounce foreign nationality at a certain age. Since you specifically ask about children born in the US, they will all have foreign nationality (US citizenship) at birth (ignoring cases of children born to diplomats). So it only depends on the other condition (whether at least one parent was a Chinese citizen who has settled abroad). The PRC government interprets "settled abroad" as having foreign permanent residency (e.g. US green card). So assuming the only relevant foreign permanent residency is the US green card, here is a table summarizing whether a child born in the US has Chinese nationality at birth, based on the status of the parents: Chinese citizen without green card Chinese citizen with green card non-Chinese citizen Chinese citizen without green card Yes No Yes Chinese citizen with green card No No No non-Chinese citizen Yes No No The current procedure at PRC consulates (both in US and in other countries) is that they issue PRC Travel Documents (旅行证) instead of PRC passports to children born abroad, who have both Chinese nationality (as determined by Article 5) and foreign nationality at birth, who wish to travel to China. These Travel Documents are passport-like booklets, are valid for 2 years (can be re-applied for again after expiration), and contain a Chinese and an English info page, both of which say, among other things, The bearer of this Travel Document is a citizen of the People's Republic of China. [...] Having a US passport does not preclude the issuance of the Travel Document. In fact, the consulate expects the child in this case to have a US passport and requests the US passport information as well as the physical US passport during the application process, if the child already has one. The consulate clearly has no problem recognizing the child as a Chinese citizen even if they know that the child has US citizenship and a US passport. This Travel Document can be used to enter and exit China. When exiting China, the child would present both the PRC Travel Document and the US passport at PRC exit controls. The border control officer will recognize, upon seeing the Travel Document, that this is the routine procedure for a dual national child, and it will not lead to problems like when both PRC and US passports are presented (even though both the PRC passport and PRC Travel Document say inside them that the bearer is a citizen of the PRC). As you can see, having a US passport is not incompatible with the PRC's recognition of the child's Chinese nationality. If the PRC Travel Document is lost or expires while in China, the child can get a PRC Entry/Exit Permit (通行证), which again can be used with the US passport when exiting China with no problems. When back abroad, the child can again apply for a PRC Travel Document at a PRC consulate the next time they need to travel to China. Although it is possible for the child to be added to hukou while in China, the child should not apply for a PRC passport, as it seems this will cause problems when exiting China, as you mentioned. The child should stick to Chinese Travel Documents and Entry/Exit Permits. I have heard rumors that the consulate might no longer issue PRC Travel Documents to such a dual national child after turning 18 (perhaps forcing the child to renounce either PRC or foreign nationality), but I haven't seen any official source on this, and the PRC nationality itself does not mention any need to do anything at any particular age. As for renouncing US citizenship, US law requires that loss of US citizenship can only occur when the person intends to relinquish US citizenship, and young children are considered to lack sufficient maturity and understanding of the meaning of renunciation of citizenship, and be too much under the influence of parents, to have the necessary voluntary intent. The Foreign Affairs Manual presumes that an age of at least 16 is generally necessary to renounce US citizenship. See 7 FAM 1292(i)(2): Voluntariness and intent: Minors who seek to renounce citizenship often do so at the behest of or under pressure from one or more parent. If such pressure is so overwhelming as to negate the free will of the minor, it cannot be said that the statutory act of expatriation was committed voluntarily. The younger the minor is at the time of renunciation, the more influence the parent is assumed to have. Even in the absence of any evidence of parental inducements or pressure, you and CA must make a judgment whether the individual minor manifested the requisite maturity to appreciate the irrevocable nature of expatriation. Absent that maturity, it cannot be said that the individual acted voluntarily. Moreover, it must be determined if the minor lacked intent, because he or she did fully understand what he or she was doing. Children under 16 are presumed not to have the requisite maturity and knowing intent;
The short answer, is "it's complicated". I can think of situations where any of the above options you listed might be true. (Another possible option is "The baby has no nationality at birth", and would therefore be considered stateless, and would fall under the birth country's rules regarding statelessness). To find a definitive answer for your specific situation, I would start with Wikipedia: British nationality law Spanish nationality law Although Wikipedia is not authoritative, it does give you a good overview of the situation for both countries. There are then links to authoritative sources in each article. In the case of a British and Spanish couple, their baby would probably be both British and Spanish at birth. Additionally, if the baby is born in a country (such as the US) which follows the jus soli rules, then the baby would also acquire the citizenship of their birth country.
It's not possible to marry the US citizen until the first marriage is terminated, and the F-2 status ends when the marriage is terminated. It's not the F-2 status that prevents the marriage to the US citizen; it's the continued existence of the previous marriage. It might be possible to file for change of status (to B-2 perhaps) in anticipation of the termination of the marriage, but it seems unlikely to be accepted by USCIS. It would certainly be unwise to attempt anything like that without the advice of an immigration lawyer.
No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.
I'm very sorry to hear about your situation. Unfortunately, this is too important to trust advice from strangers over the Internet. You should talk to an attorney familiar with Bulgarian immigration law. @jwh20 is correct; entering another country is not a human right. If they are not allowing you to return to your home country despite your following all laws, that is likely a human rights issue. This does not necessarily mean you won't be able to get into Bulgaria; if one person is preventing you from entering, an attorney may be able to get that person's decision overturned.
I assume the goal here is for nation A to prevent citizen A1 from travelling/emigrating to nation B. It can be done, but not in the way you're suggesting. It can be achieved by instituting exit visas. Wikipedia reference: Nepal requires citizens emigrating to the United States on an H-1B visa to present an exit permit issued by the Ministry of Labour. This document is called a work permit and needs to be presented to immigration to leave the country. Which is essentially what you're after, if I understand your question correctly. In short, nation A cannot tell nation B to not grant a particular visa. But nation A can require citizen A1 to get nation A's explicit permission to travel to nation B. However, as you can see in the list of examples on the Wikipedia page, exit visas are not all that common and are often linked to fascist or authoritarian regimes (which means that imposing an exit visa is liably going to raise a few eyebrows in western society, to say the least). I was genuinely surprised that Nepal still has an exit visa; I initially wrote my answer under the assumption that I would only find historical occurrences.
As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.
The general rule Birth certificates, social security cards, and driver's licenses identify a person, but what happens if these are all lost? Say a homeless person loses all of their documents in the shuffle, what could they do to recover them? Even further, if this person has no family or work colleagues who will vouch for them, is it possible that their identity is lost forever? Generally, these can be replaced. For example, I was robbed at gunpoint a couple of years ago and the robbers took (among other things) my driver's license and Social Security card, which were never recovered (I did recover one prescription slip from a dumpster about a mile away that was wrapped around a syringe, because the robbers were also injection drug users.) I went by myself without any ID to the DMV which had an online record of my driver's license containing my age, height, weight, sex, race, noted that I needed vision correction and also had my most recent driver's license photo and a fingerprint. I explained what happened without any corroboration, and they promptly issued me a new driver's license. The same process would have applied had I had a state ID in lieu of a driver's license because I wasn't licensed to drive for some reason (e.g. if I was blind). The process in Texas would be very similar (I don't know if they have finger prints though). My daughter had to do the same when she lost her driver's license while camping. With the driver's license, I was able to go to the Social Security office and have them reissue a Social Security card. One of my children's birth certificates was lost, and I could simply go to the Vital Statistics department with a name and date of birth and get a new one. The replacement birth certificate and driver's license involved a modest fee (which would be pretty daunting for a homeless person), but the replacement Social Security card was free. It's a pain in the neck to do this, and it took several hours to sort out (the time lost would not be a problem for a homeless person), but loss of my identity was not a serious possibility. If you have (or had before you lost it) a photo ID such as a driver's license, or state ID, or student ID, or passport in a system, reconstructing your identity isn't that hard. If you don't know who you are either. If you have amnesia, so you don't know the information needed to recover your records, it can be much harder to work out a lack of any ID. This happens something on the order of several times a year. Sometimes it is resolved promptly when the person regains their memory or is tied to a recent outstanding missing persons report, or is identified after a local TV broadcast seeking input from the public. But, if the person is not local, no one filed a missing persons report, and the memory loss turns out to be permanent, it can take months or years to get it sorted out. But, you will generally be assumed to be legally present in the U.S. until proven otherwise if you speak fluent English. Also, you can't easily be deported if no one can determine your nationality (including you), even if you don't speak fluent English. For example, if the only language you spoke fluently was an Amazonian tribal language and no one could figure out this fact, it would be hard to deport you without evidence of your country of origin, which by assumption, does not exist in this scenario. Officials sometimes try to crowdsource recordings of someone speaking or writing in these situations to determine their place of origins, which can take many months and isn't always successful. But, if your first language was Klingon, you would be quickly identified and not deported, because that language is widely recognized and a Google search would reveal that it has only two native speakers, both of whom are children who were born in the United States (I know their father as a casual acquaintance). Citizenship, arrest and deportation Can a person lose their citizenship in this manner? Could they be arrested or even deported? You cannot lose your citizenship in this manner, although it can be harder to prove your citizenship, if you need to do so. You shouldn't be arrested for simply not having ID (although it does happen) if you aren't driving a car without a license. Also, lots of people without ID are arrested all of the time for other charges, and then refuse to provide anything but a false alias to the police. But, they are usually not deported unless there is some reason to suspect that they are not U.S. citizens. A modest but significant number of people every year (on the order of dozens to a couple hundred) are arrested and deported in circumstances like these and the system can put someone in that situation in a very Catch-22 situation for which there a few if any legal remedies after the fact by way of compensation. Deportations Of U.S. citizens with strong foreign ties The hard cases are usually those when you have someone who is a child who has never had a photo ID, or is an adult who never had a photo ID in the U.S., especially if that person is someone who has lived much of their life abroad despite being born in the U.S., or is most fluent in a non-English language because their parents spoke that language when they were growing up, or was born abroad and naturalized as a citizen later (often as a relative of the primary person who earned the right to citizenship by taking citizenship tests). Establishing that you are the same person as the one in a birth certificate or naturalization certificate is not always easy. Naturalizations often aren't accurately cross-referenced with immigration records. And, the track record of ICE agents meaningfully following up on claims of citizenship is very poor. Identity assumption cases Another much less common hard case that still happens sometimes, involves a situation where you are born in the U.S. or to a U.S. citizen, giving you U.S. citizenship, and you have a birth certificate, but you live abroad for a long time, and in the meantime, someone similar in age, sex and race to you has assumed your identity to claim citizenship status. Then, there is someone else with a long paper trail that supports your identity actually belonging to them including photo IDs and maybe even a passport, and you have only your birth certificate that someone else claims is theirs with doesn't have a lot of provable biometric features other than your parent's names, which may be hard to use to establish that you are the true person corresponding to the birth certificate if they are deceased, and may require DNA testing or testimony from them even if they are not deceased. Persons declared dead A third class of people who have a thorny time re-establishing their identities are people who went missing, were declared dead legally by a court as a result, and then resurface. This can pose a problem even after they undeniably establish their identity due to rules relating to the finality of court orders. A fictional example of this is the title character in the live action TV series the Iron Fist in the Marvel Comics Universe. But, there are also real life examples, such as a man in Ohio a number of years ago who was in a similar situation (except for the fact that he didn't have superpowers, was middle aged, and wasn't an heir to a billion dollar fortune). These cases are very rare. There is probably less than one per year in the entire United States.
Does any design change in the flag have to be amended by an executive order from the President? On January 3rd, 1959 Alaska was formally granted statehood placing the 49th star on our Flag. Executive Order of President Eisenhower dated January 3, 1959 - provided for the arrangement of the stars in seven rows of seven stars each, staggered horizontally and vertically. https://www.chamberofcommerce.org/usflag/the.49.star.flag.html Here, it says it was an executive order of the president that brougth the change, but I am wondering if Congress as such power to bring about a design change in the flag of the United States.
Certain elements of the flag's design are specified by statute, namely 4 USC 1-2: §1 The flag of the United States shall be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field. §2 On the admission of a new State into the Union one star shall be added to the union of the flag; and such addition shall take effect on the fourth day of July then next succeeding such admission. The rest of the design is specified by executive order (EO 10834, to be precise). I won't quote the whole thing here, because it's rather heavy on detail, but it includes a couple of tables and a detailed diagram specifying the dimensions of the flag and the arrangement of the stars. The president can change anything that has been specified by executive order, and can specify additional details that haven't been specified, as long as nothing in the president's order contradicts the statute. Congress can add additional details to the statutory specifications, in which case the president's orders might have to be modified to comply.
Trivially, yes The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791. Every time there has been a dispute about what it means that has gone to court since then, the judgement of that court has established, overturned or clarified precedent - that's what common law courts do. The government can limit your speech The Supreme Court has recognized categories of speech which receive lesser or no protection from the First Amendment. For example, inciting lawless actions, fighting words, true threats, obscenity, child pornography etc. They have also determined that it doesn't limit the government's power to impose reasonable time, place or manner restrictions on speech. As Justice Holmes put it in Schenck v. United States (1918), "Even the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic." It applies to parts of government which derive their power from Congress Which is, in most cases, all government. The executive actually has surprisingly little power granted by the Constitution (Article II, Section 2). All the other powers of the executive are technically delegated powers of Congress and are therefore subject to the First Amendment. Similarly, only the Supreme Court draws its mandate without going through Congress Article III, Section 1) - all other courts are subject to First Amendment restrictions. It only restricts government The limitation is a negative one on the US Congress (and through incorporation, the states). It does not, of itself, restrict private actors who are free to restrict speech however they want within their own property, including both physical and online spaces. It is open to the government to enact laws that would extend an affirmative right to free speech onto non-state actors (see Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins (1980)), however, the Federal government has not done so and neither have most states.
No The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Any courts the Congress creates are, by definition, inferior. Of course, Congress can overrule a SCOTUS decision by passing a law to that effect,unless the decision defines a right under the Constitution. So they couldn’t overturn Roe but they could overturn Dobbs. It’s largely the gutlessness of Congress in grappling with controversial issues that has put SCOTUS in the position of lawmaker.
Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.
Are political Flags ("Trump 2024") prohibited under the HOA's no signs rule? Why or why not? Probably. The Florida statute seems to imply that a flag is a type of sign and usually a political sign, even in the form of a flag, is still considered to be a sign. The Florida statute, in any case, only excludes the U.S. flag, not any other kind of flag. The First Amendment doesn't apply to an HOA declaration, although one could argue that FS 718 is a content based restriction of speech by exempting only the U.S. flag on particular days, and not other kinds of flags on other days, but that doesn't make a remedy clear. Allowing political signs isn't an obvious remedy for a 1st Amendment violation in FS 718.
Under article II, section 1 of the Constitution: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th Amendment doesn't cover the case of the President and Vice-President becoming incapacitated simultaneously, so instead the original section of the Constitution can be consulted. And unlike the 25th Amendment, this is quite clear: Congress passes a law deciding who the acting President is. The current law is the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.
The election of the president (and VP) is a function most directly of Article II Section 1 Clauses 2 - 4 of The Constitution and the 12th and 23rd Amendments. Sections 2-3 of the 14th Amendment would probably have to be rewritten, since they also refer to there being "electors". A single constitutional amendment would suffice (and nothing less than an amendment would): the wording would of course depend on what system you wanted to replace it with. In doing this, it should be decided how to deal with the fact that electors cannot vote for both a president and vice-president from the elector's state (per the 12th Amendment): that might indicate an intent to prevent the president and vice-president from being from the same state, or it might mean that the intent was that if that happens, then that state's electors can't vote for their two favorite sons. In repealing the 12th, you can decide what you want now. There is a proposal to effectively nullify the Electoral College, the Popular Vote Compact, which has been enacted in a few states. The basic idea is to make it a statutory requirement at the state level that all electors must vote for the winner of the popular vote at the national level, regardless of the outcome in the particular state. The idea is that when enough states agree to the scheme such that they hold a majority of electors (which can change over time, so to be stable you need more than a simple majority), then they vow to vote for the winner of the national election. However, this also needs to be backed up with more compulsory faithful voting of electors, since compact or no compact, only 1 state seems to be able to actually prevent an elector from voting however he wants.
The new law wins. That's rather the point of passing a new law-- the legislature wants to change the current law of the land whether that is based on statutes or court rulings. Of course, there are caveats. Prior judicial rulings may have relied on an interpretation of a source of law that supersedes the legislature in question (i.e. based on an interpretation of the state or federal Constitution or based on a federal law that supersedes the state law). In that case the new law would be found unconstitutional or ignored. Or the new law might have an ambiguous interaction with current law that courts would have to resolve. The new law might clearly make X illegal but there may be legitimate questions about whether it intended to make previously legal action Y illegal as well. It is, after all, very difficult to write a law that covers every possible fact pattern one would encounter in the real world.
Can a medical practitioner legally charge health insurances a different amount from what it would charge a non-insured patient? In the United States, can a medical practitioner legally charge health insurances a different amount from what it would charge a non-insured patient? I am mostly interested in the states of California, Florida, and Massachusetts.
They're not actually billing people different amounts because they have insurance or not. Doctors can pretty much bill a patient whatever they want for their service, similar to how a grocery store can charge whatever they want for their fresh deli cheese. Generally, they charge every single person the same amount. It just gets discounted depending on the insurance you have and how much they're willing to pay. One of the huge benefits of having medical insurance (outside of them paying for your medical expenses) is that they build contracts with service providers, known as their network. Those contracts specify prices (both preset and algorithmic) for certain services that you receive through those providers - the insurance provider will only pay that much and the doctor cannot charge the patient more than what is paid. If a claim was processed through a different insurance provider, the price will likely be different since each provider will have a separately negotiated contract with different price points for different services. It's not a system of "this is the insured price and this is the uninsured price" but rather a system of "this is the contract you established saying you'd accept this much from us for this service." For an uninsured person, though, you have no insurance provider and more importantly no provider contract backing you up. So you'd have to face the full force of the non-discounted price of those services. You'll face the same problem even with insurance if you go out-of-network, where the provider does not have contracts and therefore will only cover up to a certain amount that they would normally pay out for a similar service, requiring you to cover the rest of the amount of whatever the doctor decided to bill for that particular service. Without that insurance contract preventing the doctor from billing you the remainder of what they'd normally charge, you'll likely be slapped with a bill for that remainder. Directing back at your original question: there is no reason that a medical provider would ever legitimately bill someone a different amount because they are insured or not, thus there are no laws preventing it. It's that they already agreed to accept this certain amount from patients covered under this specific insurance. Again, they bill every patient the same amount - the insurance company is just saying "we're giving you this much and the rest of this, yeah that needs to go away." If you've ever looked at an EOB (Explanation of Benefits) from your insurance company, you'll see that the actual billed amount from the doctor is almost always much, much higher than what is actually paid out by you or the insurance, often known as the insurance discount. Maybe you'd rather think of it as a coupon?
I think it really is a state-by-state answer. From a web site for doctors getting involved in Telemedicine. Some medical boards such as Alabama, Montana and Oregon offer a special purpose telemedicine license. Other states that regulate telepractice in medicine include Texas, Florida, California and Colorado. The levels of regulation vary greatly by state. For example, California and Florida, similar to New York, require full licensure to perform any function relating to patient care, with some exceptions for consultation in some instances. Other states are exploring the issue of telepractice and in general, how to regulate it. That site has a state-by-state break out of the rules. I see other things about reciprocity among some nearby states. Three states (MD, NY, VA) and Washington DC provide reciprocity to bordering states. Alabama and Pennsylvania have agreements with other states to grant licenses to out-of-state physicians who have licenses in states that reciprocally accept their home state licenses. In Connecticut, an out-of-state physician can obtain an in-state license based on his or her home state standards.
Employees of an employer aren't governed by a fault based liability regime in the United States (subject to some usually quite narrow exceptions that vary from state to state, which sometimes also limit tort liability). Instead, employers are required to have worker's compensation insurance policies in place, in exchange for not having any tort liability whatsoever to employees. (An employer who doesn't have worker's compensation in place is strictly liable to the worker for all injuries suffered by an employee whatsoever at work, without the prohibition of a worker's compensation insurance policy plan on paying things like pain and suffering damages as well.) Worker's compensation insurance provides coverage (in principle) for all medical costs incurred, all lost wages, and in the event of a death support for dependents if any and a modest death benefit sufficient to provide a funeral if there are no dependents. Often, in practice, worker's compensation insurance payments tend to be rather stingy. One of the most common big worker's compensation claims these days, especially in office and retail workplaces, is for employees who are seriously injured or killed in crimes at work. Often, a worker's compensation insurer will give an employer a discount if they have a "gun free" zone, because, statistically, doing so greatly reduces the average amount of harm experienced by employees at work. The presence of employees with guns in the workplace, as an actuarial matter, greatly increases the insurance company's risk of having to pay claims.
It would not be valid in California. see California Labor Code § 2870(a). This will be state-specific and complicated.
No. HIPAA places no limits on who you may share your medical records with - only on those with who your doctors (et al) can share. The HIV laws you refer to, place a positive obligation on you to share the information.
1) Why would an Orthodontia provider want to receive this payment at all in the first place? I was thinking maybe tax reasons. Less cynically, medical providers request that insurance payments be sent directly to them (and you routinely agree to allow them to do so in the fine print of your insurance contract and the paperwork you will out with the provider), every time that they request payment through insurance, because it is extremely uncommon for someone to pay in full and then come up with insurance through which a claim can be submitted. It is set up this way, in part, because medical providers have a lien on insurance payments made to compensate any not previously paid for services that they provided. So, anyway, bureaucratic inertia causes it to happen this way in your quirky case where it really doesn't make sense. Also, insurance companies routinely see claims failed by providers and handle them uncritically, while rarely seeing claims filed by insured for services that have already been rendered and paid for, and so look at those claims more critically, so it was probably in your interest to have the provider make the claim for you on your behalf. More cynically, even if the medical providers doesn't get to keep the money, holding onto it helps their cash flow. It may allow them to borrow less money for operations, or to invest it and earn a return on it. Having money has value even if it is temporary. 2) If they never end up sending me the claim refund, do I have any legal power to fight against this? I have all of the original receipts and an EOP report. Yes. You could write a demand letter, including copies of your evidence, and if they refused to comply within a reasonable time, you could sue, either with a lawyer, or in small claims court. You would have an extremely strong chance of prevailing and in all likelihood they would refund the money before the case went to trial rather than fighting a losing case in court. You have solid evidence that they were paid twice for the same thing. You don't need to bring the insurance company into it (which would make the case much more complicated). You just need to show that your local medical provider got a double recovery and didn't provide a refund. Six to eight weeks is unreasonable when they have already been paid twice. But, given the cost, aggravation and delay associated with suing, you might want to give them some time to provide a refund, although the next monthly billing cycle for them ought to be more than generous accommodation from you.
Not under that name In common law countries, like Canada, the concept is known by the delightfully visceral term price gouging or, in emergency circumstances, profiteering. This is not regulated at a Federal level in Canada. A brief overview of provincial level laws can be found here. Typically, they require prices that are not just excessive - they need to be unconscionable which is a very high bar.
The health insurance contract should set forth what is and is not covered in detail (in addition, there would be a short summary version). They probably don't have to provide procedure codes that are covered or not covered because no such one to one correspondence exists because the language of the insurance contract is controlling and does not exactly correspond to procedure codes. For example, one of the basic eligibility questions is whether a procedure is medically necessary. A procedure may be medically necessary for one person, but not for another, and usually a denial based upon medical necessity is subject to appeal to other medical professionals engaged by the insurance company. Unless the insurance contract provides that an EOB must contain procedure codes, it probably doesn't have an affirmative obligation to do so, because there is no general principle of law that would require them to disclose their internal classification of services provided outside of a litigation context. And, in a litigation context, you probably could obtain procedure codes in discovery from the insurance company, as the code assigned to a procedure on an EOB would almost surely not be privileged or a legally protected secret. It may very well be that the company has an in house set of procedures for certain common diagnosis codes that are routinely allowed or are flagged for review by an insurance company bureaucrat. But, that would ordinarily be considered something of a trade secret of the company and is not a statement of what is or is not allowed under the actual health insurance contract. However, the privilege against disclosing the information in that context would flow from trade secret law and not from the fact that they are PHI. I don't agree that PHI is the correct reason for failing to disclose that information (unless some case law of which I am not aware has interpreted it differently). The federal law definition of PHI is at 45 CFR 160.103: Protected health information means individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years. The cross reference to 20 U.S.c. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv) reads as follows: (iv) records on a student who is eighteen years of age or older, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, which are made or maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other recognized professional or paraprofessional acting in his professional or paraprofessional capacity, or assisting in that capacity, and which are made, maintained, or used only in connection with the provision of treatment to the student, and are not available to anyone other than persons providing such treatment, except that such records can be personally reviewed by a physician or other appropriate professional of the student’s choice. In short, it is B.S. that you are being given an illegitimate reason for not complying with your request, but it is probably still within the company's rights for other legitimate reasons to deny your request.
Can I enter a rental property without giving notice if I'm afraid a tenant may be hurt? I rent a “Mother-In-Laws quarters” (guest area) that is on the side of my house. It has a private entrance. If I'm concerned something has happened to the tenant, am I legally allowed to enter the building without giving notice? Some background: For the first time, my tenant is late on rent, and hasn't contacted me in any way which seems very unusual for her. Yesterday I texted once to remind about the rent, and a second time asking if they are okay once I noticed there was still mail from a few days ago in her mail box right by her door with no response. I also couldn't hear TV through the wall which I usually can, and her curtains were never opened which I notice she usually does during the day. The air conditioning also wasn't on all day, which is also unusual. She's elderly and I'm afraid she may have fallen or even worse. I'm planning on knocking on her door on my lunch break. If she does not answer the door, I'm trying to figure out if I can go ahead and enter the property and make sure everything is okay.
Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement.
In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved.
In Virginia there is a distinction between a tenant and an authorized occupant. An authorized occupant is a person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit with the consent of the landlord, but who has not signed the rental agreement and therefore does not have the financial obligations as a tenant under the rental agreement. A tenant is a person entitled only under the terms of a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others and shall include roomer. There is a third category, guest or invitee which means a person, other than the tenant or person authorized by the landlord to occupy the premises, who has the permission of the tenant to visit but not to occupy the premises. Such people who live there would not be invitees. Clearly, you can have others living with you who are not on the lease, if the landlord agrees. The landlord's main concern regarding credit rating is probably financial responsibility, and if you qualify, having people live with you who have low or no credit rating is unlikely to make any difference. There may be other concerns, such as background checks or increases utility costs). Virginia law does not specifically allow "unauthorized occupants", i.e. occupants not approved by the landlord, nor does it specifically disallow such occupants. Leases often include a provision that addresses this matter, prohibiting unauthorized occupants. Supposing that the lease is silent on the matter (not likely) and the landlord wanted to compel the other occupants to leave, the procedure would be to tell the tenant that the unauthorized occupants must leave. Then if you do not comply (do not get them to move out), the landlord could start the procedure of evicting the lot of you, and the question would be whether the court would find that you have a right to let unauthorized other people live with you. I can't find any applicable case law, but it is unlikely that the court would find such a right. Tenants have special statutory rights, as do authorized occupants under the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. A court would not find that the rights of an authorized occupant extend to an unauthorized occupant, which means that the landlord's rights as property owner are dispositive of the matter.
Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause.
If the tenant were alive, you couldn't stop them from taking away their personal property, could you? No matter how overdue the rent was. Nor could you deny them access to the property, except through formal eviction. AFAIK the estate generally has the same rights that the decedent did. So if the tenant would have had the right to remove their property, then their estate should have that same right. I'd be concerned about legal risks to you if you try to withhold it - I wouldn't want to do so without having advice from my lawyer that it was okay. (Answers on this site are not legal advice and most of the users are not even lawyers.) The decendent's personal property should now be part of their estate, so if it has any value, the representative should have to sell it if necessary to settle their debts. Thus even if you release the property, some of its value may still come back to you. Of course, if the decedent had other debts, and their assets don't cover them all, you may not be able to recover everything you're owed - that's one of the risks you run when you decide to become a landlord. In particular, the personal representative is not obligated to pay off the overdue rent out of her own pocket.
Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.
If the tenant finds a new place to live before the end of the two months' notice and wishes to leave early, is the tenant required to [give] one month's notice that they are leaving? No, the tenant is not required to give notice if they has already received notice from the landlord. In addition, the tenant is required to pay rent up to the end of the notice period, even if they move out sooner (for now; but see also below). If they don't move out, they must still pay the rent. If the tenant...moves out of the property half way through their rental period, can the tenant claim a refund on the rent already paid which reflects the time between when they left the property and when the rental period would expire? For a tenancy which started before 1 October 2015, there is no automatic right to a refund. The tenant can of course ask the landlord for one, though the landlord would only be obliged to refund rent if a new tenant moves in before the end of that period. For tenancies made after 1 October 2015, s35 of the Deregulation Act 2015 amends s21 of the Housing Act 1988 to allow the 2 months' notice to end on any day (after the end of a fixed term), not just the end of a rental period. s40 then adds a new section which requires the landlord to repay any rent applying during that final period, but after the tenant moves out. If the tenant is not in a strong enough financial position to put together enough money for the deposit for their next home, or have simply been unsuccessful in finding a property which is suitable based on their current income, what course of action should they take? Firstly, the date specified in a s21 notice is not the date by which the tenant must move out -- even though, in practice, this is how it is normally treated. Instead, it is earliest date on which the landlord can begin legal proceedings. So, after that date, there is likely to be a delay until the case can appear before a court. The judge has some discretion as to when the tenancy will actually end, so you can ask for a little more time -- but note that the only way to prevent an eviction under s21 is to show that the landlord failed to follow the correct procedure. See also Shelter's comprehensive guide on the subject for more details.
When the fixed term ends, you have two options if you want to stay. The first option is that you and the landlord can sign a new tenancy agreement, with a new fixed term. This new agreement replaces the old one at the end of the current fixed term, so the landlord is free to make changes, including proposing any number for the rent - and you are free to reject it. Alternatively, when the fixed term ends, if you don't sign a new agreement, and you don't leave, the tenancy automatically* becomes a Statutory Periodic Tenancy - often called a rolling contract. This has no fixed term, which means that if you want to leave, you have to give 1 month's notice, while if the landlord wants you to leave, they must give 2 months' notice. Apart from that, the terms of the existing contract, including the rent review clause mentioned in the question, remain in force. The rent review clause suggests that the landlord can unilaterally impose a rent increase after the fixed term ends, but only up to the amount specified. Hence, without signing a new agreement, any increase beyond that would not be allowed. Also, it doesn't appear to make any mention of future rent increases, which suggests that the default rules for rolling contracts will apply, in that the landlord can propose a rent increase, which you can accept or reject. Failing that, the landlord can impose one via a Section 13 Notice, but only once a year. If you feel the requested rent is unreasonable, you can challenge this, and a tribunal will make a ruling based on the state of the property and the rents for similar properties in the area. (* If the tenancy has any provisions relating to what happens once the fixed term ends, then the tenancy may become a Contractual Periodic Tenancy. However, unless those provisions relate to rent, then they may not be relevant here.)
If a judge says in court that he trusts the other party would this amount to judicial misconduct? The judge in a custody case with Bob and Janice says that he (the judge) trusts Janice. Would this amount to judicial misconduct or bias? Bear in mind that Bob has also the challenge of getting a male worker to have a fair trial: this has been pointed out to the judge who ignored the fact. What remedies can Bob use?
A Judge, particularly in a custody case, is supposed to form opinions on who is trustworthy. But the Judge saying that he trusts Janice need not mean that the Judge will rule against Bob, and is not misconduct.
As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible.
A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest.
The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.
It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial.
Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.
The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you.
If I can summarise: Jane gave money to Joe on the understanding that he would give it to Bob, Joe kept the money. This is matter between Jane and Joe, Bob is not involved. Edit The OP has stated that Joe did give the money to Bob. In that case, Joe was acting as Jane's agent and he discharged his agency. This is a matter between Jane and Bob, Joe is involved only so far as he was a witness to what happened.
Does your land property give you the right to anything below your property like an oil reserve? Does your land property gives you the right to anything below your property like an oil reserve? I am wondering if the state has the rights to it, or you have the rights to it in the United States. I am also wondering if you can only claim the part directly under it or it works in some other way. Also, does it make a difference if your land covers the entire oil under your land or not?
That is going to depend on the deed. In some cases a deed will include both surface rights and mineral rights. In other cases mineral rights are owned by some different entity, or by the state. If someone else owns the mineral rights, they can exploit those without the permission of the surface owner, and in some jurisdictions at lest they have a right to come onto the property and dig or drill there, even against the surface owner's wishes. In the US that varies by state, and also by the terms of the deed. If the surface owner also owners mineral rights, no one can dig ir drill from that land without permission, but I am not sure on the rules for 'slant digging".
Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.)
Farmer's Market is private property, which means that the owner gets to set the rule according to which you are allowed to enter and remain on their property. There is no fundamental right to be in a business, either under the US Constitution or California's. While you have a constitutional right to put a soapbox on the public sidewalk and denounce or extol whatever you like, there is no such right on another person's property. You also have a right to express racially and sexually abhorrent content on the street. Your right to express your viewpoint ends at the store's doors. The manager has a property right to withdraw the implicit permission to enter and remain that is implicit in running a publicly accessible store. Your constitutional right to say whatever you want has to do with government action,not private action. You have no right to compel individuals to listen to your viewpoint on private property. It is a business decision, well within the rights of the property owner, for him to find your conduct unacceptable and grounds for expulsion. You do have a recourse: shop somewhere that doesn't care what you say to their customers.
I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction I demand you give me your hat! You're not going to, are you? The point of that is that you are not obliged to do anything just because someone demands that you do. Now, if I had a court order that required you to give me your hat ... It appears that there is some confusion over who owns some land in Nebraska. This is a problem; it is not your problem. From my understanding which is entirely based on this: A warranty deed is a type of deed where the grantor (seller) guarantees that he or she holds clear title to a piece of real estate and has a right to sell it to the grantee (buyer). you would be extremely unwise to sign such a deed since it is in no way clear that you (or anyone) does have clear title. Now I take it that you are not interested in owning land in Nebraska and even less interested in getting into a legal battle over it. If that is the case then I suggest that you consult a local lawyer and ask for his advice on the following plan of action: You and your wife will renounce any claim that you may have if: You do not guarantee that you have any claim or title, The person to whom you are making this grant indemnifies you against any legal action that may result, They will prepare the documents, Your lawyer will review them, They will reimburse you for your lawyer's fees. Come back and tell us how this works out. Edit to address subsequent questions Can you be responsible for costs? Well, anything is possible but it would be extremely unlikely. If there was any wrongdoing it was many years ago by someone else! If you approach this in a reasonable way and attempt to assist in reaching a resolution (so long as it doesn't cost you time or money) then it is highly unlikely a court would award costs against you. What about background checks? This would be a civil case. It would not appear in your criminal history. While it is a matter of public record all it really means is that you and someone else had a dispute that required a court to settle; happens all the time.
According to CENDI, yes the US government is able to claim copyright on works internationally. The law in question which makes US government works public domain in the US (17 U.S. Code § 105) only does so within the confines of US copyright. Since copyright protection is on a per-country basis, there's no reason that the US government couldn't assert IP rights under foreign copyright law (though I didn't go looking for an example). While the Berne Convention generally requires countries to provide foreign works the same protection as domestic works, I can think of two general reasons why US government works wouldn't fall under copyright protection in some countries: The country simply doesn't apply copyright protection to any government works (don't know how common this is). The country applies the rule of the shorter term. If they do, they aren't required to provide a longer term of protection than the country of origin does (which is nil in this case).
Your description of the facts is vague enough that we can't offer an informed judgment, but to remedy this, I will paraphrase your account of the facts (you can decide whether this is what you were trying to say). I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today waiting for my step daughter to come out. While waiting, two police officers walked up to my car and asked me to turn off my vehicle and come inside. When I voluntarily went inside, the store staff said that they called the police because they had had some sort of problems with people applying for service and absconding with the phone to resell on the black market, and they thought that was part of some such criminal plan. Because of that, they refused to give her a phone or service contract. But then they also told us to never come back, threatening arrest for trespassing. I have never been in that store before. Were my rights violated? No, neither by the police nor by the manager. The police, or the store manager, can legally request you to come in for a conversation: what matters most is whether you were forced to come in against your will. By your report, you were not, so your rights were not violated. The police are irrelevant to the remainder of the question. What remains is whether your rights were violated because the manager told you to go away and never come back under pain of prosecution. The store is private property, meaning that the owner has wide latitude to grant or deny permission to enter. If they hate pink hair and your hair is pink, they can legally "ban" you. If they suspect you of involvement in a criminal activity, that can most certainly legally ban you. That does not mean that it was a righteous or justified decision on their part, or a good business choice, but it is their legal right. So, no, your rights were not violated.
If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.
I think you are very likely wrong in believing that if you return the water further downstream it doesn't count as illegal abstraction. Government guidance says: If you want to build a new hydropower scheme, you need to apply to the Environment Agency for: an abstraction licence - if you divert or take water from a river or watercourse Admittedly, guidance isn't law. However, your position is quite close to arguing that taking and borrowing are two different things, and I wouldn't want to try to argue it.
Would it be considered treason to help plan the movement of a migrant caravan to the border? Stefan Molyneaux, on Twitter, said: If even one American is found to be one of the forces behind the Honduran ‘caravan,’ that’s straight up treason. He is referring to the migrant caravan that originated in Honduras and that is currently on its way to the United States border. Now, I know that Molyneaux is not a law expert and that he was not educated in the legal profession. I also know that Molyneaux is intending to be provocative and probably doesn't care much whether what he says has any legal logic. (On a personal note: I think that most of what Molyneaux says is nonsense) Despite all of this, what he said still made me wonder if there is any merit to his claim. According to Article III, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted. Would helping to plan the caravan be "..adhering to [the United States's] enemies, giving them aid and comfort"? Under Article III, Section 3, could the act of aiding the caravan be considered treason?
Reading some background on Stefan Molyneux (Wikipedia) would indicate that he is a (Canadian) right-wing provocateur (Merriam-Webster) and there is no legal logic to his claim that anyone involved with the migrant caravan - either as a refugee or a person giving aid - is committing an act of treason. Provocateurs - on the political left or right - seek to incite arguments and/or movements on social or political issues with emotion and not on legal frameworks or logical discussion. Provocateurs use words and phrases that can be identified as Dog-whistles (Wikipedia). Calling out "treason" and accusing one of being a traitor are examples of dog whistles. The legal reasoning against leveling calls of treason against anyone helping the caravan members are many; the migrants are not (from the U.S. Constitution:) levying war against them (the US), or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.... because: • None of the countries of origin of the migrants are currently in armed conflict with the U.S. • None of the migrants - alone or as a whole - are armed to engage the U.S. or are a threat to the U.S. • The refugees are easily identified as economic migrants, political refugees or those fleeing violence (domestic, communal, sectarian). • According to Refugee law (Wikipedia) and US Federal law, migrants have a right to due process at the border. • There is no clear proof of an ulterior motive or funding for the migrants in the the caravans. There could be - now or in the future - Americans or American-based aid groups helping individuals or the group as a whole with necessities with food and safety while they travel or after they arrive at the border. But the fact remains that each migrant - when and if they reach the US border - will be legally assessed individually as a migrant or refugee. The aid they may have received is really no different than what many NGOs provide who help arrange a refugees' processing through legal immigration channels, in some instances in conjunction with a US Government agency or with an arm of the United Nations. Such aid by an American is not treasonous for the legal reasoning above.
Yes, although whether you get any response depends on a lot of factors. Specific, credible threats are much more likely to get a response than "I'm gonna kick your ass, amphibient, you (insert opposing viewpoint/sports team/etc)." The law broken in question would be: 18 U.S. Code § 875.c: Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. As you are in different states, this would need to be reported at a national level. This would be done at https://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx. Whether or not this is the best option depends on what you hope to accomplish and whether the other person is likely to act on those threats.
Relevant Law Treason Treason is constitutionally defined as waging war on the United States, or giving aid and comfort to its enemies. The definition doesn't formally say so, but only someone who owes allegiance to the United States (i.e. a U.S. citizen) can be guilty of treason. The federal treason statute states: Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. 18 USC Section 2381. The main limitations are in bold. The word "enemy" has a technical meaning in the area of treason and foreign relations, which means a country or insurgent group with whom the United States is at war. Thus, the following are not "enemies" of the United States: the foreign nation is a close ally of the US the foreign nation has neutral relations with the US the foreign nation is a bitter rival with cold relations to the US But, this one is an enemy of the United States: the foreign nation is in a state of open, declared war with the US Hence, a U.S. citizen giving aid and comfort to ISIS (with whom we have a Congressionally authorized war) as it tries to mount a terrorist attack on the U.S. might very well be treason, but assisting Russia (with whom the U.S. is not at war) in assassinating an American would not be. I don't know if North Korea is a current "enemy" of the United States or not. The Korean War is not over, but I don't know if the U.S. declaration of war on North Korea is still in force. It is also a lesser felony to failure to report treason in progress to the authorities, with treason itself defined in essentially the same way. 18 USC Section 2882. Thus, U.S. citizens have a legal duty enforceable with criminal law to affirmatively report treason. Rebellion or insurrection Also rebellion or insurrection is a crime defined as follows: Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. 18 USC Section 2383 The bold language greatly restricts the applicability of this crime. This is not something you can really do by yourself, you need to be part of an organized insurgency group actively trying to overthrow the U.S. government by force. Affiliation with a foreign power is irrelevant to this offense. Sedition Sedition (actually seditious conspiracy) is defined as: If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 18 USC Section 2384. The highlighted portions are the least culpable ones that qualify for the offense of seditious conspiracy, which are subject to some significant case law glosses of interpretation. At a minimum seditious conspiracy must involve defiance of the authority of the United States. Simply committing serious crimes against the United States (e.g assassinating a high government official or blowing up a government building), while acknowledging that the United States is the legitimate government of the United States acting within its authority and not seeking regime change (not just new personnel but a new constitution not adopted by constitutional means), is not sufficient. Your involvement with a foreign power is neither necessary nor sufficient for conduct to be seditious. Advocating the overthrow of the United States government Advocating the overthrow of the United States government is also a crime in some circumstances (subject to significant judicial case law glosses): Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. As used in this section, the terms “organizes” and “organize”, with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons. 18 USC Section 2385. Collaboration with a foreign power isn't an element of this crime and is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish it. The key limitations and most inclusive provisions are in bold. The First Amendment significantly limits that application of this crime as applied, but it is not unconstitutional in all circumstances. Your Examples Numbers 1-2 would never be crimes of any kind as described and not reading anything else into them. Numbers 3-6 are not illegal per se, but you may be required to register as a foreign agent and these activities may be illegal for someone holding certain government offices. Nothing in 1-6 would constitute treason or sedition or rebellion. Civil disobedience is a description that speaks more to the reason and motive for the action than the action itself so it is hard to say what you mean by 7-8. Somebody could call blowing up the Capitol "civil disobedience" or could mean protesting in violation of a curfew ordinance. Some of those activities could constitute a seditious conspiracy. With respect to 9-10, the acts involved are more clear, but the motive and context remain in doubt. Some of this activity could conceivably be a seditious conspiracy, but we don't have enough context here to know.
If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.
Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).
As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.
There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.
Following the links in the article you quoted, you find that it is indeed illegal in Germany to insult a foreign head of state. For a prosecution to happen, the foreign government has to ask for prosecution, and it would be a criminal case. It's not clear to me whether a TV station could be sued as well. Where Mr. Böhmermann lives would be irrelevant, what would be relevant is whether the insult happened in Germany.
Is it possible to look at illegal images legally? There was a case in the UK a few years ago where Chris Langham, an actor, was arrested for looking at indecent images of minors. The actor's defense was that he was about to play a pedophile in a TV show and this was research. Apparently, the judge even stated that: "Pedophilia is not an issue in this case" and [Langham] "is not a sexual predator". Let us assume, for the sake of this question, that the actor's defense was indeed true and the only reason he wanted access to indecent images of minors was for research. Is it possible for someone to access and view such images, or any other illegal content, in a jurisdiction in which such access is illegal and not risk legal consequences? Consider, for example, a legitimate academic study on the prevalence and spread of child abuse in society. Or, since in the UK possession of terrorist propaganda is also illegal, a study of terrorist groups and their methods of recruitment Since this is obviously a sensitive subject, I want to clarify that this question is emphatically not asking for any tips on accessing such content. If the question is impossible to answer without giving information that would make it easier for someone to find or view such images, then please close it! I am simply wondering if it could be done legally if someone needed to see the images for actual research. Perhaps by contacting the police in advance? Or even viewing them under police supervision?
The relevant law in England and Wales is the Protection of Children Act 1978. Under section 1 of the Act, it’s a defense to distributing, showing, or possessing indecent images of children if you had a “legitimate reason” to distribute, show, or possess them. It’s also a defense if you had not seen the images, didn’t know they were indecent, and didn’t have any cause to suspect they were indecent. However, the 1999 case of R v. Bowden held that downloading a digital copy of an image counts as “making” an image. This is not subject to the “legitimate reason” defense by statute (although I don’t know if it’d count as “making” if you have no reason to know the contents, like if a computer repair shop backs up a customer’s hard drive without looking at what’s on the drive). However, it is explicitly still subject to defenses in sections 1A and 1B of the Act. 1A covers spouses and partners. If you are the spouse or partner of a child between 16 and 18, then with their consent you can legally make indecent images of them (although this doesn’t apply if anyone but the two of you is in the image). You can also possess those images with their consent and give them a copy. Section 1B covers criminal proceedings, investigations, etc., and was added after R v. Bowden. Because copying a digital image counts as “making” an image, it would generally be illegal for people to work with digital copies of indecent images even if done for a good reason. To avoid that, Parliament made an exception for making an indecent image when necessary to prevent, detect, or investigate crimes, as well as for criminal proceedings anywhere in the world. Parliament also exempted the UK’s intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) when carrying out their duties. These are specific statutory exemptions, so they can’t really be generalized to “if you have a legitimate reason.”
The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.
This is unlikely to give rise to criminal charges in the U.S., if the bare bone facts of the question are all that is involved. It does not count as child pornography. But possible offenses might include contributing to the delinquency of a minor (a minor misdemeanor), or perhaps enticing a minor to travel in interstate commerce for sex, neither of which are likely to come up in a case where no travel occurs until both parties are adults. The potential offenses, unlike child pornography offenses themselves, would generally include defense for good faith mistakes regarding age. The situation in Turkey could be more serious. While I can't identify a particular offense, if the participants were of the same sex, even though homosexuality is not outright banned in Turkey, as it is in many predominantly Islamic countries, this could be characterized as an "offense against public morality" in Turkey. In either a same sex or opposite sex circumstance, it might be characterized in Turkey as some form of illegal seduction, or perhaps as some implicit form of blasphemy. Even if it didn't give rise to criminal charges, it might also be used as a basis for severe parental discipline, or as a basis for finding that someone lacked "good character" in a civil context, in either country. Of course, unless the interaction is known, identified with real people, and brought to the attention of law enforcement, nothing would happen.
No, but... It is not an offense to photograph people, especially if they are just caught at the edge or out of the center of the photography. However you do not have a right to photograph people either. In fact, under German law, you have to gain the consent of people that are the centerpiece of a photo for publication, or make the photo for a number of enumerated reasons. Among such is news reporting or documenting an ongoing crime - such material is made in the public interest. If you make a photo without consent or qualified reason, possession of the photo in general is no problem but you have no right to publish the photo. To prevent such publication, the photographed person may demand deletion or destruction of the photo - however, following the demand is not explicitly required. Such a demand however is equivalent to an explicit demand to not publish the picture. As such, it gets really tricky for the photographer. Publication without a release (or a no-release statement) or one of the few excusing reasons is a punishable offense, which can land you in prison for up to one year. This stems from Art. 2 GG, §22, §23 and §33 Kunsturhebergesetz. Hindering rescue services with your camera and creating photos of injured and vulnerable people is illegal under the same reasoning. Getting into the way of the police can constitute obstruction of emergency helpers atop of that. More on that specific part of German law can be learned in this question. Do note that such photography can also be a crime under §201a StGB, especially if your photography shows someone as vulnerable. Another possibility for the approaching police might have been, that the policeman was interested to find out if you might have photographed or filmed the incident that led to the arrest. In that case, he might have requested a copy for evidentiary reasons.
Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.
To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.
You are wrong that they never get into legal trouble. It isn't terribly common but it certainly happens to those that get relatively prominent. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are judgement proof. It makes little sense for Disney, for example, to sue some guy living in his parents' basement for uploading a clip of their movie when that guy has no assets. Financially, it wouldn't be worth the cost of a lawyer. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are in jurisdictions that look the other way. If you're a Russian citizen pirating content owned by American companies, the Russian authorities aren't going to cooperate and arrest you and the American companies likely can't recover any judgement they'd get because you don't have any assets in America. There is a whack-a-mole problem. If there are hundreds of people posting pirated content to Facebook and each one is running hundreds of pages, that's tens of thousands of pages posting content. By the time you identify and close all of them, the pirates will have created tens of thousands of new pages. There is a cat-and-mouse problem. Copyright owners have automated tools to scan for their IP to issue takedown notices. Piraters know this so they modify the video (posting it as a mirror image or adding some additional video elements) in order to evade the automated tools. If copyright owners have to manually identify pirated content, it's realistically not cost effective to do so. The humans finding that content would cost more than the business loses in revenue to pirates. Tracking down the actual human/ business behind the copyright infringement is often a fair amount of work and may involve motions in courts in multiple countries. That work tends not to be highly prioritized by law enforcement. If you're a small fish, it is unlikely that anyone would go to the effort of unmasking you in order to sue.
In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.
Contract to hire in Texas There are a lot of employers who normally hire people only after a period of time as a contractor. They seem to hire people as contractors and they go through a contracting agency that is separate from the employers business. The contracting agency pays them hourly and then bills the employer. They normally will either convert the person from a contractor to employee if they like their work, or they will let them go if they don't like them. The normal period of time as a contractor seems to be from 6 to 12 months. Lately a company that is providing contractors in this scenario has begun to tell contractors that if they go to work for the company as employees they will sue them. Is that legal given that the original deal was as a contract-to-hire basis? What would someone do if they were offered employment and then the contracting agency threatened to sue the person?
Is that legal given that the original deal was as a contract-to-hire basis? No, unless the contractor agrees to an amendment/contract that incorporates a non-compete clause. A party is not allowed to unilaterally modify against a counterparty's will an existing, binding contract. What you describe seemingly falls short of being a cognizable amendment to the contract. What would someone do if they were offered employment and then the contracting agency threatened to sue the person? The person might want to educate the intermediary/agency about the invalidity of unilateral amendments that are not agreed upon. The intermediary's awareness of this tenet of contract law --or its awareness that the threatened person is knowledgeable of that principle-- might dissuade the intermediary from litigating its unviable claim. Regardless, given the prospect of litigation, the person needs to make sure that henceforth all his communications with the intermediary are in writing. The person might also want to inquire of the employer whether its contract with the intermediary contains a clause entitling the employer to hire the intermediary's contractors. If it does, the intermediary's threats to the person sound in intermediary's breach of that contract. A claim of tortious interference with relation is unavailable unless the intermediary's misconduct actually disrupts the relation or prospect between the employer and the person, but it is clear that the intermediary's acts are in the direction of frustrating that relation. Even if there is no such clause between the employer and the intermediary, the person might want to update the employer on how the intermediary is trying to disrupt their tacitly agreed contract-to-hire basis.
Do I give my letter 60 days from the end of the contract, or 60 days before September? My boss told me that it would be 60 days before the end of the contract, but I wanted a second opinion. Your boss is wrong. The contract requires a party to give a 60-day notice only if the party intends to override the default condition that "the contract shall run for the full term named above". Since your contract ends on June 30th and you plan on working there up to and including that date, you are abiding by the [contract] default condition. Therefore, you are not required to send a notice for something you are not intending to do (namely, to terminate the contract ahead of schedule). The information you provide here does not reflect any language in your current contract relating to subsequent contracts/renewals. The existence of such language might or might not change the assessment. That issue aside, you might want to ensure that the preliminary offer made to you verbally be somehow reflected in writing. It will not be more binding than the verbal offer, but that evidence could prove useful in the event that the new employer unexpectedly changes its mind at a time when your current employer has discarded you for contract renewal. Your prospective employer should become aware of how its request for a reference from your boss jeopardizes a renewal with your current employer.
Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable. Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A & B. So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C.
The leading case in this area is Commun. for Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid 490 U.S. 730 (1989).1 There are two routes to employers automatically being the first owner of copyright in a work produced by a hired party: in an employee-employer relationship, or in certain works by independent contractors if an express agreement is made. CCNV construed the definition of "work made for hire" in 17 USC 101 to split paid work into two categories: work done by "employees" and work done by "independent contractors". Copyright in "employees" are automatically owned by the employer. Copyright in work by independent contractors can also be owned by the employer if it falls under a set of specific categories of work (which course materials are certainly included in) and "parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire". The term "employee" above takes on a special meaning in this context. The court held that the test is to use common law agency principles: To determine whether a work is a "work made for hire" within the § 101 definition, a court should first apply general common law of agency principles to ascertain whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor The court listed 12 (non-exhaustive) factors to be taken into account when deciding whether a hired party is a an employee under common law agency and thus the work would be automatically considered a "work for hire": the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished the skill required the source of the instrumentalities and tools the location of the work the duration of the relationship between the parties whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work the method of payment the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party whether the hiring party is in business the provision of employee benefits the tax treatment of the hired party This is a case-by-case judgement, and courts have not made a ruling that applies to all university course materials universally. I'm sure we could all imagine arrangements that would fall squarely on the "employee" side of the test, and thus give the employer first ownership of copyright in course material just as easily as we could imagine arrangements that would fall squarely on "independent-contractor" side. There are arguments on both sides regarding whether the typical university professor or lecturer relationship would be considered an "employee" relationship for the purpose of the "work made for hire" definition (I'll come back to reference some law journal articles later). Regardless, even if particular relationship is found to be an "independent-contractor", the employer can still be the first owner of copyright in the works if "parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire" (assuming the work is one of the categories listed in the 17 USC 101 definition of "work made for hire" part (2), and course material certainly is). Last, even for independently contracted work that doesn't fall under one of the special categories in "work made for hire" (2), parties could agree to a contract requiring assignment of copyright. In this case, the employer wouldn't be the initial owner, but they would be due equitable assignment of the copyright by the author. 1. There are various reasons why Weinstein (mentioned in the question) is not relevant. Weinstein doesn't hold that the author of course material is automatically the copyright owner. Weinstein is pre-CCNV. Weinstein was a Seventh Circuit opinion; CCNV is a Supreme Court opinion. The test that was being used at the time by the Seventh Circuit (an "actual control of the work" test) was rejected by the Supreme Court in CCNV.
TOS are a contract. If you have a contract through the App, you have incorporated the TOS as a term of your contract. Contracts mean what they say they do, what you are thinking of as "basic contract law" is actual just an ordinary and customary term that people in your industry usually make a part of the contract, not contract law itself.
Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job.
If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract.
Contracts are transferrable The default rule is that the rights and obligations that one person holds under a contract (your original bank) can be transferred to any other person (your new bank). This is only not the case where the contract is one for personal services (e.g. an employment contract) or where the contract explicitly proscribes or otherwise limits it. For example, if I run a dog walking business and you contract with me to walk your dog on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for 6 months then, at any time, I can transfer my obligation to walk the dog and my right to be paid by you for doing so to anyone else. I can do this by subcontracting (in which case the rights and obligations are still mine - I'm just using someone else to fulfil them), or by selling individual contracts (which is how debt collection businesses operate), or by selling the entire business. It would be completely normal that the contracts you agreed to when you opened your accounts would allow the bank to sell them. Check the terms and conditions.
Is it legal to make a film with lightsabers in it in a different universe than Star Wars? Is it legal to make a film with lightsabers in it in a different universe than Star Wars? Is it legal to make a sci-fi films where there are no Jedi, but people wield lightsabers that are very similar to the ones in Star Wars? Assume for the sake of the question that every character in the film is blue-skinned and they wield orange-colored lightsabers and it's set in a sci-fi universe completely different from that of Star Wars. Is this considered a derivative work and thus infringes copyright, or can it be considered to be an original just because the setting is different?
"Lightsaber" is a trademarked term, so it's gotta be called something else. The idea behind a lightsaber is older than Star Wars, anyhow idea are not protected by copyright. The actual design of such a weapon would be protected, but it would be a matter for the jury to decide if the supposedly-infringing design was a copy of a Lucasfilms-protected object, or that of the cover of Analog, Jan. 1969. The "setting" of the movie is completely irrelevant, all that counts is whether the object "copies" the plaintiff's design. In light of the earlier Wolfling design, it's not a foregone conclusion that all lightsaber-resembling objects are infringing. Available evidence indicates that you will be sued if you do it, so consult a really good IP attorney.
Copyright never protects ideas as such, whether in movies, novels or text books or any other kind of work. However, if an aspect of work, such as a character, place or fictional society are sufficiently distinctive, and if another work uses that aspect, with detailed similarity to the previous work, it might be found to be a derivative work of the original. A derivative work requires permission from the copyright holder of the original work. For example, in Ursula K. LeGuin's famous SF novel The Left Hand of Darkness a fictional race or species, the Gethenians, is portrayed which is neither male nor female most of the time, but becomes sexually active and gendered a few days a month, and an individual may be male one month and female the next. This is an original and distinctive idea. Another author could create a different group of people with a similar nature without infringing copyright, but if the detailed description of how the process worked, or how it felt to the individuals involved was similar, that might make it a derivative work, and LeGuin's estate might be able to sue and win. This is something that gets decided on a case-by-case basis, and such decisions are highly fact-based. But if the new work has a society or species which is clearly different from any previously invented one, even though it shares some aspect, and if there is no detailed, point-by-point similarity, an infringement suit seems unlikely. Several SF authors have said "Its not the idea, it's what you do with it that matters." Filmmakers, because of the money involved, tend to be more cautious than book authors. For example, Paramount bought rights to the "flat cats" from Robert A. Heinlein before filming the Star Trek episode "The Trouble with the Tribbles", although the similarity was quite probably not enough for a successful infringement suit (but no one will ever know for sure, since they bought permission). This is described in some detail in David Gerrold's book about the making of that episode. Gerrold wrote that his conscious model was the importation of rabbits into Australia, not RAH's flat cats, but there are some similarities, and DG had read The Rolling Stone (where the flat cats appear) years before. In any specific case. consulting a lawyer with expertise in the area would be a good idea, as the details will matter.
Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe.
You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective).
I'm assuming that you are in the UK, as you are talking about the British Standards Institue. In general the truth cannot be copyrighted but an expression of that truth can be, provided that it is creative or original to at least some extent. In this case the equations and constants you want to use are descriptions of scientific truths. If you translate them into another form (e.g. a computer program) then you are not copying the creative bit (the layout and arrangement of those equations and explanatory text), so you are not violating the copyright. Edit: I should also have said for (3) that their descriptions of the constants and variables will be copyright. You would have to avoid copying their words. However given that these are going to be terse descriptions of facts your words can still be pretty similar without infringing on copyright, because there are only so many ways of describing the acceleration due to gravity, or whatever. Take a look at some alternative references to see what words they use.
What real human teeth look like is a fact, and not subject to copyright. But some particular designer's or artist's image of human teeth would be protected by copyright, unless it is too old -- (prior to 1923 under US law), or unless it lost copyright in some other way. To create a derivative work based on such a copyrighted work would require permission from the copyright holder. Otherwise it is copyright infringement, and the holder could sue. As to the car models, the original designs would be protected by copyright, and a maker of a model should have permission in some form, or again the copyright holder could sue. Of course, a copyright holder is not required to sue, and if the value of the work is too small a suit might not pay. But that is not a matter of legal right, but of the holder's choice and business decision. A copyright holder could always change such a decision at a later time, when perhaps the value had increased. The exact laws on how to file copyright suits, and exceptions that might apply, vary by country. The question does not indicate what county it applies to.) But the basic principals are the same in all countries that adhere to the Berne Copyright Convention, which is all but a very few countries in the world. See this Wikipedia article for more details.
Yes. You could, assuming that you did not associate it with any real motion picture (which would be a trademark violation). You'd probably want to clarify in fine print somewhere, however, to avoid confusing your fans.
If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA?
Can the President amend regulations by executive order in the United States? In my knowledge, rules may only be amended through special procedures governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. This process usually requires advance notice and a period for public comment on proposed rule amendments. However, I am wondering if the President could bypass this normal process and directly amend the rule by executive order.
Amendments to regulations adopted contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are invalid, or at least, voidable if contested in a timely fashion (which they usually are). The APA does authorize emergency temporary regulations in some circumstances.
I think we're talking about In re Hennen, which dealt with the removal of the clerk of the district court in Louisiana: It all these departments power is given to the secretary, to appoint all necessary clerks; 1 Story, 48; and although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department. It would be a most extraordinary construction of the law, that all these offices were to be held during life, which must inevitably follow, unless the incumbent was removable at the discretion of the head of the department: the President has certainly no power to remove. These clerks fall under that class of inferior officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the head of the department. The same rule, as to the power of removal, must be applied to offices where the appointment is vested in the President alone. The nature of the power, and the control over the officer appointed, does not at all depend on the source from which it emanates. The execution of the power depends upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to administer it. And the Constitution has authorized Congress, in certain cases, to vest this power in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and all inferior officers appointed under each, by authority of law, must hold their office at the discretion of the appointing power. Such is the settled usage and practical construction of the Constitution and laws, under which these offices are held. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259–60, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839) (emphasis added).
It's not clear what the big deal is. Congress has already passed vast numbers of laws for POTUS to enforce, and has left the details of implementation up to the executive branch. The main limitation is that you need a Congress to fund any new federal government projects. The Constitution anticipates this problem, and there are clauses regarding filling vacancies (clearly applicable to the dead). Assuming that zombies are rioting in the streets, POTUS can invoke the National Emergencies Act, issuing an executive order to call out the National Guard.
The US President is Commander-in-chief of the US military. The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; (from Article II section 2) That does not make the president the direct boss of every federal employee. The Congressional Sergeants-at-arms, in particular (and their assistants) are employed by, and responsible to, Congress, not the President. The Secret Service is part of the Department of Homeland Security (formerly part of the Treasury Department, until 2002) which is part of the Executive branch, but I am sure the President cannot order them to arrest someone who has not committed any crime. If such a thing were pushed to a direct confrontation, I have no idea where it would go, I hope we do not find out. Article I Section 8 grants Congress the power (among a number of others): To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings That seems to say the ultimately Congress controls the District, and sets the rules there. There is also the provision in Article I section two that: The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers; which would include the Sargent-at-Arms, I think. Article I section five says: Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member. which again seems to grant control over the situation to the individual houses of Congress. Article I section 6 says: The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. which again puts Congress out of the direct control of the President.
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
No Section 2, Clause 1 says: ... and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Impeachment is explicitly carved out from the President's power to pardon.
Governments have power to do whatever their constitutions (written or unwritten) allow them to do. For example, the constitution of Australia provides: The federal Parliament can make laws only on certain matters. These include: ... post and telecommunications; ... The telecommunications power covers VPN and any software that uses the Internet for delivery or communication (i.e. virtually all modern software). In addition the federal government has power over inter-state and international trade (any software that crosses state or international borders) and corporations (any software made, sold or used by companies). If they want to ban a piece of software they have pretty strong constitutional power to do so.
There is currently no law requiring a candidate for US President to release tax records to appear on the ballot. Nor is there any law requiring the President to release such records after taking office. There are laws requiring members of congress, and other Federal officials, to make public some limited information about their finances. This is much less than the information that would be included in an income tax return. Congress could pass a law requiring candidates to release their returns, but it seems unlikely that the current Congress will do so. States have broad authority over Federal elections. A state could pass a law requiring a candidate to release his or her returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot. Such a law might be challenged on Due process grounds. This would be an untested legal area, so there is no telling how a court would rule on such a challenge to such a law. Congress, or an individual house of Congress, may subpoena almost any information in pursuit of its investigation function. Investigations must be related to possible legislation, meaning it must be related to a subject about which Congress has power to pass a law. But the relation can be rather remote, as long as the information might inform the judgement of members of congress in considering a possible law. There does not have to be an actual law under consideration. Investigations have been challenged, and in a few cases there have been court rulings that an investigation was not related to possible legislation, and so Congress was not allowed to enforce subpoenas on that subject, nor to compel testimony. But such rulings have been rare. Previous Presidents have asserted, under the name of "Executive privilege", a right not to disclose information, such as internal discussions within the executive branch. This is not explicitly specified by the US Constitution, nor by any law, but has been generally accepted, and in some cases supported by court rulings. No court has ever clearly defined the extent or limits of Executive privilege. A House committee issued a subpoena this year for President Trump's tax records, or some of them. I forget whether this was addressed to the IRS or to the Treasury Dept. This has been challenged in court, and the matter is still in court. I be3live that one of the grounds asserted against the subpoena was that it was not to look into tax issues, as specified in the law authorizing the subpoena. No one yet knows how that case will proceed. The NY State Attorney General is investigating allegations that the Trump Organization, and various individuals, violated NY law, including by falsely reporting campaign expenses and contributions. In pursuit of that investigation, he issued a subpoena for various records which he claims will reveal possible evidence of those illegal actions. He pretty learly has the authority to subpoena records which might be evidence in a criminal case. This subpoena has also been challenged, but seems pretty likely to be upheld. However the subpoena was as part of a Grand Jury investigation, and Grand Jury proceedings, including evidence obtained by subpoena, are by law secret unless an indictment and trial results. So even if the subpoena is upheld, this should not lead to the public release of the records, unless someone is put on trial for some crime, and the records are evidence in that case. Even then the judge can order the records not to be released to the public.
Do Donald Trump's actions constitute embezzlement? This question is inspired by this other question. In that question, it was written that: Donald Trump moved more than $200,000 donated to his Make America Great Again PAC into his own private business accounts, according to an analysis of his federal filings. The money was moved in February, a month after Mr Trump left office. Money donated to PACs is meant to be spent solely on campaign efforts. Assuming that the claim is true (which is disputed), does this act constitute embezzlement?
Embezzlement is criminally prohibited by 18 USC 666, and this DoJ manual page on what is embezzlement cites the answer in Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268 that Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come. It differs from larceny in that the original taking was lawful, or with the consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have existed at the time of the taking Following other case law, the elements of the crime are there was a trust or fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the private organization or State or local government agency; the property came into the possession or care of the defendant by virtue of his/her employment; the defendant's dealings with the property constituted a fraudulent conversion or appropriation of it to his/her own use; and the defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the use of this property. This page lists over 32,000 disbursements; filtering just for rent give over 2,400 disbursements, a number of which are recent and made to some business with Trump in the name (Trump Tower LLC etc). The conversion would have to be fraudulent to be embezzlement. There actually is not any evidence provided that a transfer violated FEC regulations (we have dates, amounts, and recipient), so we would have to speculate about what else is true. There are processed disbursement images up to 10/21/2020 such as this receipt for 3 charges for food and lodging paid to Trump Hotel Collection. In fact this payment was made by Donald J Trump for President, Inc. although the search term was the aforementioned PAC: I will overlook that anomaly. This is the FEC page on that committee (you have to follow the committee number because the name was also used in the 2016 campaign but was terminated). There vast numbers of filings linked there, but nothing that I saw indicates that Trump is in any sense an employee of the organization, so there is no actual evidence that there were any "Trump actions". First, it would have to be shown that there were Trump actions. Second, it would have to be show that the action was fraudulent. Technical misappropriation is not fraudulent. This FEC page describes the safe harbor provisions for misappropriation. This page specifically addresses embezzlement. Although they use the word "embezzlement", they do not purport that misappropriation constituted embezzlement as defined above, to point out that civil penalties may result from violation, see 11 CFR Part 104. Ultimately, the legal propriety of the disbursements depends on its purpose: here is what the FEC say about illegal conversion for personal use (food for daily consumption, mortgage or rent for personal residence, tuition...). The available evidence does not even suggest embezzlement.
Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000.
The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them.
The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.
Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.
The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.
Let's start with the most important point first: A campaign finance violation is not a ground to remove an elected official from office, no matter how egregious, on its own, even if one could prove that the campaign finance violation probably caused the outcome of an election to change. Congress could decide, however, that a campaign finance violation constitutes a "high crime or misdemeanor" for which a sitting President could be impeached, if a majority of the House of Representatives votes to impeach the President and a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate trying the impeachment under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the United States (that and not "Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court" is the official title) finds that the offense set forth in the impeachment has been committed and constitutes sufficient grounds to remove the President from office. At the outset, there is some ambiguity over whether the violation of campaign finance laws would have been by individual person, or the political campaign of the individual person (which is a Section 529 non-profit organization). The individual or the campaign, as the case might be, would definitely owe either civil or criminal fines, as the case might be, for a violation of the particular campaign finance laws that the individual or campaign is alleged to have violated. The violation could also affect the ability of the violator to obtain all or any amount of federal matching funds in a future election. Depending upon the particular campaign finance law involved, which isn't clearly specified, there might be a criminal penalty (either a misdemeanor or a minor felony) as well, which could give rise to a probation sentence, a sentence to some period of incarceration, a period of post-release parole, criminal fines, court costs, and, at least in the case of a felony, some collateral consequences of that conviction such as a prohibition on owning a gun and ineligibility for many occupations and jobs. Neither a civil campaign finance violation, nor a criminal conviction for a campaign finance violation, disqualifies someone from holding the office of President. The President does not have immunity from civil or criminal consequences of campaign finance violations committed prior to taking office, and the President's campaign, at a minimum, is not immune to campaign finance violations at any time. Presidential immunity from liability is limited to the conduct of the President while holding the office in furtherance of the governance duties of the President. Generally speaking, campaigning would not be a governance duty of the President, but there are factual circumstances under which it is hard to distinguish between what constitutes governing and what constitutes campaigning in the case of a sitting President who is currently in office. Also, campaign finance violations can't be prosecuted by just anyone. A violation of federal campaign finance laws must be prosecuted by a federal government lawyer authorized to do so by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which has an even partisan balance of members by design and almost always deadlocks on motions to prosecute anything but the least controversial and most blatant campaign finance violations against members of either of the two major political parties in the United States. A "private attorney general" can't bring a lawsuit to enforce campaign finance laws unilaterally. The President can definitely pardon a criminal violation of a campaign finance law by anyone other than himself. The President definitely cannot pardon a civil violation of a campaign finance law by anyone. The majority and more analytically sound position is that the President cannot pardon himself for his own criminal violation of a campaign finance law (there are prior questions and answer at Law.SE regarding that question). A judge considering a campaign finance violation charge against a sitting President could, however, take steps short of dismissing the charges that could accommodate a sitting President. For example, the judge could be very deferential to the President in setting hearing dates, allowing the President to participate in proceedings by telephone or (in some but not all cases) through a representative, or in setting the amount of a bond or the terms of pre-trial release in the event of a criminal charge, or in cooperating with the President's security detail when the President is required to appear. In a civil violation case, the President would probably be allowed to be a deposition witness, with the deposition testimony used at trial, rather than appearing in person at trial, if his lawyers requested that treatment.
The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures.
Has double jeopardy ever been used as an escape to any crime? There are other questions on Law.SE asking about specific hypotheticals related to the double jeopardy rule, but are there any concrete, actual recorded cases of anyone, in all of history, in any common law jurisdiction where: 'A' was acquitted of a crime AND There later emerged clear and convincing evidence that A had, in fact, committed that crime, but for specific double jeopardy/autrefois acquit reasons, an otherwise slam dunk prosecution was not permitted and A 'got away with' the crime.
Yes, but ... How can you know for sure? Let's say I'm charged with, and acquitted of, murder. Immediately after my acquittal, I confess to the crime describing how I did it and producing tangible and material evidence like the murder weapon, etc. So, did I commit murder? Well, we can't say. All we can say is that if I were tried again with all this new evidence, I'd probably be convicted but we can never know for sure because that trial isn't going to happen. Examples of people who (possibly) evaded justice due to double jeopardy Isaac Turnbaugh, O J Simpson, Fong Foo, Mel Ignatow This Unnamed Queensland man (double jeopardy can be waived under Queensland law when there is new "clear and compelling evidence" - the court found the evidence was neither clear nor compelling), Sharone Sylvester Brown. On the other side of the ledger, Michael Weir was the first person convicted after the UK changed its double jeopardy laws in 2005 allowing the Court of Appeal to grant a retrial if "new, compelling, reliable and substantial evidence" had emerged.
A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal.
It's a "greater offense" -- sometimes also called a "greater included offense." But you're generally going to be mistaken about whether the defendant can be re-charged after an acquittal on the lesser-included offense. In the United States, at least, the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit that prosecutorial strategy. One could still face new charges for the same conduct, but those charges have to pass the Blockburger test.
Multiple victims = multiple crimes The victim(s) in the USA and Scotland are unlikely to be the same person(s) - a separate crime is committed for each event against each victim. Double jeopardy is not applicable just as if the person had robbed a bank in the USA and another bank in Scotland. Notwithstanding, double jeopardy only applies within the same jurisdiction. If the person targeted one US victim once then they have committed a crime in Scotland, a crime in the USA and a crime against the specific US state - each jurisdiction can bring charges. However, for public policy reasons, jurisdictions are usually satisfied if an alleged perpetrator stand trial somewhere.
No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit.
So, as you say, these witnesses who try to help their buddy out may be committing perjury. Also, D himself, by lining this up, is probably on the hook for conspiracy to commit perjury and being complicit in perjury. Aside from that, I think your question is: would getting people to testify in a way that implies they did the crime lead to an acquittal for the murderer? The answer is: maybe. The jury will either vote to acquit or to convict. If the jury votes to acquit, then it's over. Double jeopardy protects D from being tried for murder again. But, if the jury votes to convict, the fact that D had his friends testifying in the way you suggest isn't going to get the conviction overturned on appeal because "a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts." People v. Young, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Cal. 2005). I haven't done a trial yet, but it strikes me that that might not be the greatest trial strategy. I think generally defense lawyers would prefer to make their client look the furthest thing from gang affiliated as possible. Don't lie to a court or ask anyone to lie to a court for you.
I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
(assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions).
Can you become a U.S. senator if you have dual citizenship? Can you become a U.S. senator if you have dual citizenship? Or is there a law that says you can only become a U.S. senator if you have only one citizenship and you are a U.S. citizen? I know you can be a naturalized U.S. citizen and become a Senator, but I am not sure if you need to renounce your second citizenship in order to become a Senator.
The U.S. Constitution merely requires that you be a U.S. citizen, that you be at least 30 years of age, that you have resided nine years in the United States, and that you currently reside in the state from which you are elected, to be a U.S. Senator. The courts have held that extra-constitutional qualifications for the office may not be imposed. The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed the historical understanding that the Constitution provides the exclusive qualifications to be a Member of Congress, and that neither a state nor Congress itself may add to or change such qualifications to federal office, absent a constitutional amendment. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 800-801 (1995); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). (Source: Congressional Research Service). Therefore, a dual citizen can be a U.S. Senator under U.S. law. This said, the oath of office involved in becoming a U.S. Senator is something that would be considered a voluntary relinquishment of the individual's non-U.S. citizenship by many countries. Under U.S. law: [W]ith the exception of formal denaturalization, a United States citizen can lose his citizenship only if he voluntarily performs an act that is “in derogation of allegiance to the United States,” 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 397, 400 (1969), and that was committed with the intent to relinquish United States citizenship. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1980). “[A]n act which does not reasonably manifest an individual’s transfer or abandonment of allegiance to the United States cannot be made a basis for expatriation.” 42 Op. Att’y. Gen. at 400. Although the Supreme Court has definitively held that Congress cannot provide by statute for involuntary expatriations, it has upheld Congress’ authority to prescribe by statute the types of acts that Congress considers to be generally “highly persuasive evidence . . . of a purpose to abandon citizenship.” See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 139; Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 261, 265. These acts are set forth in § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481. One of these specified acts is a “formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state.” 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6). Other specified acts include: obtaining naturalization in a foreign state; taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; serving in the armed forces of a foreign state; serving in an office or employment under the government of a foreign state that requires assumption of the nationality of that state or a declaration of allegiance to that state; or committing an act of treason against the United States. Id. § 1481(a)(l)-(4), (7). Thus, under U.S. law, the oath of office required to serve as a U.S. Senator if made to a state other than the United States (e.g. in connection with being sworn in as a Mexican Senator), would end the dual citizenship of the person being sworn in to public office, and make them only a citizen of the country in which that elected official held public office (in this example, of Mexico). Many countries cause dual citizenship to be relinquished under similar circumstances.
Yes, it is possible. The requirements are (1) you are a citizen (the burden is on the prospective juror to pay attention to that requirement) and (2) the court knows that you exist and calls you up for jury duty. Apart from voter registrations, drivers license data is also used (and can be dangerous, because non-citizens can have licenses and may not know that you must be a citizen to serve on a jury). Another source in unemployment benefits lists. The correlation with voter registration is one way of avoiding that problem. In fact, Florida law states that the list of candidates "shall be taken from the male and female persons at least 18 years of age who are citizens of the United States and legal residents of this state and their respective counties and who possess a driver license or identification card issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles", and does not sanction using voter lists. The Holmes County Supervisor of Elections confirms that only federal courts use voter lists, and state and local courts only use driver / ID card lists.
No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act.
Only for certain parts of the constitution, and not for the parts you are asking about. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality.16 Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens? - David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center
Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not.
In summary: Statute law allows Ireland to revoke your naturalisation on the grounds of acquiring another citizenship. But this law has recently been found unconstitutional. In practice, the government does not do this anyway. In the case of the UK, it is particularly unlikely. As an Irish citizen, there is no particular reason to pursue UK naturalisation. The law As of now, the possibility deprivation of Irish nationality for any reason is unclear, because of a ruling of the Supreme Court (Damache v Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 63) that declared the statute allowing for this to be unconstitutional. That was because the law (section 19 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956) did not provide enough procedural safeguards. The Minister would initiate the process and make the final decision after expert advice, but was not an "independent and impartial decision-maker". It is now for the legislature to replace section 19 so as to cure the defect. Under section 19, the grounds for revoking a certificate of naturalisation include: (b) that the person to whom it was granted has, by any overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State and (e) that the person to whom it is granted has by any voluntary act, other than marriage or entry into a civil partnership, acquired another citizenship. The issue in Damache was (b) following the appellant's conviction for terrorism offences in the United States. Regarding (e), it would seem on its face that acquiring UK nationality might trigger the possibility of revocation. However, in the scenario envisaged, that would leave you without any EU nationality, and in the Tjebbes case of 2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:189) the European Court of Justice found that such deprivation would only be possible after consideration of the specific consequences for the person concerned and their family. This point was not reached in Damache but would also tend to rule out any "automatic" loss of nationality; it would have to be the result of some longer and more involved process. Whatever replaces section 19 would have to be of this kind. Special considerations also apply if loss of Irish nationality would leave you stateless, but that is not the issue in question. The policy Aside from cases of immigration fraud and terrorism, the State has rarely initiated processes under section 19. In fact, official guidance on immigration and nationality admits a policy of dual nationality being allowed. For the United Kingdom, there are many people who are dual British and Irish nationals. The understanding between the governments with respect to the Common Travel Area, the Good Friday Agreement, and the general historic situation, would make it very unlikely that Ireland would treat acquisition of British nationality as a problem. The British-Irish Agreement of 1998 includes that both governments respect the "right to hold both British and Irish citizenship" for the people of Northern Ireland. Even if you are not a person of Northern Ireland, any action by the government of Ireland that would be seen as potentially touching on this right is politically untenable. Irish citizens have full rights in the UK anyway Under UK law, an Irish citizen can enter without a visa, live there as long as they want, get a job, claim benefits, vote in elections, be elected as an MP, and do everything that a UK citizen can normally do. There may be a vanishingly few exceptions for national security jobs. Because of this, there isn't much reason why being naturalised in the UK would be worthwhile. You could do so for sentimental reasons but as far as the UK's concerned, you already hold a status that's just as good. Extra note: UK honours (In response to a comment below.) The British Crown does grant honours, including knighthoods, to non-UK citizens and dual/multiple citizens, in some circumstances. It depends on whether the other nationality has King Charles III as head of state, and the attitude of the foreign government. Therefore, Canadians do not get knighthoods (Charles is King but the Canadian government would rather not), Belizians do (Charles is King and the government is fine with it), and Americans can get it as an honorary award that does not come with the Sir/Dame title. For Ireland, Terry Wogan is an example of how this works. He was an Irish citizen who lived and worked in the UK for many years. In order to receive a British knighthood, he had to take up British citizenship (which was granted on an expedited basis), becoming Sir Terry. On the other hand, Bob Geldof is an Irish citizen (only) who holds an honorary British KBE, and is not formally entitled to be Sir Bob - much like American recipients such as Rudy Guiliani. The Irish government does not object to either possibility, although some individuals do. An American-Irish-British triple citizen would be able to receive a UK knighthood and use the title Sir, assuming that the British government was willing to grant it, and unless there were some foreign legal blocker (e.g. the U.S. government does not allow federal officeholders to receive overseas decorations).
Yes It's legal: but that's more of a bug than a feature. The Constitution says this about the appointment of Supreme Court judges: he [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme Court, ... In the Federalist Papers: No 76, Hamilton had this to say: But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal. and in No 78: It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." He was wrong about the first but right about the second. Now, this is only the way he saw it and others no doubt had other views but he was focused solely on balancing the powers of the executive and the legislature. There is no consideration of what would happen if, for whatever reason, including partisanship, the executive and the legislature were tightly aligned or hopelessly opposed. Even for the time, this view seems overly idealistic and hopelessly naive. However, these are the same people who thought it would be a good idea for the runner-up in the Presidential race to be the vice-President. Indeed, Hamilton saw and was an integral part of the intense partisanship that arose in the 1790s between the Federalists and the Republicans and the first rejection of a Supreme Court nominee happened during George Washington's Presidency. This analysis shows that the confirmation rate when the White House and Senate are politically aligned is 87.2% but only 47.2% when they are different. That said, most (78%) nominees have been confirmed with the last decade being about average. The US Supreme Court has always been partisan. Indeed, it's only since the Second World War that the idea that it shouldn't be has taken root. In earlier days, the Supreme Court was not populated by jurists - it was the domain of politicians, some of whom moved back and forth between the bench and the Capitol. In Brown v Board of Education 4 of the 9 judges had been Congressmen or Governours and some had never been on the bench of any court before their appointment to SCOTUS. So, yes its totally legal but no, it probably isn't what the founders intended but yes, it has ever been thus.
The Section 34 of Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand says (highlight mine): […] No person of Thai nationality shall be deported or prohibited from entering the Kingdom. The referenced document points to the most recent 2017 Constitution. So the naive answer is No, however some legal gap may be found by the Constitutional Court (Section 27). More specifically, it would depend on the legal equivalence of terms "Thai citizens" and "person of Thai nationality".
What are the laws regarding making replacement batteries if the battery technology is patented? It was pointed out to me that Milwaukee tools has sued numerious different tool vendors for building replacement bateries for their tool line, Jury says Milwaukee Tool should receive $27.8 million in patent suit against Snap-on This to me is deplorable, and would impact my purchasing decisions but I'm not sure I understand this right. I can very easily find knock-off batteries on Amazon, https://www.amazon.com/Upgraded-Lithium-ion-Batteries-Replacement-Milwaukee/dp/B08MWG58ZV/ https://www.amazon.com/Powerextra-Replacement-48-11-1860-48-11-1850-48-11-1840 What elements of the lawsuit was Snap-on guilty of? Are you allowed to make replacement batteries for Milwaukee devices or not?
The laws are - in the US you can’t make, sell, offer for sale etc. anything that infringes a claim in an issued valid, un-expired US patent. There is no special case for replacement battery packs like there is for medical procedures. One of their battery pack patents in the suit. US7999510B2, is very broad. The first claim, below, only requires a housing, lithium ion chemistry and a particular range of current at 18 volts. It would seem to apply to batteries compatible with other brands of tools. From google patents it seems that the examiner considered 155 previous patents before deciding this was novel and not obvious. Reading the judgement the issue at court was not the inventiveness but wether or not a Canadian company who brought the concept to them initially should be considered the inventor. It was ruled that the Canadian one did not reliably put out the needed current. It expires in 2023. Claim 1 A battery pack for powering a hand held power tool, the battery pack comprising: a housing connectable to and supportable by the hand held power tool; and a plurality of battery cells supported by the housing, the battery cells being capable of producing an average discharge current greater than or equal to approximately 20 amps, the battery cells having a lithium-based chemistry, the battery cells having a combined nominal voltage of at least approximately 18 volts.
What you're talking about is called black-box reverse engineering. It can be done, and as long as you are meticulous in your record keeping the fact that it has been done should be an appropriate defence against copyright infringement. But that doesn't help against patent claims - while in copyright cases the fact that code has or has not been directly copied is critical, in patent cases it its irrelevant: if you use a patented method, it's a violation. You therefore will need to be careful about any patents that may have been issued to the original author, as well as avoiding copying.
If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program.
That is not at all what USPTO is telling you. Courts do not simply "dismiss" patents - that isn't a terminology you'd ever see used for a patent that was found to be invalid. Timeline of events: United Industries Corporation brought a suit against the owner of the patent, claiming unpatentability. That case went to trial, and the court found the claim to be invalid and that UIC failed to show unpatentability. UIC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case because both parties agreed to its dismissal (it's possible they reached some external agreement we don't know about). As far as I can tell, at this moment, the patent is active.
"I contacted LG directly over the phone eight days ago, bypassing the retailer because I assumed they were off the hook after two years and ten months, and it should be the manufacturer assuming responsibility." Nope. In the EU (and Britain still is), the retailer is the only party with a legal warranty duty (at least 2 years, national law may deviate to the benefit of the customer). The manufacturer may offer any additional warranty, but even if they do that does not absolve the retailer. The UK does have a longer warranty period than the EU minimum if you can prove the product was faulty, but this is a reversed proof, and it still binds the retailer instead of the manufacturer.
General The legal discussion hinges on the question whether the concept of copyright exhaustion applies to software. (The linked article also discusses the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling mentioned below in the EU part of this answer.) Copyright exhaustion, in simple terms, allows certain uses (like the ones in your scenarios) of copyrighted (books) or patented (e.g. devices) items for which the copyright or patent holder has the right to first sale. If and when that principle applies, the original seller cannot control further sales or other uses of that particular specimen. Their copyright is "exhausted" with the first sale. Situation in India I want to emphasize that I have exactly zero experience regarding India in any way. All I did was that I went to the google. It appears that the Indian Supreme Court recently ruled in Engineering Analysis Centre for Excellence Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT that the typical EULAs are valid. In particular, copyright exhaustion does not apply and the EULA can restrict re-selling and similar actions. The case is discussed in this article, including relevant quotes. This would make everything illegal which is forbidden by an EULA. As I read the EULA, creating a backup copy is allowed, as is restoring Windows from it, obviously; whether that has to happen on the same computer is unclear to me and may depend on the license type (OEM vs. standalone), although I have two remarks: Microsoft is the copyright owner; if they provide you with a license (for example because you called them after you re-installed Windows from a backup copy, and the internet license process didn't work) without you making false claims it is their prerogative. You are good. What constitutes a different computer? The SSD? The case? The mouse? We do have a case of the Ship of Theseus, or here for a funnier take: How much can you change before it becomes a different machine? The answer: Call Microsoft and find out. Situation in the EU The situation in the EU is fundamentally different from the one depicted with a misguided metaphor in the accepted answer. In Europe, all of your scenarios are legal. In July 2012, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of the company usedSoft who is a license reseller. (I'm writing this text on a machine with a Windows license that cost me, together with a Microsoft Office Professional license, 30 Euros, from this store.) The title of the Court's press release couldn't be clearer: An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his ‘used’ licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet Not only can you re-install the software, provided it is the only installation, on the same or a different computer; you can even sell it. You can even sell OEM and bulk licenses. The full text of the decision can be found here. The court stressed that it doesn't make a difference whether the software was originally provided on a physical carrier like a DVD or as a download. Crucially, the seller is obligated to continue providing downloads and updates for the re-sold licensed software as if it were still owned by the first buyer. There is no legal difference between software provided on a physical medium or as a download. To quote the decision: 80 Since the copyright holder cannot object to the resale of a copy of a computer program for which that rightholder’s distribution right is exhausted under Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24, it must be concluded that a second acquirer of that copy and any subsequent acquirer are ‘lawful acquirers’ of it within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24. 81 Consequently, in the event of a resale of the copy of the computer program by the first acquirer, the new acquirer will be able, in accordance with Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24, to download onto his computer the copy sold to him by the first acquirer. Such a download must be regarded as a reproduction of a computer program that is necessary to enable the new acquirer to use the program in accordance with its intended purpose. The court also examines the problem of how to prevent abuse of this permission for online copies (as opposed to physical media) and finds no substantial obstacles here. "79 As Oracle rightly observes, ascertaining whether such a copy has been made unusable may prove difficult. However, a copyright holder who distributes copies of a computer program on a material medium such as a CD‑ROM or DVD is faced with the same problem, since it is only with great difficulty that he can make sure that the original acquirer has not made copies of the program which he will continue to use after selling his material medium. To solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor — whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ — to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys. It seems noteworthy to me that the general question of how to prevent illegal copies is only loosely related to the question of reselling anyway. Even if it were illegal to resell, the seller's problem with illegal copies would not disappear. (It might be somewhat easier to enforce by "dongling" it to a specific hardware and not allow any re-installation whatsoever, but mainstream software producers don't appear to do that, generally.) Lastly it is noteworthy that the original seller may strong-arm the original buyer into signing an EULA that expressly forbids reselling; those restrictions are simply null and void in the EU.1 1 The German EULA of Microsoft Windows does not forbid reselling. The EULA for MS Office has restrictions concerning transfer to third parties in point 3 but notes that those are not applicable if the software was bought in the EU or EFTA and the transfer is inside that region.
The companies really need to speak to an IP lawyer as this question is seeking specific advice which this site is loathe to give out for fear of compouding issues. The answer would depend on the license agreements and enforceability in various jurisdictions. According to https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0368d7ee-0eb3-4e3e-a143-4410969a15bb/eula-for-vs2010?forum=vssetup Microsoft says you cant rent out the software - but this applies to the "Pro" version - I could not find anything on the "Premium" version - so most likely Microsoft to have some clam. The flipside is how enforceable this EULA is - and this would probably vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It would be a very, very good idea to speak to a lawyer before letting Microsoft come onto the premises - as "inviting them" to do this is almost certainly not going to improve the Asians company's case and will allow Microsoft to go fishing further and make it easier for them to expand on and collect evidence should they decide to pursue the matter.
At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one.
Is it a breach of privacy law in Australia if schools track student device usage at home? Since I usually only use programming Stack Exchange sites, sorry if I do anything wrong in this post. My school recently installed software on all student devices (owned by the school) which can track all activity on the device. I understand the intent if this was limited to only the school's network, but tracking students at home seems a bit invasive. It was also done without without student or parent consent. Is this a breach of privacy laws?
Commonwealth Public Schools The Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 does not apply to state and territory governments including public education. Private Schools The Privacy Act applies if: they have an annual turnover of more than $3 million - this will capture all but the smallest schools. At a low-end fee of $10k per student per year, this means 300 students will cross the threshold. they’re connected to a larger organisation (with an annual turnover of $3 million) - which captures most private education networks such as Catholic Education Australia. they supply a health service and hold health information, although this isn’t their primary activity - which is unlikely to apply. Consent is required to collect sensitive information or to disclose non-sensitive personal information for purposes other than for which it was collected. There is no age criterion on consent - an individual who can understand the concepts (as you clearly can) can give or withhold their own consent even if they are a child. Given that they can monitor all activity, this may be sensitive information (e.g. political opinions or associations, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or associations, sexual orientation or practices) depending on what you use the computer for. If so, then consent is required. However, if the school prescribes the activities that you are allowed to use the computer for such that you are not required to disclose sensitive information; if you do so knowing that it was being collected this would be implied consent. State Law new-south-wales NSW Education is subject to a specific Code of Practice under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act. Consent may or not be required depending on the purpose for the collection of the information. For example, if its primary purpose is to "control and regulate student discipline in government schools" then consent is not required.
There are legitimate apps that let you buy phone numbers. With the right app I can buy let's say a landline number in Kansas. I call you, and you will think it's some guy in Kansas calling you. That's totally legal, it's a genuine phone number, and just like I can buy 10 phones and have ten phone numbers, I can use an app to pretend to have 10 phones. I cannot pretend to by your child's school with that kind of app, because for obvious reasons your child's school's number is not up for sale. If an app let's you pretend to be someone else, like your child's school, then your phone company will be very interested in hearing about that. You don't have to sue the app maker, your phone company will. These three police officers will also be very interested, and impersonating a police officer is by itself a crime. (Normally impersonating a police officer is done by putting on a uniform, but calling you with the number of that police officer will also count). So these three police officers will have a word with your husband as well. So suing the app maker (you can't sue an app, you can only sue the people responsible for it) is very hard, and not needed. Complain to your phone company, complain to the police, first to the three police officers he impersonated (the phone company will have records of phone calls seemingly coming from them) to advice them they are being impersonated, and then you complain to the police for harassment.
Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on.
As someone who is not a lawyer, but is familiar with FERPA and university policies as a former instructor, I would be more than willing to bet that you signed or otherwise agreed to some type of Terms of Service before being given access to that type of service. There are almost certainly numerous things you signed to become a student, as well as various policies you agreed to in first gaining access to the computer services, which would apply here. I can tell you with certainty that the school where I was a student had a policy that I agreed to that they would make certain information available to other students unless I chose for it to be restricted. However, my university did not have any photos of students that were viewable by other students in a directory. That said, there were also times I participated in extra-curricular activities where I was required to sign release forms giving the school the rights to video tape, record, and photograph me, and to do what they wished with those things. So, with that in mind, I suspect that's partly due to FERPA restrictions, but also largely due to their own privacy policies that go beyond what FERPA requires. All in all, I doubt they would be okay with you using their photos for your own private use - student privacy is something that is taken very seriously.
This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy.
Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-).
There is not necessarily a contradiction. Information that they may keep may be: Account information Subscriber information Information on breaches of the Terms of Service or Agreement So yes, they might certainly not keep any logs – although that claim is doubtful, since they almost certainly keep at least error-level logs of their services – but that doesn't mean that they have no information to disclose to law enforcement. It's also questionable what "logs" refers to – would aggregate statistics be considered a log, by law? Would your last known IP address be considered a log, provided they don't keep any other history?
FERPA protects the privacy of students' records, irrespective of their age or grade level. Age is generally only relevant in determining who can assert those privacy rights. When you enter school at age 5 or whatever, your parents make your privacy decisions for you. When you turn 18, you become an "eligible student," i.e., eligible to assert or waive your privacy rights without parental oversight.
Any lawful reason preventing a tenant claiming squatters' rights at the end of their tenancy agreement with the ultimate aim of adverse possession? Prompted by this question. As per the title: is there any lawful reason preventing a former tenant from playing the long-game to obtain adverse possession via squatters' rights?
The possession is not adverse during the tenancy, so the clock does not run. If the tenancy contract ends or is violated for [appropriate length depending on location] with no reaction from the landlord, that is grounds for adverse possession.
Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario.
The Immigration Act 2016 introduced the so-called 'right to rent' provisions under which a landlord can be prosecuted for renting accommodation to someone who is not legally in the UK. Everyone in the UK, Brits included, is subject to the Act. This gives the landlord the right to examine your work permit and to see if your visa is valid. The landlord will make a copy of the information. This makes the landlord a data controller which imposes restrictions on how the information can be used. Because this became controversial, the Information Commissioner published a brochure on the things a landlord can do with your data. All things considered and based upon what you wrote, if the landlord did not get your permission to use the data, then it's likely he is in breach. But this does not mean it's actionable or that it would be advisable to make a formal complaint to the Commissioner. If you want to pursue it, you can use the Commissioner's "Report a Concern" page as a starting point. Alternatively, you can lodge a formal complaint with your landlord and he will have to respond to it. What does the law say? The act giving the landlord the right to access your data is in the 2016 act linked above. Everything else is in the Data Protection Act 1998. The ILPA Information Sheet is at "Right to Rent". "The information sheet was updated on 01 November 2016 to take account of the second commencement order issued by the government, on 31 October 2016, bringing further provisions into force." The information sheet is recommended reading for anyone in the UK on a work permit. Disclaimer: I'm a member.
No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated.
The thing I was trying to zero in on was the work/refresh/renovation that needs to be done between tenants, and if they landlord can expect to do it while Tenant A is still paying (up to the date of the 'lease change'), but expecting that Tenant A has vacated before that date, or allows the work to be done while they are still occupying? The first tenant is not required to relinquish possession of the premises while the first lease is in force. The landlord's right of access to the apartment remains unchanged from those specified in the lease and in state landlord-tenant law. So basically the landlord has to wait until the first tenant leaves before doing most of the work. If the first tenant relinquishes possession of the premises before the end of the lease period, the landlord can keep charging rent until the premises has been re-let to a new tenant. But if the landlord has agreed to stop charging rent when the first tenant moves out, the landlord may be bound by that agreement. If the landlord has signed a second lease with a new tenant beginning immediately after the first tenant's mutually agreed early move-out date, then the landlord basically has no time available to fix up the apartment except with the consent of one tenant or the other.
The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions.
There is no legal requirement for an Assured Shorthold Tenancy agreement in England and Wales to be witnessed. Signatories to the agreement are legally free to have it witnessed. Some people may prefer it to be witnessed.
None. Putting something on a piece of land long term and prohibiting anyone to move it is effectively occupying that piece of land. You only can occupy land that you either have legal rights to, or that encounters no objection from those who has (adverse possession). In the latter case, it's not that you don't "provide them right to tow", rather they just don't mind not towing it. What you describe more resembles homesteading, but that is not possible in California.
When is it "legal" to provide inaccurate personal information? In some cases, you do not need to provide your true legal name and birthdate, such as if you are just having a regular conversation. However, in some cases, it is required to provide accurate information and not doing so could range from a mere breach of contract to a crime. For example, in the cases below, which is a breach of contract, a tort, or a crime? You sign up for a social networking site with a false name and birthdate, although the ToS requires accurate information. (US v. Drew is a relevant case here, but it only applies to the Central District of California, I presume.) This specifically has been mentioned previously, but this is included to give a side-by-side comparison of different situations. You go to a restaurant or hotel and use a false name/birthdate (possibly because you are a critic and need to remain anonymous, or for any other reason). You use a false name/birthdate when signing up for a bank or other financial institution? These are just some examples. Assume that this is not an attempt at impersonation, identity theft, or fraud.
In general, providing a false name or birthdate (DoB) is only actionable when there is a legal duty to provide the correct information, or when a provision of a contract to which the person agreed requires it. If the falsity is part of a common-law fraud, then it would be unlawful, and possibly criminal. In the cases listed in the question: Sign up for an online service with a false identity although the ToS requires an accurate identity: This would be a breech of contract. Whether there could be a successful suit for such a breech would depend on why the contract demanded an accurate ID, and what harm the lie did or might do. Use a false name at a restaurant or hotel, but with no intent to defraud or avoid payment. I don't think there is any duty to give an accurate name on a restaurant reservation. In some jurisdictions the law requires an accurate name be used on a hotel register, and valid ID presented. But such violations are rarely pursued, unless they are part of a fraud or some other criminal activity (theft, prostitution, or drug dealing, say). Giving a false name when opening a bank account or other financial account. In the US, and I think many other jurisdictions, the law requires accurate identification of all bank account holders, including a SSN, EIN, or TIN. It also requires a bank to make efforts to verify such IDs, and violation are prosecuted. There are legal ways to get an account under an alternate name such as a penname or DBA, but this must be disclosed to the bank and to the IRS. Other cases that occur to me: Giving a false name at a shop when not obtaining credit or avoiding payment: generally legal. Obtaining a credit card under a false name: Can be done legally if disclosed to the issuer. Giving a false name or DoB to a pharmacy for a prescription: unlawful if attempting to access the medical info of another, or rely on another person's history to get a prescription, but may be lawful if this is just an alias, such as a celebrity might use to avoid publicity. Unlawful if done to obtain a controlled substance, or if insurance fraud is involved. Putting a false name on a job resume: lawful, but if hired an I-9 form will require a valid name and SSN or TIN. Employers usually may not require that a DoB be provided. Giving false info as part of any credit application: usually considered fraud, even if there is no intent to avoid payment, as it can deceive the creditor as to the amount of risk involved; specifically criminal in some states. Giving a false name on a date: perfectly lawful, but may cause a problem if a long term relationship develops. Some states require a valid name on a marriage license.
It is not legal in the case of a company. They must also accept communications by post. In the UK, "a company must at all times have a registered office to which all communications and notices may be addressed." (s 86, Companies Act 2006). It must display the address of its registered office on its website, business letters, and order forms (r 25, Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business (Names and Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015). It must also disclose the address to you if you ask for it in writing (r 27). A failure to do either of these is a criminal offence (r 28). As a practical matter you can also look up the address yourself on the Companies House register if you know the name or registered number of the company. The company must provide you with its registered name on all forms of business correspondence (r 24) (this is a wider definition than that for disclosure of its registered office address). A company cannot rely on the fact that the registered office address it has given to Companies House is out of date. It must continue to accept communications at any address on the register for 14 days after it notifies Companies House of any change. (s 87, Companies Act 2006).
If the factual information contained in her statement (without regard to the spin or interpretation she places on those facts, which are a matter of opinion) are true, she has every legal right and privilege to continue what she is doing. If the factual information is false in some material respect that damages his reputation, it would be possible for the person who is the subject of the statements to bring a defamation against her seeking money damages, although it is unlikely to prevail and likely to give rise to only a nominal money damages award if he prevails.
To quote Wikipedia: In theory anyone who is at least 16 and resident in the United Kingdom can call themselves whatever they wish. In practice, however, some form of documentary evidence is required when changing your name on bank accounts, passport, etc: Documentary evidence of a change of name can be in a number of forms, such as a marriage certificate, decree absolute, civil partnership certificate, statutory declaration or deed of change of name. While it seems likely that a certified translation of your marriage certificate would probably be sufficient, it may be quicker (and cheaper) to use a deed of change of name. (See also the government advice on the subject.)
Is it legal to send a document with your signature claiming to be somebody else? Is it legal to allow somebody to sign a document "for you" (using your name)? I'll answer these two questions together. It depends on what laws apply to the specific document. For example: For a contract for the sale of land, the Statute of Frauds requires a signature. However, the Statute provides that the signature may be made by a person authorised by you. In Australia, a Commonwealth income tax return must be signed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer must sign it personally. If you get your assistant to sign it then you haven't filled it in properly and you are liable to be fined for failure to lodge a valid tax return. There are rules in the legislation for corporations, e.g. the public officer signs it. Sometimes the law allows a tax agent/accountant to sign a form. The theme is that the law provides specific rules. In Australia, banknotes must bear the signatures of two senior officials such as the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the Reserve Bank. However, the law imposing this requirement allows a great deal of flexibility about how these signatures are applied, freeing these officials from the tedium of signing millions of banknotes: Reserve Bank Act 1959, s 37. In the case of a letter, there are no specific laws about who can sign it and how. You could very well get an employee to sign it for you. The other issue to be aware of is deception. If I write you a letter signed "Kim Kardashian", but she has no idea I've done this and has not given me permission, but I lead you to believe that Kim Kardashian just wrote you a letter saying you're great, and then you go and embarrass yourself posting that letter on Facebook, then potentially I am in a bit of trouble. (A more serious example would be where I impersonate your bank and purport to waive the repayments on your mortgage, resulting in you defaulting.) In such a case, the relevant laws are the various laws to do with deception, not laws specifically about who can sign a document. Is it legal for a single individual to use multiple signatures when signing legal documents (ie, is there a requirement your signature be identifiable or consistent)? This is fine. A real signature is not like a cryptographic signature. Its function is not to, by itself, prove the authenticity of a document. The act of signing something is significant because it shows commitment, etc, and for very important documents (e.g. deeds) people (or the law) will ask for the signature to be witnessed. The verification in that case comes from the witness being able to testify as to who they saw sign the document, not the appearance of the signature itself. Keep in mind that the law related to signatures evolved at a time when not everybody could write their name and continues to accomodate people who cannot today. There is no reason or principle requiring an individual to use a consistent signature. There is a practical exception in relation to banks. Banks keep a specimen signature on file for each customer and use this to decide whether to accept withdrawal slips, cheques etc. It is not an ideal system (it is not hard to forge a signature well enough to get past a teller) but in conjunction with the banks' other fraud prevention methods it is the best they can do. However, this is a matter of their own risk management not a legal requirement. If you were transacting in person at the branch and the teller knew you and the bank manager was happy, legally you could sign withdrawal slips with an "X" or a different signature every time.
In dealing with financial, medical, insurance and basically any other forms found in the U.S. do I have a legal responsibility to identify myself as Divorced? Or in other words, could identifying myself as Single as opposed to a divorcee incur any type of liability of which I should be aware? Since you specified the financial and medical contexts, yes, sometimes it is mandatory to disclose that you are divorced. Any time your signature is involved, be as accurate as the form allows. The worst consequence I can think of is actually pretty bad ("penalty of perjury" is no joke, and whether or not it should, divorce does impact a surprising number of especially financial considerations.) If possible, it would be better to simply not answer at all than to sign off on something other than the most accurate option available. In these contexts, the designation as having been divorced is often an archaic throwback predating no-fault. For example, divorce adversely impacts your credit (more than the loss of a partner's presumed earning power, the reasoning here is basically that marriage was a long-term commitment you entered into willingly that was not fulfilled.) Jobs or employment opportunities demanding a very high degree of personal integrity may be negatively impacted by having, or having had a divorce, by the same reasoning (the examples that pop to mind are officers the military, depending on the career field.) Divorce can be interpreted as an indication that the individual in question is currently not as stable in their personal life and affairs (moving, figuring out joint custody, jealous/vindictive ex, etc.) as a prospective lender or employer requires. As far as healthcare is concerned, it can have an impact on health care services and how providers interact with you, your ex, etc. (for example, your child's pediatrician.) Having had a divorce can be a flag to health care provider to screen for depression, anxiety, blood pressure, and so forth; likewise, insurance companies consider divorce a "major life event" that qualifies you to change your coverage out-of-season (I don't know, but wouldn't be surprised if divorce somehow impacted your rates because of statistical increased risk of specific ailments.) Furthermore, there can be far-reaching implications for others - how long you were married determines whether or not social security benefits are conferred to a surviving spouse, for example, or calculating your kid's FAFSA in five or ten or fifteen years.
Assuming that the documents were either true, or Manning reasonably believed that they were true, there would be no cause of action for defamation. Many of the documents disclosed would have been confidential in some sense, but usually a violation of a confidentiality statute has a criminal sanction associated with it, but does not carry with it a private cause of action – in part, because conceptually, the party actually harmed is considered to be the government and not the person about whom information is revealed. It is also possible that Manning could utilize the state secrets privilege as a defense and have such a suit dismissed on the grounds that a full and adequate defense of the claims would require the disclosure of official state secrets. For example, if a covert agent were murdered due to a wrongful disclosure of information, usually official disclosure of the fact of being a covert agent would be required to prove the case, and that evidence would be barred by the state secrets privilege, effectively barring the lawsuit entirely. Constitutional claims of privacy violations under the 4th Amendment generally relate to the wrongful acquisition of information and not its wrongful disclosure. The constitution bars unreasonable search and seizure, not unreasonable disclosure of information. The only privacy tort that might be applicable is "Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts." (A sister privacy tort, Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into privacy affairs, is directed at the collection of data phase and not the dissemination phase). See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B and 652D. But, this tort raises serious First Amendment concerns and has not been widely adopted. Realistically, this tort is unconstitutional in the absence of an affirmative contractual or quasi-contractual duty not to reveal facts that runs to the person making the disclosure, and in general, Manning would not have that kind of relationship. The classic public disclosure of embarrassing private facts case would involve a lawyer's or psychotherapist's revelations about a client. Also, in the case of the public disclosure tort the basis for damages is largely personal emotional distress and violation of trust, as opposed to damage to reputation, per se. The requirement is that the disclosure be embarrassing or breach of contract, not that it harm someone's reputation since you have no legal right to a reputation that differs from the truth.
No. In the United States, lying is not a crime. Unless it is done: under oath (in which case it's called perjury) or to a law enforcement agent conducting an investigation (in which case it's called obstruction). There are also the civil torts of slander (oral) and libel (written) if someone lies and damages the reputation or business interests of a person or company. Collectively, and without distinction, these are called defamation. Lying also has a close cousin — the civil tort of fraud — which usually applies to inducement into a transaction or a contract. There are also consumer protection statutes (federal and state) that deal with truth in advertising, truth in lending, lemon laws, etc. But those are primarily civil statutes and the last two are pretty far afield from your question. But none of that applies to the Facebook case you described. So, no.
Is it possible for someone with juvenile felony charge (not conviction) to join the military? If someone were charged with a felony in the US (e.g. sexual assault, harassment, or murder) as a juvenile, but they're not convicted (their case or the charges were dropped), can they join the military after they turn 18? If not, then why?
According to the US Army's web site, which gives an overview of the entry requirements, the minimum age is 17 and it seems that only felony convictions and juvenile offences are a bar to recruitment - however the Army Recruiter should be able to confirm whether or not dropped charges fall in to these categories or exclude a candidate for any other reason. Section 1 "meeting with a recruiter" section includes this: Your local recruiter will conduct a prescreening to see if you qualify for enlistment. At the recruiting station, he or she will ask you about your: Education level Criminal history Age Marital/dependency status Physical condition And one of the "see if you pre-qualify" quick-quiz questions asks if one's age is between 17 and 34 Section 2, "required documents", includes this: The U.S. Army makes every attempt to assess the moral quality of potential recruits. To this end, a thorough background check is done on all prospects. It is imperative that you disclose all legal offenses Felony convictions will result in candidates being exclude Drug and domestic violence charges will exclude candidates (Some minor drug offenses may be waived on a case-by-case basis) Juvenile offenses will also exclude you Certain Army jobs requiring higher security clearance may necessitate more thorough investigations
Abandonment is not the legal concept to be concerned with (though the situation might fall within the ambit of a law that uses the word "abandon"), instead the question should be about the legal obligations of a parent. California Family Code is what you want to look at. Though a look at the criminal act of "child abandonment" can be informative: section 271 and following indicate that there are some penalties for abandonment-like actions for children between 14 and 18, but the acts would have to be "willful" and "without lawful excuse" (which probably includes "inability to perform"). In the Family Code, section 7822 states when proceedings can be brought. For example, if (2) The child has been left by both parents or the sole parent in the care and custody of another person for a period of six months without any provision for the child's support, or without communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or parents to abandon the child. Section 3900-3901 says that the father and mother of a minor child have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances. The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first. Nothing in this section limits a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support or the court's power to inquire whether an agreement to provide additional support has been made. There seems to be a formula for computing expectations of support: but the law won't require a person to pay money that they do not have. The law also will not compel a third party to take in an guest, nor will it compel the mother to become homeless (i.e. order the third party to take in the child or eject the mother). The courts could easily require the mother to take financial responsibility for the child.
Try the phone or email contacts at Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Home. The state of Florida doesn't appear to maintain a statewide officer registry, but that department should be able to verify someone is or isn't a officer in conjunction with the police department closest to your location. If this neighbor is threatening or attempting to enforce the law while not showing ID that proves he/she is an officer, that's serious, and you should call the local police department. Talking about being a LEO while drinking beer at a BBQ is less serious, but still could be a third degree felony. See Statutes & Constitution - Florida State Statutes: 843.08 False personation.—A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a firefighter, sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, fire or arson investigator of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or a federal law enforcement officer as defined in s. 901.1505, and takes upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, commits a felony of the third degree,
Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence.
So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.
It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification.
Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.
Your question (when read with your follow-up comments) is somewhat complex, so I am going to make a few assumptions and break it down into several sub parts. Assumptions The conviction occurred in a state where the expungement statute allows you to tell employers that you were never arrested and convicted. When you say “public records websites” you’re asking about sites like atlaspublicrecords.com. That atlaspublicrecords.com is a US based company. They don’t list an address and the website used a private registration services, so can’t easily determine that they are US-based. Your questions and follow-up Considerations After I get it expunged, will it be removed from public records websites . . . . No. Websites like atlaspublicrecords.com do not link to actual public records. I searched a couple of common names and feel safe in assuming that it only collects and publishes the information—it does not actually link to court records. Nevertheless, it would not be available from the actual government agencies that keep those records. By getting your records expunged the convictions and arrest would no longer be available as public records that someone could request from the courthouse, police department, or whatever state agency does criminal history in your jurisdiction. do I have to show them proof of the expungement . . . . Yes, if you believe what the website claims. I can’t find a physical address for the website and don’t know if they are real or a scam, so understand that when you give them information about your expungement—or pay their silly fee, they might collect the money and do nothing. My opinion is that the company is shady and seems to operate in a gray area of the law that I will explain below. Options if they don’t remove the post: You could try to sue them for some type of secondary dignitary tort like defamation or false light. But these would have some significant legal hurdles. See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that commenting on an expunged criminal records was not defamation or invasion of privacy because it was the truth. You could try to argue that they are a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). If they're governed by the FCRA, you have some additional legal remedies (like civil penalties/fines) if they don't remove/clarify an expunged record. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to credit reporting agencies, like Experian & Equifax but also covers companies that compile and sell information for background checks. This includes criminal records. See the Federal Trade Commission’s Advisory Opinion to LeBlanc (06-09-98). But . . . this website is operating in a gray area that appears to comply with the law. The FCRA only applies to consumer reporting agencies, which are defined as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) Because they’re not charging money or a fee to access the reports and they’re not a nonprofit cooperative, they probably do not meet the definition of a CRA. Bottom-line is that you're best option is to give them the expungement documents once you obtain them.