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Rental lease agreement, what does Provided Further mean? If someone recently purchased a house that has a tenant but would like to rent to a close young family member that recently moved to town. The lease agreement that was inherited from the previous property owner stated that: Lessor or Agent may terminate this lease upon 30 days' notice in writing prior to the next rent payment date to the address shown herein; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in the event Lessee terminates this Lease prior to first 12 months from the date this Lease is executed, such termination shall constitute a failure to comply with this Agreement and the Security Deposit shall be forfeited pursuant to the section on Security Deposit. What does "PROVIDED FURTHER" here mean? Does it mean the landlord is allowed to give 30 day notice conditional on the tenant not paying rent, or does it mean in addition to, such that the landlord can unconditionally give 30 day notice to the tenant to move out, and if the tenant does not pay on time, the security deposit is forfeited? | What does "PROVIDED FURTHER" here mean? The term keeps two provisions separate, and hence independent of each other (unconditional). The former provision addresses landlord's initiative [to terminate the lease] whereas the latter addresses tenant's initiative. The latter pertains to early termination of lease and is not to be confused with tenant's default/non-payment. If rent is to be paid on the 1st of each month and the landlord wants the tenant to move out by August 13, the landlord needs to give a written notice at least thirty days prior to August 1 because the 1st of August is "the next rent payment date". This is regardless of tenant's timely payment of rent. Tenant's initiative to prematurely terminate the lease forfeits his security deposit regardless of having hitherto/always paid rent on time. | the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it. | Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute. | In general, the words "due on" take on their ordinary meaning - that is, that the performance of a contract is required on or before the date specified. If it is not specified in the contract, a court will look to what is reasonable in the circumstances. For instance, if payment is due to a company that trades 24 hours a day including the day payment was due, then payment up until midnight may be found acceptable. However, if it is not known to the person making the payment that the business has such extended hours, and especially if it is known that the business has normal hours, then payment after close of business would likely not be reasonable. To your question, and having reviewed some Canadian residential rent legislation, although none define due on specifically - and I would not expect them to do so - most have clauses which provide for termination, and they only refer to serving notice either a certain number of days after rent falls due, or the day after rent falls due. This would tend to support my assertion that rent is payable on or before the specified date, unless the contract says otherwise, in line with the above considerations. NB: While rent is usually payable in advance, this simply means that you are paying for the occupancy during that follows, or substantially follows, rather than the period that has elapsed. | Firstly, your "apartment" doesn't prohibit anything; Your tenancy contract does. A terminology nitpick, but one that can shed some light on what is actually happening. TLDR: Your right to bear arms isn't being infringed, its being traded away. An unreasonable trade may be invalidated by the courts. Firearms restrictions are far less likely to be voided than speech content limitations. Yes, you have the right to bear arms(whatever exact meaning of that is). You also have the right to voluntarily agree to a binding agreement limiting that right, in exchange for a consideration. Compare a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). You have the right to freedom in your speech: you also have the right to agree to binding limits on your freedom of speech, in return for consideration (such as money or access to information). Every contract is structured in the same general way: Party A agrees to do or avoid doing certain things, in exchange for Party B agreeing to do or avoid doing certain things. So, in essence, what the apartment contract says is, that you agree to do or not do some things (including paying rent), in return for your landlord temporarily granting you some rights(such as the right to reside(generally exclusive), the right to control the space, etc. ), and imposing some obligations on themselves (which vary from place to place). In your case, one of the things that you are trading is a limitation on your right to bear arms(note that you can still bear arms, just not on the property in question). Now one thing to note is that courts have the power to enforce contracts; they also have the power to void contracts, in part or in full, if they are illegal or "unconscionable". In general, restricting (the content of) speech is not reasonable (e.g. having a general noise level restriction is reasonable), so is more likely to be struck down than one restricting firearms on the rented property. | The landlord is complying with a city ordinance that mandates security deposits must earn interest that belongs to you. A security deposit and interest due thereon shall continue to be the property of the tenant making such deposit, shall not be commingled with the assets of the landlord, and shall not be subject to the claims of any creditor of the landlord or of the landlord’s successors in interest, including a foreclosing mortgagee or trustee in bankruptcy. | Under RCW 59.18.030(29), "Rent" or "rental amount" means recurring and periodic charges identified in the rental agreement for the use and occupancy of the premises, which may include charges for utilities. Except as provided in RCW 59.18.283(3), these terms do not include nonrecurring charges for costs incurred due to late payment, damages, deposits, legal costs, or other fees, including attorneys' fees. Per RCW 59.18.283(2) Except as provided in RCW 59.18.410, the tenant's right to possession of the premises may not be conditioned on a tenant's payment or satisfaction of any monetary amount other than rent. In other words, additional regular fees are disallowed. All recurring fees must be "rent" (but things like late fees, damages, attorney's fees which arise only occasionally are allowed). If a lease were to specify $2,000 as the rent and $1,000 as the "___fee", as a recurring charge it would still be considered to be $3,000 rent. One cannot get around the 60 day notice requirement of RCW 59.18.140(3a) (which says "a landlord shall provide a minimum of sixty days' prior written notice of an increase in the amount of rent to each affected tenant, and any increase in the amount of rent may not become effective prior to the completion of the term of the rental agreement") by calling it a "continuation fee". One does not need to get around rent control because per RCW 35.21.830, The imposition of controls on rent is of statewide significance and is preempted by the state. No city or town of any class may enact, maintain, or enforce ordinances or other provisions which regulate the amount of rent to be charged for single-family or multiple-unit residential rental structures or sites other than properties in public ownership, under public management, or properties providing low-income rental housing under joint public-private agreements for the financing or provision of such low-income rental housing. | You are never obligated to sign a contract. You already have a lease agreement in place, which will be enforceable for the agreed-upon duration. The lease can be changed if both parties agree to it, but one party cannot unilaterally demand that other agree to any changes to the contract - a landlord can't, for example, change your lease agreement to increase your rent payment in the middle of your lease term and demand that you sign it. The landlord is certainly allowed to ask, in the hopes that both parties can come to an agreement, but again, both parties need to agree in order for an existing contract to be changed. |
Can you avoid paying taxes on the Bitcoins you've sold by using a shell company outside of the U.S. and transferring the coins to it before selling? Can you avoid paying taxes on the Bitcoins you've sold by using a shell company outside of the U.S. and transferring the coins to it before selling? I am wondering if there's a legal flaw in the system that allows you to sell bitcoins through a shell company to avoid paying taxes or to lower the amount of taxes paid on any profit made. | Suppose you could. Now the proceeds of the sale belong to the shell company. What good does that do you? If you want to use the money to buy stuff for yourself, the shell company has to pay it back to you as a dividend or salary or something, and that payment will be taxable income to you personally. This might even come out worse for you: if you had held the bitcoins for more than a year, and sold them yourself, you could benefit from the lower long-term capital gains tax rate. But if you collect the funds as salary or dividend, you pay the higher ordinary income tax rate. | If you don't respond to the letter, you will be penalized. So why would they send you a pre-stamped envelope? Paying for communications is just part of your everyday life and shouldn't come out of tax payers' money. | No LLC or corporate entity exists around or in relation to SoftDAO. That's a bad thing, not a good thing, to those involved. Mr. Founder is obviously liable. When he wrote the DAO, he intended that it compete with IncumbentCo, and thus almost certainly intended that the software would violate the patent. And it doesn't matter that he's not the majority owner - he's still a part owner, meaning he's profiting from the infringement. Furthermore, he promoted the scheme, and according to 35 U.S. Code § 271(b), "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Mr. Large, and any other identifiable part owner, is liable. Mr. Large did not commit a crime himself and generally is a good citizen. Good for him. But lots of people get sued that never committed a crime. Suing Mr. Large is like suing an Enron shareholder for owning Enron shares. Typically we do not sue shareholders. But he isn't a shareholder, and that's critical. If you want the benefits of a publicly traded company, you need to actually make a publicly traded company. Mr. Large is being unfairly targeted simply because he is a public figure with association with the project due to the Fortune Magazine article. Yes, he's being sued because of the article, but so what? It's like saying the police unfairly targeted you for an underage drinking citation because you were dumb enough to post yourself on Facebook. That argument won't fly in court. IncumbentCo can pick who they want to sue. It is nearly impossible to prove that Mr. Large is the 30th largest owner of SoftCoin. Court warrant allowed the Court to find some of Mr. Large's public keys on the SoftCoin blockchain, but the blockchain says he is actually only the 100th largest owner now. It doesn't matter. He's a part owner, by his own admission and by the blockchain evidence. The developers are also liable, also potentially for the whole amount. They created software that infringed a valid patent, and profited from it. If they can't shut it down, they can't shut it down, but they're going to be paying. I'm thinking this is a case where joint and several liability applies; IncumbentCo can go after any particular one of the owners and developers for the entire amount if they feel like it, and then it would be up to that person to then sue anyone else he thinks is partially liable. If Mr. Large is a billionaire and could pay the entire judgement himself, they might just do that. They'd probably go after Mr. Founder for as much as they thought they could get out of him, though. The users are also liable, since the law provides that using a patented invention without authority is infringing. But they're only liable for their one copy, and IncumbentCo may not bother with them, at least initially. However, the SoftDAO owns no assets No, but IncumbentCo is going to seek injunctions against selling SoftCoins or running the software. Could some people slip through the cracks? Sure. People infringe copyright all the time online, and only some get caught. You could easily imagine someone selling pirated software in exchange for cryptocurrency. This would be little different. | If the situation described is accurate, then maybe First, let's deal with the implicit assumption that sales tax is not payable on gifts. Whether that is true or not depends on the law in your jurisdiction. For example, in australia there is no Goods and Services Tax (GST) payable on a gift because a gift is not a "supply" under the law. Technically, a value-added tax like the GST is not a sales tax but close enough. However, exchanging a "gift" for something of value (airline points, for example) is not a gift. Of course, Australian States and Territories levy Stamp Duty on the transfer of a vehicle's registration, and this is calculated on the sale price or the market price whichever is the greater. Also, technically, that's not a sales tax either. If it's a tax avoidance scheme, then no and it's a crime Assuming that there is no sales tax payable on a gift; if John and David entered into this arrangement (not a contract because of its illegal purpose) to avoid tax, then tax is payable and they are now criminals. If the relevant tax authority learns what happened and decides to investigate, then John and David might have some explaining to do. If David can show that he has routinely given John large cash gifts on John's birthday, then they may convince the authority not to prosecute. If they can't, then they get to try to convince a judge. It is not atypical for tax law to reverse the onus of proof: the government doesn't have to prove tax is payable, John and Dave have to prove it isn't. | It's always amazing to me why some people find it so difficult to understand, just because the word "crypto" is involved. It goes like this: Cryptocurrency is an asset, like any other asset. It's also a currency, but that part can be ignored for this purpose. Buying an asset, any asset, is (usually) not a taxable event. "Buying" in this case consists of exchanging US$ for the asset, just to be clear. Selling an asset, any asset, is (usually) a taxable event. Exchanging an asset for another asset is (usually) also a taxable event. So exchanging a cow for two sheep is a taxable event. The taxable event consist of being deemed to have sold the cow for an "amount realized" equal to the value of two sheep. That amount, less the cost of the cow (the "adjusted basis") is taxable gain (or loss), short or long term - depending on how long the cow was held before the exchange. The outcome is the same if you replace the two sheep with several hundred cups of coffee or several hundred hamburgers; the outcome is still the same if you replace the cow with any currency (other than the US$), crypto- or otherwise. And that's (almost) all there is to it... | It is likely that you don't owe any taxes even though you have worked for many years in Brazil. Earned income that is earned outside the U.S. by natural persons who are U.S. citizens (as oppose to entities like corporations) up to a certain amount that is indexed for inflation is excluded from taxation under Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code. The cut off is $104,100 U.S. per year in 2018 (about 347,000 Brazilian Reals per year). Also, unearned income and any excess earned income can benefit from the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation unburdened by your foreign earned income up to the threshold. This can be quite substantial. Similarly, if you have children, they would benefit from the child tax credit which would reduce your income tax obligation. And, any U.S. federal income tax due on your unearned income to the extent that it exceeds the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation is reduced by any Brazilian taxes you paid on your Brazilian income as a result of the foreign tax credit. The bottom line is that unless you are very affluent and have significant unearned income, it is unlikely that you owe any U.S. income taxes. Even if you do owe U.S. taxes after these considerations, they wouldn't arrest you. You have to be "willfully" violating U.S. tax laws for it to be a criminal offense and this is one small corner of the law where ignorance of the law is an excuse. And, the Internal Revenue Service would first have to send you several notices by mail setting forth the amount that they think that you owe, allowing you to dispute that amount, and the declaring that you owe it, before you have a potentially criminal tax violation that is well defined enough and communicated to you well enough that you can willfully fail to file a tax return or can willfully fail to pay. So no, they will not arrest you and make you pay, at least not until they send you lots of notices which you ignore. On the other hand, if you do owe any U.S. income taxes there is no statute of limitations on collecting those taxes for years in which you were required by U.S. tax law to file a tax return but did not (basically, years in which you owed U.S. taxes). So, if you, for example, won a big lump sum payment playing the lottery when you were 20 years old and owed U.S. income taxes as a result (even though you didn't know it), those taxes could still be collected by the IRS when you are 40 years old since you did not file any U.S. tax return for the year in which you had taxable U.S. income. Finally, under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 enacted in December last year, U.S. taxation of the foreign income of U.S. persons was reformed in the most significant way in the last seventy years or so, and the taxation of U.S. persons on foreign source income is greatly curtailed for 2018 going forward. This is not retroactive, but could mean that as you come into your higher income earning years in middle age, that the taxation of U.S. citizens on their worldwide income is no longer a serious concern for you, even if it would have been under U.S. tax law before then. Enforcing laws that have since been repealed is also rarely an administrative priority for the IRS. It is also hard (to the point of being economically not worth it) to enforce U.S. tax laws against someone who has no U.S. assets. It is also possible that even though you were a dual citizen at birth, that you could have taken an act (e.g. voluntarily serving as an officer in the Brazilian military) that could cause you to lose your U.S. citizenship. So, even if you were a U.S. citizen at birth, it is not 100% certain that you are a U.S. citizen now. | Likely not, unless A finds a jurisdiction with sufficiently lax accounting and taxation standards. As described in the question, A, B, and C are distinct legal entitites. For each entity, the tax office would want to know what the revenue, expenses, and net income are. By providing a service (use of the house) free of charge between two entites of the shell construct, profits are moved from C to A. This is usually illegal. The required paperwork might not have to look like a normal rental contract between a tenant and a landlord, since many questions are resolved by the ownership, but it would have to specify payments. The tax office should complain if they differ too much from the going market rate. Consider that C might be a LLC, and that C might be a civil judgement against C. Someone would look at the assets owned by C, and that includes the house D. | When the buyer hears "to avoid sales tax" and hears the seller describing as a gift something that s/he knows was nothing of the sort, a reasonable buyer would know that this was at best suspicious, and would find out if this was legal. But assuming that the buyer accepted the seller's suggestion ignorantly and in good faith, the buyer can file a report of the transaction and pay any tax that should have been paid. The exact way of doing this will vary based on the laws of the buyer's jurisdiction (state-level if in the US) which is not given in the question. Such a report and payment might not prevent the local tax authorities from assessing an additional penalty. Criminal charges seem unlikely, but would be possible. If the seller was a used car dealer, the authorities might want the buyer to testify against the seller. They buyer might be wise to consult a lawyer with expertise in sales tax issues in the buyer's jurisdiction. Such a lawyer could advise on exactly what the buyer's legal obligation was, and how to avoid or minimize penalties or other consequences. |
I need my twitter deleted I have seen one similar question but it is almost two years old, and there's a bit more to it. I created a twitter account a long time ago because I was doing live streaming on adult websites. I need it to be taken down. I do not have the phone number, email, or anything else associated with the account. I did not use my real name when signing up because it was adult content and I had stalkers. Because of this, they won't delete the account. I am wondering if there are any actions I can take. I can prove that it's me in the pictures because I literally have the same exact face and tattoos that I did years ago. My husband can prove that it's him in the pictures as well, but they will not take that as actual proof. Do I have any options here? It's related to a phone number that many old family members still have in their phones, so when they go to create a twitter account it pops up in their suggested friends or follows or whatever. | I do not have the phone number, email, or anything else associated with the account. Well, neither do I - so it must be my account. Unfortunately, the fact that you appear in most or all of the pictures on that account does not prove that you own it. It could be the photographer's account. Do I have ANY options here Can you reactivate the email account associated with the Twitter account? Or the phone number? Either would allow you to reset the password and access the account. You can go to court (in California) and seek an injunction ordering Twitter to delete the photos or give you access. Of course, you have the same issues proving ownership here as you did with Twitter but the court may have different priorities (justice) than Twitter does (corporate protection). I had an idea. If you (or your husband) own the copyright in the photos (i.e. one of you was the photographer) you could issue a DCMA take-down notice because the poster (who, according to Twitter, isn’t you) does not have permission (even if they did at the time: permission can be revoked). Twitter would be unable to contact the account holder and would be required to remove the images when they got no response.of course, if the photographer was someone else, they could do it. Or you could break the law and say it was you, although I would never recommend this even with a near zero chance of being caught. | this is wrong to bring this around my girls. Is there anything I can do? If my understanding is correct, your primary concern is the harassment your daughters might endure as a result of the publication(s). In that case, you might want to send the publisher a cease and desist letter where you ask the removal of sensitive information about your daughters. If the publisher does not comply within reasonable time, consider pursuing injunctive relief in court. Labels, remedies, and procedural details depend on the laws of the [unspecified] jurisdiction where this is happening. Other than that, the number of gaps and confusing details in your description render your question unanswerable. For instance, your description indicates that the "neighbor's daughter" is the person who learned about the charges, retrieved your full name and address, and so forth. A kid playing with children of age 7, 5, 2 is unlikely to engage in that elaborate conduct, unless the kid is at least few years older. It is also unclear what happened when the other person came to your house "because of this post". There are no details whatsoever, whence one is unable to grasp the extent to which that person's opinion of you and/or your daughters was influenced by the publication. The person's intent might have been to hear your side of the story, to make a proposal, to reproach, etc. There is no way to discern the substance or relevance of that event. | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | BAD idea It is one thing to upload the phonebook and associated pictures for use of the owner of the phonebook. It isn't a fair use of the phonebook pictures - and you might not have a license anyway, as some people associate photos with numbers that they don't have a license to associate with anyway. But what if instead of a photo of the person, the first photo someone associated with the person is a photo of something like... crack cocaine, a photo of someone in a very compromising situation, just genitals, or some other thing that is just as tasteless or possibly criminal to share? In that case, your company is possibly committing defamation, and in case sharing or possessing of the image itself is illegal, your company is now the actor and liable. Depending on the content of the picture, distribution of pornographic material (possibly even underage material of that sort) could be up that alley just as much as hate speech through symbols, usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas in Gernamy) and many many others. | (Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action. | The statement ABCGym refuses to refund payment it accepted for membership to a gym ABCGym closed. ABCGym has substituted an inferior-to-me option. could certainly be considered as defamatory. However, in the US and many other countries, truth would be a valid defense, if the person making the statement could prove that the statement is true. I don't see how it could be construed as solicitation. If worn on a shirt into ABC, the management could surely ask the wearer to remove it. If that request is refused, they could ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer has a valid membership, then it would depend on the exact terms of the membership contract, and provisions of local law, whether ABC could insist that the wearer leave, or have the wearer arrested for trespass should the wearer refuse. Any regulations incorporated by reference into the contract would also matter. At least in the US. walking back and forth on a public sidewalk just outside ABC's door, wearing such a shirt or carrying a classic picket sign with such a message would be pretty clearly legal, provided that others are not unduly obstructed, and no valid local ordinance is violated. In the wear-the-shirt-inside case, if the wearer refuses to remove the shirt or leave, the management would probably call law enforcement. LE will not want to decide whether wearer has the legal right to remain in the club wearing the shirt. They will probably ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer protests that s/he has a valid membership and thus a contractual right to stay, who knows what they would do. If they still ask the wearer to leave, the wearer would be wise to comply and perhaps take legal action to enforce his or her membership rights, which will depend on the contract details as mentioned above. A lawyer would probably be very helpful if the wearer wants to take that route. The wearer would be wise to remain polite and appear calm, not yelling or using epithets. | PIPA has a dispute resolution process. See page 39 of the guidance document. The judge in your current case may have the power to award you damages under PIPA, but most likely not. You are probably best served by using the information as evidence that the guy is a bad person, has little regard for the laws, openly defied PIPA, etc. However, if he's smart he will say that you consented. Look at pages 5 and 6 of that document that you linked to. Unless you protested when you handed him your license and watched him photograph it, it's hard for you to say that you did not provide implied or verbal consent. This is especially true when coupled with the PIPA dispute resolution which start with you attempting to resolve this issue before filing a complaint. In summary, it might help you demonstrate a pattern of bad behavior but your current legal dispute is not the place to resolve your privacy issue. | The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack. |
How does discovery work for financial crimes? There is a case in the news at the moment about the post office securing 736 convictions for false accounting and theft that later some were overturned on the basis of an accounting error made by an internal computer system. The High Court described the computer system as not "remotely robust" for the first 10 years of its use, and still had problems after that. What I would have expected to happen in this case would be for the accused to request the data on which the decision was made during discovery, with an accountant compared this to their own records and demonstrated an error. It appears this did not happen, though it is hard to find what actually did happen. Do we know what happened here? It it possible for a party to such a suit to bring evidence to the court without providing the underlying data to the other party? | (As there are cases that remain sub judice, I will give only a general answer describing the disclosure process.) How does discovery disclosure work for financial crimes? Disclosure for all criminal investigations in England and Wales, including those in to financial crime, are carried out in accordance with Parts 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and its accompanying Code of Practice. A full explanation is given in the Code, but put briefly: the police appoint a Disclosure Officer whose role includes reviewing and assessing everything held by the police, called "material", and passing details of all "relevant material" to the CPS appointed prosecutor. There are four stages in the police disclosure process, called the 4Rs: Record Retain Review Reveal These 4Rs overlap with three questions that require answering in order: Record and Retain: Q1: Is it "relevant material" to the investigation? If No, nothing further need be done. If Yes then Record and Retain it in a "durable and retrievable format" - write it down, save it to disc etc, keep it safe and in a place where it can be found. Review: Q2: Is it "sensitive material"? e.g. does it relate to informants, covert tactics, information given in confidence etc? Either way, two seperate schedules of relevant material according to its "sensitivity" are created. Reveal: The Disclosure Officer passes both schedules (and the actual material if necessary) to the CPS prosecutor who provides the defence with a copy of the non-sensitive schedule. The prosecutor also asks: Q3: Does the material "undermine the case for the prosecution or assist the defence with theirs"? If No, nothing further need be done. If Yes, the prosecutor must disclose the material to defence, unless it sensitive and giving it to the defence is not, for example, in the public interest as it may jeopardise life, covert operations etc. The prosecutor and police then has to decide whether to drop the case or not in order to protect the reason for the sensitivity. (They may also apply to the Crown Court judge for a Public Interest Immunity certificate which - in very, very rare cases - allows a trial to go ahead in the interests of justice without the defence being made aware of material that may assist their case as long as the whole trial process is fair to the defendant.) The defence, in addition to their copy of the non-sensitive schedule, can apply for sight or copies of and any material that they consider also undermines or assists but has not been disclosed to them by the prosecutor, and is necessary for their case. In the first instance this application is to the CPS prosecutor, but if it is refused the defence may apply to the trial judge for a ruling on whether it must be disclosed or not. The overriding principle is ensuring a fair trial. ETA: It it possible for a party to such a suit to bring evidence to the court without providing the underlying data to the other party? It is possible but the principles of a fair trial, disclosure and the continuity of evidence (what some call the chain of custody) coupled with challeges by the defence are supposed to ensure that the provenance and accuracy of evidence is properly tested and accountable at a Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH) before a trial opens. Unfortunately, especially in highly complex investigations, this does not always seem to be the case. | I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case. | In the US, the various crimes regarding mail theft, tampering are federal crimes, esp. 18 USC 1708 and 18 USC 1702. USPS has a web page about reporting mail theft here, and ultimately it would be prosecuted by the US Attorney's office. However, it is not guaranteed that the US Attorney will prosecute every case brought to his attention, instead, the case might be turned over to local authorities. Many (all?) states have their own laws covering mail theft, such as Cal. Pen 530.5(e), so it is possible that the prosecution (for the state crime) would be carried out by the state's district attorney. I do not know if there are any statistics on how frequently state and federal prosecutors decline to prosecute for throwing away or opening someone else's mail, compared to them prosecuting. The Dept. of Justice suggests accepting pleas to misdemeanors before Magistrate Judges over felony prosecutions, for less serious violations. Reporting the crime to the USPS Postal Inspector seems to be the standard first step. | In the UK, generally there is no duty to report crime. There are circumstances where there is a duty to report suspicious activity or 'knowledge' or 'suspicion' of a crime. These include: financing of terrorism money laundering or dealing in other proceeds of crime (criminal property) or fraud in a regulated sector (e.g. solicitors, accountants, insolvency practitioners, finance, gambling) (unless the information comes to the person in 'privileged circumstances') In respect of such circumstances, as soon as Bob 'knows' or 'suspects' Rob is engaged in such behaviour Bob must report this to the authorities and must not tell Rob about it (the offence of 'tipping off'). Bob commits an offence if he doesn't report it. In terms of failure to report money laundering that could lead to a maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine. Depending on the circumstances an additional risk of failure to report is being perceived to have participated in the commission of the crime. | She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove. | If there is no written contract, why not just respond to their invoice with a letter stating you do not intend to pay because the trial was free so you don't owe anything. If they attempt to collect, make the same case to the court. Then the burden is on them to prove otherwise. Which, if there is no written contract agreeing to pay an ETF, might be difficult for them to do. Be careful about surreptitiously recording phone calls without the other party's knowledge or consent. In some jurisdictions this is illegal and can subject you to criminal prosecution. | You haven't specified a jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom† this is a clear violation of section 3 of The Computer Misuse Act 1990 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if— (a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (a) to impair the operation of any computer; (b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; [F2or] (c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data; [F3or (d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be done.]] Deleting the data is unauthorized (3.1.a) The ethical hacker knows it is unauthorized (3.1.b) Deleting the data prevents access to the data (3.2.b and hence 3.1.c) † This is one of the few Acts that apply to the whole of the UK. | Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible. |
Denied Data Subject Access Request (DSAR) due to third-party information A while ago I made a data subject access request (DSAR, asking for personal information which is stored about me) which was part of an ongoing complaint. In a nutshell, I did a complaint to a company of sharing my data without consent and I explicitly instructed them not to share my data, which was on a recorded phone conversation. I have made an access request to listen to those phone calls but that was denied due to third-party information. In essence, any third-party information that was discussed was about insurance policies, i.e. anything that we did discuss could be found on the internet as well in policy documents but I don't recall discussing sensitive information about any third-party. Is the company within their rights to deny my DSAR for any potential third-party policy documents that were discussed or under what circumstances can they deny a DSAR (i.e. what level of third-party information must be shared in a conversation so that they can withhold such a request)? If it makes a difference, this is under UK law. | The GDPR allows the right to access to be limited if this access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” (Art 15(4) GDPR). However, access to the recording would not give you more information than you've already received during the phone call, so this exemption is quite unlikely to apply in any case. UK data protection law also has a large list of additional exceptions, as summarized here by ICO guidance. These exemptions also cover some aspects of trade secrets, and even mention insurance examples. However, not such exemption is likely to apply in your case: the recording would not give you more information than you already have. If the data controller is concerned about some parts of the conversation, they should provide a redacted copy and explain why the redactions were performed. They should not reject the request outright. If the data controller wants to reject the request entirely, they must do so within the time frame for the DSAR (one month), must explain their reasons, and must inform you that you're allowed to lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority or to sue them. However, ICO guidance is flexible on how detailed the reason for refusal can be: Where an exemption applies, the reasons you give to an individual for not complying with a request may depend upon the particular case. For example, if telling an individual that you have applied a particular exemption would prejudice the purpose of that exemption, your response may be more general. However, where possible, you should be transparent about your reasons for withholding information. Here, I don't see any reason why full transparency would be a problem, so I would expect that the data controller can point to a specific exemption in UK data protection law. If you are unsatisfied with the data controller's response, please consider lodging a complaint with the supervisory authority. In the UK, this is the ICO. On the ICO complaints page, you can fill out the online form about “your personal information concerns”. | Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company. | I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this. Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct. If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data. Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service. Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario. Whose personal data is it anyway? Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy. The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect: Company A is not responsible for handling erasures From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on why that data is being processed. In particular: Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases. It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a "processing activity" and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident. Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level. Caveat: public access and cloned files If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the "original" is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies. In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them. | Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on. | Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation. | If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though. | "1) Can I use an pre checked tick box under GDPR?" Nope. "Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent." (Recital 32) "2) Since GDPR also requires the data collector to ensure that the user is not under the age of 13 so I am planning to ask the users age only for that region i.e. EU Region. Now will simply mentioning that "By continuing you acknowledge that you are above 13 years" will work or will I have to ask the users age?" You have to require some affirmative action. Implicit consent (just continuing) is not acceptable (ibid.) "3) The GDPR requires the data collector to have a proof of the users consent. Now what kind of proof will be required for my App? I am ensuring that the user cannot move forward without providing the consent (only once) is that sufficient as a proof or is any other proof required?" If you are collecting data about the user, you should record the time and date consent was given as part of the user profile. If you are not collecting data about the user (this is only done by third party services such as Google analytics etc.) and there are no user profile, then preventing the user from using the app will have to do. The GDPR also requires data-minimization, and creating a user profile to record consent when no user profile is otherwise required will violate data-minimization-principles. | Any processing of personal data needs a legal basis, for example necessity for some contract or legitimate interest. If no other legal basis allows the processing, you need to acquire consent. Consent must be freely given. If something is gated behind consent without that consent being really necessary, this might coerce users and they would not be able to consent freely. The GDPR does not have a hard ban on this, but it explicitly calls out that this case must be considered when determining whether consent is valid. So what your company is trying to do is in a dark grey area. Not necessarily wrong, but likely so. Consent could be made free if users have an actual choice. For example, some online newspaper sites had success with a “pay or consent” wall. (Success in the sense that some data protection authorities allowed this). In your case, this could mean that users either consent to extra data collection, or that they buy some reasonably priced premium mode. But none of this is for you to decide. You can voice your doubts that the software would be compliant. You could also ask if the Data Protection Impact Assessment document for this proposed processing is available (creating such an assessment is likely mandatory in this case). But in the end, it is the company's obligation to be compliant, and this responsibility is largely shouldered by the company's data protection officer (to whom you can turn with further questions). |
Is it legal to provide customer service only via social media (UK) I bought an item from an online store in the UK and imported it to EU. The UK shop did not deduct taxes, and I had to pay the import fee + my own country's taxes (calculated on the price containing UK tax) when receiving the item. I contacted the UK shop to at least get a refund of the UK taxes. To my understanding a customer only pays tax to one country. To receive a refund from the shop, they are asking me to send my customs documents via social media as they don't accept attachments in e-mails. Is it legal for a shop in the UK to only provide customer service via social media? (Whatsapp/FB/Twitter) The shop does have physical shops in the UK. | It is not legal in the case of a company. They must also accept communications by post. In the UK, "a company must at all times have a registered office to which all communications and notices may be addressed." (s 86, Companies Act 2006). It must display the address of its registered office on its website, business letters, and order forms (r 25, Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business (Names and Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015). It must also disclose the address to you if you ask for it in writing (r 27). A failure to do either of these is a criminal offence (r 28). As a practical matter you can also look up the address yourself on the Companies House register if you know the name or registered number of the company. The company must provide you with its registered name on all forms of business correspondence (r 24) (this is a wider definition than that for disclosure of its registered office address). A company cannot rely on the fact that the registered office address it has given to Companies House is out of date. It must continue to accept communications at any address on the register for 14 days after it notifies Companies House of any change. (s 87, Companies Act 2006). | If the Kenya legislature passes such a law, they can impose such a requirement on Kenyans who want to create such social media groups. Note that this is a license from the Kenyan government, not a copyright or trademark license. In effect, it is a tax on running a social media group, along with various regulations. I have no idea if this bill is at all likely to pass. If it does pass, it might be hard to enforce, as it would probably require cooperation from Facebook and other social media platforms, and the companies which run those platforms are not located in Kenya, and might not cooperate. | Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive. | Ignoring morals, is there legal obligation for him to attempt to return the refund? No, but he must pay for the goods if the supplier asks. Does this fall under unjust enrichment? No. This is simply a contract law issue. The person is contractually obliged to pay for the goods and, in the present circumstances, they haven’t done so. If so, to what extent must he try? He doesn’t have to make an active effort to pay but he can if he likes. However, if and when the vendor realises their mistake and asks for payment, it must be made in a reasonable time. | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. | According to this site in the UK apparently there are laws against calling something free if it was part of the entire package before or if was added later and the price went up Example of the latter: LG sold a TV. They then added a sound bar, increased the price and listed the TV as TV for $XXX + free sound bar. They ran afoul of the regulations Also adding something and calling the addition free is okay if the price didn't go up but you can only advertize it as free for 6 months. After 6 months the law considers it included by default and therefore no longer free. | The usual method is that every country charges you income tax for income that you make while your body is in the country. Big exception is the USA which wants a chunk of every income, and some countries like Germany calculate your tax rate based on world wide income, but charge that tax rate on your income in Germany. "Double taxation agreements" usually have the purpose that if two countries think you should pay tax on the same money, then somehow you only pay once. If you were a US citizen, then being tax-free in Indonesia wouldn't help you at all, because the USA would want full US tax minus zero Indonesian tax. In the UK, you need to check what money you have to pay tax on as a UK citizen, especially in the first and last year when you are still in the UK. For the use of a bank account in which country, ask a lawyer. Especially as making a stupid mistake could be very costly. It may be easier to set up a company in Indonesia and your company pays the company, because it is very unlikely that your UK company wants to learn about Indonesian tax law and risk getting it wrong. | Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46". |
Why does the US not exercise universal jurisdiction in cases of human rights violations? In the recent supreme court case Nestlé USA Inc. v. Doe, the court ruled that Nestlé USA could not be sued for actions it took overseas--specifically, it could not be held liable for knowingly aiding and abetting in the slave trade on the Ivory Coast. I find this very strange, given that participating in the slave trade is a gross violation of human rights. There was a similar ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., though in that case, the actions of the corporations were even more extreme, and included extrajudicial killings. From what I can gather, a US citizen could literally commit first-degree murder in another country, and not be held liable in US courts. From looking at the decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it seems a corporation could go so far as to commit genocide in another country and not be held accountable in US courts. My question is basically this: Why is US law set up in this way? | From what I can gather, a US citizen could literally commit first-degree murder in another country, and not be held liable in US courts. Yes. From looking at the decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it seems a corporation could go so far as to commit genocide in another country and not be held accountable in US courts. Yes. Why is US law set up in this way, and why has nothing been done to change it? Extraterritorality The modern nation-state is part of the Westphalian tradition of sovereignty which takes as a core value that the internal laws of each nation-state are a matter for it and it alone. This is baked into international law as part of the UN charter: "nothing ... shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The basic assumption of criminal law is that it is, by default, territorial. If a US national commits a crime in the Ivory Coast, then that is primarily the Ivory Coast's problem to deal with. There are both practical and political reasons why this is a good idea. The practical matters are that law enforcement and the courts in the Ivory Coast have the on-the-ground resources and knowledge to investigate and prosecute the crime and the US doesn't. US police forces can't collect evidence and interview witnesses in the Ivory Coast unless the Ivory Coast allows it. US courts can't subpoena witnesses. On the flip side, foreign jurisdictions don't have to follow the US Constitution when conducting searches and beating up, I mean, interrogating, suspects. That may make a lot of the evidence collected in foreign jurisdictions inadmissible in US courts. The political reasons are the US (and anyone else) should stay the f&^% out of the internal operations of other countries. The treaty of Westphalia ended 30 years of the most brutal warfare in history, which killed an estimated one-third of Europe's population, which was largely fought because the ruler of country X wanted to tell the ruler of country Y what religion they should have. Extraterritorality in US law Constitutional restrictions can limit exterritoriality. First, the statute must be within Congress' power to enact. Second, neither the statute nor its application may violate due process or any other constitutional right (see above). The presumption is that Federal laws only apply within US territory. To be extraterritorial, Congress must make this clear, ideally explicitly, but the courts can find that some laws are implicitly extraterritorial based on their language. Other nation's approach is different. For example, a French citizen is subject to French as well as local law everywhere in the world. | Under 47 U.S. Code § 230(e)(1), Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute. Section 230 exists to protect site operators from civil lawsuits and overzealous state/local prosecutors (there's now also an exception for prostitution and sex trafficking, but that didn't exist back in 2013). It doesn't protect site operators from federal criminal prosecution. For that, the same rules apply to site operators as apply to everyone else. Ulbricht knew and intended Silk Road to operate as a drug trafficking site, so he was criminally liable for operating it as one. | In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue. | I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify. | The governing law would be the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). The relevant part is Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. Diplomats are also immune from civil and criminal prosecution. Technically, it wasn't a US diplomat but a family member, but by Article 37 they have the same protection. The linked article suggests that her diplomatic immunity ended, but that's a bit of a non-issue. The host nation (the UK in this case) can declare anyone, diplomats or family to be persona non grata which indeed ends diplomatic immunity, but only after the person is allowed to leave the host nation. And when the act happened, the immunity was in place. Immunity cannot retroactively be withdrawn by the host nation. | You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective). | It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action. | The order itself is here. It applies to "any United States person", which includes citizens, LPRs, entities with a US basis, and any other person in the US including tourists. It applies to transactions, and not static possession. There is no exception to the effect that "you can trade as long as it's not on the NYSE", and it says Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited The order is not just directed at brokers, or the NYSE, it applies to everybody / everything everywhere, if you are a US person. Apparently there was some unclarity on the OTC question, which was clarified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to the effect that it includes OTC trading. |
Is it legal to film someone and upload it to YouTube? Is it legal to film someone and upload it to YouTube? I keep seeing videos of people throwing racial slurs or doing something bad on YouTube. I am wondering if it's even legal to post people doing these things on a public platform without their consent. Can you be successfully sued for this? I am thinking you can seriously get sued since it can cause someone to lose a job or worse. What are the U.S. laws on this? | You have no right to privacy in public What you do and say in public is … public. In general, in common law jurisdictions, anyone and everyone has the right to record you unless you have a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. Where the exact line on that is situational but if you are shouting racist slurs, you don’t have it. The person who made the recording owns the recording and none of the people in the recording have a say in what they do with it. However, under privacy laws like the GDPR, a person’s image and voice are personal data so any data processor must have a legal reason for processing it. However, such laws do not usually extend to private individuals acting in a private capacity. So images captured on a private phone are unlikely to be caught while images on a corporate CCTV system will be. | Hate Speech is not a crime in the United States. Rather, they have "Hate Crimes" which are charged only when the prosecution wishes to show that the crime was motivated by hatred of a protected class of people (I.E. the killer shouts a slur at his victim.). They cannot be charged in absence. Spoken word, advocacy for policies that favor one protected class over another, and other signs of hatred are not in and of themselves crimes. Unless a content provider is physically within Australia's borders, their is little legal recourse. The United States does not extradite anyone to a country to face charges for crimes that are not criminal offenses in the United States. Since the site promotes these ideas but has not used the ideas as a motivation to engage criminal activity, they would not extradite the accused individual(s). | No Any such law would violate the US First Amendment as an improper restriction of speech and of the press. If done by the court rather thiygh a law, it would also conflict with 17 USC 105 which says that: Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government Courts have restricted video and still photography of court proceedings, on the ground that the presence of cameras would disturb court sessions and distract witnesses and jurors. But that would not apply to the proceedings of an appellate court. | Sound recordings can be, and new ones normally are, protected by copyright. The copyright would usually be held by the person who made the recording, or that person's employer, not by the speaker if that is a different person. Use of such a recording without permission might well be copyright infringement. But more clearly and directly, broadcasting a statement: I am {performer} and you are listening to {song name} on my favorite station {station name } without authorization from the performer would in many jurisdictions violate the performer's right of publicity, giving the performer grounds to sue the station. It might well also be false advertising, implying that the performer had endorsed the station when s/he has not done so. That would depend on the specific laws of the jurisdiction where the broadcast was made. A suit over publicity rights or an action for false advertising would probably be simpler than a copyright suit in such a case. I think that most if not all such announcements are made with the consent of the performers involved, and are probably recorded directly by such performers. (For one thing it is usually in the performer's interest to cooperate with stations and networks that play the performer's work.) If such announcements were somehow artificially synthesized, but with the permission of the performer, and of any owner of copyright in any recording used, I don't think there would be any legal problem. If an AI was trained to create a good imitation of a person's voice with9ut diretly copying a recording, I am not at all sure if there would be any copyright infringemetn under current law. That may be an area where the law will need to change to respond to the technology. But if such an imitation were used without permission to make the kind of statements discussed above, the personality rights issue and false advertising issue would still be there. Those do not in any way depend on whether the announcement uses a copy of a recording or not, those are both about the use of someone's name and reputation without authorization. In fact, even if the announcement did not pretend to use the performer's voife, those woudl still bne an issue. Suppose the announcer saids, in his orm her own voice: {Performer} said to tell you that s/he is glad thit his/her song is being playing on his favorite outlet {station name}. There is no technical fakery there, deep or shallow, but if done without authorization it is still a problem, or would be in some jurisdictions at least. If technology is used to create a plausible imitation of someone's voice, but it was not distributed with any claim, direct or implied, to be that person, then the case is different. I suspect that in most jurisdictions there would be no grounds for legal action, just as celebrity imitators do not need permission as long as they don't fake endorsements. | There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use. | These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information. | All Government produced documents in the United States are public domain, as they belong to the people. The company may be asking for license to use their film, which may include several other clips that they put in any order. Their film, specifically, including any explanatory dialog, commentary, or editing choices, are not fair game. However, the clip you are asking about is not copyrighted and is fair for any use. | I see that channel offers playlists and "videos" of popular music by several artists. The one video I tried had the music with no accompanying video or images. The channel's about page says that then operator does not own the copyrights to the music and cannot grant others permission to play it. It is possible that the channel operator has obtained permission from the artists and is thus operating under a valid license. It is possible that the channel is committing copyright infringement, but the various copyright owners have not noticed the channel, or have noticed it but decided not to take action. There is no easy way for an outsider to tell which of these is correct. If the operator has not obtained proper permission, then it seems that this would be copyright infringement. If so, any copyright owner could send a takedown notice, use YouTube's own copyright complaint mechanism, or could file a copyright infringement suit. But nothing compels the owner to act if the owner chooses not to, it is entirely the owner's choice. I do not see that the US fair use or any other exception to copyright would be likely to apply here. If the owner brought suit and won (and a win seems likely to me, from what I can see), the operator would be liable for damages, which might be sizable, or mild. In the US at least the owner could also obtain a court order (injunction) requiring the operator to stop using the owner's copyrighted music. If the owner complained to YouTube, the site could add a "copyright strike" against the operator's account. After a few strikes (I think three) YouTube will cancel the account, according to its posted policies. Similar outcomes could face anyone else who posted or made available for streaming copyrighted content (such as music) without permission from the copyright owner. But again, everything depends on action by the copyright owner. If the owner chooses, for whatever reason, not to act, then nothing is likely to be done about the infringement. |
Can a company in the US that developed a technology, and kept it secret without patenting it keep other companies from patenting the same technology? Let's say company A developed a technology, but didn't apply for a patent in the US. Ten years later, Company B applies for a patent for the same technology. Can company A void the patent saying there's prior art that was kept secret by them? | No - prior art essentially means “published prior art”. If a company decides to keep something a trade secret rather trying to patent (this involves disclosure) they take a chance that someone else will independently invent and patent it. Under the 2012 AIA law in the US such a company can have limited rights to keep doing what they were doing, where they were doing it, to the extent they were doing it. From Wikipedia Prior art (state of the art or background art), in most systems of patent law, is constituted by all information that has been made available to the public in any form before a given date that Prior art (state of the art or background art), in most systems of patent law, is constituted by all information that has been made available to the public in any form before a given date that might be relevant to a patent's claims of originality. be relevant to a patent's claims of originality. | It just doesn’t happen. It is prohibited for a patent examiner to get a patent or any interest in a patent other than by inheritance Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 4, patent examiners, other Office employees, and Office officers may not apply for a patent or acquire any right or interest in any patent during the period of their employment with the Office and for one year thereafter. and a patent attorney would lose their USPTO registration and law license at a minimum for violating their oath. Very few inventions have the potential to make enough money to risk a career. You will need to trust in the professionalism of many people on the path to making your idea a profitable reality. | Designs in publications are prior art If a party publishes a design in any way to the public, no other party can patent it and the publishing party only has a narrow window to file for a patent if the jurisdiction even allows for that.1 However, a publication of the underlying material doesn't invalidate a previous patent. In fact, requesting a patent requires disclosure and publication. Academic publications do count as a publication of the mechanism and are grounds to void a patent filed after the publication date. 1 - In the US, there is a general timeframe for that, in other jurisdictions, such a timeframe is only given if the publication was to acquire a patent in a different country. | Unless you have a legally valid IP right related to the specification that statement is meaningless. When a software license is granted it is based on the copyright of the code. The copyright of the spec. just stops people from copying the spec - it does not protect the information in it. You can restrict copying of the spec. under copyright, you can make up a name for the spec (like USB or Bluetooth) and get a trademark and only allow the trademark use in limited cases(doesn’t stop implementation of the spec), or get a patent that would be necessarily infringed if something complying with the spec was created and used, sold, made, etc. or you can keep it secret and only show it to people who contractually agreed with your terms. | First, "I've seen some people say it is legal to do so but I want a second opinion." This is not a legal opinion. This is only in response to the question "Can you use (TM) on a product that is not Trademarked"? Second, you did not specify a jurisdiction. Since you mentioned Apple, I will assume USA. tl/dr: Yes, you can used the TM mark and no, it is not fraudulent. In the USA, there are three "trademark" symbols, (R), (TM), and (SM). (R) - (Registered) The federal registration symbol. This may be used only once the mark is actually registered in the USPTO. It my not be used while the application is pending. (TM) - (Trademark) / (SM) - (Service Mark) - According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office: If you claim rights to use a mark, you may use the "TM" (trademark) or "SM" (service mark) designation to alert the public to your claim of a "common-law" mark. No registration is necessary to use a "TM" or "SM" symbol and you may continue to use these symbols even if the USPTO refuses to register your mark. Those symbols put people on notice that you claim rights in the mark, although common law doesn't give you all the rights and benefits of federal registration. | However, this uses the text "rights in an invention"; does that cover copyright? Yes. (Is this the correct law?) It certainly seems to be. Does "Relate … to the employer's business" cover the entirety of software engineering, or just the particular software engineering my employer does? Imagine that you work for a company that writes trading software. In your spare time, you develop a photo editing tool. Do you think a court would find that your project "related to the employer's business"? I do not. Or does my employer own copyright on everything down to the love letters I write? Google does not own everything their employees create; they only claim to. If someone challenged them on it, a court would decide, and probably not in their favor. | Protect against what? A US patent would, theoretically, let you try to stop anyone in the US from importing a product that infringes one of its claims. To try to stop manufacturer in an other location from producing a product and selling it other than in the US you either need a patent in the location if manufacture or or selling. Of course you can also try to accomplish this by contract with the manufacturer. They may honor a contract and to not sell other than to you. But if are wildly successful you won’t be able to stop a different manufacturer in China, Vietnam or anywhere else. One bit of advice might be to get good IP coverage for anything made, sold, offered for sale, imported or used in the US via US patents and be content with wild success in one of the largest markets protectable under one patent. Some people advocate breaking your design down into interconnectable components and have different makers in different areas make each with final assembly in the US. Others say just go fast and make money while you can. Also you can license to a big company with some clout and money for attorneys. You get much less per unit but push many costs and hassles to them. | Patents become enforceable when granted, not before. However there is something called provisional rights (absolutely nothing to do with provisional applications). In the US, under 35 USC 154(d), if a claim in a published application is “substantially identical” to a claim that eventually issues, a patent owner can get damages of at least a reasonable royalty on units produced between the publication and notice and the issue date. Enforcement on this must await the granting of the patent. The infringer must have actual notice of the published application. It is rarely invoked see this article. |
What are the advantages of applying for a patent in each major region instead of going through the Patent Cooperation Treaty? What are the advantages of applying for a patent in each major region instead of going through the Patent Cooperation Treaty? A lot of companies still decide to submit a patent application to each country instead of going through the Patent Cooperation Treaty to apply for a patent. Is there any advantage in doing so? I heard that a U.S. patent is often worth 1.5 European patent, because the requirements are higher, so I am wondering if there's part of the reason here. Could you explain in detail what the advantages are? | Ultimately all patents are issued by respective country patent offices. The PCT process is a pathway for patent applications to get to each location’s patent office. The choice of filing individually or via PCT process or regional schemes like the EPO is primarily based on cost, timing of making decisions about where to file, and convenience. The value of a patent in one place vs another will be related to the size of the market, the enforcement abilities, and the stability of patent laws over time. Some places do a better job of vetting but the value will have more to do with the market size. As of 2021 there is no such thing as a directly enforceable European patent. The EPO issues patents that then must be “validated” into actual patents in specific European countries. The courts of each country enforce under its laws. You could validate in two countries or in 20+ locations. There is some strategy in using the EPO path, A patent invalidated at the EPO level kills all the country issued patents that flowed from it. | You forgot an element of criminal copyright infringement, a minimum amount of copying. I believe the US statute specifies at least $1,000 worth of copied works within a 6-month period, but by policy the DOJ does not prosecute unless the matter is much bigger than that. A matter of terminology: criminal charges are not "settled". They are prosecuted, leading either to a trial or a plea-bargain. If not prosecuted, charges are dropped. Any country where infringing products are produced or distributed may choose to prosecute criminal infringement. However, the country where the products are produced and thus where the criminals, or some of them, are located, has an advantage in arresting them and bringing them to trial. Thus the country of production is often the one to do any prosecuting that gets done. However, often such criminals choose a country with a relatively weak law-enforcement system, or one that does not much care about enforcing foreign (to it) copyrights, to operate in. Thus the the country that could arrest the criminals doesn't, and the country that might want to, can't get hold of them. International criminal copyright prosecutions are, I believe, rather rare. As a practical matter, almost all copyright enforcement is by private suit, not criminal prosecution. Since each country has jurisdiction on the infringement happen within their country, does the mean the criminal case to be settled in each 179 countries? If that is the case, then don't you think this increases the paperwork? There is no need to "settle" the case in every, or indeed in any, jurisdiction. Any country where a criminal act occurred may prosecute if it chooses. In practice, few if any will choose to do so. Can matters like this only be settled from only one country (plaintiff or defendant)? No, several countries can bring cases if they so choose. There is no such thing as double jeopardy between separate countries, unless an agreement specifies that there is, and that is not common. Such countries may need to negotiate over possession of individual defendants - If country A has arrested Joe Thug, country B may not be able to try Joe without the cooperation of country A. Corporate defendants are, of course, always available. But unless they have an agreement not to do so, multiple countries may legally try Joe or Infringements inc for copyright infringement. Whether they will do so is another matter. | General Rules The rules on this vary somewhat by country. In some counties the is no trademark protection unless a mark is formally registers. In others use "in trade" offers a degree of protection even in the absence of registration. The US follows the second rule. Some of Europe follows the first. But in pretty much all countries trademarks (aka trade marks) are only protected when they are "used in commerce" and are only protected against other uses "in commerce". This mans that a phrase or design or other possible mark is only protected when it is functioning as a mark, that is it is used by the maker to identify or advertise a product or service (hereafter I use "product" to mean either or both). Moreover a mark is only protected when an alleged infringer uses the mark (or a similar mark) in such a way that people might reasonably be confused into thinking that the infringer's product comes from the same source as the products of the owner of the mark, or is approved, sponsored, or endorsed by the owner of the mark. A simple literary or pop-culture reference is normally not trademark infringement. This is both because a well-known phrase is not usually protectable as a mark at all, and because a reference to it is normally not infringement, even if the mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion is a very important concept in trademark cases. Examples The phrase "Elementary, my dear Watson" Is often used as a reference to the Sherlock Holmes stories and novels. But it was never used to brand or advertise those stories, so its use in a novel or video game now would not be infringement. Even if a game used that phrase as a title, it would not be infringement, because the phrase is not protected. All this would still be true even if the Sherlock Holmes stories were still being published. The tagline "In space, no one can here you scream" was used extensively to advertise the movie Alien. It had some protection as a mark (in the US), and might well have been registered for fuller protection (I haven't checked the US register of trademarks, or any other for this phrase). A game titled with this phrase might well be infringing. A game where a character speaks the phrase at some point probably will not be infringing. Caution All that said, exactly where the limits of infringement lie depend on the detailed factual situation. Before investing sizable amounts of money or time and effort on such a project, it might be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about trademark law in one's particular jurisdiction, and make sure that the risk of suit is not to great for one's tolerance. | There's a few good reasons that spring to mind. Firstly, it's possible that Tesla or Microsoft have been themselves licensed something where the license is not sub-licenseable. This would prevent them from subsequently licensing you, but a promise/pledge is not a license and they can go right ahead and make promises. Secondly, a license is broadly an agreement between two parties. A promise doesn't require formal acceptance whereas a license does. To answer your question regarding a covenant not to sue - that's something else entirely. A covenant not to sue is a legal agreement between parties where the party seeking damages agrees not to sue the party it has cause against, whilst still preserving the existence of the cause (and conditions may have been set that must be met for the covenant to stand). For example, Party A still maintains that Party B used work that was not licensed to Party B, but Party A has agreed not to sue on the matter, provided that Party B advertises the fact that the work was used. | Yes, in a sense. One patent is US 7444589 Automated patent office documentation by AT&T. Another is US 6434580B1 System, method, and recording medium for drafting and preparing patent specifications from NEC. In most locations patents on a business method are not allowed but, although controversial, they are allowed in the U.S. Of course the fundamental requirement for patentablity is to be new. Since patenting itself is very old any patent on the topic would need to cover some narrow aspect, like the AT&T and NEC patents. I do not understand the assumption that such a patent would necessarily be licensed freely. | Per Art 3(2), GDPR only applies to non-European companies when their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to people in Europe, or when the processing activities relate to monitoring people in Europe. However, the word “offer” of this targeting criterion requires some level of intent. It is not enough for GDPR to apply that they're marketing to someone who happens to be in Europe, but GDPR would apply if they are intentionally marketing to people who are in Europe. I don't know what they are marketing, so I don't know if that would be the case here. Even if GDPR were to apply, it would not be the most appropriate law. Yes, there's the GDPR right to erasure, which applies under some conditions (though there's a pretty absolute right to opt-out from marketing). The EU's ePrivacy Directive provides more specific rules though, in particular that every such marketing email must offer a way to unsubscribe. Other countries have comparable anti-spam laws, potentially also the home country for this online service. | The Cayman Islands are well known as a tax haven. They have a corporate tax of 0%, and that includes income from abroad. So by moving your company officially to the Cayman Islands, you can avoid to pay a lot of taxes. Now of course most other countries will still send you a tax bill for any income you make with business activities within their borders. But there are accounting tricks to get around that. For example, many countries only tax profits, not revenue. So you can reduce your annual profits of your national subsidiaries to zero by having them pay money to your company on the caymans. For example, you can transfer your trademark to your subsidiary on the Cayman Islands and then have your subisdiaries in all other countries pay the Cayman company an annual license fee for using that brand name. And the license fee happens to be just so expensive that your national taxable profits become zero. And no, that's not just a Chinese thing. Corporations all around the world use that method to avoid taxes. | The WHO regulations (according to that page; I haven't seen them) "provide an overarching legal framework that defines countries’ rights and obligations in handling public health events and emergencies that have the potential to cross borders." They don't dictate the conditions for practicing medicine. it does not make that much sense that an American living in Germany could not get telemedicine from America with the same level of convenience - for example, German insurance covering it, and the American prescription being somewhat valid. This would result in a geometric increase in the administrative burden. You need a system for the American prescriber to know what medicines are approved in both countries (and in every other covered country). You need some way for the German health authorities and the insurers to trust that prescribers in the United States are not endangering the health of people in Germany, which means that they need to evaluate the education and certification systems in place in the US (and every other covered country). You need to consider the legal recourse in cases of malpractice: if the prescriber makes a mistake, does the case go to the US courts or German? If German, will the US state that licensed the prescriber honor a judgment revoking the prescriber's medical license? And more. There are simply too many elements that need to be coordinated. With two countries, you have to reconcile one pair of systems. With three countries, three pairs. With four countries, six pairs. With N countries, it's N(N-1)/2, so even with a modest number of countries such as 20, you have 190 pairs of systems to consider. With 196, the number is 19,110. |
What's the minimum age of consent for sexual matters in India I'm confused about the age of consent for sexual relations. Is it 18 or 16? IPC (1860) has various sections like 375 which criminalises sex with girl under 18years of age even with her consent. But some High Court and Supreme Court delivered judgements which conflict with IPC (section 375 etc). So in light of latest laws (like POCSO Act etc), what exactly is the age of consent in India? (Is it gender neutral?) Edit : For further reading on this issue this news article is helpful. | Independent Thought vs Union Of India (2017) apparently states the law of India, presently, and the answer is, 18. India being a common law country, the Supreme Court has the power to interpret the law when the statutory language might suggest something else. The issue is that marital intercourse is often an exception to rape laws (India does not recognize rape between husband and wife). The court ruled that "sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless of whether she is married or not". The court found the legal distinction between married girls and unmarried girls to be unnecessary and artificial, discriminatory, and not in the best interest of the girl child. They leave untouched the lack of application of rape law to married couples over 18. This extends legal prohibitions beyond what is stated in POCSO, a law discussed in para 37 ff of the ruling. One can detect in degree of dissatisfaction on the court's part with the legislature's failure to reach the conclusion that they announce. | what the law says about a person sending nude photos to a 10 year old child. The pictures are of her mom. This is a felony under Australian law and comes under the umbrella of Child sexual assault. The following quotes are from Statutory definitions of child sexual abuse, from the Australian State and Federal Governments. From the legislation for Northern Territory: Care and Protection of Children Act 2007 Exploitation of child Exploitation of a child includes sexual and any other forms of exploitation of the child. Without limiting subsection (1), sexual exploitation of a child includes: (a) sexual abuse of the child; and (b) involving the child as a participant or spectator in any of the following: (i) an act of a sexual nature; (ii) prostitution; (iii) a pornographic performance. This type of abuse would also constitute Child Sexual Abuse and Child abuse generally. The person is also calling the child's mom a whore and talking about sexually explicit acts he is doing From the legislation for Australian Capital Territory: Children and Young People Act 2008 In this Act: "abuse", of a child or young person, means- .../... (d) emotional abuse (including psychological abuse) if- (i) the child or young person has seen or heard the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a person with whom the child or young person has a domestic relationship, the exposure to which has caused or is causing significant harm to the wellbeing or development of the child or young person; .../... | Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice. | Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred. | The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 apparently sets no lower limit on marriage for Muslims. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 then defined a child as a female under 18 and a male under 21, and a child marriage is one where at least one party is a child. The law then says that "Every child marriage is voidable at the option of the contracting party who was child at the time of solemnization of marriage". The punishment (not at the discretion of the child) for a male offender is rigorous "imprisonment which may extend to two years" or a fine of 100,000 rupees (or both). While the political question of modifying the law to allow Sharia and Nikah to prevail for Muslims, the current law does not allow this. The crime is a cognizable offense (section 15), meaning that no court order is required for police to arrest without warrant, and bail is not available. | Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation). | Is it gender-based discrimination against C and in favour of B and thus a constitutional right violation? Apparently not, according to this source LGBT rights in India, Wikipedia: Same-sex sexual activity was decriminalized in 2018. [India] has ... explicitly interpreted Article 15 of the Constitution to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. But many legal protections have not been provided for, including same-sex marriage. ... Same-sex marriages are not legally recognised in India nor are same-sex couples offered limited rights such as a civil union or a domestic partnership. However, things appear to moving towards equality - albeit slowly: In 2011, a Haryana court granted legal recognition to a same-sex marriage involving two women. After marrying, the couple began to receive threats from friends and relatives in their village. The couple eventually won family approval. | TL;DR No Context Let's look at what the Act actually says: 76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (1)A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, (b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, (c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and (d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B. ... (4)A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if— (a)it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or (b)it causes B serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities. ... And let's look at what the Cheshire Police actually say: You/they may be in an emotionally abusive relationship if your/their partner: ... Punishes you by withholding affection ... You/they may be in a sexually abusive relationship if your/their partner: ... Has ever forced or manipulated you into to having sex or performing sexual acts ... Demands sex when you're sick, tired or after beating you ... Ignores your feelings regarding sex. Discussion The Act requires the behavior to be engaged in "repeatedly or continuously" and it must have "a serious effect", meaning it must cause "serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities". The withholding of sex of itself does not have "a serious effect" as defined. As part of a broader pattern of emotional "controlling or coercive behaviour" within the broad context of "withholding affection" it could be a factor in evidence but the law recognizes an absolute right for anyone at any time to refuse sex (Sexual Offences Act 2003 s4). The latter part of the Cheshire Police's advice draws from this. |
Would this stand the test of the Constitution? The back story: Lady in SF Walgreens in Civic Center with accomplice “robs” store fake-coughing and claiming to have COVID. Security, manager won’t touch them, they flee with $90 of merchandise likely no indication that items were subject to “interstate” commerce. The FBI(!) gets involved, and they charged by the U.S. Attorney; at least one of them gets convicted for 20 years and $250,000 in fine for robbery and interference with interstate commerce or some similar statute. I thought there were case law that punitive damages don’t serve there purpose if they ruin the defendant. https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Woman-robbing-San-Francisco-Walgreens-COVID-fake-16319776.php I have a lot of questions in mind so I’ll just throw a few in: Is there a slightest of chance that this sentencing could have happened with the governments compliance with Amendment XIV and Amendment VI? (Not by case law, but by the letter of the law.) Is this sentencing going to stand on appeals as being cruel and/or unusual? | Barela was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce and faces a sentence of up to 20 years and $250,000 in fines. I assume your issue is that you think this is too high (although I don't see what it has to do with the 14th or 6th Amendments). Fortunately, it's also almost completely unrelated to the actual sentence. The number that was quoted is the statutory maximum for robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce. It represents the maximum amount that any defendant under any circumstances could receive for one count of that crime. A career criminal who threatened to kill an armored car guard in order to steal $10,000,000 would face the same 20-year statutory maximum as someone with no record who threatened to give COVID to a store clerk in order to steal $90. In some situations, things like the amount stolen or the defendant's criminal record affect the actual crime the defendant is convicted of. At the federal level, that's mostly not the case. Robbery affecting interstate commerce doesn't have degrees or statutory enhancements. Instead, a judge decides what sentence is appropriate. The judge can, in theory, pick anything between the statutory minimum (here there is none) and the statutory maximum (here it's 20 years). 18 U.S. Code § 3553 lays out the factors for the court to consider. In practice, federal courts generally sentence within the range given in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. While the statute itself doesn't distinguish between stealing $90 by threatening to cough and stealing millions by threatening to shoot, the Guidelines do. Courts don't have to follow the Guidelines range but typically do. If they don't, it's much more likely their sentence will be overturned as unreasonable on appeal. Popehat has a good blog post on the Guidelines, how they work, and why press releases quoting statutory maximums are basically straight-up lies. Sentencing.us has an unofficial calculator you can use to estimate the Guidelines range for a particular crime. If you plug in 18 U.S. Code § 1951 (which translates to the "Robbery" guideline) and enter in $90 stolen, no weapon used, no threat of death, and no criminal record, then you get a range of 33-41 months and/or a fine of $7,500 to $75,000. This is basically the lowest Guidelines range possible for robbery. For comparison, under California state law robbery is punishable by two, three, or five years in state prison. Robbery is a serious and violent crime, so a sentence of multiple years would not be considered unreasonable. But it takes a lot for the Guidelines range to approach the statutory maximum of 20 years. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment. | Without a witness willing to break their silence, we will probably never be certain. It is possible that this was harassment (current ordinance, not 1999 – version in force at that time not available), defined in Arvada if one has the intent to annoy (etc.) and "Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response" (the "record" indicates that there was a pattern of such conduct). We don't actually know that he was fined (hearsay...). | All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality. | As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury. | Reports I've seen are that these seed shipments have false customs declarations, claiming that they contain something else, e.g. this one which was declared as "ring". That would violate 18 USC 542: Whoever enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance, or makes any false statement in any declaration without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, whether or not the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties; or Whoever is guilty of any willful act or omission whereby the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties accruing upon merchandise embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission— Shall be fined for each offense under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Indeed, if they had been properly labeled "seeds", the packages would probably have been intercepted by US Customs and never have been delivered in the first place. International shipment of seeds and other agricultural products tends to be tightly regulated due to the risk of spreading plant diseases. There is also the Federal Seeds Act, 7 USC 1581: The importation into the United States is prohibited of— (1) any agricultural or vegetable seeds if any such seed contains noxious-weed seeds or the labeling of which is false or misleading in any respect; Under 7 USC 1596 violation is punishable by a fine of up to $1000 for the first offense, and up to $2000 for each subsequent offense. | Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established. |
Tenancy Renewal Fees As a tenant I am served up a new "Assured Shorthold Tenancy Agreement" every 6 months where I live by the Letting agent my landlord uses. I have previously debated the renewal fees and their fairness but continue to pay these fees on the bases that the letting agent usually says "pay or we will take legal action as stated in my tenancy agreement I agreed to this". So, this morning I was woken up by some random ideas going through my head. If i'm paying these fees then the landlord is too are they actually unreasonable I know they aren't illegal but are the side effects worth it if I were to fight the agent on this. would I also be fighting my landlord or just the agent ... So I did some digging in my tenancy agreement ... Key useful pieces of information: Deposit paid £1,800 Term of tenancy 6 months Type of tenancy: Assured Shorthold Key terms that help clarify my situation ... 6.1 The Agent shall place the Deposit in a nominated Client account as soon as reasonably practicable. Any interest earned on the Deposit shall be retained by the Agent, and used to cover administration costs. 9.9 To Pay £100.00 + VAT for each extension of the Tenancy So lets get some figures together here ... At the time I write this question out the bank of england base rate is about 0.5% with typical interest rates on bank accounts ranging from around 1% to 4% per annum. lets a assume a low interest rate on a typical bank account of around 2% is put on that deposit each year so the agent receives £360 for doing literally nothing. Then 6 months later they get another £120 from me for opening up the existing digital copy of the contract they have for me and moving the dates on by 6 months and printing a couple copies then charging me to sign them. so, per year the agent gets £500 for sending out 2 copies of the same document 2 twice and then filing it away. ... and that's just what they charge me. It's reasonable to assume the agent is charging the landlord too, and probably similar figures. ... I have some options ... Simply refuse to sign new agreements and risk eviction. Sign the agreements but then have to justify to a judge why refused to uphold clause 9.9 in the contract. Contact the landlord direct and agree the stupidity of these costs in order to put in place a longer term agreement (assuming he's willing) ... I have also noticed that there may be some precedent to argue the fees under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 but that's vague and may not directly apply here. In Scotland however I noticed that such fees have been made illegal and pressure is mounting to make it law here. So, my question is ... Have I explored all the options here and if not what other possible routes could someone go down if presented with this situation? | There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term. | I haven't listened to the podcast, but this is probably referring to the anticipated "Renters Reform Bill". A white paper was published on 16 June 2022. There is no Bill before Parliament yet, so the mooted changes are quite a long way from happening. (Additionally, the usual political churn may mean that this does not happen at all. The Secretary of State has already changed, and will likely change again once there is a new Prime Minister; political priorities may shift in all sorts of ways; there could be a general election; etc.) One proposal from the government is (section 3.1): We will abolish Section 21 evictions and simplify tenancy structures. To achieve this, we will move all tenants who would previously have had an Assured Tenancy or Assured Shorthold Tenancy onto a single system of periodic tenancies. Tenants will need to provide two months’ notice when leaving a tenancy, ensuring landlords recoup the costs of finding a tenant and avoid lengthy void periods. This will provide greater security for tenants while retaining the important flexibility that privately rented accommodation offers. This will enable tenants to leave poor quality properties without remaining liable for the rent or to move more easily when their circumstances change, for example to take up a new job opportunity. Landlords will only be able to evict a tenant in reasonable circumstances, which will be defined in law, supporting tenants to save with fewer unwanted moves. Currently, tenants on an AST cannot leave their tenancy during the fixed term, unless the tenancy agreement specifically provides for this with a "break clause". A break clause might say that after six months, the tenant is allowed to terminate the arrangement with one month of notice to the landlord. Or there might be no break clause at all, so that the arrangement can end early only if the landlord and tenant agree ("surrendering the tenancy"). Once the fixed term ends, it can be renewed for another fixed term, or terminated, or else it rolls on to become a "periodic tenancy", typically month-to-month. The tenant can give notice to quit during this time. The government's proposal seems to amount to having no initial fixed term, but a statutory periodic tenancy from the get-go. As far as timing, the white paper says: We will provide at least six months’ notice of our first implementation date, after which all new tenancies will be periodic and governed by the new rules. Specific timing will depend on when Royal Assent is secured. To avoid a two-tier rental sector, and to make sure landlords and tenants are clear on their rights, all existing tenancies will transition to the new system on a second implementation date. After this point, all tenants will be protected from Section 21 eviction. We will allow at least twelve months between the first and second dates. Again, the Bill has not been introduced to Parliament or even published in draft, so Royal Assent is a long way off. | If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord. | Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction. | One possible reading of this clause is: The tenant is required to pay for the preparation of a forfeiture notice, even if ("notwithstanding that") the forfeiture doesn't actually happen ("forfeiture is avoided")--but the tenant doesn't have to pay for the notice if the forfeiture doesn't happen for the following reason ("avoided otherwise than by"): because the court said so ("by relief granted by the court"). In other words: if the Court says the forfeiture notice is bogus, the tenant doesn't have to pay for it. Otherwise, he or she does. | Please note that I can't provide legal advice and consider the following as suggestions you can and should discuss with a lawyer of your choice: You are probably member of a tax-advisory association (Lohnsteuerhilfeverein). These associations can only advise its members on their tax declarations. Therefore you are indeed a member, not a "member". As a member you are presumably obliged to pay a yearly membership fee, and from your initial question I infer that the membership cannot be terminated before three years have passed. That and when you have to pay your fee is most likely provided for in the association's constitution. Payment of the fee does not depend on an invoice, because the requirements of § 14 UStG are most likely not met: the association is not a trader (Unternehmer), nor is a membership a performance (Leistung). Whether you have to pay a penalty depends on the wording of the section regarding the fee in the constitution. If your membership rights have been infringed by not giving you notice of the annual general meeting, this would not give you a defence or objection against the payment of the fee. You could report this matter to the competent watchdog (Aufsichtsbehörde) under § 27(1) StBerG, though: Aufsichtsbehörde ist die Oberfinanzdirektion oder die durch die Landesregierung bestimmte Landesfinanzbehörde. 2 Sie führt die Aufsicht über die Lohnsteuerhilfevereine, die ihren Sitz im Bezirk der Aufsichtsbehörde haben. That is either the Oberfinanzdirektion or the Landesfinanzbehörde in the German state where the association has its statutory seat. | The overwhelming majority flats in England are leasehold, not freehold; older buildings typically have 80 or 100-year leases, newer buildings usually have 999-year leases. Therefore you are dealing with the freeholder as a landlord for the matters that a HOA would deal with in the US. Depending on your landlord you may want to reconsider your statement that HOAs "are pure hell". It is possible for the leaseholders to collectively buy the freehold although it is time-consuming and expensive and happens very rarely. If they do they set up a body similar to a HOA. | I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed. |
How do you get an interest-free conditional debt recognized? How do you get an interest-free conditional debt recognized? Let's say I sign a contract with a relative that says upon my death, you get X amount of money if I have enough money to service that debt, but there's no interest rate and if I have less money than that you just get all of my money. How do I get a debt written in a contract recognized by financial institutions? Are those even considered debts legally speaking? You can assume that the country is the U.S. | Let's say you have an actual contract where you give A something of value in consideration of which B gives you something of value. That way, the exchange is legally enforceable and is not just a cancellable promise. This is all written up clearly, and you become a creditor. One thing to bear in mind is that you may have to wait in line so that others are paid first. For example, taxes have to be paid, also secured creditors have to be paid. Nearly at the end of the list, unsecured creditors such as you are paid, and finally heirs can receive shares of what is left. I don't know what you mean by "recognizing" a debt, but what a financial institution could do is treat a debt as an asset, for the purposes of a loan. For instance, a bank might lend you $10,000 where you pledge your home as a thing of value that they can take in case you default on repayment. You cannot force a bank to accept a particular asset as collateral, so the answer to the "how" question is "by persuasion". Since your asset has an indefinite value between $0 and let's say $10,000, you would have to persuade the bank that there is negligible risk to them. In the case of property used as collateral, when you default the creditor can use the courts to seize your property and sell it, but they can't seize the property of a third party who owes you something, they would have to wait possibly for years for the third party to die and see what's left. Investment instruments might be used as collateral, but only if they can be liquidated reasonably promptly. The risk to the bank is extremely high, but if you are very persuasive, they might accept such a debt as collateral. | Between your mother and you the bank does not care where the payments come from. If they do not get them, they can sue you, or your mother or (most likely) both of you and they will chase whichever of you has the most money and ultimately repossess the house to satisfy the debt. What matters between you is the contract or deed that you signed with your mother where you documented that you would each pay half of the mortgage. Unfortunately, agreements between family members are presumed not to be contracts. That is, the courts will not get involved to decide how much each of you owe - you have to sort that out for yourselves. A signed agreement will usually overcome that presumption. Other evidence may overcome the presumption - for example, evidence that you split the payments 50/50 for some period of time. Talk to your mother. And a lawyer. | I believe non-probate assets are specific gifts you call out -- in the Will -- that are designated for specific beneficiaries. Little Jimmy gets the old pair of lucky Yankees socks, Little Suzie gets the old, decrepit, half-eaten turkey sandwich that Babe Ruth once took a bite out of, etc. This is incorrect. Every transfer arising from a will is a probate asset, because probate is the formal legal process of determining if there was a will, and if so, which will applies, and then distributing the assets of the person who died in accordance with that will (or with the determination that there was no will). I'm guessing things like: 401ks/Roth IRAs Life Insurance policies Savings accounts Stock market investments Houses, land & real property ...could all be probate assets if one does't specifically gift them to a Beneficiary? A 401k/Roth IRA with a beneficiary designation (other than the owner's estate), a life insurance policy with a beneficiary designation (other than the owner's estate), a savings account or stock account or investment with a joint owner or a pay on death beneficiary (other than the owner's estate), or real property with a transfer on death beneficiary or a joint ownership with right of survivorship is a non-probate asset. Any of those assets if there is no beneficiary designation, if there is no pay on death beneficiary, if there is no joint owner with right of survivorship, if it is not owner through a trust, and if there is a beneficiary designation that names the owner's estate, is a probate asset. The General Rule Anything subject to allocation and distribution in a will, or by intestate succession is a probate asset. Specifically devised property in a will is a probate asset. A non-probate assets is something transferred pursuant to a beneficiary designation, pay on death provision, joint ownership with right of survivorship, tenancy by entireties, or provision in a trust existing prior to the death of the decedent. These assets are not dealt with through the probate court process. However, if a will purports to specifically devise property that has a beneficiary designation or pay on death beneficiary or is owned by a trust or is in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, then the non-probate transfer prevails over the inconsistent language in the will. See also: Examples of Non-Probate Transfers Used in Estate Planning The following are examples of non-probate transfers commonly used in estate planning: Passing property to beneficiaries through a living trust. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on a pay on death account or transfer on death account. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on a life insurance policy. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on an IRA, 401k or other retirement account. See financial planning. Holding title to property as joint tenants or tenancy by the entirety. Leaving motor vehicles to a transfer on death beneficiary. Gifting assets to heirs during your lifetime so the assets do not pass as part of your estate. Executing and recording a transfer on death deed naming a beneficiary to inherit your real estate. (Source) The American Bar Association devotes a full chapter length treatment to discussing the difference. It begins: Upon death, a decedent’s estate includes both probate and nonprobate assets. Probate assets are those that pass to persons identified in a will (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of wills), whereas nonprobate assets pass outside an estate’s administration. Examples of traditional nonprobate assets include qualified and nonqualified retirement plans, individual retirement accounts, and life insurance policies. However, nonprobate assets can also include certain checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, investments, and even real property, but only if a beneficiary is designated and state law allows for such an asset to pass outside of an estate’s administration. Nonprobate assets are frequently referred to as “will substitutes.” | The first thing you need to do is establish if the arrangement that you have with the person is a contract or not. In summary a contract requires: Intention to create legal relations. Note: social and family agreements are presumed not to have this intention. If you have given money to a friend or relation, then the onus is on you to show that you both intended to be legally bound; otherwise the money is legally a gift. Agreement Consideration Legal Capacity Genuine Consent Legality of Objects If you do not have a contract then your best course of action is to write the money off and get on with your life. If you do have a contract then, depending on the amount of money, your best course of action may be to write the money off and get on with your life. If you decide not to do this then you need to determine what the terms of the contract are. That is, what did you agree to do and when and what did they agree to do and when. If you do not have these written down in a signed document then your best course of action is to write the money off and get on with your life. Verbal contracts are as legally binding as written ones but it is a bugger to determine what was actually agreed. If you can determine what the terms of the contract are; has the other person broken any of them? For example, unless the contract says they must: show you what they've used the funds for show you the progress that has been made, and not live extravagantly (this would possibly be void term anyway for uncertainty or meaninglessness) then they do not have to! If they have (or there is a reasonable belief that they will) breach the contract then you can: Affirm that the contract continues Terminate the contract Repudiate the contract (i.e. there never was a contract) Seek an order for Specific Performance Seek an injunction Seek damages | The first step of a non-governmental debt collector would be to sue you and obtain a money judgment (if this debt collector is legitimate, something the comments touch upon). A tax debt is different, if this is a legitimate tax debt. There is usually an internal tax collection agency process that must be exhausted, resulting in an assessment of taxes which then results in a non-judicial imposition of a tax lien, upon which what is sometimes call a distaint warrant authorizing execution against assets pursuant to the tax lien is issued by a court in Oregon. Outside Oregon, the Oregon money judgment or the distaint warrant would have to be domesticated into California as a foreign judgment, which is a basically administrative process that might be possible to do without notice to you (I'm not a California law expert on these fine matters of procedure). Once there was a money judgment domesticated into California, your wages and bank accounts could be garnished, your property could be seized pursuant to writs, and liens in your personal and real property could be perfected and foreclosed upon. Of course, if this outfit is a sham, with a fake debt, this is unlikely to happen, and they might give up, or you might sue them for violating debt collection laws or engaging in fraud, or a law enforcement agency might do that based upon your complaint. It might take a civil action of some sort to set aside in invalid judgment, if it was invalid, but the process of setting aside an invalid foreign tax debt is very complicated even for an average small firm lawyer. Lack of notice of a lawsuit is generally a strong defense to a private sector debt, but is not always such a strong defense to certain kinds of tax debts (and the process for different kinds of tax debts is quite different). | The hypothetical situation would be a material misrepresentation of the facts, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation - both are grounds for nullifying the contract. Under your hypothetical this is almost certainly material and is certainly a fraudulent misrepresentation. A fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts pertinent to a contract occurs when one party, to a bargain for exchange, misstates a fact and either knows or believes that the fact is not true, or is not sure whether or not his statement is true but claims it to be true nonetheless. If a party to the contract relies on the fraudulent misrepresentation and enters into a contract based on that misrepresentation, the contract is voidable by the innocent party. A material misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that will induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract. If a misrepresentation is material to the contract, the contract will be voidable by the relying party even if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. So, in this scenario, the contact would be voidable because there is both a material misrepresentation, as well as a fraudulent one. If the other party suffers a monetary loss because of the deceit, you would almost certainly be held responsible for any damages that may flow from the inducement. | Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms. | A security interest is an interest that only extends as a security, i.e. "Property that is given or pledged to guarantee the performance of an obligation". So for example, a bank mortgaging a house has a security interest in the property, allowing them to do things such as force a foreclosure sale in certain circumstances, as well as claim their money immediately if the property is sold; likewise, a car title loan issuer has a security interest in the car their loan is based off of. This doesn't have to be a loan debt; it can be a performance bond, such as a bail bond to appear in court. A security interest does not extend to the property itself, merely the obligation. So, for example, if you default on a home loan, the mortgage company can foreclose and force a sale, but they cannot claim all of the money of the sale, only the portion corresponding to the debt (e.g. if you default on a debt that is currently 100k, secured by one's house, and the house sells in foreclose for 200k, the bank can only keep 100k (plus allowed fees); the remainder must be paid to the former owner). A property interest that is not a security interest is an interest in the property itself. So for example, owning a portion of a house, via an inheritance, is a property interest; because it is not a guarantee for anything, it is not a security interest. Or in other words, a property that is not a security interest is the "default" state, with said property interest only becoming a security interest if it is pledged in some manner. |
(How) Can I easily export produce from Serbia to Sweden via Hungary? I am from Sweden and I have a friend who lives in Serbia. My friend produces cheese, honey and wine. I'm helping my friend to investigate what would be involved in order to export his produce to Sweden. I have started a dialogue with the customs authorities in Sweden, and it seems quite bureaucratic and complicated. I'm also investigating an alternative route: import the produce from Serbia to Hungary. Once it is in Hungary, I think it will be easy to export it to Sweden, and we can do so without any special permits or certificates. Once the produce is in Hungary, is it actually easy and straightforward to send it to Sweden? What are the legalities involved when exporting the produce from Serbia to Hungary? I have assumed here that it is easier and less bureaucratic than exporting it to Sweden. | Serbia is not in the EU nor internal market, so when importing products you would have to follow specific product requirements, pay eventual import duties and internal taxes (VAT). I would recommend checking out the European Trade Helpdesk for more information about this. As both Hungary and Sweden are in the internal market it should be the exact same procedure to import into either of the countries. Neither of them should be "easier" than the other as the rules are the same. Once the products are inside the internal market area you can freely transfer them anywhere. | You are referring to article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 which contains: Article 9 List of mandatory particulars In accordance with Articles 10 to 35 and subject to the exceptions contained in this Chapter, indication of the following particulars shall be mandatory: (...) (l) a nutrition declaration. In a comment you clarify that you are talking about wine. Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 contains: Article 16 Omission of certain mandatory particulars (...) Without prejudice to other Union provisions requiring a list of ingredients or a mandatory nutrition declaration, the particulars referred to in points (b) and (l) of Article 9(1) shall not be mandatory for beverages containing more than 1,2 % by volume of alcohol. As wine contains typically more than 1,2 % alcohol, a nutrition declaration is not required. See also Labelling of alcoholic beverages in the EU: some facts. | Your caveat about not being a national of either country is a bit puzzling, because your question is about acquiring the countries' nationality, which implies as a matter of course that you do not presently have either nationality. After acquiring each country's nationality, of course, you will be a national of that country, so by the time you are a dual citizen of Italy and the US, it will no longer be true that you are not a national of either country. In other words, it's analogous to asking "Will I be able to get a driver's license after I learn how to drive? The problem is that I don't have a driver's license." US law does not require you to renounce Italian citizenship if you naturalize as a US citizen. I don't know Italian law on the matter very well, but the relevant section in Wikipedia says, without citations, that naturalizing elsewhere does not cause loss of Italian citizenship. Assuming that is true, and that neither country makes any relevant changes in its nationality law, then the answer to your question is yes: you can be a dual citizen of both Italy and the United States. (In fact, you may at that point hold three or more citizenships if your current country or countries of citizenship does not or do not have laws causing you to lose citizenship when you naturalize in Italy or the US.) | To answer the last part of the question: Jurisdiction would be where the copied media is being producted and where it is being consumed/sold. Moving media from one jurisdiction with ineffectual protections to another jurisdiction is part of product piracy. The scheme you suggest might shield the company producing the counterfeit goods, leaving the importers holding the bag. If the importers and manufacturers are controlled by the same person, courts in jurisdictions with strong protection might hold that person liable for the whole criminal enterprise. There is a widespread assumption that the internet is 'beyond national laws.' That is wrong. Enforcement may be difficult in some cases, but the laws apply. If you try to make profits by skirting the edges of law, you need really good, really professional legal advice. | While I haven't read the full agreement (trade deals aren't exactly riveting), there seems to be a few gaps in the arguments given. Here's Article 24.18(3) (PDF link): Each Party shall base its fisheries management system on the best scientific evidence available and on internationally recognized best practices for fisheries management and conservation as reflected in the relevant provisions of international instruments aimed at ensuring the sustainable use and conservation of marine species. In my opinion (since I can't find too much independent commentary on this point), the US would only be required to abide by UNCLOS insofar as it relates to fisheries management. UNCLOS covers a much wider range of topics than just fisheries. There appears to be no commitment beyond that. On the other hand, there's no dispute that UNCLOS is one of those "international instruments," as it's referenced in the footnotes to this section. Also, since the US is not party to UNCLOS, dispute resolution would be through the panels established by Article 31 (PDF link), not through UNCLOS tribunals which might otherwise be possible between Canada and Mexico, as per 31.3, for example. | In the US, it is illegal to sell screwdrivers to Gaza without a license, see 31 CFR 595.409. There are numerous rules pertaining to the Palestinian Authority staring here. Dept. of State has a partial list of countries and their associated restrictions, if you want "like Gaza", and note that they warn you that this is not a complete list. If you are specifically interested in weapons-related restrictions, the US Munitions List is here. There is no generic "anti-drone" system, so you would have to look at the specifics of a system to see if it is on the restricted list, or not. | The answer may vary depending on your state. If you're in a state that's a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement,* there's a designated heirarchy for sourcing sales of digital goods: First, if you're making delivery to the customer at your location, source to the location where you make the sale. If not, source to the location where your customer will receive the product. Neither of those works for you, so you'd continue down the list to the first one you can apply: The purchaser’s address that you maintain in the ordinary course of the your business; The purchaser's address obtained during the consummation of the sale; The address where you first make the product available for transmission or the address from which you provided the service. By my reading, that means that in the absence of an address, you basically come back full circle and source the sale back to your own location. *Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming | When you breach a contract, you can get sued in local court, and if you don't show up to defend yourself, default judgment will be entered against you. Then the aggrieved party will have to collect, but the court in Washington (to invent a jurisdiction) can't enforce an order against a person in Norway (to invent another jurisdiction). So the aggrieved party would need to take enforcement of the judgment to the Norwegian courts. In the actual case of Norway, this is fairly simple, you just call an attorney in Norway to do the paperwork. It might be harder if the other jurisdiction is Belarus. If you return to the US, even if there is a money judgment against you for the rent owed, you will not be arrested for that debt. Depending on the state (about half of the states), you might be arrested for failing to comply with a court order to pay the debt. The difference lies in refusing to comply with a court order, versus simply having a debt. The State Department conveniently lists the reasons for denying a visa. Owing money or having an uncollected judgment against you is not one of the possible reasons, in fact even having been ordered by a court to pay, ignoring the order, and the court issuing an arrest warrant does not make you inadmissible. |
Is it a felony to drive a car that was recalled and poses a danger? Is it a felony to drive a car that was recalled and poses a danger? Let's say a car was recalled due to faulty brakes. Is it a felony to still drive that car without having it repaired by the manufacturer? What happens if you weren't aware? I heard that saying you weren't aware of a law is not an excuse, but I am wondering if it also applies to car recalls. Assume that's it's in the U.S. | Unlikely, but specific facts may change this. The fact a vehicle gets the approval of the NHTSA and/or other safety regulatory bodies will probably mean that it already passed a certain level of safety testing, and any reasons for a recall will only surface after orders of magnitude greater sample and/or testing time. Therefore, the probability of causing endangering participants in traffic and others are negligible. The duty of notice will most likely be on the manufacturer under a product liability theory. Driving continuously and/or repeatedly after notice may be a different matter if it actually results in harming one — theoretically even oneself. | Threatening to report the uninsured driver to avoid payment would be blackmail and illegal / criminal. As a result, they are not going to do this. Reporting the uninsured driver on the other hand is their civic duty. So they can get your friend into trouble, but they can't get around paying. Is your friend insured now? If not, tell him to get insured IMMEDIATELY. And if they are very lucky, the other company doesn't figure out your friend was uninsured, and they get away with it when they make a claim. Alternatively, tell them to figure out how much the damage is, how much the repair will cost, and whether it is worth taking the risk. | An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all? | What you are describing may be the crime of insurance fraud: to avoid that, you would have to admit to the insurance company that you put a "Please steal me" sign in an unlocked car with the keys in the ignition, in a high-crime area. If we remove some of the elements of the scenario and reduce this to "leaving the keys in the ignition", this would probably be be considered contributory negligence, meaning that you failed to act prudently to protect your property. This can reduce the amount that the insurance company has to pay you. At this point, it depends on what state you're in, since sometimes a little bit of negligence (in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) means that you may get nothing. However, negligence hinges on an assessment of the actions and intentions of a party, and what you describe isn't "neglect", there is the direct intent that the car be stolen. Insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional loss. So the bottom line would be that the person would be out a car, and could be in prison for fraud if they did not reveal what they actually did. One should assume that the thieves took a lulz video of the sign before they stole the car, and posted it on FaceTube where it entered the viral hall of fame and was used against you in a court of law, so fraud is the worst choice. An alternative if you have a car is to donate it to charity, and take a tax write-off. | I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? | Driving without a license is illegal in every state in the US, and a judge presented with evidence that establishes probable cause that a person has engaged in driving without a license can issue a warrant for that person's arrest. Doing so is in no way prohibited by the US Federal Constitution, nor by any state constitution. | Since there are cases where it is legal to break into a car, is it legal to publish a guide on how to break into a car online? It is legal to publish this guide. Indeed, it is legal to do so even if there are no cases where it is legal to do so. Does it need to have a disclaimer saying to comply with all applicable laws? No. Could the author be held responsible if someone uses the instructions to illegally break into a car? Generally not. I could imagine that there might be some very specific and exceptional fact pattern where it might, but that would be the rare exception. But see man sentenced to twenty-years in prison after pledging support to ISIS and uploading a bomb making video related to that pledge. | All torts have to be proved. In 99.99% of cases the proof is by admission of the tortfeaser. That is, they agree to pay damages with or without admission of liability. Where liability is contested, there are never any “slam dunks”. There are strong cases, even very strong cases, but when someone else is deciding the case, there are no certainties. Remember, if your opponent thought they were going to lose, they’d settle. Looking at your examples, it seems that the tort you are thinking of is negligence. In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Where the issue is not one of evidence, that is, the facts are as you say and are not in dispute, the question is not “what happened”, but “is what happened negligence”. For all the examples, 1, 3, and 4 are probably not in dispute: there was a duty, the conduct caused damage at law and the plaintiff actually suffered harm. The question to be decided is whether the driver failed to conform to the required standard of care. For examples 2 and 3, most courts would conclude they didn’t. For example 1, some courts might decide that the way the driver drove did conform to the required standard and others that they didn’t. The legal argument would not be about “proof”, it would be about the standard the law requires. |
Who is liable for damage to a rented house not caused by tenant? Towards the end of a lease of a house, the glass in a sliding door was shattered and cost €300 to repair (which was paid by the landlord). When the tenant was leaving, the landlord deducted the cost of the repair from the security deposit. The tenant disputed the deduction on the following grounds: The door was actually damaged by a neighbour during an argument / fight. The landlord spoke with the neighbour's mother (the guy who allegedly broke the glass not being available at the time) who denied vehemently that the boy did it and supposed that the partner of the tenant did it in an act of rage (related to the argument but that's not really relevant), but promised to pay if the police (who had been called at the time) found that he did. Now my question is, must the landlord return the deposit in full and seek payment by pursuing the matter with the police, or can they withhold the amount from the deposit and leave it up to the tenant to seek reparations from the neighbour in question? | Under the Residental Tenancies Act of 2004, the landlord is obligated to carry out necessary repairs to both the structure and interior of the dwelling. The Act provides that this obligation (as with others) cannot be "varied, modified, or restricted" by a rental contract. Meanwhile, the tenant is obligated to not do any act that would cause a deterioration in the condition the dwelling was in at the commencement of the tenancy (with "normal wear and tear" explicitly disclaimed from the tenant's responsibilities). The landlord is not obligated to repair damages caused by the tenant violating that obligation. So the landlord is generally responsible for repairs (and, in fact, if the tenant had needed to arrange for the door to be repaired themself, they would have been able to deduct the cost from rent). If the tenant had broken the door, it would have been a breach of their responsibilities. But if a neighbor, or even the tenant's partner, had broken the door, it would not have violated the tenant's obligation and so the landlord would remain responsible for the repair. | I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right. | This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't | Probably not, although it is impossible to say without reading the lease. Usually leases are monthly. That means you pay for the entire month or lease term regardless of how much or how little you use the property. It seems weird that the lease ends on the 21st, but if that is the case, then you are legally obligated to pay for that time interval. That said, if you want to drive a hard bargain, you could threaten to reoccupy the apartment and stay in it until the 21st which are legally entitled to do, unless he refunds you some money. You would have to be a pretty serious hard-ass to pull this off, or be prepared to go to court. One possible course of action is that you demand return of the key and say you changed your mind and will be staying in the apartment until the 21st. Make sure the conversation is recorded and that he knows the conversation is recorded, or have a witness. He will refuse. You can then sue him for denying you the use of your property. | The landlady is trying it on. The purpose of a deposit is to protect the landlord from being left out of pocket by: damage to the property rent arrears Reasonable wear and tear does not constitute damage. It seems unlikely that the stiff tap is as a result of damage. The hob is not so clear cut: the landlady could argue that it was damaged, albeit by accident, and the cost of repair taken from your deposit. If she insists that the only remedy is to replace the hob, she should make an appropriate deduction to reflect the fact that it is several years old and will be replaced by one that is new (thereby gaining her some value). It would be reasonable for you to expect to see the written report from the gas inspector who has condemned the whole hob in that case. But I find it hard to believe that: the plastic knob cannot be replaced doing so would make the hob unsafe, if the knob can be removed for cleaning it's my understanding that if the hob is indeed broken, I only have to pay what it was worth at the moment before it was broken. Your liability is to return her to the position she would have been in had the damage not occurred. If that means replacing a removable plastic part instead of the whole hob, that would be a reasonable remedy. | Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this. | Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner. | Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble? |
Do legal tender laws prevent "no cash" restaurants? This story about restaurants that only accept electronic payment set me wondering. I know that under legal tender laws a business can set a policy on what forms of payment it will accept, but that only applies if no debt exists prior to the time of payment. I think this creates a problem for restaurants trying to impose a "no cash" policy. Normally you only pay for your meal after you have eaten it, so the debt is incurred when you eat the meal, and the payment happens some minutes later. Am I right in thinking that that legal tender laws would apply in this situation? If you provide payment in cash, the restaurant cannot then claim you haven't paid your debt. Note: not a duplicate of this question because it did not consider the delay between incurring the debt and paying it. | No A debt is created by a contract (among other ways not relevant here). A contract for a restaurant does not contemplate the creation of a debt, payment is to be contemporaneous with the service. Presuming that the customer was made aware that cash payment was not acceptable and that they chose to enter the contract, by ordering, then they accepted that term. Not abiding by it is a breach of the contract. Now, if the customer did not pay and the restaurant sued for the amount (plus damages) and won, that would be a debt for which cash must be accepted. | In placing an order (for anything, not just in a restaurant) and in the supplier accepting it then a legally binding verbal contract has been created. There are terms that come into being implicitly: some come from statute law and some from common law. For example, in most jurisdictions there will be either a common law or specific statute that requires the product to be of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose the customer explicitly or implicitly made known to the vendor. In a restaurant, this means that the food must be presented in a way that enables you to eat it and it must be fit for human consumption. It also means that, in the absence of a time for delivery being specified, that the meal must be delivered within a reasonable time. Reasonable has a specific legal meaning and is an objective test: what an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would expect in the specific circumstances. It is clear that a reasonable time varies with the circumstances. Reasonable in McDonalds is different from reasonable in a 3 Michelin star restaurant and also different from the same McDonald's when it is obvious to the customer that they are currently insanely busy. If the supplier does not supply the goods and services within a reasonable time then they have breached a term of the contract. The customer has several options: repudiate the contract and sue for damages if this is a breach of a condition of the contract (a condition is a term that is fundamental to the contract; late delivery of food probably isn't a condition), repudiate the contract and sue for damages if this is a major breach of a term of the contract (late delivery probably is), sue for damages if this is an intermediate breach of a term or a breach of a warranty. Enough generalities, for your specific queries: What law in involved in restaurant orders? Contract law, consumer protection law, health and safety law, business law, food hygiene laws, tax laws etc. etc. If I go into a restaurant and order hundreds of dollars of food, then leave before it arrives, I would imagine there is some recourse that the proprietor could take. Sure, there is a contract, you breached it, the restaurant can sue for damages. In addition, they could make a complaint to the police that you have acted fraudulently by ordering food you never intended to pay for. However, if I order a single item and it doesn't show up for over an hour, despite me inquiring about it's status, would I be compelled to pay? It depends on if an hour is a reasonable time or not. By inquiring you have demonstrated that you don't believe that it is but you may not be "an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person". If the breach is actual and egregious enough then you probably have the right to repudiate the contract; that means the contract is at an end and neither of you have any further obligations under it including an obligation to pay. That said, you would be on surer ground if you attempted to renegotiate the contract to make time a condition. "Look, if the meal is not here in 15 minutes, I'm leaving"; if the restaurateur accepts this renegotiation by, for example, saying "I'm terribly sorry, we will sort it out" then your position is much clearer. | The "point" of including bank-interest income on your tax return rather than having the government automatically deduct what it feels that you would owe is that the government is not legally empowered to take money away from you in that fashion. The government is legal empowered to compel you to pay your taxes, and there are numerous rules enacted as law or as a consequence of laws passed. You can read the various relevant laws here. There simply is no general law that says that banks must withhold taxes on interest. There might be a specific case when an entity is subject to backup withholding (as a response to a taxpayer not following certain rules). There are also special rules regarding non-resident alien withholding, which could require interest withholding. Apart from the intrinsic political unpopularity of imposing new withholding requirements on people, it is difficult to compute the correct amount to withhold, since not all interest is taxable. In theory, a set of rules could be constructed to require withholding of interest income, if Congress were to pass a law similar to 26 USC 3402. | It depends in part on what you mean by "money". US $100 bills are a prime example of "money". Art 1 §10 Cl. 1 of the US Constitution says No State shall ...coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts... Under the constitution, only the federal government can "print money" in the "universally usable" sense. Anyone can print or otherwise "emit" objects with economic value, and such objects can be voluntarily accepted in trade. State and local governments can incur debts and thus spend money now that they do not yet have, as long as there is no legal limit on a government's ability to go into debt. California could issue IOU-bucks with the intent that a holder could redeem them as real federal money or as gold or silver at some point. This limits the ability of a state treasury to print money, since in principle and practice it is redeemable in gold or silver. Each state has some set of laws and constitutional provisions that prevent writing rubber checks ad infinitum, for example only allowing debt for large capital projects (building) and requiring voter approval; requiring expenditures to not exceed projected revenues; granting emergency debt-mitigation powers (e.g. hiring freezes) to the governor when a state does go into unauthorized debt. In California, Art IV §12 of the state constitution requires a balanced budget, meaning that the state cannot create infinite obligations without infinite revenues. From the legal perspective, private banks do not create money, although non-legally, people may talk about what banks do as "creating money". At that point in the discussion, we will have left law and moved to the realm of economic theory. | First of all, anyone can sue for more or less anything, with a good case or without. We have no possible way to predict who will sue or for what. What we might be able to predict is whether in certain circumstances a suit has plausible legal merit, and if someone filed such a suit, there would be a reasonable chance of winning it. Even that often depends on detailed facts which cannot be discussed or addressed here. Trademark protection is limited in several ways. First of all, trademark protection is limited by country. Each country has a different set of trademark laws, and a different mechanism for registering trademarks or determining which marks are protected, although there are many similarities. If a mark is protected in the US, that does not give grounds for suit in Canada, although if Canadian products or services are sold into the US, there could be a suit there. Secondly, trademarks are protected for specific industries or kinds of products/services. for example, "Bass Ale" is a well-known trademark for a beverage. But that does not mean that "Bass Media" used to identify a media company, would infringe that mark, because a drink and a media company are very different things, and one would not be likely to be confused with the other. Thirdly, some marks are "descriptive" while others are "distinctive" or "original". For example, "Tasty burgers" is descriptive. It describes the product (or claims to, at least). "Quadzos Burgers" is original. It is a coined word that has no meaning except to name this product. Original marks get significantly stronger protection than descriptive marks. Fourthly, Trademarks only protect against uses in trade, or in commerce. If you are not selling anything, or doing business using a mark, you are probably not infringing that mark's protection. Finally, and most important, the key question is whether a reasonable person in the market would be confused into thinking that the alleged infringer is the same as the maker of the goods or services named by the mark, or is endorsed or approved by that maker. Trademark protection is supposed to prevent one person or firm from benefiting by the reputation and good will of a product or firm with which they have no connection, from, in effect, falsely advertising "I am the same as those guys". If no reasonable person will be confused, then there is probably no infringement. If reasonable people might well be confused, there might well be infringement. | Is there a law regarding this? The relevant law is the Employment Standards Act of British Columbia which only requires an employer to provide meal breaks for employees but not somewhere for them to eat their meal. (1) An employer must ensure (a) that no employee works more than 5 consecutive hours without a meal break, and (b) that each meal break lasts at least 1/2 hour. What legal actions are possible? None - unless there's a breach of, say, health and safety legislation by allowing meals to be eaten in a refuse area, but that's off-topic. | As a matter of contract law it would not be possible to enforce a requirement to pay legal fees without agreement. You could easily see how this would be problematic: one could just draft letters to hundreds or thousands of people and require them to pay the costs of composing the letter. My understanding is that this is common practice in the United States (see speculative invoicing). However, people are generally free to pay whatever they want to anyone they want. The other side is free to pay the legal costs, they just probably won't. In some common law jurisdictions, the concept of a Calderbank offer may be another reason to write a letter such as this; the settlement offer can be relied upon in later proceedings as an indication as to the costs that would be appropriate to award to the winning party, should the offeree unnecessarily prolong legal proceedings | There are both statutes and customs aimed at preventing "Malicious Prosecution" and "Abuse of Process." (In Pennsylvania, for example, the 1980 Dragonetti Act allows the victim of a frivolous lawsuit to counter-sue for compensatory damages.) One can also buy insurance against this type of risk: Umbrella liability policies will generally provide a defense against civil lawsuits and any damages awarded, as will many business insurance policies. Of course, none of this is to say that a skilled legal team can't avoid all of these countermeasures and, in practice, take up a significant amount of your time and trouble. We do not have a perfect system of justice. |
If the superior sovereign deports an individual, is that a defense for failure to show up to court? I am specifically thinking in the context of the United States, but other jurisdictions where there is a notion of federalism and competing priorities for different sovereigns are also interesting. Suppose an individual is cited for a speeding infraction or served with a civil subpoena/complaint and fails to show up to court because at the same time the federal government deports the individual and as a result the individual cannot show up to a state court/trial. Does this individual have any recourse if a default judgement is entered against them? Or otherwise avoiding penalties for not appearing in court as a circumstance beyond their control occurred? | Yes In general, default judgements can be set aside for good cause. If the defendant can show that they had a legitimate reason for being unable to respond to the cause of action, then the judgement can be set aside and a new hearing scheduled. However, “good cause” encompasses things both unforeseen and unforeseeable and includes having good cause why the court and/or plaintiff/prosecutor could not have been advised of the incapacity before default judgement was entered. In most jurisdictions, they also need to show that they have a prima facie defence such that a different result is possible. The “superior sovereign” is not really germane: good cause can include a sudden illness or injury, police detention (be they superior, inferior, same-level or foreign sovereign), natural disaster etc. | Probably not. There is an unenumerated constitutional "right to travel" (which has been recognized in case law, and has not yet been judicially overruled) and there is also a concept called the "dormant commerce clause" which prohibits legislation by a state that interferes with the ability of people to engage in interstate commerce even if Congress has passed no relevant legislation. There could also be a privileges and immunities clause argument arising under the original 1789 constitution and not the 14th Amendment to that document privileges and immunities clause, which affords people from outside a state the same rights as people in a state. Also, citizens of a state are defined as its residents, so a state only has jurisdiction over someone as a citizen for so long as they reside there. I was born in Georgia, for example, but haven't lived there since I was six years old, so I am not a citizen of Georgia. The proposed Texas law bears some similarity to the Mann Act of 1910 which prohibits transporting people across state lines for the purposes of prostitution (to slightly oversimplify). But the Mann Act is a federal law, not a state law. The proposed Texas law also bears some similarity to the infamous Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which required free states to respect the slave status of people treated as slaves in a slave state under the slave state's law by returning fugitive slaves to their out of state masters, when the slave escaped across state lines. But, this was also a federal law and reflect the greater extraterritorial force of contracts and property rights created under state law compared to the extraterritorial force of the police powers of a state government. There are constitutional provisions requiring states to honor each other's rulings as well, most notably the requirement to extradite felons, and the full faith and credit clause that requires states to honor the court judgments and government determinations of status (e.g. marriage certificates) of other states in most circumstances. But, I don't think that you get there in a case regulating the conduct of a state resident outside the state, or in a case where you want to criminalize assisting someone in the state to leave the state for a particular purpose. Neither of these examples, however, involve state laws. Generally, penalties for doing something across state lines need to be established by federal, rather than state, laws. This said, the issue has not been litigated in this particular context yet, and the legal theories implicated and structure of those lines in fine particulars could matter. States have only rarely tried to regulate the conduct of their residents outside their own states and have even less frequently been successful in doing so. | Suppose I live in State A, but am on vacation to State B. While on vacation, suppose someone living in State C, but currently in State D, accesses my bank account to take money out illegally. The bank has a central headquarters in State E, although my branch of the bank is in State F. In which of these states could I file a lawsuit? Any of them? All of them? The thief would be the defendant in a lawsuit brought by you. The fact that you are on vacation in State B is irrelevant. You can always sue someone where they are domiciled, so State C is one forum where you could sue the thief. You can also always sue a natural person (as opposed to an entity) in a State where they are physically served with process, so if a summons from the courts of State D were served upon the thief while the thief was in State D, then State D could handle the case. You could also probably sue in State A on the grounds that intangible property is deemed to be located where the owner is domiciled and the theft of intangible property was a harm directed a State A. But, there is an argument that if the thief has no way you knowing that you lived in State A as opposed to State F where your branch is locate, that the thief's actions were targeted at State F. State E would not be a very plausible state to argue that there is jurisdiction. A federal district court has geographic jurisdiction only over cases that could be heard in the state courts of the state where it is located, so a federal court case would be brought only in the states where a state lawsuit could be brought. A federal court cases would either have to seek at least $75,000 (since there is diversity of citizenship between you and the thief), or would have to state at least one theory arising under federal law (which might or might not apply to this case). The you can choose which state to file in from those that are available. Which of these states could file charges against the person? A state can prosecute if the crime happened there, or if the crime caused a harm there. In this case the answer to both of those questions could be muddy. Basically, State A or F is probably where the crime caused harm, and it isn't clear from the OP facts where the crime was committed by the thief (we only know where the thief is now). These acts would also probably violate some federal crime that could be prosecuted in federal court, mostly likely the federal courts in State A or State F. Which of these states could file charges against the person? Could the federal government file charges as well? Would more than one prosecution violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment? What if these were countries instead of states? The double jeopardy clause applies to prosecutions within a single U.S. state, and in addition to any state prosecutions, a single prosecution can be made at the federal level. Likewise, prosecutions in different countries do not count against each other for purposes of a double jeopardy clause. Many U.S. states have a binding or non-binding policy of not prosecuting crimes that have already been prosecuted by another U.S. state or by the federal government, the U.S. Justice Department likewise has a non-binding policy of not prosecuting cases which have already been prosecuted by a U.S. state or another country. But these policies do not have constitutional dimensions and are not required by the 5th Amendment. if I use a Canadian Wi-Fi network without authorization from within the United States, would US or Canadian law apply? In criminal cases, choice of law and jurisdiction over the case are the same thing, because a state or country can only apply its own criminal laws. In civil cases, choice of law is a question distinct from jurisdiction. A court applies the law with the most significant connection to the disputed legal issue in question (sometimes more than one set of laws in a multi-issue case), even if it is the law of a different state or country, which is a standard that affords a judge considerable discretion. Either U.S. law or Canadian law could be plausible to apply in this case depending on the detailed circumstances and the legal issue that is disputed. | The best course of action for Barr would be to file an objection to the subpoena in the proper court (probably the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) under or by analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) (which governs disputes over subpoenas in civil cases in the federal courts), if he thinks that there are matters he cannot lawfully divulge or thinks it is improper to divulge even if they are not privileged, and to let a judge decide. Generally speaking, in a civil action, you can only object to a subpoena by following this process and Congress has increasingly used the civil lawsuit discovery process as a benchmark. Failure to file an objection with the proper court, or at least in a response to Congress by the date required in the subpoena to produce the materials, will generally constitute a waiver of the objections that might otherwise have been asserted to the subpoena. Simply not responding without explanation by the due date would be a pretty clear case of Contempt of Congress which is the basis for both a civil action and criminal contempt charges. For example, in the Lynch case, cited below, the Court stated with respect to information that was withheld without any claim of privilege: Failure to provide any grounds for withholding particular records does not comply with the order or enable the Court to resolve defendant’s privilege claims as to those documents. Accordingly, defendant must produce the material withheld without any proffered justification. This said, in any dispute between Congress and the Executive Branch there is always some uncertainty, and the courts strongly favor negotiation and conferral between the parties before bringing these matters to a head. A general discussion of Congressional subpoenas can be found here, recognizing, however, that while there are a variety of grounds for redaction asserted in the Mueller report case, "Executive Privilege" is not among them and so the special considerations that apply to an assertion of executive privilege do not apply. The authority of the judicial branch to resolve these issues has been upheld, for example, in the cases of United States v. Nixon (U.S. 1974) and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Lynch (D. D.C 2016) (both of which involved the more difficult scenario of an assertion of executive privilege in addition to the more ordinary assertions of privileges like the grand jury privilege). Not infrequently, the judge will review the unredacted material in camera (i.e. privately in chambers without showing it to the requesting party) to determine if the claim of privilege or other basis for redaction is really valid (e.g. maybe something that was redacted under the label grand jury testimony is not, in fact, grand jury testimony). But, there is case law to support the notion that Congress would have to demonstrate some specific reason why it doubts the accuracy of the assertions of the executive branch regarding redactions in this particular case to make it necessary for there to be an in camera review. In the Lynch case (which is a non-precedential opinion itself) the Court said: As for whether the redactions are what they purport to be, the Court notes that counsel for even the most disputatious parties are often called upon to trust each other, and that the judiciary relies regularly on declarations by the executive branch that matters redacted from FOIA productions are what they are described to be in the Vaughn index. See Loving v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion by relying on agency’s Vaughn index and declaration in determining whether a disputed document contained segregable portions); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The reviewing court may rely on the description of the withheld records set forth in the Vaughn index and the agency’s declaration that it released all segregable information.”). The Court has been provided with no reason to believe that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of government assertions made in pleadings by an officer of the court representing another, equal branch of government. If in the end, a neutral is required to read each individual redaction and confirm that what the Department claims is simply a name or a telephone number is in fact a name or a telephone number, the parties can arrange for that on their own. These discretionary issues are likely to be influenced by the partisan leanings of the particular judges involved. Another question is to whom a subpoena could be directed. While attorney-general Barr is one possible person to whom it could be directed, Mueller himself is another possible person to whom a subpoena could be directed and that might lead to a more tractable counter-party in the lawsuit and might simplify some of the conflicts of interest present in a subpoena of the attorney-general himself that in criminal contempt cases is enforceable by his subordinates, i.e. U.S. attorneys, who are required by law to bring such charges. | There is a legal concept of de minimis: the idea that some offenses, civil or criminal, are too small to be worth prosecuting. For example, a photograph of a city scene that incidentally captured part of a copyrighted billboard in one corner of the image infringes the copyright on that billboard. But if the copyright holder were to sue, it's virtually certain the suit would be thrown out due to the minimal nature of the infringement. Technically speaking, yes, what you describe is a crime. But any prosecutor who tried to bring charges to that effect is likely to be chewed out by the judge for wasting everyone's time. (Incidentally, assuming the reporter and property owner are US citizens, the crime is failure to cross at a designated crossing point (19 USC 1459, a customs offense) rather than improper entry (8 USC 1325, an immigration offense).) | When you are in another country, you are subject to their laws - you may be arrested and go through the due process as defined by that countries laws. This potentially means anything from a fine, to incarceration or deportation or even execution, depending on the local countries laws. A good example is the caning of American citizen Michael Fay in 1994 by the Singapore authorities, as a judicial punishment for vandalism, or the case of Swiss citizen Oliver Fricker, who was also caned in 2010 for vandalism. | There's been recent publicity about an American diplomat in Britain responsible for a car accident that killed someone. She claimed diplomatic immunity and left the country. Could the victim's family sue her in an American court? They could sue, but the case would probably be summarily dismissed, often one of the following two grounds: (1) related to diplomatic immunity, but not specifically covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, such as common law sovereign immunity which bars suits against individuals or their employers for actions taken in an official capacity on behalf of a federal government employer (the scope of which is interpreted broadly in the case of diplomatic personnel abroad, much as it is in the case of what conduct of the President of the United States constitutes an action taken in an official capacity), unless waived. Cf. Cruikshank v. U.S., 431 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977) ("Alleged activities of agents of Central Intelligence Agency in opening and photographing sealed, first-class letters mailed by plaintiff to colleagues in the Soviet Union fell within purview of general waiver of sovereign immunity statute, despite claim that Central Intelligence Agency agents involved could not have been legally authorized to carry out such activities and consequently, as matter of law, were not “acting within the scope of their office or employment,” as that phrase is used in this section.") If a diplomat is acting in an official capacity, lawsuits can be filed against the U.S. government, but not against the individual, and can't only be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and only then if an exception to it does not apply. The FTCA is the "exclusive means by which a party may sue the United States for money damages ... in tort" (28 USC § 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy). Accordingly, an FTCA action "can be brought only in a United States District Court" (28 USC § 1346(b)). Regarding the timing of filing, FTCA's § 2401(b) states that the action must be brought "within two years after the claim accrues," or "within six months after ... notice of final denial of the claim by the agency". In addition, under the FTCA, "Liability is determinable in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" (§1346(b)(1)). More fully, 28 USC § 1346(b)(1) states: Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. But, 28 U.S.C. 2680(k) expressly precludes the exercise of jurisdiction under the FTCA over "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (FTCA does not apply to claims arising in Antarctica). "It is a longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' " Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Basically, sovereign immunity is absolute for torts committed abroad in an official capacity by a U.S. government official of any kind. So, if the official capacity conduct claim is barred by diplomatic immunity where it occurred, it is barred everywhere. or (2) in cases not arising from actions taken in the diplomat's official capacity, on the discretionary quasi-jurisdictional grounds of forum non conveniens, even thought American courts, as a general rule, have jurisdiction over all civil claims of private persons arising anywhere in the world against a person who is domiciled in the state where the state or federal court in question is located. For over a quarter century, federal judges have assumed that foreign injury cases, particularly those filed by foreign plaintiffs, are best litigated abroad. . . . Federal judges approach the forum non conveniens decision as if it were a species of choice of law, as opposed to a choice of forum question. Elizabeth T. Lear, "National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens", 41(2) U.C.-Davis Law Review 559 (2007). One of the leading forum non conviens cases pertinent to this fact pattern is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), involving an airplane crash in Scotland in which U.S. defendants were allegedly at fault. Potential loopholes in that decision have been closed by subsequent cases. Federal judges are all that matter in a lawsuit between a foreigner and a U.S. person involving claims in excess of $75,000 (which essentially all personal injury cases worth bringing internationally do), such as the one contemplated in this case, which fall within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be removed from a state court to a federal court. (And, state courts tend to defer to federal precedents in diversity cases in claims which are not removed from state court to federal court.) The Alien Tort Claim Act expressly authorizes certain lawsuits in U.S. Courts for violations of international law or treaties committed abroad (although whether the judicial power extends to cases where all of the defendants are non-U.S. persons is an issue of ongoing dispute), but not for simple common law torts like the negligence actions that are the basis of most automobile accident cases. There are also other specific statutes that might authorize lawsuits (e.g. civil rights statutes, patent laws, copyright laws, etc.), but none of them would ordinarily apply to a simple automobile accident allegedly causing a wrongful death. It is conceivable that an attorney could find some way to thread a needle through these two strong limitations on bringing suit against U.S. diplomats in U.S. courts for personal injuries caused by ordinary common law torts committed abroad which are barred by diplomatic immunity where they occurred, but it would take extraordinary facts that do not appear to be present in this relatively routine automobile accident allegedly wrongfully causing a death of a non-U.S. person. Could she be criminally prosecuted in America because of what she did in Britain? No. The Vienna Convention only directly limits criminal prosecutions of people with diplomatic immunity in jurisdictions where someone is a credentialed diplomat or head of state. But, usually criminal cases can only be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where they are committed or the jurisdiction to which the crime was directed if a crime is committed outside a prosecuting jurisdiction but directed at a victim or target in the prosecuting jurisdiction. There are federal statutes criminalizing conduct victimizing various U.S. government officials, but very few criminalizing conduct that would otherwise not be a crime subject to U.S. criminal prosecution if it is committed by a U.S. government official abroad (in some cases, a violation of civil rights claims might apply, but not in a car accident case like this one). Note that I am limiting this to a criminally culpable automobile accident against a non-U.S. person while diplomatic credentials were in force. There might be a U.S. prosecution of a diplomat, for example, for espionage in the form of revealing U.S. secrets, or as another example, for a rape of one U.S. person who has diplomatic immunity by some other U.S. person at the same embassy. The cases could arguably be directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person. The most negative U.S. consequence that could arise from criminal conduct that did not take place in the U.S. and was not directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person (for civilians not subject to the U.S. Code of Military Justice) would usually be termination of employment at the U.S. State Department and termination of diplomatic credentials, both of which would have prospective application only. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. |
Can constitutional matters brought to the Supreme Court be deferred if Congress has yet to fully determine its stance on the matter? I saw at the following wiki page, that the supreme court has decided not to hear a constitutional matter while admitting there is a constitutional issue in need of addressing. Saying the following... The Supreme Court declined to review the case in June 2021.[18] In a opinion on supporting the denial, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh, stated that while there was a Constitutional argument about discrimination on sex on the current draft, they agreed to decline because Congress was actively evaluating removing the male-only requirement of the draft through the 2016 Commission, and that "the Court's longstanding deference to Congress on matters of national defense and military affairs cautions against granting review while Congress actively weighs the issue".[19] Is this a regular occurrence, that the supreme court will not hear cases on the constitutionality of a law, while the law is under review, even when there is a clear constitutional decision to be made, or is this as incredible an occurrence as I suspect it is? Somehow the Supreme Court admitting a case is a constitutional matter and declining to review at the same time seems incredible to me | So it's not that SCOTUS is declining to review the matter on Constitutional Grounds but that it's declining to rule because 1.) It's a military matter 2.) It's under review by congress. SCOTUS is basically saying that, of the three branches, they are the least equipped to deal with military policy and when a better equipped branch is reviewing the matter. SCOTUS doesn't want to dictate to Congress how to change the rules when Congress is in the process of changing the rules itself... but they can say "Hey, we got our eyes on this as a constitutional matter so keep that in mind when you decide on what you're gonna do about this. When Congress makes a decision on this particular law (either change it or keep it), SCOTUS may take a look, but that doesn't mean they'll rule against it, as Congress and the Military can present an argument that it might be necessary for military defense reasons. | From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage. | This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts. | The US courts (including the US Supreme Court) do not have an army or even a police force under their direct control, except for a few court bailiffs. Ultimately, if the executive simply defies the courts, the only remedy is a political one. A court can order a person held unlawfully to be released from detention, but the jail/prison authorizes might ignore such an order. A court might order DACA applications to be accepted, and if they are not, might rule that deportations or other negative actions are unlawful. A court might hold persons who defy its orders in contempt, and send marshals to jail such persons. But if the executive branch in an organized way defies such orders, there is no judicial power to compel obedience to court orders. This is why the judiciary has famously been called the "least dangerous branch" of the government: it cannot actually do anything without at least the tacit cooperation of the executive. Cherokee Case (Worcester v. Georgia) There was a reference in the comments above to the the Cherokee Indians case, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In that case the US Supreme Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Marshall held that the Georgia laws purporting to seize Cherokee lands were invalid as violations of Federal treaties. President Jackson was strongly displeased by this ruling. He was supposed to have said: John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it. It appears that President Jackson probably did not say that, at least not publicly. But in fact Jackson did not take any steps to enforce the decision, and the decision was in fact not enforced. The lands were seized, and the Cherokee were forcibly relocated across the infamous trail of tears. This event shows that a court ruling (proper or improper) may have no effect if the executive branch refuses to obey or enforce it. | Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See "Special Juries in the Supreme Court" by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of "contract judge" who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps. | Thus being a fundamental question of constitutional law, this translates into asking how SCOTUS would likely rule given a certain situation where e.g. there was no confession and the two-witness requirement is not satisfied. In the case of Cramer v. US, 325 U.S. 1, the direct testimony of two or more witnesses established that "Cramer met Thiel and Kerling on the occasions and at the places charged; that they drank together, and that they engaged long and earnestly in conversation", but "There was no proof by two witnesses of what they said, or in what language they conversed; no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value to their mission, or that he had any to give; no showing of any effort at secrecy, they having met in public places, and no evidence that Cramer furnished them shelter, sustenance, or supplies, or that he gave them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks". The ruling (in favor of the defendant) focused on the fact that what was suffiently witnessed was not treasonous (drinks and conversation are not overt acts of treason). The court assigns some significance to the testimony of a single witness Kopp, stating that To the extent that his conviction rests upon such evidence, and it does to an unknown but considerable extent, it rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness not without strong emotional interest in the drama of which Cramer's trial was a part. The fact that the evidence was uncorroborated is dispositive in this case. There has not been a case where a conviction was supported only by circumstantial evidence, and the language of the Constitution plus the meaning of "testimony of a witness" is clear enough that it would be a major break with legal tradition to say that circumstantial evidence can substitute for direct evidence (testimony). A video recording cannot testify, only a person can testify. A person can testify that they watched a video, but they cannot testify that they directly witnessed defendant making a certain statement. Rather they can testify that they inferred from watching the video that defendant made a statement. This is not to say that some SCOTUS could not find a path for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, but that would be a significant break from existing tradition. | There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process. | The most relevant federal Obstruction of Justice type is from 18 USC 1505: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress— I'm not sure if passed Articles of Impeachment count as an "inquiry", and I'm not sure whether failing to "send" them to the other house is "corruptly impeding". Even if those two conditions are met, members of Congress are immune to judicial process for acts taken while they are in session, as part of the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1): ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So, if the person in question is not a member of Congress acting in their official capacity and intentionally endeavors to prevent passed Articles of Impeachment from being sent from the House to the Senate (e.g. a courier intentionally failing to deliver them, or an IT person preventing the electronic form from being copied into the Senate's database), I do not know whether that could be considered Obstruction of Justice, as I doubt such a situation has ever been adjudicated. Given the publicity of the proceedings, such an impediment would probably be found out or overcome so quickly that no one would be inclined to do more than fire the perpetrator. |
Can military necessity override POW rights? Here are some hypothetical situations where respecting POW rights interferes with achieving a military objective: A mechanized column has a time-sensitive objective to capture a town. The column came across an unsuspecting enemy, managed to ambush them and most of them surrendered. The column commander can't simultaneously organize POWs transfer to the rear and capture the town. What shall he do according to the US military law? A squad captured an enemy combatant. Afterwards they came under fire and it is too risky to withdraw with the prisoner. Is it legal to release him? Shoot him? Suppose that guerilla forces want to obey the laws of war. They capture a government soldier but they have no ability to provide him "human treatment" (they don't enjoy basic amenities themselves). What should they do? A Special Operations fireteam is on a stealthy mission in the enemy rear. They capture an enemy soldier. They can't release him as he will raise the alarm, they can't remain in hiding with him. Are they allowed to kill him? | england-and-wales Can military necessity override POW rights? NO. The Geneva Conventions Act 1957 provides prisoners of war with certain fundamental guarantees for humane treatment at Article 4 of Part 2 of Schedule 6: 1 All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors. 2 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: (a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c) taking of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts ... 4 If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so deciding. Q1 What shall he do? The humane and fair treatment of prisoners of war takes primacy, so if the commander cannot complete his mission without properly securing the prisoners it should be aborted until he can. Q2 Is it legal to release him? Shoot him? There is nothing to prevent a prisoner being released (para 4) but shooting him will probably amount to murder and may well be a war crime. Q3 What should they do? As combatants, they should guarantee the prisoner be treated humanely and without distinction - a lack of amenities does not necessarily equate to inhumane treatment, although it may depend on the particular circumstances. Q4 Are they allowed to kill him? No, the prisoner's liberty has been restricted so the fireteam must treat him humanely, which may mean aborting the mission if they cannot safely release him - killing him will probably amount to murder and may well be a war crime. I assume the united-states has similar, if not identical provisions | Although the assailant (or their estate if they are killed) could lodge a claim for damages it does not necessarily follow that they would win - they would have to show that the shooting was not legitimate self-defence but rather was unlawful by, for example, negligence or use of excessive force - say by shooting them when they didn't pose an immediate and unjustified threat. The Federation rules, as far as I can see, are not actual legislation. Although they should be adhered to in normal circumstances, this shooting would be, in the given circumstances, legitimate self-defence according to Article 122-5 of the Code Pénal which says: N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte. N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l'exécution d'un crime ou d'un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu'un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens employés sont proportionnés à la gravité de l'infraction. Which Google translates to English as: The person who, in the face of an unjustified attack on himself or others, performs, at the same time, an act ordered by the necessity of the self-defense of himself or of others, is not criminally liable, except 'there is a disproportion between the means of defense employed and the seriousness of the infringement. The person who, in order to interrupt the execution of a crime or an offense against property, performs an act of defense, other than intentional homicide, when this act is strictly necessary for the aim pursued, is not criminally liable. provided that the means employed are proportionate to the gravity of the offense. | Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water. | If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations. | The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted. | 1) Bob could disclose the PTSD condition and seek accommodation for it (in reality, controlled narcotics aren't actually used to treat PTSD but it isn't hard to imagine a situation where another controlled substance, e.g. ketamine, was used to treat this or some other Americans with Disabilities Act recognized disability and the absence of that disability was not a bona fide qualification of the job). The legal analysis in the case of the FBI (a federal government civilian civil service employer subject to special rules applicable to governmental employers), and a private employer, is not exactly the same, but it ends up in the same place. 2) Medical marijuana is, as a matter of federal law an oxymoron, because it is a Class I controlled substance that as a matter of law (contrary to reasonable facts) has no medical applications, and the FBI is charged with enforcing this law (among other agencies), so medical marijuana would legally disqualify someone from FBI employment. In Colorado which has legal under state law medical marijuana, employers have been allowed to discriminate based upon medical marijuana use because an employer is at a minimum allowed to treat federal law as enforceable. It is conceivable that some U.S. state other than Colorado which allows medical marijuana at the state level might reach a different conclusion as a matter of state law on the employment discrimination point, but potentially, the employer could appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court on a pre-emption argument so it would be a tenuous legal position to take. | There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law. | "Martial law" is not a cleanly-defined legal concept in US law, but it is generally understood to refer to placing a region of the US under military control. POTUS, Congress and state governors can do it, to some extent. Art. 1, §9 (speaking of powers denied to Congress) says that "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it". Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus is one fundamental element of "martial law". Art. 2 §2 (presidential powers) grants relatively little power to POTUS, but does say "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States", so as commander in chief, POTUS can command the army, but in general requires authorization from Congress. At the outset of the Civil War, Lincoln declared a numbered of things which Congress ratified, but this did not include a declaration of martial law. In Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, the Taney (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States) stated that "the president, under the constitution of the United States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, nor authorize a military officer to do it". Congress eventually retroactively legalized the suspension of habeas corpus. Without Congressional approval of the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, a "declaration of martial law" would be meaningless and toothless. The Posse Comitatus Act further limits the ability of the army to meddle in domestic affair, and 18 USC 1385 states that Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. One of authorizations by Congess is The Enforcement Acts, which empowered federal intervention when states refused to protect the constitutional rights of citizens, and this was invoked more recently during the Eisenhower administration and in connection with the Mississippi Burning murders. Another much older authorization is the Insurrection Act of 1807, now at 10 USC Ch. 13 allows use of the military (§252): Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The next section §253 would, no doubt, be the statutory provision invoked for use of the military: The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it— (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution. The rhetoric that would need to be associated with such an executive order (sending in the troops) would resemble that in Texas v. Pennsylvania et al, which did not turn out well for POTUS. Moreover, nothing at all authorizes POTUS to declare elections void and to order new elections (therefore, the military cannot be employed to engage in such an illegal action). |
Use of a trademark instead of a business name Can a trademark name be used instead of a business name in legal information such as web-site and product copyright notices, EULAs, Terms Of Use, Privacy Policy, etc., provided that the actual business and trademark registration and ownership information is published on the web-site in a separate section? In particular, the statements of concerns for me are: "... the agreement between You and TRADEMARK(R)" vs "... the agreement between You and BUSINESS" "... the TRADEMARK(R) is not responsible" vs "... the BUSINESS is not responsible" "... Copyright (C): TRADEMARK(R), YEARS" vs "... Copyright (C): BUSINESS, YEARS" It's for US/Canada. | It's best to use formal names in legal documents. For example, Ringo Starr's musical compositions are credited to Richard Starkey. If you have a business that wishes to do business under a name other than its legal name, you can investigate d/b/a ("doing business as") designation. For the purpose of a single contract or other document, you can usually include language that designates a name for the business such as "this agreement is between Full Name Incorporation, Inc, hereinafter known as Trademark®, and...." You shouldn't do any of this in real life, however, without first discussing it with your lawyer. If you believe that there is business value in calling your company "Foo" when its actual name is "Bar Corp," then surely that value warrants some expense to find a lawyer who will defend the validity of the company's contracts in court, should that become necessary. | Copyright does not Protect Names at All Names and book titles and other short phrases are never protected by copyright, whether they are common or uncommon. The US Copyright Office Circular 01 "Copyright Basics" states on page 2: Copyright does not protect: Ideas, procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, or discoveries Works that are not fixed in a tangible form (such as a choreographic work that has not been notated or recorded or an improvisational speech that has not been written down) Titles, names, short phrases, and slogans Familiar symbols or designs Mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring Mere listings of ingredients or contents For more information, see Works Not Protected by Copyright (Circular 33) Circular 33 "Works Not Protected by Copyright" states on pGES 2-3: Names, Titles, Short Phrases Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. Examples of names, titles, or short phrases that do not contain a sufficient amount of creativity to support a claim in copyright include: The name of an individual (including pseudonyms, pen names, or stage names) The title or subtitle of a work, such as a book, a song, or a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work The name of a business or organization The name of a band or performing group The name of a product or service A domain name or URL The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expressions Under certain circumstances, names, titles, or short phrases may be protectable under federal or state trademark laws. For information about trademark laws, visit the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website or call 1-800-786-9199. Use of a name from a previous work can be one element that makes the later work a derivative work, but the name of a character alone will not m make a later work derivative. There must be significant and distinctive aspects of the source work (not merely common or generic aspects, or bare ideas) that are sufficiently original to be protectable, and those must be used in the later work to make the later work derivative. Even then a fair use defense may apply. Having giant spiders called 'aragogs' would probably not alone be enough to make a work derivative of a Harry Potter novel, but if the detailed description and behavior of those monsters was used, it might possibly do so. Failure to object to an infringement does not forfeit copyright, and later infringements can still have legal action taken over them. Distinctive Characters: Court Cases The OP asks: Are there any similar court cases? In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) the famous Judge Learned Hand wrote: If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin's theory of the Origin of Species. It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.[Emphasis added] In he later case of Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989) the court wrote: The precise legal standard this Court should apply in determining when a character may be afforded copyright protection is fraught with uncertainty. The Second Circuit has followed Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d. Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Judge Hand set forth a test, simple in theory but elusive in application, to determine when a character should be granted copyright protection. Essentially, under this test, copyright protection is granted to a character if it is developed with enough specificity so as to constitute protectable expression. Id. at 121. ... The Rocky characters are one of the most highly delineated group of characters in modern American cinema. The physical and emotional characteristics of Rocky Balboa and the other characters were set forth in tremendous detail in the three Rocky movies before Anderson appropriated the characters for his treatment. The interrelationships and development of Rocky, Adrian, Apollo Creed, Clubber Lang, and Paulie are central to all three movies. Rocky Balboa is such a highly delineated character that his name is the title of all four of the Rocky movies and his character has become identified with specific character traits ranging from his speaking mannerisms to his physical characteristics. This Court has no difficulty ruling as a matter of law that the Rocky characters are delineated so extensively that they are protected from bodily appropriation when taken as a group and transposed into a sequel by another author. Names may be Protected as Trademarks A name may be protected as a trademark. This means that no one else can use it to promote or label a product or service of a similar type without permission. Trademarks do not expire as long as they remain in use. But trademarks only protect against uses "in trade", that is uses that identify a product, or are used to advertise that product, or are used to imply endorsement, approval or sponsorship of a product. If a reasonable person could be confused as the the source of a product, or who endorsed it, then the use of the mark may be infringing. Trademarks are also country-specific. What is a protected mark in country A may be quite unprotected in country B. While trademarks do not expire if they remain in use, if a term becomes "generic" and loses the distinctive association with a specific brand or maker, then it may also lose protection as a trademark. At one time Xerox feared that its name would become a generic synonym for "photocopy" and that it would lose trademark protection. It undertook to discourage people from using the mark "xerox" in connection with photocopying using non-Xerox equipment. Similarly the maker feared that "Kleenex" would become a generic synonym for "face tissue" and took steps to avoid this. However, a single use would not cause this result, it would require widespread use amounting to a change in the language for such distinctive marks to lose protection. I strongly suspect that "Harry Potter" has been protected as a trademark in a number of countries. I am far more doubtful that "aragogs" has been, or even could be, protected as a trademark. The word "aragogs" is one fictional element in the HP books, but it is not used to label, identify, or advertise those books (or related products). Thus it is probably not protected. And even if it were, using such a term in the text of a work of fiction is probably not infringing I could write a mystery novel in which one of my characters has a Coke without seeking permission, and it would not be infringing the soft drink company's trademark. Unless the "aragogs" appear in the title, blurbs, or advertising of the fan novel, or are in some other way used to identify or advertise the novel, they would not infringe on a prior trademark of JKR's even if she has obtained one. | united-states If the computer is in fact a HAL-9001 (no doubt running the Clarke-68 OS) then the reseller can so describe it without trademark infringement. This is a case of nominative use, where the trademark is used as the name of the thing, to describe and/or refer to it. In addition, under US law, an attempt to prohibit the reseller from using that term would run into first amendment issues, and would be subject to strict scrutiny. If the term were used in such a way as to disparage the brand, there could possibly be an action for tarnishment of the trademark. but such actions are now limited in the US on first amendment grounds, following the case of Matal v. Tam. See What is trademark tarnishment or dilution under US law? for more details. | I will note from the outset that journal editors might require things from you that go beyond what is legally necessary. A typical case is that they will require one to obtain permission before reusing a figure from another article/journal/author (even though in the vast majority of cases no such permission would be needed). The legal answer might allow you to push back on the editor’s demands, but they still have the last word. There are two kinds of intellectual property to consider. Unless otherwise noted, this answer is valid for france and united-states. Trademark is almost certainly not an issue Trademark is a right to branding. A trademark holder can prevent others from using certain elements to promote their own products. The elements need not be complex, they just need to be recognizable by the public as related to the brand in question. For instance, "Tesla" is the name of an 19th century Serbian-American inventor known among other things for discoveries related to radio transmission. You would probably be able to market a radio transmitter under a "Tesla" brand (assuming there are no existing trademarks, which I have not checked). If you try the same thing with electrical vehicles, you will get sued. For a research paper, as long as you do not imply that Visa or MasterCard support your research or its results in any way, that should not be an issue. I assume, but cannot guarantee, that the above applies to most Western jurisdictions. Copyright Copyright is a protection or creative elements. Whoever authors a creative work can forbid others from distributing it under certain conditions. Are the Visa and MasterCard logos copyrighted? The first question is whether the elements at hand are protected under copyright. In the case of the Visa and MasterCard logos, this might depend on the jurisdiction. The criterion for "creativity" varies a lot. Some jurisdiction have adopted (some version of) the sweat of the brow doctrine, according to which work suffices to produce a "creative element" with copyright protection. The typical example are databases of facts where each individual entry is unoriginal but the collection might take some time to collect, curate and maintain (such as a phone book). In the united-states, the Supreme Court rejected the sweat of the brow doctrine in 1991. Accordingly, a work needs to reach the threshold of originality. Determining whether the threshold is met for a given work is done on a case-by-case basis at trial. However, it seems very likely that both logos are not protected by copyright in the United States. The Visa logo is a simple font with no significant creative elements; the MasterCard logo contains two overlapping circles. I note that Wikimedia Commons hosts both logos on their website and claims they are public-domain under that rationale (Visa, MasterCard). Wikimedia Commons usually follows copyright fairly closely, and they are a high-profile website hence a prime target for takedown requests by IP lawyers at Visa or MasterCard, so that is weak evidence that their claim is correct. But there is always the possibility that Visa / MasterCard just have not decided to sue yet. In france, the statute makes no explicit reference any threshold of originality: (article L-112-1 of the code of intellectual property) Les dispositions du présent code protègent les droits des auteurs sur toutes les oeuvres de l'esprit, quels qu'en soient le genre, la forme d'expression, le mérite ou la destination. The present code [containing all copyright statutes] protect copyrights for any works of mind, whatever their style, form of expression, artistic worth, or intended use. However, various court cases have tended to require "works of mind" to exhibit some amount of intellectual originality. For instance, Civ. 1ère 22 janv. 2009, n°08-11404 held that a perfume cannot be copyrighted because la fragrance d'un parfum, qui procède de la simple mise en oeuvre d'un savoir-faire, ne constitue pas la création d'une forme d'expression pouvant bénéficier de la protection des oeuvres de l'esprit par le droit d'auteur the smell of a perfume comes from the simple application of a know-how and does not constitute the creation of a form of expression subject to the protection of works of mind by copyright After a fifteen-minute look at various cases, I still do not have any strong idea of whether the Visa or MasterCard logo would be copyrighted in France. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that they are. "Fair use" Even copyrighted works can be used without the copyright holder’s agreement under certain exceptions. Here again, any precise answer is jurisdiction-specific. "Fair use" is a US-specific doctrine, resulting from a string of court cases eventually codified into law (Wikipedia has a decent history). It is a rather general doctrine (any use case can be analyzed under the four balancing factors) and results can be hard to predict. I believe research articles usually fall on the right side, but because the logos under discussion are not under copyright in the US (see above), I will not attempt to make any in-depth analysis. Pedantic note: it is sloppy wording to use the term "fair use" for similar clauses in other jurisdictions. "Fair use" is a US doctrine. In france, the corresponding doctrine is given by a rather strict but precise statute at article L122-5 of the code of intellectual property: Lorsque l'oeuvre a été divulguée, l'auteur ne peut interdire : (...) 3° Sous réserve que soient indiqués clairement le nom de l'auteur et la source : a) Les analyses et courtes citations justifiées par le caractère critique, polémique, pédagogique, scientifique ou d'information de l'oeuvre à laquelle elles sont incorporées ; When the work has been published, the author cannot forbid: (...) 3° As long as the name of the author and the source are clearly mentioned: a) Analysis and short citations justified by the inclusion in a work with an aim of criticism, debate, pedagogy, science or information A research article is the typical case of a "work of science" (science means here "scholarly research", not STEM). I have little doubt that it would be a covered use, especially if the paper discusses the reason behind the choice of those logos (easily recognizable by test subjects? simple shapes? etc.). | Do I need to create an LLC if I already own the domain? No. Can someone legally create an LLC with the same name as my domain? Yes. Just trying to understand what the difference is between an LLC and a business An LLC, a "limited liability company," is a kind of legal entity that has a separate identity from the members of the LLC. The members' liability is limited with respect to the company's liability, hence the name. A business is a commercial activity. The two concepts are independent. A person can have a business without forming a corporation, or indeed many businesses. A single corporation can also have many businesses. Back to the question about someone forming an LLC using your domain name, this raises the issue of trademark protection. In the US, at least, you can't register a trademark unless it is "in use in commerce" (15 USC 1051(a)(3)(C)), which means explicitly that you cannot use the mark "merely to reserve a right in" it (15 USC 1127). But there are many subtleties of trademark protection that are widely misunderstood by most people, so if you anticipate wanting trademark protection for a name, you will probably want to learn about how trademark protection works and likely talk to a trademark lawyer. | A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap. | I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images. | Copyrights You may use the circle c mark (c) normally with a year, the name of the author of the work and possibly the words "all right reserved" without any legal permission. This gives you more rights legally than you would have from the copyright rights that arise automatically upon the creation of the work. Registering the copyright with the copyright registrar simply gives you additional litigation rights and must be done before you file a lawsuit to enforce a copyright. "All rights reserved" means you aren't granting a license to people who see the website to republish it or use it themselves. "All rights received" would mean that you are using someone else's copyright with their permission, but would more commonly be expressed "used with permission of [name of copyright owner]." Trademarks A trademark arises from use in commerce that causes people to associate your mark with your goods and services. You may use the superscript letters TM to claim a common right trademark in a trademarkable item such as a logo or slogan by affixing it to the claimed mark. This is a basis to sue for trademark infringement but requires proof of many elements that can be dispensed with when the Patent and Trademark Office includes a trademark in its principal register following a formal application to them. What you can't do. You may not say "patent pending" if you have not applied for a patent, may not claim that something is "patented" when a patent has not been approved, and may not use the circle R mark (R) if your claimed trademark has not been including in the principle register of the Patent and Trademark Office. (This answer is based on U.S. law, but copyright and trademark laws are quite similar on these points internationally.) |
Are there laws stating that contracts should have good morals? I am reading a contract that is clearly one sided and demands a lot of rights on the recipient's end to be withdrawn for the sake of the lease agreement. The lending party also wants to negate a lot of responsibilities that are enforced by law such as safety for the receiving party. I like to categorize this under bad morals and evil intent and would like to accuse the lending party of such. Although I just want to see some enactments or civil codes that protect citizens from expensive corporations abusing people through signed contracts. The jurisdiction is California. | There is no requirement that the terms of a contract be even-handed The common law position is that parties are free to contract on whatever terms they like: if you agree to sell me your late model car for $1 that's a matter between the two of us. The law allows you to make a bad bargain. Unconscionability There is an equitable doctrine that allows the court to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts or terms. The California Supreme Court has ruled that "the central idea (of the) unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain "… but with terms that are 'unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.'" In other words, courts will not enforce contracts that are "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." However, I would be extremely surprised if the terms you are upset about rising to the level of unconscionability. The basic test of unconscionability, as expressed in official comment 1 to section 2-302, is: whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. . . .The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. They seem to be dealing with risk allocation and moving risks that are normally on the lender to the buyer or requiring the buyer to waive statutory rights and warranties - there is nothing illegal in that unless the law has a "no contracting out" provision. Some laws do and some laws don't. Some laws may not allow contracting out in consumer transactions but may allow them in business transactions. You seem to be talking about some sort of equipment financing arrangement. As such, if you don't like the deal, there's a bank down the street with a different deal. US law recognises that once there is a contract, the parties have to act in good faith to ensure each party gets the benefit of the bargain they made but there is no such requirement in negotiating that bargain. If you can use your economic strength to get a better deal, that's called capitalism. | I can answer for the U.S., if that's helpful. The general rule, in the United States, is that covenants not to compete are enforceable as long as they are reasonable. What constitutes "reasonable" varies from state to state. Factors considered generally include: What kind of actual harm will come to the business if you go to a competitor? In other words, is this rote language they include in every contract, or did they put it in yours because you know all the secret formulas and have the customer list memorized? Is it reasonable in time, location, and scope? Something preventing you from taking any job anywhere in the United States for ten years won't be enforceable; something preventing you from taking a job with the exact same title in the same industry in the same town for the next six months might be. The general rule at common law was that covenants not to compete were unenforceable restraints of trade; the fact that they're enforceable at all is later law created by each jurisdiction, and that means it's going to vary based on your specific jurisdiction. If you want to know whether it's okay to take a specific job based on a specific non-compete you signed, you will need to talk to a legal professional licensed in your jurisdiction--and even she may not be able to tell you for sure. | The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK. | The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds. | No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive. | if a friend hires someone to fix something in their house, but after the repairs are done, the friend refuses to pay, this would likely fall under theft of service. This is incorrect. The most common distinction is intent. (The federal Canadian criminal code provision for theft (Section 332) requires intent to commit the crime, although "false pretenses" (Section 362) is probably a better match within the Canadian criminal code to theft of services and also requires a showing of intent). If breaching a promise to pay that the person making the promise to pay intended to be honor when the promise was made fails to pay (e.g. due to poor budgeting or losing a job) this is a breach of contract. Similarly, if someone accidentally attaches the wrong cable line to their TV and gets the premium package rather than the regular one, but didn't realize that fact, the cable company might have a claim for negligence or for unjust enrichment, but this would not constitute theft. In contrast, obtaining services knowing at the outset that you do not intend to honor your promise yet deceiving the service provider with your promise is theft. Theft (in the context of a theft of services) is intentionally obtaining services by deceit with an intent not to pay for them at the time that they are obtained. Proving this intent is usually prohibitively difficult and no something that law enforcement will choose to press charges regarding, but with very clear evidence (e.g. an audiotape of the person making a promise to pay bragging immediately before or after making the promise to pay about how he never intends to pay in the first place, or in a case with a pattern of conduct involving many service providers on multiple occasions), charges can be pressed and a conviction can be won. Also, to be clear, it has nothing to do, per se, with the power relationships of the parties. If an employer picks up a bunch of day laborers telling them that they will be paid an agreed rate at the end of the day for the work they are made to do, and the employer not only doesn't pay them at the end of the day but didn't intend to do so in the first place and perhaps has a practice of picking up day laborers and then refusing to pay them without good cause, that is theft of services a.k.a. wage theft. if I play a movie from a streaming service and screen-share on Zoom, I would be committing civil copyright infringement (if it is not fair use), but if I give other people my login credentials for the streaming service, it would be theft of service, I think, depending on the jurisdiction This isn't a good analogy as it implicates copyright law which is quite different from other bodies of law. Some acts are both civil and criminal copyright violations. But criminal copyright violations are generally not a theft of services. In Canada, the typical criminal copyright violation involves the sale or rental of the copyright protected material to third parties for money. how does this distinction affect the outcome for a person liable/guilty of either? Civil law violations are a basis to bring a lawsuit against someone who breaches the law in a civil manner for money damages sufficient to compensate the person bringing the lawsuit for the damages that they have suffered. Theft is a criminal offense. The prosecutor's office decides whether or not to bring charges and if it does bring charges does so (in Canada) in the name of the Crown, at the government's expense under criminal procedure rather than the civil procedure applicable to lawsuits. The victim is usually a witness and is usually consulted, but is not a party to a criminal case. If a conviction is obtained for a criminal offense, the penalty is usually some combination of incarceration, a fine, probation and community service, as authorized by statute, with court costs and restitution to the victim tacked on as an afterthought. The measure of what is owed as restitution is typically more grudging than the measure of the damages that can be awarded in a civil lawsuit. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive. Someone who is prosecuted for committing a crime can also be sued if the evidence supports both civil and criminal claims. Someone who is sued can also be prosecuted if the evidence supports both civil and criminal claims. | It isn't uncommon to interlineate contract language, or to cross out contract language, with the initials of the parties to the contract. This is normally only done with smaller businesses, however, where there is someone who has the authority to do so. Some contracts, such as insurance contracts, for example, have to have their language approved by state regulators before they can be used and can't be modified in that fashion. | Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy). |
Can someone create a podcast and read public content outloud? I've stumbled upon a podcast, where the author is simply reading public docs and blog posts outloud. Does this violate any copyrights? Can he monetize this by including ads? | There's usually at least a little wiggle room for a fair-use argument in copyright law, but as you're describing it, this sounds like a pretty straightforward copyright violation. A copyright holder's exclusive rights include the rights to make copies, create derivative works and publicly perform the work. Whichever way you want to characterize the podcaster's conduct, he's running afoul of at least one of these rights. | My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee. | ...articles are never signed by authors. Is it then enough that the magazine itself is in the public domain? Absolutely not. Even though articles are not signed, they are still copyrighted at moment of being written by whoever wrote them, and upon publication by who the authors are writing for. That's basic copyright law; read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berne_Convention Further, the magazine's own Terms of Service outlines this: Intellectual Property The contents ... supplied to you in conjunction with the Site and/or a Digital Application (such contents, design and materials being collectively referred to as the "Economist Content"), is copyright of The Economist and its licensors. You may not use or reproduce ... for any reason without written permission from The Economist... http://www.economist.com/legal/terms-of-use | It is not obvious that it violates the TOS (which is a complex wall of text and links to chase). §3 states that "we need you to make the following commitments", followed by some subsections – you can re-interpret this as an agreement on your part to do this stuff. Those subsections relate to "legitimate accounts and users" (not relevant), "what you can do" (potentially relevant), "permissions you give" (granting them license to use your stuff), not infringing on their copyright. The second subsection about what you can "do" says that you can't "violate these or other terms", or do anything unlawful, or infringing, nor may you upload viruses, or scrape Facebook data. So it turns out that there is nothing specific in that subsection, but it does say that you won;t violate "other terms". §5 presents a bunch of other possible terms and policies: Community Standards, Commercial Terms, Advertising Policies, Self-Serve Ad Terms, Facebook Pages, Groups and Events Policy, Meta Platform Terms, Developer Payment Terms, Community Payment Terms, Commerce Policies, Meta Brand Resources, Music Guidelines and Live Policies. Those primarily apply to advertisers, group-pages, developers, commercial use and content broadcast via Meta. Community Standard applies to everybody, and as you should predict there is a long list of specific sub-categories such as "Violence and Criminal Behavior", "Safety", "Objectionable Content", "Inauthenticity" etc. You would have to hire a lawyer to do an exhaustive search and interpretation. However, it appears that using an ad blocking app is not forbidden on FB, and that seems to be what that extension is. But you should read it for yourself. All. Of. It. It may have violated the older TOS, but that clause seems to me missing from the present TOS. | If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens. | It would be illegal because only you are allowed to view the comic you purchased. Creating a copy of your comic (e.g photcopying, scanning etc) is not allowed, and showing others a copy of your comic is also not allowed | "Educational use" does not get a free pass on the law against circumventing copy-protection. First, "educational use" is extremely broad and could include "to post on Stackexchange", or "so that I can learn something". The cited clause specifically limits this exception to "A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution" – the library must be nonprofit, and the archive or educational institution may also need to be nonprofit (until the courts fix the ambiguity in the scope of "nonprofit"). Second, the circumvention has to be very limited: the purpose must be only to evaluate the work, to see if you want to legally acquire it. So a nonprofit library can peek into a work to see if they want to buy a copy, but you may not. The only thing the library can do is evaluate the work for legal acquisition, and they have to get rid of the pirated copy once they've made the decision. Additionally (other parts of the subsection say), they can't do this is there is an equivalent legal copy available (e.g. if there's a print book available, they can't hack into the e-book to "determine" whether they want the book), and w.r.t. libraries and archives they must be open to the public. | It's allowed by the Creative Commons Attribution -ShareAlike license, and intentionally so. The Wikimedia Foundation wants things like this to be possible; that is part of the goal of open content. (This license is also used on Stack Exchange content, so the same applies to e.g. this answer.) However, it is important to remember that this is not a public-domain equivalent license. If you copy from a Wikipedia article (or an SE post), you must comply with the "Attribution" and "ShareAlike" requirements. Attribution: You must give credit to the author. For Wikipedia articles, which typically have many authors, a link to the page is sufficient; editors agree to this in addition to the license when they save their edits. For Stack Exchange content, a link to the post itself should be enough. (To get a link to a post, click the "share" link below the post.) ShareAlike: If you modify the content, you must release your modified version under the same or a compatible license. You can't copy this answer, add more information (or translate it into another language, or make any other change), and keep an all-rights-reserved copyright on it, or release it into the public domain; your version must also be released under CC BY-SA. As long as you follow these requirements, copying is allowed and encouraged. |
Landlord responsibilities on tenant-built structures? In the US, nearly every state has some form of an implied warranty of habitability created between landlords and their tenants. For example, jurisdictions may require landlords to provide heating, electricity, water, do repairs, install locks, and so on. But does this still apply for tenant-built property? For example, let’s say I own a piece of land and rent it out on a long-term lease (5+ years). My lessee would like to build a cabin on the property, and I add as a term of our contract that the tenant can build a cabin, but that I’m not responsible for repairs. Does the tenant still retain the warranty of habitability if they build the property? | A lease of land is not the same as a residential lease, the latter being strongly regulated by special laws. So caveat emptor is the default rule for land leases (see this article). You have to look at the laws of your state, but let's take Washington as an example. This is not a residential tenancy which is subject to different laws, it's just leasing land, similar to leasing a chainsaw or a car. Your implied warranty would be that the land is fit for the ordinary purposes for which land is used, and that is all. It might be worth wondering about whether building a cabin on the land changes your property tax liability. | You have a contract - if you break it, you can be sued. A contract is a legally binding promise that the state (through its courts) will enforce. You promised to pay the deposit - you must pay the deposit. You promised to pay rent on a regular basis for the period of the lease - you must pay that rent. You don't want to live there? Fine, the lease probably doesn't require you to. So long as you keep paying the rent, you don't have to. If you break the lease, then the landlord can sue you for the damage that they suffer - this is typically the value of the rent until they can find a new tenant and if that tenant is paying less than you, the difference between that amount and your rent for the balance of the lease. If you want to renegotiate the contract (for example, to end it early), you will need to ask your landlord but they are under no legal obligation to release you from it. They may be willing to do so out of the goodness of their heart and/or if you pay them. | By default, the tenant is liable for all rent until the end of the lease. E.g. if neither the tenant nor the landlord can find a suitable and credit-worthy replacement tenant (e.g. if the market has crashed), then the whole lease must still be accounted for by the original tenant, and the lost "rent" becomes "damages". However, there is also a concept of damage mitigation, and California Civil Code 1951.2 explicitly defines that it's the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. This means that the landlord cannot simply sit still and collect the rent on an empty apartment. Because of this, some smaller landlords in California outright have a policy that you can cleanly break the lease by paying for 2 months of rent as a penalty. (It appears that a good summary of various examples about landlord/tenant damage mitigation is available at UniformLaws.org.) However, when it comes down specifically to the SF Bay Area with the ever increasing rents and the lowest residential vacancy rates in the nation, and also especially with the corporate landlords that already have sufficient resources in place to readily advertise and promote an abandoned unit, it can probably be argued that, in practicality, requesting more than one month of rent (in damages) as a penalty for breaking the lease is simply unreasonable. | In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction. | The possession is not adverse during the tenancy, so the clock does not run. If the tenancy contract ends or is violated for [appropriate length depending on location] with no reaction from the landlord, that is grounds for adverse possession. | In practice, the legal requirements for a dwelling to be considered legal and fit for registering as a residence with the government in Denmark are often enforced by the local municipalities, which have the power to interpret and apply the laws and statutes according to their specific circumstances and needs. The checklist provided below is based on the general principles and guidelines set out in the relevant legislation and regulations, but it may vary depending on the local context and the specific characteristics of each dwelling. The Danish Building Act (Byggeloven): The Danish Building Act sets out the basic requirements for all buildings in Denmark, including dwellings. It defines the minimum requirements for size, health, safety, and location, and provides guidelines for construction, renovation, and demolition. The act is constantly updated to reflect new building technologies and changes in society's needs and expectations. The Danish Water Supply Act (Vandforsyningsloven): The Danish Water Supply Act sets out the requirements for the quality and safety of drinking water, as well as the responsibilities of the water supply companies and the consumers. The act ensures that all buildings have access to clean and safe drinking water and that the drainage system does not cause pollution or health hazards. The Danish Wastewater Act (Spildevandsloven): The Danish Wastewater Act regulates the disposal of sewage and other wastewater, and sets out the requirements for the treatment and discharge of wastewater. The act ensures that all buildings have proper drainage and that the environment is protected from pollution. The Danish Planning Act (Planloven): The Danish Planning Act sets out the guidelines for land use planning, including the designation of residential zones and the approval of building permits. The act ensures that all buildings are located in appropriate areas and that the surrounding environment is protected from inappropriate development. The Danish Rent Act (Lejeloven): The Danish Rent Act regulates the relationship between landlords and tenants, including the rent level, the notice periods, and the rights and obligations of both parties. The act ensures that all dwellings are rented out fairly and that the tenants have adequate housing standards. The following laws seem to be relevant when we start considering applying them to your conditional checklist: Size Occupancy Problem There is no minimum size requirement for a dwelling in Denmark, but there are regulations that specify how much space is required per person. The Danish Building Regulations specify that a dwelling must have a minimum floor area of 20 square meters per person. However, this does not necessarily apply to tiny homes or other non-traditional forms of housing, as long as they meet the minimum space requirements and other safety and health standards. The maximum number of occupants allowed in a dwelling is determined by its size, layout, and facilities, as well as the health and safety requirements set out in the Building Act and other regulations. Overcrowding is not permitted. Health Care Facility The Danish Water Supply Act sets out the requirements for the quality and safety of drinking water, as well as the responsibilities of the water supply companies and the consumers. The act ensures that all buildings have access to clean and safe drinking water and that the drainage system does not cause pollution or health hazards. This act deals with land property too. The dwelling must have adequate access to emergency services, such as fire, police, and ambulance. Enforced by this, residence must have it. The water supply and drainage system must meet the requirements set out in the Danish Water Supply Act (Vandforsyningsloven) and the Danish Wastewater Act (Spildevandsloven) in residence. Legal and enforced If a dwelling does not meet the legal requirements for size, health, safety, or location, it is considered illegal and can be subject to fines, demolition, or other enforcement measures by the local municipality or the Building Appeals Board (Huslejenævnet). Illegal dwellings are those that are not approved for residential use, or that have been altered without the necessary permits and inspections. The local municipality has the authority to enforce the Building Act and other relevant legislation and regulations. Permits and approvals: Depending on the specific circumstances, a dwelling in Denmark may require various permits and approvals from local authorities, such as planning permission or building permits. There might be many more laws, bindings, and promises to make, but these are compulsion with some relaxation to above situations. The question examples and requirements deal to land reforms, and health-care facility. | The primary legal question is whether the resident (tenant) has breached a duty of care. There are all sorts of laws establishing duties of care, such as between doctor and patient, which may be created by a legislature or may be part of common law tradition. There is a duty of care imposed on a landlord w.r.t. the tenant, requiring that the premise be "secure", therefore a landlord might easily be held liable if the main door into the building was not locked. This duty is a specific instance of a general duty from tradesman/businessman to customer. As far as I can determine, there is no such statutory duty imposed on tenants in Washington state, and none from case law being revealed by a few cursory searches. In order to be subsumed under general "everybody has a duty to everybody else" law, the damage would have to be foreseeable. It is said that "If something is foreseeable, it is a probable and predictable consequence of the defendant’s negligent actions or inaction". This mean that a reasonable person would have known that, under the circumstances, the damage is likely to result. Circumstances vary quite a bit, and there is no general rule about holding the door open for another person. If there is abundant signage reminding tenants to never ever let in a stranger no matter that their excuse and/or if the premise is in a crime war-zone, the outcome is more likely to be considered to be foreseeable. | A landlord may have an agent, whether an employee or a family member, prepare an itemized statement of deductions on the landlord's behalf. The landlord is just as responsible for its contents as if the landlord had prepared it personally, and the tenant need not know or care who actually prepared it. If it is knowingly excessive, that may constitute bad faith no matter who prepared it. The tenant's options for challenging the statement of deductions are not changed based who exactly prepared the list. |
Can I sell a rhino horn carving? Suppose that a son inherits a rhino horn carving from his father. Assuming that the father acquired the horn without violating any laws that were in force at the time it was acquired. Can the son legally sell the horn? | Rhino horn cannot be sold across state lines: Rhino horn: Generally cannot be sold in interstate or international commerce. Consult the Service for limited exceptions. Import or export requires a permit. Sale of items within a State allowed unless restricted by “use after import” limitations associated with items imported after the listing of the species under CITES or unless prohibited under State law. Pennsylvania has a proposed bill banning the sale of rhino horn but it is not yet law. | Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions. | In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime. | Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No. | §Sec. 54-212 of the ordinance states (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire, carry or possess any assault weapon or large capacity magazine in Cook County So if the gun is an assault weapon, it is not legal to sell. That ends the legal inquiry. Beyond that, we can only conjecture as to possibilities, for example (1) you may be mistaken in your assessment of some particular firearm, (2) the authorities don't know yet so haven't taken action or (3) they do know and they have taken action. Your link did not lead to any obvious things that count as an assault weapon, perhaps you could be more specific. | "As we know non-adults aren't allow to carry weapons" This is not something that we know or an obvious point. It is also not obvious that a knife would qualify as a weapon for these purposes. This would not be true in most jurisdictions in the world. I have no idea what knife control laws look like in China or Taiwan. A reference to why you think that this is the case would be helpful. Even if there are laws banning possession of knives (i.e. carrying knives) when one is in public for use as a weapon, it would be very surprising to me if teens weren't allowed to possess knives in a kitchen, or a work site where a knife was a necessary tool. It would similarly surprise me if a teen working on a knife design in a craftsman's workshop would be illegal. What makes you think that any of these things are illegal in China or Taiwan? This might have been illegal in Japan in the 1600s when metal blades were highly regulated (this is one of the reasons that most Japanese food is served with portions pre-cut to be bite sized), but I very much doubt that teen possession of knives for practical purposes is illegal in any of those places today. There is also, in general, nothing wrong with factories run by adults making knifes from other people's designs. They do that all the time and it wouldn't be illegal to do so just because the designer wasn't allowed to use the product of the factory in public. I would be surprised if a factory even asked how old the designer was, particularly if he was operating through a company formed for him (something an adult might have to do). The harder question would be whether the teen can enter into an enforceable and valid contract with a factory without having the co-signature of a parent or guardian. Many countries don't allow this so that the teen is not exploited into agreeing to a big contract on unfair terms. Also, many countries make a distinction between criminal acts committed by adults and the same acts committed by minors. A teen, particularly a young teen, may be under the relevant law, capable of only engaging in juvenile delinquency, rather than an adult felony. But, again, I don't know how this is handled in Taiwan or China. In general, the legal system in Taiwan strongly resembles that of the legal systems in Continental Europe not long after World War II (i.e. in the 1940s), with its own local developments since then. But, China's legal system is quite unique and is not very similar to the common law legal systems of England and former or current English colonies, or the civil law legal system of Continental Europe (or for that matter, Islamic law). China's legal system is different at the level of very deep concepts of legal process, of what is and isn't law, and of many core legal concepts. It also has piecemeal bits that are imposed by treaty even though they are not organically natural fits with the rest of the Chinese legal system (e.g. its intellectual property laws). | You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft. | As of present moment, under no circumstances. That said, the law may and probably will change around that. But the time has not come just yet. Trying to predict what the law will be is out of scope of this site. |
Is it illegal to give my friend money for drugs? I live in Texas and my friend wants me to give them Bitcoin in order for them to buy drugs online. I will not ever see these drugs or partake in them, I would simply just give the money to my friend so that they can buy drugs online. Will I get in any trouble for doing this? | Yes. Helping someone to commit a criminal offense is generally a crime identical to the offense itself. Under Texas Penal Code section 7.02: A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if ... he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. | I can’t speak for Indonesia but if you did this in Australia you would be a criminal. You either committed fraud or are an accessory to fraud. You would probably be considered an accessory at and after the fact which means you are subject to the same maximum penalty as if you had committed the fraud yourself - 10 years in jail. In addition, you are liable to repay the money taken, jointly and severally with your ‘friend’. However, if they can only find you, you cannot recover from your ‘friend’ as you were engaged in a joint criminal enterprise. Scams such as you describe are distressingly common and many people fall for them. As such, assuming the court accepted your story (because you might actually be the fraudster and have just made it up) you would be unlikely to get close to the full sentence and if you caught the judge on a good day, might even escape jail. If you are lucky, the jury might acquit, even though, on the facts, they shouldn’t - juries do what juries do. If you’re really lucky the police might decide not to prosecute. | Suppose you could. Now the proceeds of the sale belong to the shell company. What good does that do you? If you want to use the money to buy stuff for yourself, the shell company has to pay it back to you as a dividend or salary or something, and that payment will be taxable income to you personally. This might even come out worse for you: if you had held the bitcoins for more than a year, and sold them yourself, you could benefit from the lower long-term capital gains tax rate. But if you collect the funds as salary or dividend, you pay the higher ordinary income tax rate. | It doesn't even have to be pennies. Any cash denomination is open to discretion. The Federal Reserve tells us "There is, however, no Federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or services. " | If I can summarise: Jane gave money to Joe on the understanding that he would give it to Bob, Joe kept the money. This is matter between Jane and Joe, Bob is not involved. Edit The OP has stated that Joe did give the money to Bob. In that case, Joe was acting as Jane's agent and he discharged his agency. This is a matter between Jane and Bob, Joe is involved only so far as he was a witness to what happened. | There is commonly a law like RCW 69.50.309 which says that A person to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner, and the owner of any animal for which such controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was delivered to him or her by the person selling or dispensing the same. A controlled substance is "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or state laws, or federal or commission rules". Schedule V includes some opiates with low potential for abuse and dependency. It does not include prescription antibiotics, and does not include Ibuprofen and other OTC NSAIDs. The cop may be right about keeping your narcotics in the original container, but wrong about anything less. I can't presently locate the Oklahoma analog of this law. After diligent searching, I even suspect that Oklahoma does not have such an "original container" law. It would count as a "counterfeit substance" if it is a controlled substance and is in a container with labeling that is not that of the original distributor, but if the contain is completely blank, it is not legally a "counterfeit substance". And again, that only applies to controlled substances. | The physical cash in the bank is not your property, at least not in US law (according to Scalia). It becomes your property when the withdrawal is performed by some means specified in your contract. A deposit gives you a contractual right to demand money from the bank. Bank robbery is a crime. Having money deposited with the bank doesn't change that. The only possible chance a robber has at trial is jury nullification. I haven't found records for that in Lebanon, but it does have jury trials. Impartial review classifies Lebanon's justice system as somewhat corrupt, but generally compliant with the basic principles. So it might be possible to get away with it at trial, but a very long shot. | That the cop claims to be your friend is not more illegal than a salesman claiming that he has "the best offer" for you because he likes you (in fact didn't you see any film about the good cop/bad cop routine?) The term you are looking for is Entrapment. The (very simplified) basic idea is that police officers can promote the comission of a crime to catch criminals but cannot "trap" innocent people into it; the difference being that their persuassion should not turn otherwise innocent people into criminals. An extreme example would be if the cop threatens the target into commiting a crime. For the more usual situation when a cop promotes a crime to catch the criminal, I saw it explained (just for illustration purposes, it is not that you are safe when the cop insists a third time) as it follows: Legal: Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I don't know. Cop) Trust me, it will be easy, nobody is there at night and it will be just a couple of hours. Target) Ok, count me in. Illegal Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I am not a thief. Cop) Come on, it will be easy, the place is insured and nobody will be hurt. Target) Not interested. Cop) We can get 5000 US$ each one, just for a night of work. Didn't you told me that you had troubles with your bank? You could solve those overnight! Target) Maybe you are right, but I have no experience with these things... Cop) Do not worry, I will tell you what you need to do. Target) Ok, count me in. Note that it is not only "the cop insisted a lot". For the drug dealer example, if the cop insisted a lot but, when agreed, the boy produced the drug from his pocket, already packaged for sale, it would not be entrapment. OTOH, if the guy had told "I do not know where to buy drugs" and the cop had told him "go talk with X so he sells you the drug", then it could be considered entrampment. In any case, this is generic information only, entrapment is difficult to prove and will depend on the views of the judge/jury so, no matter how enticing that criminal offer is, just don't do it. |
How long can a company take to answer my GDPR request to download my data? In March this year I started the process to download my personal data on a website. I received a mail a month later informing me that my request will be delayed and can take up to 90 days to be processed. It has now been over 90 days since I received that delay notice and I still haven't gotten access to my data. According to this question a company can inform me that my request will take longer if they are unable to comply with my request within 30 days. I am now wondering if there is an upper limit to how long a company has to process my request or if they can simply delay my request indefinitely? | The data controller is correct: they can take up to three months (approx. 90 days) to process a request, though this is only allowed in exceptional cases. From Art 12(3) GDPR (emphasis mine): The controller shall provide information on action taken on a request under Articles 15 to 22 to the data subject without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. That period may be extended by two further months where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of the requests. The controller shall inform the data subject of any such extension within one month of receipt of the request, together with the reasons for the delay. You have not received a response in that timeframe, so the data controller has failed to meet its obligations. The polite thing to do would be to remind them that the time has run out, and that you would like a response ASAP. You can lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority. A letter from the data protection authority tends to speed things up a lot :) In principle, you could sue them to get a response. In practice, this is likely to be too expensive to be worth it. | I live in the EU and Facebook has blocked access to my account unless I accept their privacy rules, which means giving up GDPR protections. Facebook operates in the EU and has EU data subjects, therefore Facebook is subject to GDPR. You should be able to withdraw your consent. Article 7(3) says: The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. | The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization. | Yes, you still need consent (opt-in). Cookies usually require consent, but not always. There are two relevant laws at play here: GDPR makes general rules about the processing of personal data, and ePrivacy has specific rules about cookies and similar technologies, regardless of whether the cookies involve personal data. The ePrivacy directive was implemented in your EU member state (or the UK) in national law. The national laws contain the authoritative rules on this matter. But in general: Accessing or storing any information (such as cookies) on the end user's device requires consent. Consent is defined by the GDPR. You do not need consent if the access/storage is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user (“functional cookies”). Using cookies to store site preferences such as user language is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, so you do not need consent for this. You must still make your use of cookies transparent to the user. Setting cookies for marketing purposes is not strictly necessary to provide the service, so you always require consent for them. Registered users don't automatically give consent. You now raise the interesting question if this is also the case if the user is already registered. Yes, you still need consent (opt-in). This is due to the way how the GDPR defines “consent”. Consent is not general or vague agreement. Agreement with your terms of service or privacy policy is not consent in the sense of the GDPR. Instead, consent is defined in Art 4(11) GDPR to be (emphasis mine): any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her Art 7 GDPR adds further conditions for consent. (1) You are responsible for demonstrating that the user has given valid consent. (2) The request for consent should be clearly distinguishable from other matters (i.e. not buried in a larger document) and should be presented “in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.” (3) Withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. (4) In general, you cannot make access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. I.e. you can't force your users to consent to marketing cookies in order to use the app. The users must have an actual choice, or the consent isn't freely given. Supervisory authorities have produced extensive guidance on the matter of consent. If you're in the UK, consider the ICO Guide to Consent and Guidance on the use of cookies and similar technologies. If you're in the EU/EEA, consider the EDPB Guidelines 05/2020 on Consent (PDF). To summarize why agreement with your terms of service is not consent to marketing cookies: Agreement to such large documents is not sufficiently specific. The consent would not be sufficiently informed. You cannot expect users to actually read all your legal documentation. You must present information in an intelligible manner, possibly with multiple layers (compare WP29 Guidelines on Transparency, endorsed by EDPB). Agreement to your terms of service is not an unambiguous indication that the user wants these cookies. If consent to marketing cookies is a condition of using your service, the consent is likely invalid. The consequence is that cookie consent is usually obtained via separate consent management tools that provide detailed explanations about different categories of cookies, and let the user select which specifically categories of cookies they want to consent to, if any. Outside of cookies, consent is just one legal basis among many. In this context, you might ask “if getting consent is so difficult, but GDPR requires that I have consent, how does that work?” It is a common misconception that the GDPR requires consent for everything – the ePrivacy requirement that most cookies need consent is one of the exceptions. In general, GDPR offers a choice of six categories of legal bases for processing in Art 6 GDPR, and consent is just one of them. In many cases, an online service will process personal data because it is necessary to fulfil a contract with the user, or because there is a legitimate interest for the processing (and the legitimate interest outweighs the user's interests). For example, reasonable security measures such as keeping logfiles can be based on a legitimate interest and do not require consent. | Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person, whether that information is public or not. The student website is definitely processing personal data of faculty. Any website is also necessarily processing personal data of visitors due to technical reasons, even though hosting has been outsourced to a third party. There's always a server, you just might not be managing it yourself. Thus, GDPR applies. Just because it processes personal data doesn't mean that the student website would be illegal. It just means the students are responsible for GDPR compliance of that website. Since the website is controlled by students and not by the university, the university DPO has no say here and the university can't demand the website to be hosted in a particular manner. Nevertheless, the DPO's suggestions might be quite sensible. Typical GDPR compliance steps include: having a clear purpose for which the personal data is being processed having a legal basis for that processing (here, probably a “legitimate interest” which will require a balancing test), see Art 6 providing transparent information to the data subjects providing a privacy notice to website visitors, see Art 13 notifying faculty per the requirements in Art 14 GDPR preparing to fulfill data subject rights such as access, rectification, and erasure when using a legitimate interest, there's also a right to “object” (opt-out) implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure security and compliance of your processing activities, see Art 24+32 making sure that third parties to which you outsource processing activities are contractually bound as “data processors” to only use the data as instructed by you, see Art 28 if you transfer data to non-European countries, having appropriate safeguards in place Does this sound complicated? It can be complicated. The point is that the internet is no longer the lawless Wild West. Just because you can easily publish a site with personal data, doesn't mean that you should. The GDPR is about requiring data controllers to find an appropriate balance with the rights and interests of the affected persons. Of course there are countries with less regulation, but there are also countries with fewer taxes and that isn't necessarily good for society. The easiest way to avoid these responsibilities will be to stop publishing the site as students – and instead taking up the university DPO's offer to have the university run the site. Which is less fun, of course, but the adult thing to do. If this motivates you further: note that the data controller (the people responsible for the site) must publish their contact information in the privacy notice, typically name + email + street address. The GDPR contains no exceptions that would help here. There is an exception for purely personal or household activities. But if the website would be available to the general public, it would be difficult to argue that this is purely personal. There's also case law such as the Lindqvist case requiring a narrow interpretation of that exception. In Art 9, the GDPR does mention that some restrictions are lifted if the data subject made the information public themselves. But that isn't relevant here, because Art 9 is only about extra-protected sensitive data, e.g. health information, union membership, or sexual orientation. | Don't collect or process personal data Many (though of course not all) websites can easily be run without collecting or otherwise processing any personal data. The position of GDPR is that if you are not able to fulfil the basic, simplest core conditions for processing personal data (understanding what you're processing and why and why it's allowed, describing it in a privacy policy, having a non-underage person who's responsible for that) then you are not allowed to process personal data of other people. So don't. Build your website so that any personal data are not collected. | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time. |
How a country can fine an Internet company from another country? Recently France fined Google. Google intends to comply. Why? How a country can fine an Internet company from another country? I understand that Google's business is mostly ads. As long as France is not blocking Internet traffic, can't Google just ignore them and continue doing their business as usual? | Google is an international company. It has employees in France. It has offices in France. It has costs and revenue in France. It has French subsidiaries, with French bank accounts. Google could absolutely try to ignore a French judgment against it, but the government could seize assets from their French bank accounts, and/or real property they have in the country. The French government could petition other countries in which Google has assets to enforce the judgment, and at least in other EU countries it would likely be successful. Ultimately, though, there'd be no need for such extreme measures. Google's business in France is selling ad space to French businesses. If they didn't have that available as a revenue stream, they might well cut off service to the country themselves. | No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to. | If you can’t stand the heat, get out of the kitchen The thrust of this question, as well as many others you have posted, seems to be looking for a way of avoiding your obligations under the GDPR because they are difficult, onerous and/or expensive. Too bad! You don’t have the option of which laws you comply with and which ones you don’t. If I had my choice, I’d comply with the GDPR and not with tax law, but I don’t so I can’t. You have 3 simple choices: Do your best and insure the rest. This means learning what’s required and implementing it to the best of your ability and taking out appropriate insurance cover to deal with any mistakes you make. Ignore the law and hope you don’t get caught. Don’t release apps. | From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info. | The Cayman Islands are well known as a tax haven. They have a corporate tax of 0%, and that includes income from abroad. So by moving your company officially to the Cayman Islands, you can avoid to pay a lot of taxes. Now of course most other countries will still send you a tax bill for any income you make with business activities within their borders. But there are accounting tricks to get around that. For example, many countries only tax profits, not revenue. So you can reduce your annual profits of your national subsidiaries to zero by having them pay money to your company on the caymans. For example, you can transfer your trademark to your subsidiary on the Cayman Islands and then have your subisdiaries in all other countries pay the Cayman company an annual license fee for using that brand name. And the license fee happens to be just so expensive that your national taxable profits become zero. And no, that's not just a Chinese thing. Corporations all around the world use that method to avoid taxes. | You are wrong that they never get into legal trouble. It isn't terribly common but it certainly happens to those that get relatively prominent. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are judgement proof. It makes little sense for Disney, for example, to sue some guy living in his parents' basement for uploading a clip of their movie when that guy has no assets. Financially, it wouldn't be worth the cost of a lawyer. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are in jurisdictions that look the other way. If you're a Russian citizen pirating content owned by American companies, the Russian authorities aren't going to cooperate and arrest you and the American companies likely can't recover any judgement they'd get because you don't have any assets in America. There is a whack-a-mole problem. If there are hundreds of people posting pirated content to Facebook and each one is running hundreds of pages, that's tens of thousands of pages posting content. By the time you identify and close all of them, the pirates will have created tens of thousands of new pages. There is a cat-and-mouse problem. Copyright owners have automated tools to scan for their IP to issue takedown notices. Piraters know this so they modify the video (posting it as a mirror image or adding some additional video elements) in order to evade the automated tools. If copyright owners have to manually identify pirated content, it's realistically not cost effective to do so. The humans finding that content would cost more than the business loses in revenue to pirates. Tracking down the actual human/ business behind the copyright infringement is often a fair amount of work and may involve motions in courts in multiple countries. That work tends not to be highly prioritized by law enforcement. If you're a small fish, it is unlikely that anyone would go to the effort of unmasking you in order to sue. | Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe. | You're completely misreading the goals and purpose of the Export Controls Office - Overview. They regulate the transfer of US regulated information and technology, commodities, and software in the interest of national security and economic growth. Transfer and export are not the same as the use of technology that personal devices contain. The simplest thing to do is simply call the Export Controls Office, and they will explain the difference, and tell what you need to do and what is not required of you when traveling. Some countries do prevent the use of some personal tech or Apps, i.e. Russia and Signal, the encrypted phone app; but that has nothing to do with UC. |
Can you sue the CIA for civil damages if it killed one of your relatives? Can you sue the CIA for civil damages if it killed one of your relatives? I am wondering if a U.S. citizen can sue the CIA for civil damages and whether it can sue only if documents are declassified or if the citizen can have some documents declassified during the legal process. | Can you sue the CIA for civil damages if it killed one of your relatives? Almost never. Governmental immunity (a.k.a. sovereign immunity) bars most suits for intentional use of force by the government that is legally authorized by a government official with the authority to authorize this action under the relevant statutes, regulations, executive orders, and chain of command. The common law state secrets privilege bars a very large share of the remaining cases, such as most killings arising from negligence in the course of covert operations, and most legally unauthorized killings by covert operatives. While this is framed as a question of evidence, in practice, it operates more like a form of extended sovereign immunity without a careful case by case analysis of the relevant non-classified evidence. There are narrow cases in which a proper party can sue for a violation of of the decedent's civil rights in such a killing. The primary remedy against federal law enforcement misconduct is a common law remedy authorized by the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). But usually, if a national security justification is advanced, the much narrower standard of relief applicable to combat killings and collateral damage in war (subject only to criminal war crimes review rather than civil liability) rather than the 4th Amendment analysis applicable to civilian law enforcement intentional killings by the government, applies. Of course, if the CIA negligent kills someone due to negligence in connection with its non-covert activities (e.g. a non-covert delivery truck delivering ordinary paper gets in a deadly traffic accident caused by negligence en route to CIA headquarters), an appropriate party (I don't recall if it is designated next of kin as in most state wrongful death statutes, or the probate estate of the decedent) may sue the U.S. government under an exception to governmental immunity provide for in the Federal Tort Claims Act which would be brought in the U.S. Court of Claims (generally in a non-jury trial with more limited damages available than in a private automobile accident case and with more involved procedural requirements). | In the US, private prosecutions are heavily disfavored, and are not allowed in most jurisdictions. Where they are allowed, they tend to be limited in nature and subject to the ultimate control of a government officer. Federal court is one of the places where private prosecutions are not allowed. However, in two cases, Congress has decided that private citizens can file a civil case on behalf of the United States. These are called qui tam actions, and the private citizen is representing the interest of the United States; the United States has standing, so the private citizen does as well. Private criminal prosecution would presumably follow the same rule if it existed and was constitutional at the federal level. | First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties. | Civil law instead of criminal law Not all things that we commonly refer to as "illegal" are actually crimes - many of them refer to violations of contracts or other obligations where the harmed party may (or may not) use the civil system to obtain some satisfaction, but the government and prosecutors will not do it for them. In general (with some exceptions, depends on jurisdiction and circumstances), most low scale copyright violations are treated as a civil matter - it allows the harmed party (i.e. the copyright owner) to sue you for damages in a civil court, if they wish and are able to do so. However, it generally is not a crime (again, with some exceptions - e.g. large scale distribution often is) so the government and police on their own cannot, should not and does not investigate and prosecute violations of software licence terms. | The criminal case will only punish the perpetrator, it will not give any compensation to the victims. So if you are the victim of a crime, and the perpetrator is capable of paying compensation, you would go for a civil case to get compensation. There's also the fact that in a civil case, there is less evidence required, so the perpetrator may win the criminal case (not found "guilty beyond reasonable doubt"), but lose the civil case. In many cases, the perpetrator is not wealthy enough to make a civil case worthwhile. If some lowlife stabs you in the street, you might very well win a civil case, but would end up getting nothing because the person has no money. So taking them to court would only cost you money. | Civil litigation involves general causes of action that are available to anyone, including both private parties and the government. Civil courts are designed primarily to provide restitution to the injured party. Criminal courts exist for governments to exercise their police powers: specific, limited authority held only by the government. The principal purposes of criminal law are...well, they're debated, but broadly speaking, it's to punish and/or rehabilitate the criminal and deter future criminals. Because criminal conviction can result in jail time and even the death penalty, there are more stringent procedural protections accorded to criminal defendants than there are to civil defendants. So when the government's goal is to recover damages, it's easier for them to use the less burdensoome civil procedures, just the same as anyone else would. Let me give you an example. Someone steals your identity and runs up $100,000 on your credit card. You call the police, and they find someone they think is the guy. To convict him, the police must convince an entire jury panel that he did it, beyond a reasonable doubt--a high standard. He pleads the fifth, and without his testimony, the police may not succeed. If they do, he will be sent to jail, and he may also be ordered to give part or all of your money back. If the case is weak, however, the police may not want to spend their limited time on it--and that's their call, not yours. (This also applies to government agencies; only law enforcement can bring a criminal case, not any government agency.) However, you can also file a civil lawsuit. In that lawsuit, depending on the jurisdiction, you may only need to convince some of the jury--civil verdicts don't always have to be unanimous. You may even just face a judge, with no jury. And the legal standard is a "preponderance of the evidence," which in layman's terms just means "more likely than not"--a much easier thing to prove. Because the Fifth Amendment doesn't apply to civil litigation, you may even be able to argue before the jury that the defendant's refusal to testify suggests he's guilty. In summary: civil lawsuits use different rules and procedures, which may make it easier to recover money (or get other civil relief, such as an injunction) in cases where that's the goal. These courts are open to anyone, including the government. But if the government wants to use its special police powers to put someone in jail or get other criminal relief, they have to use the stricter criminal rules and procedures. | If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts. | The closest the Supreme Court has gotten to criminal liability for official acts seems to be Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). There it addressed civil liability and held that the U.S. President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." It's unclear how the Justices would decide criminal liability for official acts. (Though some might argue that non-precedential logic in Fitzgerald suggests the Court could extend immunity to the criminal context as well.) As to homicide, murder and manslaughter are federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112. The latter involves the commission "of a lawful act which might produce death" "without due caution and circumspection." |
Legal basis for arresting a person not actively committing a crime? Originally the purpose of an arrest in English common law, meaning a deputy of the state seizing and holding a suspect against their will, was to apprehend the suspect to confirm their identity. In the case that they were seized in the commission of a felony, there was no question that sufficient evidence existed to justify an arraignment. Formerly if a person was NOT apprehended in the commission of a felony, but was merely a suspect, then the authorities had to INDICT the suspect to prove sufficient evidence. Even after the person was indicted, they would still not be arrested, they would simply be summoned to court. A person would only be arrested if they failed to appear, in which case a warrant for their arrest would be issued by the court. Now, of course, this standard procedure has been abandoned. The police now seize and arrest anyone they plan to charge without warrant and the indictment is sought AFTER they have arrested the person. Obviously the police desire to arrest the suspect because that gives them the opportunity to humiliate the suspect and interrogate them to collect more evidence. Also, a suspect in prison will have a much harder time defending themselves at an arraignment or resisting an indictment. So, what exactly is the legal principle under which the police consider themselves to be authorized to arrest and imprison people before they have been indicted? Note that this question, to repeat the above, only applies to people who have not been apprehended in the act of committing a crime (in flagrante delicto) and are suspects by virtue of some subsequent investigation. For example, let's imagine (and this is a real example) a store complains they were shoplifted (grand larceny) and provide photos of the suspect. The police, then by computer matching of the photos to mugshots, have a suspect. They then go and arrest the suspect without indicting him first (in corpore delicti). In the old days, this would have constituted a false arrest because the suspect was not caught in the act. Now, however, the police routinely arrest people like this for felonies after the fact without indicting them or otherwise proving in court that (1) a crime has actually been committed, and (2) that they have sufficient evidence to bring the person to trial. | Warrants You say: "Formerly if a person was NOT apprehended in the commission of a felony, but was merely a suspect, then the authorities had to INDICT the suspect to prove sufficient evidence." This is not true. What the authorities had to do was issue a warrant which required no prerequisites or even suspicion that the person was involved in the crime. If I had the power, I could issue a warrant any time I felt like it. The abuse of warrants was one of the grievances that led to the American Revolution and is the primary driver for the fourth amendment to the Constitution and the limit that warrants can only be issued on "probable cause". Needless to say, all Western democracies have similar protections. Statute law In common law jurisdictions, parliament/congress can overrule the common law by passing an act that effectively says "the law is now this". With the rise of professional Police starting with the Glasgow Police in 1800, the statutes that created (or regulated them) extended the power of arrest without a warrant beyond what the common law allowed. For example, in new-south-wales, the police power of arrest without a warrant is in s99 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002. The general power of arrest without a warrant is in s100 (which also broadens the common law power to allow arrest where a person has "just committed" an offence or has committed a serious indictable offence for which they have not been tried at any time in the past) and the power to arrest with a warrant is in s101. | united-states The ethical standard for U.S. prosecutions, under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 (ethical rules have parallel numbering in every U.S. jurisdiction and there is little variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction for this part of this ethical rule) is to refrain from prosecuting a charge that is not supported by probable cause. Probable cause is also the standard used by a grand jury, and in an adversarial pre-trial hearing, to screen charges before they go to trial. It is also the standard for issuing an arrest warrant. The higher threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard for convicting a defendant at a trial on the merits of the defendant's guilt or innocence, it is not the standard for bringing a criminal charge in the first place. The job of the prosecutor at trial is to convince the trier of fact (usually a jury, but sometimes a judge in a bench trial) that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the case was thin on evidence when commenced, this may require law enforcement and the prosecutor's office to develop evidence after the criminal charges are brought. As a practical matter, a prosecutor wants to prosecute cases that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and will usually try to do that. But a belief that a case can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial is not an ethical requirement for prosecutors and is not a ground for imposing sanctions against a prosecutor. Of course, individual prosecuting attorneys' offices are free to establish their own standards that are more rigorous as an internal policy for bringing criminal cases. | The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence. | Law enforcement officers can obtain information with a search warrant, which is a document issued by a judge or magistrate that authorizes them to search for specific information or evidence based on "probable cause" to believe that it will inform the investigation or prosecution of a crime. A court can also issue a subpoena at the request of a party to a proceeding before it. Since in most cases only the state can bring criminal charges before a court, an individual would have to bring a civil complaint before a court in order to even request a subpoena related to his complaint. Also, it is up to the court to enforce its subpoenas: It's not like a warrant where you can then pursue the items subpoenaed through force. If the subject of a subpoena doesn't respond you have to ask the court to compel the party, which means you have to bring your complaint before a court that has jurisdiction over the party you wish to subpoena. This can be difficult when it involves a third party – especially a third party that would rather ignore or object to the subpoena than hand over the information. I.e., if you can't convince law enforcement to investigate the crime, and you can't convince the company in possession of the data that it's in its interest to help you, then you would most likely be facing a steep legal bill to get an attorney to successfully obtain the information through civil process. | If the conditions at s.17 and s.24 PACE 1984, and PACE Code G are satisfied for the offence of rape then there is no requirement for a warrant. Once the suspect is in police custody he may be further arrested for suspected harrassment if any of the necessity criteria are met - this will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. An either way offence is, for these purposes, regarded as an indictable offence. A constable does not need to physically see an offence being committed, but he must have (a) reasonable grounds to suspect an offence has been committed (b) reasonable grounds to believe an arrest is necessary (c) the requesit belief to satisfy s.17 PACE 1984. All this will come from conducting a proportionate investigation in to the allegations. | In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless. | More generally, but subject to the specifics of state law, a person may be required to assist a police officer. For instance in Alabama A person commits the crime of refusing to aid a peace officer if, upon command by a peace officer identified to him as such, he fails or refuses to aid such peace officer in: (1) Effecting or securing a lawful arrest; or (2) Preventing the commission by another person of any offense. In Washington, the obligations is much narrower: A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer. Washington seems to be in the minority, compared to Alabama. | What are the reasons/ legal requirements that the police might need my personal information, given that I had not been able to provide any further information/ witness testimony to the incident that they were investigating? The police in england-and-wales have a duty to undertake reasonable lines of enquiry and to carry out a proportionate investigation in to allegations of crime. No-one is legally obliged to answer house to house questions but, notwithstanding the honesty and integrity of the majority of members of the public, any information held by the police may need to be corroborated to identify or eliminate suspects, witnesses, evidential opportunities or other lines of enquiry. Also, if it is established that someone has no information that may assist the investigation this is recorded to prevent duplication of effort thus enabling the police to focus their resources accordingly. All the while complying with the relevant privacy and data retention legislation. |
Is it racial discrimination - company wide email disparaging white people A friend of mine works at a religious organization as an employee. They are also a naturalized citizen, who is white, but is of a minority ethnic group (for background). The org has sent out several emails over time focusing on racism, but with the implication that white people are the sole problem of all racism. (which, let me be clear, here in the US, there is of course centuries of legitimate beef!) The issue being that they are receiving these messages and feel insulted and as if they're being disparaged by the company itself, solely for their race. This person is open minded and believes that there are issues with equality in the country, but receives these emails and believes from time to time that they are being told that all white people are a problem, rather than focusing on issues with inclusivity and equality or racism in general, just very specifically focusing on white people. They recently received a company wide meeting invite for a meeting discussing the concept of whiteness and how it impacts an organization and individuals, going on to liken "whiteness" itself to white supremacy. My friend wrote a response, asking not to be included on future meeting invites, explaining that the one in question and others have made it feel as though their 'whiteness' was a problem, and that they felt it was a pejorative term and would like to not receive remarks like this in the future. The business later sent another email that includes some description of the meeting itself, that it is sent to an organization wide distribution list and will not have an ability for people to opt out (therefore, my interpretation being, they are ignoring their request to stop receiving the offensive remarks in these emails into the future). It goes on to state that the next session will be on White Fragility, and states that "by definition", racism is based on the concept of whiteness, which is enforced by power and violence. It has a definition of 'white fragility' later on that paired with the usage of the term in the email seems somewhat offensive... in the same way that hearing 'black fragility' or other combinations of the words would seem, from the negative connotations of the word fragility, of course pejorative to whatever group is paired with it. My question is... This seems like a form of harassment and discrimination. Is it? Are there additional steps they should take to address the issue? I've told my friend they need to find a lawyer and consider whether they have a case, as they'd included HR and their own manager, as well as the other person who's sending these messages, and are still receiving them. They've told me messages like these have been going out for years and it's been very upsetting having to read them and having to confront them specifically in order to request that they stop receiving them... just to have it continue. They are, of course, very worried they'll lose their job over speaking up over it. **Are religious organizations allowed to discriminate based on race, is this a moot point?** I've seen references on the internet that the supreme court has ruled that religious org's can discriminate based on religion, but I haven't seen on race, such as in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C. (2012) (https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/926/discrimination-by-religious-organizations). | This is the overview of employment discrimination by the EEOC (no legal reason for them to specifically put this under "youth"). To "discriminate" against someone means to treat that person differently, or less favorably, for some reason... The laws enforced by EEOC protect you from employment discrimination when it involves: Unfair treatment because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information. Harassment by managers, co-workers, or others in your workplace, because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information. A subtype of harassment is "hostile environment harassment". See the EEOC page on harassment. It is unwelcome conduct that is based on race... Harassment becomes unlawful where 1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. Also it is illegal to punish a person for complaining about harassment. On the face of it, this could constitute racial harassment. The EEOC suggests that it is illegal here, in their FAQ Are White employees protected from race discrimination even though they are not a minority? Yes. You are protected from different treatment at work on the basis of your race, whether you are White, Black, or some other race. Although this is an advisory from the Dep't of Interior and not the EEOC, it is reasonable to assume that it was at least minimally vetted by competent lawyers who know discrimination law. What is prohibited is Unwelcome conduct, verbal or physical, including intimidation, ridicule, insult, comments, or physical conduct, that is based on an individual’s protected status or protected activities under Personnel Bulletin 18-01, when the behavior can reasonably be considered to adversely affect the work environment, or an employment decision affecting the employee is based upon the employee’s acceptance or rejection of such conduct (where race is a protected status). I don't know of any case law that establishes for certain that what you describe is illegal. The ministerial exception allows a religion to follow the rules of the religion in hiring its ministers, but otherwise doesn't exempt religions from prohibitions against discrimination. | It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange. | Businesses can discriminate against their customers on any basis they like provided that such discrimination is not on an illegal basis like race, sex or age. They do not have to serve you if they don't want to. | Has Bob been treated less favourably than Alice by this establishment with respect to his committed philosophical worldview of opposing fascism and all its associations and forms? Has Bob thus been unlawfully discriminated against? No. There is no discrimination law engaged here by the retailer asking if its customer would like to donate to the Red Cross Crisis in Ukraine Appeal or such and not asking if the customer would like to donate to any other appeal. | Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic. | In this context, the phrase "there are no equitable considerations that would require the court to reduce or deny reimbursement for the parents" largely refers to defenses to claims arising under the law of equity as applied historically in the chancery courts of England, and more recently, to claims of a type that would have been brought in equity courts if there were still a separate equity court system. Two of the more common equitable defenses are "unclean hands" and "laches". The equitable defense of "unclean hands" applies when the person seeking relief has engaged in misconduct of some kind in the same transaction. For example, if "the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement" because the student had previously been expelled for beating up another kid (especially if this had nothing to do with the reason that a FAPE is needed) or because the parents ignored a deadline for filing the application for a FAPE at their public school of which they had reasonable advanced notice, that student's parents might be denied reimbursement under the doctrine of unclean hands. The equitable defense of "laches" applies when unreasonable delay on the part of the person seeking relief causes prejudice to the person from whom relief is sought even in the absence of a date certain deadline or before a date certain deadline expires. For example, suppose that "the private school was an appropriate placement" but it had tuition three times as high as two other private schools in town. If the other two less expensive private schools had vacancies for months after the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement, but had no room for new students a week before school started leaving only the much more expensive private school with any vacancies, the request might be denied, or limited to the amount that would have been paid if the parents had applied to other private schools more promptly, under the doctrine of laches. Other equitable defenses include the duty to mitigate damages (e.g. there might be reimbursement for private school tuition, but not for late fees and interest that could have been avoided), impossibility and impracticability (e.g. no public or private placement is capable of addressing the fundamental problem that the child is in a catatonic state), acts of god/force majeure (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE because the school was destroyed in a hurricane and the school district had to shut down the schools for everyone for a semester), implied waiver or estoppel (e.g. after the student was denied a FAPE the student was enrolled for regular classes at that public school without complaint and without trying to find a private school placement), spoliation (e.g. the records needed to determine eligibility were intentionally destroyed by the applicant before the hearing), fraud as a defense and not a claim (e.g. the parents lied in their reimbursement application), payment (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE by two schools and already received reimbursement from another one and is not entitled to a double recovery), release or accord and satisfaction (e.g. a settlement agreement was already reached with the school denying reimbursement or agreeing to a particular reimbursement). | Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) "This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff" (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual "demonstrated good interpersonal skills." Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer "said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers." Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude "doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job." IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. | According to the EEOC, in general: An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. But how religious is this party? Simply calling it a "Christmas party" (or "holiday party") doesn't really make it a "religious activity". Many nonreligious people celebrate Christmas as a general holiday. If the party is nonreligious, then your religion is mostly irrelevant, whether or not it celebrates a winter holiday. The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion. So, they'd likely have to serve something you could eat if they're serving food, as that would be a reasonable accommodation. (But you'd have to inform them of your needs beforehand; asking them to go out and buy something during the party would probably not be "reasonable".) |
Take action against a hotel for negligence in accommodating a disabled guest? My wife has diagnosed C-PTSD which her doctors have classified as a disability. She also lives with another disability related to a spinal injury which makes it difficult for her to walk. We are staying at a resort hotel in which we discovered sound readily transfers through the floors. This is evident due to frequent stomping above our room last night, and today when the cleaning crew presumably started work. She got up around 3:00AM this morning to work on packing and cleaning our room. Around that time I also called reception to send us towels. A few minutes later the phone in our room rang, and I answered because I assumed it was reception calling us. The caller was actually another guest who I assume was in the room below us. He sounded intoxicated and was berating me for making sounds "like an elephant." I politely stated that if I had done anything to disturb him, I apologize. He hung up the phone. I was shocked he was able to call our room directly and this scenario was extremely triggering for my wife's PTSD symptoms. This was an extremely disturbing incident which the hotel failed to provide the level of security and safety that could reasonably be expected at a five star hotel. We had actually been moved to this current room due to an incident that occurred the previous day. Since my wife is a survivor of a violent sexual assault, and especially because the assailant is still at large awaiting a criminal and civil resolution, when we arrived she was very specific and clear with the concierge in requesting a room that would be secure and that the staff would use discretion in being sensitive to her situation. The concierge mentioned that our room would have a balcony. The concierge did not explain that the balcony is adjacent to an exterior breezeway and elevator lobby which is separated by an easily climbable partition wall about 42 inches tall. Anyone in the breezeway could easily access the door to the patio by climbing over the wall. There were undeniably alternative rooms available featuring isolated balconies that are inaccessible to guests outside the room. So we are puzzled as to why we were assigned to a room with two easily accessible entry points. Over the course of a few hours we noticed a guest in the breezeway who walked by several times while into our room looking through the sliding door on the patio, which was unnerving to put it mildly. This is the reason we requested to be assigned to a different room. In summary, and without going into further detail, we are looking at the big picture of the hotel failing to accommodate a guest with disabilities, the nature of which was made explicit upon our arrival. From our perspective, they put a guest who struggles with PTSD in more than one situation which excessively exacerbated the symptoms of her condition, and furthermore allowed a guest to harass us over the symptoms of her physical disability (i.e. difficulty walking and allegedly making noise "like an elephant"). Additionally, as a result of these incidents, we have been unable to take full advantage of the amenities and services we have paid for due to her symptoms being exacerbated and preventing both of us from sleeping. We have a meeting with a manager this afternoon. Depending on the results, we are considering escalating the matter to the corporate level. Just wanted to get some constructive feedback on this scenario. Do we have any standing to look at taking legal action? And what type of attorney would we contact who might be familiar with relevant circumstances? Thanks in advance for any feedback. To clarify location--these events occurred in California, United States. | You have "standing" to take legal action, given the particularized injury you've suffered. If you're interested in doing so, you would talk to a civil-rights or disability-rights lawyer. There are plenty of lawyers who specialize in this sort of work, so you should make sure you're talking to someone who is well-versed in these laws. However, I suspect that you'll find that you are not on particularly strong footing as a legal matter. It is not clear that your wife is "disabled" as defined by the ADA, which asks how an impairment affects your life functions rather than whether your doctor believes you are impaired. I'm not sure what the status of this question is in California, but some courts have ruled that PTSD is not always a disability within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Tinsley v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs., Corp., 766 F. App'x 337, 342 (6th Cir. 2019) ("We must now examine whether Tinsley's PTSD sufficiently limited her ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. The evidence demonstrates that it did not."). But even if she is disabled within the meaning of the statute, that doesn't necessarily mean the hotel has done anything wrong. The ADA does not require hotels to give disabled guests whatever rooms they want; it only requires them to make "reasonable accommodations" for their guests' disabilities. If I were representing the hotel, I'd feel pretty good arguing that creating a perfectly secluded environment and reprogramming the hotel phone system to prevent unforeseeable triggering events is not a reasonable accommodation. However, a good ADA lawyer could probably come up with some good arguments why the hotel should have done more. But the final problem is that lawyers may not be particularly interested in the case because it sounds like a very low-damages situation. That said, this analysis is only under the ADA, which is what I'm already familiar with. California quite likely has its own disability-accommodation laws, and I'd bet they're more favorable to the disabled than the ADA. You'd need to talk to a local disability-lawyer to get a full understanding of your rights. | Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement. | This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order. | While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit. | The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to. | If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money. | It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst. | In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business". |
What laws prohibit dirty water and poor sewage systems at apartment complexes in California? What law requires habitable living conditions that require clean water and no bad sewage smells coming from the bathroom at an apartment? | What law requires habitable living conditions that require clean water and no bad sewage smells coming from the bathroom at an apartment? The landlord's implied warranty of habitability is mentioned in sections 1942.3(b), 1954.06(i) of the California Civil Code. It can be adduced also from other sections such as 1942.4(a)(1) regarding the "endanger[ment of] the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling". Additionally, see Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 616, 627, 637 (1974): [P]ublic policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing in our state [...] This implied warranty of habitability [...] does mean that "bare living requirements" must be maintained. Grabowiec v. Schopmeyer, CoA (unpublished, March 2014), cites precedents in the sense that "the leaking of sewage from the bathroom plumbing, [...] lack of proper plumbing connection to sewage system in bathroom [has] supported a breach of implied warrant of habitability claim" (brackets added). | No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false. | Taking California as an example, California Labor Code section 6314 (a) provides: To make an investigation or inspection, the chief of the division and all qualified divisional inspectors and investigators authorized by him or her shall, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the employer, have free access to any place of employment to investigate and inspect during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner. So, the only requirement is that the inspector has been authorized by the chief of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health. In principle the chief could limit this authority to those periods when the instructor has been assigned to work, but I don't see any evidence that this is the case. In particular, you can find here the policy manual on inspection procedures that inspectors are assigned to follow, and it says nothing about "only perform an inspection when you are on duty". (You might also note the discussion on page 2 about unprogrammed inspections and the criteria for performing them. One indication is "Complaint about, or observance by anyone of, an imminent hazard", which could include a hazard observed by the inspector himself.) So to your specific questions: Do any states provide legal authority by statute for an OSHA compliance officer to inspect a site when they are in their own words "not working"? Yes, California provides authority for an inspector to inspect a site "during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health". That is the only time-related restriction in the statute. I don't think that the inspector's comment that he's "not working" has any legal significance. What is the test to determine if an individual is acting in their official capacity or acting in their individual capacity? I do not know of any reason to think that any such legal distinction exists. If Joe Smith has been authorized as an inspector by the Chief of the Division, then Joe Smith can perform inspections and is to be given free access to do so. End of story. What is the legal "bright line" for state administrative agency employment as to acting in their official capacity as an agent of the state? Based on what I said above, I think this question is meaningless. | One option is an odor complaint filed with pscleanair, however Seattle's Department of Planning and Development opines that marijuana smell is not harmful. You can always try suing -- nuisance, breach of statutory duty to keep the premises habitable, breach of the common law covenant of peaceful enjoyment, negligence, harassment, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress – these guys (non-smokers) are not very encouraging about legal options. Also trespass, which was the first thing that came to my mind but they didn't mention. Merrill v. Bosser, No. 05-4239 COCE 53 (Broward County Ct., June 29, 2005) is an example of successful litigation based on trespass. | Here is the state of California code regarding the question. I am sure a state by state inquiry could reveal other statutes. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-01000&file=565-566 In California there is no specific registry but registration is performed by marking the container with a registered brand. | It wouldn't quite be theft; California theft, like theft in many places following English legal tradition, requires intent to permanently deprive the owner of property. However, it fits section 499b of the Penal Code to a T: 499b. (a) Any person who shall, without the permission of the owner thereof, take any bicycle for the purpose of temporarily using or operating the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding four hundred dollars ($400), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding three months, or by both that fine and imprisonment. | Not in the state of California. California law prohibits discrimination based on source of income; only discrimination based on amount of income is allowed. See the California Government Code, section 12955. It is not even legal to indicate a preferred source of income in the advertisement; landlords may ask prospective tenants about the source of income, but may not discriminate or indicate preference for a particular source (provided it's a lawful source). Also, you can't really force a city to re-zone based on "I'll make sure this bad thing doesn't happen." If the city doesn't want to re-zone, they won't re-zone. You have no right to force them to re-zone; this is especially true when the property was purchased under those zoning rules (if the buyer didn't like them, they didn't have to buy). | A tenant has a right to "live in a property that’s safe and in a good state of repair". There are additional regulations possibly applicable in your situation if this is a "house in multiple occupation", summarized here. "Hazards" are explained here. However, these rules pertain to the condition of the building, not other tenants (except that "overcrowding" is also a hazard). They also say you should "report anti-social behaviour to your local council". It is legal to rent a room in the UK to a person convicted of a violent crime, so it would also be legal to rent a room to a person who hasn't committed a crime (assuming he is legally in the UK). If the person did not engage in actual anti-social behavior towards you, there is nothing to report to the local council. The landlord has no affirmative duty to disclose such a fact, and it might be illegal to do so under the Data Protection Act, since this is "sensitive personal data". |
When can one flee a state that is becoming more authoritarian Britain is undeniably becoming more authoritarian by the day. The government has stripped an unprecedented number of rights from its citizens in the last few years and continues to do so. For instance, the government is about to place significant restrictions on the right to protest. My question is thus: At what point does a state become so authoritarian that its citizens would stand a reasonable chance of claiming asylum elsewhere? (Obviously we're nowhere near that point but it's an interesting hypothetical and also useful to have a vague idea of where the line lies) | Anyone can claim asylum Whether that person qualifies as a refugee depends on the law in the country where they make the claim which usually involves an administrative decision making process. If a country is a signatory to the UN convention on refugees then local law will reflect that in some way. This outlines the process in australia. Under the convention a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it ... Being a citizen or a resident of a state with an authoritarian government does not, of itself, make one a refugee. The individual must have a “well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Most citizens of most authoritarian countries are not persecuted or at risk of persecution. They also must be outside their home country. You can always emigrate The UK has no general restrictions on people leaving the country in search of more freedom. However, you need to choose carefully. At last count the UK is less authoritarian than 151 of the 167 countries in the world. If you are going to emigrate there are 15 places you could go that are better. Fortunately, 4 of them have English as a primary language and, not coincidentally, a system of government in the UK model. | Gaining UK citizenship at birth would not count, the law stipulates "after having attained the age of 18 years", so it is explicitly ruled out. (Also, gaining UK citizenship at birth involves no formal declaration.) The scout promise would not count. It doesn't involve swearing allegiance to the Queen, only promising to "do your duty to the Queen"; and an American could argue they have no duty to the Queen. (Also, you might well not have repeated it after 18.) On the face of it, the Oath of Allegiance for the OTC would count - it looks pretty much exactly what the law-makers had in mind. On the other hand, the oath is almost exactly the same as that taken by Members of Parliament, and Boris Johnson took it first in 2001 - but didn't renounce his American citizenship until 2017. (Perhaps it wasn't until 2017 that he finally drew the American authorities attention to the fact he had taken the oath.) | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. | You have to distinguish between the Tory party and the UK parliament. The UK parliament just had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May and lost. Had they won, parliament would have had to come up with a different government (for example the same government except for a different PM, or a government formed by the current opposition) that would have a majority to rule, or there would be new elections. The Tory party could legally do lots of things, but they are bound by their party rules. They had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May maybe a month or so ago, and she won. According to the Tory party rules, there cannot be another such vote for one year, so right now and for the next eleven months, they can't replace her. If that vote a month ago had not happened, they could. But that is all not because of some law, but because of the rules this party set for itself. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. | I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down. | Owners of property establish rules of trespass. This applies when the government owns the land just as it does for private property owners. Being a citizen of a country does not give you ownership rights on government land. The government is question can apply multiple rules to multiple pieces of property such as: Park use only during certain hours of the day No unauthorized access Access only for certain uses, such as no camping allowed Certainly no one thinks that military bases, prisons, etc. should have unrestricted access by the public. In general, if you're not allowed to be there the government will put up barriers, gates, lock doors, etc., or place signage to indicate limits. Really not all that different from private property. | Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law. |
Is a written promise relating to the “workmanship” of software and hardware components create an express warranty under Magnusson-Moss or U.C.C.? A U.S. auto manufacturer promises in writing that its vehicles will, for the life of their vehicles, receive free hydrogen at its charging stations. Bob buys such a vehicle. Turns out the vehicle communicates with the hydrogen wells, and commands them wirelessly or otherwise that it is entitled to initiate charging without a payment method setup associated with the VIN number or other ID of the vehicle. Turns out the vehicle, once coupled with a hydrogen well, runs computer executable instructions stored on the vehicle which will block the vehicle to open its tank for hydrogen to enter unless a payment method is added and then authenticated with the manufacturer wirelessly. The promise, although undisclosed in such detail, related to computer executable instructions which coupled with the vehicle which coupled with a hydrogen well, causes the tank of the vehicle to open and allow the pooring/blowing of hydrogen inside the vehicle. (It also communicates with the well to open ordinarily) The written promise was related to the workmanship of the vehicle in connection with its software and hardware components. Was a warranty created? Was a warranty created even if the manufacturer failed to clearly and in readily understood language disclose what it was going to do in case of malfunction or defect with the vehicle relating to its ability to cause a hydrogen well to open and start filling up? Is this a warranty? | A U.S. auto manufacturer promises in writing that its vehicles will, for the life of their vehicles, receive free hydrogen at its charging stations. . . . The written promise was related to the workmanship of the vehicle in connection with its software and hardware components. Was a warranty created? It sounds like there were two separate promises. A promise to provide free hydrogen (which is a contractual obligation, although not a warranty) which amounts to prepayment of hydrogen, and a warranty that the vehicle had adequate workmanship in software and hardware components. Was a warranty created even if the manufacturer failed to clearly and in readily understood language disclose what it was going to do in case of malfunction or defect with the vehicle relating to its ability to cause a hydrogen well to open and start filling up? Whether this is a breach of the agreement to provide free hydrogen, or a breach of the warranty agreement that the vehicle's recharging feature would work properly, or both, taken together it is a breach of contract by the automobile manufacturer. There were agreements, and taken as a whole, those agreements as reasonably interpreted in light of the intent of the parties and construing against the drafter of the agreements, were breached. Therefore, you should be entitled to the damages for breach of contract as measured by the benefit of the bargain test applicable to contracts. Most likely, repair of the defeat at the cost of the manufacturer and reimbursement of money you had to spend on hydrogen due to the defect. | Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...). | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. | On the one hand, there are statutes that prohibit the delivery of instructions which distort or circumvent the official/intended use or safety of a device. For a somewhat related example of this, see MCL 750.540c(1)(3). On the other hand, the company/manufacturer is unlikely to prevail under contract law no matter how clearly and conspicuously its EULA prohibits the disclosure of discovered weaknesses. That is because the prohibition in the EULA is outweighed by the severe vulnerability to which all other unsuspecting customers are subjected. From the standpoint of public policy, people's awareness of the discovered vulnerability is certainly in the public's best interest. The disclosure will warn both (1) potential customers not to purchase a product that fails or misses its primary purpose, and (2) current customers to adopt precautions now that the product's reliability has been disproved. Thus, the effectiveness of broadcasting the discovery of such weakness is in stark contrast with the technical deficits and managerial politics that typically hinder a company's ability (or its will) to respond to the issue. If the weakness was known to the manufacturer prior to the disclosure, the release of that product would constitute fraudulent misrepresentation. The details of the demonstration in the video supports the argument that the manufacturer knew --or should have known-- about that weakness, since a padlock design is supposed to pass all kinds of tests of breakability and not be disabled by a screwdriver. It is hard to deny that the notion that "the padlock is secure" induces customers to purchase the product. As such, the misrepresentation violates the contract law principle that a contract --such as a purchase-- be entered knowingly. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 161-167. With respect to the publisher of the weakness, that misrepresentation renders the EULA-prohibition void. See Restatement at § 164(1). Regardless of whether or not the manufacturer incurred misrepresentation, the manufacturer's decision to sue the publisher is only likely to backfire by bringing more attention to the poor design of the product. In all, the manufacturer's best option is to do a product recall ASAP and enhance the design. | "I contacted LG directly over the phone eight days ago, bypassing the retailer because I assumed they were off the hook after two years and ten months, and it should be the manufacturer assuming responsibility." Nope. In the EU (and Britain still is), the retailer is the only party with a legal warranty duty (at least 2 years, national law may deviate to the benefit of the customer). The manufacturer may offer any additional warranty, but even if they do that does not absolve the retailer. The UK does have a longer warranty period than the EU minimum if you can prove the product was faulty, but this is a reversed proof, and it still binds the retailer instead of the manufacturer. | Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed. | england-and-wales The government grants limited rights of return (thanks Jen), for which you are entitled to a cash or cash-like refund (e.g. reversal of a credit card charge as described below). The vendor has the option to go above and beyond that statutory minimum as a courtesy to the customer. In that non-compulsory zone, they have the liberty to offer store scrip rather than a cash refund. Of course, any business can try to cheat you, and then you have to stick up for your rights by insisting or reporting to relevant authorities. united-states If you buy with a credit card, the rules and contractual obligations of the credit card companies oblige the merchant to accept returns by doing a refund to the card. It's important to understand how this happens: the merchant isn't just picking an arbitrary amount of money and doing a new "sale in reverse"... they are identifying a specific past transaction that already happened, and modifying or reversing it. That is a system safeguard so they don't credit the wrong person or be tricked into a reversal on a transaction that never happened. That's why they want your receipt. On a cash transaction, it is sellers prerogative whether to issue cash or store credit. Issuing store scrip is a reasonable option to deter theft and fraud. For instance someone who wanted an item could get it for free, by buying the item, taking it home, returning the next day without the item, grab another identical item off the shelf and sneak over to the CS line and "return" it with yesterday's receipt. With cash sales, that would be completely untrackable, and the thief is gone. With credit card, they have your identity; with scrip they can "flag" the scrip in their system to either prevent its use and/or have a security officer detain you if you try to use it. For instance American home stores will cheerfully take re-saleable condition items back even without a receipt, but will issue a store voucher for the value rather than cash. That policy would be a disaster if they refunded cash. As it is, I find it rather convenient! So if you want the convenience of cash refunds, you can just use credit cards - gaining the feature at the expense of anonymity. | Can they have a clause in the fine print that in laymans terms just says 'we might just not fulfill our side of the deal'. That paraphrase appears to trivialize the actual terms of the contract (of which fine print you mention you don't know in detail). Germany's Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) at §262 entitles the shipping company --insofar as obligor-- to a choice of service, provided that the company duly informs the customer, Id. at §263. The latter section of the BGB is not explicit as to whether the obligor's notification ought to happen at the formation of the contract, although I am almost positive that that is so and is premised on the BGB itself. Since delivery at the post office and delivery at the home address are mutually exclusive (i.e., they preclude each other), by virtue of §262 the company may outline in the contract both alternatives and thereafter decide for one of these unilaterally. If the company makes its contractual [post office] alternative contingent on "being too busy with other things" and the customer proves that the company opted for post office despite not being that busy, the customer could prevail on grounds that the company contravened Treu und Glauben. See Id. at §162(2). The "I will mow your lawn" example you outline is not a good analogy. The shipping company may argue that, even if the product is not delivered at customer's home address, the customer still benefited by having to retrieve it from a location --such as a nearby post office-- that is closer from the location where the product was commercialized or manufactured. The customer would prevail only if delivery were at a location which is more inconvenient to him than if he discarded transacting with the shipping company. See Id. at § 226. |
Can I hire a resident of Iran in USA to work remotely? I have a start-up and I want to know if I can hire a ux designer from Iran in my company or not? | Under US regulations pertaining to Iran sanctions, §560.201, Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, the importation into the United States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, other than information and informational materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is prohibited. where that acts grants the President the authority to regulate various things but The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly... the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not include those which are otherwise controlled for export under section 4604 3 of this title, or under section 4605 3 of this title to the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18 So information isn't generally regulated, except potentially under section 50 USC 4604 – which was repealed. For the moment, here is what that law said (huge, not gonna copy). But that doesn't matter too much because the exception to the exception is for exports, not imports: it is legal to import technology into the US. (OTOH, how is it possible to import programs without exporting at least shred of programming technology?) Also under §560.419 The prohibitions in §560.201 make it unlawful to hire an Iranian national ordinarily resident in Iran to come to the United States solely or for the principal purpose of engaging in employment on behalf of an entity in Iran or as the employee of a U.S. person, unless authorized pursuant to §560.505. See also §560.418 with respect to the release of technology and software. You cannot bring an Iranian resident to the US for this purpose, unless you get authorization. It does not say you can't pay a guy in Iran to work remotely. And finally, §560.505 which is about the "authorized pursuant to" clause: The release of technology or software in the United States, or by a United States person wherever located, to any person violates the prohibitions of this part if made with knowledge or reason to know the technology is intended for Iran or the Government of Iran, unless that technology or software meets the definition of information and informational materials in §560.315. There are other clarificatory notes attached to this section. Finally, §560.505 explicitly allows importation of certain non-immigrant services, but what you intend doesn't seem to be covered. So it is not crystal clear, especially since your plan might involve "exporting technology". It's not safe to interpret these regulations on your own, and you need to hire an attorney who specializes in this area, where you would discuss in detail what you will be "exporting" (even if you don't think it is exporting, it could be legally deemed to be exporting). That, I think, is the main legal issue. | You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company. | You'd have to look careful for example at the Taiwanese law. Does it disallow companies in Taiwan to hire minors, or does it disallow minors to take jobs in Taiwan? In 99.99% of all cases the effect would be the same, but in this case the minor is in Taiwan, and the company in the USA. If their law disallows minors to take jobs, then the matter is clear. If it disallows companies to hire minors, then there is the question if the US company hiring a remote employee is covered by this or not. On the other hand, if employment is against Taiwanese law, how can they enforce it? Normally enforcement is against the company, not the minor. | International organizations such as the UN are typically treated similar to foreign governments, and thus enjoy various privileges. One consequence is that typically, income from employment by these organizations is not subject to taxation by the host countries where the employee lives or carries out their work. However, the details depend very much on the tax laws in that host country. The employee might still be required to file taxes, but would then likely be able to declare the income as tax-free under the corresponding provision of the national tax law. This usually also depends a lot on the treaties which created the international organisation. For example, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations contains an explicit tax exemption for UN officials, though not necessarily for regular employees. As an example for how a country treats employees of international organization, the IRS has guidance regarding US tax law here. Other countries tend to have similar rules, albeit with less accessible online documentation :) | Is this work for hire? There is an arguable case to be made that you are an employee for copyright law purposes and, if so, the copyright belongs to the company. The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. Second, if you do own the copyright, there is clearly an implied licence with the company to allow them to use it. It is arguable that the licence is exclusive since the software is bespoke and made specifically for the company. Can you sign an agreement now Yes, but … It is clear that the purpose of signing the agreement is to screw the company over (with the compliance of 2 of the directors). That’s a contract entered into in bad faith and possibly for an illegal purpose and would likely be found invalid. You need to understand that the company is a distinct legal entity from its owners and it has its own rights. People make the mistake of thinking the owners are the company: they aren’t. The two rebel founders are on dangerous legal ground. Assuming they are the directors of the company, they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. That is, they must put the company’s interests ahead of their own. It is clearly not in the company’s interest to have a rival business start so they cannot plan to do that while they are directors - they need to resign first. You are not so much at risk - as an employee/contractor your duty is to follow the directions of the company (the company - not a faction within the company). However, if you aid the other two in what might be a crime, you could be in trouble. | Yes, and this is very common - Cuba, North Korea and Iran are often excluded. Mind you, this is from a US perspective. The banned country may have other ideas about the legality of the ban under its laws. But if you weren't planning to do business with that country anyway, that's not exactly going to hurt you. | For a large organization, software licensing compliance is a very broad and intractable problem. The licensing environment is very different for the big company than it is for little tiny you. Many large companies are subject to audits by software vendors (i.e. Adobe, Oracle, etc.) in which they have to show licenses purchased for each active seat. There's a whole new INDUSTRY around maintaining license compliance. An employee bringing in their own software and installing it on a company computer complicates this vastly. That is the environment that the question should be considered within. The large company makes the decision somewhere along the way that your individual efficiency in performing your individual tasks is less important than maintaining auditable software licensing compliance. Since they own the computer/laptop/server, it's their decision. Many times it seems that corporate policies as they apply to the individual worker are obstructive and limiting, but there's a bigger picture to the situation. | Yes. Content not created by a user is not protected by Section 230, and if the platform agents or employees begin to substantively edit content, the platform becomes a co-author rather than merely a platform for that content. |
How to deal with major companies flat-out ignoring your contact attempts about serious bugs on their website as well as refunds? I'm forced to order groceries home these days. This is in Sweden The company I order from has a bug which keeps silently switching the delivery address from whatever you entered and saved, to the one associated with the payment card you use for the payment, every single time you make an order. This has caused them to deliver the groceries to the completely wrong address (with me as the only person who suffered from it) before I started double-checking it every single time and manually changing the information back. When I report this, they simply ignore it. No response whatsoever. The bug is never fixed. And when they failed to deliver a watermelon (the delivery person accidentally broke it on the way, and claimed it would be refunded), nothing has happened with that for many months, in spite of countless e-mails by me. No silent refund. No apology. No response whatsoever. I sent the e-mails to all e-mail addresses I could find on their website. In fact, after a while, I got tired of manually sending the e-mails and set up a script to e-mail them every hour (originally, it was only every 8th hour), since allegedly they get such a flood of e-mails all the time that mine get lost. Is there any legal recourse for failing to fix issues like these? | What would be the most reasonable thing to do? Live with it. Oh, and stop breaking the law with your automated emails. Illegality on their part does not justify illegality on your part. Also, it’s likely that this activity has caused your email address to be blocked automatically which may explain why they aren’t contacting you. From a legal point of view, that’s the only reasonable option. You do have valid grounds for a lawsuit for the value of the watermelon but the cost of filing will be a couple of orders of magnitude greater than the value of the melon so doing so isn’t “reasonable”. If you want to vent, the internet offers a wide variety of social media platforms for which that seems to be their primary focus. But that’s got nothing to do with the law. | While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws. | Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country. | You owe money if there is a contract obliging you to pay. Whether you receive what you pay for (e.g. services) only affects your stance when suing for non-performance/damages; your obligation to pay still stands until the court decides it does not (or there is a mutual agreement to discharge the contract). It is irrelevant whether the original payment method still works or not. If it does not but you still owe money — you have to pay. The ability to turn the credit card off is just a handy feature. It does not affect your contractual obligations in any way except for when the terms explicitly provide for it (like automatic cancelling subscription when payment method fails). | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem. | While it is true that cash is legal tender, this can still be overridden by mutual agreement (i.e. in a contract). So the legal tender status only matters if payment methods were not agreed upon before entering into an agreement. In other words: If a restaurant lets you eat without telling you they do not accept cash, they will have to accept cash. However, if they explicitly tell you they only accept card payments, they can insist on this later. This applies in both the United States, in Germany, and in Canada (see e.g. It may be legal tender, but more businesses are snubbing cash). So to address your points: As I understand the legality would work something like this: 1) I accept the the contract where I agree to pay with card in exchange for food Yes - however, in accepting the contract you also accept that the restaurant is "cashless" (assuming the restaurant clearly tells you so, e.g. by putting up a sign or by saying it in person). I attempt to fulfill the contract to the best of my ability, but am prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond my control Yes. Since you attempted to fulfill the contract, you did not commit the crime of theft (which requires intention not to pay). However, you still owe what you promised when entering into the agreement, which is to pay with a card. At this point I owe the restaurant the money, but since the original transaction failed, this is a debt, which I offer to settle with legal tender No. As explained above, if the agreement stipulates a specific payment method, this generally overrides the "legal tender" aspect. In short: You agreed to pay with a card, so you are required to pay with a card. If you cannot pay with a card, you have not fulfilled your part of the agreement. It is is arguable that it is not your fault, but this does not change your obligation. Now you must either negotiate a suitable alternative (cash, cheque, golden watch...), or come back to pay later with a card. Also, the business may be able to charge you additional costs, such as extra accounting work or interest because of your non-standard payment - that would depend on the details. | A lawsuit is designed to put you in the position you were in before the sale happened. Since the company has already offered you a full refund, suing would achieve nothing except cost you fees; your time and frustration are not legally recompensable. It may be that some consumer-protection office can fine this company for misleading advertising; the case would turn on whether the mistake should have been noticed before customer support sent a false confirmation. If you want to start the process, you should make a formal complaint to your local trading standards/customer service office. You will get no reward except relief to your feelings. |
How must undercover police officers identify themselves? This question (and this one written in parallel) comes out of discussion on a more specific question with details about a particular situation, which was apparently too specific for this site. When plainclothes officers driving an unmarked car want to arrest a person, how do they identify themselves in a way that isn't easily faked, especially when they're acting against somebody who has government-mandated duties to protect items in his custody? This is different from "(When) are police required to identify themselves?" because that question is about getting the name and badge number of a uniformed on-duty officer, where it's clear they are police but not known exactly who/which specific officer they are. This question pertains to individuals who are not wearing a uniform and not driving a marked police car, and who are making demands of another person, including detaining that person and taking them away against the person's will and in violation of the person's duties. While the option of calling for backup by uniformed officers in a marked car could be one strategy, suppose that the people who claim to be police are not using that option for whatever reason (maybe because they aren't police, maybe they just don't want to). This is also related to "How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?" but for the case of someone who is not in uniform and just claims to be a police officer. There are examples of people who kidnap others by claiming to be police, and it seems to be illegal to resist such a kidnapping (see motivating question about that specific situation here). Not all the people who use this strategy have made the news and even of those who have, not all have been caught. It's common enough there are even pop-culture memes about people falsely claiming to be the police not having to identify themselves ("We don't need no stinkin' badges!") but the meme may or may not match the law. | In Massachusetts law it says the following: The term ''police officer'' as used in this section shall mean a police officer in uniform or, if out of uniform, one who has identified himself by exhibiting his credentials as such police officer while attempting such arrest. So, showing a badge or ID card or possibly even an official business card would be sufficient under the law. | It depends on the jurisdiction, and what you hire the officer to do. It is generally legal to hire an off-duty police officer, and here is what Seattle says about that. They are held to the same standards as when they are on duty; they have to be off duty (and not on sick leave). They do have to submit an approval form that describes what they will do. While in uniform, the work has to be of a law enforcement or traffic enforcement nature (thus not bill-collecting or vehicle repo), also you can't work in an alcohol or marijuana sales establishment. Some of your interests would probably not be covered, since zoning-type infractions (pool) are not within the purview of the police, but burning trash on the sidewalk would be. Because of the requirement for approval, you probably can't pay to get a response to a robbery (still takes 24 hours to get "short notice" approval). It is not clearly illegal to offer an officer money to "do his job", but it is also not clearly legal. It is illegal (bribery), if you With the intent to secure a particular result in a particular matter involving the exercise of the public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action in his or her official capacity, he or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon such public servant It is not obvious whether a peace officer is a public servant, as defined under the law. A "public servant" is any person other than a witness who presently occupies the position of or has been elected, appointed, or designated to become any officer or employee of government, including a legislator, judge, judicial officer, juror, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, or otherwise in performing a governmental function and a "peace officer" is a duly appointed city, county, or state law enforcement officer By statutory stipulation, a LEO is "appointed", and they are an employee of the government. Then when you hire them to do something, do you do so "with the intent to secure a particular result in a matter involving the exercise of the public servant's exercise of discretion in his or her official capacity"? If so, it is bribery (a crime). Since LEOs can legally be hired to enforce the law when off duty, the legality of that hiring must depend on the "particularity" of the job. If an officer has the discretion to arrest Smith for a criminal act, but declines to do so, then you cannot pay him to act otherwise. Officers generally have the discretion to arrest (or not) anyone committing a crime, so hiring an officer to "control traffic" or "work security" is not influencing the officer to exercise a particular form of discretion. The crucial question would be, why didn't they enforce the law in the first place? | I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply. | The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf | Try the phone or email contacts at Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Home. The state of Florida doesn't appear to maintain a statewide officer registry, but that department should be able to verify someone is or isn't a officer in conjunction with the police department closest to your location. If this neighbor is threatening or attempting to enforce the law while not showing ID that proves he/she is an officer, that's serious, and you should call the local police department. Talking about being a LEO while drinking beer at a BBQ is less serious, but still could be a third degree felony. See Statutes & Constitution - Florida State Statutes: 843.08 False personation.—A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a firefighter, sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, fire or arson investigator of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or a federal law enforcement officer as defined in s. 901.1505, and takes upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, commits a felony of the third degree, | england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop & Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop & Account provisions. | There are various ways in which a minor cannot assist a police investigation, and it might be useful to say in what ways any civilian could do so (TV shows notwithstanding). A civilian cannot conduct a custodial interrogation, nor can most of them gather physical evidence (so that a proper evidence log is maintained including relevant information on method of collection, the evidence isn't contaminated etc. – stuff that requires a modicum of training). They cannot execute a search warrant. On the other hand, anyone can provide information that is useful to the police, and it can be done without giving your name or indicating that you are a minor. A minor can serve as a witness at a trial, and it can be helpful to police to know that they have a witness to a crime. A minor can also be used the same way an adult is used, as a confidential informant. There is not a lot of data on that practice given the confidentiality of juvenile records, but there is an article to read ("Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense". The article does suggest that parental consent may be necessary in some cases (such as wearing a wire to a drug transaction). There is a law in Washington requiring every county's prosecutor to have a local protocol for using informants, and there should be guidelines developed by a work group, however the results (if any) of that group's meetings are not available on the internet. It is possible that there are specific restrictions on the use of minors as informants in some jurisdiction. The article explores the subtle distinction between "informant" and "friend", applied to minors. California has a law that limits the use of minors – none under 15, those above with approval of a judicial officer and parent, though those 13 and older can be used as bait in a cigarette or alcohol sales case. New York does not have a blanket prohibition against using a minor as an informant, but there may be relevant guidelines for a particular department. | The role of the 101 call handlers is to assist with enquiries and to progress reports of non-emergency incidents - not deceive. They are not (usually) police officers do not (routinely) have access to PNC. Even if they did, they are under no obligation to divulge potentially operationally-sensitive and/or personal information over the phone; especially as the caller's identity cannot be verified. In response to comments and the OP edit on 09/03/2022... The police will not confirm if you are wanted on warrant over the phone. You must attend your local police station and bring some form of identification with you such as a passport, driving licence or birth certificate. Source1 You can find your local police force here 1A random example taken from one of the 43 territorial police forces in england-and-wales |
I abandoned my bicycle in the parking of the apartment I was living (Houston, Texas), what will happen? I was in Texas(Houston) and lived at a place where my name isnt on the lease. I had to rush a few places and go back home and my bicycle remained locked to a small corner in the parking spot. My flatmates had a key but didnt give it away and left it there. The manager i heard put some stickers on it for it to be removed. Usually what happens to such cases. They don't know it was my bicycle nor from our apartment. From what i read online, they will ask the city to take it away and if i dont claim it in a given time they will own it. I have no problem with that. Is that how it is? | I gather that you either a) don't want the bike or b) are physically unable to retrieve it. You are acting like a spectator here. You ARE involved. By doing nothing, you are creating trouble for others, and failing to create a good. They must go through an extensive process to protect the rights of an owner they don't know who even is. What you should do, is to send a paper letter to the landlord at that complex. Dear landlord, You may have a bicycle at Location Here inside Apartment Complex Name Here. I am the owner of the bicycle. I had to leave the region, and I had to leave the bicycle behind. I cannot come back and claim it. Perhaps you know someone who could use a bicycle. Please give the bicycle to them, or dispose of it as you see fit. Here is the key to the lock. Signed, Your name Why a paper letter? Because you can't email a key! If you sent an email and key separately, they'd get confused. Plus, the signature on paper is legally binding, so they don't have to worry about it being a trick. Tape the physical key to a piece of paper, to keep it from rattling around and chewing a hole in the envelope. (it could be the paper the letter is written on, note that a printout of a Word document is fine). Paper letters have gone out of style, I know; you can work out how to send them, but an older person will help you do that faster, since well, we used to do everything that way. Now if you do want the bicycle, that gets harder. You will have to have one of your roommates give a key to someone who can retrieve it for you and store it for you. And you/they may need to coordinate with the landlord to even get access to it / find out if it's still there. This is probably a waste of your time. | I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? | A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from). | I would assume that the seller ('Transferor') still owned numbers 7 and 11 at the time of the sale. If so, this clause means that the owners of 7 and 11 (now and in the future) have a right of way on the path coloured blue on the plan. The land still belongs to number 9, but the owners cannot build on it so as to block the path. (As mckenzm comments, "on foot only" is an important qualification; the neighbours do not have a right to install utilities under the path, and the owner can put in obstacles that prevent bringing cycles down it). | Interesting question! I believe all of the examples can be addressed by the following rules: A vehicle on a roadway has the right-of-way over a vehicle not on a roadway. Therefore, the vehicle leaving a parking lot always yields to a vehicle in a parallel road. Absent another rule, the vehicle on the right always has the right-of-way. So if two vehicles are leaving adjacent parking lots, the left one waits for the right one to go if there is any potential conflict. Of course, not enough people know these rules, so in practice if you can't get the vehicle with the legal right-of-way to take it I teach drivers to be as decisive and cautious as possible: I.e., take the right-of-way, but not so fast that you can't avoid the other vehicle if it decides to go after all, because legally you will be at fault in a collision. (Though it's anyone's guess how police and insurers would settle the tricky scenarios you illustrate.) | Following the guidance of the police In summary: If the item is hazardous or dangerous you should report it to the police using the emergency number. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a private place, hand it to the owner of the premises - it's their responsibility to attempt to find the owner and the property becomes theirs if they can't. If the item is non-hazardous and found on public transport, hand it to the operator - they have their own by-laws about lost property. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a public place, if it has a serial number, hand it to the police - they may be able to trace the owner if it is a government document, hand it to the issuer if it is of low value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner "these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item." if it is of high value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner and if you can't hand it to the police. | Great job taking the photo at the time, it could end up saving you some money. I can see an Acera rear derailleur(inexpensive), a seven speed freewheel (cheap), a rusty chain (poorly maintained), a bent derailleur hanger (possible damage) and a rear derailleur cable which is doing something slightly funny. Focusing on the seven speed freewheel, we can tell that this is a budget bike. I would expect you could replace the whole bike for 370 euros. Labour charges will make up a large portion of a repair bill, but it does seem like an inflated price. You absolutely must insist on transparency upfront from the bike owner. If they are not prepared to tell you what they want to spend your proposed 370 euros on, then I am confident they are trying to rip you off. If they tell you what the money will be spent on and you are struggling to decide if it is reasonable, please ask us about it with the updated info, before you pay any money at all. Also seek some regional legal input into what your obligations and time frame need to be (we aren't lawyers!). If you meet your legal obligations and do so in a timely manner, then you are free to be as generous or not as you like in returning the bike to the condition it was in before the incident. As for the original questions (sorry). I would suggest having the quote for the repairs approved by someone you trust in advance, yes perhaps a third party bike shop you trust. I would suggest not doing the repair work yourself. Even though that could be cheaper, you don't want any follow-ups from the other person. So if the repair is done at the other person's choice of repair shop, with your prior agreement about the cost and extent of the work, then they cannot follow up and ask you for more money after the fact. | I would think that this would be treated the same as lost property. In most places, if you notice lost property (for example because the postman hands it to you) you have the choice of ignoring it (don't touch it, don't accept it from the postman), or you have to make reasonable efforts to find the owner and return it. If you as the sender had no idea who received the package so you cannot contact them, and there was nothing in the package identifying the sender, the receiver would be able to keep the package when their efforts of finding the owner fail. But if you manage to contact them, then the receiver knows the owner, so there is no legal excuse to keep the package. |
Family sue police over existence of body camera footage The media indicates: https://abcnews.go.com/US/lawyers-breonna-taylors-family-sue-police-existence-body/story?id=78753109&cid=clicksource_4380645_1_heads_hero_live_hero_hed The lawsuit, filed in Jefferson County Circuit Court, claims police are withholding public records that would show whether there is additional body camera footage that could provide more details about the night Taylor was killed by police If the assertions are proven to be true, What obligations do said authorities have to disclosed said video evidence? Is there a statute applicable in all states requiring authorities to not actively hide (deny) evidence? What mechanisms are in place to nudge institutions to not repeat the issue What access is provided in law to police collected evidence? Would any and all statutes for question 2 have to be at the Federal level? Obviously IANAL. | You can read about the obligation to access public records under Kentucky law here. This page is the Louisville PD' statement about what is available. They state that "Some items have been redacted, blurred or withheld for privacy or legal reasons", noting for example that the statute "exempts from disclosure under the Open Records Act information that, if disclosed, would create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Any further reference to redactions for personal privacy /concerns is also made pursuant to this law and/or HIPAA". The plaintiff's filing is not available and the police department has not commented, so we don't know exactly what is being demanded. However, the PD has not claimed that they are withholding the requested records for legal reasons, and the media alleges that the suit alleges that the PD lied about the existence of said records (note the double allegation). Body-worn cameras are specifically included here, and this part says that you can sue in county court. FOIA does not apply, because the Lousiville PD is not an agency of the US government. | Ah, but destroying the insulin is not "tantamount to to murdering the victim". Any pharmacy or hospital can supply more. Once the villain is secured, or the cop and victim are away from the villain, additional supplies can be obtained. That does not justify deadly force. (And since the T J Hooker series was set in a large US city, such supplies would have been readily available, 24/7. If the setting was far away from any such supplies, the case would be different.) However, if the cop has plausible reason to fear that the villain will attack him or the victim, and pose a serious threat of injury or death, the cop can use as much force as is reasonably required to defend himself or the victim, including deadly force if that is needed. He may not use more force than is reasonably required, but in practice once it is established that there was a valid threat, or reasonable grounds to believe that there was a threat, the cop's judgement on how much force was needed will only be overruled in a really egregious case. Under current law, the cop may not use deadly force simply to stop the suspect from escaping, unless there is some unusual factor involved. I think the law may have been interpreted differently on that point when the TV show was made, in the early 1980s. | Chain of custody and testimony in this regard. Say there is a murder victim, with DNA of the suspect under the fingernails and a knife with the suspect's bloody fingerprints stuck in the chest. There would be testimony what happened to the knife. If a paramedic removed it to attempt first aid, the paramedic would testify. So would the officer who bagged it, and the forensic analyst who took the fingerprints. A pathologist would testify if the knife was consistent with the stab wound (a careful pathologist could never swear that the knife was the cause of death, just that it matches). The pathologist would also testify how DNA was collected under the fingernails, and how it was sent to the lab. The defense may claim that the suspect also tried first aid, or that a corrupt cop forced the suspect to hold the knife. The court or jury then draw their conclusions from this and other testimony. Same here. A lifelike picture found on the web proves nothing. A witness who takes the stand to testify that he or she took a certain picture would be more credible. So would a forensic officer who testifies how she or he removed the data from a surveillance camera, checked for common signs of tampering, and then signed a copy of the data with a private key. (The signing shows no third-party tampering after collection, it is not evidence of integrity before that.) Years ago, in germany, there was the case of a bank robber who claimed that a fleeing suspect had handed him a bag of money in the forest and then vanished. "Prove it wasn't so," he demanded. "You can't. So there is reasonable doubt." Well, the court found that the statement merely created unreasonable doubt, and the sentence was upheld on appeal. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations. | I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police). | If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal. | For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that. |
"Innocent until proven guilty" doesn't apply to bail? How does the law reconcile the "innocent until proven guilty" principle with the treatment of those awaiting trial on criminal charges? At least in the U.S., it seems like there is a meta-criminal-justice system in which merely being accused of a crime is enough to land a person in prison. An illustration of this is the case of Michael Avenatti: While he was out on bail awaiting trial, prosecutors accused him of committing additional crimes (while on bail). The judge agreed with the prosecutors and revoked his bail: At the end of the court hearing, Judge Selna said he agreed with prosecutors that Avenatti’s handling of the $1 million was probably illegal. He said he also agreed that Avenatti posed an economic danger to the public if he remained free on bail, because he was likely to keep committing crimes. “I believe that the danger to the community is real and palpable,” Selna said. I understand that the bail system is discretionary, but AFAIK the legitimate purpose of imprisonment awaiting trial is to ensure that the accused appears for trial. Here we have an example in which a person's freedom awaiting trial was curtailed based only on an accusation of illegal behavior, not based on a legal conviction for committing a crime. | The concept of "innocent until proven guilty" is inherent in our constitutional protections for due process. As far as I know, the Supreme Court first formally recognized it as a rule in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458-59 (1895): Now the presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty. In other words, this presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created. The key phrase -- for purposes of your question -- is "sufficient evidence." At a criminal trial, sufficient evidence consists of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on “all the essential elements of guilt” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). But if the government wants to lock up a defendant pending trial, the question is not whether the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, but rather whether he poses a danger to the community and can be trusted to appear for trial. 18 U.S. Code § 3142(e)(1). And on those questions, he retains the presumption of innocence, but the government's burden of proof when arguing otherwise is substantially lower. The courts recognize both the potential of fleeing from the court and the prevention of additional crimes as legitimate bases for pretrial detention. In cases like Avenatti's, where the government is seeking pretrial detention because the defendant is a danger to the community, it needs to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S. Code § 3142(f)(2). However, if the government is seeking to hold the defendant because it does not believe he will appear for trial, it need only prove its case on that question by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986) (“For detention to be proper, the government had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure Martir's attendance at trial.”). As a side note, I'd agree with some of the answers that in practice, the bond system is regularly abused to the point that its underlying principles become unrecognizable. My answer is meant only to address the actual legal rules your question implicates. | An accused would be arrested for the purposes of arraignment ("even a scheduled arrest is still an arrest"). That does not entail that the accused would be held in custody pending or during trial. Many commenters are of the view that Mr. Trump would be released under his own recognizance without bail. Reference: AP News. | england-and-wales I think the main reason is that in specific prosecutions such behaviour may not be found to constitute any of those criminal offences. While on the face of it the behaviour is illegal, the court is also obliged to take into account the rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and association, in the Human Rights Act 1998. But a court's injunction sets out in black and white the restrictions on behaviour after considering the human rights aspects of the case, and breach of the order is a contempt of court (not a criminal offence as such, but punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine). Such injunctions are an additional tool for trying to mitigate or deter the behavior to which you refer and in a sense they are more convenient than criminal prosecutions. Some considerations and more detail in no particular order: Standard of proof differences You mention relevant criminal offences. These necessarily have the criminal 'standard of proof'. The trier of fact (the jury at jury trial; the magistrate or judge at non-jury trial), having considered all the relevant evidence, must be sure the defendant is guilty. However, the entity seeking an injunction (the claimant) does not need to meet that standard of proof to obtain an injunction that includes restrictions on behaviour. They need only persuade the court there is a real and imminent risk of a civil wrong for which they merit relief, or that there is a serious issue to be tried at a later date for which they merit relief until the conclusion of that trial. Criminal prosecution delays For the past two years to the time of writing this answer, circumstances have been such that if there were a criminal trial (which is by no means guaranteed), it may be scheduled months, perhaps even a year or two, in the future. But the claimant (and the wider public) may want relief 'now' and the defendant(s) might be free to continue their behaviour in the meanwhile, the defendant might not be held in custody pending trial. Due to delays, some defendants have been in custody for several months pending trial and this isn't satisfactory either, particularly if they are innocent: "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time" (article 6 Human Rights Act 1998). The behaviour may not be found to constitute a criminal offence In this context, the law providing for the criminal offence must be read 'compatibly' with the human rights legislation - the qualified rights to freedom of expression, to assembly and association. Meaning, is this criminal justice system reponse to that behaviour provided for in law, necessary and proportionate, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and were there no alternative and less restrictive responses? Now, some of those elements are a definite yes (e.g. trespass to or obstruction of the highway are provided for in law), others may be arguable. But in any case, the police, prosecution and the court (if it gets that far) must consider those things, must do that weighing up - it is not explicitly provided for in the legislation that creates those criminal offences. The courts have not found every protest on a highway to constitute a trespass to (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones and Another) or obstruction of a highway (Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) v Ziegler and others (Appellants)). On the other hand, when these claimants seek an injunction the court does that weighing up and may consider alternative, less restrictive approaches (the claimant submits a wishlist, the defendant or court may push back). The court will say "Yes, this is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of the claimant and the wider public, however X is disproportionate, Y is proportionate, the defendants may go in area A but not area B, this time period is disproportionate, that time period is proportionate," and so on. So the claimant and the police are now armed with that injunction, the claimant will publish it, defendants are aware of its contents and fellow protesters ought to be made aware of it. It's there in black-and-white what is restricted and anyone breaching the injunction could be found guilty of contempt of court (punishable by up to two years in prison and/or unlimited fine or asset seizure; must be proved to the criminal standard). Example judgments about injunctions including lists of restrictions Here are some examples from the context that include different kinds of restrictions by court order and the court's weighing up of the competing interests of the claimants, the defendants and the wider public. Shell UK Oil Products Ltd v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 1215 (QB) (20 May 2022) The claimant sought (and succeeded) to maintain an injunction that was granted on an emergency basis, its restrictions set out at para 20, conclusion at para 70. National Highways Ltd v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078 (QB) - see para 7 for restrictions, the court found some protesters breached the so-called M25 Order and the court ordered their immediate imprisonment (para 66). National Highways Ltd v Persons unknown (blocking traffic) [2021] EWHC 3081 (QB) (17 November 2021) - the reasons for the decision to not set aside the ex parte interim injunction made by Linden J on 25 October 2021, some restrictions at para 4. High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd & Anor v Four Categories of Persons Unknown & Ors [2022] EWHC 2360 (KB) (20 September 2022) - restrictions at para 188. | united-states The ethical standard for U.S. prosecutions, under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 (ethical rules have parallel numbering in every U.S. jurisdiction and there is little variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction for this part of this ethical rule) is to refrain from prosecuting a charge that is not supported by probable cause. Probable cause is also the standard used by a grand jury, and in an adversarial pre-trial hearing, to screen charges before they go to trial. It is also the standard for issuing an arrest warrant. The higher threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard for convicting a defendant at a trial on the merits of the defendant's guilt or innocence, it is not the standard for bringing a criminal charge in the first place. The job of the prosecutor at trial is to convince the trier of fact (usually a jury, but sometimes a judge in a bench trial) that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the case was thin on evidence when commenced, this may require law enforcement and the prosecutor's office to develop evidence after the criminal charges are brought. As a practical matter, a prosecutor wants to prosecute cases that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and will usually try to do that. But a belief that a case can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial is not an ethical requirement for prosecutors and is not a ground for imposing sanctions against a prosecutor. Of course, individual prosecuting attorneys' offices are free to establish their own standards that are more rigorous as an internal policy for bringing criminal cases. | united-states Minimum sentencing laws do not prescribe any punishment for a judge that simply refuses to obey them. See 18 U.S. Code § 3553 as an example that explains how sentencing must be enforced, yet no mention of punishments for violating these laws. It also makes mention of how minimum sentencing can be avoided by a judge lawfully as well. Judges do not risk jail time or fines for breaking these laws, as they have judicial discretion, which is literally a power defined by what it means to be a judge, to hand out whatever sentence they think is appropriate. (Note: there may be exceptions, but I couldn't find any. If any such examples exist, they are likely rare) If a judge refuses to hand out an appropriate sentence by these laws, there are options available. The two main choices are by review, and by appeal. The review board has a few options. They can accept the lower sentence, they can reject the sentence to have the judge resentence, or they can assign the sentencing to a different judge. By way of appeal, the prosecutors can choose to appeal to a higher court. Eventually, either the sentence will become fixed at the reduced level, or it will be corrected by someone else in the system, if not the judge, then either an associate or superior. Either way, the odds are stacked against a rebel judge. However, at least one documented example of this exists, the story of Judge John Coughenour (linked below). He sentenced the same person three times for the same crime, and while he eventually did get a "victory," the story goes to demonstrate that (a) judges can rebel and get some effect, and (b) even as hard as he fought, he wasn't punished, but he also didn't get nearly the effect he was hoping for, despite a promise from the government to reduce the criminal's sentence in exchange for cooperation. While judges can be censured, reprimanded, removed from office, voted out (at least, at lower levels), and impeached, most of these punishments are reserved for situations of corruption, bribery, etc, rather than simply executing their judiciary discretion, which is one of the core powers granted to them by the judicial branch. Further Reading: One judge makes the case for judgment 18 U.S. Code § 3553 - Imposition of a sentence | In the U.S., one trial can be held for multiple co-defendants, though prosecutors and defense attorneys will have reasons for seeking separate trials (If only to avoid having a scene similar to the on in Dark Knight where Harvey Dent has about 50 mobsters caught in one RICO violation plus their lawyers and the judge's simple question of "How do you plea?" is met with a din of responses.). The Defense's reason for this is that an individual may not have been a part of every step of the collective guilt and thus some charges might not be appropriate if it's an individual's guilt compared to a groups guilt. For example, the six police officers involved in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray at trial were all tried separately. The first trial was declared a mistrial over the hung jury, and two subsequent trial's resulted in findings of not guilty by a judge during a bench trial. The remaining individuals had charges dropped (The three officers who had yet to have trials plus the one officer whose trial resulted in a mistrial). One of the findings a running theme of the officers as individuals did nothing wrong, though had they been tried collectively, the results may have been different, since the individual trials meant certain facts couldn't be brought up as they didn't apply to the individual but did if they were tried as a group. From a prosecutor's standpoint, separate trials mean that you can use one suspect against the other and make a deal for lighter charges in exchange for testimony against a partner in crime. The U.S. legal system does allow for plea deals between the defense and prosecution (and while it's not the only nation that allows this, it's one of the few where plea bargaining is not viewed as a "dirty" tactic and is openly embraced (U.S. attorneys tend to hate going to trial and will try to avoid it.). Prosecutors are not above offering immunity or granting lighter sentences in exchange for help in other cases, often in the form of testimony against the big fish. For a criminal who believes "snitches get stitches", an offer of flipping on your co-defendant for a sentence of 10 years, with parole in 5 is nothing to sneeze at when you're looking at 25 to life without parole for what you did. It's not immunity for testimony (typically, witnesses in plea bargains are not allowed to take the 5th with respect to questions on the stand because they will typically plea before the trial, and thus can't be prosecuted for the same crime.). | There is no direct equivalent to the American-style plea bargain, but there are some similar procedures: Basis of Plea A defendant can offer a written guilty plea to a lesser offence with the same (or closely similar) facts as the offence charged, which has to be accepted by the court to take affect. The prosecutor must consult with and seek the views of all victims, and if the plea is accepted it must not be misleading or untrue. The Attorney General's Guidance provides more information on the process and the detailed requirements (which are too long to repoduce here). Assisting Offenders The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 offer the option for a "minor-player" defendant to assist the prosecution and/or police by providing information to secure convictions of the principle offenders in return for immunity from prosecution (section 71), a restricted use undertaking (a version of immunity) (section 72) or a reduced sentence (section 73). Immunity requires full and frank disclosure of all previous offending (referred to as "cleansing"), but for whatever reason the defendant does not "cleanse" they may still be eligible for a lesser sentence. Either way the assistance - either as evidence at trial or as intelligence given in confidence - should be substantial and verifiable to be eligible. Statistics There is, as far as I can, no publicly available detailed statistics on these procedures, presumably the reason is that vast majority of the former cases go unreported and, despite some being public, there is a real risk of retribution to the informant in the latter. | This article may be helpful. The development of a distinct, lower standard of proof for civil cases comes after the US came into existence, thus the expressions were developed independently, after the doctrine itself started to develop. Various expressions are used, often with different implications that could lead to fixing a specific expression to a definite doctrine, for instance "greater weight of the evidence", "more likely than not" as well as the contender expressions. Earliest expressions of the principle in question include Edward Wynne Eunomus (1768) Wherever a verdict is given, the Plaintiff at least must give evidence to maintain his Declaration: where evidence is produced on both sides, the verdict is given for the Plaintiff or Defendant, according to the superior weight of evidence. Richards Wooddeson's 1777 formulation is In causes concerning civil rights and property, that side must prevail, in favor of which probability preponderates: but the (a) humanity of our law never esteems the turn of the balance sufficient to convict a man of any, especially a capital, crime. For it requires a very strong and irrefragable presumption of guilt to justify the infliction of the severer human punishments In Delaware (1801) in the case State v. Crocker, 2 Del. Cas. 150, the doctrine is "named", preponderance of evidence: In civil cases a preponderance of evidence is sufficient for you to convict; in criminal, you should have proof You can find "balance of probabilities" in a UK case Head v. Head (1823). The origin of the construction "balance of probabilities" is philosophy and theology, whereas "preponderance of evidence" is a more-distinctly legal expression. Since the underlying ideas were developed separately in the US and England, it is not surprising that different expressions were attached to the doctrine. |
I am stuck working alone with new coworker who I believe is dangerous. Must the employer take action? I work in a shop. Most of the time I work alone or with one other person. We recently got a new manager who hired two new employees. One of them I have conflicts with (back story on workplace.stackexchange.com) I am concerned for my safety being alone with him. He randomly gets mad. Today he clearly said "I'm not comfortable with you staying and I refuse to work with you" when I asked what was wrong he said it's my work ethic, and he's been here one week. I told him I was stepping outside to speak to the manager one my phone. A minute later he ran outside to interrupt me to ask a work question. Does the employer have some sort of responsibility to fairly resolve this? Or can they just keep scheduling us for shifts together? | An employer has a duty of care to employees and must take steps to ensure their safety. Notably: 125 (1) Without restricting the generality of section 124, every employer shall, in respect of every work place controlled by the employer and, in respect of every work activity carried out by an employee in a work place that is not controlled by the employer, to the extent that the employer controls the activity, ... (y) ensure that the activities of every person granted access to the work place do not endanger the health and safety of employees; (Canada Labour Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2)) If there is a reasonable belief that the other employee is a danger to you, they should take reasonable steps to prevent this. If they choose to ignore this, they may be liable. Whether or not there is a reasonable belief they are a danger to you or others here is unclear. Being annoying or rude does not endanger you and they haven't made threats towards you (I assume, since you'd have mentioned otherwise). | Depends on your definition of "require". In case of at-will employment — where the employer can fire an employee for any or no reason (other than that being discrimination of a member of the protected groups) — it would be perfectly legal for the employer to fire an employee who does not comply with that request. But that aside, no (unless such testing was a term of the employment agreement, be it written or verbal). No party to a contract can require the other party to perform what the contract terms did not include. | Would breaking a rule in the handbook constitute breach of contract? Generally speaking, yes. Of course, most employment contracts are "at will" so a breach of contract often isn't necessary to terminate employment. Does my employer's updating the handbook constitute a unilateral change of contract? It depends upon what is changed in the update to the handbook. Typically an employment contract would have a term that says something to the effect of "employee shall devote his full time effort to perform the duties he is directed to perform by employer in a satisfactory manner." If the employee handbook says, "part of every employee's duties includes cleaning up his work area at the close of business each day, locking his file cabinets and shutting down his computer", this would typically simply be a definition of the duties of the employee which the employer reserved the right to change in the original employment contract, and not a unilateral change of contract. On the other hand, if the employee handbook says, "vacation days may not be taken during December" when the employee's contract simply said that "you have ten vacation days per year", that might constitute a unilateral change of contract which might not be enforceable for an employee with a fixed term of employment who was not an employee at will, without additional consideration. Locale is UK but (I assume) contract law is pretty universal so answers specific to any region are welcome. I have answered based upon general contract and employment law, but the UK frequently sets mandatory standards for different kinds of contracts and modifies common law rules related to contracts (much more so than the U.S.), so it wouldn't be very surprising if this were modified by a statute of which I am not aware. We have UK lawyers who contribute to Law.SE and they can chime in if there are particular statutes in the UK that apply to this question. | The other answers are correct that you should speak to a lawyer, but you should expect your lawyer to tell you that you don't have a viable lawsuit. I can't speak to Pennsylvania law, but these facts would make a pretty weak claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. To win a hostile-work environment case, you must demonstrate: you suffered intentional discrimination because of your sex; the discrimination was severe or pervasive; the discrimination detrimentally affected you; the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and the existence of respondeat superior liability. Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2018). Your main problem will be in proving that the harassment was so "severe or pervasive" that it altered the terms of your employment. This is not as high a bar as it used to be, but the courts will not grant relief for "isolated incidents" unless they are extremely serious. Such incidents typically involve some kind of forcible, physical, sexual contact, which I don't see here. The general rule is that the more severe the harassment, the less frequently it needs to occur, and vice versa. Unfortunately, courts would probably look at the events you've described -- not physical, not sexually explicit, not threatening, not intimidating, not soliciting sexual conduct, not mocking you -- and say that they are not particularly severe. Given the lack of severity, the court would need to see them happening with pretty regular frequency, but you've described only two events in the course of about 18 months. And with one of those, the employer appears to have taken reasonable corrective action, leaving you with only one incident to complain about in however long you've worked there. Even if a court agreed that your co-workers engaged in unwanted sexual conduct, I'd expect the employer to be able to successfully invoke the Farragher-Ellerth defense, which permits them to escape liability if they can prove: that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Since they took corrective action when you reported harassment, and you did nothing to report that there were problems even after the discipline, and did nothing to report that you felt harassed by the second incident, the Farragher-Ellerth defense would probably be successful. | As the owner of your own computer, you can dispose of it however you see fit (as long as your choice is legal). The courts could, theoretically, force you do do something with your computer, but installing software is not one of the things that the courts are empowered to force you to do. (Mostly, they can force you to turn it over for a search). A company can't force you to do anything with your property: only the courts can order the use of force. But there is no legal basis for the courts to grant a company's request for an order to install software. A company can perhaps persuade you to install software on your personal computer, in exchange for keeping your employment. I assume you are familiar with the law regarding firing people. If you do not perform your job, you might be terminated for cause. You could hire an attorney and sue for wrongful dismissal, and it's not obvious that you have a valid reason for non-performance. So I would suggest consulting a Canadian employment attorney before sticking your neck too far out. | could they make a realistic claim that I had voluntarily terminated my contract before the year was over? The employer's act would forfeit its entitlement to reimbursement of bonus. The clause clearly indicates that the triggering event is termination, not the anticipatory notification thereof. Furthermore, the employer's act would be a breach of the [contract law] covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That would be in stark contrast with your compliance with, and/or kindness in, giving a two-week notice. The employer's termination of your employment seems improper in equity insofar as it was aware of your notice and thus took advantage thereof. | I've litigated cases like these before. The IRS enforcement reaction is swift and severe. Penalties for the employer are heavy and rarely waived. It would be rare for a business like this to stay operational long enough to issue a W-2. A business like this would probably be shut down by the IRS and have the people responsible for the payroll function, at a minimum, promptly burdened with tax liens, within four to six months. These cases also constitute a significant share of all criminal tax prosecutions. The odds of someone doing this spending several years in federal prison is high. Generally speaking, if the wrongdoing is fully on the part of the employer without the collusion or knowledge of the employee, the IRS will not force the employee to double pay the taxes that should have been withheld by the employer in this situation. Instead, this IRS will try to recover the amounts that were withheld from the employees but not delivered to the IRS. It will seek to recover these amounts from the employer and also from other responsible persons in the organization (and from outsourced professionals) with the authority to pay the IRS who did not do so. There may be circumstances, if push comes to shove, where the IRS could collect from the employees in a case like this one (I've never had occasion to need to research that issue), but that would be the rare exception and not the rule, in practice. On the other hand, if the employer simply does not withhold taxes or prepare W-2s at all, and either 1099s people who should have been classified as employees (or files no information tax returns at all), the IRS will generally insist that the employee pay income taxes on the full amount owed and that they pay the employee part of payroll taxes. It will also pursue the employer for the employer's share of payroll taxes. The employer will also be jointly and severally liable for any taxes that should have been reported and subjected to withholding that are not paid by the employee (perhaps because the employee spent all the money). Sometimes cases like this are also criminally prosecuted, but it is less common to do so. | The real question isn't whether there is a law, but whether you want to keep your job. If you want to do something that you believe will affect your company negatively, and you ask whether it's legal or not, the question alone should show you it's a bad idea. And another question is whether you can be sued, and what it will cost you even if you can win a case, and the answers to that are "yes" and "a lot". |
Handwritten "Copyright 2021 Joe Doe" copyright notice on a handwritten 30-page work, published only on social media Would a handwritten "Copyright 2021 (My First and Last name)" copyright notice, be valid and have it's standard legal aplication in USA as well as in EU, for me - an author form Slovenia (EU), if I write it in handwritting on a handwritten 30-page original literary work of nonfiction, which I would publish only on social media, in the form of a collection of 30 pictures of scans of handwritting? The work would not be catalogued, registered or published anywhere else so I assume that if it would be censored by the platforms - deleted, I would not have a link to an active published refference to the work, and don't know how could I persue my case in court, should it come to that, however my research so far has given me the impression that such a copyright notice is the best international protection and deterence symbol agianst infringement on the rights, and even to use in a court of law. (My current project just has to be in handwritting...) Grateful for any help. | In the united-states since the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act, all copyright notices are optional, and copyright does not depend on any notice at all. The same is true in every country that adheres to the Berne Copyright Conventions, which is almost every country in the world, and includes all countries with significant publishing industries. Even before the 1976 act, when a notice was absolutely required, a hand written notice was just as effective as a printed notice, provided that it was legible. Many painters, for example, included (and still include) hand-written copyright notices near the painter's signature, and these were effective. In the US, one cannot file a copyright suit unless the work involved is first registered. If the work was not registered before the infringement occurred, statutory damages are not available (in the US) unless the work is registered within 3 months of publication. For non-commercial works, statutory damages are often the only way to get any significant damages. The original handwritten work, whether posted to the net or not, is still protected by copyright, with or without a notice. A notice is not a substitute for registration. Neither is a post on social media. Proving who created a copyrighted work is not usually a major issue in a copyright suit, and worrying overmuch about ways to establish this is often a waste of tiem and effort. The issues are more often: Was the work copied; if so who copied it; was it infringement, fair use, or use under a license; did some other exception to copyright apply; what damage was done to the copyright owner; what advantage did an infringer get? A copyright notice does largely eliminate the defense of "innocent infringement" in which an infringer claims not to have known that the works was protected. If proved this can greatly reduce damages under US law. A handwritten notice will have the same effect on that defense as a printed one. | I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.) | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. | For a particular poem(s) the copyright term in ROK is Life + 50 years. In copyright, these are measured as calendar years so it will enter the public domain on 1 January 2019. That is, unless you plan to use it in a country that doesn't observe the rule of the shorter term (like the USA) - in those countries it may still be under copyright based on the term using their individual domestic law. Ask another question if you want this clarified. Copyright in the anthology belongs to the person who created that work i.e. the editor(s) who selected and arranged those particular poems from those particular poets. The duration is measured from the (last of) the editor's death(s). IF you are not copying or deriving from the anthology (i.e. you are only using one of the poets and are arranging them in a different way), this is irrelevant to you. | If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court. | There is no fixed amount or proportion of a copyrighted text which may be quoted without infringement. Whether quoting without permission is a fair use (which is what this question asks) depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the purpose of the use, the effect of the use on the market or potential market for the original, and the nature of the original work. In the Harper vs Nation case, quotes totaling roughly 300 words from the autobiography of former President George H. W. Bush (which was many hundreds of pages long) were held to be the "heart" of the work, and quoting them was found not to be fair use. There is no formula which can be rigidly or automatically applied to determine if a quote is a fair use. Note also that fair use is a strictly US legal concept, and a use which would be fair use under US law might well be copyright infringement under the laws of the EU, the UK, or other countries. | The text and content (including all diagrams and illustrations) of the 1847 work (and of any other work published in 1847) are in the public domain in the US and everywhere in the world. You may freely use them verbatim or in any modified form that you wish. You are not even legally required to credit your source, although not to do so would be unethical, in my view. The version by Nicholas Rougeux that is linked to in the question has the licensing statement: Posters and website design are copyright Nicholas Rougeux. All other content and diagrams are under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0). This will not apply to any content copied from the 1847 version, of course. You may use any of the new content and diagrams so released, or make and use derivative works based on those elements, provided that you comply with the CC BY-SA 4.0 license. This has a number of provisions, but the major ones are that you must release your work under the same license, must acknowledge your source work, and must not impose any additional conditions or restrictions on users of your derived work. These are spelled out in sections 3.a and 3.b of the license (linked above). Please read the full terms if you intend to use this license. If this procedure will satisfy your purpose, you do not need any further permission from Nicholas Rougeux, nor to pay any fees or royalties to him. If you do not choose to place your work under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, then you must not use the diagrams from Rougeux's version, nor modified versions directly based on them, nor an overall design clearly and directly based on the original design of that version, unless you secure permission from Rougeux (or the current copyright holder of Rougeux's version, whoever that may be). Given that Rougeux chose to release under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, he may well be unwilling to grant permission under a different license, but that is his choice to make. Exception: in the US, you may use content from the Rougeux version to the limited extent permitted by fair use. This is not likely to cover the use of all or a large number of diagrams, particularly for a competing version of the same base work. Without specific information on how much content you would be using from that version, and how similar it would be to the original, no one can reliably determine if fair use would apply or not, but fair use is most likely to apply when a strictly limited amount of content is reused, and particularly when it is used for a different purpose than the original. Also, fair use is a strictly US legal content, and a work that might be held to be fair use by a US court might be considered an infringement by the courts of some other counties. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright which are different in scope and terms from fair use. Many of them are significantly narrower. Note that a work posted to the internet is in effect published in all countries, and a copyright holder might choose to sue in any country s/he pleases. US courts might well enforce such a judgement even if it would not have been the judgement of a US court. Rogeux (or any other creator of a new edition) can have no copyright in elements already present in Byrne's 1847 work. Any similarity to Rogeux's work that is because of a similarity to Byrne's 1847 work is not copyright infringement. But any new elements introduced by Rogeux (or anyone else), including the manner of adding interactivity to a diagram, may well be protected by copyright (although the idea of having an interactive version of the diagram will not be). Any new or significantly modified text or diagrams introduced in a later version will be protected. As to any other versions of the 1847 "Byrne's Euclid" that may have been published, the publishers gain no copyright over the original 1847 work or any of its elements, including text, diagrams, or color scheme. Provided you do not use any original content newly introduced in such editions, you do not need to secure any permission from, or pay any fee to, the copyright holders of such editions. However, you may not use any such original content, or modified versions clearly based on such original content, without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use, applies. All that I said above about fair use would then apply. A copyright holder may grant or refuse permission to use a protected work or create a derivative work on any terms that s/he chooses, and charge any fee or royalty rate s/he thinks proper. Lack of response to a request for permission must be treated as if the response was "No". | Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement. |
Is it illegal to infringe copyright if your boss or your client ordered you to do it? The first possible scenario is this: suppose you work in a company, and you need to install some software for a client. The software needs to be purchased, but the boss tells you to just download it for free illegally (infringing copyright). You tell your boss that of course that's illegal and it's not the best way to do the job, but they tell you: "I know, but who cares, just download it for free". If you did it, who would be responsible for the illegal download in this situation? If you are responsible, how should you deal with such a situation? The second possible scenario is this: suppose you are a freelance software developer, and your client asks you to install a thing for them. They give you a link to an unofficial website where you can download the stuff for free (illegally). You tell them it's illegal, and the stuff should be purchased. They tell you: "Who cares, I'm not going to spend any money for purchasing it, your job is just to do exactly what I've told you, that is, just install it, and that's it". Again who would be responsible and how should you deal with this situation? Of course here there's always the option to not accept the job since you are a freelancer, but I also wonder if there are other options in theory. For example, maybe the client could download the software illegally themself, and then only give it to you for the installation? Location of the scenarios: any States of United States or any Member States of the European Union, but only one jurisdiction at a time. | There are two parts to copyright liability: civil and criminal. TL;DR: both cases are criminal offences, and it is illegal to break the law even when you are paid to do it. In the USA criminal copyright infringement requires a deliberate act to infringe copyright for commercial gain. Both of the scenarios meet these requirements. In the UK (and probably the rest of Europe) criminal copyright infringement includes possess in the course of a business an article which is, and which you know or have reason to believe is an infringing copy of a copyright work with a view to committing any act infringing the copyright. Again, both these scenarios meet this requirement. In the first scenario you are acting as an employee, so you don't have any personal civil liability for damages; that goes to your employer. However you still have, at least in theory, criminal liability. In the second scenario you are your own employer and so have both civil and criminal liability. Your client will share some liability as they have provided inducement to break the law. The best way of dealing with the first scenario is to point out to the boss that he is ordering you to commit a crime. Cite the law in your jurisdiction and the penalties for breaking it. Do this by email so that you have evidence of having told him, and take a printed copy of the email home with you just in case (if your boss isn't above criminal copyright infringement he may also not be above tampering with evidence). If you are in a big company then a CC to HR might also be indicated. If the boss is the company owner then you are in a stickier situation; your best option is probably to perpetuate the evidence as above and start looking for an employer who doesn't break the law. The second scenario is simpler: just refuse to do it. | Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts. | Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ... | Making a profit does not make the act illegal: it is illegal without there being any profit. The act of copying without permission is what makes the act illegal. Profit might maybe enter into the matter if you are talking about the "fair use" defense, since certain kinds of works can be partially copied for certain purposes. You could quote a few lines from a novel in a review, for instance. The judgment of whether a given act of copying without permission is allowed under fair use is complex and involves a balancing act. Profit becomes relevant in that a non-profit use favors fair use and a for-profit use disfavors it. Wholesale copying of works of art as you describe is illegal (is infringement). However... "illegal" is a pretty broad concept. If you infringe on my intellectual property, you almost certainly will not suffer any consequences unless I sue you. Taking "illegal" to mean "in violation of the law", infringing copyright is illegal because it violates the law, but I have to make a federal case out of your infringement – I have to sue you. As it happens, it can also be a crime to infringe copyright, and in that case, the government and not the copyright holder pursues the matter. If a person knowingly infringes copyright, he might be prosecuted, thus the Megaupload case which in the US is realized in the indictment US v. Dotcom. Moreover, profit motive is a required element for criminal infringement. (Also note that you don't have to actually make a profit for the profit element to be present). You cannot sue a person unless they have harmed you, so if you know that Smith copied Jones' work you can't sue Smith for harming Jones. (This is what they call "standing"). You might sue Smith, but not for infringement itself. If they sold you an illegal infringing copy, then you could sue. Or, their infringement could diminish the value of your legal copy. This website gives a multi-nation overview of criminal copyright infringement laws. | It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works. | Your question mixes up two different aspects of intellectual property. From a copyright point of view, it is perfectly legal to reproduce the features of a one piece of software in another. The functionlity of the software is not copyright (although the detailed look and feel of the user interface might be). However you ask if you, as an employee, can do this by "looking into the code of software X". Presumably by doing this learn something of the organisation and algorithms used. Even if you avoid direct copying, you are likely to have learned trade secrets of your employer, and publishing these is at least a civil tort in the US, and in some states a crime. | The question is a bit sparse on relevant details, but yes, a EULA is binding, even when you agree in the course of employment. It may not be you who is bound, though. In case 1, you install a program at word to do something, the EULA says "don't copy any of these files", you see a cool file and decide "Neat, I'm taking a copy home. I can do this because I installed the program at work and am not bound by the EULA". Wrong. Case 2: you are installing software on behalf of a customer. It's not you that is bound by the EULA, it's the customer. Case 3: you work for the company that develops the software and holds the copyright, either fixing bugs or testing the security of the system by trying to crack it. In that case, you have special permission from the copyright holder that overrides whatever restrictions would normally from from the EULA. I don't know if that covers the kind of case you are concerned with. To reduce the matter to a simple sentence, just because you agree to something in the course of a job does not mean that the agreement is invalid. | If it is open source code, then usually the requirement is that you produce the source code for the software that you release. Exactly for the software that you release. For example if you took open source software X, and added feature Y, and distributed the combined software outside your company, anyone can request the source code for X including Y. Handing them the source code for X only wouldn't meet the open source requirements. Now all this is not illegal, but it means the copyright holder of X could sue you for copyright infringement. They will do that if they have enough reasons to do so. So let's say you are continuously developing your software and occasional hand out your compiled software. Say you built versions 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 of the software, you gave versions 100 and 103 to customers, and anyone asking for the source code is given the source code for the latest, slightly improved version 104. The copyright holder of X might sue you but: 1. They wouldn't know you are doing this. 2. A judge might side with you and decide that newer, improved source code is good enough (I don't know this, but it seems not unreasonable). 3. The copyright holder might decide that they don't want to sue you for this because you are close enough to meeting the requirements. |
Can I sue a moving company for damages in small claims court? I hired a moving company to move my furniture from one apartment to another. While unloading a coffee table, one of the movers stacked a stone sculpture on top of the coffee table. This caused the coffee table glass to crack and shatter. I have pictures of this. I immediately (the next business day) got an estimate to replace the glass and filed a claim with the moving company's insurance. The estimate for the glass replacement is $490. The moving company's insurance responded with an offer of $45. They claim that this is standard policy, and claims against them are governed by Federal law (US). I have 21 days to accept their offer or I get nothing. The coffee table was purchased new for $800, 4 years ago. I understand there may be depreciation, so I'm not expecting full replacement value. I'm wondering if I can get a claim against the movers in small claims court to make up the difference? If it matters: This is in Colorado. | You can read about (federal) damages from the Surface Transportation, but they are at least liable for 60 cent per lb. for damages. The company has to inform you that you have the option for full-value, which you can waive. In addition, they are allowed to limit their liability for damages for items of high value such as furs and jewelry, things worth more that $100/lb (sounds like the coffee table might be such a thing). You are also required to give notice of high-value items. If you waived full coverage in exchange for a lower rate, then it would be non-productive to take them to small claims court. Also, under state law, there may be an arbitration clause which would prevent you from suing them (so, check the contract). | Much of the remedies for your situation depend on what you have in writing about 1) the transmission agreement and warranty you signed and what it may contain about warranty replacements, arbitration and court actions, and 2) what written evidence you have to the fact that the garage was encouraged to "keep trying things" until the warranty ran out, as well as evidence of the dates of the CEL (check engine light) maintenances and the shift solenoid replacements. Do you have - or can you get - a statement in writing from the garage that they were told to keep trying things until the warranty ran out? Your case to get the company to pay for the installation of the new transmission may hinge on this, as you need to prove that the transmission was possibly failing before the end of the three years. Does the transmission sale and installation agreement contain a clause about binding arbitration or court actions if you have a warranty complaint? These will determine what you can and can't do if you exhaust all other remedies and want to go to court. But it sounds like the transmission company is at least trying to make the situation whole by offering a replacement transmission. You need to gently push them to pay for the installation. Your basic options are: 1) you can try to talk to the transmission company yourself (along with the ammunition of possible evidence of the garage being told to delay warranty replacement) and try to work out a settlement for them to pay the installation costs; failing that, 2) file a complaint with a consumer advocate (like Consumer Protection | Washington State); or failing those, 3) take the transmission company to small claims court (if your agreement does not bind you to arbitration). Re: the first option above: something that can work very well is if the transmission company is a regional or national chain, look up the president or CEO and send them an email outlining your complaint. Many times a corporation will try to settle these types of situations before a complaint is filed or they go to arbitration or small claims court, because good PR (paying for the labor/installation) is cheap and bad PR is expensive. They already offered a replacement transmission, which is good; you need to gently push them to pay for the installation. | As you say, the roommate who was there "did not equate the sound of a running toilet with wasting water". That, I am afraid to say, is negligent: normally, when you hear constantly flowing water, you do something about it. Somebody has to pay for the water, and assuming the water is in your name, that is you. You could yell at the roommate, but legal negligence is irrelevant to the water bill. However, if there were any resulting damage (for example to wiring or walls), that is where the question of negligence would come up: you probably would be found liable for damage to the building that resulting from letting the condition persist. But unless the fill valve broke at the tank and leaked water onto the floor (which would be clearly obvious) there won't be any damage that you are liable for. I assume that the leak developed from an old part giving out. This would be normal wear and tear, for which you would not be responsible (assuming you didn't cause the problem, for example by putting concentrated bleach in the tank). You you are saying that the landlord is trying to charge you for the repairs, and on this point, the landlord is on thin ice. A landlord cannot just make up rules about assigning liability for damage: that is a matter to be determined by the courts. A tenant can do things to a fill valve that can cause a leak; and the seal has to be replaced every few years. The tenant is not liable especially for routine replacement of the fill value seal, and does not become liable because they failed to inform the landlord in a prescribed manner. Not reporting a leak within 24 hours does not contribute to the underlying failed part. You could probably contest the legality of that bit of maintenance clause 24, in that the landlord cannot unilaterally declare who is responsible for damage. At the trial, both sides will present relevant evidence, and the judge / jury will decide whether the tenant's negligence caused the seal to fail. | He may be entitled to (part) of the deposit or he may owe you more money When you and he agreed you both entered a legally binding contract - you are obliged to sell the vehicle to him, he is obliged to buy the vehicle from you. The deposit is merely the first instalment of the payment for the vehicle with the balance being due on delivery. They are not refundable by default. He now wants to repudiate the contract and you have several options: you can refuse his repudiation and require him to complete the contract within a reasonable time. He probably won’t do this so when he doesn’t we move on to one of the other options. In essence, this is simply a warning shot that if he doesn’t complete the contract you will move on to item 2. you can accept the repudiation and sue for damages, these would include your lost rent, pro-rata of registration, insurance etc. from the time you would have sold to the time you do sell, any additional advertising, any difference in the price you ultimately get if it is lower than his offer etc. you can accept the repudiation in return for keeping the deposit in lieu of the actual damages. This in makes the deposit a liquidated damages amount and it must follow all the same rules, basically it must be a genuine pre-estimate of the damage you would suffer and not be so high that it amounts to a penalty. You can accept the repudiation and, as a gesture of goodwill, return some or all of the deposit. | Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line). | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | It's the seller's responsibility. Note that in the UK you actually get much more than 2 years. The 2 year rule is the minimum required by the EU, but each country is free to implement that as they choose and the UK has much more. In the UK you are protected by the Consumer Rights Act. It states that products must last a "reasonable length of time". What counts as reasonable depends on the goods. For electronics 2 years is usually the absolute minimum, but for things like televisions the courts generally consider it to be 5 years even for cheap models. Under the Act the retailer is responsible. They can either replace the device or refund you, with the refund amount accounting for the 1.5 years use you had from it. As it was part of a phone contract it could be difficult to agree on a value for the speaker, but looking up the replacement cost for the same or a similar device is a good place to start. Which? has a lot more information and advice. | General the measure of property damages in an automobile accident lawsuit in the United States is the minimum amount of money necessary to restore the vehicle to its pre-accident state, and/or the diminution of fair market value of the vehicle due to the accident that repairs can't fully remedy in a reasonable fashion. Beyond that very general statement, the cases get decided on a case by case basis after consideration of all of the relevant facts related to damages. There are legitimate arguments either way regarding what is reasonably necessary to repair the vehicle to its pre-accident state in this situation. Generally speaking, if there is a lawsuit, neither side will get their attorney fees in the United States, so they both have to decide how much they are willing to fight over a modest dollar amount dispute. A $950 disagreement would be eaten up in two to four hours of lawyer time, so that colors the analysis. To some extent it ends up being a game of chicken - who is most credibly going to continue to fight knowing that taking a legal battle to the full extent it could be taken would be mutually destructive. |
How is videogame medium protected by copyright in practical terms? Before some people get all worked up, the question is being asked in the context of modding. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_game_piracy Video game piracy is the unauthorized copying and distributing of video game software, and is a form of copyright infringement. Okay, so at least in one (and probably the major and common one) case it the sharing is illegal due to copyright law rules. But how exactly are game files protected and what exactly is protected? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_property_protection_of_video_games#International_standard This standard treats the whole game as a singular component but does not define what would be covered by such a protection and what would be excluded. WIPO had recognized the complexity inherent in copyrighting video games, saying: "Although Article 2 of the Berne Convention provides a solid basis for eligibility for protection of video games by copyright, they are in fact complex works of authorship, potentially composed of multiple copyrighted works." WIPO has also stated in one of its reports that "there is no clear classification of video games and their protection will vary depending on each particular game and the elements that are part of it. In this sense, video games can be treated as computer programs and, thus, are classified as works of authorship; in that case, the source code for a video game is classified as a literary work. If pictorial or graphic authorship predominates, a video game may be classified as a visual arts work. Similarly, if motion picture or audiovisual authorship predominates, a video game may be classified as a motion picture/audiovisual work." I understand that things differ between countries, let us stay in International/USA space. So, according to this standard videogame medium considered a whole piece and even a small portion of that piece, even if it makes not sense outside of the whole or bears no value (copyrightable value i.e. creative and original content) is protected? Let's take, for example, a typical videogame that is made on a generic-purpose videogame engine such as Unreal Engine 4 or Unity3D Engine. When the game is packaged as a final product it contains a lot of stuff that is fairly easy to determine as protected and copyrighted work: audio assets (music, sound effects), graphical assets (textures, sprites, etc), other visual assets (3D models aka meshes, protected design-wise) and so on. This packaged game is our videogame medium. But along with this game, a bunch of meta-data is packaged as well. This metadata has no possible copyrightable value by definition (and can be actually considered as a "fact" or "factual data") and it does not even belong to the IP holder/wonder but rather, in some way, to the creators of the tools itself (Unreal Engine, for example). Let say all this data is in one single file that is being shared - how would copyright law protect against this kind of sharing? For the context, this is somewhat follow-up to Can digital signature/Hash sequence be copyrighted? | The general rule under united-states law is that copyright is infringed when a copyrighted work, or any part of it, is copied or distributed without permission, or a new derivative work based on the copyrighted work is created or distributed without permission. There are several exceptions to this. There is, for example, a specific right to create a backup of a computer program to which one has lawful access. The best known and widest exception to copyright in US law is "fair use". What use is a fair use is a highly fact-driven question: It cannot be answered in general, except by quoting the statutory provisions. There are no exact rules for what is and is not fair use that apply in all cases. There have been several detailed discussions of fair-use on this site, including https://law.stackexchange.com/a/66608/17500 not long ago. Note that fair use is a strictly US concept, and does not apply under any other country's law. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright, which will cover some of the same cases as fair use, but not all of them, and will get to results by different routes. If hashes were distributed separately, to confirm the authenticity of a program, they would probably not be protected by copyright for lack of originality. Under US law, and particularly the Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) case there must be a "minimal degree" of creativity for something to be protected by copyright. The decision said: Many compilations consist of nothing but raw data—i.e. wholly factual information not accompanied by any original expression. On what basis may one claim a copyright upon such work? Common sense tells us that 100 uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status when gathered together in one place. ... The key to resolving the tension lies in understanding why facts are not copyrightable: The sine qua non of copyright is originality. Since a hash or other digital signature can be computed automatically from the document to be signed (indeed that is its value), it is not creative and copying a hash alone would not be an infringement. Whether this would be true of other metadata depends on the exact nature of that data, and the degree of creativity that it represents. Without specific facts no judgement can be made, and making that kind of very specific judgement might be beyond the scope of this site. A comment said: Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, ... I would put it that every part of a work is copyrighted, but some copying does not amount to infringement. Extracting facts and rewording them so that none of the expression is copied is not infringement. Extracting a completely non-creative part of a work and reproducing it is not infringement. Copying a limited amount for use in a review or commentary is often fair use, and fair use is not infringement. Video Games There is nothing in US law specific to video games. There is little that is specific to computer software, although the right to make a backup copy is protected. A good deal of case law has focused on the issue of temporary copies made while running a program, which does not seem relevant to this question. Other cases have focused on the protectability of user interfaces, and of APIs, also not relevant here. whether a work is packaged as a single file or as many related files should not affect its copyright protection. (I know of no case on that specific issue.) Whether copying a part of acomputer file is infringement or not would depend on the purpose of the copying, and on the effect or potential effect on the copyright holder, and perhaps on other factors. Copying a non-creative hash, as a way of detecting whether a file is modified or not, does not seem likely to be infringement, unless the holder could show harm, but no one knows for sure how a court would rule in such a case. Copyright does not protect facts, but it does protect the way in which facts are expressed, unless there is only one or a few such ways available to express such a fact. Copyright also may protect the selection and arrangement of facts, except where the arrangement is "obvious". Placing facts in alphabetical order (as in a phone book) or chronological order (as in a timeline) has been held to be obvious and not protected. International Standards The question and a comment ask about international standards for copyright. In effect there are none. The only significant international agreement on copyright is the Berne Copyright Convention. That is a treaty to which almost every nation belongs, thus rendering the Universal Copyright Convention and other international copyright agreements obsolete. But the Berne Convention leaves details to national copyright laws. The making or authorizing of copies, and the authorizing of derivative works are part of copyright in every Bern-compliant country. Berne provides for exceptions to copyright, but leaves the details to national law. Moreover, there is no intentional court in which copyright claims can be made. Anyone wishing to sue for copyright infringement must do so in the courts of some specific country, and so all the case law which defines details on what is and is not infringement is national, not international. It should be noted that a copyright holder may sue in any country where infringing actions have occurred. When an allegedly infringing work is distributed over the web, that often means that a plaintiff may sue in almost any country, although enforcement will be limited if the defendant has no presence and no assets in the chosen country. Thus the copyright laws of multiple countries may be relevant to a particular case. | German perspective: In German law, there is the concept of Schöpfungshöhe (threshold of originality), which is required for authorship rights (Urheberrecht) to apply to a work. Basically, the idea is that a minimum of creativity is required for something to be protected. However, that bar is rather low. Thus, for example: Literary works are protected practically always. Maps are generally protected, even though you might argue they "slavishly copy nature", because the act of choosing what to show and what not is already creative. However, a faithful photographic reproduction of a painting is not eligible for Urheberrecht to apply (LG Berlin, AZ 15 O 428/15) So yes, a "slavish copy" of a work would not qualify for protection if there is no creativity involved. Note, however, that other types of protection apart from Urheberrecht might apply, such as Sui generis database right. | Fair use is a four-factor test. Whether the use is commercial is part of just one of the four factors. Fair use is determined on a case by case basis, and it would be rather silly to assume that everything a user could post would be covered by fair use. Rather than just rely on the possibility of fair use, you may want to utilize the DMCA protections. Doing so can protect you from copyright liability for the user-generated content. You will have to register a DMCA agent, and expeditiously respond to takedown notices and counternotices. | This answer is limited to United States law. The situation in other countries is definitely different. Under United States law, the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has, as a right of the physical possession of that work, the right to the work's ordinary use. Licenses grant you additional rights such as the right to make derivative works, the right to make copies beyond what's needed for ordinary use, and so on. A pure license doesn't ask for anything in return, it just gives you new rights. Those rights may be conditional, but the conditions are just things you have to do to get new rights. They're not conditions imposed on any existing rights you had. A contract is an agreement between two parties. Both parties must agree to a contract for the contract to be enforceable. Contracts can take away rights you otherwise have. You don't need a license or contract to use a copyrighted work if you lawfully possess a copy of that work. Say you download a copy of a work covered by the GPL. You can refuse to accept the GPL license and you can still use that work. Why? Because no law prohibits you from doing so and there is no civil cause of action for using a lawful copy of a work under US law. But now say you want to give a copy of that work to your friend. This is illegal under US law because 17 USC 106 restrict that right to the copyright holder and there's no applicable exception since that's not part of the ordinary use. For a work covered by the GPL, the license offers to give you that right, a right you wouldn't otherwise have. It imposes conditions on you that are specifically in exchange for the grant of the new right. If you do accept the GPL, it functions as a contract. You got in exchange a right you didn't have before and if you don't comply with the GPL's terms, you don't have the copyright holder's permission to exercise those rights which is required under the law. By contrast, a click-through or EULA takes effect when you agree to it and such agreement is a condition for using the software. That's a pure contract and usually doesn't give you any rights you wouldn't have in the absence of such an agreement other than the use of the software. | From the legal code of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license (emphasis in the original): 1.a Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. 1.b Adapter's License means the license You apply to Your Copyright and Similar Rights in Your contributions to Adapted Material in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Public License. 1.f Licensed Material means the artistic or literary work, database, or other material to which the Licensor applied this Public License. 2.a Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: 2.a.1.A reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and 2.a.1.B produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. 2.a.5.B You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. 3.a.4 If You Share Adapted Material You produce, the Adapter's License You apply must not prevent recipients of the Adapted Material from complying with this Public License. In short, if the original is CC-BY, you can license derivative works under whatever terms you want, so long as the license of the original work is not infringed by the new terms for the derived work. In particular, ordinary copyright (aka. "all rights reserved") is a perfectly acceptable copyright for a derivative of a CC-BY work (but the original credits should be included -and augmented- in order to also comply with the original CC-BY). Also note this doesn't restrict anybody's rights to use the original material under the original license. The other non-ShareAlike license that permits derivative works (Attribution-Noncommmercial) has a different version of clause 2.a.1.B: produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material for NonCommercial purposes only. so any license of a derivative work cannot permit commercial use of the original work. It may be possible to permit commercial use of those portions of the derivative that can be separated from the original; this gets into an extreme edge case of copyright law and you'll probably want to consult a lawyer if you find yourself in such a situation. Another way to consider this issue is by noting that you are only licensing your modifications. For example, if you add a mustache to a CC-BY portrait and use a CC-0 license, only your mustache is CC-0; you can't eliminate the original author's requirement of attribution this way. The derived work would still have to be used under a CC-BY license (or compatible). | The GCIDE dictionary itself is licensed under GPL-3.0. It consists of a bunch of files with markup, no software involved. Indeed, the GPL can also be applied to non-software works, though it is unusual. When you use material under some license, you must comply with the terms of the license. In case of the GPL, there are two highly relevant conditions: Everyone who receives a copy of the covered work (original or modified, in whole or in part) must receive the complete corresponding source code of the work, under the terms of the GPL-3.0. If you create a derivative work of the covered work, the derivative work can only be distributed under the GPL-3.0. However, selling the covered material is perfectly fine. The GPL does not forbid you to make money, however you must not profit from your requirement to provide the corresponding source code. Here, the core question is whether your mobile game would be a derivative work of the GPL-licensed dictionary. If your game merely loads the dictionary as a data file, I don't think they would form a single derived work. However, if you compile the dictionary into your app, this would be more difficult to argue. Ultimately, what is a derivative work will depend on a court. It could therefore be helpful to keep your app as clearly non-derivative as possible. I would avoid baking the dictionary into the app's binary but store it separately as a data file, would show attribution notices in reasonable places (e.g. a screen with attribution notices and the complete license text), and would make it possible for users to export a copy of the dictionary files. Furthermore, the GPL-3.0 may require you to allow users to modify this file, for example by making it possible to import a modified dictionary into your app. | No, it isn't. A sound recording of a song has a few different elements that are distinct from one another, but they are each protected by copyright (unless the song is old enough to have passed into the public domain): the lyrics the melody and other aspects of the musical composition the instrumental arrangement the recording itself A sound recording is protected by copyright even if it is a recording of something that isn't protected by copyright. If you use a portion of the recording that has no lyrics, or if you use technical means to suppress the lyrics or filter them out, you still have to contend with the copyright protection of the other elements. But sometimes it is allowed to use copyright-protected material. There is a lot of discussion about "fair use" and other circumstances under which one can use copyright-protected material without permission. The most clear-cut way to use copyright-protected material without violating copyright, however, is to have permission in the form of a license. You can always ask. | You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data. |
Is there any cognizable harm that I could sue phone manufacturer, Pear, Inc. for? Pear, Inc. already has admitted that it purposefully slowed down Bob's uPhone with software upgrades, and therefore, Bob is concerned to update any new software from Pear. Some time before in software update section in settings Bob used to have a "download update button" but after uOS 11 there are no "download update button" now, and it is replaced by an "Install update button". As a result of this change, Bob's uPhone now downloads any update without any affirmative step of Bob. Once downloaded, the phone prompts Bob to upgrade the newly downloaded OS taking up significant space on the phone. Sometime Bob gets notifications on the phone including: “Update will be installed after 10pm if connected to power”. That means, Bob either lets the phone die or accept that the phone will upgrade despite Bob's actual intention. Bob hoped to cease this behavior of the uPhone and deleted the update. Unfortunately, after few days the update was downloaded again and prompted Bob to install again. Bob is using a 4G-based hotspot service with limited data to all Bob's devices which results in undue and unintended consumption of the data allowance causing material harm to Bob every time an unnecessary update of 2.5gb is downloaded despite the express rejection of the update (in that it was deleted previously). The associated costs are significantly harming Bob financially as well as take significant and unnecessary time to revert the changes on the device. Bob is effectively compelled into updating against his original intentions based on the bargain he made for the purchase of uPhone. What statutes may Bob rely on to sue Pear? | You almost certainly can't (successfully) sue Apple because the license agreement that is part of the product you purchased almost surely gives it permission to do so. A tech support based solution would be a better alternative to litigation. | Every software is potentially vulnerable, unless it runs on an air-gapped computer with sealed data ports. How vulnerability fixes are prioritized against other goals is usually a business decision, legitimately made by the management. There are some jurisdictions and issues where the law requires them to act, but again there is usually a judgement call involved. For example, the GDPR talks about due regard to the state of the art. What you describe seems to be a difference in opinion about the importance of the fix. Ask about that at Workplace SE, not here. There are ways for software developers to influence their management, but ultimately the management is responsible for the outcomes and gets to decide. You can inform your superiors, in writing. If you are in a large company, there may be a legal or compliance department. Inform them if you have a reason to distrust your superiors. In most jurisdictions, you cannot simply talk to the press, either now or later. If you believe that your company is acting criminally, talk to a lawyer. | As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum). | If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | It depends on the warranty itself. Here is one warranty, which only protects against manufacturing defects and excludes any software issues (whether pre-installed or user-installed). I'm a little surprised that a manufacturer is willing to include someone else's software under their warranty. This also excludes failure or damage resulting from misuse, abuse, accident, modification, unsuitable physical or operating environment, natural disasters, power surges, improper maintenance, or use not in accordance with product information materials failure of, or damage caused by, any third party products, including those that X may provide or integrate into the X product at your request This does not say "If you change the OS, you void the warranty". But, if you change the OS and that causes hardware damage, that voids the warranty. The next question is, what evidence do you have that the problem is a manufacturing problem rather than a consequence of changing the OS. They would have to answer the same question in court. It is legally absurd to claim that you have to prove that it is logically impossible that you contributed to the problem, you only have to prove by a preponderance of evidence, when you take them to court. The burden of proof rests on the person who makes a claim. You claim that the product was defective, now you must prove it. But you don't have to prove it to the standard of absolute ccertainty. | If the stranger was aware of the reward offer at the time of the return you have a legally binding contract - you made an offer to the world, money for return of the phone, and they accepted it by returning it. If they were ignorant of your offer and returned the phone then there is no contract and you do not have to pay: albeit at the cost of being a jerk. Of course, if they obtained your phone unlawfully (e.g. by stealing it) the contract is void. | Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts. |
In the United States, can I sue my ex significant other for turning me gay? Suppose that a person A happily entered a mutually romantic heterosexual relationship with another adult B and after suffering through three years of daily abuse, deliberate cruelty and elaborate attempts by B to make A feel jealous A separated themselves from B and swore off B's gender as a whole. Suppose that A is now an active homosexual and A and A's same gen partner C have decided to marry. Can A sue B for deliberate cruelty, abuse and emotional distress so severe that it turned A into a homosexual? | For cruelty and abuse, yes. For sexual orientation change, you would need to prove a loss, i.e. that you are damaged or diminished as a result of that change, and your current partner might find that rather offensive! You would also need to prove your partner's culpability for that. Those are very, very bold claims, which will require very, very bold proofs. Realistically I think your prospects are very, very poor. You have much better prospects on the ordinary abuse. Further, the conversion claim will have terrible optics. It will gain national notoriety and will be the butt of jokes on late-night talk shows and "what is wrong with the world?" editorial columns. And I don't think I'm telling you anything you don't already know. It will generate a great deal of negative publicity for you, will reflect badly on LGBT (which is something you ought to think about since you're part of it)... and you will be widely viewed as publicity-seeking opportunist and drama-maker, including by the judge and jury, and it will undercut your abuse claim. For that reason, the opponent's legal team will do everything possible to amplify that. The long-term effects will be that you'll be "Oh yeah, that person", and people won't take you seriously for decades to come. It'll hurt your long term social and employment prospects. It's the hard way to get your own page on Wikipedia. | A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt. | Yes Unless your business is a sole proprietorship it operates as a legal entity seperate from its owners. It owns its assets an acrues its own liabilities. It can be sued and it can sue others. It can also agree to its own contracts. Typically the only thing a legal entity that is not a natural person cannot do is sign a marriage contract. Depending on the industry there may be no need to sue. There exist many mandatory workplace insurance to cover accidents in the workplace. You may have to share details of the injury with them but they may be uninterested in whos at fault. | Canada: Not since 1962. The nail in the coffin for alienation of affection torts in Canada was the 1962 Kungl v. Schiefer Supreme Court of Canada decision which held 'there is no separate cause of action for “alienation of affections” known to the law of Ontario.' | The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering. | There are several. First of all, the suit must state a claim for action under the law. This means there must be some law, or case law, which permits a person to sue in the kind of situation at hand. The claim for "looking at me funny" would probably be thrown out at this stage, unless perhaps it could be framed as a case of harassment. This often has a good deal to do with how the case is framed and what laws it cites as giving the plaintiff the right to sue, and the right to a remedy. Secondly, the plaintiff must usually allege significant harm, actual or in some cases potential. In federal courts, and some state courts this is often part of having standing to sue. A person only has standing when that person can show a real and significant actual harm, or a likely imminent harm, as a result of defendant's alleged actions. For example if a person claims that Congress has passed an unconstitutional law, but that person is not personally affected by the law, that person has no standing to sue. Thirdly the claim must be one that is within the jurisdiction of the court. That means both that it is the kind of claim that the court is authorized to handle, aka subject matter jurisdiction, and that the court has authority over all parties (personal jurisdiction), You can't sue for slander in a landlord/tenant or a traffic court court, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Nor can you sue for theft under a state law in a federal court, it only has jurisdiction over "federal questions" (or in some cases over issues between people in different states, diversity jurisdiction). And if person A in Georgia did something to person B in Georgia, B cannot normally sue in a California court, although if the is some connection to California, the court may find it enough. Thirdly the suit must present a claim for a remedy which the court is authorized by statute or precedent to give. In some kinds of cases, the law may permit an injunction. but not a claim for money damages. In proceedings for action under the California Consumer Privacy Act (for example) most provisions can only be enforced by the California Attorney General, not by a private litigant. This will vary widely depending on the specific law involved. A classic example of a frivolous suit is United States ex rel. Gerald Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D.Pa. 1971) in which a prison inmate sued Satan and his assistant devils, claiming that "Satan has on numerous occasions caused plaintiff misery and unwarranted threats, against the will of plaintiff, that Satan has placed deliberate obstacles in his path and has caused plaintiff's downfall" and had therefore "deprived him of his constitutional rights". The judge noted that Satan was not under the control of the prison, and it was not clear if he was a US resident, but dismissed the suit on the technicality that the prisoner has not told the US Marshals where and how to serve the needed papers on Satan. Dismissal of a lawsuit as frivolous, or as "not reasonable" is a judgement call by the court, guided by past cases on the topic, of which there are many. Details will matter. A good lawyer should be able to advise if such a dismissal is likely. | No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation. | You sue the legal person One of the things that distinguishes legal personhood from other structures is the ability to sue and be sued. You can't sue a business name or a trust for example but you can sue a company. I have in fact been required to make adjudication decisions that I know will be unenforceable in court because the applicant named a trust rather than the trustee. |
Can a citizen of the European Union receive legal aid or legal representation in a 3rd country from the EU? The UK, for one, has a program which is probably a sort of remnant of its past EU membership where the government provides legal aid in European countries, (incl. EU, EEA and other countries) including paying for a legal representative if one is accused of a crime. For example, if a UK citizen is accused in Ukraine, they can be paid for a lawyer there. (See: Legal Aid — Legal problems abroad) I found that the EU has a program with similar geographic scope; however, it relates only to its own jurisdiction except for Denmark — applications can be filled out in a form. (See Form of Legal Aid Application in another Member State of the European Union) Is there a program of the EU that functions in a similar fashion outside of its jurisdiction or in 3rd countries? Specifically, can an EU citizen, within EU protocol or as a matter of EU law, apply for or request an attorney to represent them if accused of a crime? If so, through what procedures and based on what law? | Other than the most exceptional cases, no... As a citizen (of any country), you are entitled to consular support but that does not extend to your country hiring a lawyer for you or representing you in court. It covers such things as facilitating communication with your family, attempting to ensure the trial is fair and repatriation at the end of your sentence - usually with you paying for your own transport. In exceptional cases, it is not outside the realm of possibilities that secretaries, ministers or their respective departments of foreign affairs get involved one may receive a representative. …but Citizenship is irrelevant to have the right to representation. In most liberal democracies, you are entitled to legal representation, in most autocratic dictatorships, you aren't, and there are a large number of steps in between. How this works depends on local law and custom but it usually works the same for citizens and non-citizens. In most jurisdictions you find, hire and pay for your own lawyer. Some jurisdictions may provide a lawyer for you without payment by you. How this works varies. For example, if you are accused of a crime in the united-states you are entitled to a lawyer that you pay for or, if you can't afford one, the state will provide one for you. In australia, this extends to civil and administrative matters as well subject to a means test, however, you are not entitled to free legal representation even if you are destitute - you are entitled to a fair trial which, depending on the circumstances, may mean the state pays for a lawyer. In china the state appoints a lawyer for you and you are not entitled to another - defendants rarely win in China. Each country may or may not make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens: the three above don't. | Does this mean all countries law applies to it? Basically yes. If the videos are in english and are about science in general does this mean if some country some day bans ( imprisonment ) science videos or use of a specific colour in videos can they extraterritorialy enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other country like USA or India? With respect to criminal cases, only if it can arrest that person or convince another country to arrest and extradite that person. Generally speaking, countries will only extradite someone if it is a serious offense under the domestic laws of the country of arrest as well as the country requesting that the person be handed over, and also only if the crime occurred in or was targeted at the requesting country. Sometimes the arrest is not legal in the place where it is made. For example, in this case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court (the quote is from the official syllabus to the case): Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). I mean can a country just bring to jail any youtuber outside its borders ( using its national language as the language of the video ) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? If the country can manage to arrest the person, yes. There are high profile cases from Saudi Arabia where that has happened. See, e.g., here and here (a blogger and his sister arrested in Saudi Arabia, while his wife and children flee to Canada), here (journalists for Lebanese periodical arrested in Saudi Arabia in relation to years old publications) here (more journalists arrested in Saudi Arabia), here ("A male Saudi Arabian teenager has been arrested in Riyadh over a series of online videos of conversations between him and a female Californian streaming-video star that went viral."), here (Yemeni blogger), and here (Washington Post journalist tortured and killed in Saudi Arabian embassy in Turkey at the direction of a senior member of the Saudi Arabian royal family). Also can a country just hold liable for youtube's data privacy practices a youtuber outside its borders and enforce the judgement if the practices of both youtuber and their chanell and youtube is legal in their home country? A country can hold anyone liable for anything its domestic laws allow it to hold someone liable for, and can enforce that judgment against any assets it can exert power over. Some countries with similar legal systems recognize each other's court judgments widely. Countries with very different legal systems often don't recognize each other's judgements. For example, most European countries do not recognize U.S. money judgment for torts (i.e. civil wrongs such as personal injury awards). Similarly, the U.S. does not recognize most foreign defamation judgments, and does not recognize most judgments of Saudi Arabian courts. One last thing is wether inclusion of ads make a difference? Usually not. But it can matter for purposes of assertions of lawsuit liability over someone outside the jurisdiction seeking to impose liability for something that harmed someone in their country. If conduct amounts to "doing business" in the country seeking to impose liability or amounts to a "purposeful availment" of the laws of the country seeking to impose liability in some why, an imposition of extraterritorial liability is more likely, and that tends to happen more in cases where there are ads that are commercial targeting the people of the country where the courts seek to impose liability. | Documents from countries which did not sign (or to be received by non-signatory countries) must be certified by the foreign ministry of the source country (or its equivalent) and then further certified by the foreign ministry of the receiving country, before such documents can be used in legal proceedings. The Wikipedia article says: A state that has not signed the Convention must specify how foreign legal documents can be certified for its use. Two countries may have a special convention on the recognition of each other's public documents, but in practice this is infrequent. Otherwise, the document must be certified by the foreign ministry of the country in which the document originated, and then by the foreign ministry of the government of the state in which the document will be used; one of the certifications will often be performed at an embassy or consulate. In practice this means the document must be certified twice before it can have legal effect in the receiving country. For example, as Canada is not a signatory, Canadian documents for use abroad must be certified by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa or by a Canadian consular official abroad, and subsequently by the relevant government office or consulate of the receiving state. This seems to answer the question rather completely. | If i have am served a claim form by the claimant, can I travel overseas? Yes Also, if I am overseas and receive the claim form whilst overseas, can I ignore it if I am not a citizen of the country which the claimant is from? You can always ignore a civil summons - the likely effect is that judgement will be entered against you and the plaintiff can then take further action to enforce the judgement. This can include having your property seized, garnisheeing your bank accounts or wages, or requiring you to attend court - failure to answer this summons is contempt and can lead to your arrest. A judgement in a UK court can, subject to treaties, be enforced in foreign jurisdictions under the relevant local law. | No. The UK is no longer in the EU, and the terms of service, which are probably drafted poorly, fail to include non-EU countries that are subject to EU law, such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. This oversight means that the UK is also not included as of the beginning of February 2020 when it ceased to be a member of the European Union. | I haven't found any cases where this defence has worked. I strongly suspect that that's because it never has. Every piece of advice I've read on this unsurprisingly suggests you'd be a fool to attempt to rely on this defence in court, including some cases in which defendants have attempted to rely on it and have failed. There are a couple of Freedom of Information requests to the government which state very clearly that it won't work: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statute_law_4 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/consent_of_the_governed The last link is particularly clear on the matter: every citizen of the UK tacitly consents to be governed, according to Blackstone. And this one makes it even clearer: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/18097/response/56511/attach/html/3/TO%20255452%20TO09%205866.doc.html Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Acts of Parliament override common law. So it simply wouldn't be possible to argue that you choose to live under the common law alone; no court in the land would allow it, as it's a cornerstone of our legal system that Parliament is sovereign, and therefore that statutes enacted by Parliament will 'trump' the common law. Parliament derives its sovereignty from the fact that the current government is elected and therefore represents the citizens of the UK, and for this reason, Acts of Parliament take priority over case law. On that basis, it wouldn't be possible for a citizen to argue that they choose not to abide by statute: their consent is tacitly assumed. Based on all the above, then, I would say no: the 'common law' defence will never hold water if relied on in court. | As your question is concerned on English law, a clear answer is yes but is specific for English law. Barristers from the same chamber may represent opposing sides in a case. This is normal and common practice. Barristers are independent practitioners in the British and many other common law systems who represent clients in court but are not in charge of the case as a whole. As a result, they may be instructed to represent clients whose interests diverge, and each barrister is responsible for deciding whether or not to accept a particular case. While each barrister acts independently and is free to take on any case they choose, chambers are groups of barristers who share resources and facilities. Even if they are representing opposing sides in the same case or different cases, barristers are typically required to adhere to the professional code of ethics and maintain client confidence. It is important to note that ethical rules prohibit lawyers from representing opposing sides in the same case, and the concept of barristers and chambers does not exist in some jurisdictions, such as the United States. | Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer. |
What are the laws for trespassing in Germany? Bobbi, national or equivalent of Germany, after admitted to enter, refuses to leave from public (government) premises at the close of business hours despite being given due notice. What laws and precedent are applicable for willful trespass or similar actions in Germany? | What laws and precedent are applicable for willful trespass or similar actions in Germany? It will depend on Bobbi's intentions and justification for not leaving. Trespass is defined by § 123 StGB (non-binding translation on the official site) as: (1) Whoever unlawfully enters the private premises, business premises or other enclosed property of another, or closed premises designated for public service or transportation, or whoever stays there without being authorised to do so and does not leave when requested to do so by the authorised person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine. (2) The offence is prosecuted only upon request. The case law for § 123 StGB includes this AG Haldensleben judgement on the objective justification of trespass: A trespassing can be justified by an emergency situation if environmental activists break into an animal breeding facility in order to document violations of the Animal Welfare Act. Also, as referred to in the comments, § 124 StGB increases the maximum sentence to two years if the unlawful trespass was aggravated by being carried out by "crowd" | can really anyone in Germany call the police on others without proof of anything? Anyone anywhere can call the police without proof of anything as long as they have a phone. The question is, what will the police do about it. Police in Germany are more professional and less corrupt than in many countries in the world (e.g. they are much less corrupt than police in much of the United States or police in Southern Italy or Mexico, or in much of the "third-world"). Most German police are unlikely to exercise their power unless they are genuinely deceived into thinking that you committed an actual crime. But, German cops are human too. Some German cops are bad cops and even good cops aren't perfect truth detectors or bias free. and if so what are my rights? There has to be some evidence to arrest you or prosecute you, but testimony from people who claim to be eye witnesses is a form of evidence and proof. People are routinely convicted of crimes (everywhere in the world) based solely upon the testimony of other people with no additional proof. This is usually a good rule. As a society we don't want the criminal justice system to let people who commit crimes that are witnessed by lots of truthful witnesses and testified to, to go free just because there is no non-testimonial evidence. But because people lie (or are simply mistaken about the truth) sometimes, it isn't a perfect way of determining who is guilty and who is innocent. You also have the right to lodge a complaint of criminal defamation with the police in Germany and in Germany hundreds of thousands of such cases are prosecuted by police every year. Making false accusations against you (or even just insulting you in an extremely offense manner) as they did is a minor crime in Germany. and the person I mentioned had 2 of his employees with him but I am sure and I know for a fact they are on his side and I had no witnesses with me so how can I prove I am innocent? if they agreed on making up a story against me? The possibility that people will be wrongfully arrested and wrongfully convicted of crimes because people lie and authorities believe the people who are lying is a constant risk. The best you can do is to tell your story consistently and honestly and hope that you are believed. But it is impossible to eliminate the risk that people will lie and be believed and that you will suffer the consequences, even if you are doing everything right. In the long run, you may want to avoid people who you think would lie and make false accusations around you, and to have the presence of either friendly witnesses and/or audio/visual recording at times when you are in their presence. You may also, as a long run strategy try to figure out if there was anything you could have done to prevent them from being out to get you so badly that they would make false accusations against you. While I don't want to blame the victim, and often enough, especially for example, if you are a foreigner or otherwise different in a homogeneous community some people are doing to hate you for no reason, sometimes their real motivation may be a failure to follow social norms that are not actually illegal, or a misunderstand that could be cleared up. | Finding S seems to be hard and I have not much hope, if her siblings cannot provide any information. I think the "inhabitants registry" (Einwohnermeldeamt) is not allowed to give you her first address in Spain ("Zuzugsanschrift im Ausland") (§§ 44 and 45 Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG)). The best option I see is a court auction (Zwangsversteigerung), more precise a "Teilungsversteigerung". If one of S's siblings want money for the land, he can ask for a court auction at the local court (Amtsgericht). The court will get S's first address in Spain (§ 34 BMG) and if it cannot deliver its letter to S, there will be a "public delivery" (öffentliche Zustellung) through a posting in court. It would take a while, but in the end the land could be yours. Be prepared that the cost for the court auction will be much higher than the 1000€. If you plan to take this way, ask a lawyer for detailed advice. Also you need one of S's siblings to participate in the process. If the trees are really a danger for your house, the heirs could also have an obligation to remove them. Maybe this could help you too. | You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes? | Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition. | Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-). | Even though as you found out calling is also sufficient, there is also a form available for this: Abmeldung der Wohnung/en One of the reasons listed is Ich ziehe dauerhaft ins Ausland (I am moving abroad) They ask for a Meldeamtliche Bescheinigung for this case. That's the deregistration notice. | germany Ah, okay, there isn't any easy answer/number/table for this. In general, the "Aufsichtspflicht" results from Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 1631 Inhalt und Grenzen der Personensorge. There are not clear cut lines or given ages. This is mainly because it does not make a lot of sense. A very independent and mature 6 year old can do things a less developed or even disabled person might not be able to do, even at the age of 18+. Generally speaking, the parents have the duty to care for the child, anything else can be handled by contracts. For example a contract with a kindergarten. Or School. Or private/public pool. From personal experience I can say this: Germany is very safe. Kids go to school on foot, on bike or longer distances by normal public transport among all the other adults. We do not have "school busses". Between 07:00 and 08:00 public transport is packed with kids of all ages going to school. Schools do not normally have their own stops. Kids get off at the nearest stop and walk the rest of the way. Around the school you will see streams of children coming from all directions on bike or foot. It is rare to see adults accompanying them, unless it's the first weeks of elementary school or the last day before school holidays where parents pick up their kids to do something fun after school. When I was a kid, I walked to school every day, almost from day one of elementary school. The first few weeks an adult would accompany us (one of the parents, they had a rotation going), then we walked on our own, as a group of 3-4 kids in the same class from the same neighborhood block. Google maps says it's a 10 minute walk of 800 meters. If any teacher had stopped me from leaving the school building on my own when school was finished, I am sure people would have wondered why. That only happened for mentally handicapped kids. Even kids who needed transport for one reason or another would just know to wait in front of the school. No teacher or other adult would be there. At 5th grade, I know half my class came by bike and in the winter or on rainy days by public transport, because they did not live in walking distance to the school. Neither did I, but I lived close enough to not get the public transport ticket subsidized, so the kids from our street got there by bike, or on foot when the parents deemed riding a bike to unsafe in snow and ice in winter. Who is responsible for the child now that the class has ended? The parents. Unless the contract says otherwise, or circumstances are exceptionally dangerous. There is no exact written guideline for this, because it would not make sense. The adult has to know what is exceptionally dangerous and what is not. It can be perfectly safe for a 10 year old to walk home through the woods. If that is what the parents deem okay, then it is okay. Yet as the adult in charge, you have the duty to keep them back, if you know the woods are on fire today, or a criminal escaped into the woods or something similar that would make it significantly more dangerous then the parents had in mind when they made their general decision. If a 10-year-old child says that their parents "said they could go home alone", can I reasonably stop them? If you have a contract that says they cannot go home alone, sure. If there is a special situation that implies the conditions have changed from what your contract said (lets say the radio broadcasts a storm warning and you see that the weather is horrible and branches flying around could injure a smaller kid) you can (maybe even have to), even if you do not have a contract. Otherwise... why would you? It’s their parents decision. If they had wanted you to keep an eye on their kids when the time is up, they would have made a contract that says so. |
Why is the defendant presumed guilty in traffic court? This article says, "When it's your word against the police officer's [regarding a failure to stop at a stop sign], the person with the badge usually wins." It seems like the officer should have to present at least some kind of evidence that the alleged crime occurred. I could see this being in the form of a video from his or her dash cam. However, if it's his or her word against mine, what prevents him or her from pulling people over to meet some kind of quota? | It seems like the officer should have to present at least some kind of evidence that the alleged crime occurred. Testimony is evidence. Officers can and do abuse this, but courts tend to give them the benefit of the doubt, so they typically attribute greater weight and credibility to a police officer's testimony than to that of a defendant. | Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception. | england-and-wales NO Unlike some other jurisdictions, there is no requirement for an officer to have "probable cause1" or suspect an offence as the police can stop a vehicle for any reason under section 163 Road Traffic Act 1988: (1) A person driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road must stop the vehicle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer. (2) A person riding a cycle on a road must stop the cycle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer. (3) If a person fails to comply with this section he is guilty of an offence. There is no associated power to search the vehicle or its occupants but under section 164 and section 165 the driver must produce inter alia their licence, name, date of birth, address, insurance details and other relevant documents as the case may be. Note that although vehicle stops can be random, police officers are subject to the public sector equality duty under section 149 Equality Act 2010 and not permitted to stop a vehicle solely based on the occupants' protected characteristics. 1The term "probable cause" is not used in the UK, but roughly equates to somewhere around reasonable suspicion / reasonable belief | If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves. | In Massachusetts where I live, here are the general guidelines: In re G.L. c. 268, § 32B(b). A person can be charged with resisting arrest only when the officer is acting under the color of his official position (meaning he is on duty and acting according to those duties). The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant knew that the person seeking to make the arrest was a “police officer.” The Commonwealth may do so by proving that the officer was in uniform or, if not in uniform, identified himself (herself) by exhibiting his (her) credentials as a police officer while attempting to make the arrest. Such credentials would include such things as a badge, insignia, identification card, police radio, or other police equipment such as a clearly identified police vehicle. Thus, in Massachusetts according to usual legal interpretation: (1) The officer must be on duty and acting in an official capacity. (2) The officer must be provably known to be a police officer by some means to the person charged. Resisting arrest must be ancillary to some other charge. You cannot just be charged with "resisting arrest" unless you are actually being arrested on some other charge (or interfering with someone else being arrested). So, as far as a search is concerned, even if the resisting arrest charge were thrown out, the real question would be why was the person being arrested in the first place? That would determine the admitability of the evidence. | In the circumstance you describe, you can refuse a breathalyzer test ("opt to not take it"), and doing so would not constitute probable cause for an arrest (the results of the test can be probable cause). That is when you are on the roadside. This is Washington's "implied consent" law. One of the first things that the law says is that the test is "subject to the provisions of RCW 46.61.506", which includes the requirement that the test be performed according to methods approved by the state toxicologist and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the state toxicologist for this purpose. The state toxicologist is directed to approve satisfactory techniques or methods, to supervise the examination of individuals to ascertain their qualifications and competence to conduct such analyses, and to issue permits which shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the state toxicologist. There are other requirements regarding 15 minute prior observation. The legally required test is done in the police station by a specially trained technician, on an approved machine (the portable machine is not approved). The implied consent law also says that this test is "required" if arrested for any offense where, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor You are not required to take the Portable Breath Test, which is optional (when you have been stopped) – it's the post-arrest "evidentiary" test that is obligatory, using the approved procedure. Note that failing the optional test gives probable cause for an arrest, however there can be other grounds such as failing the line-walking test. If the officer just tells you that the roadside test is mandatory, that is a defense which can be used at trial ('cuz the optional test is not mandatory). Whether or not the portable test is admissible in court depends on the state: in Kentucky it is statutorily not admissible, likewise in Washington per court ruling. The other tests (often known as Standard Field Sobriety Test) are also optional, so ultimately it reduces to whether they already have probable cause, that is, if "the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of arrest would warrant a reasonably cautious person to believe a crime has been committed". It is just not clear to me what actual circumstances distinguish mere reasonable suspicion (driving slow) from probable cause, but watery eyes, slurred speech and alcohol smell will make probable cause. I don't know if driving slow and having watery eyes is probable cause – I would think not. Dunno about "smell of alcohol plus driving slow". In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ we find an example of a traffic stop with ample probable cause for an arrest (smell of alcohol, bloodshot watery eyes, driving into a ditch, failing the alphabet test and massively failing the voluntary breath test). The analogous North Dakota law is largely similar to Washington law, mandating only the "approved" more technical version of the test and not the roadside test. Defendant, in that case, refused the mandatory test. A crucial difference compared to Washington law is that while suspension of driving privileges follows from refusal under Washington law, refusal in North Dakota is itself a misdemeanor per N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. The issue for SCOTUS is whether a law criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test (but not a blood test) violates the 4th amendment: it does not. | It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted. | This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied. |
Are there privacy laws other than GDPR which consider IP addresses as personal data? In EU's GDPR the IP address is considered personal data (lots of discussions about it, but this seems to be the correct interpretation at the moment). Several countries have now privacy laws which are quite similar to GDPR (e.g. Switzerland's revDSG, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, ...) or plan to set this up. Are there privacy laws oher than GDPR which consider IP addresses as personal data? Or is the EU currently the only one? | The California CCPA, Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (CDPA), and the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) all use definitions of "personal information" (PI) very similar to that used by the GDPR, and the arguments which have been applied to classify an IP address as Personal Data under the GDPR could logically be used under each of those laws. For example this official page gives the CCPA definition as: Personal information is information that identifies, relates to, or could reasonably be linked with you or your household. For example, it could include your name, social security number, email address, records of products purchased, internet browsing history, geolocation data, fingerprints, and inferences from other personal information that could create a profile about your preferences and characteristics. Note that IP addresses are not specifically mentioned, nor are "online identifiers" a key term under the GDPR. But an IP address often provides geolocation data, which is mentioned. The April 2020 article "Are IP addresses 'personal information' under CCPA?" from The Privacy Advisor by IAPP says: For many businesses, the collection of IP addresses provides multiple benefits from monitoring website traffic to advertising, tracking and deterring malicious activity. But are IP addresses “reasonably capable” of being associated with or “linked” to an individual or household? If not, do they still “relate[] to” or “describe” a consumer or household? These questions are critical to address, because if IP addresses are considered to be “personal information,” then businesses may find themselves subject to additional obligations under the CCPA or forced to rethink how they handle IP addresses as part of their online business. ... The CCPA’s definition of personal information expressly contemplates including IP addresses. An IP address alone may not allow a business to identify a particular consumer or household; however, in many — if not most — cases, an ISP can link an IP address with a name, home address, phone number, email address and even payment information. ... ... On Feb. 10, the California attorney general issued its first set of modifications to its proposed CCPA regulations. These modifications included the following guidance: [I]f a business collects the IP addresses of visitors to its websites but does not link the IP address to any particular consumer or household, and could not reasonably link the IP address with a particular consumer or household, then the IP address would not be ‘personal information. The article goes on to explore the implications of that proposed regulation, saying: In other words, if the business did not link the IP address to a consumer or household, and the business could not reasonably link the IP address with a particular consumer or household, the IP address would not be personal information. This interpretation aligns with the reality that even if businesses wished to link IP addresses to individuals or households, many would lack the information needed to do so themselves and would be unlikely to succeed in compelling an ISP to do so for them However, the regulation quoted above was removed in the March 2020 draft of the proposed regulations and did not appear in the (PDF) Final Regulations, issued in August 2020. The IAPP article goes on to discuss the ECJ case Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland in which the Court held that IP addresses were personal information in that instance. The article mentions that: Ultimately, the court held the website provider had the means likely reasonably to tie dynamic IP addresses back to individuals because it had legal means for compelling ISPs to do so. Therefore, it held that dynamic IP addresses collected by a publicly accessible website constituted personal data “in relation to that provider.” What the article does not specifically mention, and several other published comments relying on the Breyer decision do not discuss was that in that particular case the website was operated by the government of Germany, which has legal powers to require any ISP operating in Germany to disclose IP assignments. That means that in that particular case IP addresses were potentially linkable by the Data Controller of the site, in ways which would not be available to a non-government site. There does not seem to have been an official decision under any of these laws, including the GDPR, as to whether an IP address is PI for an ordinary business site. The downloadable Privacy Law Comparison matrix compares various aspects of the CCPA, CDPA, CPA, and the GDPR, including their definitions of PI. In short it is not clear to what extant any of the other privacy laws mentioned in the question or in this answer treat an IP address as personal information (PI), particularly when the site is not operated by a government agency, and has no right to compel an ISP to provide data linking an IP address to a specific user. Future litigation may well clarify this. | From the GDPR's definitions: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; This blurred image would be "information relating to an identified ... natural person (‘data subject’)." It does not matter whether the person can be identified using the information in question. Therefore, the answer to your question Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data is yes. | Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area. | Its special personal information The GDPR uses “special” not “sensitive”. Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. | Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data | Generating a list of all possible numbers doesn't sound like it would constitute personal data any more than listing all dates for the last hundred years as a "possible date of birth" would. However, the moment anyone linked even one of the numbers with any other personal data - for example a name - they would be bound by GDPR and would need to show a Lawful Basis for processing the data. [If you linked your own name you could presumably argue Consent, but anyone else's would need to have an associated Lawful Basis.] | If GDPR applies, then no one can opt out. If it doesn't apply, then an IP block is superfluous. Whether GDPR applies is determined by Art 3 GDPR. For this, we must distinguish where the data controller is operating from. It is irrelevant where the site is hosted, but primarily relevant where the data controller (your colleague) has an “establishment”, e.g. where he resides or typically works from. Per Art 3(1), GDPR applies to all processing activities in the context of an European establishment, regardless of where the users are. So if your colleague were running this site from Europe, they wouldn't be able to circumvent GDPR by blocking European users. However, if your colleague is running this site from outside of Europe, then Art 3(1) doesn't trigger. Per Art 3(2), GDPR can apply to processing activities where there is no European establishment. There is the Art 3(2)(a) “targeting criterion”: if your colleague “offers” goods or services to people who are in Europe, regardless whether paid or gratis, then GDPR applies to all processing activities related to this offer. I'll discuss this more below. There is also the Art 3(2)(b) criterion: if your colleague monitors the behaviour of people that occurs in Europe, then GDPR applies. For example, an app collecting geolocation information or a website creating interest profiles for ad targeting might trigger this criterion. An IP block can help to establish that no offering/monitoring related to people who are in Europe is happening, but it might not be necessary. It may be worth talking a bit more about the targeting criterion. The GDPR explicitly says that mere availability of a website in Europe doesn't imply that GDPR would apply. Instead, it is necessary to establish the data controller's intention – are they soliciting users from Europe, or otherwise expecting that people from Europe might use those services? Recital 23 gives a couple of non-exhaustive factors that can be considered here, for example: the site uses a language or currency used in the EU but not used in the controller's own country the site mentions users or customers from Europe, e.g. in testimonials This means that a lot of US websites, written in English or Spanish, only mentioning payment in USD (if any), not mentioning any European countries, will not be subject to GDPR. Then, occasional European visitors are irrelevant. It wouldn't be necessary to IP-block potential European users. However, such an IP-based block would help establish that the data controller really doesn't intend for those services to be offered to people who are in Europe. My personal opinion is that it's wasted effort to block users from foreign countries in case their foreign laws claim to apply, but if such a block brings peace of mind that might be worth it. While geoblocking might not be necessary, is it sufficient? There is no clear guidance on this subject, but it seems to be generally accepted that IP-based geoblocking is fine, even though it is trivially circumvented using VPN services. Of course, if a website were to block European IP addresses but were to also advertise that people in Europe can use their services via VPNs, that would probably still be an “offer” and might defeat the point of doing any geoblocking. The Art 3(1)(a) targeting criterion is most easily applied to things like ecommerce where physical goods are shipped to the customer in return for payment – so essentially whenever the data controller participates in the EU Single Market. This is roughly similar to the concept of a Nexus in US tax law. But in principle the targeting criterion can also apply to other kinds of websites or apps such as blogs, even if they are gratis. GDPR does not just apply to for-profit commercial activity, and doesn't distinguish between controllers that are entities/LLCs and controllers who are natural persons. Things are slightly more complicated due to the Art 3(2)(b) monitoring criterion and the pervasive use of online trackers on websites, but this aspect of the GDPR is difficult to enforce and frequently ignored. In this answer, “Europe” means the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the United Kingdom (UK). Note that countries like Norway are covered by GDPR, whereas Switzerland is not. Of course, the GDPR is not the only privacy law relevant internationally. | If the website's processing of your personal data is within the scope of the GDPR, then you have a qualified right to request the erasure of your personal data. It is relevant whether: the website operates within the EU; the website is operated by a company established in an EU country; the website aims to sell goods or services to people in the EU; or the website is routinely processing the personal data of people in the EU (including non-citizens). Furthermore, it is relevant whether your posts: contain one or more identifiers from which you could be personally identified, directly or indirectly, including by only the administrators or owners of the website; and by their content, directly reveal information relating to you. For example, let's say you posted on a forum saying that "I am a keen supporter of socialism", and your personal email address was used to sign up to the website, then you would have revealed information about your political beliefs, which by reference to a username, the website owners could use to uniquely identify you by your email address. You would not necessarily have to have used your name. If, for example, you posted something factual, like, "The Porsche 911 GT2 RS MR recorded the fastest lap time for a road-legal sports car on the Nürburgring," then it is only personal as long as it is associated with an identifier through which you could be identified. As such, the removal of the relationship could easily anonymise the post. A data controller has an obligation to provide means by which the data subject can exercise the rights guaranteed under Chapter 3 of the GDPR. Article 17 grants the right to "erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay" where the grounds under Art. 17 lit. 1 (a) to (f) are met. It may be relevant what the lawful basis of processing personal data was in the first place, such as in determining whether you can withdraw consent (i.e. you cannot withdraw consent if consent was not given), or in determining whether there is a right to object under Article 21 lit. 1. Derogations permissible under local implementing laws may provide for other exemptions or requirements to the right to erasure, so it is also important to determine the country of jurisdiction. |
The legal distinction between gambling and insurance [USA] 28 US Code §5362(1)(A) defines a bet or wager to be: the staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the person or another person will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome (1)(E) then explicitly states that this does not include, inter alia, "any contract for insurance". My question is this: Ignoring (1)(E) and relying solely on the literal text of (1)(A), would insurance contracts have to be considered bets or wagers? | Gambling creates a risk where none exists. Gambling provides the opportunity for gains or losses. Insurance mitigates an existing risk of loss. The buyer of insurance has no opportunity for gain. The opportunity is to be made whole. EDIT: I suppose that I have provided the practical difference. The legal difference is that the statute distinguishes between the two. | Well baseball for historical and frankly crazy decisions of SCOTUS is exempt because it is not a business that crosses state lines (by definition of the court if by no one else's). The other sports have had their run-ins with antitrust laws; some they've won and some they've lost. All of these have been to do with antitrust provisions in restraint of trade between leagues and clubs and clubs and players. As for monopoly powers: The elements of monopolization are twofold: possession of monopoly power in a relevant market; and willfully acquiring or maintaining that power. There are two clear defences to allegations of running a monopoly: the definition of the market - if the market is defined as "baseball" then there is a clear monopoly, however, if the market is "professional sports" it is not so clear that there is a monopoly. Certainly, both definitions of market are arguable. that the monopoly was "the result of superior skill, foresight, and industry". These types of monopoly are allowed as the acquisition of monopoly power was not willfull. | Yes Written contracts do not have to be written in any particular language or character set. Purely visual contracts are used and are legally binding. If a pictorial term is ambiguous it is resolved by the court the same way as a textual term would be. | is this absolutely required to be considered a valid document in most jurisdictions, most notably, the European Union? Not at all. There is no legal requirement that contracts, terms of service, and so forth be drafted, devised, or even validated by a lawyer. Law requires that certain types of contract be notarized. That refers to the moment where the parties sign/formalize the contract, which is different from --and independent of-- whether its terms were written by a lawyer. A messaging service like the one you have in mind definitely is not subject to such requirement either. | There is no requirement that the terms of a contract be even-handed The common law position is that parties are free to contract on whatever terms they like: if you agree to sell me your late model car for $1 that's a matter between the two of us. The law allows you to make a bad bargain. Unconscionability There is an equitable doctrine that allows the court to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts or terms. The California Supreme Court has ruled that "the central idea (of the) unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain "… but with terms that are 'unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.'" In other words, courts will not enforce contracts that are "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." However, I would be extremely surprised if the terms you are upset about rising to the level of unconscionability. The basic test of unconscionability, as expressed in official comment 1 to section 2-302, is: whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. . . .The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. They seem to be dealing with risk allocation and moving risks that are normally on the lender to the buyer or requiring the buyer to waive statutory rights and warranties - there is nothing illegal in that unless the law has a "no contracting out" provision. Some laws do and some laws don't. Some laws may not allow contracting out in consumer transactions but may allow them in business transactions. You seem to be talking about some sort of equipment financing arrangement. As such, if you don't like the deal, there's a bank down the street with a different deal. US law recognises that once there is a contract, the parties have to act in good faith to ensure each party gets the benefit of the bargain they made but there is no such requirement in negotiating that bargain. If you can use your economic strength to get a better deal, that's called capitalism. | I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds. | The written document is given very high priority, so parties will be held to what is in the document. Both parties sign at the bottom, as a way of signalling their agreement with the terms specified in the document. If conditions are added or subtracted (by crossing out), especially with pre-printed forms, the "customer" (person who didn't write the contract) can initial such modifications, as a way of clearly signalling that they indeed agree to the deletion of such-and-such clause. Since both parties have a copy of the signed agreement, this is not strictly necessary. The potential issue would be that an unscrupulous person could cross out a clause after the contract was signed, and claimed that they aren't bound by that clause. A comparison of the two copies would then reveal that the unscrupulous person was attempting fraud. There is nothing special about handwriting in or crossing out conditions, except that it poses a potential evidentiary problem as to what exactly was agreed to, if for example one party threw away their copy and then maintained that the crossed-out clause had not been crossed out. (So, keep your copy). In case you are proposing a scenario where one party is unaware of a change, i.e. at the very last minute Smith crosses something out and signs it, and Jones did not see that happen, then both copies would be the same and Jones would be legally bound to what's in the paper. Smith should announce to Jones that a clause was being deleted. We might suppose that there are innocent reasons why Smith made changes without making an announcement to Jones, in which case the parties do not have an agreement. There may be amicable ways to deal with that situation, but push could come to shove, in which case the written form of the document is generally taken to be the most important piece of evidence (though not always the only admissible evidence, unless you're in Colorado, Florida or Wisconsin). | UCC section 2-509 is the law pretty much everywhere in the United States, and it addresses your situation: Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier ... if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier. Although the statutory language is a bit convoluted, it all boils down to whether you have a shipment contract or a destination contract, i.e., whether the contract calls for the seller to ship something to you or deliver something to you. Because you asked for a shipment contract, the risk of loss shifts to the buyer upon delivery to the shipping carrier (USPS). If the package is destroyed in transit, that becomes a problem for you and USPS to sort out. If you didn't purchase insurance for the shipment, you're probably screwed. Note that because this is the statutory default, the seller didn't "contract away" anything; instead, it alerted you to what was already true, giving you an opportunity to contract around the rule, purchase insurance, or otherwise mitigate the risk you were taking on. |
Statute of limitations for F on M rape across jurisdictions? I am an Aussie dude (ie, a person with a penis, pronouns "him, he, his"). Back in 2015/16 I was living in Hong Kong, engaged to a local girl (ie someone with a vagina, tits and womb) 2 years older than me. The entire relationship was just her abusing me and manipulating me (I was a young naive guy). Now, specifically for this question, she raped me regularly. It was rape because I did not consent before during or after, I communicated this to her clearly and repeatedly, but she just kept doing it. At the time I thought it was my fault and so the trauma was amplified by an intense experience of catholic guilt, dread and despair. She was able to keep doing it to me for a variety of complicated reasons, but one simple reason was that I had to take a high dose of epilim and zeldox every night, which I'm fairly sure means i was "incapable of consent" under aussie law at least. So, the actual question: Is it worth taking her to court over this, and how would that work given that im in australia and she's in HK? not gonna lie, im not looking for money; i'd be happy even if it were possible to simply blacklist her passport and prevent her from entering australia, or get her name logged on a sex offenders registry in hong kong or something. Im still suffering and recovering from this 4 years on, whereas she got away without any consequences; what legal rights to compensation could i perhaps pursue here? | This occurred in Hong Kong, so Hong Kong law applies here. Hong Kong law's definition of rape is explicitly male on female (nonconsensual male-male is covered by sodomy laws instead). It is impossible for her to be charged with rape. Assuming you were over 16 at the time, the only offence that could be possible is indecent assault. As far as I can tell, there is no statute of limitations. However, the chance of her being charged is basically zero. | The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically ("shall be") a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of "claiming" of citizenship from some report that one can "claim" Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still "claim" it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no "claim" of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would "render him stateless", though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary "is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless." (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are "eligible" to "claim" one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being "eligible" to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot "sue" a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court. | Generally, irrespective of charge, there is no 'shield laws' in the UK legal system. Any such provisions are a matter of discretion for the judge on the same grounds as the admissibility of evidence. Though the following case relates to a murder case rather than rape, it does provide justification for the lack of 'shield laws'. In R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36; [2008] 1 A.C. 1128 (henceforth Davies), as described in para 3, per Lord Bingham, the witnesses were subject to extensive protective measures, as 'they claimed to be in fear forth their lives if it became known that they had given evidence against the defendant'. [Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011 Penguin) 99]. The case addresses issues at the time of the original hearing. However, more recently, there have been statutory provisions for anonymity of witnesses, specifically section 86 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This enables witness anonymity orders to be made, however there are specific requirements that can be found in subsequent provisions of the Act, but there is no common or absolute protection of victims or witnesses. A closing note regarding the 'victim' in the rape case, it should be noted that in the UK legal system, as criminal cases are brought by the CPS on behalf of the Monarch, not the victim and as such the victim is, for all intents and purposes, a witness. | canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin"). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, "If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism..."), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. "Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence..." This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. "Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence..." Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional. | It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on. | In 2017 Illinois changed its law so that criminal charges for child abuse have no statute of limitations, and can be prosecuted as long as the accused is alive. This applies to all such crimes that occur after the new law was passed, and to all prior crimes on which the previous statute of limitations had not yet expired. See this news story on the change Previously, Illinois law allowed for prosecution for up to 20 years after the victim turned 18. Since the women Kelly is accused of having abused were 16 or younger in 1998 or later, the older statute of limitations would not have expired until at least 2020. More than 35 states now have no statute of limitations for child abuse. By the way, for civil actions, as opposed to criminal charges, the Illinois law now says: an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date [a person turns 18] or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse." (ILCS § 5/13-202.2(b)) Thus, a civil suit by one of the alleged victims might or might not be barred by time, depending on details of the date of the abuse and the victim's age. In short, do not take a drama as a source of legal advice. Look it up or ask a reliable source. | This issue was addressed in United States v. Meng, 2020 BCSC 785. The authority to extradite is via the extraditing state's treaty with the U.S. and its domestic implementing legislation. In Canada, this is the Extradition Act. Extradition requires consent of the extraditing state and for the requesting state to follow the extraditing state's domestic procedure. The question you raise is how sanctions of requesting state affect the interpretation of the domestic offence for the purpose of establishing the double criminality requirement. Critical in this case was that the charged offence was fraud against HSBC (albeit based on alleged concealment of sanctions violations). See para. 23: The double criminality question in the committal hearing is therefore whether Ms. Meng’s alleged conduct, had it occurred in Canada, would have amounted to fraud contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Ms. Meng argued: that the conduct cannot amount to fraud because in essence the proposed prosecution is to enforce US sanctions laws against Iran, measures that are not part of Canadian law and which, indeed, Canada has expressly rejected. The Attorney General argued: that the double criminality analysis may properly take the US sanctions into account as part of the foreign legal backdrop against which the essential conduct is to be understood. The court agreed with the Attorney General: The effects of the US sanctions may properly play a role in the double criminality analysis as part of the background or context against which the alleged conduct is examined. | I will assume B.C. as your specific jurisdiction: there could be provincial differences. As phoog says, you certainly may mention this problem to management, who have an interest in keeping you happy. No law against that. As for the "legality" of sexual harassment, the CBA BC branch says that "Sexual harassment, which is discrimination based on sex, is illegal under the BC Human Rights Code". It is interesting to see what the code actually says. Section 8 Discrimination in accommodation, service and facility says (1) A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. The question is whether using the term "babe" constitutes discrimination against a person regarding service because of sex. This article on the Law Society of BC web site specifically identifies "verbal harassment" as an instance: Verbal harassment – This comes from anyone within the firm and or other workplace or a person who does business with the firm or company. Some examples are: referring to an adult as a babe, honey, girl or stud; whistling at someone; turning work discussion to sexual topics; asking personal questions of a sexual nature; making sexual comments about a person’s clothing, anatomy or looks; or asking someone repeatedly for dates and refusing to take no for an answer. (emphasis added). In case you're thinking that maybe there's a difference in what the code says regarding services and what it says regarding employment, section 13 Discrimination in Employment says: (1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person. In other words, it is defined simply in terms of "discrimination", which means "making a distinction". It is known that unwanted sexual advances constitute illegal discrimination, see Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR 1252. The court found that Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job‑related consequences for the victims of the harassment. They did not, however, find that this is the only form of sexual discrimination (obviously, since it isn't). I can't point to case law indicating whether gender-biased expression are actionable, but that would be consistent with the letter of the law and "babe" is indeed an example cited in the Law Society article. |
What happens if you create something (e.g. a book/game/show) which includes copyrighted content, then release it into the public domain? I assume it might be a problem if you have a Patreon or something where people support you for creating the content since you can technically be considered making money off of it even though it's public domain, but what if you don't monetise it in any way and don't even reveal yourself as the creator? Would people even know who to sue? | Copyrights, in general, relate to the right of copying or reproduction. Another’s copyright may be substantially violated and causing harm even if one doesn’t monetize on it: A free access to the work of art may mean that anyone who would otherwise pay for a copy or any sort of license will not pay. This is the reason why in most countries torrenting is illegal. The last question is rather difficult to answer in a meaningful way: If one doesn’t get caught ever then one doesn’t get caught; if one does, then he does. I haven’t found the channel through which such unauthorized copies would enter “the public domain” and therefore it is hard to even make a guess on the probabilities of such infringement to be discovered and one getting sought damages on. There are exemptions under “fair use” rights mostly in common law jurisdictions, and there are examples of non-enforcement or decriminalization in certain other jurisdictions under certain conditions. (See also: Is it illegal to infringe copyright if your boss or your client ordered you to do it?) | All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on. | I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. | Addressing the question of programmer liability, generally speaking, a person who creates something that others use to infringe on copyright is not liable is liable if there are non-infringing uses for the thing (Sony). They can be liable if they intentionally contribute to infringement, viz Grokster one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. End-user liability is different. In order to legally download (watch) anything, you have to have permission from the rights-holder, and from the site operator. The site operator will have terms of service according to which you can access material: if you violate those terms, you are infringing on copyright (you didn't do what the permission to copy required of you). If the site-owner knowingly distributes material without permission, he is an infringer and you have no legal license to copy (watch) that content, so you too are an infringer. If the site-owner unknowingly distributed material without permission and generally complies with the DMCA safe harbor requirements, he is not an infringer but you the user are. Congress has not created an innocent-infringement defense where you can defend yourself against an accusation of infringement by proving that you didn't know that the material was distributed without permission (there is an option to reduce liability for statutory damages to $200 in case of unknowing infringement, but not make all liability go away). | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. | Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue. |
Does the word "allegedly" shield from defamation claims? If Bob publicly says "Rob killed Alice", Rob could sue (and win) Bob for defamation — unless Rob gets convicted for that crime. But if Bob instead says "Rob allegedly killed Alice" then Rob would have no defamation case — at least so long as Rob has been charged with that crime. This is how the media reports ongoing criminal cases. Does that magic of the word "allegedly" disappear when Rob has not been charged? In other words, can Bob always avoid defamation liability just by saying "I allege Rob did that" instead of just "Rob did that", or does that work only when Rob is being prosecuted? (Any jurisdiction) | There is no magic about the word "allegedly". "Rob allegedly killed Alice" simply means "Someone said that Rob killed Alice". It implies that the person reporting this is not claiming that it is true or false, but just reporting what someone else has said. If in fact some person did say that, such a statement is true, and quite probably not defamatory. However, if the original claim is unreliable, and it is being repeated in a way that serves to lend it credibility, it could still be considered defamation by implication. If Rob has been charged, or accused by a credible source, or multiple such sources, reporting on that accusation will normally not itself be defamation. Saying "I allege that Rob killed Alice" is just saying that "I claim that Rob killed Alice" and might well be defamatory if Rob did not in fact do so. Again there is nothing magic about any particular word here. It is the overall meaning of the statement that makes it defamatory or not, as that meaning would be reasonably understood by readers or listeners. Any statement that will be understood as carrying a defamatory meaning may be an act of defamation. There is also nothing magic about Rob having been formally charged. Such a charge is a fact that can be freely reported on. Widespread or credible claims that Rob is the killer are also facts, and can also be reported. But if the only source is an anonymous vid on YouTube, with no supporting evidence, that is not a credible claim. Reporting it in a way that makes it sound far more credible than it is may cause people to believe the false accusation, and thus be defamatory. Again the overall meaning of the statement is important. | Defamation of public figures is governed by the "actual malice" standard: the person making the statement must either have known that it was false at the time they said it, or must have been acting with reckless disregard for the truth (meaning they had serious doubts that the statement was true at the time they said it). The First Amendment bars a public figure from winning a libel suit unless they demonstrate that the defendant fell in one of those categories, because any lesser requirement would discourage people from speaking on topics of public concern for fear that they might say something wrong and be sued for it. The standard was first applied for public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan, and later cases have extended it to public figures in general. If someone genuinely thinks Obama was born in Kenya, it is not libel for them to say that. Even though you could argue that any reasonable person should know that's wrong, it's not enough -- the defendant had to have known it was wrong or seriously doubted it. Even if your sole basis for claiming he was a gay prostitute is that you heard a rumor from a friend, if you actually believed them, you can say he was. You aren't required to check Clinton's book to verify a quote before repeating it; if you read it on a website and had no reason to think they were lying, you can say that the quote was in there. It is extremely difficult for a public figure in the United States to win a defamation lawsuit. This is the system working as designed; a public figure who wants to correct lies being told about them can put out the correct information (which is easier for them than for most people), which is preferable to government action (and libel judgments are government action, because they involve a government officer ordering you to pay someone else money and/or do and/or not do something). | He cannot enter a Guilty Plea until he has been charged with a crime. He would only be charged with a crime if the Prosecution believes they have enough evidence for a conviction. If they believe "the true culprit is still out there", they would not arrest or charge or attempt to prosecute "Bob". He can hire an attorney, and go on TV and say he is guilty, and beg to be prosecuted. The District Attorney (or similar Office) can simply respond, "We are aware of the claims by Bob. At this time, we do not have enough evidence to support charging Bob with a crime. The investigation continues." Somewhat ironically, if they have substantial evidence that Bob is not the murderer, he can then be charged with Making a False Report. | My understanding is that defendants in Britain have to prove statements true by the preponderance of evidence, whereas in the U.S. the standard of evidence is "compelling" (a lower standard). This is not the case. Preponderance of the evidence can still be the burden of proof in the United States (in a civil libel case, although it must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal libel case). But, the difference is in what has to be proved. In Britain, it appears to be necessary to show that the statements are true in order to prevail. In the U.S., it is merely necessary to show in a case like this one (because it involves a matter of public concern) that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statements made. A factual basis for believing the statements made to be true is a defense if the basis is at all reasonable, and is a complete defense if the factual basis for making the statement is disclosed and that is true or believed to be true by the speaker. It is not necessary for the statements to actually be true under U.S. law in a case such as this one, although actual truth is also a defense, which is not the case in all circumstances in U.K. law, and was not the case under the historical common law. Historically, defamation claims could be brought for statements critical of the monarch, for statements pointing out the natural infirmities of someone for example by mocking a person with low IQ, or for speaking ill of the dead. Furthermore, the U.S. has a variety of doctrines that make it hard to find that a false statement was made in the first place. For example, statements of opinion are not actionable and many of the alleged falsehoods in the McLibel case would be considered to be statements of opinion in U.S. law rather than statements of fact. Similarly, U.S. law does not require that statements be literally true, and instead recognizes that a defendant may have been engaged in using hyperbole, or may have gotten the gist of the accusation right even though strictly speaking the exact statement made is not technically true (e.g. someone might say that a company paid a "penalty" when it actually paid a settlement amount in a lawsuit seeking a penalty or paid an amount representing compensatory damages only rather than a penalty amount). In the same vein, it must be clear from the context of the statement that the person making it intended it to be received as a truthful account and not a mere parody or satire which was intended to be understood as false. For example, I couldn't sue someone who made a knowingly false statement that I assassinated King George V, who died several decades before I was born, or that I was telepathically controlling my uncle because I had a space alien parasite in my spine. Those claims are so absurd that they would be inferred to intended to be fictional on their face. Certain kinds of falsehoods (e.g. lying about one's military record in a a political campaign) are simply not actionable as a matter of law, no matter what, as the harm is not concrete enough. There is not, however, necessarily a defense under U.S. law to defamation liability if the defendant said many things that were true, but something else that would be defamatory in isolation. For example, even if everything else were true, if the defendant had also stated that the CEO of the Plaintiff was convicted of leading a Nazi concentration camp and killed millions of people, which would have been possible given the CEO's age, knowing perfectly well that the person with a similar name to the CEO who did so was someone else who died an untimely death decades ago, that statement might be defamatory and actionable (at least by the CEO personally and probably by the company if it was alleged that he was hired despite the fact that the company was aware of this circumstance). | The fuller statement is reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The reckless disregard for truth element in defamation claims requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant had serious doubts about the accuracy of the material. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). A summary of the holding of this U.S. Supreme Court case explains its holding: Recklessness requires a higher level of proof than ordinary negligence, so the reasonable-care standard is not appropriate. The defendant cannot avoid liability by testifying that he had a subjective belief that the statements were true. Instead, the jury must find through its consideration of all of the relevant evidence that the statements had been made in good faith. There was no evidence in this situation that St. Amant had entertained serious doubts about the veracity of Albin's accusations. The absence of an effort to check their facts did not rise to the level of actionable conduct. This decision clarified the requirement of malice in defamation lawsuits regarding matters of public concern. It does not mean ill will but rather knowledge of the information's falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. This means that if you just make something negative up without having any idea whether it is true or not, you can be guilty of defamation if it turns out to be false under U.S. law. But, reliance on a third-party whom you believe to have a basis for their allegations and republishing the third-party's claim is not reckless disregard for the truth if you have any reason to believe that the third-party is credible. One doesn't have to have personal knowledge of the facts. One can also have a reasonable factual basis for having a belief without knowing for sure that something is true from evidence that would be admissible in court or would definitely prove the allegation. For example, if the chess player's moves were atypical of that chess player's previous plays and showed insights that player had not shown before, that would provide a basis for the statement that would overcome a reckless disregard claim. | Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice. | A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal. | Yes Loss of income that is directly attributable to a loss of reputation can be part of the damages in a libel case. However, the plaintiff must prove the connection, must show that had the libel and the resulting loss of reputation not occurred, the income would have been received. This can be hard to establish. Testimony from specific people who say that they would have hired the plaintiff or done business with the plaintiff but for the libel is a common way to establish this kind of damage. Showing a sudden drop of income after the libel can also help such a case. And of course, the plaintiff must establish the other elements of libel: (in the US) a negative factual statement, communicated to others, the falsity of the statement, and a resulting loss of reputation. |
Spin-off company with all parent's debt? Out of curiosity, is it theoretically possible for a parent company to create a spin off company that holds all of its debt and no assets? Then the subsidiary spin-off company will declare bankruptcy and the parent company remains with only assets. | An arrangement like that (if successful) would be a fraudulent transfer in which creditors could gain access to the assets of the company's to which the assets were transferred, if pursued before the statute of limitations for doing so runs (typically four years from the date of transfer, or one year from discovery of the transfer, in the U.S.). In a bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee could exercise that right on behalf of all creditors. Also, the debt can't be transferred without the creditor's consent. To do the transaction, the assets would have to be transferred to a subsidiary, not the liabilities. | Your lease is with the LLC in bankruptcy - you should not be paying rent to anyone else. Unless and until the lease is transferred to someone else (in accordance with the terms of the lease or with your agreement) it will remain with the LLC. Contact the bankruptcy trustee to see how they intend to proceed. Providing the LLC keeps fulfilling its obligations under the lease there is no breach. | You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court. | Is transferring money from a company where you're a director to a company where you're an employee considered money laundering? No. The scenario you outline seems too broad and generic. There are many possible, lawful reasons why company B could transfer money to its supplier, company A. Some examples are payment for the services that company A provided, an indemnization/settlement, and a buyout. The mere fact that B's director/shareholder is A's employee does not render the transaction(s) money laundering. Also, the statutory elements of money laundering vary by jurisdiction. | 20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued. | The only reason you couldn't take all the profits is if your business were a C-Corp. I don't know of any reason a single-owner LLC would elect to be taxed as a C-Corp. Multi-owner LLCs and LLPs are, for federal tax purposes, either an S-Corp or a C-Corp. When possible they can and should generally elect to be taxed as an S-Corp. IRS Pub 2553 lists the criteria for S-Corp election. (Employees have nothing to do with the question.) For tax purposes partnerships, sole proprietorships, and S-Corps are "pass-through" entities that are not expected to pay a corporate tax. In effect, whether you like it or not, you do pay yourself all of the profits each fiscal year, and they are taxed accordingly. | Can bankruptcy be used as strategy to avoid paying back investors? Are there examples of such behavior? In the United States, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently used as a way to cancel equity investments and to reduce or eliminate long term bond debt (especially subordinated bond investments) by senior management, in an effort to keep the business operating as a going concern and keep their elite senior executive jobs, and the jobs of many subordinate employees and contractors of the business. Pretty much every single business bankruptcy reduces the amount of return that investors in the company can receive from it (although there are rare cases when investors can be compensated in full in an orderly disposition of a company's assets but bankruptcy is filed to prevent a fire sale of assets in a disorderly fashion that would hurt investors, or hurt them more than the alternative outcome). A key factor here is the segregation of ownership and management in most big businesses. A large equity owner in a company is in a poor position to defraud other equity owners in bankruptcy, however, and equity owners are behind debt investors in priority in bankruptcy, so it is also hard for the equity owner to use bankruptcy to defraud debt investors without hurting the large equity owner. In some ways, this is a variant on a leveraged buy-out by management, because usually, in a big business bankruptcy, a key step is for management to secure a third-party lender to the bankruptcy debtor (G.E. Capital was the dominant lender in this market for many years), to finance the continued operations of the business until a plan could be put in the place to reorganize the company with less debt and none of its old equity investors. This is almost never a strategy of the company at the outset. It is one that is chosen once it becomes clear that its business model has ceased to be viable with the amount of leverage that the business has. Often, in such a plan, some long term debt that is not subordinated is converted to equity, although that equity is usually worth less than the original equity investment of the investors in the firm. Typically, this strategy is used when a company with a large initial capital investment is in a market where it can still make a profit relative to its variable operating costs from the revenues it can secure in current market conditions, but can no longer afford to service its long term debt that was used to make that large initial capital investment (e.g. in a building or factory) that has decreased in value because the products made with that investment are no longer as valuable as they used to be, or because, for example, patents expired but the long term debt wasn't paid off during the terms of the patents. For example, many U.S. coal mining companies in the U.S. have recently had Chapter 11 bankruptcies. These companies made large investments in coal mining operations that were economically sensible when coal was worth more and alternatives to coal were not economically viable. But, when renewable energy became cheaper with changes in technology, and environmental requirements made coal fired power plants more expensive, the market price for coal collapsed and those companies could no longer support the debt that made it possible to conduct the mining operations that these companies had incurred. In a reorganized fashion, some of these companies could continue to be viable with lower sales volume and lower coal prices since they now only had to pay current operating costs and not obligations to investors in those companies. What are the mechanisms in place in US law to prevent people from creating a company to attract investors with the intent of filing for bankruptcy as a strategy to not repay their debt? This strategy doesn't really make sense as a plan from the issuing company's point of view, it only makes sense if the person promoting the scheme has some way to extract value from the investment made by the investors. The company itself that issued the securities (typically stock or corporate bonds) in which the investor invested also isn't a suitable target of litigation because the company that issued the securities simply doesn't have the assets to pay damages to the investors. If one can show that the company incurred debt with an intent not to repay it, and is followed by transfers out of the company without receiving substantially equivalent value in exchange to some third party behind the scheme, this can be regulated by fraudulent transfer laws. See Section 4(a)(2) in the Uniform Act numbering although individual states adopting the act as state law invariably number the sections differently). This conduct can also be used to seek securities fraud liability or common law fraud liability from the persons other than the company itself (such as its officers or brokers or promoters of some other kind) involved in promoting the company. Footnote Re Importance Of A Formal Bankruptcy The bankruptcy code component of this analysis isn't a particularly important part of the strategy. A limited liability entity can dissolve itself, or make an assignment for the benefit of its creditors of all of its assets, or be placed in a receivership, outside of bankruptcy, with similar effect, since the discharge of debts is not relief associated with a Chapter 7 liquidation of a limited liability entity (although debts can be reduced or eliminated as part of a Chapter 11 plan so long as the creditors are at least as well off as they would be in a Chapter 7 liquidation or otherwise consent to the plan). | The analogy in the other answer isn't particularly helpful because a company isn't tangible property like a truck. It is a legal entity that has not only assets and liabilities such as tangible property (trucks, computers), intangible property (trademarks), and loans, but also owners (shareholders), a board of directors, and officers. In an acquisition, another company buys up all the stock of the entity being acquired. The acquired company may continue to exist as a subsidiary, in which case it continues to have its board and officers, or it may be dissolved, in which case its assets and liabilities would be transferred to its new parent (or to another subsidiary of the new parent). |
Has a company been indicted for failing to pay taxes on benefits? A similar question has been asked on Skeptics.SE. The New York Times wrote on Friday: The Manhattan district attorney’s office has informed Donald J. Trump’s lawyers that it is considering criminal charges against his family business, the Trump Organization, in connection with fringe benefits the company awarded a top executive, according to several people with knowledge of the matter. [...] Several lawyers who specialize in tax rules have told The New York Times that it would be highly unusual to indict a company just for failing to pay taxes on fringe benefits. None of them could cite any recent example, noting that many companies provide their employees with benefits like company cars. Has a company been indicted for failing to pay taxes on benefits? | Yes. There have been indictments of individuals for failing to pay taxes on fringe benefits, such as the 2019 prosecution related to multiple instances of fraud including failing to report $410,000 of fringe benefits for People's Express, a bankruptcy start up airline. Often executives are prosecuted criminally, but corporations are actually easier to obtain convictions against (for example, corporations do not have protections under the 5th Amendment against self-incrimination). But since civil and criminal fines are hard to distinguish, it is more common to seek civil fines than criminal convictions against corporations, while pursuing criminal penalties against key officers and employees of the corporations. The U.S. Department of Justice has a set of policies (also here) regarding when corporations themselves should be prosecuted criminally that have parallels in state prosecutor's offices. A list of corporate criminal prosecutions in the 1990s (mostly for non-tax violations) can be found here. For example, in 1991, the Georgia Pacific Corporation was convicted of tax evasion and fined $5 million. Tax fraud prosecutions are rare but hardly unprecedented, although large civil penalties are vastly more common. There is nothing terribly new about it either. For example, an academic article on defending criminal tax prosecutions against publicly held companies was published in 1978. Simply stealing money meant for employee fringe benefits or taxes on those benefit is a more commonly prosecuted crime. At the federal level, in 2020, there were 593 tax evasion convictions in the US. In 2019, 848 people were sentenced, and in 2018 — 1,052. 945 prosecutions were recommended for tax crimes in 2020 in the U.S. In 2018, there were 1,050 recommendations. In 2019, the number of recommended prosecutions was 942, and in 2020 — 945. State tax fraud prosecutions are similarly rare but not unprecedented, although the raw number of cases per year is smaller because the federal statistics cover the entire United States, while state tax fraud cases comes from just one of fifty states. Almost all tax code provisions are the subject of fraud prosecutions at some point, and the common bond of the provisions is not the nature of the tax code section violated, but the willfulness of the violation. Detailed breakdowns of tax fraud prosecutions by type of tax code provisions violated are hard to determine, without detailed reviews of court records, because they all fall under the same criminal code sections. Many current federal prosecutions focus on tax fraud related to COVID related tax credits and cryptocurrencies. But federal tax prosecution agencies don't track fringe benefit fraud as a distinct subtype of case, and fringe benefit tax fraud could be variously classified as employment tax fraud, abusive tax schemes, general tax fraud, or corporate fraud. | International organizations such as the UN are typically treated similar to foreign governments, and thus enjoy various privileges. One consequence is that typically, income from employment by these organizations is not subject to taxation by the host countries where the employee lives or carries out their work. However, the details depend very much on the tax laws in that host country. The employee might still be required to file taxes, but would then likely be able to declare the income as tax-free under the corresponding provision of the national tax law. This usually also depends a lot on the treaties which created the international organisation. For example, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations contains an explicit tax exemption for UN officials, though not necessarily for regular employees. As an example for how a country treats employees of international organization, the IRS has guidance regarding US tax law here. Other countries tend to have similar rules, albeit with less accessible online documentation :) | In the US, there are a number of non-government organizations which take on such cases, such as the ACLU or the Institute for Justice; individual law firms may also take such cases pro bono. There is no automatic right to free representation in case a constitutional issue is alleged, so if IJ doesn't like your case they won't take it. These are private organizations: there is no general government agency that one can call on, other than the Public Defender's office in case you are charged with a crime and can't afford legal defense. (A constitutional issue may arise in a case that a PD might handle, but you can't e.g. call on the public defender to sue the government for infringing your 2nd Amendment rights.) A state attorney general could file suit against the US government over a constitutional issue, as Washington's AG did in the case of the Trump travel executive order, where the underlying issues were constitutional. An individual might inspire a state AG to take on an issue, but the AG would be representing the interests of the state, broadly, and not individual interests. | Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice. | You are describing a charity. In the simplest case, a charitable foundation could be established to receive donations and dispense payments for medical services. There are various irrelevant non-legal reasons why it might not work (e.g. insufficient contributions relative to demand). The main legal concerns of such a foundation are its tax liability (do they have to pay income taxes on contributions?), and local regulations (how do you distinguish between a scam and a real charity?). The tax question is primarily about 501(c)(3) status, and for the most part there should be no problems with charitably dispensing contributions, though there is a requirement that no part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual – perhaps the CEO would be an exception to the universality of the program (but providing equivalent service could be a pre-tax employment benefit). A recipient does not have to pay tax on a gift, owing to the "medical exclusion" Registration is a state-level matter, here is the Washington law. Nothing in that law says "you can't provide coverage of medical expenses", and no maximum income level is imposed on the recipient of a charitable gift. The concern of these regulations is mainly record-keeping and access to records, not on specific ways of benefiting the community. Since unlike taxes contributions cannot be coerced, this means that some people might not pay what other people deem to be "their fair share", which is, again, a political issue. | It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common. | The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it. | The EU has established rules about member governments subsidising industries. The intention is to ensure that trade in the EU is not distorted by government incentives, so that factories get built in the most efficient location rather than where a government offers the biggest subsidy. This is the mirror image of the rules which prohibit tariffs; governments cannot protect their own industry from competition either by imposing tariffs on imports or by providing subsidies to exports. The Irish government was found to have provided an illegal subsidy to Apple in the form of a tax reduction made especially for Apple. Hence the tax break was invalid and effectively did not exist. Legally Apple therefore had to pay their back taxes. As to why Apple had to pay after being assured that they would not have to, its a basic principle that civil servants cannot change the law merely by saying something. If a civil servant tells you that you don't need to pay tax when you do, then the civil servant is simply wrong. You could use their opinion as a defence against criminal charges of tax evasion, but you would still have to pay the tax. |
Are you out of the woods if you pay a lump sum child support? Are you out of the woods if you pay a lump sum child support? If not, in what case can you still be asked to pay more money to support your child? Let's assume that the country is the United States and the couple lives in California. | I am not aware of any U.S. state that allows amounts owed for future child support to be paid in a lump sum that cannot be modified in the future if there is a change in circumstances (e.g. increased or deceased incomes of the parties, or changes in parenting time). There may be an exception for very high income families where the child support guidelines set under state law (but mandated by federal law), apply and the maximum guideline amount is paid in a lump sum. Lump sum alimony (a.k.a. spousal maintenance), however, may be paid in a lump sum, as may child support for periods that have taken place in the past, whether or not they are past due. | Unfortunately, it looks like the answer is yes. There was a bill passed around 2007 called the "Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007". You should track down official information as I am going by newspaper articles. If an employed, adult child isn't supporting their parents or step-parents, 60 or older, their parents or step-parents can go to a tribunal and ask for an enforcement order. The upper limit was 10000 rupees per month or a possible jail term. The Times of India has an article from December 2019 that the government plans to expand the law to include son- and daughter-in-laws as responsible besides children, step-children, and adoptive children. The new bill also includes grandparents and they do not have to be over 60. The plan is also to remove the 10000 cap. | Let's look at what they say: Pennsylvania does not have any statutory laws governing assisted reproductive technology. True Pennsylvania’s laws regarding sperm donors come only from case law that are specific to the facts of the case being considered by the court. True and trivial given the previous sentence. Pennsylvania courts have found sperm donor contracts to be legally enforceable. True, that's what Ferguson v McKiernan says in the first paragraph of the decision. Your statement that "PA case law falls strongly on the side of not respecting donor contracts" is, at least as far as the case you cite, flatly wrong. In other cases, the contract may or may not be enforcable indeed the court agrees with this specifically: Although locating future cases on this spectrum may call upon courts to draw very fine lines, courts are no strangers to such tasks, and the instant case, which we must resolve, is not nearly so difficult. This also directly supports the previous sentence. Therefore, even if you go through a fertility clinic, a contract between the donor and the intended parents would need to be in place before the conception. True, this is exactly what Ferguson v McKiernan says. You assert that Ferguson v McKiernan says "donation through a clinic does not make a sperm donor the legal father", however, it doesn't say that at all. The status of the doner as the father was never an issue - both parties agreed that he was the biological father and the court accepted that. What was at issue is if he had the rights and obligations of a father that had been removed by the contract. The lower courts held that the contract was unenforcable as being contrary to public policy because it removed rights from the children who were not parties to the contract. However, the State Supreme Court held that the contract was enforcable. TL;DR What they say on their website is not misleading. | They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no. | You can offset the amount but you must go to court to do it. The court can then grant you an offset. This document from a law office describes the details. The risk you run if you do not pay and do not do this properly is that she, with a valid judgement in her hand, can take enforcement action including garnishee of bank accounts and seizure of property (of course, you can do the same to her). | canada* What you describe is completely acceptable First, one of the goals of child support is to provide a similar standard of living in each household, so spending an amount on rent that happens to be a large portion of the child support amount is understandable. Second, the fact that the child only spends part of their time at Parent B's home is already accounted for in the computation of the amount owing. Child support in Canada is based almost exclusively on the income of the parents, taking into account the proportion of time the child spends with each parent. And this is all subject to any specific hardships of the paying parent. Only where a portion of child support is based on a special and extraordinary expenditure (e.g. a specific extracurricular activity, or medical insurance) is it expected the claimant make that specific expenditure. If they stop making that expenditure, then the child support add-on associated with that expenditure is removed. * I understand the question is directed to Arkansas, but I have provided an answer for those interested in Canadian law, in line with the guidance here ("Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions – while it might not answer your question directly, your question will be here for others who may be from those jurisdictions. If you do this, please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"). | Generally a person can leave money to any person or organization that the testator pleases. In some US states, a minimum portion must be left to family (spouse and/or children). Aside from that, there is no requirement and no exclusions. US law prohibits gifts (and other support) to a few specific organizations which the government has officially listed as terrorist, and I suspect the Taliban is one of these. Gifts by will would be covered by this law just as gifts from a living person. But if a living person in the US can lawfully make a gift to an organization, a similar gift may be left by will. Even if a particular bequest was unlawful, that would not make the will as a whole invalid. Edit: It seems that the Afghan Taliban is not on the list of terrorist organizations maintained by the US, and so there would be no bar to a US citizen leaving money to that group. There would be to groups actually on the list. The general principle above holds. | Whether or not this would be allowed would generally call for a more fact rich situation than the one presented in the original question, that would cast light upon why a retailer might be inclined to refuse to accept payment. Hypothetical legal questions that presume that people are acting irrationally for no good reason are generally ill posed and don't have meaningful answers. Sometimes, there might be a legitimate privacy interest implicated if the invoicing party acknowledged a payment from a third party. For example, suppose that the invoice was for a paternity test and payment would confirm that the incapacitated person actually obtained a paternity test. Sometimes, there are legal rights beyond payment that are implicated and the reasonableness of a refusal might hinge on those rights. For example, suppose that the invoice was for an option to keep using an oil well. Payment of the invoice by the deadline would keep the oil well operating and the land owner sending the invoice might prefer that it not be paid so that the oil well would be shut down. Quite a few contracts are structured in this way. Maybe the invoice was for the right to purchase a first edition of a book when it was finally released, for example, and not paying it would free up a copy for someone else at a price that had increased in the meantime. Or, suppose that the invoice were for unpaid taxes and payment of the taxes would prevent property from being seized for sale by tax authorities, and the taxing authority would prefer that the invoice was not paid so that the valuable property could be liquidated. But, it is hard to imagine that there would be any reason that an ordinary retailer with an ordinary bill would ever refuse payment, although I suppose that this might trigger an interest or penalty amount owed under the contract for late payment. If that were the case, the principal of mitigation of damages, which says that a party to a contract must take all reasonable steps to mitigate their damages, might obligate the retailers to accept the payment or forfeit the penalty amounts that the retailer could have avoided as damages by accepting payment. I doubt that an undelivered tender of payment from a third party would eliminate the obligation, but, it might limit the damages that could be claimed as in the scenario above. |
Can you be prosecuted for tax information which would lead to an overestimate in the amount of taxes you owe? Suppose you pay more taxes than you owe, either because you neglect to use a tax credit or deduction that you could claim, you put $0 for charitable giving as a result of forgetfulness, poor record-keeping, or wanting to avoid overestimating, etc. The end result is that you end up paying more taxes than what you were required to pay. Is this legal? Also, what happens if you forget about a small transaction? For example, suppose you make $100K at your job, but also made $25 of taxable income selling your stuff to a friend, but you forget to include the latter under taxable income. | The tax man always wins. You can make mistakes to your own detriment, but not to the detriment to the state. Forgot to take a deduction that was available to you? Perfectly legal. You're not required to “optimize” your taxes. Forgot to declare taxable income? That is a problem, and you would need to amend your filings. You are required to accurately disclose all of your taxable income. Of course, not all income is taxable income. For example, occasionally selling personal items for less than their original value (i.e. at a loss) is not taxable. | Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.) | If your friend was a salaried W2 full time exempt employee hired by the company to, among other things, write software like this, then the fact that it was developed "off the clock" with the employee's own resources means nothing once he gives it to the company. I mean if I give you a present and it blows up and breaks your arm, I'm still liable even if we didn't have a "contract" - especially if I knew it would blow up. Your friend's position is even worse since the relationship entails the employee's having the employer's best interests in mind. If I were your friend, I'd either figure out how to fix this or take gnasher729's advice from the comments and find a country where it's easy to hide from parties public and private. Maybe buy a bunch of canned food and go live on a boat? | It is certainly possible to give gifts to your relatives (or to anyone really). But, the harder question is whether or not it is really a gift. A characterization of a transaction as a gift is less likely to be questioned if it is between related parties, and it is less likely to be questioned if it isn't obviously a quid pro quo. If you told your brother that you would make a gift to him of all of the appreciation in the house, if he made the guarantee in advance, it would be a guarantee fee (or an equitable or nominee ownership) rather than a gift. But, with the timing and motives described in this post, it is certainly a closer call. The fact that the "gift" amount exactly matches the appreciation casts doubt on the theory that this is really a gift, but doesn't absolutely clearly require the conclusion that it is not. This could end up being resolved either way, and ultimately, could be very dependent upon the detailed facts and how they are presented to the person determining if tax is owed. | People make mistakes. My assessments come with information on how to dispute them, and if yours don't you should be able to get that information. File a dispute or whatever it is you do to challenge the assessment. Include the information about you being outside the district and not having he measure on your ballot. If you're just outside the district, you might have been mistakenly included. You'll either get a revised assessment or you'll be told that you have to pay the tax. You don't have a reasonable complaint unless and until your challenge is denied. | No IRS Pub. 526, Table 1, lists "Value of your time or services" under "Not Deductible As Charitable Contributions". This is repeated several other places in the document. However, expenses incurred in the course of providing the services can be deductible in some cases. There's more specific information for lawyers at https://practice.findlaw.com/practice-guide/tax-deductions-for-lawyers-providing-pro-bono-services.html. | Under U.S. law, each donor can give up to $15,000 per person, per year to as many people as desired gift tax free (this is called the "annual exclusion"). So, yes you could. The gift tax portion of the Internal Revenue Code is specifically designed so that de minimis gifts don't have to be accounted for. Also, the amount of the gift for gift tax purposes if you had 11.8 million co-owners of an account would be 1/11,800,000 dollars, not $1 dollar each. While co-ownership of a joint account is a gift, it is not a gift of 100% of the value of the co-owned account to each co-owner. The default rule in absence of evidence to the contrary, is that co-owners of property have equal ownership of it. Adding one joint owner to a solo account is a gift of half of the amount in the account. | You would report illegal income via Schedule 1, line 8. At the bottom, after naming many specific legal sources of income there is a line 8z "Other income. List type and amount" with very little space. The instructions refer you to Miscellaneous Income in Pub 525. They do list "Stolen Property" as a category, saying If you steal property, you must report its FMV in your income in the year you steal it unless in the same year, you return it to its rightful owner. However, there is no requirement to report the illegal nature of your income, and it is not difficult to describe such income in non-incriminating terms, such as "miscellaneous income". If they are not satisfied, you may inform them of your 5th amendment right to not incriminate yourself. Invoking your right to silence does not constitute probable cause for a search warrant. |
Staying anonymous as a witness in Germany Alice witnessed an altercation in a public park in which a knife was pulled, but nobody was hurt. The police were called, the offender fled the scene but stayed in the vicinity. Since Alice saw everything from ca. 30ish meters away, her statement was taken by the police at the time and now she is asked to provide a written statement. Alice understands that this will make her address visible to the accused, and she is already nervous about the person targeting her for giving a statement/pointing him out. Is it normal under German law to just assume the accused will never go after a witness? The form seems to allow giving a different address (like a work address), but this seems to require a "good reason". What are acceptable reasons? What is the best way to go? | Is it normal under German law to just assume the accused will never go after a witness? This is not a question that can be answered here, or probably anywhere with any degree of certainty. The form seems to allow giving a different address (like a work address), but this seems to require a "good reason". What are acceptable reasons? These include an imminent risk of serious detriment to her well-being and a well-founded reason to fear she (or anyone else) might be improperly influenced if she gives here address. Staying anonymous; She is asked to provide a written statement. SHORT ANSWER A witness is not obligated to give the material witness statement to the police. Instead, a witness is only obligated to appear before and make a statement to the German public prosecutor (Staatsanwalt). AND... every (potential) witness is obligated to give their particulars at the hearing, including full names, maiden name, age, occupation and place of residence. Some or all of these details may be omitted, however, if there is a specific risk. In those cases, the identity of the witness may be kept undisclosed. LONG ANSWER Book1, Chapter 6 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, Strafprozeßordnung (StPO), gives the rules for examining, and protecting, witnesses. Section 48 (Obligations on witnesses; summons): (1) Witnesses shall be obliged to appear before the judge on the date set down for their examination. They shall have the duty to testify if no exception admissible by statute applies. (2) ... (3)... An examination shall, in particular, be made as to whether an imminent risk of serious detriment to the witness’s well-being requires measures to be taken pursuant to section 168e or section 247a, as to whether any of the witness’s overriding interests meriting protection require that the public be excluded pursuant to section 171b (1) of the Courts Constitution Act and as to what extent it is possible to refrain from asking non-essential questions concerning the witness’s personal sphere of life pursuant to section 68a (1) [see below] Account is, further, to be taken of the witness’s personal situation and the nature and circumstances of the offence. Section 68 (Examination as to witness’s identity; limitation of information, victim protection): (1) The examination shall begin with the witness being asked to state his first name, last name, name at birth, age, occupation and place of residence... (2) A witness shall, furthermore, be permitted to state his business address or place of work or another address at which documents can be served instead of stating his place of residence if there is well-founded reason to fear that legally protected interests of the witness or of another person might be endangered or that witnesses or another person might be improperly influenced if the witness states his place of residence. If the conditions of sentence 1 obtain at the main hearing, the presiding judge shall permit the witness not to state his place of residence. (3) If there is well-founded reason to fear that revealing the identity or the place of residence or whereabouts of the witness would endanger the witness’s or another person’s life, limb or liberty, the witness may be permitted not to provide personal identification data or to provide such data only in respect of an earlier identity. However, if so asked at the main hearing, he shall be required to state in what capacity the facts he is indicating became known to him. (4) ... (5) Subsections (2) to (4) shall also apply after conclusion of the examination of the witness. Insofar as the witness was permitted not to provide data, it must be ensured in the course of the provision of information from or inspection of the files that these data are not made known to other persons, unless a danger within the meaning of subsections (2) and (3) appears to be ruled out. Section 68a (Limitation of right to ask questions to protect privacy): (1) Questions concerning facts which might dishonour the witness ... or which concern their personal sphere of life are to be asked only if they cannot be dispensed with. Section 168e (Separate examination of witnesses): If there is an imminent risk of serious detriment to a witness’s well-being in the event of his being examined in the presence of persons entitled to be present and if that risk cannot be averted in some other way, the judge shall examine the witness separately from those entitled to be present. There shall be simultaneous audio-visual transmission of the examination to the latter. The rights of participation of those entitled to be present shall otherwise remain unaffected. Sections 58a and 241a shall apply accordingly. The decision referred to in sentence 1 shall not be contestable. Section 247a (Order for witness examination via audio-visual means): (1) If there is an imminent risk of serious detriment to the well-being of the witness were he to be examined in the presence of those attending the main hearing, the court may order that the witness remain in another place during the examination; such an order shall also be admissible under the conditions of section 251 (2) insofar as this is necessary to establish the truth. The decision shall not be contestable. Simultaneous audio-visual transmission of the testimony shall be provided in the courtroom. The testimony shall be recorded if there is a concern that the witness will not be available for examination at a future main hearing and the recording is necessary to establish the truth. Section 58a (2) shall apply accordingly. | In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source. | There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door". | You won't be able to get around self-doxxing yourself. § 5 Abs 1 TMG requires tele-media service providers like you to list den Namen und die Anschrift, unter der sie niedergelassen sind the name and the address where they reside or are established Similarly, Art 13(1) GDPR requires you to provide the identity and the contact details of the controller In a German context, it is generally accepted that both of these involve a ladungsfähige Anschrift, i.e. a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit (not a post box). These requirements exist for both natural persons and legal entities, and for both businesses and non-commercial activities. The TMG Impressumspflicht talks about “geschäftsmäßige, in der Regel gegen Entgelt angebotene Telemedien” but in practice this only requires that the service could be paid (not that you're actually making any money), and that the service is offered routinely/business-like (not necessarily commercially). It does not matter where your service is hosted as long as you live in Germany. The TMG and GDPR might not apply if the forum is run purely privately, e.g. if it is only made available to a few close friends or family members. | The Missouri trespass law is here. The police will not detain a person for expressing himself, even repeatedly, though a court order to stay away would change things. The law says A person does not commit the offense of trespass in the first degree by entering or remaining upon real property unless the real property is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders or as to which notice against trespass is given by: (1) Actual communication to the actor; or (2) Posting in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders. You can also use purple paint markers. There is also a law against stalking which prohibits unwanted communication that may be threatening, intimidating, frightening or causes emotional distress to another person. However, you need to petition the courts for an order of protection. If granted, violating the order would be a felony, and more likely to get the attention of the police. Getting an attorney is the simplest immediate solution, since I expect that purple paint won't mean much to him. | It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more. | This is, in effect a defense of mistaken identity, and an assertion that the person on trial is not in fact the person who committed the crime. It is not legally significantly different from a case where the defendant claims that a witness has identified the wrong person. Exactly how the defense would be conducted would depend on what evidence establishes that "Herschel Greenbaum" committed the crime, and what evidence establishes (or disproves) that the defendant on trial is that same Herschel Greenbaum. The purpose of a trial is to establish or fail to establish the guilt of the person actually on trial, normally the person present in the courtroom. (trials do not establish innocence in the US). "The defendant" is the person actually on trial, even if an incorrect name has been used in bringing the charge. In such a case people would need to be careful about evidence that applies to a person named "Herschel Greenbaum" but might not apply to the defendant actually on trial. | To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source. |
What constitute as income when calculating child support? What constitute as income when calculating child support? Does it include unrealized capital gains (stocks)? So does a person who has a lot of stocks but very little income only be required to pay child support proportional to his income or can the court force the individual to sell some shares? How does the court determine how much to sell and how much should be paid in child support? Assume this is in the U.S. and in the state of California. | In California, everything that counts as taxable income for federal purposes, and then some. The form is here, the corresponding explanation is here starting p. 18. It includes things that are income but not taxable (see p. 24), such as tax-exempt interest. Potential profit i.e. unrealized capital gains coming from increased value in a home or increased share values is not income in the relevant sense. FAM §4058 is the statutes that lists some of what counts as income, but it says "includes, but is not limited to, the following". The courts' use of IRS tax forms as defining "income" is not mandated by the legislature, so if unrealized capital gains become taxable income at the federal level, the courts will have to decide how such "income" is to be treated. | Yes, maybe The legislation varies by state but s494 of the Victorian Children, Young Persons and Families Act is typical. A person who has the control or charge of a child must not leave the child without making reasonable provision for the child's supervision and care for a time which is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. If the child is 17 years old then the circumstances are such that it is not unreasonable to leave them, even for a period of days. If the child is 17 days old, even 30 seconds may be unreasonable. | Would capital gains taxes come into play given that the house is his daughters primary residence, but not his? Yes. He sold something that was his property, i.e., his [long term] asset. The fact that it was not his primary residence is irrelevant in this regard. The issue of primary vs. non-primary residence might be relevant only for purposes of computing the applicable credits and/or deductions, but that is very jurisdiction-specific. | Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety. | The fundamental question is whether children can own property: they clearly can. See Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (I improved the link so it can be more easily read). As a general rule any property acquired by the child in any way except by its own labor or services belongs to the child, and not to the parent McClosky v. Cyphert, 3 Casey (27 Pa.) 220 The right of an infant to be the owner of property is as clear and as well protected as that of a person who has arrived at full age. When anything is given to an infant to be held by him in his own right, he has the title to it, and the parent, guardian or master has in law no more right to take it (for any purpose beyond safekeeping) than a stranger. Wheeler v. R. Co., 31 Kan. 640, 3 P. 297, 300: As a matter of law a minor may own property the same as any other person. He may obtain it by inheritance, by gift, or by purchase; and there is nothing in the law that would prevent even a father from giving property to his minor child. A father may also so emancipate his minor child as to entitle him to receive his own wages. It is probably true that where a minor child lives with his father, and is supported by him, all things given to the child in the way of support, such as clothing, for instance, would still belong to the father and not to the child. But things given by the father to the child, not in the way of support, but with the understanding that they should become the property of the child, would, undoubtedly, become the property of the child. Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen 497, the father has no title to the property of the child, nor is the capacity or right of the latter to take property or receive money by grant, gift or otherwise, except as a compensation for services, in any degree qualified or limited during minority. Whatever therefore an infant acquires which does not come to him as a compensation for services rendered, belongs absolutely to him, and his father cannot interpose any claim to it, either as against the child, or as against third persons who claim title or possession from or under the infant. However, a parent does have the right to prevent their child from using or acquiring a computer, car (also prohibited statutorily in Washington), television, cell phone; they can also prevent a child from spending their savings. Parents do retain their property right in things that they give to their children for general support and maintenance, such as a pair of shoes, or books. There can also be specific statutes such as the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (Washington version) which partially recognize this right, making it easy for a person to transfer property to a minor, where the property is in the care of a custodian, but not owned by the custodian. | The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S. | In the eyes of the IRS, income is income It doesn't matter if that income is in the form of dollars, or gift cards, or red kidney beans, so long as you pay the correct tax on the income the IRS is happy. | united-states In the United States, divorce is a matter of state law, and each of the 50 states has slightly different laws. But in general, it is not true as a matter of law that divorced women are awarded everything but "a mattress and a TV". A small number of states, of which the largest are California and Texas, are community property states. In such states, all property acquired during the marriage is generally divided equally according to the value of the assets. The majority of states, however, follow what is called "equitable distribution". In such states, assuming the divorce goes before a judge (most divorces don't), the judge must determine a fair distribution of the assets acquired during the marriage. As an example, in the state of Illinois, this division should be based on factors such as: the effects of any prenuptial agreements the length of the marriage each spouse's age, health, and station in life whether a spouse is receiving spousal maintenance (alimony) each spouse's occupation, vocational skills, and employability the value of property assigned to each spouse each spouse's debts and financial needs each spouse's opportunity for future acquisition of assets and income either spouse’s obligations from a prior marriage (such as child support for other children), contributions to the acquisition, preservation, or increased value of marital property, including contributions as a homemaker contributions to any decrease in value or waste of marital or separate property the economic circumstances of each spouse custodial arrangements for any children of the marriage the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live in it for a reasonable period of time, to the party who has physical custody of children the majority of the time, and any tax consequences of the property division. (The exact legal phrasing of the statutes can be found in 750 ILCS 5 if you're curious.) In practice, this may result in a partner who has stayed home with the kids for 10 years getting a larger share of the shared property; such a person may have difficulty re-entering the workforce because of their lack of recent work experience. Similarly, if it is desirable to have the couple's children remain in the family home, and one partner will be receiving primary custody (perhaps because they have spent many years at home bonding with the children), then the family home may be awarded to that partner. In such circumstances, the judge may also award the other partner a larger portion of the assets than they would otherwise receive, to compensate for the loss of equity. In practice, given gender norms within Western societies, it is more likely that a woman will stay home with the children, have worse economic prospects after divorce, and be awarded primary custody of any children. An equitable distribution would therefore favor the woman under the above criteria. But the law itself does not discriminate by gender. If a heterosexual couple divorced where the woman had been the primary wage-earner and a man was the homemaker, the distribution of assets might well favor the man. |
Is hydroquinone illegal in the EU? I read somewhere that the skin lightening agent hydroquinone was banned by the EU at the start of the millenia however my doctor in Ireland told me that one can get a prescription for it at 4% concentrations. | The EU has banned all pharmaceutical products containing hydroquinone in greater than 1% concentration due to concerns over increased risk of cancer and mercury poisoning with prolonged use. The US has banned all pharmaceutical products containing hydroquinone in greater than 4% concentration, and products over 2% require a prescription. | I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered. | I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws. | There is no bright, highlighted line, but the test is generally what a reasonable person would do or expect. Not a total moron. Let's take an example of using spray-on adhesive instead of hairspray. Would a reasonable person pour wood glue into their hair? Well, Hair gel is technically a very weak glue. But would you pour a glue that is (let'S take Gorilla Glue as a typical example) labeled as skin irritant, don't get in contact with eyes and skin onto your hair, or is it a misuse of a product the producer could not have expected? 2.1. Classification of the hazardous chemical Classification according to the model Work Health and Safety Regulations (WHS Regulations) Flammable aerosols, Category 1 H222 Gases under pressure : Liquefied gas H280 Skin corrosion/irritation, Category 2 H315 Serious eye damage/eye irritation, Category 2A H319 Specific target organ toxicity — Single exposure, Category 3, Narcosis H336 And that is not even the crux: reading the chemical composition and MSDS, that stuff is laden with solvents while its glue-power is what one would expect from superglue. Is it foreseeable that a reasonable person puts superglue in their hair, in any shape or form? Is it even advertised as a possible hair-product? No While you can sue for anything in the US, being stupid and (in our example) dousing your hair in a product advertised as extra-strong spray-on superglue is far from what any reasonable person would do. And in this case, Devin J. Stone and Steve Lehto agree that there are no grounds to sue, product liability does generally not cover gluing your hair to your head. | This will ultimately depend on the specific laws, but the scope of EU laws like Directive 2006/114/EC is generally restricted to the EU Single Market. Thus, we would have to consider whether the advertisement in question is directed at that market. In your scenario, you have two US-based companies that engage in comparative advertising via an US-based platform. But where these companies are headquartered is not directly relevant, as non-EU companies can participate in the EU Single Market as well. Instead, EU rules are applicable if either: the comparative advertising occurred in the context of the activities of an EU establishment such as an EU-based subsidiary; or the advertising was directed to a country in the EU Single Market, for example by fulfilling the criteria listed in the Pammer and Alpenhof cases. For example, lets assume that the companies do not have a direct EU presence, but that they offer goods or services to consumers in the EU and the comparative advertisement was in German and mentioned prices in Euros. If so, there would be a good argument that EU rules apply and that the comparative advertising was potentially illegal. But as another example, lets consider two restaurants/diners in Memphis, Tennessee, US, that made unfair comparative advertisements which were distributed via YouTube. It is possible to view the advertisement from the EU. But is there any reason for this ad to be illegal in the EU? No. This ad falls out of scope of EU law as the ad is not directed towards the EU Single Market, and it is unlikely to mislead consumers in the sense of fair competition laws as there won't be any potential customers for the Memphis restaurant in the EU. National laws could take a more narrow approach though. Does YouTube have any responsibility here? No, fair competition laws generally only address the competitors, not the platforms through which advertisements are distributed (e.g. newspapers or social media platforms). Online platforms with user-generated consent benefit from safe-harbor laws. However, there are some legal theories such as the German Störerhaftung under which it might be possible to hold an otherwise-privileged service provider responsible for acts committed by an unknown third party. Note that while comparative marketing is quite regulated in the EU and thus rare, it is not actually illegal when done fairly. For example in Germany, § 6 UWG defines criteria to determine whether comparative advertising is unfair. | All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems. | What statutory or prerogative authority is the FSA exercising when it allows such false labelling? As other answers have noted, they have executive discretion to "turn a blind eye" to what would normally be a violation of food safety laws and just decide that, right now, their government-mandated priorities are better served by not enforcing that particular letter of the law in these particular circumstances. In theory, someone could probably challenge that decision and take them to court over it, claiming that they were derelict in their duties or not acting impartially and in the public interest. However, in this case they'd probably have a pretty good defense against and such claims, both due to having explicit authority to make such decisions in emergencies (as also noted in other answers), and also because the decision itself seems pretty fair (it applies to all producers using sunflower oil in their products) and justified by the circumstances (more on that below). What public good is supposed to be being served here? It is stated that allowing items to be labelled "sunflower oil" that contain no sunflower oil "[maintains] the supply of certain food products", but this is nonsensical because replacing a product with another product does not maintain its supply, regardless of whether the replacement product is labelled accurately or falsely. Labelling the replacement as being the product it replaced appears to maintain its supply, but it doesn't actually maintain its supply. That is fact rather than opinion. You seem to be assuming that this advice by the FAS is about allowing someone to sell bottles of "sunflower oil" that actually contain rapeseed oil. It's not. It's not even really about products like crisps (potato chips, for those not in the UK) or pesto sauce or margarine that might contain sunflower oil as a major ingredient. For those products, the news page you linked indicates there are separate rules that apparently require, at a minimum, applying a sticker to notify consumers about the substitution: "where sunflower oil is a key ingredient, such as crisps, retailers will imprint information on substitute oil onto existing labels." However, think about all the other foodstuffs sold in stores that might include sunflower oil as a minor ingredient, like, say, granola, mustard sauce, instant noodles, mashed potato powder, microwave popcorn, frozen pizza, bolognese pasta sauce or just plain white bread. (If you're wondering where the random list of products above comes from, I just looked quickly around in my kitchen for products that had sunflower oil, rapeseed oil or some other neutral vegetable oil listed as a minor ingredient. There are surprisingly many.) I assume you would agree that all of these products would still be substantially the same product regardless of which kind of vegetable oil was used in them. The companies making all those products, and many others besides, typically order their product packaging in bulk, often from overseas, getting a new shipment of boxes or wrappers or labels maybe every few months or years. And of course those will all have the ingredients list printed on them, as mandated by law. If they want to change the ingredients, that means they have to send a new design to the company that makes the packaging and wait however many days or weeks or months it takes for the packaging company to make and ship the new packaging with the updated ingredients list to them. Normally that's not much of a problem, because normally food manufacturers don't tend to change ingredients in a hurry. Usually they'd plan such changes months in advance, order the new packaging well ahead of time and probably use up all of the old packaging they have in stock before actually making the switch so that they don't have to throw it away. (Companies that do need to frequently switch ingredients, e.g. due to seasonal or unpredictable availability, usually plan for that in advance e.g. by making their labels generic enough to accommodate the change or, where that's not allowed, finding workarounds like indicating the exact type or origin of the ingredients in codes that are stamped on the packaging late in the manufacturing process. That's why you occasionally see stuff in ingredients lists like "vegetable oils (rapeseed, sunflower or soybean)" or "produced in EU and non-EU countries" or "see last letter of expiration code for country of origin: A = Spain, B = Morocco, C = Israel, D = China".) In this particular case, however, a lot of companies that had been using sunflower oil in their products, and expected it to remain easily available, were caught short when the war in Ukraine broke out and the price of sunflower oil suddenly went way up, as companies selling the oil realized that there probably wouldn't be much sunflower oil exported from Ukraine this year. At that point, the companies that had been using sunflower oil as a generic cooking oil in their products would normally have a limited number of options, none of them particularly good (for either the companies or consumers): Keep using sunflower oil at whatever cost and transfer the increased cost to consumer prices. (To make things worse, the more companies do this, the higher the price of sunflower oil will rise, as they're basically competing for a limited supply.) Switch to a different type of oil and order new packaging ASAP, hoping that it will arrive before your existing stock of sunflower oil runs out. (This might take longer than usual, since presumably other companies are also in the same situation, so the packaging makers are probably swamped with sudden orders. Also, your stock of old packaging is now useless, and you might have to throw it out.) Order the new packaging immediately and pay extra for expedited delivery. Again, you'd be competing with lots of other companies who also really want to be the first to get their new packaging, so premiums for fast delivery are likely to be high if you can get it at all. All of that extra cost will also likely transfer into consumer prices. Use the existing packaging but apply stickers with updated ingredients lists on top of the old ones. That's not nearly as easy and cheap as it sounds, not only because you still have to get the stickers printed (and the printing companies are probably also swamped with orders), but also because you'll have to apply them to every single box or bag or carton, likely by hand. That's a lot of expensive manual labor that will, again, likely increase consumer prices. Just halt production until you can get new, updated packaging (or more sunflower oil at a reasonable price). That's probably the worst option for both the manufacturers and the consumers, since it results in lots of lost income for the manufacturers and product shortages for the consumers. Still, if all the other options are even more expensive, some manufacturers might be forced to do this. The exceptional decision by the FAS to selectively enforce the food labeling requirements in this particular case basically offers these food manufacturers one more option: switch to an alternative type of oil now, but keep using the old packaging until you can replace it. Practically speaking that's probably the best outcome for almost everyone. There's really very little difference between sunflower and rapeseed oil — both are neutral, mostly flavorless vegetable oils suitable for generic cooking purposes — and most people probably can't really tell them apart, especially not when they're used as minor ingredients among many others. Of course, there may still be people who really don't like the taste of rapeseed oil (assuming they can taste it) or are allergic to it (which, as the news article you linked notes, is very rare) or have some ethical or religious objection to consuming it (not that I'm aware of any, but I'm sure someone out there has one). Hence the news release, so that those people who might be affected by the substitution can find about it in advance. | Serbia is not in the EU nor internal market, so when importing products you would have to follow specific product requirements, pay eventual import duties and internal taxes (VAT). I would recommend checking out the European Trade Helpdesk for more information about this. As both Hungary and Sweden are in the internal market it should be the exact same procedure to import into either of the countries. Neither of them should be "easier" than the other as the rules are the same. Once the products are inside the internal market area you can freely transfer them anywhere. |
Can I refuse to settle out of court even if the defendant agrees to pay my claim amount? I am suing a large corporation in small claims court for what I believe is a clear-cut case that I will win. The amount I am claiming is only a few hundred dollars and I suspect the company will offer to pay me rather that be defeated in court (and potentially get copycat suits, or a class action suit etc) Suppose they offer to settle and pay my claim, can I refuse? I would prefer to win in court, unless they are willing to settle for substantially more than I am claiming. | The company can't force you to settle out of court. But if it pays you what it says you owe it in an unconditional payment, it can cause your claim to fail on the merits at trial for a lack of damages. A company might want to do this to avoid the collateral estoppel consequences of a judicial determination of your liability. The doctrine of collateral estoppel would make judicial determinations on the merits on particular issues resolved in the case against it binding on the company in future lawsuits against other plaintiffs. A company cannot simply pay to defeat a claim on the merits, however, in a class action suit, without paying all of the amounts owed to all members of the proposed class. Some states also have procedural penalties such as costs or attorney fee shifting when a settlement offer is refused and the outcome at trial is not significantly better than the settlement offer, but I don't know if Florida has such a provision. If it did, your net win could easily be converted to a net loss. | Realistically, if your lawsuit is with the person who has been acting as your agent in the United States, small claims court is probably not the right way to go. If you are owed less than $10,000 (possibly including attorney fees), you probably need to hire a lawyer to pursue your case in the non-Small Claims Magistrate Division of the District Court. Lawyers are allowed in this forum, unlike the Small Claims division which is oriented towards pro se parties (i.e. people without lawyers). Small claims can consider only claims up to $4,000 against defendants in the county where the lawsuit is brought, and attorneys are now allowed in small claims court. (Source) Even if you can be in the Small Claims division of Magistrate's Court, the enforcement of a judgment if you win requires technical court documents which are essentially the same as those for collecting a judgment from any other court. Even when Zoom participation is allowed in a court, usually the main trial can't be conducted entirely remotely so someone needs to be in the courtroom representing you for the trial. (The only U.S. state where there is an actual right to participate in a civil court trial remotely is Alaska.) A lawyer will also often be more effective at negotiating a settlement, with or without a mediator, which would avoid the need for a trial at all, and mediations these days since COVID are routinely conducted remotely. Mediation is often required before a case goes to trial. If you are owed more than $10,000, you probably need to hire a lawyer to pursue your case in District Court (outside the Magistrate's Division). (Source) It is also possible in District Court (not the Magistrate's division) in some cases to resolve the case in "motion practice" based upon submitted papers, rather than in a hearing. This is not really a possibility in the Small Claims Court or the Magistrate's Division. Also, to be perfectly honest, the kind of case you describe is probably beyond the capacity of even a college educated person without legal training to do right and not screw up. Handling issues like service of process, the rules of evidence, and the collection of a judgment are all highly technical matters, and there may be legal claims related to possible misappropriation of funds that you might not know how to raise. Depending upon the language of your contract, the other side may even be able to demand a jury trial which is far beyond the capacity of an unrepresented person to manage, even if they are only doing it to force you to hire a lawyer. It could also be necessary to use the "discovery" process or subpoenas to obtain records needed to prove the case. For what it is worth, Idaho lawyers are less expensive than lawyers in much of the U.S., and Idaho is not known for having overcrowded courts the greatly delayed schedules, however. | Is there a legal argument to force the father to repay the debt if he is supporting his grown son? No, if you wanted to be paid back by the father, you should have told the adult son to tell his father to ask you for the money. Is there a legal argument to force the father to repay the debt if he is supporting his grown son? No, not unless you can go back in time and have the father co-sign each loan. Over the years, I lent him small sums that added up over time, which we kept track of on a spreadsheet. Over how many years? Is some of the debt more than two years old? If you're going to sue the son in Small Claims court, you only have two years to file your lawsuit and you must exclude all the debt that precedes those two years. In New York city, you can only sue in Small Claims court for up to $10,000. And no, you can't sue the father. And no, if the son is not clean, he most likely won't pay you back even if there is a Small Claims Court judgment against him. | Yes You asked for work to be done in the expectation you would have to pay for it and they did the work - that’s a legally binding contract. It appears that you did not agree on a price and possibly not on a time for making payment. If that is so, you agreed to pay a reasonable price in a reasonable time. They have issued an invoice stating what and when they believe is reasonable. You dispute parts of that invoice. That’s fine, people are allowed to have disputes. You have paid the undisputed amount I hope? Notwithstanding, your negotiations with the other party can go back and forth and things can be put on and taken off the table. But you don’t have a deal until you have a deal. At any time, either party can walk away and assert their rights. Or make a take it or leave it offer, commonly called playing hardball. Since it is undisputed that you owe them something, they can refer the debt to “collections (be that internal or an external debt collector). You should pay the undisputed amount immediately and you can continue to dispute the remainder. They will make a deal, initiate legal action, or let the matter die. | If you can persuade them to release the car without paying – but with a promise to pay – they could sue you to recover what you owe them for towing and storage (breech of contract). If not, you would have to sue them to recover the money you paid (which is the damage that they did to you). I cannot imagine a towing company releasing a vehicle without first being paid. There is no state which requires a towing company to release a towed vehicle just because the owner asks. | This is called double recovery, double compensation or over-recovery, and it is usually prohibited. The rule against double recovery is also known as the one-satisfaction rule. Courts may give effect to the rule by: refusing to enforce a judgment under the relevant civil procedure rules to the extent that it has already been recovered from a co-defendant, deducting damages already recovered from the amount awarded in any subsequent lawsuit, or ordering the restitution of doubly-recovered payments under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The rule is an ancient principle of equity which developed over many centuries. The precise way in which the rule will be applied today depends on the jurisdiction and the nature of the claim. I'll outline two 18th century cases which establish the basic principle. For further information, consult a civil procedure textbook in your jurisdiction. Two early cases establishing the unjustness of double recovery In Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burrow 1005, Moses and Macferlan settled a debt of £26 by agreeing that Moses would pay Macferlan £20 and indorse over four promissory notes to the value of 30s each (£6 total). Macferlan agreed to release Moses from liability as an indorser, but when Macferlan failed to recover the value of the notes from the issuer, he sued Moses in the Court of Conscience. Because that court's jurisdiction was limited to debts of up to 40s, it could not consider the terms of the £26 settlement and held Moses liable. Moses paid the £6, but successfully recovered it in the Court of King's Bench. Lord Mansfield said (at 1009): Money may be recovered by a right and legal judgment; and yet the iniquity of keeping that money may be manifest, upon grounds which could not be used by way of defence against the judgment. In Bird v Randall (1762) 3 Burrow 1345, a journeyman (Burford) contracted to work for a silk dresser (Bird) for five years. After just over a year, Burford left. Bird sued and obtained a judgment against Burford. Bird then sued Randall for 'enticing and seducing' Burford out of his service. After the case against Randall was commenced, but before it went to trial, Burford paid the first judgment. Randall then argued that Bird's action could not be maintained. Lord Mansfield said (at 1353): [T]he plaintiff must recover upon the justice and conscience of his case, and upon that only ... the penalty recovered by him from the servant was actually received by him before the present action came on to be tried; without any sort of difficulty ... [this] is against conscience ... If he had actually recovered it, through the defendant's not knowing "that the penalty had been paid," an action would lie against him, for money had and received: like the case out of the court of conscience, not long since determined in this court [Moses v Macferlan]. The double recovery rule in the modern United States In the scenario posed in the question, any attempt at double recovery is likely to be rejected without the need for detailed legal argument. Such a straightforward case would probably be settled without litigation, on terms providing for the debt to be apportioned between the joint debtors. But assuming that this doesn't happen, in a federal case, rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would apply: On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons ... the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged[.] Different rules and procedures apply in the various State jurisdictions, but the underlying principles are generally similar. The theoretical and historical basis of the rule against double recovery, as an aspect of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment, continues to attract a great deal of academic and judicial attention in Commonwealth countries, although it seems to be of less interest to American lawyers: Saiman, 'Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party' (2008) 28(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 99–126. | The expected value formula involves multiplying the estimated dollar amount of each possible outcome by the estimated probability of that outcome adding up the result for every possibility. The results for each outcome have to include the ability to pay if you win and the cost of collecting if you win and the time value of money if not settling delays getting you paid. This formula is routinely used in litigation to evaluate settlements, but it is only a starting point, it isn't the only factor that should be considered. You need to consider the margin of error in the estimates. A big margin of error in the best or worst case scenario, or in a small probability, can make a huge difference. You also need to recognize that it is well known that the best lawyers who ultimately get the best results, routinely overestimate the strength of their own cases, and that clients usually overestimate the strength of their own cases as well. This is a well known cognitive bias and you need to correct for it. You need to include reaching a settlement later on, but before trial, in your list of possibilities. Often, even if it make sense to settle, making an offer at just the right moment instead of a less opportune time can make a big difference. Similarly, you have to consider the case from the other side's point of view to get a realistic sense of what the other side might be willing to pay. If it seems very likely that they would be willing to pay more, you might not want to accept an offer even if the amount offered would be good enough to be an acceptable result for you. You need to consider the future litigation costs that are avoided by settling, both in terms of dollars paid to lawyers and litigation costs, and in terms of lost time, expense and opportunity costs to you or your firm. You need to consider the economic harm that you may suffer from not having the matter resolved now rather than later. For example, suppose that your firm is about to have a public offering of stock, and if the litigation is not settled, the litigation will have to be disclosed and will have a disproportionate negative effect on the price investors will be willing to pay in the public offering. It may pay to settle a case for "more than its worth" to avoid the economic harm caused by having the litigation still outstanding. You need to consider the economic harm potentially caused by information disclosed in the context of a public trial which would reveal information that there is economic value in keeping secret, or that might encourage others to bring additional lawsuits. You need to consider the long term strategic impact of each possible outcome when considering each possibility and in considering settlement, and not just the impact in the immediate transaction. Once something has been proven in court, that loss in one case can frequently be held to have been judicially established in future cases in many circumstances. For example, if a contract term is determined to have a particular meaning in a lawsuit, and the court interprets it in an unfavorable way, that could influence the economic value of another 200,000 outstanding contracts with the same language where the meaning of this term has not been resolved in litigation, and it could open the door to a class action lawsuit against you on behalf of a class consisting of all 200,000 counter-parties with you on this contract. If it the contract interpretation makes only a $5 difference in each case, the incentive to prevent that from being resolved against you in court could be huge. On the other hand, if a corporation that engaged in many transactions gets a reputation for easily settling weak cases for generous amounts, they will be bombarded with frivolous lawsuits. Expected value really only makes sense with these adjustment and also only for repeat players in cases where the outcome of any particular case will not materially affect the person considering a settlement and there are no long term strategic effects, such as large employers and large companies in consumer cases that try to force other parties to resolve disputes with them on a case by case basis in confidential arbitration hearings that don't create precedents. It is less useful for one time participants in the legal system in a case with life changing consequences, as the benefits and costs of an outcome may be non-economic or may be non-linear (although this can be solved by more accurately valuing the dollar amounts in an expected value formula to consider the total impact of a particular result rather than the naive immediate payment). This non-linear factor is critical in these cases, however, because the personal utility value of an outcome is not strictly a matter of average dollar return. To give a simple and fairly common example, suppose that you have a case where you have a 70% chance of winning and a 30% chance of losing. If you lose you get nothing and pay nothing. If you win, you get $10,000,000. The expected value is $7,000,000. But, if you have someone who has never had real money in their life and will never have an opportunity to get real money in their life ever again, settling for a 100% chance of getting $3,000,000 could very well be better than getting a 70% chance of getting $10,000,000, because to that person the difference between getting $3,000,000 and $10,000,000 may not be very important, but the difference between getting at least $3,000,000 and getting $0 would be huge. One of the reasons that plaintiffs like to use class action lawsuits is that handling one big all or nothing cases causes businesses to stop thinking like expected value repeat player robots, and to start thinking like individuals who participate in litigation one time with high stakes, causing them to accept less optimal settlements for them relative to expected value to avoid the risk of a big disaster. Paying settlements or losing a modest percentage of small cases now and then won't harm anyone's career. Losing a big life or death of the company case after going to trial when a settlement that was a better deal was an option will cost the entire management team their careers and get many of the lawyers at the firm handling the defense of the case fired as well. | If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get. |
Crime records as a minor, does it affect sentencing as an adult? Are crimes as minor, especially felonies, kept in your records? And would they affect your sentencing as an adult? I am not asking about a specific jurisdiction, I just want to have a general idea. | As pointed out in comments, the exact answer depends on the jurisdiction, and on the nature of the crime(s). As a general statement: In many jurisdictions, old criminal records are sealed (=made less available), or even completely deleted after some time. The timespan will depend on many factors, particularly (but not only) on the number and severity of the crimes. Extremely serious crimes may never be sealed/deleted. Sometimes the sealing/deletion may be automatic, sometimes only at the request of the perpetrator, and there may be additional conditions. As an extension of the above, some jurisdictions have special rules for criminal records created while the perpetrator was a minor. Some time spans may be shortened, or minor crimes may be excluded. So, to directly answer the question: Yes, crimes as minor may be kept in your records and influence sentencing as an adult, or they may not - it depends. That is about all you can say in general. | As has already been said, as far as the vehicle registration, the officer likely already knows who the vehicle is registered to and whether it's expired or not before he walks up to your car, or at the least, he can easily find that information out. The proof of insurance is a different matter. The officer will need to see it to know if you have insurance or not. To him, it doesn't matter what the reason is that you don't provide it to him. Left it at home, misplaced it, lost it, destroyed it, or just refuse to provide it because you feel you have the right to refuse. He can't "force" you to provide it (unless he is able to search your car and happens to find it there). He can only issue you a ticket for not providing it. But your attitude could play a part in what happens next. Being upfront and letting the officer know you have left your documents at home could help your situation. In my experience... one time that this sort of thing happened to me, the officer agreed to hold my drivers license and allowed me to bring the documents to the police station and retrieve my license. Another time, in a parking related matter, I was issued a ticket, but I was allowed to bring the required documents to the police station where they then "invalidated" (cancelled) the ticket. Of course this won't always work, and is not at all likely to work if you are far from home. Keep in mind, (as far as I know, in most states) the real infraction is that you "don't have insurance"... that you failed to provide proof when asked, is secondary. In many cases (likely nearly all cases), if you show up in court and provide documents that your insurance is current, and was current at the time the ticket was issued, the judge (or the prosecutor) will likely dismiss the case with no penalties. But, what the officer has written down on the ticket about your attitude and what you told him at the time, may have an effect on how this all plays out. | Are there any legal constraints on the number of times that a defendant can be retried following mistrials due to hung juries? No. A fairly recent case in Louisiana, for example, involved someone who had been tried perhaps half a dozen times resulting in a mix of hung juries and reversals of convictions on appeal. Or is the only practical constraint the willingness of the prosecutor to expend government resources (and perhaps political capital) pursuing a conviction? Yes. This is the only practical limitation. | The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" which suggests that Crime B is still fair game under double jeopardy. However, if B is a lesser included offense under Blockburger, i.e. A is Aggravated Robbery and B is Robbery, then a prosecution could be barred by Double Jeopardy. Barring that, and jurisdiction specific law, the State isn't barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th (and 14th) amendment. That does not foreclose Person C from finding an ethical, equitable, statutory remedy or controlling case enforcing a plea bargain. As far as I can tell, commutation is the equivalent of a conviction while a pardon is equivalent to an acquittal. I also imagine if the prosecution isn't barred and tried C for B, the Executive may just pardon/commute C again. Edit to add: Under Santobello, it would appear C may have an additional remedy enforcing a plea bargain. Santobello didn't involve a case dismissed in a plea bargain, nor commutation or pardon. A court might find that commutation or pardon are essentially a breach of the agreement. | If you are convicted you can be retried (indeed, on appeal, you asked for a retrial). Double jeopardy prevents retrials in cases of acquittals and some mistrials, not convictions. | You are misinformed. In fact, approximately the reverse is true: in a typical jurisdiction in the United States today in excess of 95 percent of criminal cases that begin never reach a verdict. (The exact number varies a little, depending on which exact court system we're talking about.) Or never reach a trial at all, in fact. Or never even come close to making it to the trial date. Now, in some of those instances the charges wind up being dismissed. In some others defendants are diverted outside of the traditional criminal justice system when the circumstances seem better suited to other resolutions (examples: a petty criminal who steals to feed a drug addiction is diverted into a process where he or she will get drug treatment, a non-violent mentally ill person is put into a process where he or she will get mental health treatment); if they complete the diversion program the criminal charges are dropped. But in the vast majority of cases a defendant winds up pleading guilty, in court, to something. Sometimes in exchange for the prosecutor dropping certain other charges. Sometimes in return for the prosecutor downgrading a charge he or she would otherwise pursue in court to a charge for a lesser offense. Sometimes just in return for perhaps getting some credit in the eyes of the judge for "acceptance of responsibility" when sentencing rolls around. But make no mistake: there are few elements more central to the way modern American criminal justice works than plea bargaining. But don't feel too bad: for what it's worth you are certainly not alone in thinking otherwise. In fact, in my personal experience almost everyone outside the legal profession and the court system/s holds at least a few large misconceptions about the way criminal justice in the U.S. actually works. General news media outlets contribute quite a bit to helping those misconceptions form by typically focusing solely on the rare, high-profile, controversial (and thus ratings-grabbing) cases rather than the vast, vast number that end in a whimper instead of a bang. Law drama shows and movies almost invariably bear little relation to reality. (And that's is totally fine, BTW, as long as you realize they bear almost no relation to reality.) Which makes sense: Law & Order: SVU probably wouldn't have stayed on the air year after year if most episodes just consisted of an endless stream of one rote, dull plea hearing after another, each featuring some otherwise-unremarkable sleezeball who's been caught dead-to-rights downloading and re-distributing child pornography. (And, BTW, the misconceptions aren't limited to criminal law & justice, by any means. In fact, in my view other high-profile legal arenas like civil litigation, intellectual property disputes, constitutional law battles, and many others are even more misunderstood. But I digress...) Anyway, to sum up: very frequent plea bargaining = one of the foundations of how modern American criminal justice operates at a practical level. For tons more stats, background info, and analysis corroborating and analyzing that fact, see the links commenters have already posted and/or any of the many, many good items on the topic indexed via our friend Google. | See the answer to this question. It is remotely possible that it will show up, but the new S.C. law also says that an employer cannot use that information. On the other hand, that law is not yet effective (it becomes effective Dec. 27 2018), so for the rest of the year, the information could be used, if an employer obtains is. There is a law-enforcement exception that arrests can always be used against you if you apply for a law-enforcement related job. Under the current law (has been in effect for a while), the record is "under seal", so revealing the record in the course of a background check would be a violation of the relevant court order. The law specifies a punishment for illegal disclosure: A person who intentionally violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both. however, accidental disclosure is not a crime. You might think that you could at least sue them for accidental disclosure, but the law also says Unless there is an act of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, nothing in this section gives rise to a claim for damages against the State, a state employee, a political subdivision of the State, an employee of a political subdivision of the State, a public officer, or other persons. If the government person who releases the information intentionally does so, you can sue. Perhaps an accidental release could be found to be grossly negligent: that would depend on the circumstances. | Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it. |
To whom does copyright of an item belong, if a computer program is used to create it, according to the Deutsches Urheberrecht? Section 69b of the German Copyright Law "Deutsches Urheberrecht" states that: Where a computer program is created by an employee in the execution of his duties or following the instructions of his employer, the employer alone shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the computer program, unless otherwise agreed. However, what happens if the computer program is created by a third party? Do the economics rights, and copyrights, belong to the third party that created the computer program or the entity that uses the program to create, in this case, a musical composition? | You are confusing economic rights in a computer program with economic rights in a work created using the program. The latter belong to the user of the program, though the rights in works made for hire typically belong to the employer rather than the employee. Suppose for the sake of argument that J. K. Rowling used Microsoft Word to draft her Harry Potter series of books. Would Microsoft have any economic rights in those books? No, it would not. Similarly: what happens if the computer program is created by a third party? Do the economics rights, and copyrights, belong to the third party that created the computer program or the entity that uses the program to create, in this case, a musical composition? If I understand correctly, there is a computer program here that was created by a third party ("T"), used by someone ("S") to create a musical composition in tbe course of employment with some employer ("E"). In this case, the economic rights in the program belong to T, and the economic rights in the composition belong to E. | All computer programs are not just copyrightable, they are protected by copyright as soon as they are put into fixed form (for example, as soon as I type it on my computer which will save it as a file on a disk). The copyright owner doesn't have to take any actions whatsoever to have a computer program protected by copyright. It’s not just computer programs, even many fonts are copyrighted because they are essentially computer programs. BTW. What I just wrote is also protected by copyright. There are some licenses involved that I agreed to when I submitted it to this website, and which allow the website to publish and you to read this text, but I'm the copyright holder. PS. There is a comment saying “computer programs are not literary works and therefore not copyrightable”. That may have been true or arguable in the 1980’s. It’s not true now. PS. No, stack exchange doesn’t own the copyright to my post, I do. Unless I was an employee of the company and posted on their behalf. Stack exchange needs and has a license to publish this post. | Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters. | The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)? | The relevant concept is dedicating a work to the public domain, that is, saying in the work something like "This work is dedicated to the public domain". I understand that this isn't entirely reliable in European civil law. The preferred alternative is to license it to the public. However, you have to decide how "free" you want the work to be made. The normal state of affairs, where you do nothing and just rely on copyright law, is that you have the sole right to allow copies to be made and derivative works to be created. Thus if someone were to make a derivative work based on your composition, they would need your permission: but then they would have the right what they created (such as a translation). If you just abandon your property right to the work, you impose no obligation on others, and a person can freely create a translation (which is now their property). If you execute the right public license, you can allow people to use your work as long as they include that license in their versions. A fairly common public licensing scheme is the Creative Commons licenses. That article gives a decent summary of relevant rights and how particular licenses correspond to configurations of permissions. I would say that the most difficult thing to do is to figure out what you don't want to happen, and pick a license that matches that interest. | It is mildly hard to say. First, one has to determine if he was an employee hired to do something like invent the WWW. He "spent time" at CERN, but was an independent contractor in his first period (1980), then took up a fellowship in 1984. "Fellowship" is generally not an "employment" relationship in the relevant sense, and academics are rarely "employees" in the common law work-for-hire sense. It is reported that he "began creating the software and standards for the web on his own as an informal project within CERN". So if anyone holds IP rights (to what?), it would be him. Given where CERN is, it is not self-evident whose copyright law would be applicable. He reports that he wrote the code in CERN Building 31, which appears to be in France, though CERN appears to be in Switzerland (CERN is, in fact, in France and Switzerland). Article 17 of Swiss copyright law says Where a computer program has been created under an employment contract in the course of discharging professional duties or fulfilling contractual obligations, the employer alone shall be entitled to exercise the exclusive rights of use. and otherwise, "work for hire" is not an applicable concept under Swiss law. France, which has the same basic droit d'auteur concept, also have the software exception in Intellectual Property Code Article L113-9: Unless otherwise provided by statutory provision or stipulation, the economic rights in the software and its documentation created by one or more employees in the execution of their duties or following the instructions given by their employer shall be the property of the employer and he exclusively shall be entitled to exercise them. In either venue there is a very narrow path for CERN to hold the copyright to the original software, one that is not likely to match the facts of Berners-Lee's relationship with CERN. It is also true that CERN created a version of web software (the usable version), which was released into the public domain Apr. 30 1993 (p1, p2). It is likewise known that he approved of, and propagated the release of the IP that we associate with the WWW into the public domain. The idea underlying the web is not subject to copyright protection (the text of the proposal would be), but the original code that he wrote would be. It is unknown what relationship exists between that original code any current code, but it highly unlikely that any current code copies original code. Further speculation about the relationship between the original code and anything that exists now would have to be addressed in a History of Computing SE (if there were such a thing). As for patents, since he did not patent the method, it is ipso facto unprotected and out in the open. From the legal POV, the world wide web is not a single thing, so it is meaningless to ask who has dominion over it. | Your understanding of the GPL is a bit off. GPLed code doesn't generally force you to GPL the output of the program, but that's just because the output of the program is normally not a derivative work of the program. For instance, if you write a novel in Emacs, your novel is an entirely original work. The fact that you used Emacs as a tool doesn't mean that your novel is somehow based on Emacs. This generator is different. It generates sprites by putting together art assets made by the program's creator. That means that the output contains a substantial amount of content made by the program creator, which means that it would likely be covered by the program creator's copyright. If the content was licensed to you under the GPL, you normally have to abide by GPL restrictions when you redistribute the content or incorporate it into your own program. Copyright holders can, if they want, grant additional permissions to their content and allow you to incorporate that content into nonfree software. For instance, the GCC compilers have an additional permission for their runtime libraries to let you use them in any GCC-compiled code; without that permission, GCC could only be used to compile GPL-compatible code. But unless the copyright holder has granted those permissions, when program output contains large amounts of their copyrighted content you're bound by the GPL when using it. In this case, the program specifically says that the art is dual-licensed under GPLv3 and CC-BY-SA-3.0. Since the generator's output is a combination of premade art assets (the buttons just let you tell the program which art assets to combine), the output is a derivative work of those assets. You can't use it unless your use is compatible with the GPL v3 or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (either works, since dual licensing lets you pick either license). | I think that both your examples would be considered, if not outright copies, then at the very least derivative works of the originals. Under US law, the copyright holder of a work has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. So anyone who prepares such a work without the authorization of the copyright holder is infringing their copyright and will be liable for such infringment. The US Copyright Office, in their Circular 14, explicitly includes "a new version of an existing computer program" as an example of a derivative work. That would certainly seem to cover the GTA folks. The concept that derivative works generally include "translations" might capture them, too. Your example of transcribing a musical performance isn't explicitly mentioned, but I think your sheet music would likewise be a derivative work of the performance: it includes all the editorial and arrangement choices made by the orchestra. Of course, both the performance and your transcription are derivative works of the original composition, but since the composition is out of copyright, there's no legal problem with that aspect. |
Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partner's children? Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? I am wondering if in the U.S. you can have a court order invalidated after doing a genetic testing to see if you're the biological father, and I am wondering if there's a period after which a court order cannot be invalidated, because I know some people are forced by the law to support children even if they're not genetically related. | Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly "no", as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law. | Usually and ideally, a GAL would take an active role in parenting questions, while taking a secondary role in property division and maintenance with the primary concern being that the economic arrangements are sustainable and don't subject the child to hardship when with the other parent (e.g. many divorcing parents fail to realize that maintaining two households will result in more child related expenses than one). I will assume that you are asking from the perspective of a party to the divorce and not from the perspective of a mediator, although the phrasing is not entirely clear. Some basics: Have a good command of the facts about your finances, your ex's finances, and the children's schedules and needs (assuming that there are children). For example, it would be good to have school calendars as far forward as they are available, to know the children's medical providers, and to have a firm command of their extracurricular activities, their friends and the requirements of any childcare providers. Often child support worksheets will be mandatory for a settlement to be approved, so get those worksheets and fill in the facts you know already. Bring a calculator so you can consider new assumptions and evaluate financial proposals accurately. If you think you have received inaccurate disclosures, be prepared to explain in detail what you think is inaccurate and why you think that this is the case. If domestic violence has been an issue, there are restraining orders that are or have been in place, there are abuse or neglect allegations present (including emotional abuse of a spouse or children), or the co-parents have had trouble coordinating and reaching decisions without outside assistance, be prepared to explain these situations in factual detail so you can avoid summarizing the situation in a vague way. Bring anything you might need to refresh your recollection about relevant facts with you to mediation. If you haven't received full disclosure of your spouse's finances, insist on receiving that, ideally before going to mediation and absolutely before reaching a deal. Spend time considering possible resolutions of property, maintenance and parenting matters in advance. Very early on in mediation each of you will be asked what you want and mediation shouldn't be the first time that you have thoughtfully considered the question. Spend time thinking about what you need on a non-negotiable basis to survive - to be able to meet basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. for you and your children, and also about what your ex needs and how your ex can achieve it. Proposing ways to achieve objectives that your ex hasn't considered that are viable is a good way to get a resolution. Ideally, attend a parenting class (mandatory in many jurisdictions before getting a divorce that involves children) before attending mediation. Keep in mind that children are not prizes or bargaining chips and that you need to consider their needs as well as your own. Your kids love both of you even though you can no longer manage to live with each other. Do not utilize the children as sounding boards for mediation stances and do not try to use them as decision makers or conduits for communication between the co-parents. Recognize that in most states, marital fault is irrelevant, and that starting a new relationship is natural and routine, even if it makes your skin crawl that your ex is starting a new relationship. Take an attitude of focusing on what the deal does for you rather than what the deal does for your ex. This is about you getting what you need, not about making your ex worse off. Be prepared to walk away from mediation without a deal if necessary, because your ex won't accept a reasonable deal. Maybe half of mediations end without a settlement. Recognize that it may be possible to reach partial resolution (e.g. splitting up tangible personal property; figuring out how holidays will be handled with the children; agreeing on schools that children will attend; figuring out who, if anyone, will continue to live in a marital residence; stipulating to the value of particular assets; stipulating regarding each party's income; stipulating regarding what is and isn't separate property where you can agree; agreements to disclose information), without resolving all issues. Partial resolutions reduce uncertainty and make it easier to prepare for and conduct a permanent orders hearing on the remaining issues. Even if you can't afford to hire a lawyer to represent you in the entire case, pay for an hour or two of a lawyer's time to evaluate what kind of property division, maintenance award and parenting arrangements are within the range of the possible and likely if you go forward to a permanent orders hearing. Be prepared to put the terms of anything that is agreed to at mediation in writing. Mediators will usually tell you if they need forms signed, payments made, or a "mediation statement" in advance. Do everything required on time. A "mediation statement" is a summary of the key facts and your position on a fair resolution and could be a couple to a dozen pages depending upon the complexity of the case. Be clear in a mediation statement about what is O.K. to share with the other side and what is for the mediator's information only. When a mediator asks for a mediation statement the main reason for doing so is to save time that the mediator is charging you per hour for 50-50. A mediation statement can make getting the mediator up to speed on the facts more efficient and less likely to omit important facts and the mediator needs to learn the key facts to be effective. | Can a divorced man win a downward modification of alimony and/or child support if he were tricked into a marriage by a child that wasn't his? The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. Will the man likely be able to get reduced child support and/or alimony on the claim that he was tricked into a marriage he would not otherwise have undertaken? Generally speaking, marriages induced by fraud about anything other than the extreme case of fraud involving who someone is marrying in the act of marriage itself (i.e. someone believed they were marrying John Smith from Denver but actually was married to John Smith from Los Angeles, whom they had never met before, because the marriage ceremony was conducted with disguises and they didn't look closely at the marriage certificate), has no impact on marital rights. Evidence regarding fraud to induce a marriage wouldn't even be admissible at trial because it wouldn't be legally relevant. This has no impact on alimony. Paternity can be contested by filing a paternity suit within the statute of limitations for doing so which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (usually within two to five years of the child's birth). If the husband prevails in a timely paternity contest, child support will not be owed. Otherwise, actual genetic paternity would be irrelevant. In California, the statute of limitations to disavow paternity of a child born to one's wife is two years from the date of birth. N.B. I am making some interpretations of inexact language in the question. It says: The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. But I assume that what is really meant is that one or both of the members of the couple file for divorce and that in the course of the divorce proceeding the wife seeks alimony and child support. If the divorce proceeding is concluded without an adjudication of paternity that would usually preclude a later lawsuit to disavow paternity. | The following answers are based upon general U.S. law, I have not personally confirmed that they apply in Illinois in particular under its adoption law, or each of its welfare benefits programs, or its wrongful death statute. There is no affirmative duty of a mother to inform a father or potential father of the existence of his child, at least outside (1) the context of relinquishment of parental rights in anticipation of an adoption (where there may be a statutory notice requirement in some cases), (2) applications for certain kinds of welfare benefits (where identification of a father is required for some programs), and (3) possibly in the context of a lawsuit for the wrongful death of a child in which both parents are frequently vested with authority to bring the suit. Identification of a father on a birth certificate is not mandatory (and not infrequently omitted). In an adoption case, due process often requires some effort "reasonably calculated to give notice" to the father of the proceeding relinquishing parental rights, although failure to do so is generally not a jurisdictional defect that renders the adoption void ab initio. There is also generally a requirement to affirmatively state in adoption proceeding if the father is, or might be, a member of a Native American tribe, as that goes to the jurisdictional issue of the applicability of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires notice, at a minimum, to the father's Indian tribe, even if notice cannot be given to the father. There is a presumption that a child born to a woman married to a husband is the child of the husband and after a certain number of years, for certain purposes (such as child support). This presumption is usually conclusive and cannot be rebutted even by DNA evidence to the contrary, on the theory that the husband is the psychological parent of the child and has assumed that responsibility, and in order to discourage after the fact denials of paternity simply to avoid child support when paternity was never disputed. There is also a presumption that a birth certificate's statement of paternity is correct, although this is in often not a conclusive presumption. And, birth certificates are a matter of public record, so a man can search the vital statistics records of a state to see if anyone has identified him as a father even if he has not been told of that fact, arguably giving him constructive knowledge of his paternity in that case. But, the identity of the person who is the child's father, or of persons who could be the child's father, is not privileged (other than under the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination where applicable), and so, a woman can generally be legally compelled to disclose this information by subpoena or in response to discovery in litigation. For example, a woman under the age of consent at the time her child was conceived can be incarcerated for contempt of court for failing to disclose the name of the father in connection with a criminal prosecution of a suspected father of the child for statutory rape. | Yes ... ... apart from the impracticality of it. Basically, the bureaucratic process of marriage and divorce doesn't fit within a 24-hour cycle. For example, in australia it is a requirement to notify the state one month before you intend to marry and divorce is a legal process that takes as long as it takes - typically years. But, assuming those obstacles did not exist, your scheme would not fall foul of the law. In general, you can remarry a person you previously divorced. kentucky [apparently]1 says enough is enough after the third time. Unless adultery is illegal (as it is in much of the Muslim world) there is no law against polyamory so long as no one person in the relationship is married to more than one other person. Your headline of "Concurrent Polygamy" is wrong - what you describe is "Consecutive Monogamy". | Off the top of my head, unless there's a provision that says otherwise, no, they cannot do that. Obviously, I can't tell you if there's a provision that says otherwise. Consult a lawyer for more specific advice. | Breathalyzer tests are distinct from blood tests because the former does not "implicat[e] significant privacy concerns" (see Birchfeld v. ND). A cell phone is like a blood test, because it implicates significant privacy concerns, especially the level of electro-snooping that would be required to determine if someone had recently committed a phone-use offense. As the court held, Because the impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. A breath test might (but also might not) also satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception (waiting some number of hours for a warrant can easily result in the destruction of evidence), but a cell phone case could not give rise to such an exception. It should perhaps be noted that the "implied consent" laws are misnamed, because consent is not the issue. The 4th Amendment ban is on unreasonable searches, not unconsented searches. If you actually consent, it is reasonable for the police to search. I am not aware of any ruling to the effect that "because the defendant consented, the search is valid". In the context of breathalyzer law and case-law, an essential component of what makes the search reasonable is that it is incident to an arrest. With or without consent, or an implied consent law, Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Extending "implied consent" to cause-unrelated searches of cars, homes, or body cavities might not pass strict scrutiny. The state has a legitimate interest in public safety which justifies some minimal intrusion, but adding a provision that "when you drive, you give implied consent to searches of everything" is not narrowly tailored. But since driving is a privilege and not a right, the state has much more leeway to give you an ultimatum: if you don't cooperate with the search, you can lose your license. On the other hand, SCOTUS has not actually approved of this slogan about driving being a privilege. Something noteworthy from Birchfield is that the court also disapproves of blood tests because a less invasive method of achieving the result is available, and they grant that "Imposition of a warrant requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, given the enormous number of drunk-driving arrests, with little corresponding benefit". There being no less-invasive alternative means of realizing the legitimate state interest in stopping distracted driving, I actually expect that when this comes to pass and the matter ends up at SCOTUS, there will be another important change in search law (but "implied consent" will still be irrelevant). | If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will."). |
Liability for damages in the U.S. for finding and disclosing "0-day" computer exploit In the IT/Programming security world, usually people contact the vendor/owner of a particular software if they find a bug or security vulnerability and give them time to patch it before releasing the bug or vulnerability for public scrutiny/awareness. This is usually as a courtesy though unless you're bound by contract. But as asked in If I Find or Create a 0day: What if I find a vulnerability in a widely used piece of software? Can I be held liable for damages if I release "Proof of Concept" code to the public without giving the vendor time to properly patch and update its vulnerable code? UPDATE: After having a discussion about this question with some peers, I realized I need to be a bit more specific with the question: Security researchers usually work with the vendor to try and patch (fix) the error/vulnerability. If after sufficient (30 days?) time has passed and the vendor has not fixed the code then a full disclosure is released publicly. Can I be held liable for damages caused after the release of a "Proof of Concept" code if the software/vendor is open source? What if the vendor/software is closed source? | Can you be liable for damages? Under Tort Law, yes. Let's assume someone developed a virus based on your code. The virus caused millions of dollars of damage. The plaintiff (software vendor) can argue that: You have a Duty of Care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee are likely to injure your neighbor Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) (UK) The concept of Duty of Care is also found in U.S. law, for example in MacPerson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), which established that negligence does not require a contract. Breach of Duty: A reasonable person can foresee that the "proof of concept" can cause harm. The act of releasing code, therefore, falls short of the expected standard. If you are a IT professional, it is going to be difficult to defend this point. There is a causation relationship between your code release and the resulted damage. You are liable for negligence. Damage: It is likely that users will sue the software vendor for their loses. The software vendor will then sue you, since because of you, the software vendor has to compensate to its customers. This, of course, depends on what exactly did you release to the public. For example, if significant effort is needed to convert your "proof of concept" to an actual exploit, and you have provided a workaround to avoid this vulnerability, you may defend yourself by arguing that the cause and effect linkage is too remote. So I must keep the report private? What if the software is open source? Not really. You should take reasonable measure to ensure that your "proof of concept" is not an actual exploit, and a hacker needs considerable time to develop a functioning malicious software. CVE is a platform where vulnerabilities are publicly shared. What if you have given the vendor reasonable time to fix the vulnerability? It does not matter (to you) if time has been given for the vendor to fix the vulnerability. It does matter for the vendor, because if something happens later, the vendor is liable for knowing the problem well in advance and have not allocated the appropriate resources to correct the problem. To demonstrate a vulnerability exist does not require instruction of how to utilize this vulnerability. For example you can record a video showing the effects of the hack. Here (Wayback Machine; original link is dead) is an interesting read about Motorola taking matters into their own hands after they discovered a vulnerability on the Xerox CP-V system and Xerox did not patch the problem. | could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)". | There are two common approaches. The first approach is simply to let copyright law apply. Under the default terms, the IT provider has no rights to copy your software. Running software is allowed, of course, and not a problem that you need to deal with vis-a-vis the IT provider. You still can sue them if they copy your software, even in the absence of a contract. That is the chief function of copyright, after all! The second approach is to allow the customer to subcontract third parties to act on behalf of them, while acknowledging that such subcontracting does not dissolve them from any responsibilities towards you. In other words, if the 3rd party would do something unauthorized, you have a claim towards the customer and they have a distinct but related claim towards their IT supplier. | This is part of an indemnification clause. Basically, the idea is that the service provider guarantees that if your business gets harmed because they let in an intruder, then they will absorb the losses if somebody sues you, as long as they have control of the court case and you cooperate with them in defending the court case. So, for example, imagine you are using a web hosting service. Suppose there is a vulnerability in the hosting service computers, and a hacker is therefore able to break into your web site and steal your customer information. Your customer sues you for allowing their credit card to fall into the hands of a hacker. The web hosting service's insurance will pay the damages if the lawsuit succeeds, as long as you let their lawyers (ie the insurance company's lawyers) run the defense of the lawsuit and you cooperate with them. The reason this language is there is because the "service provider" has an insurer that is guaranteeing them if they get hacked or something, then the insurer will cover any damages. The insurer requires them to make all their clients (like you) sign an indemnification agreement which includes the control clause. | Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline. | NDA provisions in general are rather similar. In particular the ones covering the exceptions to the confidentiality obligations required to the receiving party. Such provisions normally have the following wording (more or less): Information shall not be treated as Confidential if: - at the time of disclosure is already in the public domain or becomes available to the public w/o breach by receiving party; - the receiving party receives it from a third party free to lawfully disclose such information; - was in the prior lawfull possession of the receiving party; - was independently developed by the receiving party; - is approved to be released by the disclosing party; or - the receiving party is required by law to disclose in response to a valid order of a court or by a government agency. Your particular case might not necessarily fall under any of this exceptions (i do not know the exact wording of the NDA you're referring to) but in any case, please note that simply telling a third party that you are discussing the development of "an app similar to x but with a better UX and simpler design", might already be considered as a breach of confidentiality. Surely the NDA is identified as being Confidential itself and it probably also contains a section saying something like: "This Agreement and its contents shall be treated as Confidential Information". | What would be the legal validity of this behaviour? Your changes to the browser source of the website contract or license of Terms of Service (TOS) - essentially a "click-wrap" license - before agreeing to it means nothing in a legal sense, other than to void the contract. The other party (the website) can't possibly agree to those contract changes without them being submitted as contractual changes and agreeing to them, if they did agree to them. That's basic contract law. That website TOS probably has a clause that says that if you don't agree to the TOS in full, as written, without modifications, you can't use the website. And the TOS may also say that they reserve the right to prevent you from using the site by closing your account or even blocking your access. Your "witness" to the contract changes is meaningless, as your witness is not a party to the contract. And any witness to the fact that you have changed the terms of the TOS before agreeing to it would work against you in a civil proceeding as proof of your attempt at modifying the contract. | The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once. |
"attempted murder" of a dead man? This question inspired by an episode of a certain popular TV detective show. Mr Smith hates Mr Jones, and plots to kill him. Smith enters Jones' house, and shoots him in bed, while also setting up an alibi for himself. The clever detective quickly breaks the alibi. Then he receives the autopsy. Jones was already dead, having been poisoned by a third party. Detective has to release Smith, saying "You can't murder a dead man." When I saw that I thought: but surely he's guilty of attempted murder, at least. And then I thought again: can you legally be held responsible for attempted murder if the intended victim is already dead? Would the defense of impossibility apply? [source, The Illustrated Guide to Law, a layman's guide to legal principles, written by a lawyer] If it matters, the show was set in LA. Would it make a difference if it was set in, e.g. New York, or London, or Canberra? And by the way: In the episode, it turned out that Smith was also the poisoner. He gave himself a double alibi. But for the purposes of this question, please assume that the poisoner was a third party | Not only is this possible, it has been done. At least in Canada. On July 27th 2013 Sammy Yatim was on board a Toronto Transit bus and began brandishing a knife and threatening passengers. Constable James Forcillo of Toronto Police Service responded, and when Yatim ignored warnings and advanced towards police, Forcillo fired three shots, which felled Yatim, followed by another six shots when he was on the ground. An autopsy revealed that the first volley of three shots had killed Yatim almost instantly. At his trial Forcillo was found not guilty of murder, since the first three shots were deemed justified. But the second volley were deemed not justified. Since Yatim was already dead, Forcillo was not guilty of murder but found guilty of attempted murder. | The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence. | Yes For example, s270AB of the south-australia Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 says: (1) Where— (a) a person attempts to kill another or is a party to an attempt to kill another; and (b) he would, if the attempt had been successfully carried to completion, have been guilty of manslaughter rather than murder, he shall be guilty of attempted manslaughter. Relevantly in SA, voluntary manslaughter occurs when a victim dies as the result of an offence that would otherwise amount to murder, but the defendant’s liability is reduced because of the presence of mitigating circumstances, such as provocation. So, in circumstances of provocation (say) where the accused shoots at the victim but misses, attempted manslaughter is a possible charge. Most likely this would be charged as attempted murder but downgraded where the defence of provocation was made out. | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. | "Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent. | Breaking and entering, just by entering a private premise without permission. Causing bodily harm, possibly grievous harm, depending on what consequences it has for the victim and how the jurisdiction defines grievous harm. A prosecutor might also insinuate that the defendant had a sexual motive, so they might also add some sexual assault charges In addition to criminal charges, the victim could also press civil claims as compensation for the physical injury and the psychological trauma they experienced from a stranger entering their home at night and drinking their blood. A possible defense which the vampire could use is to claim that they are no longer a human, so human laws do not apply to them. But this would be a rather dangerous strategy, because if human laws don't apply to them, then by the same argumentation human rights might not apply to them either. If they insisted on being tried as an animal, then the court could very well reason that the best way to deal with a dangerous animal that can not be controlled and can not be kept away from humans is to euthanize it. | There are numerous what-ifs. Society’s moral values and thus laws may change. Or the unlikely death of your wife makes this question moot. (Let’s hope not.) Yes, failure to render assistance is punishable under § 323c Ⅰ StGB. Everyone can commit this crime (Allgemeindelikt). However, this section concerns accidents, contingencies or other unplanned adverse events. In your specific case there is no element of “surprise” though, quite the contrary. Your wife does not even need to be aware of the circumstances; the assessment “is there an accident” is made objectively. Having said that, unfortunately there’s a difference of opinion how courts judge (case law) and how “legal scientists” (at law school) think. Ultimately it depends on what evidence investigators find. Frankly, § 323c Ⅰ StGB is a “minor issue” here. You can get at most “just” a one-year-sentence. And there’s the option to consider one’s own spouse’s death as poena naturalis, thus refrain from imposing any penalty because the grieving widow “won’t learn anything” from that, § 60 1 StGB←§ 153b StPO. I’d worry more about §§ 211 ff. (murder, manslaughter, etc.): To kill someone means, a) any short‑term shortening of lifetime through action, or b) in the case of § 13 StGB, any failure to potentially prolong the lifetime. § 13 StGB, Garantenstellung, also applies to spouses, cf. § 1353 Ⅰ 2 BGB. It could be argued that failure to take, say, a loaded firearm away from you constitutes manslaughter. Or, worse, maybe you’re particularly wealthy and she’ll inherit your assets. This could be construed as greed, an aggravating circumstance. At any rate it’s necessary that the omitted action makes a difference, i. e. prevents or at least inhibits the crime’s success (your death). At some point, with terminally-ill patients, you might say “he’ll die tomorrow anyway”. Then your wife could attend your suicide. Finally, for a legally airtight plan I’d seriously consider to change the jurisdiction though, e. g. by going to Switzerland. Everything happening here is subject to German criminal law, § 3 StGB. PS: Marriage can be viewed as a kind of contract. In principle you are completely free in formulating its terms. However, you cannot make provisions concerning termination of life (nichtdisponibles Rechtsgut). | There are many cases where it is quite obvious that A has illegally killed B, but where it is much less obvious whether this was first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter. The usual approach is to charge A with all three, and then convict for the highest that the jury agrees with (for example, the jury might agree that it was at least second degree murder, but not agree that it was first degree murder beyond reasonable ground). A prosecutor who wants a first degree murder conviction might charge with first degree murder only, hoping that the jury will agree with the charge rather than letting a proven killer go free. This may fatally backfire. If a proven killer is only charged with first degree murder, and there is insufficient evidence for first degree murder, then yes, with a responsible jury that killer will go free. If the only charge requires proof of premeditation, and there is no proof, then that charge will not succeed. |
Can a marriage be dissolved between Alice and Bob under California law? Alice is a national of Afghanistan, Bob is of Afghanistan and the U.S.. Bob gained U.S. citizenship as a result of having been in the employ of the U.S. military as a translator and subsequently having been provided refugee status and lived in the U.S. for sufficient time. Bob has a well-founded fear to enter Afghanistan; Bob may be killed. Alice lives in Afghanistan, Bob in California, and they get married. The marriage is arranged remotely due to COVID and/or for Bob’s fear for his life, and they are made husband and wife under Afghanistan law. Alice moves to California and eventually becomes a citizen of the U.S. herself. Alice and Bob become father and mother of children each becoming a dual citizen. May a court of the State of California or the U.S. dissolve the marriage if either one of them files for divorce at? May the one keeping the children after divorce seek child support at a California or U.S. court? Can a court of Afghanistan adjudicate either matters under California and not Afghanistan’s law? Edit: Some questions and comments required clarity for this hypo; added more substance. | If both parties are legal, permanent residents of California, their marriage is recognized under Californian law no matter where it originated (provided that the marriage doesn’t violate Californian law, e.g. if Alice were a minor). Alice and Bob would file for divorce in California and the matter would be adjudicated under a Californian court and under Californian law. After these proceedings, Alice and Bob would still be married in Afghanistan (and maybe other foreign countries? That’s a tricky question, so if someone else can figure it out please leave a comment!) but the US would cease to recognize the marriage. In no case would either a Californian or Afghan court make a ruling under the other’s laws. As far as child custody, property, etc. the divorce would essentially proceed as a normal divorce case, although things could become complicated if Alice and Bob own property in Afghanistan, which would usually still be able to be appropriated by a Californian court but, once again, the matter is complex since Afghanistan still recognizes the marriage. As you can tell, a divorce of this nature is not as complicated as one might think, but nevertheless could create some complicated legal situations. Also, marriage is regulated state-by-state, so other states may have different rules regarding foreign marriages. As always, the best path of action is to consult an attorney who specializes in divorce. Edit: A commenter brought up the issue of whether California would recognize a marriage where both parties weren’t present. While this varies by state, California generally doesn’t allow so-called “proxy marriage” unless one of the parties is deployed in the military. | A and B have been in a common law marriage for many years. A and C then apply for and receive a marriage license. When A and C marry, what is the legal status of each marriage? I assume in answering all of these questions that C did not know that A was in a valid common law marriage to B at the time of C's marriage to A, although the answers below may implicitly shed some light on how the questions would be resolved if C was aware of this fact. The Marriage Of A and C Is Invalid, The Marriage Of A and B Is In Force The only way to end a common law marriage that is valid in the recognizing state (i.e. either the same one where it is entered into or another way as the case may be; see below for when a common law marriage or foreign marriage must be recognized as valid) apart from a Utah common law marriage, is by the same death or divorce that would terminate a valid marriage entered into with a marriage license. A valid marriage is not established between A and C. No marriage is established between A and C, even if A and C are married in a state that does not recognize common law marriage, and even if both A and C were not aware that a common law marriage was formed between A and B because A and C did not know that the state where A and B were living at the time that the common law marriage was formed recognized common law marriage. This rule is subject to an important burden of proof rule. If there is a facially valid marriage certificate in evidence, the burden of proof is on the person seeking to show that this marriage is void to show that any prior marriage did not terminate by death or divorce prior to the new marriage certificate being issued. This rule flows from the fact that there is no comprehensive index of divorces entered in the United States and the fact that a valid divorce can be entered by consent of the parties in a jurisdiction other than the place where the parties were domiciled at the time of the purported divorce. In practice, this can be used to circumvent the general rule even when the general rule actually applies, especially when a putative marriage existed for many years and the common law marriage was long ago and the couple was separated shortly after it formed (often with the former common law spouse or both spouses being dead at the time of the litigation). But, this is only a burden of proof rule and can be overcome with affirmative proof of a lack of divorce (e.g. by the testimony of A and/or B in this question). The question of when a foreign divorce is recognized by a U.S. state as valid is a complicated one and beyond the scope of this question. It is particularly complicated in countries with non-Western legal systems such as Islamic law, in which some divorces are effected non-judicially. Where Are Common Law Marriages Valid Most states recognized common law marriage at some point in their history, or prior to becoming states when they were territories or parts of other countries. The states that currently recognize common law marriage or recently did so, if the marriage was formed in the first place in that state are as follows: Alabama (if created before January 1, 2017) Colorado (subject to restrictions for minors but allowing same sex marriages even if common law marriage between them was not legally recognized at the time of the common law marriage) District of Columbia Georgia (if created before January 1, 1997) Idaho (if created before January 1, 1996) Iowa Kansas Montana New Hampshire recognizes domestic common law marriage for purposes of probate only (there is a three year cohabitation requirement) although it recognizes valid common law marriages entered into outside the state. Ohio (if created before October 10, 1991) Oklahoma Pennsylvania (if created before January 1, 2005) Rhode Island South Carolina Texas Utah recognizes only common law marriages that have been validated in a judicial proceeding. A common law marriage may be validated by a court of law up to one year after the alleged marriage has been terminated (effectively allowing for "common law divorce" in Utah only). Prior to statehood, Utah allowed polygamous marriage (at least de facto) and this issue greatly delayed its admission as a U.S. state, but it does not now recognize such marriages as valid and all people who entered into those marriages are now dead. The exact test for a common law marriage formation varies by state. The most common test for formation of a common law marriage is an understanding of the couple between each other that they are married, the couple holding themselves out to the public that they are married (especially in joint tax returns and in health insurance applications), and in some states, either cohabitation or consummation of the marriage. There is a body of law governing what connect a couple must have to a state in order for their relationship to be subject to that state's common law marriage rules. If the couple has a shared domicile in the state that is generally sufficient, but this is not always the bare minimum level of connection necessary to establish that a state's common law marriage laws will apply to a couple that is physically present in that state. For example, it is customary in many U.S. subcultures, for example, to hold a wedding in the state of the bride's parents' domicile even if neither the bride nor the groom are domiciled in that state. But, a ceremonial wedding held in a state that recognizes common law marriage without the benefit of a marriage license would almost always be valid in all U.S. states (if otherwise valid), even if neither member of the couple resided there. I am not aware of any U.S. state except New Hampshire where mere cohabitation and/or coparenting for a certain number of years establishes a common law marriage, even though law enforcement and journalists often describe couples in those circumstances as being common law married couples. Functionally, common law marriage usually comes up in one of two fact patterns. First, it validates ceremonial marriages conducted with most formalities of a fully valid legal marriage license marriage with a formal wedding that have some technical defect in formalities; these are easy cases. Second, it establishes marital rights between cohabiting couples (often with shared children) who live together and act more or less like marriage couples who never have a decisive moment that is a wedding or marriage ceremony but end up considering themselves to be a married couple and deal with the administrative state and in their social lives accordingly. In both cases, common law marriage is usually a doctrine invoked generally avoid harsh consequences for wives who have sacrificed economically in reliance on a domestic couple relationship who lack meaningful legal rights do to a lack of marriage formalities. N.B. Australia has a concept called de facto relationships that provide certain legal rights after more than two years of cohabitation for a limited period of time after the relationship ceases to exist in fact. These are not common law marriages in the senes of American law. When Must A State Recognize A Marriage Valid Where Entered Into At The Time Entered Into There is really only one exception to the rule that a common law marriage (or any other form of marriage) which was valid where entered into (even outside the United States) at the time it was entered into (even if that state no longer recognizes common law marriage) is valid in every state. The exception is that a state does not have to recognize marriages which are barred by public policy in the state where the second marriage takes place (for reasons other than a lack of a marriage license), but not in the original state. Basically, the marriages which a state does not have to recognize are: (1) marriages valid where entered into that were polygamous when entered into (generally outside the U.S.), (2) marriages where a spouse was a minor too young to marry at the time of the marriage by the recognizing state's standards if the common law marriage was not reaffirmed by conduct after both spouses were of age (Colorado recognizes common law marriages only when both spouses were at least eighteen years old at the time of the marriage or at some time afterwards in the continued common law marriage, and the validity of this unique limitation has not been legally tested), (3) a marriage entered into without the voluntary consent of both spouses that was valid where entered into (generally outside the U.S.), or (4) a marriage where the spouses were too closely related (although many states will recognize first cousin marriage that was valid where entered into even when first cousin marriage is not recognized in that state). This public policy exception also previously applied to (5) same sex marriages valid where entered into but not in the recognizing state, and (6) to interracial marriages valid where entered into but void in the recognizing state. But, these two public policy reasons to deny recognition of a marriage entered into elsewhere have now been held to be unconstitutional in the United States. Paternity Implications The father of a child born while A and B were married, prior to the purported marriage of A and C would be presumed to be the father among A and B, even if this paternity was not noted on the birth certificate of the child because vital statistics bureau officials were not alerted to the existence of the common law marriage. But, the rule in a majority of jurisdictions is that contrary to the general rule, the presumption that the father of a child born while A and C were purportedly married and at least one of them believed themselves to be married, was the person among A and C who did not give birth to the child, without other proof of paternity, would remain effective even after C learns that A and C are not married. Thus, a child of A and C would be legitimate, even though the marriage between A and C was void. Tenancy By Entirety Implications States with tenancy by the entirety are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. In those states, title to a residency owned by a husband and wife that would otherwise be a joint tenancy with right of survivorship would instead be a tenancy by entirety. A tenancy by entirety property is only subject to being used to satisfy judgments against both a husband and wife, rather than only against one of them individually and functions a bit like an unlimited homestead exemption as to money judgments against one spouse only. Any property purported held in tenancy by entirety between A and C would actually be held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship by operation of law and the claims of a creditor against A or C but not both of them could be enforced against that residence in the one half interest of the person against whom the creditor had a claim. Criminal Law Implications A would guilty of the crimes of bigamy in most states (or under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if A is in the U.S. armed services which might also prosecute A for adultery), although a minority of them might recognize an intent requirement that would absolve A of criminal liability if A didn't realize that A and B were living in a common law marriage state. A may or may not be guilty of the crime of perjury in connection with the marriage application depending upon whether A was aware that A and B were in a common law marriage. Restitution might be awarded in a criminal proceeding resulting in A's conviction, in favor of B or C but probably limited to the legal fees incurred to establish the invalidity of the marriage to C. The odds of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal case under these facts if B complained are probably about 50-50, given that the facts are quite blatant. Often both B and C would ask the prosecutor not to bring charges because both of them have an economic interest in A being able to make money while not in prison so their economic rights can be respected, and often, but not always, a prosecutor would respect those requests. Of course, depending upon the state where the marriage license was issued and the time that the common law marriage of A and B was discovered by a complaining witness to the police or prosecutor's office, the statute of limitations for one or more of these criminal offenses may have run by the time the prosecutor is considering bringing criminal charges. Statutes of limitation for state criminal charges vary greatly from state to state. Rights Of B Against A As A Spouse B has the full rights of a spouse to support during the marriage, and, if either A or B seeks a divorce, to a property division and alimony and if there are joint children to child support and parental rights, with respect to A. While every state has no fault divorce, in some states, fault is considered in property division and alimony and spousal support other than support for children during marriage, and this would work to the disadvantage of A. Rights Of C In States Without A Putative Spouse Doctrine Against A In states without a putative spouse doctrine, C has only the rights of an unmarried person with respect to A (e.g. rights arising from co-ownership and rights to child support and parental rights with respect to their joint children). This said, it is conceivable in these circumstances that C might have a right to recover prejudice in C's economic position as a result of a purported marriage to A under a restitution doctrine, or under a common law fraud theory. Rights Of B In States With An Alienation Of Affections Tort Against C In a few states (including South Dakota, Mississippi, and North Carolina) B would have a right to sue C if C continued to carry on the purported marriage after C learned of the common law marriage of A to B, in an alienation of affections tort. The alienation of affections tort also exists in Hawaii, Illinois and Utah, but subject to greater limitations: Illinois only permits actual economic damages to be recovered in alienation of affection actions. Thus, it prohibits non-economic damages like pain and suffering, and punitive damages, in these suits. Hawaii would only allow B to sue C if C persistently overcame A's free will to establish the relationship with A (e.g. in a relationship that would constitute illegal sexual harassment in employment or an abuse of a fiduciary relationship by C) and B was without marital fault at the time. In Utah, B could sue C only if "full responsibility for the breakdown of a marriage can be attributed solely to the conduct" of C (with the typical case being one where C was a priest or psychotherapist for A). No states have both an alienation of affections tort and a formally recognized putative spouse doctrine. Rights Of C Against A In States With A Putative Spouse Doctrine And For Social Security Benefit Purposes In Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Texas, and Washington state and for purposes of Social Security benefits, C has the legal rights of a putative spouse from A for the period from the date of the putative marriage to C until C learns that A was in a common law marriage to B. The rights of a putative spouse are essentially the rights that a legal spouse would have had for a marriage of that duration reduced, to the extent necessary to respect the rights of B as a true spouse. The relative rights of B and C would be balanced by the Court in an equitable manner in the Court's discretion, likely, in part, by imposing greater burdens on A than a single spouse alone would be entitled to in a divorce. Note also that Colorado, Montana and Texas are the only U.S. states to have both common law marriage and to formally recognize putative spouse status. Bankruptcy Priority Consideration If the claims from B and C against A render A insolvent, and A files for bankruptcy, the marital claims of B will generally have priority as bankruptcy claims over the tort and putative spouse and contractual claims (if any) of C. But, child support claims of both B and C will have equal priority to the marital claims for alimony of B and will be superior to the property division claims of B. Probate Considerations If the common law marriage of A to B is discovered by C only after the death of A, then B has all of the rights of a surviving spouse (some of which are higher priority than creditors claims and some of which are lower priority than creditors claims) while C will have no spousal rights in the probate estate. Any putative spouse rights or tort or contract claim or property ownership claim that C has against A at that time can be asserted in the probate case as a creditor or co-owner of probate property. If A left a Will leaving A's estate in whole or in part to C, C will have rights an unrelated will devisee in the estate to the extent that there is anything left over after B's minimum marital rights and the claims of all creditors have been paid. The rights of a surviving spouse at death differ considerable from state to state. If A left assets by virtue of non-probate transfers to C (e.g. joint tenancy and/or beneficiary designations attached to particular assets), generally C will be entitled to those assets, but the assets that C receives at A's death from A may be invaded by B to the extent that the probate estate assets of A's estate are insufficient to meet A's obligations to B at death as A's surviving spouse. Joint Tax Return Considerations If A and C filed as married filing jointly on their taxes, their tax returns would have to be amended for all such tax years for which the statute of limitations had not yet run (usually three year from the due date of that return) as single or head of household taxpayers with separate returns for each of them. Usually, this would result in additional income tax being due from A and C combined. The application of prior tax payments made and prior tax refunds received would be allocated equitably by an appropriate court if necessary because the parties could not agree. Gift and Estate Tax Considerations For estate tax purposes, B will receive any unused gift and estate exemption of A at A's death. B will receive any assets received from A free of gift, estate and income taxes. Transfers at death to C from A will potentially be subject to estate taxation, and gifts made during life to C from A will potentially be subject to gift taxation. But, unless the sum of A's gifts and inheritances given to all people other than B during A's lifetime exceeded about $11.5 million, no gift or estate tax will actually be due at A's death. Retirement Account Taxation If A died with C as a beneficiary of a retirement account of A, or if C died with A as a beneficiary of a retirement account of C, the surviving person of A and C would not be able to roll over the proceeds tax free into a retirement account of the survivor. Instead, the survivor of A or C who was the beneficiary of the retirement account of the decedent among A or C would have to take taxable distributions either over the life expectancy of the surviving person, or over five years, as the survivor elected. Note On Authority I am writing from memory and my summary notes from when I was a professor of estate planning and later a continuing education teacher for lawyers. I could find all of the statutory or case law authority to back it up, but it would take another two or three hours that I don't have to devote to this answer. | Short Answer I was wondering if it exists the possibility of signing a legal agreement before impregnation that states legally that both parents compromise into offering shared physical custody of the child to each other in case of divorce or separation. Do theses types of contract exists? are they legal? I currently live in Switzerland, but the question is meant generally. Agreements of this type are not valid in Switzerland, the U.S., Australia, or any other jurisdiction of which I am aware. There are some fine nuances to this general rule, however, that are explored below. Obviously, of course, there are many countries in the world, and there could be an outlier out there somewhere. Exceptions For Choice of Family Religion Agreements In particular, in some countries, such as Israel and India, the substantive family law rules that apply to a married couple and their children are governed by the religion of that family as determined by law. Thus, Muslims families and Hindu families in India, for example, are governed by different laws related to child custody. In these countries, there is a legislatively approved set of family laws for each faith, but the laws for members of one religion are not the same as the laws for members of another religion, and there are typically rules to determine which sets of family law to apply in cases where the parents of a child belong to different religions. Pre-nuptial agreements in these countries may govern, to some extent, how a married couple's religion is determined for intra-national choice of law purposes, although they cannot specifically resolve custody issues on a pre-dispute basis. U.S. Law In General This would not be enforceable in most U.S. states. Agreements between parents in matters involving children (even post-dispute) are generally not legally binding, because the court has an independent duty to evaluate the best interests of the child under the circumstances as they actually present themselves. Courts can and do appoint third-party guardians ad litem to evaluate the best interests of the children when they have any reason to doubt the judgment of the parents. Put another way, pre-nuptial agreements and post-nuptial agreements, may govern property division and maintenance and restoration of name and inheritance rights and enforcement of economic provision rules, in the event of death or divorce, but may not govern parental responsibilities or child support or the circumstances under which the marriage may be terminated. Post-Dispute Agreements In practice, if parents come to a post-dispute agreement that happens to track the outlines of a non-binding pre-dispute agreement regarding parenting time and parental responsibilities, and the agreed resolution seems reasonable after perfunctory due diligence, a Court would usually ratify that agreement without much second guessing. But, the pre-dispute agreement would be only marginally relevant in the event of a dispute and would not have legal validity. It might be considered by a court as one factor among many in addressing the parenting dispute, as a source of ideas for a resolution and to ascertain the expectations and perspectives of the parents, but would not be given much weight in most cases. Exceptions For Dispute Resolution Method Agreements The exception would be that in some jurisdictions, a mediation or arbitration clause for parenting disputes in a material agreement would be honored, although the same substantive law would apply, in theory. Exceptions For Assisted Contraception And Surrogacy Agreements Note, however, that most jurisdictions in the U.S., do honor and give legal effect to a contract regarding the intended parent in a medically assisted conception or surrogacy contract, in which a pregnancy arises through some means other than intercourse between a man and a woman which of the source of the sperm and egg from that man and that woman that gives rise to a fertilized egg (e.g. cases of sperm donation, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, etc.). In those cases, the default rule is generally that the legal parents of the resulting child are the intended parents under the contract. But, this is purely an agreement governing paternity, and not parenting once a child is born. Swiss Law While I do not have first hand knowledge of Swiss law, a digest of Swiss law prepared by Westlaw (a major law book publisher and online legal research provider) does state the rule of Swiss law clearly, however: The areas a pre-nuptial agreement can cover are fairly limited. The following cannot be determined in advance: The preconditions for a divorce, nullification or separation of a marriage are ultimately governed by law. Any agreements that are not compliant with the law are invalid. Agreements on arrangements for children, in particular about parental responsibility, visiting rights or maintenance, made in advance, are not binding. Any amounts saved in pension funds during a marriage are divided in the event of a divorce. Waiving such a division is only possible under very restrictive conditions. Agreements in a marital contract that are not compliant with the law are invalid. This source also identifies the precise statutes and treaties that apply to resolve these questions of Swiss law. Choice of Law and Forum Related Issues There is also an implicit choice of law issue presented. Choice Of Law and Forum Agreements Are Usually Void Generally speaking, under U.S. law, these issues are governed in domestic cases by the state that is the "home state" of a particular child under a statutory test and the parents may not contractually agree to a choice of venue. In international cases by the state and country that are the home state and country of the child under a test established by treaty which may not be contractually agreed to in advance. Since the applicable statutory tests in the U.S. usually direct a court to apply the laws of the state with which the child has the strongest residential connection (except for Native American children whose family law disputes are subject to tribal law), and since laws relating to divorce and parenting are matters of state and not federal law for the most part (except as to choice of law and choice of forum issues, and certain federal welfare program guidelines for child support that states have economic incentives to comply with and all do), the law governing parental rights and responsibilities (and over the circumstances when a couple may get divorced) may change over time as the family (and each particular child) moves over the course of their lives. In international cases where there is not treaty in place between the potentially relevant countries (and in which diplomatic personnel or members of foreign royal families or families of heads of state are not involved), a U.S. court will generally apply the law of its own state in all cases where it has jurisdiction over the child, or of both parents. Jurisdictional disputes and inconsistent decrees are resolved in part through diplomatic channels at the national level in these cases. There Is Little Variation In U.S. Substantive Custody Law In practice, this isn't a very important observation in domestic cases, however, because almost every U.S. state gives judges extremely broad discretion to handle custody disputes on a case by case basis under a "best interests of the child" standard during the last several decades (even though this isn't constitutionally required), subject only to the barest U.S. constitutional limitations prohibiting decisions that amount to a termination of a legal parental relationship without certain forms of due process, and there aren't huge differences in the case law applying that standard in practice between states. The differences between particular judges in a particular county would typically be as great or greater than the difference between different states, when it comes to final outcomes in disputed and litigated cases. Before the best interests of the child standard was adopted more or less universally, many states had a sex specific "tender years doctrine" that presumptively gave custody of younger children to mothers and older children to fathers. But that standard was held to be unconstitutional because it discriminated based upon sex. In each state where the tender years doctrine or similar sex specific custody doctrines were held to be unconstitutional, the "best interests of the child" standard was adopted rather than a gender neutral standard that provided more guidance to judges such as a dictate to maintain the status quo as much as possible such as a "primary caretaker presumption" (which many judges applying the "best interests of the child" standard actually apply in practice). Most European countries also follow the "best interests of the child" rule for child custody. One of the big differences between jurisdictions in their laws typically involve issues like the standing of people other than parents to intervene in parenting litigation, such as grandparents, stepparents and social workers, and the rights of these third-parties vis-a-vis the legally recognized fathers and mothers of a child, and the circumstances under which an adoption and related relinquishment of parental rights is valid. The procedures that apply in family law cases also often differ significantly between jurisdictions. Exception For Post-Dispute Choice of Law and Forum Agreements However, once there has been a litigated dispute in the first instance, that jurisdiction will generally retain authority over the parenting of the child set forth in a decree. But if there is an agreement of the parents which has been ratified by a court regarding choice of law and venue that will be honored in a post-dispute settlement agreement. Also, there are typically statutory circumstances that cause the original jurisdiction to address a parenting dispute to lose authority over the child. For example, suppose that a couple divorces in England with a separation agreement approved by a court that states that the divorce court in London shall have continuing jurisdiction over future custody and child support disputes and the London divorce court approves that agreement. A U.S. or Swiss court would usually defer to the London divorce court for these matters at that point, unless some emergency or change of circumstances undermined the relevance of London to future disputes involving the child. | The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that. | The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you. | Can I go to USA with my B1B2 visa and marry her within a week and come back to Canada, will this be legal ?? Yes. Or would it be an visa fraud that I misuse my entry to USA for marriage and will cause problems for my Future Green Card application ?? No. It is only visa fraud if you lie. Or would it be misuse of entry only if I marry to green card holder ( which she is not yet) and not come back to Canada and apply for visa status adjustment there in USA ? As long as you leave the US within the period of admission granted to you on entry and otherwise abide by the conditions of B-1 or B-2 status, there is no violation. If you attempt to enter in B visitor status with the intention of marrying and not leaving, but rather adjusting status, however, the immigration officer is entitled to refuse entry, and if you attempt to adjust status after entering in B visitor status, you may find yourself having to prove that you did not have the intention to do so when you entered. If Yes, What kind of marriage it would be ? A marriage between two non-immigrant or marriage between non-immigrant ( Visitor) and immigrant (Her) As noted in a comment, l don't think this matters. As she just got her work permit and SSN but not appeared for her asylum interview yet, Do I need to apply for any kind of k visa for marriage ? Or she needed to be green card holder first then I can apply for k visa. K visas are for the fiancé or spouse of US citizens (and their children). You don't need to worry about K visas. If I can marry her with my B1B2 visa as she is not green card holder or citizen yet. Should I also have to wait 90 days in USA before marriage so that USCIS not consider it as misuse of my entry in future when I apply for green card once she get her green card after completion of her asylum case. Gaming this is a recipe for trouble. Your best bet is to hire an immigration lawyer and follow your lawyer's advice. If you can't afford an immigration lawyer, you can get some generalized advice over at Expatriates. If in my l-94 Form I am just allowed to stay for 2 weeks in the USA but i stay 90 days then marry her and come back to Canada. Then what will be its consequences for my Future green card application. If you overstay a 2-week period of admission and then leave the US you will trigger a few adverse provisions of immigration law. If the US finds that you had intention to do this when you entered, for example, and lied about it, you could trigger permanent inadmissibility for misrepresentation. What would be the best possible solution for our case ? How should we proceed so that we don't have any kind of immigration problems for future. Find a good lawyer. Getting married in the US is fairly easy. Using your marriage to immigrate to the US requires a bit more care. | For clarity, in a divorce case in New York State involving children, the judge typically decides: (1) child custody, (2) child support, (3) alimony, (4) division of the couple's property, and (5) allocation of attorney's fees and costs associated with the case. The judge also terminates the marriage if the jurisdictional requirements for doing so are met. In New York State, there is both no fault divorce and fault based divorce, and in a fault based divorce, the judge decides if fault was present. Divorces are handled by the New York State Supreme Court (not, as one might suspect, by the New York State Family Court), which is a trial court of general jurisdiction in New York State. In a fault based divorce, marital fault is considered with regard to issues of property division and alimony, but not with regard to child custody or child support. If you are married and your wife has a child during the marriage, in New York State, you are presumed to be the father of the child. You can bring a lawsuit to prove that you are not the father of the child, but the deadline for doing so is fairly short after the child is born. After five years this statute of limitations would probably have run. But, it sounds like the infidelity is not alleged to have caused the wife to become pregnant, so that isn't really an issue. The extreme levels you would have gone to in order to spite your spouse and your hostility towards her, make it unlikely that the court would award you full custody or joint custody, although it would be required to award you some parenting time so long as you were legally presumed to be the father. If you are legally considered to be a parent of the child, custody will be allocated in the best interests of the child, and child support will be awarded based primarily on your income, your ex-wife's income, and the number of nights that the child spends with each parent. In all likelihood, you would be awarded little parenting time given your conduct and statements, and full custody would be awarded to the wife who would get child support from you based upon your income. (Assets are rarely considered in child support awards.) If you sign assets over to your brother, the court will probably treat you as if you still owned those assets for purposes of property division upon the divorce. If your assets exceed those of your spouse, the court will probably award all remaining assets to your spouse and require you to pay a property equalization payment to your spouse to make up for your inability to pay a full amount to your pre-transfer share of assets to your spouse. If the transfer to your brother took place after the divorce was commenced, the court would probably also hold you in contempt of court and put you in jail. Your transparent efforts to divest yourself of assets, and your unsubstantiated claim of infidelity would not in any way reduce you alimony obligation to your spouse, if under the facts and circumstances, such as the length of the marriage and the relative economic means of the parties, the court finds that an alimony award is appropriate. Unsubstantiated claims of infidelity will only make the court treat you more harshly. Most New York State divorces are no fault divorces in which infidelity is irrelevant, but New York State does have residual fault based divorces which could count against your ex-wife in a variety of ways (although not with respect to child custody or child support). But this is only if you can prove the infidelity in court. In reference to the linked case in Spain, it is worth noting that a New York State divorce judge has much more power and discretion than a Spanish divorce judge. The New York State divorce judge is allowed to equitably divide the couple's property rather than merely adhering to formulaic community property rules, and the New York State divorce judge has contempt of court power which the Spanish divorce judge lacks. | This is going to depend very much on exactly what is in writing. Note that your father could, if he chose, directly leave both the house and the IRA to his partner. If you become the homeowner after your father's death, and the "3-year right to use" and the cost sharing provisions are not in writing, then neither is legally binding. You and the partner may choose to honor your father's wishes, but if he does not put them in the will or another legal document, neither of you is bound. The question says: I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. I do not know of any jurisdiction in which there is a general ban on evicting a senior citizen in all cases. There will be some restrictions no doubt, but they will depend on the local laws. And of course you may not wish to exercise all the legal rights you may have. You would ultimately, have the right as homeowner to evict the partner. I don't what procedures would need to be followed legally -- that will depend on the specific jurisdiction, which the question does not list. As the homeowner, you would be legally responsible for maintaining and paying taxes and other expenses on the house. The partner would be either your tenant or your guest. Once you have title (and that will take some time after your father's death, in all probability) if the "right to use" was never put in writing, you could ask the partner to sign a lease. The terms could be whatever the two of you choose to agree on. If she becomes a tenant under such a lease, she has both legal rights and legal responsibilities, and each of you has the protection of a clear agreement. You would be wise to consult a lawyer to learn exactly what the local law does and does not permit. Your father might well be wise to put his wishes more clearly in writing while he still can. |
Can benefits be charity? With the recent tax related charges against the Trump organization for various fringe benefits they have been giving top employees I have seen some counter claims I have questions about. The big one I have been seeing is that some are claiming that the act of paying for the school of various employees is charitable giving. My question is twofold, could this be considered charitable donations and if not is there any kind of donation that can be given to an employee that could? | This is a duck You can label it a chicken if you like but you won’t fool anyone who knows about ducks. A charitable donation comes with no expectation of a quid-pro-quo. Paying a school in return for them educating someone is not charity. | In many countries (for instance, the US), churches and mosques are private property. In general, the owner of private property can throw anyone off their property; claiming you're doing an extensive period of praying doesn't matter, because they are under no obligation to let people stay as long as needed to pray (they can kick someone off the property for just about any reason). If there's a contract in play things are different, but contracts aren't in play in this situation. That said, nothing stops the church or mosque from letting the homeless stay there; this is actually not that uncommon (charity being a fairly common religious virtue). | This sounds like a really bad communication issue. I would contact the company to find out what is up and inform them politely that they have been given more than a "reasonable" time to release the 401k. I would also inform them that they need to expedite the notice and offer to stay on the phone while they contact the plan administrator. If they give you any resistance or if the issue persist, I would inform them that they may be in violation of the Department of Labor ERISA guidelines and may be subject to fines by the Department of Labor. If you get any attitude, file a complaint with the Department of Labor (Federal). I would also call the plan administrator and ask them to verify employment since she has not been employed. That may go a bit further. Just as a personal comment, I have noticed with companies that are not doing the right thing because you are the little guy, is that filing complaints is easier than lawsuits. No company wants the Department of Labor on there back looking at their records or books. And normally, the governing agencies will motivate the company to do the right thing. One time I sent an email to the CEO of the company and within 48hrs my issue was solved. | No, but ... The CEO is an officer of the company (as are the directors and any others with the ability to substantially exercise control over the company) and as such, owes fiduciary duties to the company - not to the shareholders or any subset of them. For example, if it is in the best interests of the company to enter a trading halt but not in the best interests of the current shareholders then the duty on an officer is to do what’s best for the company. As another example, for a crime many limited by guarantee rather than by shares it’s rarely in the owner’s interest to have that guarantee called but it might be in the company’s interest. | The crucial phrase is "in ihrer Eigenschaft als Mitglieder". This restricts the prohibition on receiving benefits from the gGmbH to benefits you'd receive because you are a partner. It is common to have more than one legal relationship with a (g)GmbH, and being a CEO or otherwise employed by one is a typical situation. The snippet from the law does not restrict what benefits you may receive in your CEO role, just those in your partner role. The distinction is also relevant for regular GmbHs: If you are the CEO of a GmbH as well as a partner, then your salary as CEO is taxed differently than your share of the profits. But typically the tax on salary will be higher than the tax on profits, so there is little incentive here to overpay yourself. | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | Freedom of Religion Concerns I doubt that this policy would be held to be unlawful on First Amendment freedom of religion grounds. Indeed, such requirements usually exclude church-related service. Also, I don't see how this policy discriminates against your religion specifically. It seems on its face to apply to all religions equally. Even if "Church-related" is read broadly to include both service that benefits a church, and also service that is organized by a church, that doesn't preclude you from coming up with some other kind of service that is neither of these things. Why would you be prevented from coming up with service that is neither of these things when other students do not? Unless you have also undertaken Holy Orders or something, in which case 100% of your time away from school would be devoted to your church, it is hard to see what the problem would be with this requirement for you as opposed to someone else. And, it would probably be improper for a public school to allow you to use religious activities to satisfy a graduation requirement - that would sound like an establishment clause violation. Some of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases are: Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp (1963) This pair of cases shaped the modern understanding of how the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment constrains prayer in public schools. In Engel, the Court struck down a New York State rule that allowed public schools to hold a short, nondenominational prayer at the beginning of the school day. The Court decided that these prayers amounted to an “official stamp of approval” upon one particular kind of prayer and religious service, and said that, since teachers are agents of the federal government, the scheme violated the Establishment Clause. The reasoning in Engel was also applied in Schempp, in which the Court struck down a Pennsylvania policy that required all students to read 10 Bible verses and say the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of each day. While a student could get an exemption with a parent’s note, the Warren Court decided that this still amounted to an unconstitutional government endorsement of a particular religious tradition. Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) This case adjudicated a different sort of Establishment Clause challenge, where the controversy dealt with a statute providing financial support for teacher salaries and textbooks in parochial schools. The Burger Court unanimously decided that this financial aid scheme violated the Establishment Clause and delineated the governing precedent for Establishment Clause cases known as the Lemon test. Under Lemon, statutes (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have primary effects that neither inhibit nor advance religion; and (3) cannot foster an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that this scheme violated the third prong of the Lemon test. Allowing Church-related community service projects could implicate both the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. In a pertinent ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that no public funds be used to assist religious organizations, even if this prevented a facially neutral voucher program from treating religious and non-religious schools equally. The opinion in this 2015 case reviews some of the relevant law. A critical portion of the analysis is that aid to religious institutions must be limited to institutions that do not discriminate on the basis of religion and that supporting religious institutions at the K-12 level is more of a concern than doing so at the higher educational level. A Church, however, would (and should) discriminate on the basis of religion. In General There has been consideration of whether community service requirements, in general, are constitutional. Generally, courts have upheld the programs. See also here. In particular, Rhode Island is in the 1st Circuit of the federal courts, which has expressly ruled that community service requirements are constitutional. A 1999 law review article in the Duke Law Journal considers the issue from several perspectives. So does a 1997 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review article. A 1916 case called Butler v. Perry is a particularly strong precedent in favor of the proposition that mandatory service is constitutional, despite arguments to the contrary under the 13th Amendment. The issue was discussed in the New York Times in a 2003 article. Both are concerned about the involuntary servitude aspect of the requirement, but given that school attendance may be mandatory, and a community service requirement is one, relatively unconstrained aspect of mandatory educational activity, this isn't a very easy case to make. | The only time that this conduct has to be prohibited in a private university is when state or federal law prohibits it in any case. In those circumstances, no separate university policy to restate the applicable law is required. Best practices are to make students and teachers aware of any applicable laws, because knowing that, the the parties are less likely to be involved in illegal conduct. But private universities aren't required to adopt policies of that type if they aren't bothered to do so. With federal grant funding, private universities are required to have a mechanism in place for addressing sex discrimination complaints, but the policy doesn't have to articulate that particular conduct is or is not prohibited, beyond what federal law provides in the absence of a formally adopted policy. Incidentally, a few private colleges, almost all religious, specifically decline federal funding in order to be free of the regulations and strings that come with accepting it. Also, while private universities are not required to have such policies legally, private universities are required, as a matter of practical reality (e.g. in order to be considered eligible to borrow money from banks and to be eligible for many charitable grants) to have liability insurance in place, and liability insurers will often insist that their insured have certain policies in place, especially if the insured private university has a history of prior claims of this type. |
What are the rules on businesses that wish to only hire attractive females? Many businesses feature beautiful female employees as part of their business plan and service offering. Examples include: Hooter's waitresses Sportclips stylists A small chain of drive-thru smoothies in my area that feature bikini clad hotties with whom you can purchase a photo Most all entertainment jobs I am considering buying a franchise that falls into one of these categories and I just wanted to understand the legality of hiring only attractive women. Is it sexual discrimination or just a legitimate hiring practice, since offering attractive female employees is part of the business strategy? I'm in Maryland, USA in case that matters, but I'm looking for kind of a high level, general answer that might apply to anyone in the US. | There is a good answer at the Skeptics StackExchange here. Its three most relevant references are: 42 U.S.C. Chapter 21, especially Subchapter VI (applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees every day in at least 20 calendar weeks in a year) An example case, Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender Discrimination, 16 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 169-210 (2009) Wilson v Southwest held that being attractive and female is not a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) for being a flight attendant, even when the company marketed themselves using female sexuality: sex does not become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool or to better ensure profitability Most scholars believe that the BFOQ exception would not apply to Hooters servers for the same reason. The job is serving food, and the sexualized nature of the service is just the manner in which they do the job, not a requirement of the primary job itself. Hooters has never had a discrimination suit go to trial, however has been sued and settled out of court multiple times. Employment discrimination based on gender has been allowed only in cases where the primary product being sold (not merely the manner of delivery of the primary product) requires a particular gender. One example would be sexual entertainment. This would include strip clubs, modelling agencies, Nevada brothels, etc. I'll say it one other way. Simply offering attractive female service as part of a business strategy is not enough to trigger a BFOQ exception. To allow a BFOQ defence based on an employer's desired manner or means of achieving its primary business purpose would render the statute inoperative, and the BFOQ exception would "swallow the rule" Phillips v. Martin Marietta 400 U.S. 542 (1971). (This paragraph taken from here.) | The employer might be liable for a discrimination claim, under the doctrine of disparate impact. See Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc and references cited therein. The idea is that an employer can be liable absent proof of intentional discrimination when a practice disproportionately affects protected classes of individuals, and the practice is not justified by reasonable business considerations. So it would depend on why this particular state of affairs in employment came about. There is a test known as the 80% rule which attempts to quantify the notion of "under-representation" as evidence of discrimination. This test (not widely respected by the courts these days) might constitute evidence of discrimination, if a protected class is demonstrably under-represented. The current standard seems to be by comparison to random selection. In EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, the court found that a grooming policy had a disparate impact on members of a religion (Sikhism), and was thus contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although a requirement to shave does not obviously discriminate on the basis of religion. This points to an important element of a successful disparate impact claim, that there has to be a policy with a causal effect. In the above scenario, there is no proposed policy that has this effect. Note that the burden of proof is on the person suing for relief – they must have a theory of something the company does that causes this hiring pattern, a practice that is discriminatory. The identified policy (whatever it might be) could be justified by a business necessity defense (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424), by showing that the practice has a demonstrable relationship to the requirements of the job. That, b.t.w., would not excuse a racially or religiously discriminatory hiring policy for a factory manufacturing menorahs or kinaras. If a company recruiting locally in Boise ID had a 75% black work force, it would be reasonable to suspect that something was up. But legally, without showing that this results from a unjustified policy of the company, mere statistically anomalous distribution is does not sustain a claim of discrimination. | Adding m/w/d in a job posting is not explicitly required by any German law. It is however the established way to implement the requirements of the AGG (~ general equal treatment act) which in turn implements various EU directives. Protected classes under the AGG are race, ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief system, disability, age, and sexual identity. Of these, only gender manifests itself in the German language, making workarounds necessary that indicate that no gender is preferred. Within certain bounds, the German language can use gender-neutral terms, for example a job called “Lehrer/-in” or “Lehrer*in” could also be called “Lehrkraft”. If you are able to use gender-neutral language in English but are still subject to German law, adding “m/f/d” is probably not necessary but still a very sensible idea as it corresponds to German best practices. If you fail to add some explicit note that applicants of all genders are welcome, nothing bad will happen automatically. However, a person with a not-explicitly listed gender may apply for the job, get denied, and then sue with the argument that they were denied because of their gender. The employer would have the obligation to prove that their job postings are non-discriminatory. | No The intent of the proposed bill is to codify existing case law. You are an employee now and you will be an employee then. You are an employee now because a) you are not free from the company's control and direction or b) the work you are doing is the company's main business. If you read the bill you will find out that c) involves "an independently established trade, occupation, or business" so your business qualifies for this but you need to qualify for all three factors to be an independent contractor. | It is discrimination. However, it is legal, and generally not grounds for a lawsuit. Discrimination is legal, except when it is based upon certain specific categories, such as race, sex, and religion. For example, it is perfectly legal to discriminate for a position based on the possession of education degrees, skill certification or availability to work specific hours or days of the week. Immigration status (and specifically, needing a H1B sponsor in the future) is not a protected category, and as such it is legal to discriminate against this as a factor. Additionally, there are several downsides for hiring a H1B candidate, and foremost of which is sponsoring someone for an H1B visa is not a sure thing, since the H1B system is run as a lottery; as such, you may not receive a visa or extension, and thus be ineligible to legally work. | This is explicitly prohibited under 42 USC 2000e-2(c) (c)It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization— (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section. | Yes, you can be fired for "not being a good fit": New York State is generally considered to be an "employment at will" state, which means that a private sector employer can pretty much hire and fire as he or she pleases and a discharged employee usually will have no legal recourse even when the discharge is unfair or unreasonable. Source: New York State Office of the Attorney General | Discrimination is legal, so long as there is not based on a protected category or class(e.g. race, sex, religion). Age is generally not a protected category. Some states do treat age as a protected category, but: 1) It is generally only in employment, so, for example charging someone differing amounts based on their age is legal (e.g. senior discounts, kids under X are free, etc.). 2) It is generally only protecting higher ages (i.e. discriminating against someone in employment because their age is higher than what you'd like would be illegal, but discriminating against someone because their age is lower than you'd like is not; and in some cases the later is mandatory). |
How can a US Citizen lose citizenship? I recall reading that it is very difficult to lose U.S. citizenship. For example, that you can pledge alliance to another country and still remain a U.S. citizen. Is this true? If this is the case, what are the circumstances in which a US Citizen can lose citizenship? | A list of potentially expatriating acts may be found at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/Advice-about-Possible-Loss-of-US-Nationality-Dual-Nationality.html As the page explains, one will lose one's citizenship when performing one of these acts with the intention of losing one's US citizenship. In most cases, the presumption is that such intention does not exist. One obvious exception is an explicit renunciation of citizenship before a consular officer. The others are accepting a "policy-level position" in a foreign government, serving in a foreign military engaged in hostilities with the US, and committing treason. | Does this person have witnesses to his existence? Particularly before the age of five? Under 8 U.S. Code § 1401, native-born citizens include a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States; If he appears out of nowhere, he is likely to be suspect of illegal immigration. Age may be a factor there, too. | [C]an this decision really be used as legal precedent for birthright citizenship for tourists and illegal immigrants? Yes. If the case did not depend on the fact that they were lawfully resident in the US, then it would apply to those who are not lawfully present in the US. For the case to apply to some people but not others, there must be a distinguishing difference that is relevant to the analysis of the case. The question then is whether lawful residence is a distinguishing difference here, and it seems that no court has ruled on the question. Referring to current events, it would be possible for the executive branch to assert that the 14th amendment does not grant citizenship to one born in the US of parents who were not lawfully present. This would end up in court. For example, such a person could sue to compel the government to issue a passport, or, if the government sought to deport such a person, the person could assert US citizenship in deportation proceedings. At that point, the court would have to rule on the question, whereupon it would almost certainly rule that the 14th amendment does grant such citizenship. See, for example, Plyler v. Doe, in which the court ruled that illegal immigrants in a state are within its jurisdiction for the purpose of the equal protection clause. It would be odd indeed for the court to rule that the same word means something different in the previous sentence. Furthermore, in a footnote, the court writes [W]e have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . . ." ... [N]o plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. You ask: [H]ow is it that foreign diplomats' children born in United States do not have birthright to US citizenship because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and children of tourists and illegal immigrants do have the birthright to US citizenship? Consider what happens when an illegal immigrant commits a crime in the territory of a US state: the person is subject to trial and punishment in the state's criminal justice system. A foreign diplomat who commits a crime, on the other hand, or indeed the child or other family member of a foreign diplomat, is immune from prosecution. That is what distinguishes diplomats from illegal aliens such that the first sentence of the 14th amendment applies to the latter, but not the former. | The State Department is mischaracterizing the law, which requires only that the US citizen "bear" a valid US passport, not that the US citizen "use" the passport. This law, 8 USC 1185(b), used to have a fairly stiff penalty, and it used to apply only in time of war. When the wartime element was removed in 1978, so was the penalty. It now reads Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. If a US citizen attempts to leave the US without a valid US passport, there is a very small chance that the departure could be prevented by a CBP officer, but in the normal course of affairs the traveler would not even encounter a CBP officer, so the possibility is very remote indeed. There is nothing, however, that prevents a US citizen who also holds a passport issued by another country from using the other passport while also carrying a valid US passport. See also What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? at Travel and Can someone be penalized for an "unlawful" act if no penalty is specified? on this site. | At time of answering, the question is: What's the most crucial issue when deciding Senator Cruz's citizenship? The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, Section 1, states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States[.] Cruz did not go through a naturalization process. He was also not born within the territorial limits of the US. If either of those facts were different, those would be the crucial issue. Since they are not, we then look to the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress, which states that children born to citizen parents outside the United States are also citizens, specifically: The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens[.] (emphasis added) According to the Wikipedia article and/or sources it cites, this is the only legislation to use the phrase "natural born citizens" and it seems clear this is intended to refer to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution which states a requirement: No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. (emphasis added) The 1790 Act was repealed and replaced in 1795, but the new law also contained the language (lacking "natural born"): The children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States[.] The specific laws have been further changed, as the naturalization process has, reintroducing ambiguity about the "natural born" requirement, but birthright citizenship from parents is not in question and the "natural born" aspect is not in this question. So, to answer the question directly, the most crucial issue is: Were Cruz's parents citizens when Cruz was born? Cruz's Wikipedia page says his father was not naturalized until later, but his mother was born in Wilmington, DE, which is in the United States, and so unless she renounced her citizenship she would have been a US citizen at the time of Cruz's birth. This means there's a crucial issue: Did Cruz's mother renounce her US citizenship before Cruz was born? "Kaithar" commented on this answer with speculation that she voted in a Canadian election at a time (1947-1977) when Canada didn't recognize dual citizenship in that it required its own citizens to give that up if they acquired foreign citizenship; "user102008" refutes that. However, if we don't want to end this issue-identifying answer at that question, let's assume the answer is "no" and that Cruz's mother was a US citizen when Cruz was born. Then we have to see if birthright citizenship from parents extends to Cruz. For this, we can look to Public Law 414 (66 Stat. 236), passed June 27, 1952, especially section 301(a)(7): The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: […] A person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. Side note: Section (4) (modern (d)) would matter if Cruz's father were considered a noncitizen national of the US, slightly relaxing the requirements so that the mother only had to spend only one continuous year in the US prior to the birth. The armed forces exemption was broadened Nov. 6, 1966 to cover the parent (or their parent's) nonmilitary employment by the US government or certain international organizations. If that's relevant, this answer can be edited to expand on this point. Section 309 of that law addresses children born out of wedlock, and says that section 301(a)(7) (quoted above) applies directly as if the parents were married, "if the paternity of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." To the best of my knowledge, section 301(a)(7) applies to Cruz. If I were wrong on that, we'd look to Section 309(c): A person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year. The equivalent of the first quote today is in 8 U.S. Code § 1401(g) if parents are married at the time of a child's birth, replacing "ten years, at least five" with "five years, at least two" (Nov. 14, 1986; see Section 12 in this law). The quote from 309(c) is now 8 U.S. Code § 1409(c). So then the crucial question is: Did Cruz's mother spent the requisite period of time in the US before Cruz was born? Apparently she did, regardless of marital status, and if that's true it means Ted Cruz is a US citizen and has been since at least birth*. Again, the "natural born" aspect is omitted from this now-answered question. The answer to the question you meant to ask (perhaps "What's the most crucial issue when deciding if Senator Cruz's citizenship makes him eligible for the Presidency?") is "What does the phrase 'natural born citizen' mean in context of Article II, Section 1 of the US Constitution?" (*) Which may mean that he hasn't been a citizen his whole life, using a Cruz definition for when life begins. That's a separate discussion, though, and not very relevant to this one. | There are two models for citizenship, by location of birth and by the nationality of the parent. The US chiefly follows the first model, which is why only your grandma's father is American, and your grandma is not. By the same logic, you are not. Countries like Spain are far more lenient, and do allow you to request Spanish citizenship if you can show any of your direct ancestors are Spanish. That's possible because each country can make its own laws within reason. The international norm is that everybody should get at least a citizenship at birth; statelessness should not happen. | I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce. | There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state. |
Self-quarantine of neighbor broken, if infected, can I sue (civil) Hopefully this is an allowed question. If not, I will delete. My neighbor returned from overseas recently (if necessary for answering, Somalia). How she managed it, I don't know, or care. They are supposed to Self-Quarantine for 14-days. I literally ran into her at the grocery store (cart to cart) where she was not masked. If I am infected (with COVID) and name her as a possible vector, and she is positive as well, what are my options, legally, assuming it came from her to me, and not me to her? | TL:DR Not really possible, no This is from the website of Allen Allen Allen & Allen, a Virginia-based legal firm. (NOTE I will not be including links within the quotes, you may view their website for more information.) In order to prevail in a personal injury lawsuit arising from the Coronavirus, the plaintiff will need to establish: (1) that the wrongdoer had a legal duty to the plaintiff (i.e., that the wrongdoer had a responsibility not to expose the plaintiff to the Coronavirus); (2) that the wrongdoer breached their legal duty; (3) that the wrongdoer’s actions caused the plaintiff to get sick; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered damages (i.e., illness, medical expenses, lost wages or death). First, there is Legal Duty, which they show as: In Virginia, every person has a duty to exercise due care to avoid injuring others. The scope of the duty varies with the circumstances of each case, but as a general rule, everyone owes a duty to every person within reach of their conduct. This duty “arises from that basic and necessary regulation of civilization which forbids any person because of his own convenience, to recklessly, heedlessly or carelessly injure another.“ Before imposing liability against a defendant, the court will examine whether the defendant knew, or should have known, that his conduct placed others at risk of harm. Virginia courts have imposed liability against a farmer who allowed his cow to wander into traffic (which caused a crash) and a manufacturer whose employees wore their work clothes home (which exposed their family members to asbestos fibers and caused them to develop asbestos-related diseases). Similarly, any person who knows that they have the Coronavirus and exposes others to it could, in theory, be held liable. Next, we have causation, which would be the major sticking point. Under Virginia law, plaintiffs are required to prove that the defendant caused their injury. In Coronavirus cases, if the plaintiff cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence (that it is more likely than not) that the defendant was the source of the disease, the plaintiff will not prevail at trial. Virginia courts allow plaintiffs to pursue claims against defendants who caused them to become sick or develop disease. Unlike the cases described above, where the source of the exposure was known and easily determined, proving causation in Coronavirus cases is challenging because an individual who is exposed to the virus might not develop symptoms for up to two weeks, and the Coronavirus can survive on surfaces for several days. Therefore, a plaintiff who did not practice social distancing or limit his or her exposure to others could find it difficult to establish that the defendant was the source of the virus. I have left out two example cases that they show within the above paragraphs, for brevity. Both are related to passing AIDS from an HIV-positive person to a healthy person. Finally, they talk about did the person know they have COVID-19 (positive screening for the virus) and did they take reasonable precautions: In litigation arising from the COVID-19, courts will consider whether the defendant knew or should have known that they had the virus, and whether they knew or should have known that they would (or could) spread it to others. Certainly, anyone who intentionally and deliberately spreads the virus to others could be held liable and might face criminal penalties, as well. In some cases, individuals who have been officially diagnosed with the virus could potentially be held liable if they do not take reasonable steps to prevent spreading it to others. However, it is unlikely that a court would impose liability against any person who was not officially diagnosed with COVID-19. It is also unlikely that a court would impose liability against individuals who take reasonable steps to prevent spreading the virus to others. So, in my example from my question, if I don't know that my neighbor was diagnosed, or more importantly, if they don't know, then the case would go nowhere. If they received notification of a positive result of a test AND they went out shopping and did not wear a mask, then PERHAPS this requirement would be met. However, the real sticking point here is number 2, causation. I would have to prove that I caught the virus from that person and not from any other people I may have come into contact with. So, while I am not a lawyer, I can understand that it would be next to impossible to prevail with this lawsuit, unless I were able to show that I came into close proximity with only one person, and that that person has the virus, and knew they had the virus, and purposefully did not use precautions to protect others. That seems an awful lot to overcome. | In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source. | What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem. | You've got four cases there with four different reasons for substantial delays: In the case of the Aurora theater shooting, the shooter pled not guilty by reason of insanity. There's no doubt about who did it, but doubt was raised about the mental status of the shooter. Murder is not a strict liability crime, so the ability of the defendant to form the intent to commit the crime is relevant. In the case of the Charleston church shooting, the defendant was twice evaluated for competence to stand trial. Again, no doubt about who did it, but most if not all jurisdictions require a defendant to be sufficiently sane to participate in their defense. In the case of the Parkland shooting, the initial delay was confusion over who the defense lawyer would be. Florida will only provide a public defender to someone who cannot afford their own defense lawyer, and it took nearly a year to determine that the defendant had inherited enough money to afford a private lawyer. Due to this delay, the trial was initially scheduled for mid-2020, which caused it to be delayed by the COVID-19 outbreak. In the case of the Tree of Life shooting, it appears to be straight-up delaying tactics by the defense. There are a great many motions, appeals of motions, requests for delay, and other things a lawyer can do to slow things down. Since the defendant is currently being held without bail, the prosecution probably isn't strongly motivated to speed things up. | ICE has a degree of authority to deport without court hearing, via an expedited process. The legal framework for such deportations are explained here, and rely on 8 USC 1225. The Secretary of DHS has authority to establish rules, and has recently done so here. The current regulations pertaining to expedited removal are at 8 CFR 253.3. There is no exemption for people being medically treated, for covid-19 or any other reason, but "parole" is available (at the discretion of the attorney general) to "parole" an immigrant if it is "is required to meet a medical emergency". Thus an illegal immigrant in the ICU might be exempt from immediate deportation, but that is at the discretion of the AG. State and local officials do not have the authority to interfere in the enforcement of federal law, even if the state or municipality has declared itself a "sanctuary". The criminal penalties for interference are spelled out here; no law compells cooperation, the law simply prohibits forcible interference. | Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause. | You might suggest that the neighbor consult with their insurance agent, in case the insurance policy does not cover liability from damage caused by standing trees, especially when the policy holder knows that the tree poses a threat to property. The only thing you can do without the neighbor's cooperation is complain to the city, since it's possible that this situation violates a local ordinance, and the city might order him to remove the tree. | I am not a lawyer and I have never even been to the UK. You will not go to prison if your neighbor's dog attacks you and it dies as a result of you defending yourself. You might go to prison and/or owe the owner damages if: You are somewhere you do not technically have a right to be. It can be shown you could have retreated from harm but chose instead to stand your ground. The force you used was deemed excessive - it showed intent to harm the dog more than necessary to protect yourself You contributed to the confrontation in a way that a reasonable person would think might cause trouble You might be able to protect yourself from problems by: taking pictures or videos of the dog behaving badly or aggressively note dates and times when you observe the dog behaving badly or aggressively formally contact the dog's owner with your concerns and/or evidence in which you assert your rights to access the areas you walk through and your right to defend yourself in the event that you are attacked by the dog if possible, change your route or schedule to avoid the problem entirely Good luck |
Is it legal for companies to set up parallel courts? In India is it legal for a company to set up an internal system of law and order where there shall be a chain of courts under the company and a formal code of law? Punishments shall range from denial of certain allowances to smll monetary fines. Is this legal? If yes, what are the limitations and to what extent? I was thinking about the following system: There may be a central court with many subordinate courts in a company. One employee can file a case against another or the company's employees may be sued by customers. If a court finds a flaw it may impose a fine, send it to a higher court or order something. Higher courts decide on serious cases or cases of contempt of lower court orders. Punishment may range from reduced pay, loss of job, taking the matter to a real court, determining a code of conduct, transferring or shuffling of posts, or imposing a ban from services. The higher courts can set precedents and rule according to company law set by the CEO or any other person who is above all courts of the company meaning they are immune to prosecution. Is this legal in India? | If you substitute the courts with line managers and HR policies, this is just a description of an internal discipline and grievance process. | Does the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Queen's Bench Division) ever exercise original criminal jurisdiction in serious cases (eg, a terrorism trial) in modern times? Has it ever exercised such jurisdiction since its creation by the Judicature Acts? No, with the exception of criminal contempt of court proceedings (which arguably don't constitute "serious cases"). Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, the Lord Chief Justice of the High Court was "President of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal and Head of Criminal Justice, meaning its technical processes within the legal domain," but these duties were appellate and administrative in nature, rather than involving original jurisdiction, and under the 2005 Act the Lord Chief Justice can appoint another judge to these positions. England's criminal courts and civil courts were already almost completely separated before the modern "High Court of Justice was established in 1875 by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873." The High Court is a direct successor to courts dating all of the way back to the 1200s, some of which had original criminal jurisdiction, but those predate the Judicature Act cutoff of the question. Caveats This said, English legal history is not a model of strict consistency, and I wouldn't be stunned to discover some random one-off original jurisdiction criminal trials in the late 1800s or early 1900s under statutes that have now been long since repealed that attracted little notice and have little or no modern legal importance. But, I have no actual knowledge of any such exceptions. For example, while the Admiralty Division of the High Court is now exclusively civil, I wouldn't be stunned to discover that the Admiralty Division at some point long ago, but after 1875, might have had original criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas, like piracy and mutiny, even though it no longer has such jurisdiction. England's Admiralty Courts historically had this jurisdiction, and England's Admiralty Courts were consolidated into the High Court in 1875. But it isn't easy to discern from the resources available to me precisely when authority for crimes committed on the high seas was transferred from England's Admiralty Court to the Crown Courts (which have jurisdiction over these cases now). Similarly, while debtor's prison was abolished in England in 1869, a few years before the High Court was created, I wouldn't be shocked to find that the Queen's Bench division may have handled some residual original jurisdiction cases related to quasi-criminal body executions for non-payment of debts originally resulting in incarceration in debtor's prisons, in cases originally arising prior to 1869 that weren't fully wrapped up in 1875. Footnote Some countries with common law legal systems and a court system based upon the English model have courts called a "High Court" which consolidate the functions of the English "High Court" and the English "Crown Court" (which handles trials in serious criminal cases) in a single court. This is frequently motivated by a shortage of judges with the exceptional legal competence necessary to inspire confidence in the conduct of such proceedings. In U.S. practice, for example, it is the rule and not the exception, for felony criminal cases, civil cases arising in equity, serious civil cases arising at law, and both criminal and civil appeals from lower courts to all be handled by the same court of general jurisdiction (although the terminology, of course, is usually slightly different since the U.S. does not have, and has never had after 1776, a King, a Queen, or Lords, as a matter of constitutional law). | The basic legal principles are as follows. First, a government may pass a law criminalizing an act, for example this Ugandan law which penalizes homosexual acts, their attempt, and aiding and abetting same. Second, a government has the subpoena power to compel a party to provide evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, unless there is some specific restriction enacted in the country – I find no applicable restrictions in Uganda. In principle, the government could subpoena records of an internet service, in order to find violations of the law. Enforcement of the subpoena is relatively simple within the country, but enforcement against a website in Norway, for example, would be virtually impossible, in that Ugandan courts do not have authority in Norway and Norwegian courts will not recognize such an order. Uganda is not a party to the Hague Service Convention, so the Norwegian courts will simply not consider the subpoena. | Both. The process server deliver's one set of documents addressed to the individual in their individual capacity, and one addressed to the company. If the individual in an official capacity and the company are both parties, as well as the individual in an individual capacity, you serve three sets. Even if the law ultimately is in your favor that serving just one set is sufficient, serving one set of documents for each defendant removes any argument that would have to be litigated as non-minimal expense and producing delays in the case, and it is cheap to do so relative to what is at stake in any case worth suing over. | As @DavidSupportsMonica says, you can't go back in time to fix the problem. As a rule regulators are more interested in obtaining compliance than throwing the book. There are no sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences, but most convictions lead to a fine. However HSE Policy is that enforcement should be proportionate to the degree of non-compliance and the level of risk created. 5.2 In our dealings with duty holders, we will ensure that our enforcement action is proportionate to the health and safety risks and to the seriousness of any breach of the law. This includes any actual or potential harm arising from any breach, and the economic impact of the action taken. 5.4 Applying the principle of proportionality means that our inspectors should take particular account of how far duty holders have fallen short of what the law requires and the extent of the risks created An annual inspection that was overdue by one day is a very minor failing, and the principle of proportionality means that you are most likely to get verbal advice not to let it happen again. You say "if anything happens", presumably meaning if there is an actual incident or serious risk, such as a fire or CO poisoning. Its true that in such a case they will certainly want to look at your records, but the proportionality rule still applies. They would need to be able to make a causal link between your failing and the actual incident to make any more of it, which wouldn't be the case here. | It is. Part 2 Chapter 1 Section 8 specifically says "People who are not married or civil partners do not have this characteristic." In practical terms, a claim for unlawful dismissal would not have to rely on this Act or this Characteristic. Many company handbooks refer to avoiding discrimination on "marital status", so the claim could be made that the company had acted against policy. Not as strong as national law, but likely to succeed in absence of other factors. Single people who were expected to cover shifts that people with a family consistently avoided could argue constructive dismissal on "making unreasonable changes to working patterns or place of work without agreement" grounds. And cases of sexual harassment are as likely to refer to Sections 11 or 12 of the Act as to Section 8. There appears to be some interest in this - north of the border if not in England and Wales - and perhaps less jurisdictionally in Bella De Paulo's article for Psychology Today, which concludes "All serious forms of prejudice and discrimination go through a similar process of going unrecognized, then getting dismissed and belittled once people start pointing them out, and in the best cases, eventually getting taken seriously. Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that when she was first appointed to the Supreme Court, the other judges did not think gender discrimination existed. ..." | Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it. | The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error. |
Can you get sued for producing excessively violent materials in the form of a book, movie or video game in the U.S.? I am wondering if there are specific clause in the freedom of speech law in the U.S. that could get you in trouble. | You cannot be successfully sued nor charged with a crime in the US merely because a movie, book, or other work is violent. Consider the rape scenes in the movie Deliverance, or John Hersey's The Wall, a 1950 novel which describes in detail the Warsaw Ghetto and the massacre and torture of its inhabitants by the Nazis during WWII. Or Plevier's Stalingrad, a 1940s novel about the aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad, also during WWII, and the suffering of both Russian and German soldiers and civilians there. (Both novels were later filmed in less violent versions.) Many other examples could easily be mentioned. Triggering anxiety or PTSD in a reader or watcher would not be grounds for a suit either -- attempts to bring such suits have been dismissed. Claims that violent works inspire or encourage crime or anti-social acts have led to attempts to regulate such works, from comic books in the 1950s to video games in the 1990s. None of these works have prevailed. The so-called Comics Code Authority survived for a time because it was a strictly voluntary process -- some publishers never submitted content to the CCA censors. The Motion Picture Production Code was similarly voluntary, as is the current system of movie ratings. Works that defame someone can be the subject of libel suits. But to win such a suit in the US, the plaintiff must show that statements were made that were false, and not matters of opinion. The plaintiff must also show that such statements were "of and concerning" the plaintiff, that is that they were specifically about the plaintiff. The plaintiff must in most cases further show actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation, unless the false statements were of the limited category known as per se libel, which give rise to a presumption of harm. These include false claims of improper business or professional conduct, false claims that the plaintiff committed a serious crime, or false claims of sexual improprieties. Moreover, in many cases in the US the plaintiff must show actual malice, that is that the defamer made the false statements knowing them to be false, or with reckless disregard for whether or not they were true. This applies when the person bringing suit is a public official or public figure. Mere general violence will not be grounds for a libel suit. Incitement Several comments have asked if violent depictions could constitute incitement and therefore be unlawful. The current rule in the US is that speech (or writing) can only be punished as incitement if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". This language comes from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and has thus been stable for over 50 years. Prior to that the US Supreme Court used the "clear and present danger" test, first adopted in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) The actual passage from Schenck was: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. In Brandenberg the Supreme Court held Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute unconstitutional, because that law generally criminalized simple advocacy of violence. Under neither test would a book or movie that simply depicted violence be subject to legal action simply for that reason. A work would have to specifically advocate violence. Under the current Brandenberg test the work would have to urge people to violent lawbreaking right away, when it is read or watched. and actual lawbreaking would need to occur, or be reasonably likely to occur, for legal action to be constitutional. Actions against incitement under this test have been largely aimed at speeches before crowds or groups, urging them to riot or take other violent and unlawful action right then. While a book, movie, or video could be incitement under this test, it would need to be much more than just violent, it would need to strongly advocate present unlawful violence. That is not what the question asked about. | The site's owners would likely be immune from any civil action based on its users' conduct, under Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act: No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. The users, though, could still face liability. Although it would be libel rather than slander (because it is published rather than spoken), any damaging falsehoods could be actionable. The emotional distress component would also be a possibility, but it would probably be a tougher case. The laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but generally speaking an emotional-distress case requires really outrageous behavior and and very serious emotional damage. | The First Amendment forbids the government from abridging your freedom of speech. There is no (federal) law against your private employer doing so. A good summary is https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html | In a hypothetical case like you are describing, you could make a contract with them regarding the duplication of the content, irrespective of copyright law. Their violation of that contract would not necessarily be a copyright violation (which would allow statutory damages), but you might win a breach of contract lawsuit. But if someone took it from them and made copies, you would likely not have a case against that person because copyright would not protect you and you have no contract with them. In addition, you could obtain a very "thin copyright" in a particular new presentation of the material. This would mean that copyright law would apply, but only to the particular presentation (e.g. new footnotes, a particular layout, etc...) If considering doing this IRL, you should consult a copyright attorney. | No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action. | The United States gives the accused the right to a fair trial. However, it also gives exceptionally strong protection to the media (and to people in general) to speak on matters of public concern; there are very, very few cases where a US government (federal, state, or local) can legally order someone not to publish something (as opposed to letting it be published and then issuing sanctions). The rule of thumb for content-based restrictions on speech is that they must be the least restrictive way of achieving a compelling government interest. For trials, there are other ways to achieve a fair trial without restricting the press. One of the most preferred ways to do it is to use the voir dire process, in which jurors can be rejected for prejudice. Courts can also move the trial to a new location; they can grant motions from the defense to delay the trial while things cool down; they can sequester the jurors (meaning that the jurors are kept in a central place and prevented from talking to anyone else or reading anything about the case); if none of these are done, a conviction can potentially be reversed on appeal. US courts will, wherever possible, modify the trial to mitigate the damage done by the press, rather than restrict the press to mitigate the damage to the trial. For a review of a few different approaches to this in different jurisdictions, you might want to look at this law journal article. | In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful? | united-states In the US it is not unlawful to produce and display a video arguing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whether the intent is to support that invasion or to document the claims of those who do support it, and argue that they are invalid. Such a video would be protected by copyright, and copying it and redistributing it with subtitles might well be an infringement of that copyright, if done without permission. On the other hand, doing so with the intent of educating others about Russian claims might constitute fair use. If so, it would not be copyright infringement under US law. Aside from the copyright issue (which would be up to the copyright holder to take action on) US law does not really care what the motivation for posting such a sub-titled video might be. Whether or not it is "beneficial for the whole human civilization" is not relevant to US law. It is protected by the First Amendment against government suppression. That would not affect YouTube, as a private actor,, determining not to host it on their site. |
Can a U.S. citizen who renounced his citizenship, get a green card through his American wife? Here's the situation: A dual citizen American-British couple lives abroad (i.e. in the U.K). Because of the burdens of U.S. worldwide tax (the only country that does this besides Eritrea) the husband decides to renounce his U.S. citizenship so that he won't be doubly taxed on his income, sale of his home, etc. The wife and children however maintain their U.S. citizenship with the idea that should they ever wish to move back to the U.S., the husband can accompany the wife and obtain status (i.e. green card) as the spouse of an American. Are there any rules that would prevent an ex-citizen from returning as a spouse? Form I-130, the Petition for Alien Relative, makes no mention of ex-citizens, but I wonder if anyone knows of any hidden rules or precedent for this sort of situation. | If the Attorney General has officially determined that you renounced US citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation, you have a lifetime ban under INA 212(a)(10)(E), and there is no immigrant waiver for this ban. See 9 FAM 302.12-6. I am not sure if the Attorney General has ever made such a determination about anyone. Otherwise, I don't see anything that would prevent you from immigrating to the US like any other foreigner. | Here is everything that I learnt throughout this process: I was not born a U.S. citizen, and I did not naturalise. Instead, I inherited U.S. citizenship at the moment I became an LPR (Legal Permanent Resident), because I both had a parent with citizenship and I was under the age of 18. There is no paperwork to file to inherit citizenship this way, it is completely automatic and as a result there are people in the U.S. that do not know they are citizens. In order to assert that I was now a U.S. citizen, I just had to apply for either a U.S. passport, or a Certificate of Citizenship. There is no deadline to do this, because I was a fully-fledged citizen from the day of approval of my Permanent Residence application. When I applied for my U.S. passport, I simply had to prove that I was a child at the time of receiving my Green Card, and that one parent was a U.S. citizen. This is exactly what I had to provide the German consulate. I provided my own birth certificate, my I-485 form (with approval date) and my father's naturalisation certificate. Those were accepted without question. To obtain a copy of my Form I-485, I had to file a FOIA request--I used a Form G-639 to make it easier--and I emailed it to [email protected]. I did attempt to get a copy of my passport application, as I filed that while under 18, but I was told by the State Department that they did not have a copy of it (curiously, several months later a full copy of my original passport application arrived by post from the State Department...). The response was not a surprise as when I applied for a passport at the age of 17, I was told by the official that they do not keep a record of my application, so I should also have a Passport Card in case my passport goes missing and I must prove citizenship. Under German citizenship law, one loses citizenship when "voluntarily" obtaining another citizenship. The reason that I did not lose my citizenship when I became a U.S. citizen was because: I was a child, and it happened automatically. Therefore, it is not considered voluntary. Luckily, I did not have to explain this, since it was a consulate in the U.S. (Houston, TX) that I visited, they were well aware of the way in which I inherited U.S. citizenship. However, I had some trouble when dealing with the London embassy as they did not understand all of the U.S. citizenship qualifiers. I hope this helps anyone else that finds themselves in a similar situation! I was completely lost when I started this process, but three months later I have my German passport in my hand. | Statelessness is a very serious condition. It is quite likely that a person such as you describe may be required to board an aeroplane to that country but will not be permitted to pass through immigration on arrival - Mehran Karimi Nasseri lived in Charles de Gaulle airport for 18 years in this condition. There are many people in the world who are stateless and this may or may not affect their lives. Citizenship is generally only an issue when crossing international borders or in employment situations, the latter is significant in advanced countries but less of an issue in countries with less-developed economies. | As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there. | The newly-reinstated presidential proclamation says (Sec 3(b)) says The suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this proclamation shall not apply to: (i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States; The State department also lists exceptions to the travel ban on 8 countries, identifying those who "will not be subject to any travel restrictions listed in the Proclamation" d) Any lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States; Requesting / receiving a passport (or renewed passport) from your current country of citizenship does not invalidate your permanent resident status. Additionally, State says No visas will be revoked pursuant to the Proclamation. Individuals subject to the Proclamation who possess a valid visa or valid travel document generally will be permitted to travel to the United States, irrespective of when the visa was issued. If you stay out of the country too long, that could cause a problem. If you plan to stay away more than a year, you have to first apply for a reentry permit. This is the current state of the law, which is subject to change. | As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand. | The law upheld by the decision is a New York law, and thus only applies in the state of New York. Its current text reads in relevant part: No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is... Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment. The citizenship requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed whose immigration status is that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and who would otherwise be eligible to serve as a teacher, or to apply for or receive permanent certification as a teacher, but for the foregoing requirements of this subdivision. The last sentence of that will no longer be effective starting Nov 30 2022. So, this law only says they are prohibited in New York public schools. And even then, they are allowed if they are applying to be a citizen, if they are hired pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education, or (until 2022) if they are a lawful permanent resident of the US. Other states may have other laws, of course. | Would such a person be considered a "natural born citizen," for the purpose of qualifying for the presidency, from October 25th 1994? In other words, after having lived in the US for at least 14 years, could such a person run for the office of the president or the vice president? This is an unresolved issue. Some scholars believe that to be a "natural born citizen" you have to be a citizen on the day that you are born. Other scholars believe that a "natural born citizen" is someone who gains citizenship by a means other than naturalization. No binding precedents resolve the issue because the phrase "natural born citizen" is used nowhere else in the law besides qualification to be the President of the United States, and the issue can't be resolved until someone is purportedly elected because there isn't an actual case or controversy until then, and there haven't been an examples that have come up that have tested this issue. My personal guess is that the courts would make every effort to find that someone who has been elected by the citizens of the United States as President, despite the inevitable debate by the public over someone's qualification as a "natural born citizen" during the campaign, is eligible to hold that position, because to do otherwise would seem massively undemocratic. So, I suspect that retroactive citizenship at birth would be held by the courts to make someone a "natural born citizen" and eligible to serve as President. Then again, I could see this issue being resolved by the courts on basically partisan lines too with conservative judges tending to hold that a liberal candidate was ineligible for office, and liberal judges making the opposite conclusions about a liberal candidate. This is one fair reading of what happened in the case of Bush v. Gore. Would the answer depend on whether the person had been naturalized before 1994? The citizenship by naturalization is irrelevant to whether you have another grounds for claiming citizenship that was present at birth or did not arise from naturalization. On October 25th, 1994, the naturalization became redundant. |
For showing a deceased person under a negative light, can you get sued for defamation by relatives of the person deceased? Let's say you make a movie and you show a deceased person under a negative light, can you get sued successfully by his relatives, and does the success of a lawsuit get diminished if the movie is a parody rather than a film biography? | Many countries of Continental law recognize “desecration”, “deningration” or defamation of the deceased or similar civil or criminal wrongs, the special form of defamation of the deceased and it is ordinary that those who had been relatives to the subject are entitled to press charges. (e.g. Germany (See: §189 “denigration of a deceased person”), Slovakia (See: MAC TV v. Slovakia before the European Court of Justice leaving ambiguity about the extent of legality of defamation-of-the-dead laws under Community law), Greece (See: Penal Code, Article 365, “disparaging the memory of the deceased” etc.) Additionally, the prosecutors may press charges by the operation of law or as a duty of their office if certain conditions are met. One example in detail is the Penal Code of Hungary: Defamation § 226 (1) Whoever states, reports or uses an expression directly referring to a fact capable of defaming the honour of another person, shall be punished for a misdemeanour by imprisonment for up to one year. (2) The penalty shall be imprisonment for up to two years if the defamatory statement a) with malicious motive or purpose, (b) in public, or (c) by causing substantial damage to the merits is committed. Making a false sound or visual recording likely to defame § 226/A (1) Whoever, with the intent to defame the honour of another or others, makes a false, falsified or untrue sound or image recording, if no other offence is committed, shall be punished for a misdemeanour by imprisonment for up to one year. Disclosure to the public of a false sound or image recording likely to defame § 226/B (1) Whoever, with the intention of defaming the honour of another or others, makes available a false, falsified or untrue sound or image recording, shall be punished by a misdemeanour with imprisonment of up to two years. (2) The penalty for a felony shall be imprisonment for up to three years if the offence is (a) in public, or (b) by causing substantial damage to the interests of is committed. Dishonoring § 227 (1) A person who, against another person other than those specified in § 226 a) in connection with the performance of the victim's duties in the exercise of his or her employment, public office or activity in the public interest, or b) in public uses an expression capable of defaming the honour or commits any other such act, shall be punishable for a misdemeanour by imprisonment for up to one year. (2) A person who commits defamation by an act of deed shall be punishable under subsection (1). Desecration (“Kegyeletsértés”) § 228 Whoever desecrates a dead person or his memory in the manner specified in §§ 226 or 227 shall be punished for a misdemeanor with the punishment specified therein. In the case of Hungary, one, including especially a surviving relative, may also step up as a substitutive civil prosecutor and file a motion with the court for criminal charges to be filed in case the public prosecutor fails or refuses to press charges. This is true despite freedom-of-speech rights. In the U.S., some states allow for libel and/or slander claims to go forward and be brought against one who engage in such or similar conduct (e.g. Rhode Island, Texas etc.) Many Asian countries also recognize both the civil and criminal forms of such acts (e.g. the Philippines, Thailand etc.) | In your example, nobody said anything false. The list does include movies from 2003. The movie studio admits this. The person says it too. The person doesn't say the studio tried to hide it. Nothing is wrong with what the person has said in your example. | Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen. | The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one. | Can I sue? (Shall I sue? Is up to you) Yes, anyone can sue anybody but that doesn't mean it will be successful. The likely candidate for making a claim seems to be under the tort of Emotional Distress, however, note that... Since the definition of offensive conduct is subjective by its very nature, the courts have set high standards to make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm. To be successful, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct which caused severe emotional distress to another person. Source ...but according to the OP and comments, this criteria does not appear to be have been met. | As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years. | You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.) | Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this. |
What state labor laws apply when you're working remotely from a different state? What state labor laws apply when you're working remotely from a different state? Let's say my company office's and team are located in California while I am working in the state of Texas. What labor law applies here? The labor laws of the state of California or the labor laws of the state of Texas? Did I divulge enough information here? | As seen here, the laws of the employee's state and city are controlling, and not that of the employer. A person working for a North Dakota company in Seattle is owed at least Seattle minimum wage. This to "were the employee usually is working" so it does not suddenly switch when the employee takes a working vacation. | The fact that the employer has vicarious liability for acts of its employees "within the scope of employment" does not mean the employees are not also liable for their own acts. In reality, however, the employer is more likely to have insurance for such "acts or omissions" of employees. The plaintiffs can "sue everyone in sight" and let them figure out who actually pays when they are found liable. That way, when the employee's actions are (for instance) ruled a "personal frolic" or otherwise outside the scope of the employer's liability (in tort or contract), the case doesn't get dismissed for failure to name all the proper parties. One policy goal is to place financial liability as close as possible to the person most likely to have been able to avoid the harm, thus discouraging such risks, without placing the entire burden on individuals employed in hazardous occupations and without artificially limiting potential sources of compensation. | Illinois collects the fine; California treats it the same as if you had run a red light in California Both Illinois and California are parties to the Nonresident Violator Compact and the Driver Licence Compact. The former means that Chicago will forward the ticket to Illinois who will forward it to California who will forward it to you. You can contest the ticket in various ways including by mail but your prospects of success are slim. If you successfully contest, that's the end of the matter. If you don't contest or lose, you have to pay the $100 fine. The latter means that if the offence is upheld or not contested, California will apply 1 point to your licence. | It seems that this is known as a "working interview". Asking a candidate to do actual work without paying for it is illegal under Texas law. However asking a person to take an extensive, even a multi-day, skills test is not. Asking a prospective web developer to submit a portfolio of prior work, or to design a web site for a fictional company, say for the Acme Company that supplies the Coyote, is legal. Had the applicant created a web site for the actual employer without being paid, the applicant would own the copyright, and the prospective employer would be in violation of Texas minimum wage law, and would have committed copyright infringement if they used the design, without securing permission. Statutory damages for wilful copyright infringement can be as high as $150,000, and as low as $750. A federal suit must be filed to collect such damages. However, if no actual work was done, I doubt that the applicant has a valid claim. One would need to consult a lawyer to see if some other basis for a claim would apply. Many lawyers will offer an initial consultation for free or a nominal charge. Here are some Texas sources on the issues with "working interviews". The page "Are “Working Interviews” Legal?" from the Gay Reed law firm says: If you bring someone in for a working interview you must pay them for their time in compliance with state and federal law and make appropriate withholding. Some believe that since they are only going to be there for a few days, you don’t have to do new-hire paperwork. Just skip the I-9, background check, application, and W-2. Wrong again. If you hire anyone – for 1 day or 1,000, you have to do new hire paperwork. Depending on how long you would like to conduct your interview, we can create a day contract or a week contract for the prospective employee. This will limit your exposure under unemployment compensation laws, and you can even reduce the amount you pay. Where you might pay a good hygienist $20 per hour or more as a full time wage, you can pay them minimum wage during a working interview. The page "What Is a “Working Interview” and How Does It Work? from CEDR HR Solutions says: A “working interview” is the act of assessing a job candidate’s skills and ability to fit with your existing team by bringing them in to perform work for your business temporarily before you officially bring them on board. Traditionally, working interviews take place after a successful verbal interview. ... However, using working interviews does not exempt you from your obligations as an employer, and performing working interviews without understanding their legal implications can actually get you in a lot of trouble. ... If your “interviewee” is performing work for your business that would usually be performed by one of your employees, in a legal sense, that person must be treated as an employee of your business. By testing your applicants’ abilities and knowledge without having them perform actual work for your business, you can get an idea of their skill level without putting your practice at risk. “Skills tests” are especially helpful when it comes to evaluating candidates for clinical positions. ... Instead of performing an unpaid working interview or trying to call someone an independent contractor when they do not fit those requirements, hire them and use a “Getting Acquainted” period to judge whether a new hire will be a long-term fit for your practice (90 days is often a good span of time for this). The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) has a page on "Interviews" which says: Interviews When interviewing applicants, apply the same standard that is applied to job applications - ask only about things that are directly related to the job requirements for the position under consideration. Watch out for tape-recording - the applicant might be tape-recording the interview without an employer's knowledge, and a video- or tape-recording of an interview would be discoverable in a discrimination claim or lawsuit. Tell the managers who conduct interviews to be extremely careful about note-taking during interviews - anything like that can be discovered in a claim or lawsuit - many discrimination cases have been lost due to careless and/or embarrassing comments written by interviewers. Test for whether something should be written down: would you feel comfortable explaining it in front of a judge and jury? "Working interviews" are not the same as pre-hire interviews at which an interviewee might demonstrate how he or she would carry out a sample task - an "interview" during which the worker performs actual work and receives what most companies would call "on the job" training or orientation to the company is work time - a company must pay at least minimum wage for such training time, satisfy all of the usual new-hire paperwork requirements (W-4, I-9, new hire report, and so on), and report the wages to TWC and IRS. The TWC can be reached at: 512-463-2222 The TWC page on the minimum wage says that Texas uses the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hr. It lists several exceptions, none of which seem to apply to the situation described in the question, or rather the situation that would have occurred had the applicant accepted an "unpaid trial" or "working interview". The actual Texas law is Chapter 62 of the Labor Code The exact section is 62.051. | A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire. | I wouldn't be surprised to see other states and jurisdictions with similar statutes. Fortunately, in the United States, there is a safe harbor against demands for state income taxes: For every dollar of taxable income, you can only be taxed by one state. (This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.) Therefore, if you show that the LLC (or its members if it's a pass-through) paid taxes to another state on the income in question (e.g., by sending a copy of the tax return), that's legally the end of the matter. | Yes If you look at the law pertaining to the work week and opting out of the maximum, which is also in The Working Time Regulations 1998 (with my emphasis in bold): 4.—(1) Subject to regulation 5, a worker’s working time, including overtime, in any reference period which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each seven days. ... (3) Subject to paragraphs (4) and (5) and any agreement under regulation 23(b), the reference periods which apply in the case of a worker are ... So if we go to 23(b): A collective agreement or a workforce agreement may— (a)modify or exclude the application of regulations 6(1) to (3) and (7), 10(1), 11(1) and (2) and 12(1), and (b)for objective or technical reasons or reasons concerning the organization of work, modify the application of regulation 4(3) and (4) by the substitution, for each reference to 17 weeks, of a different period, being a period not exceeding 52 weeks, in relation to particular workers or groups of workers. | Is this something that an employer can just do? That is very unlikely, although strictly speaking there is not enough information to answer either yes or no. Section 2810.5(a)(1)(C) of the California Labor Code provides that "[a]t the time of hiring, an employer shall provide to each employee a written notice [...] containing the following information: [...] The regular payday designated by the employer in accordance with the requirements of this code". This implies that the employer is required by law to issue the paychecks in accordance with the timing that pursuant to Section 2810.5 the employer should have informed your girlfriend. The fact that your girlfriend does not know when exactly her salary is due suggests that the employer did not even comply with this statute. |
What legal recourse do citizens have when law enforcement refuse to address crimes for political reasons? This is a bit of follow-up to this situation, although the question is different and things got much worse. According to a recent poll, 40% of San Francisco residents are considering moving out of the city. Many attribute this in part to the SF DA, who even before COVID publicly announced that he won't prosecute quality of life crimes, as well as shoplifting under $950. If harmed, what can SF residents legally do to reintroduce such prosecutions? | A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends. | In the US, there are a number of non-government organizations which take on such cases, such as the ACLU or the Institute for Justice; individual law firms may also take such cases pro bono. There is no automatic right to free representation in case a constitutional issue is alleged, so if IJ doesn't like your case they won't take it. These are private organizations: there is no general government agency that one can call on, other than the Public Defender's office in case you are charged with a crime and can't afford legal defense. (A constitutional issue may arise in a case that a PD might handle, but you can't e.g. call on the public defender to sue the government for infringing your 2nd Amendment rights.) A state attorney general could file suit against the US government over a constitutional issue, as Washington's AG did in the case of the Trump travel executive order, where the underlying issues were constitutional. An individual might inspire a state AG to take on an issue, but the AG would be representing the interests of the state, broadly, and not individual interests. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | "Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well). | That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism. | You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on. | Presumably, they at least took a report which could make it possible to file an insurance claim for the stolen phone. But, a good faith belief of law enforcement that is unable to figure out who committed the crime with the resources available to them is a legitimate reason not to investigate and prosecute a crime, even in countries with legal systems based upon the German one where prosecutors have an enforceable legal obligation to prosecute criminal offenses known to them. A prosecutor can't bring a case unless he knows who did it. And, the police may be wise not to try to investigate a crime that previous experience has proven to them is a dead end most of the time for a crime of modest economic value. Most cases of simple larceny are never solved. And, institutionally, the police have to balance the cost of investigating the crime against the seriousness of the crime. Murders and kidnappings are almost always going to take priority for police resources over stolen phones, particularly if investigating the phone theft may require international cooperation that makes the investigation more costly. A key point is that the mere fact that a phone is pawned doesn't mean that the person pawning it is necessarily committing a crime, so even if you find out where the phone is in some pawn shop (possibly in Albania or Turkey, by now), that doesn't mean that the job is over. That person could have bought it innocently and at fair market value from a flea market, from someone who could have gotten it from someone who received it innocently as a gift, from a friend of a criminal fence, who may have bought it not innocently from a true thief. In fact, because criminals respond to incentives like anyone else, it is far more likely that the phone was swiftly "laundered" along the lines I suggest in this example, than it is that it is still in the possession of someone close to the thief. But, only the fence and the thief would have criminal liability. It is a lot harder to solve the crime of a stolen cell phone than you would think, and the agency may simply not be able to justify the resources it would take to investigate that case properly to a situation where someone had a phone stole that was worth maybe 400 Euros in used condition. The more you can do to solve the crime, the more likely it is that they will find that it is worth further investigating until a thief can be identified and apprehended. For example, the company with the network that serves the phone might be willing to cooperate with its owner. Also, the more that you can do to show that this case might crack an entire ring of people involved in a black market in stolen cell phones might make it more attractive to law enforcement. | It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power. |
Can one be prosecuted in the US for buying stolen goods if one was unaware that it was stolen? I have a practical example question that this applies to, so I'd like to know the answer in general, but specifically how it applies here. Let's say I find something I'd like to buy on Craigslist, being sold on the order of $1000. Let's say I text with the guy, we meet up in public, and I buy the item with cash. Then let's say, it turns out it was stolen, the guy gets caught, and confesses to the police/victim and tells them my name/phone number/transaction details. I have several similar/related questions about this scenario: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. What if I just said "sorry, I never ended up buying it." Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Let's say they somehow do prove that I bought it (very contrived, but the guy was recording our conversation or something). Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? That's what this section seems to be saying, but that sounds crazy to me, because it would mean basically buying anything puts you at risk. I ask this because I was getting a little paranoid and was thinking about the implications of this: I'm imagining a scam where someone sells me a "stolen" item and then the "victim" (really their accomplice) says "I found out that you bought an item stolen from me, but the thief got away" and presents me with irrefutable evidence (e.g., a receipt for the item with its serial number) that the item was his. He could potentially threaten me to return it to him, and then I've lost my money (since the "thief" is in the wind) but they still have their item. It's unlikely, I know, but I'm wondering what the legal implications of this would be. Thank you! | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. | However, can I ask the person provide me money in exchange that I am not going to call police? First of all, the conduct you describe is a tort, in addition to possibly being a crime, and so you could ask them to provide you with money in exchange for a release from tort liability (i.e. not suing them). This is done all of the time and is perfectly legal, although if one is afraid of extortion claims, the safer course would be to file the lawsuit first (and possibly also report the crime to the police first) and then to seek money damages. Once a criminal complaint has been filed and an accusation made publicly, there is no "extortion" element. A lawyer would not be permitted as a matter of professional ethics from proposing a settlement in exchange for not contacting the police, but could obtain money with a threat of civil liability. This is not obviously within the definition of extortion, because reporting them for committing an actual crime would not necessarily be "wrongful" conduct in every situation, and wrongful use of "fear" is one of the elements of the California crime for extortion. But, it is clearly within the definition of "fear" which is defined to mean: Fear, such as will constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat of any of the following: To do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened or of a third person. To accuse the individual threatened, or a relative of his or her, or a member of his or her family, of a crime. To expose, or to impute to him, her, or them a deformity, disgrace, or crime. To expose a secret affecting him, her, or them. To report his, her, or their immigration status or suspected immigration status. This definition makes no reference to the validity of the accusation. It might be possible to determine with more case law research when threatening to report a crime that they have committed is "wrongful use" of "fear". My expectation is that this is something of a gray area and may be quite fact specific (it is not a point upon which there is great uniformity between U.S. states). This excerpt from a California Supreme Court decision helps clarify the line between a legitimate threat and an extortionate one (case law citations and references omitted), and tends to suggest that insisting on money, hinging on a threat that the a criminal complaint will be made otherwise, does constitute extortion in the State of California, even when made by the victim in the case of a crime that was actually committed: Extortion “Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... induced by a wrongful use of force or fear....” (Pen.Code, § 518.) Fear, for purposes of extortion “may be induced by a threat, either: [¶] ... [¶] 2. To accuse the individual threatened ... of any crime; or, [¶] 3. To expose, or impute to him ... any deformity, disgrace or crime[.]” (Pen.Code, § 519.) “Every person who, with intent to extort any money or other property from another, sends or delivers to any person any letter or other writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat such as is specified in Section 519, is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were actually obtained by means of such threat.” (Pen.Code, § 523.) Extortion has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of themselves, may not be illegal. “[I]n many blackmail cases the threat is to do something in itself perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a demand for money.” The extortion statutes “all adopted at the same time and relating to the same subject matter, clearly indicate that the legislature in denouncing the wrongful use of fear as a means of obtaining property from another had in mind threats to do the acts specified in section 519, the making of which for the purpose stated is declared to be a wrongful use of fear induced thereby.” “It is the means employed [to obtain the property of another] which the law denounces, and though the purpose may be to collect a just indebtedness arising from and created by the criminal act for which the threat is to prosecute the wrongdoer, it is nevertheless within the statutory inhibition. The law does not contemplate the use of criminal process as a means of collecting a debt.” In Beggs “we explained that because of the strong public policy militating against self-help by force or fear, courts will not recognize a good faith defense to the satisfaction of a debt when accomplished by the use of force or fear”; For purposes of extortion “[i]t is immaterial that the money which petitioner sought to obtain through threats may have been justly due him”; “The law of California was established in 1918 that belief that the victim owes a debt is not a defense to the crime of extortion”. Moreover, threats to do the acts that constitute extortion under Penal Code section 519 are extortionate whether or not the victim committed the crime or indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or arrested the victim. Furthermore, the crime with which the extortionist threatens his or her victim need not be a specific crime. “[T]he accusations need only be such as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime. The more vague and general the terms of the accusation the better it would subserve the purpose of the accuser in magnifying the fears of his victim, and the better also it would serve to protect him in the event of the failure to accomplish his extortion and of a prosecution for his attempted crime.” Attorneys are not exempt from these principles in their professional conduct. Indeed, the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibit attorneys from “threaten[ing] to present criminal, administration, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.” (Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 5–100(A).) In Libarian v. State Bar we upheld disciplinary action against Librarian who, after losing at trial, sent a letter to opposing counsel, accusing his opponent's client of perjury and threatening to use the perjury charge as the basis of a new trial motion and a criminal complaint unless opposing counsel's client paid Librarian's client. “Although no action was taken either by Librarian or Siegel to prosecute Nadel, the record clearly shows conduct which is in violation of Librarian's oath and duties as an attorney. The threats contained in the letter indicate an attempt to commit extortion. The sending of a threatening letter with intent to extort money is ‘punishable in the same manner as if such money ... were actually obtained’ (Pen.Code, § 523) and the crime of extortion involves moral turpitude.” The conduct of an attorney who threatened an oil company with reporting adulteration of its gasoline to the prosecutor unless it paid his clients was not only grounds for disbarment but “constituted an attempt to extort money as said crime is defined in sections 518, 519 and 524 of the Penal Code”; attorney's suggestion in letter demanding $175,000 settlement in divorce case that he might advise his client to report husband to Internal Revenue Service and United States Custom Service constituted “veiled threats [that] exceeded the limits of respondent's representation of his client in the divorce action” and supported attorney's extortion conviction]. As these cases illustrate, a threat that constitutes criminal extortion is not cleansed of its illegality merely because it is laundered by transmission through the offices of an attorney. Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to the instant case. Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 15–21 (Cal. 2006). | In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say. | You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives. | This would probably constitute illegal wiretapping and would certainly constitute a 4th Amendment search if conducted by law enforcement. Normally, the definition of whether something is "public" for purposes of an expectation of privacy is whether it could be detected by a human being unaided by technological enhancements from a place where someone could lawfully be to make that kind of observation. Some of the relevant cases are Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. (1967) (tape recorder outside a public telephone booth was a search violating the expectation of privacy) and U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. (1984) (tracking device placed in barrel by authorities violated expectation of privacy). RFID signals are not "public" even if they are not encrypted with a private code because a device, such as the ones identified in the question, is necessary to receive them. The Wiretap Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 2511, is a federal law aimed at protecting privacy in communications with other persons. Typically, when you think of a "wiretap," the first thing that comes to mind is someone listening to your telephone calls. But the Act protects more than that. Under the Act, it is illegal to: intentionally or purposefully intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a "device." The Act provides criminal and civil penalties for violations, although it creates various exceptions to when interceptions and disclosures are illegal. From here. In this circumstance, despite being passive, one is intentionally intercepting the contents of electronic communications through the use of a device. The fact that there was not in all cases an intent to communicate through, for example, an RFID chip, on a specific occasion probably does not suffice to render it not a communication. | If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal. | When does it become illegal to exchange bitcoin for cash? When the transaction purposefully skips the controls in place regarding anti-money laundering. Generally speaking, the issue is not the mere involvement of cryptocurrency in a transaction, but the crimes a wrongdoer seeks to camouflage or conceal by means of cryptocurrencies. Such crimes typically involve money laundering, identity theft, stolen card numbers, and the like. As quoted in one of the links you provide, "[t]he use of bitcoins in the transactions is a new technological flourish to this very old crime". Is there any direct source or any laws with numbers? Apropos of your first link, mentioning that "a Florida judge threw out money transmitting charges against a bitcoiner" (see also here), I will point out that the court's dismissal of charges against that defendant has been reversed early this year. See State v. Espinoza, 264 So.3d 1055 (2019). Although the judges' narratives of a case are questionable and/or sloppy and to be taken with a grain of salt, the appellate decision cites language from Florida legislation as applicable to virtual currencies (and, impliedly, cryptocurrencies). You will notice that the focus in the Espinoza decision is the interpretation of Florida Statutes in its sections 560.125(1) and (5)(a) (regarding unauthorized vendors), and 560.103(21), (29) (defining monetary value as "a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable in currency"). As usual, each legislation may present subtle and/or fundamental variations. For instance, the court in Espinoza at 1065 identified that federal law is inapplicable there in that 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) contemplates that "the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means" (emphasis added), and Espinoza's transaction(s) did not involve a third party. By contrast, the Florida statute does not allude to third parties in that transmission of monetary value, hence preventing the statutory sanctions from being preemptively foreclosed in the matter of Espinoza. What about when someone buys with stolen money or money from illegal proceeds. Did you commit a crime if you sell bitcoin to someone and the money is stolen, or the gift cards are stolen? That also depends on the jurisdiction and the facts of the case. In Espinoza, he was allegedly informed that the cash he received (or was about to receive) in exchange for bitcoins "derived from engaging in illegal activity and that [the buyer] was planning to use the bitcoins to engage in further illegal activity", Espinoza at 1058. The court highlighted the State's argument that "dismiss[ing] a charge of money laundering is improper because money laundering requires intent" (emphasis added), which is sanctioned by section 896/101(3)(c). | Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing. |
Does replacing a gated fence with a gateless fence reduce backyard liabilities? When I put in a pond, the city engineer warned I must have it built within a fence, to reduce liability, e.g. if a child entered the backyard and fell in the water. Though there is a fence, I'm sure there could still be some liability, if a child somehow entered the backyard. The fence itself is 6 ft tall, and has a 10 ft wide gate (same height), allowing access to the backyard. Though the gate is locked, I am wondering: Will I face less liability if I removed the gate and filled the space with more fence? My reasoning is thus: Though I might keep the gate locked, it could be difficult to prove when the gate was locked. The absence of a gate means nobody is expected to enter, except by some illegal means, like climbing over the fence, so m maybe it lifts some responsibility from me. | What you have is a pond. The doctrine of attractive nuisances has state-specific nuances, so you should consult a lawyer in your state to see what the local facts are. The question of liability only arises when there is some harm done and the court either determines that you are responsible (liable), or not. Until there is harm, there is only a risk. In general, you would be held liable if a child came on to your property, got in the pool, and drown, even if you had signs saying "Don't get in the pond". The general rule comes from R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, that in dealing with hazards that would be attractive to a child of "tender" years, you have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the dangers of the attraction. What constitutes "reasonable care" is hard to define, except in the most tautological sense "the care that a reasonable person would have". Case law in your state may specifically address the question. As a general rule, you should get legal advice from lawyers, not from city engineers. The doctrine may be spelled out as more specific rule such as in Washington (Schneider v. Seattle, 24 Wn. App. 251, the requirements are that a condition or instrumentality existed which was dangerous in itself and likely to or probably would cause injury to those coming into contact with it; that it was attractive or enticing to young children; that plaintiff was incapable, by reason of his age, of comprehending the danger involved; that it was left unguarded and exposed at a place where children of tender years were accustomed to resort, for play or amusement or gratification of youthful curiosity; and that it was reasonably practicable and feasible either to prevent access by children or else to render it innocuous without obstructing any reasonable purpose or use for which it was intended. The record does not indicate the details of the injury, except that the area was in fact fenced with a cyclone fence. There may have been a gap in the fence, or the child (who was 10) may simply have climbed the fence (the latter seems likely since the ruling also invokes questions of contributory negligence – "even if the child is held to be within the attractive nuisance doctrine, the question of his contributory negligence, in the light of all relevant circumstances, will have to be decided"). FYI the final outcome was that the plaintiff lost the case. A gate is less of a precaution against trespass than an impenetrable fence, especially if the fence is solid wood and makes it impossible for the child to see the attractive nuisance. A locked gate a more of a precaution than an unlocked gate. Your reference to illegal means of entry is a bit misguided, because the doctrine say that adult trespassing standard don't apply to children, therefore you cannot assume that the child will always act in compliance with the law. A latch at the top of a 6 ft. tall gate cannot be defeated by a "tender" child wandering in a curious manner (unlike a latch at 3 ft.). As I say, you have to research the specific liability states and case law of your state. | No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false. | A lien is used to prevent sale of a property until a debt is paid. This has nothing to do with priority over a mortgage. The HOA agreed to release the lien for some payment. The negotiation of that payment doesn't matter to the new buyer. Once the lien is released, then it is no longer listed with the county on the property, so the property can now be sold. The former lienholder cannot now apply a new lien to the property because the new owner is not a debtor to the former lienholder. This would be a terrible way to manage property sales, and no mortgage company would allow a mortgage for a property that could not be sold in case of foreclosure, which is likely why the mortgage holder was a private individual. It is possible for a new owner to take on existing liens, but this would be clearly spelled out in purchase documents. There should be a statement on the title search results that no liens exist. | Entering onto someone's land without lawful excuse is trespass Permission is lawful excuse. You don't have express permission. You have implied permission to enter in some circumstances, for example, to approach someone's front door or to reasonably recover your property. You would also have lawful excuse if you were a police, fire or ambulance officer discharging their duties or if you were in physical danger if you didn't enter - running from an assailant across someone else's property is not trespass. Among others. Whether the field is fenced or not or if that fence has an opening or gate does not give you permission although it can remove some implied permissions, not least that you do not have implied permission to enter over the fence. If its not your field, stay out of it. | You would need to be able to prove that he encroached on your land (or your tenancy to land) with his pesticide/herbicide. You should speak to him and let him know that you feel his herbicide made its way (it could've come with the wind if its just on the borders) to the land, and as a result your animals were harmed. It's always better to see if you can handle this by appealing to his sense of responsibility. Just ask him to not spray the border, or not spray on a day with any breeze if he insists on spraying the entirety of his land. If he denies spraying the border (or at all), you can try to catch him in the act and film it, or find neighboring witnesses, such that you can file a complaint for trespass. It is probably not illegal in the true sense of the word, but it may subject him to damages. You may try contacting your department of agriculture. If he is a commercial applicator there are likely regulations that dictate the necessity of following label instructions or specific regulations or laws in your community that may also subject him to liability under common law, if the pesticide drift enters the properties of others (like yours) and causes damage. While pesticide particles carried by air may cause harm to people, your type of damage or damage to another's agricultural crops is the typical claim made and the typical measure of damages. More-so when they drift to organic crops. Generally, plaintiff(s) must show that defendant(s) breached either the label instruction or a regulatory provision to succeed in recovering damages outside of common law. Typically, there are labeling instructions or regulatory provisions that limit spray drift. Is he spraying whole fields such that you think he is purchasing commercial amounts? If he is just spraying his small field or plot of land, you will have to establish a claim for trespass in order to recover damages. You also must be able to prove damages – e.g., veterinarian bills, loss of use of the animals for plowing or whatever. You have to have show the act (spraying), causation (the cause and effect) and damages (the actual effect to you that brought about specific damages) to make a claim. So far, you don't seem to have actual evidence of the act, although if you can acquire that, causation seems to be met, as well as the potential to show specific damages. Unfortunately, the pain and suffering of animals does not have the same impact or carry any of the same rights as people incurring some sort of physical harm. It must be some actual quantifiable damage to you. Only you can determine what this is. In neighborly disputes, the measure of damages is often not worth the cost of litigation. Sad but true. As a plaintiff (if it comes to that), you'll need to establish trespass or another common law cause of action as a basis for the recovery. Or you could seek equitable relief (ask the court to order he stop the practice). These claims prove challenging for plaintiffs to establish because of the common usage of pesticides. Also, strict liability is generally not available as a cause of action. You may have a claim in nuisance, but you still must show those three elements of proof. There are typically laws that preempt negligence claims concerning labeling (like in the US), and remaining negligence claims tend to be difficult to prove, for the very reason you stated (you didn't see him do it but you know he did). This means that in order to show you (or your chattel) were injured by spray drift you will probably have to file a claim in trespass. However, chemical spray drift is so intangible it is difficult for plaintiffs to meet the requirements for a trespass claim. States’ approaches to trespass for securing damages resulting from spray drift vary, and this can mean that a plaintiff must carefully plead interference with exclusive possession (your right to the land) together with injury meaning substantial property damages or damage that is physical, to establish their cause of action in trespass. | The only avenue for tenant liability would be if the tenant is responsible for the damage. The courts have not assigned responsibility for damage resulting from other people's disagreement with a political expression to the person expressing the viewpoint. You are generally free to peacefully express yourself, and as a renter this would be part of your right of "quiet enjoyment of the premise". If there is a lease condition that says "no political signs", then maybe that's a violation of the contract, but that might also be an illegal term in your state or city (under landlord-tenant laws). Since you have the right to express your opinion, the courts must respect that right and not deem that engaging in political expression negates your other rights. In general, if someone commits a crime, the law does not say "but you take the blame if you express your political opinion". | The Missouri trespass law is here. The police will not detain a person for expressing himself, even repeatedly, though a court order to stay away would change things. The law says A person does not commit the offense of trespass in the first degree by entering or remaining upon real property unless the real property is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders or as to which notice against trespass is given by: (1) Actual communication to the actor; or (2) Posting in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders. You can also use purple paint markers. There is also a law against stalking which prohibits unwanted communication that may be threatening, intimidating, frightening or causes emotional distress to another person. However, you need to petition the courts for an order of protection. If granted, violating the order would be a felony, and more likely to get the attention of the police. Getting an attorney is the simplest immediate solution, since I expect that purple paint won't mean much to him. | You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company. |
Can an employee in the UK (England) be imposed a contractual duty to subject themselves to marijuana tests? Bob, a citizen of the UK, is a white collar employee of a UK construction company. They never engage in hazardous work or work that is, within the scope of its risk, can endanger others. Can the employer fire Bob if they refuse to provide saliva sample for a marijuana test? | Can the employer fire Bob if they refuse to provide saliva sample for a marijuana test? Maybe, if drug testing is an enforceable condition of Bob's contract of employment. An employer's drug testing policy has to be justified according to the nature of the work carried out and requires an employee's consent. If Bob is required to occasionally operate machinery, for example, then it may be proportionate to include mandatory testing in his contract of employment. Workers can’t be made to take a drugs test but if they refuse when the employer has good grounds for testing, they may face disciplinary action. Source ETA Employers have a legal duty of care under s.2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health, safety, and welfare of their employees. Employees have a comparable duty under s.7 to take reasonable care of themselves and anyone who could be affected by their work. This duty of care may extend to requiring an employee to give their consent for drug testing / screening - as long as the process is fair to all, proportionate and justified, in all the given circumstances, to enable the employer to discharge this duty. | Unless your employer agreed in a contract to not discuss your employment, then there is no legal restrictions on them discussing anything about your employment. If they say things that are untrue you could sue them for defamation. | It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal. | Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to. | What would the implications be if an employee were to refuse signing an amendment and insist on what was stated in the original signed contract, even if he/she knows it's a mistake? The contract is voidable unless the employer's subsequent conduct reinforces its legitimacy. The employee's attempt to take advantage of something he knew was a mistake contravenes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on which contracts are premised. South African contract law is not an exception to this: The law of contract underpins private enterprise in South Africa and regulates it in the interest of fair dealing. The employer can resort to records of prior communications between the parties to prove that the stated compensation was intended as yearly, not monthly. Even if those records are not available in a judicial dispute, the employee would have a hard time persuading a court that the salary that was agreed upon is 12 times --or exceeds by a factor of 12-- the market rate for a job position of similar type. | Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure. | Legally obtain employee’s covid vaccination status without employee’s consent? No Request employee to provide one. On grounds of what law? Anyone can ask anyone anything, however, I presume you are asking when they can demand to see your certificate. Employers have a general right to issue reasonable and lawful instructions to employees and failing to comply is misconduct. The direction to show a certificate is certainly legal and almost certainly reasonable given the employer’s obligations under Work Health and Safety law. More directly, all businesses in NSW are required to have and update a COVID-Safe Plan. It is perfectly reasonable for them to require employees to divulge their vaccination status. In certain workplaces it may be appropriate for them to mandate vaccinations. Also, there are various Public Health Orders under the Public Health Act 2010 that mandate vaccinations for health care workers, aged care workers (and visitors), child care and care workers. An employer has a legal obligation to check this. In addition, there are requirements under the Public Health (COVID-19 General) Order 2021 under the Public Health Act 2010 requiring some business to check in all visitors to the premises (including employees) including checking their vaccination status. This is what a status check looks like. There are 45 types of premises and events in this category listed in Schedule 5. Terminate employment should employee decide not provide this information or openly declare that they do not want to get vaccinated? What is the law allowing to discriminate the employee on their vaccination status? This is a typical office environment, nothing to do with health care or public sector. Yes. More specifically, refusing a lawful and reasonable instruction is misconduct and, if persistent, may warrant dismissal. If they refuse vaccination in a workplace where vaccines are legally mandated or where the employer has required them (and the requirement is reasonable to protect the legitimate interests of the business), they are similarly disobeying a lawful and reasonable direction. Case law in industries where flu vaccines are mandated is clear - refusal to have them is a legitimate reason for dismissal. There is no doubt this will be good law for COVID vaccines. Decisions on whether an employer not in a mandated industries can make vaccines mandatory have only been made at the Tribunal level so no precedents have been set but the general thrust of these decisions is if it is a reasonable precaution to protect other employees or the public (e.g. if social distancing and PPE is impractical or not likely to be effective): yes. So far, no employee has been successful in an unfair dismissal claim. | In general, yes. 1 USC 109 states that: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. Translated into plain English, this means that if you were to smoke marijuana in a Yellowstone National Park campground today, and Congress were to pass an act saying "28 USC 841 is repealed" tomorrow, you could still be arrested and convicted for possession of a controlled substance next week. However, if the act instead stated "28 USC 841 is repealed and no retroactive prosecutions shall take place", then you can't be convicted. (The other half of 1 USC 109 is basically the same thing, applied to temporary laws: if a temporary law expires, you can still be prosecuted for actions taken while the law was in effect, unless the law states otherwise.) |
Can the word "Cola" be used for commercial purposes? I want to start doing some media stuff on YouTube etc and would like to have the word "Cola" in my name (e.g. names like ColaFinder, ColaCabin, StaleCola etc.). Now I am trying to figure out whether the word "Cola" is subject to any IP laws/is trademarked etc. Unfortunately googling for it ALWAYS returns "can I use coke", and not just "cola". I'm not looking for any legally binding counsel - I am aware of the limitations of this site. Just trying to get some inputs on this as I struggle to find info online. FWIW my research has uncovered that there is a plant called cola: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cola_(plant) , so I figure it can not be trademarked on it's own, one can only trademark a specific combination? | Can the word "Cola" be used for commercial purposes? It depends on what you want to do with it, but most uses would be permissible. "Cola" is, as you note, a generic term, comparable to "trout" or "sugar" or "beer." Still, generic words may be subject to trademark protection. Even "coca" is a generic word. Such protection is, furthermore, not exclusive; trademark protection is more subtle and complex than most people realize. There might be a company called "Cola" that operates guided outdoor activities, but that wouldn't necessarily prevent an unrelated company of the same name from pursuing the same business in another jurisdiction. Similarly, it might not prevent a company that repairs household appliances in the same jurisdiction from calling itself "Cola." For example, in the US, you can buy "Dove" personal care products and "Dove" chocolate; they are sold under distinct trademarks. The central criterion is confusion: trademark protection primarily prevents others from confusing consumers about the source of goods or services. Even if a word or phrase is unambiguously a protected trademark, there are still allowable uses, most notably to designate the product, service, or company associated with the trademark. For example, if someone wants to tell a story about a bottle of Coca Cola (or even to claim "our product is better than Coca Cola"), the owner of the Coca Cola trademark cannot use trademark protection to prevent them from using the phrase "Coca Cola" in the story (or to make the claim). For a specific opinion about a specific use of a specific trademark, you should engage a qualified lawyer with experience in trademark law. | A company's or brand's logo is often protected as a trademark. It may also be protected by copyright, unless it is so simple as not to be subject to copyright protection, unlike a name, which is normally not protected by copyright. But trademark protection is likely to be more important for the kind of use described in the question. One may not, in general, use a trademark without permission in such a way as to suggest that a product or service comes from the trademark owner when it does not, or is sponsored, endorsed, or approved by the trademark owner when it is not. One may also not use a trademark or any similar mark in such a way that consumers my reasonably be confused, thinking that the marked product or service is the one for which the trademark is normally used. This is know as passing off. In some counties a trademark is only protected if it is registered with the government. in others, like the US, some protection is granted simply on use of the mark, although registration may grant additional protections. Nominative Use It is, in most countries, permitted to use a trademark to refer to the product or service represented by the mark, without permission. This is known as nominative use, because the mark is used as the name of the product or service. Statements such as Our cola has half the calories of PeppyCola. Our GreatBattery is compatible with a Pear28 cellphone. However, valid nominative use usually requires using as little of the trademark as possible. In the US at least, this has been interpreted to mean that it is permitted to use the word or words which constitute the name of the product or service to be referred to, but not the logo or other graphic mark for that product or service. The uses mentioned in the question seem like nominative uses, and it should be fine to use thew name or text representation of the service to be linked to. For example "Buy on Amazon" might be the text of a link to an amazon page from a page advertising a book or other item. But using the amazon graphic logo probably requires permission. Stock Symbols Note that stock symbols are text, not graphics. Moreover, in registering with a stock exchange, I believe that a company explicitly permits the stock symbol to be used to represent the stock, so the trading platform example is a bit different from the other examples. However, use of graphic logos on a trading platform would have the4 same possible issues as other logo uses. Permission In many cases online companies routinely grant limited permission to use their logos to indicate links to their sites, or compatibility with their products. In other cases they may be willing to grant such permission on request. Any use covered by such permission is lawful, But only to the limits of the permission granted. any use beyond that would need to be justified by an exception to trademark protection, such as nominative use. Permission would normally cover copyright as well as trademark issues. Copyright Use of a logo protected by copyright without permission. would also be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright applies. In the US fair use is the most common exception, and would probably apply to most of the kinds of uses described in the question, which do not harm the market for the original copyrighted work, and fit the other fair use factors. In other countries, there are various exceptions to copyright which may apply, including "fair dealing". The exact scope of these exceptions will vary from country to country. Again, obtaining permission will prevent any such problems. | I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.) | Generally speaking pop-culture references, like literary references, are neither trademark infringement nor copyright infringement. Trademarks Often a referenced item is in fact not a trademark. Most character names, for example, are not protectable as trademarks, because they are not used to identify the product or service, nor to advertise the product or service for sale. Similarly many pop-culture references which are associated with various groups, events, or products are not being used to identify or promote those things, and so are not protectable as trademarks. Even when a reference is (or includes) a trademarked phrase, it is unlikely to be trademark infringement. As long as the user of the trademarked term or phrase is not using it so as to identify the product or service where it is used, is not using it to advertise or promote that product or service, is not using it in such a way as to cause confusion by reasonable people on what the source of the product or service is, and is not using it so as to falsely state or imply that the product ore service is endorsed, sponsore, or approved by the owner of the trademark, then the use is not in fringement. One may use a trademark to identify a related product or service, to indicate compatibility, or to make comparative claims, and that is nominative use (using the mark as the name of the thing marked). Nominative use is specifically not infringement. Copyright Names, taglines, titles, mottos, and other short phrases are not protected by copyright at all. See the US Copyright office Circular 33 -- Works Not Protected by Copyright, where it is stated: Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, , distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. This circulart includes as exMPLES: The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression As I wrote in https://writing.stackexchange.com/questions/60965/what-are-the-fair-use-rules-in-the-usa-for-short-quotes-from-books-or-song-lyric Literary references, including short quotes, to other works of fiction are commonly allowed as fair use. They are usually appropriately attributed. There are several reasons for this. Such references normally do not serve as a replacement for the original. They normally do not harm the market, actual or potential for the original. And they are often transformative, that is, they re-user has a different purpose and achieves a different effect from the original. All of these factors are important in fair-use decisions, and all lean toward fair use for literary or pop-culture references. In fact, there are few cases to cite on such references, because it is so widely accepted that they would be fair uses that no on ever sues over them. | The most important fact to bear in mind is that there's no way to predict whether a given individual will decide to file a suit against you, though we might say on what basis he might, if he so chooses. There are two basic grounds for a suit, one pertaining to trademarks and the other pertaining to use of names – misappropriation and violating the right of publicity. A word can be a trademark, but the scope of protection is somewhat narrow because the protection is in terms of use within a given business. So calling your computer company "Apple" is out, but calling you roofing service the same is okay (assuming that somebody didn't previously register "Apple Roofing"). The main consideration is the likelihood of confusion. Supposing your business were selling landline telephones and I don't think Apple computer company sells such phones, you might still be in trouble if you called your company "Apple Phone", since they certainly do sell phones. There are thousands of trademarks that include "Puff", including Cocopuffs and various pizza and cheese puffs. Since "Puff" is such a generic word, there is a higher bar to proving infringement (there are thousands of trademarks including "Puff"). "Puff Daddy" is, however, a registered trademark covering perfume, jewelry, clothing and certain online services, so there is a non-negligible chance of confusion. In the case of names (or apparent names), an additional concern is whether this is commercial exploitation without consent of a person's name (which causes harm to the subject). The underpinning of this tort is that such a use falsely implies an endorsement of the product. Again, with a fairly generic word like Puff, there isn't a clear implication that Sean Combs has endorsed a product that is called "Puff Communications", but "Puff Daddy Communications" would almost certainly cross that line. The main issues, then, are the extent to which the name is generic vs. unique, and whether it is likely that a person would interpret the product or service as being the same as another, or would constitute an endorsement. | Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ... | There must be a use in commerce Assuming there are no other barriers to trademark protection, you are asking what amounts to a "use in commerce" that is sufficient to warrant trademark protection (I'm assuming in United States law). In the United States, the protection comes from the Lanham Act, and protection requires "use in commerce". See e.g. International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003). This requires "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark" (15 U.S.C. § 1127). This does not require a sale and token sales are not determinative However, "the existence of sale or lack thereof does not by itself determine whether a user of a mark has established owenrship rights therein" (Planetary Motion v. Techplosion, 261 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2001)): announcement of a title ("Plasmer") to 13 million comic book readers and promotion at a trade conference was sufficient to establish trademark rights, even without sales but a toy manufacturer's promotional efforts were not sufficient—they only made a few presentations and even made one sale to a toy retailer The talismanic test is whether or not the mark was used "in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark" (Windows User, Inc. v. Reed Business Publishing Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), citing New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 417 (1st Cir. 1951)) The Court in Planetary Motion says "Courts applying the 'totality of circumstances' approach routinely have found evidence of a few sales of goods to which the mark had been affixed insufficient to establish trademark ownership." In the particular case in Planetary Motion, the Court found that free distribution of software using the "Coolmail" mark constituted a "use in commerce." The factors they noted were: the distribution was widespread there was evidence that the public actually associated the mark with the software distribution was not limited to a trade show or a group of friends or small circle the software was posted and accessible on the internet using the filename bearing "Coolmail" users were communicating about the software using the word "Coolmail" the software was incorporated into other software that was sold the software was distributed under a GNU General Public License—"the sufficiency of use should be determined according to the customary practices of a particular industry" Application is fact-based, looking at the totality of the circumstances Applying the principles from above to your hypothetical, the fact that there are not widespread sales would raise an immediate issue that could be argued in litigation. The question would come up as to whether this was a "bona fide use" and not use "made merely to reserve a right in a mark." In my view, the single donation of one dollar would not change anything; nor would even a literal sale of a single shirt. The question would turn on whether the distribution of 100,000 shirts, even without sale, created a connection in the minds of users between the mark and a product (presumably clothing?), and put others on sufficient notice that this mark was to be used in commerce. This is a heavily fact-based inquiry, and on the facts of the hypothetical, we just don't have the information to answer this. | This is known as nominative fair use. The leading case in the US is New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). The International Trademark Association (ITA) summarizes: Nominative fair use generally is permissible as long as (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark, (2) only so much of the mark is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service and (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. The ITA uses iPhone cases as an example of allowable nominative use: Use of “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6. Here is an example of that by J.Crew. |
Is it illegal to sell a spell online? This question is for the United States in general for online marketplaces. Some history: Back in 2012, Ebay stopped the sale of spells, and now Etsy has also banned the sale of spells. They have both banned several things that are not illegal to sell, but questionable. I am not concerned about whether it is 'moral' or against a religion, but rather whether the seller and/or the site that the spell was sold on could be held liable for anything? An assumption would be that the buyer would get some proof that the spell was performed. This could be a photo, video, skype session, or some other form of proof. The proof may be downloaded, mailed, or in person delivered. If it is against the law, what law / regulation? I've seen several posts stating that it's against the law, but no one has mentioned an applicable law. Also, what would be the legal difference between a spell and a prayer? | Selling online is unclear. However, selling in the mail, the court has held that, based on 18 U.S.C.A. S1341 (Frauds and swindles): Therein the weight of authority is that astrologers, conjurers, fakirs, magicians, mediums, and all variety of pretenders to supernatural power, and who assume to sell the same for money, are amenable to the criminal law of false pretenses. United States v. Calwer, 282 F. 1007 (D. Minn. 1923). In prosecution for devising a scheme and artifice to defraud and using the mails in connection therewith, which scheme consisted of representations by defendant that he was gifted with supernatural powers, evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction. Crane v. U.S., C.C.A.9 (Cal.) 1919, 259 F. 480, 170 C.C.A. 456 Notwithstanding constitutional provision as to religious freedom, it was an offense to pretend to believe in supernatural powers for the purpose of procuring money and to use the mails in pursuance of such purpose. New v. U.S., C.C.A.9 (Cal.) 1917, 245 F. 710, 158 C.C.A. 112, certiorari denied 38 S.Ct. 334, 246 U.S. 665, 62 L.Ed. 928. These are mostly lower court cases (the last has a cert. denial from the Supreme Court, meaning the Supreme Court effectively upheld the lower court's decision without making it the law of the land), and both were from nearly 100 years ago. It is reasonable to assume that one would still incur liability for facilitating "Frauds and swindles" over the internet. | What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea. | This would probably be legally considered "gambling' Gam,bling is prohibited in many US states and a good many non-US jurisdictions. It is significantly regulated in most US jurisdictions where it is legal, often requiring a specific license. Analyzing laws on this subject in all 50 US states would be beyond the scope of an answer here. This is definitional the sort of thing where consulting a local lawyer, experienced in this area of law, would be wise. Maryland law As an example I will cite the specific laws which I think woulds apply to the situation described n the question in teh US state oof Maryland. The Maryland criminal code Section 12-201 provides that: In this subtitle, "lottery device" means a policy, certificate, or other thing by which a person promises or guarantees that a number, character, ticket, or certificate will, when an event or contingency occurs, entitle the purchaser or holder to receive money, property, or evidence of debt. Thus an entry or ticket issues by such an app, would be "lottery device" if winners were paid in money or things exchangeable for money or property, which would include gift cards. Section 12-203 provides that: (a) Prohibited.- A person may not: (a) (1) hold a lottery in this State; or (a) (2) sell a lottery device in the State for a lottery drawn in this State or elsewhere. Section 12-205 provides that: (b) Prohibited.- A person may not: (b)(1) bring a lottery device into the State; or (b)(2) possess a book, list, slip, or record of: (b)(2)(i) the numbers drawn in a lottery in this State or another state or country; (b)(2)(ii) a lottery device; or (b)(2)(iii) money received or to be received from the sale of a lottery device. Section 12-206 provides that: b) Prohibited.- A person may not print, write, or publish an account of a lottery that describes: (b)(1) when or where the lottery is to be drawn; (b)(2) any prize available in the lottery; (b)(3) the price of a lottery ticket or share of a lottery ticket; or (b)(4) where a lottery ticket may be obtained. Most plausible ways to advertise an app as described in the question would seem to violate this section. Section 12-208 provides that: A court shall interpret §§ 12-201 through 12-207 of this subtitle liberally to treat as a lottery ticket any ticket, part of a ticket, or lottery device by which money is paid or another item is delivered when, in the nature of a lottery, an event or contingency occurs. So if it is arguably a lottery, the court will treat it as one. Section 12-209 provides that: A grant, bargain, or transfer of real estate, goods, a right of action, or personal property is void if it occurs while engaging in, or aiding or assisting in a lottery. So winners cannot lawfully collect prizes. In short any such app would seem to viol;ate several sections of Maryland law if it is used of promoted in Maryland | I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images. | This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing. | The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience. | I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal. | I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies. |
Has the defence of 'speed is relative' ever been used in court? On the road we may often see signs on how fast we can go on that road, but there is an ambiguity in all signs, in what frame is the sign saying? Hence, in a way, all road signs could be argued to be utter non sense unless the frame of reference in which the speed is taken is limited. Has this defence ever been used in course? Does there exist provisions in any legal system to fix this legal loophole? | I do not know whether anyone has ever tried it, but it would not take much for a judge to conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of a speed limit sign is that the speed is to be measured relative to the surface of the road or to any other object that is stationary in that frame of reference. Does there exist provisions in any legal system to fix this legal loophole? Most rules for interpreting legal texts fix "loopholes" of this sort by providing for the consideration only of interpretations that are reasonably likely to have been intended, or that a reasonable person might arrive at. The interpretation that the speed limit could be measured against any frame of reference (or indeed any one other than that of the Earth's surface) is not reasonable. | They have the same standard of proof but different onus The legal system places the onus of proving an allegation on the person making the allegation. For your example, this is A if they are suing B or the government prosecutor if B is being prosecuted. The standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt” if B is defending a criminal prosecution and “balance of probabilities” if B is defending a civil prosecution or a lawsuit. Courts have historically been reluctant to define these terms further because doing so can lay grounds for an appeal if the judge oversteps so they mean what their plain English formulation means and what they mean precisely in any given case is one of the things the trier of fact has to decide. For A or the prosecutor to win, they have to meet this burden for each and every element of the offence or cause of action; if they don’t, then B wins. So, B doesn’t have to offer a defence at all and will still win if A doesn’t meet their burden. If B does offer a defence then the trier of fact compares the evidence of each side and decides which they prefer and therefore whether A has met their burden. A jury doesn’t have to give reasons for their decision; a judge does. In general, the decisions of the trier of fact are not appealable unless there was no reasonable basis in evidence to support the decision. For example, the evidence of B might not be believed - this is fine, unless the reason for not believing it is that B has a beard and everyone with beards are liars. Options 2 and 3 are simple matters of comparing evidence and deciding which is preferred. Option 1 is different; it is what’s called an affirmative defence. Here, A has met their burden because B conceded. Now B is relying on the position that they had a legal excuse, that is B is alleging a position and B has the burden of proving it. Now, the burden on B is always “balance of probabilities” because B is not alleging that anyone committed a crime so they don’t have to reach the criminal standard. | Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | england-and-wales What would realistically happen to this person, legally speaking? Nothing The most common speeding offence is at section 89(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 A person who drives a motor vehicle on a road at a speed exceeding a limit imposed by or under any enactment to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence. And, section 1(1)(c) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 requires a Notice of Intended Prosecution (NIP) be served to the car’s registered keeper within 14 days of the offence, but as the car had false plates there is no way to identify who this was. If that 14 day deadline is not met, then the driver cannot be prosecuted regardless of any confession. | This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied. | If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept. |
For what crime can you get jailed if a criminal leases you a stolen art piece? What crime can you get jailed for if a criminal leases you a stolen art piece? Let's say you loan an art piece for 1 day, and then you call the authorities because you know it was stolen, can you still get criminally prosecuted for it and for what crime? | england-and-wales Although there's the potential for money laundering the more obvious offence is Handling Stolen Goods contrary to s.22 of the Theft Act 1968 (1) A person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of the stealing) knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person, or if he arranges to do so. (2) A person guilty of handling stolen goods shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. Note that any criminal liability will depend on one's mens rea (i. e. their guilty knowledge) when obtaining the stolen item. That said - the authorities, after considering all the evidence and circumstances, may prefer to use the recipient as a witness against the person from whom they received the artwork instead of prosecuting them. | As the previous reply says, you can't steal something if it was yours already. That's by definition – stealing can only be of something that isn't your possession. However there are three ways you can have a problem despite this, partly referred to in another answer: If there is a law or other legal basis for the other person to have control and keep that object, either for a while or indefinitely. So if your phone is legitimately taken by a police officer, you can't "steal" it but you may still not have the right to take it. But this would be treated as some other crime, not "theft." If you cannot gain legal access it, and would have to commit another kind of crime to get it back. So you can't legally get back money by hacking someone's bank account, or defrauding them, or get back an object by breaking down their front door or using illegal force, or by making unlawful threats and blackmail.On the other hand, if you were invited by them to visit their house (or persuaded them to let you visit) and you found it and took it back while visiting under their consent, or they gave you a lift and while in the car you rummaged in the glove compartment and saw your property there, then the issue of legal consent for access is potentially a non-issue, meaning that taking it back under those conditions (even against their objections when they realised) may well be technically legal in many cases, depending on the exact facts of the case and applicable law. (less likely) If something has happened that means, technically, it isn't yours any more, or never was yours. For example, you accidentally give or throw your valuable phone away in error and someone else legitimately (in law) assumes ownership afterwards, or sign away or renounce something without realising it, or allow someone to use something in a way that gives them some ownership-like rights over it, so that by law you are deemed to have relinquished or waived some/all of your rights as an owner (the other person was honest and didn't defraud you), and you later try to take it back without consent, then in principle you could now be seen as stealing it back.You might also believe something is absolutely yours but in fact legally you don't own it and never did. For example you 'bought' some music or software, or a right to use something under license, and believe you actually own it or that you have a moral right to own it. So, later on, you sell it, dispose of it to someone else, or treat it as yours, when in law, it never was yours to do these things. Technically depending on the situation and exact wording of the law, this might be construed as stealing, in some cases and some jurisdictions. Between these legal limits, there is a grey area where you can get it back in practice despite an illegality. For example if the unlawful access is so minor you are sure it won't be a criminal issue, or you're sure it wouldn't be reported, you might chance it. But that's not a legal issue as much as a personal one. An interesting variant of this applies in English law, although I doubt it has any legal relevance in US law. In English law, "theft" was defined by the Theft Act 1968 as, "A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with intention to permanently deprive the other of it". This meant that a person who could show a court that they did not "intend" to "permanently deprive", or did not act "dishonestly" or "appropriate" the property (treat it as if they were its owner), might in fact have a strong legal defence against a charge of theft. Update from comment below "If you saw it in a shop would you be able to take it and run away?" You wouldn't have to. In almost all cases if something isn't legally yours, you can't legally pass ownership to anyone else, such as a store, whether for money or not, because it wasn't ever yours to pass good (legal) title. So the item is still owned by its original legitimate owner, meaning the exact same legal position still applies as above, if you had discovered it was in someone's house. It could change hands many times (not just once) from thief to fence to store to shopper to friend as a gift, and even so, the same would still apply - it would remain yours in law. If anything it's a bit easier if you saw it in a shop. A shop usually consents to members of the public entering - they don't have to ask normally! - and you might ask to see the item or look closely (if it's locked in the window). You now have it with consent and without any crime. If confident, you can walk out completely legally with your possession. (Tracking down the "rogue" or recovering any money paid for it, is their problem not yours in the eyes of the law). That said, realistically you wouldn't do it that way. This is slipping into personal view rather than law, but this is how I'd do it instead of "grab and run." Assuming a "typical" store and store staff, you would ask them to fetch the manager, and you would explain firmly that you claim this is your stolen property, and therefore not owned by them (nor do they have any rights to make any decisions about it), and you are taking it back. You would offer sight of ID or some means of contact, telling them this is so that they have a means to contact you, if they wish to dispute it via lawyers or police. You would offer to wait for the police if they wish, but maintain that you are not parting with it and they may call the police if they disagree; when they arrive, tell the police exactly the same, and that you have given your ID and waited there, as a mark of good faith, and invite them to come back with you to see where you live or proof of purchase or anything else, if relevant. You would tell the police that if they think you have committed a crime according to the law then they must of course arrest you for it, but if not, you now wish to go. You would meet any police request to give it to the police or store by asserting that it is your property and you would rather not, or by asking if you will be committing a criminal offence (if so which) if you refuse, and refuse if you feel able to do so. Then follow whichever way it goes. You would do these things because they are fair, reasonable, and they mark you out as someone asserting a right, not a thief yourself, and they reduce the odds that you will be taken for a thief, or meet with violence in their efforts to recover it. After all, the storekeeper and police can claim "reasonable belief" for any of their actions afterwards, so it's best that you reduce their likelihood of something nasty. | I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen. | Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me. | Anyone can be arrested, as long as the police (and in some cases, anyone) have probable cause to do so. This generally includes two points: You are in the process of committing a criminal act The police have probable cause, generally through evidence, that you are in the process of, about to, or have committed a criminal act. This usually requires obtaining a warrant for the arrest. However, it's important not to conflate searches with arrest. Arrests are when you are being taken into custody for the reasons mentioned above. Searches are when your personal belongings (i.e. property), are searched to collect evidence. It is not up to police to convict someone. This is the job of the judicial system. There's a bit of terminology here: convictions basically mean being found guilty of an offence. Police don't have the ability to convict someone of an offence. They do have the ability to arrest, and charge with an offence. To charge someone with a crime basically means to accuse them of having done something. Now let's get to the actual crime. Since you haven't mentioned a specific jurisdiction, I'm going to use Canadian cases and law, but in general, it should apply worldwide. If the police have reason to believe that you are engaging in unlawful hacking-related behaviour, then they have the authority to arrest you. They simply need to have a reasonable belief that you are engaged in the crime. Something such as connecting you with an IP address and connecting that you were online at the time is enough. If the police need to find out more information (which they generally do, to investigate further into the matter) - they can obtain a search warrant afterwards. With this, they can legally search into your computer, and investigate. Any evidence that they collect can be used in court. I've recently done some research into cyber crimes. One rather infamous case involved the attack on multiple large scale websites, including Dell, Yahoo, and Amazon, in 2000. This sparked a large scale investigations, between the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and the FBI. The attacks were claimed by some to cause nearly 1.7 billion dollars of damage. The hacker was charged with 58 different offences. You can imply from the linked article that he was arrested before his computer was searched. | As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting. | Your confessions, to anyone, can be used against you. If A admits to B that A stole the car, B can testify to what A said. In fact, if B accuses A of a crime and A says nothing (and C witnesses this), C can testify as to what B and A said (or didn't say) – this is known as an adoptive admission, and it is up to the jury to decide if they think the silence is significant. Recordings are likewise admissible. All evidence is in principle defeasible, so if there is a video of "you" committing a crime, you can make the case that it wasn't really you, and the jury will weigh the evidence to see if they are firmly convinced that you did commit the crime (at least in New Jersey... long story about 'burden of proof'). | None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of "breaking" Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage |
Can citizens exercise constitutional right to abolish state government? Could U.S. citizens realistically abolish their state government, if that power is declared in their state constitution, but no methods are described? If they could, would that state face federal challenges, such as having to be re-recognized by Congress and the President? If a state constitution (such as Idaho) has an article like: All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform or abolish the same whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature. Is there any actual muscle behind that declaration? No thresholds or processes are described how "the people" would be able to abolish the state government. If the constitution also declares the people grant the legislature to manage laws to govern on the people's behalf, doesn't it create a conflict of who has the ultimate power: the people or the legislature? However, related to this, states that have constitutional amendments granting citizen ballot initiatives, referendums on recently passed laws, and recall of elected officials, also usually have language declaring something like: "...under such conditions and in such manner as may be provided by acts of the legislature...". For example, in Idaho, the initiatives amendment was passed in 1912, but laws establishing "conditions and manner" weren't passed until 1936. Initiatives can only apply to state laws, but not the state constitution. The state supreme court later ruled that initiative laws have "equal footing" with laws passed by the legislature. Scenario Assumptions: 3/4 of state citizens are fed up with many state government controls and actions. They agree that normal processes like public testimony, initiatives, referenda, elections, and recall effort have failed to make any changes that the public wants. This could be a result of district gerrymandering, impossible initiative requirements, etc. They want many changes wholesale, and 3/4 of voters want to exercise their constitutional right to abolish the state government. Nobody is suggesting violence or rebellion. All processes will follow pre-abolishment laws. The new constitution will still be legal under federal laws. No declaring rights to slaves, polygamy, banning interracial or same-sex marriage, etc. The state name will not change. The government would be simultaneously replaced by something that was still a republican form of government? By "wholesale" I mean changes several amendments and state laws at the same time, not converting to communism or anything like that. UPDATE: By saying "All processes will follow pre-abolishment laws." I guess I mean they're trying to exercise the right to abolish without violence or insurrection, nothing that would justify military suppression. But it seems that cannot happen. | The scenario in the question says that: They [3/4ths of citizens] agree that normal processes like public testimony, initiatives, referenda, elections, and recall effort have failed to make any changes that the public wants Nobody is suggesting violence or rebellion. All processes will follow pre-abolishment laws. But if "normal processes" cannot be used to make the changes desired, then "pre-abolishment laws" are not being followed in all respects. Moreover, id the current elected officials do not agree to be replaced, then violence of some degree will be needed to remove them, or they may initiate violence in the form of attempted arrests of those leading the change process for violations of those "pre-abolishment laws". So these conditions are inconsistent, they cannot all be true. Luther v. Borden There is at least one highly relevant episode in US history, adn it was explored in the Supreme Court case of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) In connection with he opinion the Justia Syllabus says: At the period of the American Revolution, Rhode Island did not, like the other States, adopt a new constitution, but continued the form of government established by the Charter of Charles the Second, making only such alterations, by acts of the Legislature, as were necessary to adapt it to their condition and rights as an independent State. But no mode of proceeding was pointed out by which amendments might be made. In 1841, a portion of the people held meetings and formed associations which resulted in the election of a convention to form a new constitution to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. This convention framed a constitution, directed a vote to be taken upon it, declared afterwards that it had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the people of the State, and was the paramount law and constitution of Rhode Island. Under it, elections were held for Governor, members of the Legislature, and other officers, who assembled together in May, 1842, and proceeded to organize the new government. But the charter government did not acquiesce in these proceedings. On the contrary, it passed stringent laws, and finally passed an act declaring the State under martial law. In May, 1843, a new constitution, which had been framed by a convention called together by the charter government, went into operation, and has continued ever since. The question which of the two opposing governments was the legitimate one, viz., the charter government or the government established by the voluntary convention, has not heretofore been regarded as a judicial one in any of the State courts. The political department has always determined whether a proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision. The courts of Rhode Island have decided in favor of the validity of the charter government, and the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the state. The question whether or not a majority of those persons entitled to suffrage voted to adopt a constitution cannot be settled in a judicial proceeding. The Constitution of the United States has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power of recognizing a State government in the hands of Congress. Under the existing legislation of Congress, the exercise of this power by courts would be entirely inconsistent with that legislation. The President of the United States is vested with certain power by an act of Congress, and in this case, he exercised that power by recognizing the charter government. Although no State could establish a permanent military government, yet it may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The State must determine for itself what degree of force the crisis demands. In the Court's formal opinion, Chief Justice Taney wrote: We do not understand from the argument that the constitution under which the plaintiff acted is supposed to have been in force after the constitution of May, 1843, went into operation. T he contest is confined to the year preceding. The plaintiff contends that the charter government was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful power, after the organization, in May, 1842, of the government which he supported, and although that government never was able to exercise any authority in the State nor to command obedience to its laws or to its officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established government upon the ground that it was ratified by a large majority of the male people of the State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then existing laws of the State. The fact that it was so ratified was not admitted, and, at the trial in the Circuit Court, he offered to prove it by the production of the original ballots and the original registers of the persons voting, verified by the oaths of the several moderators and clerks of the meetings, and by the testimony of all the persons so voting, and by the said constitution, and also offered in evidence for the same purpose that part of the census of the United States for the year 1840 which applies to Rhode Island and a certificate of the secretary of state of the charter government showing the number of votes polled by the freemen of the State for the ten years then last past. The Circuit Court rejected this evidence, and instructed the jury that the charter government and laws under which the defendants acted were, at the time the trespass is alleged to have been committed, in full force and effect as the form of government and paramount law of the State, and constituted a justification of the acts of the defendants as set forth in their pleas. It is this opinion of the Circuit Court that we are now called upon to review. ... Certainly the question which the plaintiff proposed to raise by the testimony he offered has not heretofore been recognized as a judicial one in any of the State courts. In forming the constitutions of the different States after the Declaration of Independence, and in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision. ... The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates altogether to the constitution and laws of that State, and the well settled rule in this court is that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State. ... Besides, if the Circuit Court had entered upon this inquiry, by what rule could it have determined the qualification of voters upon the adoption or rejection of the proposed constitution unless there was some previous law of the State to guide it? It is the province of a court to expound the law, not to make it. And certainly it is no part of the judicial functions of any court of the United States to prescribe the qualification of voters in a State, giving the right to those to whom it is denied by the written and established constitution and laws of the State, or taking it away from those to whom it is given; nor has it the right to determine what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to, unless there is an established constitution or law to govern its decision. ... he fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Under this article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. ... ... by the act of February 28, 1795, provided that, in case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to sufficient to suppress such insurrection. ... By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere is given to the President. He is to act upon the application of the legislature or of the executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act. The fact that both parties claim the right to the government cannot alter the case, for both cannot be entitled to it. ... ... It is true that, in this case, the militia were not called out by the President. But, upon the application of the governor under the charter government, the President recognized him as the executive power of the State, and took measures to call out the militia to support his authority if it should be found necessary for the general government to interfere, and it is admitted in the argument that it was the knowledge of this decision that put an end to the armed opposition to the charter government and prevented any further efforts to establish by force the proposed constitution. The interference of the President, therefore, by announcing his determination was as effectual as if the militia had been assembled under his orders. And it should be equally authoritative. ... The court thus upheld the verdict for the defendants, and the authority o the government recognized by the President. It should be noted that this Case arose before the passage of the 14th and 15th amendments to the Federal Constitution, and particularly the Equal protection and Sue process clauses of the 14th, and the "one man, one vote" cases later decided under those clauses. If a state government in 2020 had laws similar to the Charter Government of Rhode Island in 1840, they would be struck down as against those clauses and amendments. But unless an "abolishment" as described in the question were to be recognized and the resulting government approved by the President and Congress, it would not be lawful, and federal authority and military force could be used to support the lawful government. | If you want to sue them, you should start with the US Constitution (as a model), in particular the Free Exercise clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". The question is whether one could overturn homicide statutes on the grounds that an individual holds to traditional beliefs that a human sacrifice is required every few months. Or, is it an unconstitutional prohibition of the Mormon belief in polygamy to outlaw polygamy, see Reynolds v. US, 98 U.S. 145. The court held that the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Observe that a religious exception to the law would be unconstitutional, as establishing religion as a means of gaining extra rights. The reductio ad absurdum of the unfettered religious-belief excuse is: Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. The "wall of separation" was modified more recently in the 60's and 70's. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the issue was compulsory education imposed on Amish children, where higher education was held to be antithetical to the Amish doctrine of a simple life. The court rules that The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children and especially it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish There were additional holdings pertaining to the legitimacy of the purported belief (that is, is there really such a doctrine – clearly yes). You might have better luck purporting to be a Rastafarian or Hindu, so I will set aside that complication. The core question will be whether the government has a "compelling interest" in the restriction, also whether the restriction is narrowly tailored. In the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, Sherbert's employer required her to work 6 days a week (a change in policy during her time of employment), which she refused to do (as a member of SDA) and was fired. Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits because the firing was for cause. The court ruled that Disqualification of appellant for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion. and There is no compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute which justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's right to religious freedom under the First Amendment. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 brings us to the neighborhood that you are interested in living in. The relevant detail is that Smith (and Black) were fired for ingesting peyote in connection with a ceremony at a Native American church. The court ruled that The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use To be more precise, Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. We can contrast this with Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520. The city of Hialeh passed an ordinance forbidding animal sacrifice, specifically to suppress the Santeria church. The Supreme Court said, no, you may not do that: Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied ... The ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's central element, animal sacrifice. At least so far, restrictions on drug use have not been overruled as conflicting the the Free Exercise clause, although if e.g. Washington state were to prohibit Mormons from purchasing marijuana (where others can), that would surely be struck down as unconstitutional. There are a number of other relevant developments, for example Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, in reaction to Employment v. Smith, and that law statutorily mandating that strict scrutiny be applied to the question of whether a law violates the 1st: but this was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. Then in Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (Schedule 1 tea for religious purposes), the court ruled that The courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca which is to say, we have a case where the federal government was prohibited from enforcing a drug prohibition involving religion. A challenge of the type which you have in mind will surely also involve the question of the legitimacy of the purported religion, where UDV was founded in 1961 whereas one might suspect that your claimed religion is a pretext to smoke pot (hence the Rastafarian suggestion). The WWII era conscious objector cases held that the CO exception to military service is not limited to governmentally-approved religions, but as a general rule, the courts have not ruled that you can simply claim to have a religious belief which is being infringed on and thereby be excempt from the law. The basic issue would be whether either the US government of the state of Kentucky have a compelling interest in preventing the use of marijuana. The Kentucky Supreme Court does indeed recognize the concept of "strict scrutiny", so the case is not doomed from the start. | Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.) | There are a number of specific limitation on what can be made criminal in US law, derived from constitutional protection. Specific Rights Expressions of free speech, for example, cannot be made criminal, although there can be laws which regulate or impact speech to a degree. Similarly, the establishment clause of the First Amendment prohibits a law requiring people to attend a particular church, and he free Exercise clause prohibits any criminal penalties for any religious practice or lack of practice. Most of the other provisions of the Bill of right would impose similar limitations. The legislature cannot criminalize what people have a constitutional right to do. Thre are also specific limitations not in the bill of rights, such as the prohibition of Ex Post Facto laws, the right to trial by jury, and the constitutional limitation of Treason laws. Rational Basis Beyond that the Due Process clause of the 5th and the parallel clause of the 14th impose limits on criminal law generally. Criminal laws must have (at least) a rational basis. The legislature cannot just prohibit picking up papers because they felt like it, they must have articulated a problem and a plausible reason why a given law would address it. If they don't the law may be overturned as unconstitutional. If a law is challenged as being unconstitutional, it will currently either be subject to rational basis analysis, or to one of the stricter levels. However a law which cannot pass rational basis analysis will not survive intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny either. Laws which appear to invade one of the enumerated rights, or a right that the Court has deemed "fundamental" are normally tested under either strict or intermediate scrutiny. According to the the Wikipedia article: Courts applying rational basis review seek to determine whether a law is "rationally related" to a "legitimate" government interest, whether real or hypothetical. The higher levels of scrutiny are intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. ... laws implicating unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court has not recognized as fundamental receive rational basis review. ... In modern constitutional law, the rational basis test is applied to constitutional challenges of both federal law and state law (via the Fourteenth Amendment). This test also applies to both legislative and executive action whether those actions be of a substantive or procedural nature. The rational basis test prohibits the government from imposing restrictions on liberty that are irrational or arbitrary, or drawing distinctions between persons in a manner that serves no constitutionally legitimate end. ... A court applying rational basis review will virtually always uphold a challenged law unless every conceivable justification for it is a grossly illogical non sequitur. (See Killian, Johnny H., George A. Costello, & Kenneth R. Thomas, co-eds., The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002, by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Senate Document No. 108-17, 108th Congress, 2d Session) and specifically Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) at 635) Rational Basis analysis became accepted after the demise of "substantive Due Process", mostly in a civil, rather than criminal context. A version of it was suggested in Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in the dissent by Justice Holmes. It was adopted as governing in [*Nebbia v. New York * In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 413 U.S. 528 (1973) The Court overturned, on a rational basis scrutiny, a law excluding households consisting of unrelated people from the Federal Food Stamp program, writing: [A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. Specific cases In Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) a law that criminalized the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was overturned on a rational basis review. Similar cases are now generally treated with intermediate scrutiny. In James v. Strange 407 U.S. 128 (1972). a Kansas law reclaiming payments for public defenders was overturens on rational basis review as “an impermissible burden on the right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright." In Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986), rational basis analysis was employed to sustain a statute criminalizing homosexual activity. However, this was later overturned.. Vagueness Also under Due Process, vague laws are prohibited. If a reasonable person cannot tell from the law what is or is not illegal, the law can be overturned for vagueness. Procedural protections Then there are procedural limits, also largely derived from the Due Process clause(s). A law cannot automatically convict people without a genuine hearing, in which a person can present a defense to an independent, impartial judge or jury. A law cannot impose duties which are flatly impossible to perform. A law cannot impose punishments which are considered unreasonable for the seriousness of the crime (as evaluated by judges). Other Limits There are other limits as well, it would take a book to list them all in detail. But those are some of the more frequently applied ones. | Can a state declare: "any violence against insert a group here shall not be prosecuted," which is pretty much what Nazis and Communists did, and then claim non-involvement in the violence that would ensue? This would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. https://www.justice.gov/crt/guidance-regarding-use-race-federal-law-enforcement-agencies goes into exhaustive detail on the topic of what may constitute an illegal abuse of selective enforcement. A key quote is highly relevant to your question: [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. There is a lot of case law on this topic. This is frequently discussed in the context of race (especially profiling). | Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so. | The article "The Posse Comitatus Act..." analyzes the legal restrictions on use of military power arising from that act. Following US v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, where the act played a role in trials related to Wounded Knee, it was found and subsequently supported in various ruling that the use which is prohibited by the posse comitatus statute is that which is regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in nature, and causes the citizens to be presently or prospectively subject to regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions imposed by military authority. Mere "involvement" of "deployment" of the military is not contrary to the act. It should also be noted that the act includes a provision for actions expressly authorized by Congress, as was the case of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the related Magnuson Act of 1950. Hypothetically (in extremis), Congress might pass a law requiring the seizure of persons infected with a disease. If Congress expressly authorized USAMRIID to effect such seizures, that would not be in violation of the act. Otherwise, it would be. Since USAMRIID is a research lab and not an enforcement arm of the military, it is both highly unlikely that Congress would authorize such activities or that USAMRIID would get involved in this way. W.r.t. their ordinary operations, scientific research, nothing in what they do that contradicts the Posse Comitatus Act. Since we are dealing in hypotheticals, I should point out that SCOTUS has so far not definitively endorsed the "regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory" test, so that test could be overturned, though it is unlikely to be. | Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment. |
What obligation is there for police to find and arrest false 911 callers? Oklahoma man held at gunpoint by police, handcuffed after false 911 call Given that 911 calls are recorded and the phone number is logged, I would expect that a motivated detective to quickly ID a suspect. Does said police department have any obligation to ID, investigate and detain / arrest the false caller? | Does said police department have any obligation to ID, investigate and detain / arrest the false caller? No. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 (2005). Usually, police do investigate, but that is a matter of department policy and political expectations, not a legal obligation to do so. | The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal. | In most states you are required to pull over to the side of the road and come to a stop for any vehicle displaying flashing red and/or blue lights, whether oncoming or overtaking. If you don't you are guilty of a moving violation.1 If the vehicle with the lights then pulls in behind you the same law forbids you from moving your vehicle. So that's the law for being pulled over by an unmarked car. If you are concerned that you were stopped in this manner by someone not authorized to do so (police impersonators have been known to do this) you should call 911 and get the dispatcher to confirm whether the apparent emergency vehicle is legitimate. In general, if you fear for your safety, you can stay in your car and ask to be escorted to a known police station before exposing yourself. E.g., here's the advice of one Ohio State Highway Patrolman: If the area where you stop looks desolate, Miller said you don't have to stop there. In fact, he said, "Proceed to that well lit area or a public building, the fire department, hospital." [B]efore you even stop, if you don't feel safe, "Use your cell phone to dial 9-1-1 and talk to the dispatcher, let her know what's going on, give your location and have her guide you as to what she wants you to do." There are some jurisdictions that restrict the use of "unmarked" cars by police. | There are certain situations where the law may require you to provide some information -- particularly when you've been pulled over for a traffic violation -- but it is typically limited to basic identifying information. Beyond that, it is legally advantageous to refuse to answer questions. If you are doing so, though, you should explicitly invoke your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and your Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Invoking the Fifth prevents the police from using your refusal to answer as evidence, and invoking the Sixth requires the police to stop asking you questions. It may, however, be practically disadvantageous to refuse to answer questions, as there are cops who are just looking for a reason to act like a psychopath. | There are some complexities here, and several possibilities. First of all, it seems from the question that: There were not any "exigent circumstances" or any other special situation which would justify making a search without a warrant (there are several circumstances which can justify a warrantless search, but none are mentioned in the question). The police had no probable cause, indeed not even any reasonable suspicion. Thus the police had no valid reason even to request a warrant, and if they had asked for one, they should have been refused. No resident of the house consented to any search at any point. The police had no honest belief that they were acting lawfully. They knew, or any reasonable police officer should have known, that they were acting unlawfully. Now, let us consider some of the possibilities left open by the question. For purposes of discussion, let us assume that the house was owned by Bob and Carol, and no one else lived in it. There are several possibilities. Case One: The evidence appears to implicate Bob. Bob is charged, and Bob's lawyer Joan makes a timely motion to suppress the evidence. The judge should hold a suppression hearing, and under these conditions, should suppress the evidence. The trial will go forward without it, or be dismissed if there is not enough other evidence to proceed. Case Two: Much like Case One, but another group of police officers had good reason to suspect Bob, and was already in the process of preparing a request for a warrant, supported by valid probable cause. Had the first group not searched the house unlawfully, the second group would have obtained a valid warrant and found the evidence under its authority. In this situation, known as inevitable discovery the evidence would be admitted, and the unlawful search will not matter. Case Three: The evidence implicates Fred, not Bob or Carol. Fred did not live in the house, but had asked Carol to store some boxes for him. Carol did not know what was in them. Fred has no privacy rights to the house. Bob or Carol could have lawfully consented to a search, and Fred would have no grounds to object. Fred has no grounds to suppress the evidence, as Fred's rights were not violated, and Fred cannot assert Bob or Carol's rights. A trial of Fred would proceed as if the search had been lawful. Bob and Carol may have grounds for a Section 1983 lawsuit against the police for violation of their rights, but that will not help Fred. Case Four: The evidence appears to implicate Bob. The police arrest Bob, and tell him that they have a case against him, and that if he does not confess, they will also arrest Carol as an accomplice. (They lie, but Bob believes them.) Bob pleads guilty. The unlawful search is never raised, and Bob is sentenced as if it had been lawful. Case Five: The evidence appears to implicate Bob. Bob's lawyer Joan fails to request a suppression hearing, or to object at trial to the evidence from the unlawful search. Or more likely, instead of going to trial, Bob's lawyer arranges a plea bargain without raising the issue of the search. Bob is convicted as if the search had been lawful. Bob may have a valid appeal on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, as Joan should have known better. Case Six: The evidence appears to implicate Bob. But the police have other evidence as well. Bob's lawyer raises the issue of the unlawful search. However, the prosecutor convinces Bob's lawyer Joan that they can probably convict Bob even without the evidence from the search. Joan arranges a plea bargain, and Bob accepts it. Bob will be sentenced under the plea deal, and nothing will be done about the unlawful search, except that Bob may get a somewhat better deal because the authorities do not want it exposed in court. Note that only in cases One and Five will a possibly guilty person possibly go free because of the unlawful search, and it is by no means certain even there. It is also possible that a judge will wrongly admit the evidence in a Case One situation. This is likely to be corrected on appeal, with the unlawfulness as blatant as the question assumes. In a case where the unlawfulness is more marginal, this is less sure. | There are a variety of situations like border crossings, entry into official buildings, etc. in which there is a general right for law enforcement to demand identification on a suspicionless basis, none of which seem to apply in this case. But, the most common justification for demanding ID is to make what is called a Terry stop (after the name of the U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld the legality of these stops in the face of 4th Amendment limitations on searches and seizures). Wikipedia accurately summarizes the law in this area as follows. A Terry stop is: a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that police may briefly detain a person whom they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity; the Court also held that police may do a limited search of the suspect's outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be "armed and dangerous". To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" that would indicate to a reasonable police officer that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity (as opposed to past conduct). Reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances", and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous. The search of the suspect's outer garments, also known as a patdown, must be limited to what is necessary to discover weapons; however, pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize contraband discovered in the course of a frisk, but only if the contraband's identity is immediately apparent. In some jurisdictions, persons detained under the doctrine of Terry must identify themselves to police upon request. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the Court held that a Nevada statute requiring such identification did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor, in the circumstances of that case, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self incrimination. New York is one of the many states that has a stop and identify statute, that allows an officer to insist on presentation of an identification any time there is a legal basis for making a Terry stop. The New York stop and identify statute is N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §140.50. This says: 1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security services for any court of the unified court system may stop a person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 4. In cities with a population of one million or more, information that establishes the personal identity of an individual who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer, such as the name, address or social security number of such person, shall not be recorded in a computerized or electronic database if that individual is released without further legal action; provided, however, that this subdivision shall not prohibit police officers or peace officers from including in a computerized or electronic database generic characteristics of an individual, such as race and gender, who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer. In this particular case, if the law enforcement officer were more clever, he would have said that he was concerned that the crew might be using the drone to case the property in order to commit a crime there in the future. And, if he had said that, this would surely pass muster for reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and would have provided a legal justification for demanding ID. The "about to commit a crime" justification for a Terry stop makes it, in practice, much broader than probable cause for an arrest, which requires that the police believe that a crime has actually already been committed or is in progress, not just that someone is about to commit a crime (a person may be subjected to a Terry stop even if his actions which tend to show he is about to commit a crime have not yet progressed to the level of an attempted offense for which someone may be convicted and are not truly imminent). (Actually, strictly speaking, the officer is only entitled to determine the information that an ID would reveal, and not to insist that someone actually have the ID on his person, under state law, although a local ordinance or court interpretation of the law could possibly give him the authority to actually demand an ID to determine this information. For example, California courts have held that a duty to provide basic information implies a duty to provide it in a verifiable manner.) The fact that the law enforcement officer failed to articulate any legal basis for the stop, yet went on to arrest the individuals, weakens the case that the stop was valid considerably, because generally, at least in theory, a law enforcement officer is supposed to be able to articulate the reasonable suspicion for the stop at the time that the stop is made and not days later after the fact. In addition to stop and identify laws, some states (including Colorado) have held that failing to provide an ID on demand, under the "totality of the circumstances" can sometimes constitute obstructing a police officer and provide a basis for an arrest. It isn't inconceivable that a law enforcement officer in this situation could make that argument and prevail at least in showing probable cause for arrest on that basis, even if it wasn't a sufficiently solid argument to give rise to an obstructing a police officer conviction. | a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself. | I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen. |
Why did double jeopardy not apply in the O.J. case? On 1995 O.J. was found not guilty in the famous murder case. This was in criminal court and after that he was tried for the same thing in civil court - except this time it was called wrongful death rather than murder. He was found "responsible" and ordered to pay $33.5 million in damages. How is this not double jeopardy? After being tried and found not guilty he was tried for the exact same thing in a different court. This source says: The catch is that the second trial involved civil charges, not criminal charges. The penalties are different -- imprisonment or even death for guilt in the criminal charge of first degree murder, but only financial penalties for the civil charges of being found liable for a death. Just because you call it a different name doesn't mean you aren't being tried for the same thing. If this is an actual loophole, doesn't it allow resourceful adversaries to lock their victims into court battles indefinitely? | "Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent. | Does double jeopardy prohibit prosecution, for the same event, in both federal and state court? No. Key precedents on the question are US v. Lanza (1922) and Abbate v. US (1959). From Lanza: The defendants thus committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense against that state is not a conviction of the different offense against the United States, and so is not double jeopardy. From Wikipedia's article on Abbate: Abbate asked that the Court overrule its prior decision, which the Court declined to do. The Court reasoned that overruling Lanza would result in serious and undesirable consequences. Particularly, the state conviction here resulted in only three months' imprisonment, while the federal conviction made up to five years of imprisonment available. The Court deemed this potential disparity to be problematic. The only way to ensure that federal law enforcement interests would be vindicated under such a regime would be to displace state power to prosecute actions that also constitute federal crimes, which would be a massive shift in the balance of criminal power as between the states and the federal government. In a comment, you raise a question about the last sentence: "The only way to ensure that federal law enforcement interests would be vindicated under such a regime would be to displace state power to prosecute actions that also constitute federal crimes," seems to state that not displacing state power to prosecute, under such circumstances, would keep the law enforcement interests un-vindicated (which would mean unjustified). So the only justified thing to do would be to try under the Federal law and to not try under the state law. "Vindicate" here does not mean justify but rather maintain or substantiate. The point is that if double jeopardy protected against prosecution by the federal government for a crime that has already been charged under state law, then states could effectively neuter federal crimes with which they disagreed by establishing a crime with identical elements and a token punishment. Another way of avoiding this outcome without permitting separate state and federal prosecutions for the same crime would be to prohibit state prosecutions altogether for acts that are also federal crimes. In other words, this says that the court found that the prohibition against double jeopardy allows these separate prosecutions because prohibiting them would require a "massive shift" in the responsibility for enforcing criminal law away from the states and toward the federal government. (Of course, this works both ways; if double jeopardy applied across sovereigns then the federal government could also neuter state laws. More generally, the current approach to double jeopardy may be seen as maintaining the balance of power between the states and the federal government, more than as protecting the interests of one side over those of the other.) | The question to be answered is "did the state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt", the answer to which should have no reasonable doubt. The interests of the defendant are sufficiently protected by the basic burden of proof requirement. The alternative that a single vote of not guilty exonerates the defendant would seriously hobble the interests of the people, and the alternative of automatic mistrial would make trials prohibitively expensive. The unanimity requirement does mean that in case of initial disagreement, parties have to re-think their positions, which is not a bad thing. The question of whethar a supermajority of guilty votes suffices for conviction was decided in a recent case, Ramos v. Louisiana, allowing conviction with a 10-2 vote. The court takes unanimity to be a basic common law right from the 14th century. Louisiana and Oregon had unconventional schemes allowing less than unanimous decisions: the reasoning behind the unanimity requirement is discussed extensively in that opinion. Since Alito, Roberts and Kagan dissented in part, the rationale for the other view is also spelled out. | In general, the perpetrator can be sued by anyone who suffered harm as a result of his actions. The fact that he's also being prosecuted criminally doesn't change that, nor does it matter whether or not the victim is a "celebrity". The perpetrator could, for instance, be sued by any or all of: the victim himself, for his pain and suffering and loss of earnings the victim's club, for the financial loss due to the player not playing the victim's medical insurer, for the cost of his care. However, even if any of these plaintiffs win their case and are awarded some huge sum of money, it doesn't help them if the perpetrator doesn't have the money. They can only actually collect what the perpetrator has, and possibly some fraction of his future earnings (which are not likely to be very much if he is in prison). So unless the perpetrator is quite wealthy, it's unlikely they would go to the trouble and expense of a lawsuit. | Given that a murder and an involuntary manslaughter are two different offenses, could a jury be asked to adjudicate on both counts? This happens routinely. Could it find the defendant guilty of both? Only for certain offenses. See lesser included offense. Could the DA even accuse the defendant of both during the same trial? Yes, which is how juries are asked to adjudicate multiple offenses as noted above. What about in different trials? All the crimes associated with a given act have to be tried at once. If you've been acquitted of murder in connection with one act, you can't subsequently be tried for involuntary manslaughter for the same act, nor vice versa. And what about murder and attempted murder? I don't think it's possible to be tried for an attempt when the crime has been successful; certainly, the opposite is true. But again, if the charges are based on the same act (i.e., we know you tried to kill the victim, and we know someone succeeded, but we don't know whether it was you) then the charges would have to be tried at the same time. | In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't". | You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm. | It happens all of the time, even though it is mildly improper. Usually, the lawyer can get away with it until the judge sternly warns the lawyer not to try it again, in which case the lawyer risks being held in contempt of court. This is riskier for a prosecutor (who risks this conduct causing a conviction to be overturned on appeal resulting in a new trial), than for a criminal defense attorney. This is because an acquittal, if obtained by these methods, is still not subject to appeal. Indeed, for a criminal defense attorney, even if it results in a mistrial followed by a new trial (which can be allowed if the mistrial is caused by the conduct of the defense), the mistrial will often count as a win if the trial was going badly on the merits. |
What's the meaning of © and ℗ on Spotify? At the bottom of an album page, Spotify shows certain details including © and ℗. For example for Taylor Swift's album 1984 https://open.spotify.com/album/2QJmrSgbdM35R67eoGQo4j © 2014 Big Machine Records, LLC. ℗ 2014 Big Machine Records, LLC. What's the meaning of © and ℗? In the example above they are identical, but when might they differ? | From https://artists.spotify.com/blog/talk-the-talk-music-terms-a-glossary P Line: In copyright law, the P Line is specific to musical works (the P stands for “phonogram”) and is represented by ℗. The purpose of this symbol is to indicate that legal rights are held for a sound recording and to identify the owner of those rights. You may have seen this printed on an LP sleeve or CD booklet accompanied by the year that the work was first released and the name of the owner of the sound recording. For digital music the P Line is included within the metadata associated with an audio file. C Line: The © symbol, or C Line, is used to indicate copyright in a range of creative works other than sound recordings. In the context of music it is used to denote rights protection for the cover art or written material included within an album, like liner notes. It can also be used in relation to the underlying musical composition and lyrics. Because the P Line and C Line refer to different rights you will always see them written separately, even when the owner of the rights is the same. | Very similar to how MySpace done it all those years back.... MySpace did it differently back then because they got sued for copyright violations for the music their users were uploading and streaming. https://www.google.com/search?q=myspace+lawsuit+music These days, you can upload music to MySpace, but they have licenses and agreements with music publishers, and are clear to their users what can be legally uploaded: https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202591770-Music-Upload-Requirements And remember.... By uploading any content to Myspace, you hereby certify that you own the copyright in or have all the necessary rights related to such content to upload it. Don't step on someone else's hard work. And Myspace is are clear on how they handle copyright violations: https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202055394-Copyright-FAQs Myspace will respond to allegations of copyright violations in accordance with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The DMCA provides a process for a copyright owner to give notification to an online service provider concerning alleged copyright infringement. Now, with your question: you are allowing users to both upload music and stream it. Streaming is legal in the UK; see an older question here on LSE Is Streaming Copyrighted Content Illegal in the UK But the hosting - storing the actual files - of copyrighted material is not legal. But my app knows no detail of the song uploaded. Could be anything.... This doesn't matter; the files are on your server. You run the risk of legal action being taken against you for the actual .mp3 file of copyrighted music on your server. You are the owner of the webserver, and thus control the files on it, along with your knowledge of building an App that allows users to upload the files. Even if you claim to know nothing about what users upload with the App you built, the music files are on your server. What happens also depends on where the server with the music files is located, i.e. in the UK (action against you legally possible), or elsewhere (legal action against depends on the country and their laws and agreements with other countries). If your server is in a third-party country and can't be taken down, but you are a UK resident, the music companies can still go after you in other respects, as the paying owner of the server, the owner of the domain registration, even possibly as the creator of the App itself. | The exact timing of this story makes a bit of a difference, as you're placing the story right around the time of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which changed the rules for works first published after March 1, 1989. Before then, most copyrightable works were only treated as protected if they included a proper copyright notice, which required the copyright symbol (or "copyright" or "copr."), the year of first publication, and the original copyright owner. So if this happened in February 1989, the lawyer was correct that you needed to include "a proper copyright notice." But he was probably mistaken to think that your rendering was problematic. The copyright symbol required was the same circled C that you mentioned, but the Copyright Office will also recognize a variant on the symbol if it "resembles the © closely enough to indicate clearly that the variant is intended to be the copyright symbol." The office's current guidance makes clear that your variant would be sufficient: Acceptable variants include: The letter c with a parenthesis over the top. The letter c with a parenthesis under the bottom. (c c) (c) The letter c with an unenclosed circle around it. Examples of unacceptable variants on the © symbol include the following: CO C C/O @ (i.e., the letter a in a circle). The letter c with a circle attached to the bottom of the letter. The letter c in a square. [c] The same was true under the guidance that would have been in effect at the time. See section 1005.01(c)(6). If the advice came after March 1, 1989, the notice would not have been strictly necessary, regardless of how you rendered it. | Generally, no - lyrics of a song are intellectual property, and the mere act of publishing them, especially if commercialised through advertisements, can be grounds for a claim of copyright infringement to be brought against the website operators. For example, in 2012, a company that displayed websites without a license from the rightsholders was awarded $6.6 million in statutory damages and legal costs. As for whether it is fair use, it will depend on the precise circumstances. The mere publishing of the lyrics without license is unlikely to be considered fair use - in general, it must educate, or stimulate creativity. | The relevant law is trademark law. The basic question is whether the mark is identical or creates an unreasonable risk of confusion with the protected mark. There is no per se 30%-40% rule. I can imagine cases where changing a single letter in a long phrase turns a trademark violation into a parody or clearly different mark (see the Electric Company TV show). I can also imagine cases where changing a large part of the mark could still be infringing and confusingly similar. A parody is protected on fair use grounds in copyright law (which could conceivably come into play since this is a derivative work but would be protected since it is a parody), but in trademark law the issue is that a parody is unlikely to be confused for the original. Of course, at a fine grained level when one is looking at particular cases rather than general ideas, you would have to know which country's laws were involved, for example, where the goods would be sold. | general things on copyright Copyright law is very similar globally, due to the Berne convention on copyright. Ány country's copyright law grants the copyright to an author. Copyright is the exclusive right of an author to authorize ("license") copies, performance, and derivative works. In case multiple authors jointly create a work, they own the right in their respective parts, or jointly. The copyright holder can deny making derivatives. If a derivative is made without authorization, it is copyright infringement. If the author was asked, denied the authorization and it is made anyway, it is wilful copyright infringement. Relinquishing your rights in the altered work does not make it not copyright infringement. The only way to not commit copyright infringement is to get a license. Naming the original author of a work you adapted is not just politeness, it is mandatory in all copyrights that follow the Berne convention on copyright. Licensing Fees The Verve's agreement to get the license was specifically to pay all the proceeds to the Rolling Stones, but that was an extraordinary case. License fees for recording a cover version (with the unaltered lyrics!) are usually mandatory to be available. for example in the united-states, it is mandatory to grant a mechanical license to create cover recordings for a licensing fee, for which for example the Harry Fox Agency is collecting and distributing the required payments and royalties. Those Royalties are about 9.1 cents per copy for a sub-5-minute song's recording. This license does not allow to alter lyrics. However, synchronization (tone and video) is not mandatory to be granted, and those start at a flat 4-digit and are rather open-ended. Without a sync license, you may not make video recordings of a work being performed. A public performance of a work requires a different license. A performance license is required for any public performance, and those are not regulated either, but typically not too expensive - yet alteration again is not within the scope of such a license. Granting a performance license is typically handled by Performing Rights Organisations such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, taking the required fees and distributing the royalties. Making an adaptation or alteration is a derivative work. Making a derivative work requires a license that is different again. Those can only be granted by the copyright holders, and if they say no... Close the folder. The price of copyright infringement Wilful copyright infringement, especially after you were told no, can be super expensive: In the US, the rightsholder can get 150 000 USD and the lawyer fees for willful infringement. The rightsholder can sue in the US if they are there. Recoverable costs plus damages are also available in the UK, capped at 60 000 GBP for costs and 500 000 GBP in damages. | The other answers get at this somewhat obliquely, but to be clear your assumption 7, that there is no substantial similarity, implies no infringement. Substantial similarity is an element of infringement. But it is also often a disputed element. On your fact pattern, it might even be the only disputed element in the case, and in a close case in a technical area such as this (where it would likely seem to a judge that it could go either way), a jury would simply vote on it. That is, no oracle of copyright doctrine would be consulted for "the answer" to the question of substantial similarity; a jury would just hear testimony from both sides and get some instructions from the judge on the applicable standard (which are rarely much, if any, help) and vote. Substantial similarity - that is, similarity that appropriates "enough" of the original work to be actionable - is very difficult to assess in any objective manner. This aspect drives many creative people in copyright-intensive specialized disciplines (such as software and music) crazy. Often when people have expertise in an area, it may seem "obvious" to various individuals what ought to be actionable and what shouldn't. But it is rare to find complete conensus. (Most copyright infringement cases involving music - e.g. the one involving Katy Perry's "Dark Horse" or Robin Thicke's "Blurred Lines" - attract a lot of attention because juries end up voting on an issue that almost anybody who has heard two songs could form an opinion about, and maybe a strong opinion about.) A loose analogy to your question would be in the criminal context, where the fact pattern is, so let's say A kills B, but didn't intend to, did A commit murder? In most jurisdictions the formal legal answer to that question would be "no, of course not, because intent is an element of the crime of murder." But in many murder cases intent is a highly disputed element (sometimes the only disputed element) and in close cases a jury just gets to vote on what they think from their understanding of the facts, or at least what is presented to them as the facts in court. (The standard of proof in criminal cases is formally different but in practice I am not sure it is at all different.) As another answer suggests, the fact pattern you describe sounds kind of "fishy," and while that does not doctrinally matter, let alone settle the issue, it might matter to a jury. Two cases somewhat along these lines are Google LLC v. Oracle, Inc. (which involved basically this fact pattern, with Google in the role of "app b") and Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l., Inc. (with Borland in the role of "app b", although the copying that occurred was not at the level of source code). They were both ultimately decided on other grounds (and the relevant issues only got to a jury in one of them), but in a world where other statutory defenses had not been asserted they both could have been decided simply by jury vote. | Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged. |
Does one have to name third parties in a lawsuit? If someone is indirectly involved in a case but not a defendant, do they have to be specified by name in the complaint? For example, say person A asks their neighbor, person B, if they can borrow five dollars. Person B declines. Person C learns of the situation and publishes a story saying that Person A robbed Person B at gunpoint. Person A then sues person C for libel after they're declined for a job at a bank. Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Edit- I want to clarify that I'm not referring to naming person B as a defendant. I'm asking if they have to be named in the body of the complaint when recounting the facts. | Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints. | Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen. | The Plaintiff can't implead a third party. If the Plaintiff amends its complaint to join a new party to the case, that new party is a defendant, and as such, may assert counterclaims against the Plaintiff and crossclaims against any co-defendant in the case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 applies to third-party complaints brought by defendants who sue third-parties, not to first party complaints brought by plaintiffs against newly joined parties. FRCP 14(a)(2)(B) provides that the Third-Party Defendant may bring counterclaims against the defendant who filed the Third-Party Complaint. FRCP 14(a)(2)(C) and(D) provides that the Third-Party Defendant may bring claims against and assert affirmative defenses against the Plaintiff who sued the Third-Party Defendant, even though the Plaintiff didn't itself sue the Third-Party Defendant. There is a question upon which FRCP 14 is silent, however. Can a third-party defendant in a case brought by a defendant/third-party plaintiff bring claims against co-defendants of the defendant/third-party plaintiff that sued the third-party defendant? The rule does not expressly authorize such a quasi-cross-claim. But, in practice, by hook or by crook, most federal court judges would allow a third-party defendant to do so by some means, although without so prolonged research I couldn't tell you exactly how that would be justified. Perhaps, the third-party defendant would bring a (second order) third-party complaint against other defendants in the case. Likewise, an existing co-defendant in the case could probably bring a third-party complaint against the third-party defendant already sued by their co-defendant. | Yes, a statement made to only a single other person can be defamation, at least in the US (you don't mention the jurisdiction that you or the accused person are in, and it may matter). Only the accused person can normally sue, and that person would need to establish that the statement was made, and that it was false. In most cases actual damage to reputation also needs to be established. However, a few limited categories are considered defamatory per se. these include an accusation that a person is guilty of a serious crime. (The exact line for defamation per se will depend on the jurisdiction.) If a statemant is defamatory per se actual damage need not be proved. Strictly speaking saying that someone "is a pedophile" only says that that person is sexually attracted to children, but it is usually taken to mean that the person has in fact sexually abused children, which is a crime, and would I am sure be considered defamatory per se. Even so, proof of actual damage to the reputation of the person defamed might be important to the measure of damages to be awarded. often the number of people to whom an accusation is made is relevant to the degree of damage to the reputation, and thus to the damages to be awarded, but the relation is not always 1-to-1. Particularly with a very serious accusation, the damage to reputation could be significant, even if only one or a few people heard the false statement. By the way, the word is spelled "pedophile" (or paedophile in UK English), it is from two Greek words meaning literally "lover of the young". A now obsolete related term is "pederast", with much the same meaning. | This is likely to depend on whether Person B is aware of what Person A is doing, regardless of any imputations Person A makes as to the nature of their business. If Person B is aware, or it is found that Person B ought to have been aware, that Person A is doing something illegal, then they may be held contributorily liable for damages suffered. For instance, in (what is still) a landmark case for copyright infringement, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001), Napster was found to be contributorily guilty of copyright infringement. A defense that they attempted is they weren't aware of it - which was thrown out on the basis that they should have, and could have, known that it was happening. I'm not a lawyer, but you'll need to give a lot more information about the situation for liability to be determined. Oh, and also — both of them could be held liable. It's not necessarily a case of one or the other. | Presumably you mean "and make untrue accusations of wrong-doing". In the US, defamation involves statements about a legal person, and a place, government or government body, or industry is not a legal personal (a specific business can be, however). In the course of "defaming" a city, you might end up defaming a supposedly fictitious individual who bears a striking resemblance to a real person, for example a made-up New York real estate tycoon named Ronald Rump who runs for president. Or you could defame the "police department of Bug Tussle" which in fact is composed of only one person -- that is, you refer to a group but the group is so small that it actually refers to an identifiable individual. See this answer regarding defaming people in fiction. Okay, it's not actually true that a government can't be a legal person. The fact that in the US a government can't sue for defamation would be rooted in the First Amendment, and is surely embodied in case law that is lurking. In Canada, governments have had more power to pursue critic via defamation suits. In Ontario, Halton Hills (Town) v. Kerouac 80 O.R. (3d) 577 (2006) says that "a government may not sue in defamation". I expect that there is some such ruling in the history of US law. | If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible. | There's really no difference. Quoting from here, What if I change the person's name? To state a defamation claim, the person claiming defamation need not be mentioned by name—the plaintiff only needs to be reasonably identifiable. So if you defame the "government executive who makes his home at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue," it is still reasonably identifiable as the president. What does the whole thing depend on? It depends on how easy it is to identify the pseudonym-using plaintiff. They don't have more recourse, per se - nor do they have more protection under the law - but it may be harder for them to win the case. On the upside, the statement might not cause them as much harm when compared to a person using their actual name. |
What would happen if a there emerges a pattern of overthrown warrants by a federal judge? Does the mechanism by which federal judges are chosen in the USA consider things like how many warrants issued by the judge were overthrown? Is this type of thing a professional embarrassment for a judge, a blight on his record so to say or is it so common as to not matter to a judge? I would be interested to know on what basis federal judges are chosen and reinstated and what effect overthrown warrants would have in this process (if at all) | In the U.S. Federal judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by a vote in the senate. There are no professional qualifications required.They serve for life unless removed by impeachment or they resign. Some have resigned due to scandal. Some have been impeached and some voluntarily retire. | Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial. | This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know. | What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.) | Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up." | It is not the case that treason must be tried by a military tribunal. See for example US v. Kawakita, which was an ordinary civilian jury trial. I cannot even imagine why one would think that there is any such requirement. Here is the federal law against treason, and nothing says "offenses must be tried in a military court". Perhaps that misconception was based on the use of military tribunals during the American Revolution, which preceded the creation of a US legal system. | This question, along with a number of articles on the Internet, misconstrues what the rule change is about. The rule change does not say that you can get a search warrant, that is to enter premises with/without machineguns etc, solely on the basis that someone is running Tor on that premises. The rule changes actually has nothing to do with search warrants. The rule change is about "remote access" warrants and, specifically, the question of which magistrate you need to get the warrant from. The background is that statute grants the FBI the power to hack into a computer (that is, obtain "remote access") to search for and retrieve evidence in a criminal investigation. One of the preconditions for doing so is that they identify which district the computer is in, and apply to a magistrate in that district. (By way of further background, under the American way of distributing power, it is seen as a bad thing for (for example) a magistrate in California to be able to issue a warrant to an FBI agent to conduct a search in North Carolina.) When the target computer is desired to be hacked because it is running a hidden Tor service, then how does anyone know what district it is in? Where does the poor FBI agent apply for his or her warrant? This rule change resolves this practical problem by saying that, where the use of Tor or a similar system precludes any knowledge of the physical location of the target computer, then the FBI can apply for a warrant with any magistrate. See further http://www.fed-soc.org/blog/detail/amendments-to-federal-criminal-rule-41-address-venue-not-hacking-powers | Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records. |
Can a landlord submit a change-of-address on behalf of a former renter who refuses to do so? My family owns a condo, and I recently moved in. The previous tenant refuses to have his mail forwarded because, as he says, "I don't want the junk mail, and everything important is forwarded already." I am getting multiple catalogs and letters addressed to him and his wife still. Can I fill out a change of address form for this guy who just wants me to clean up his mess rather than unsubscribe himself? | There is a USPS form to fill out, to change a person's address. This page shows you what the form looks like. You should notice the text which they transcribe onto the page: NOTE: The person signing this form states that he or she is the person, executor, guardian, authorized officer, or agent of the person for whom mail would be forwarded under this order. Anyone submitting false or inaccurate information on this form is subject to punishment by fine or imprisonment or both under Sections 2, 1001, 1702 and 1708 of Title 18, United States Code. So you cannot legally do anything, other than take annoying mail and notate it with an indication that they are not at this address ("Return to Sender" is the classical response), and stick it back in the mail. It is also legal to go to the post office and complain (politely) to the staff, who deal with the situation in a way that doesn't put you at legal risk. | http://www.tenantslegalcenter.com/html/eviction_notices.html 3 DAY NOTICE TO CURE BREACH (sometimes called PERFORM COVENANT) OR QUIT is used to notify a tenant that he/she has 3 days to do or stop doing something as per the rental agreement or the law. The tenant can comply with the notice or vacate within the 3 days. If the tenant vacates within the 3 days, he/she is NOT relieved from the rent obligation under the lease or rental agreement. So, the notice must be based on a law and/or the lease agreement. Presumably, the law and/or lease provision must be cited in the notice. The City of San Diego has a GOOD CAUSE law (Right to Know Ordinance) protecting certain tenants in a residential tenancy of at least TWO years and that good cause must be written in the notice. You state that you've been there seven years, so this law applies. To count the days of a notice, you begin on the next day after service as the first day. Weekends and holidays are counted but the last day of a notice to act generally may not land on a weekend or holiday. If it does, and if applicable to that notice, the "last day" can carry over to the next business day. For example, if a 3 day notice to pay rent is served on a Thursday, we count Friday as the first day Sunday is the third day. Since the last day of this type of notice cannot be a Sunday, the "third day" is then Monday (giving the tenant four days instead of three) to pay the rent. If that Monday was a legal holiday, then Tuesday would then be the "third" day (giving the tenant five days instead of three) to pay the rent. http://www.rogerfranklin.org/Instructions_for_Landlords_2017.pdf B. SERVE THE THREE-DAY NOTICE 1. After the Three-Day Notice has been filled out and signed, you must serve it on the tenant. The Three-Day Notice may be served either: (a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, or (b) If the tenant is absent from is place of residence and from his usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years at either place, AND mailing a copy of the Three-Day Notice addressed to the tenant, postage prepaid, first-class mail, to his place of residence; or (c) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained and a person over the age of eighteen cannot be found at the tenant’s residence, then by affixing a copy of the Three-Day Notice in a conspicuous place on the property, AND mailing a copy of the Three Day Notice to the tenant at his residence. So if the notice was just left at your apartment, and was not delivered personally or mailed, then the service is invalid. | First of all, the amount involved is probably a few hundred dollars, maybe a thousand: if you do not pay it is extremely unlikely that your roommate will attempt to recover. Even if they do, they will probably fail - 30 days notice is 30 days notice: unless last month was February, the 8th to the 8th is either 30 or 31 days, you have complied with the terms of the lease. If the lease had said "one named months notice" then your roommate may have a case; as it is, they don't. Is he right? No. Is there ever a case where I'm liable for pro-rated rent beyond the 30 day notice period? Only if it says so in the lease. Do I owe him rent for each day in November that the room is vacant beyond the 8th? No Would a judge make an exception in his favor since I didn't tell him I was looking for a new place to live? Judges don't make exceptions, particularly not in anybody's favour. The role of a judge is to enforce the law - not to make exceptions to it. A judge would give effect to the terms of the contract except where those terms are prohibited or against public policy. | What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board. | Approach the neighbor in your yard and ask him to leave. You are the tenant, you have full rights to do so. Once he refuses to leave he is a trespasser and you can call the police to take care of him, let alone if he makes any threats. Regarding the landlord, just ignore them and take care of the yard and the house as the lease terms bind you. Require them to give 24 hour notice before any appearance as the lease terms bind them. | Can a landlord keep a security deposit if my apartment rental application is approved, but I back out of signing the lease? That can't be legal, right? No. That is a violation of California CIV 1950.5. Although 1950.5(b) reflects that one of the permissible purposes of a security deposit is "to reimburse the landlord for costs associated with processing a new tenant", item (e) limits that amount "as [is] reasonably necessary for the purposes specified in subdivision(b)". A deposit of 1.5 times the monthly rent clearly is excessive for "processing a new tenant", let alone processing an applicant who never became a tenant because no lease agreement was entered. All other permissible uses of security deposit are inapplicable in your matter. Furthermore, if the landlord required a separate payment for the application, then your application fee satisfies the provision in 1950.5(b). This means that the landlord has the obligation to reimburse you 100% of the security deposit. | One path would be to get compliance, by demonstrating that it is legally required. The best evidence that he is legally required to wear a mask is this recent mandate from the Department of Public Health. However, I cannot find a corresponding executive order, which may be in a generic form empowering CDPH to issue orders. Any imposition of penalties for violation must be publicly announced and rest on legislative authority. The mandate is not generally enforced, except in a few cases regarding bars and restaurants. There are various persuasive avenues that you could pursue, such as asking CDPH to come talk to him (unlikely, but you could try), complaining to the property owner, appealing to local social media to apply pressure (possibly putting yourself at legal risk for defamation, if you make a false statement). There are two more involved legal actions to contemplate. One is to terminate the lease and move elsewhere. This would likely result in an action to collect the remainder of the rent, but the strategy would be to argue that the manager has interfered with your private enjoyment of the premise. A second, highly improbable, is to sue the manager and get an enforceable court order requiring him to wear a mask. Courts have a prejudice against ordering people to take actions when other options exist (terminating the lease, monetary compensation). It could be an interesting but expensive test case to see if you could get a judge to order the manager to wear a mask. So yes they are obligated to wear masks, but legal enforcement is going to be difficult at best. | The closest you will get is the first-in-time ordinance passed by the city, but that was overturned in court. That law required accepting the first qualified applicant for a rental: it did not say anything about sales. If there is a specific provision to that effect in your lease agreement, that would be applicable, but there is no general legal mechanism that forces a seller to accept a particular offer. |
Recourse loan state and Non-Recourse loan state which one prevails? Someone that lives in a non-recourse state buys property in a recourse state. All signatures where done by mail in their home state. Is it automatically a recourse loan since the property is located in a state that allows recourse or is the loan automatically a non-recourse loan as the buyer resides in a non-recourse state and paperwork was signed in a non-recourse state? | Short Answer The question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the real property is located. The place where the parties to the agreement reside, or where the documents are signed, is irrelevant. I am not aware of any exceptions to this rule anywhere in the world. In some circumstances, the parties may reach an agreement regarding whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse if the law of the jurisdiction permits agreements of this type. But, often the parties are not allowed to vary this aspect of their real property mortgage agreement by contract. Choice is law for loans secured by collateral which is property other than real property is pretty much irrelevant in the U.S. This because the law is the same in every U.S. state, territory, or district. Long Answer Background regarding recourse and non-recourse loans To clarify, the terms "recourse" and "non-recourse" are normally used to refer to the remedies available in the event of foreclosure of a loan secured by property that serves as collateral for the loan. When the collateral is real property, the core documents in the transaction are a promissory note that represents a borrower's promise to reply the funds borrowed from any assets available to the borrower that is not exempt from creditor's claims, and a document representing the fact that the collateral may be seized if the promissory note is not paid as agreed, and that the creditor's interest in that collateral has priority over all third parties seeking to collect their debts out of that property which cannot be erased by transferring the property to someone else. This document is sometimes called a mortgage, and a substantially equivalent document used mostly in the Western U.S. is called a deed of trust. I will call this document a mortgage for simplicity, whatever its true name in your locality. In the case of a recourse mortgage, if the borrower defaults, the lender can foreclose on the mortgage, which results in a foreclosure sale at which the lender can bid all or part of the debt secured by the collateral together with any additional cash desired, and their parties may make cash bids. Ignoring for the moment the complications involved when there are multiple mortgages and liens with different priorities encumbering the real property, the person who makes the highest bid at the foreclosure sale is given ownership of the real property in exchange for paying the price bid at the foreclosure sale either in cash (in the case of a third-party bid) or in the from of a reduction in the debt owed, in the case of a lender bidding the debt owed against the property. If the mortgage is a recourse mortgage, then if the lender bids less than the full amount of the debt owed on the promissory note and is the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, then the debt owed on the promissory note is reduced by the amount of the bid made by the lender and the remainder of the balance owing on the promissory note is a personal debt owed by the borrower to the lender called a deficiency judgment. For example, suppose that you buy a house for $1,000,000 with a $200,000 down payment and an $800,0000 recourse mortgage loan. Some time later, the balance owed on the mortgage loan from regular monthly principal and interest payments is $775,000. But, due to a collapse in the real estate market in the real estate market where your house is located, your house, which had a fair market value of $1,000,000 when you bought it, now has a fair market value of $725,000. You lose you job due to the same economic downturn that has caused the market value of your house to decline and are unable to make mortgage payments. The lender forecloses on your house and bids $725,000 at the foreclosure sale, even though you still owe $775,000 on the promissory note. After the foreclosure sale is completely, the lender owns your house, and you still owe the lender a deficiency judgment of $50,000. The lender may now collect the $50,000 deficiency judgment in much the ame way that the lender would collect a judgment entered by a court on an unpaid credit card bill for $50,000. The lender can garnish your wages (once you get some), can seize your bank accounts, and can seize other property which you own which is not protected by a statutory exemption from creditors. In a recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the borrower. In contrast, if you had a non-recourse mortgage, the lender's sole remedy would be to seize the collateral and the lenders would not be able to obtain a deficiency judgment no matter how little your house was worth. Operationally, this means that the lender is required to bid the full amount of the debt owed by the borrower to the lender at the foreclosure sale, even if the property is worth much less than the amount of the debt owed. In the case of a non-recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the lender. Choice of Law For Real Property The place where the documents are signed and the domiciles or place of organization of the parties to the agreement are irrelevant to the question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse. In the U.S. (and everywhere else that I am aware of), the law governing security interests in real property, such as mortgages and deeds of trust and liens is the law of the place where the real property is located. So, if you take out a mortgage on property in a non-recourse state, the mortgage will be a non-recourse mortgage. Usually, in a non-recourse state, it is not possible for a lender and a borrower to mutually agree to make the mortgage a recourse mortgage when the default rule is that mortgages are non-recourse mortgages. In contrast, if you take out a mortgage on property in a recourse state, the mortgage will be a recourse mortgage, unless the borrower and lender expressly waive the right of the lender to obtain a deficiency judgment in a foreclosure within the mortgage document. Choice of Law For Other Property The law governing security interests in property other than real property in the U.S. is usually the Uniform Commercial Code which contains choice of law rules. While, in theory, different rules that states could adopt regarding whether security interests in property other than real property are recourse or non-recourse, in practice, every U.S. state has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as a matter of state or territorial or district law, and at the level of generality of whether a security interest (which is the legal name for a mortgage with collateral other than real property under the Uniform Commercial Code) is recourse or non-recourse, the law is uniform throughout the United States, although there might be slight technical differences between the laws of different states or other jurisdictions within the U.S. based upon the version of the Uniform Commercial Code that is on the books or the decision of state legislators to deviate from the uniform statute's language. The Uniform Commercial Code of each state contains choice of law rules determine which state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to a case. And, the choice of law rules of the Uniform Commercial Code in the state where a lawsuit pertaining to the personal property security interest is what a court in that state applies to resolve the choice of law question. These rules are generally consistent with each other. Footnote on Macroeconomic Implications Of Recourse v. Nonrecourse Mortgages The incentives of lenders and borrowers when entering into mortgage loan arrangements is different in recourse and nonrecourse mortgages, particularly, when the decision to give a borrower a loan is made by a third-party mortgage broker subject to bureaucratic conditions, or by a low level bank employee who acts in the same way, rather than by someone with an economic stake the financial well being of the lender. When mortgage loans are non-recourse, down payments are small, and housing prices are rising, and may be entering a real estate bubble, a borrower is in a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation. If real property values collapse, the borrow loses only his small down payment. If real property values go up, the borrower can sell the property and pocket all of the profits (in some circumstances the profits are even tax free). The borrower has little incentive to worry about the possibility that the fair market value of the real estate could collapse at some point. But, if the decision to allow the borrower to borrow is made by an employee or broker with nothing to lose if a loan is authorized when it shouldn't have been because the risk that the property values will collapse due to a real estate bubble are too great, the mortgage broker has an incentive to be lax in underwriting the loan to make sure that the borrower can really make the payments and that a foreclosure of the loan will realize enough value to pay of the loan if a real estate price bubble collapses. And, since the bank can get its money back and more by foreclosing if the borrower doesn't make payments while prices are going up, there isn't much of an incentive to make sure that the evidence of the borrower's ability to make the payments on the mortgage is accurate. The incentive of the broker or employee is usually to get as many mortgages processed as possible, even if that means overlooking problems with paperwork in a loan application, or using an appraiser who will say that the property being financed is worth what is necessary to get the loan approved, even if you know that the appraiser is cutting corners or just making up inaccurate values to get what the broker wants done. These events can conspire to make a real estate mortgage very bad and to expose the entire community of lenders who make loans in a non-recourse state to catastrophic losses in the event that a real estate bubble collapses. In contrast, this is much less likely to happen in a recourse mortgage state, where the risk of a downside loss deficiency judgment discourages borrowers from trying to finance the purchase of a house that could easily lose more value than the down payment if it was apparent that a real estate bubble was developing. So borrowers would self-police. The reason for this extended footnote and story is that this was one of the root causes of the financial crisis. A handful of states with big real estate markets and non-recourse mortgages (California, Florida and Texas mostly) started to experience real estate bubbles and mortgage lenders, because they had bad incentives in their mortgage origination systems didn't do enough to prevent themselves from financing the purchases of overprices houses. Eventually, the real estate bubble collapsed, lots of borrowers with overpriced houses and little money down defaulted on very large mortgage loans, and the lenders took huge losses on their real estate mortgage portfolios which were supposed to be ultra-low risk but weren't because the people evaluating the real estate mortgage investments overlooked or willfully ignored the risks. This, in turn, resulted in losses so great at the financial institution level that almost every major investment bank in the country and almost every subprime lender in the country went out of business or went bankrupt, and the collapse of this part of the financial industry, in turn, wrecked havoc on every firm in the economy that relied of these financial institutions as a source of investment or a source of financing for their unrelated businesses. The result was the worst recession since the Great Depression. | Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal. | Each of the 50 states plus non-states has their own laws, but there is nothing general about contract or other law in the US that forces a rental facility to accept customers who don't have / won't get the insurance that they require. It is a reasonable requirement, because it protects their interest insofar as angry customers might sue the facility because their car was broken into, and many of them would mistakenly believe that their car insurance covers theft or destruction of contents (thus leading to a desire to sue, to cover the property loss). It may be just too much hassle and too risky for them to assume the correctness of a customer's claim that they already have adequate coverage and will maintain said coverage, with no practical means to verify the claim. | You might take a look at this summary. You have an offer, consideration (a promise of something valuable), acceptance, and "mutuality" i.e. there was no confusion over what you are talking about. Email is a form of writing, and written contracts are the strongest that there are. In this case, the offeree relied on the contract in buying materials and who knows what else. If there's nothing surprising that you're not mentioning, a court would then obliged you to make him whole. That could be in the form of compensating him for his losses, or else ordering specific performance (i.e. making you sell the car). Specific performance is most likely with real estate deals where the seller reneges, but maybe not in this case, and maybe especially not in Wisconsin. It is likely that you could keep the car for a price, but you'd really need an attorney to advise you on that. | Question 1. In the trust that goes solely to my brother, in the event either my mother or father are dead, how is that asset split up? Can a trust dictate how an asset if split up if I am not on the trust. This is governed by the terms of the trust. The trust can say whatever the people who wrote it wanted. Question 2. How is the debt handled? The asset still has debt on it, who is responsible for the debt? I am thinking the answer to this question depends on the answer the Question 1. The trust owns the property subject to the mortgage. The people who originally signed the mortgage (presumably both of your parents) are also personally liable to pay the mortgage in the event that the debt is not fully satisfied in a foreclosure sale, or in the event that the mortgage creditor prefers to sue the mortgage debtors individually in the event of a default. After the death of the mortgage debtors, the mortgage company can file claims in their probate estates for repayment of the mortgage related debt if it does so in a timely fashion, although it would be more common to simply foreclose on the real property and obtain repayment of the debt that way. The death of the mortgage debtors is almost always an event of default under a mortgage, so if both mortgage debtors die, the mortgage creditor can usually force the trust to repay the debt, either by selling the house or by refinancing it. Question 3. They currently live in New York state, I found an article that New York state for nursing home care at more that 12k per year. If they were to move to a cheaper state like Alabama what are the laws or rules, ie. how long they have lived there, assets. This question verges on incoherent. But I think I understand what you are trying to ask. In every U.S. state, the joint federal-state program known at the federal level as Medicaid, although it has different names at the state level (California, for example, calls it "Medi-Cal"), will pay for nursing home care at approved nursing home facilities if the applicants meet state eligibility requirements. This generally involves an income test, an asset test, and a determination that the applicants have not made disqualifying gifts to trusts or to third-parties within the past five years. The income test is based upon state median or average income and is usually lower in a state like Alabama that has a lower median state income, than it is in New York, that has a higher median state income. For retirees, the main kinds of income considered are defined benefit pension plans payments, annuity payments, and investment income. The exact details of the asset test vary somewhat from state to state. Generally speaking, New York State is among the most strict in this regard. The basic outlines of the disqualification for gifts made within five years to others including trusts before applying for nursing home care are similar in broad outline, but the consequences for violating the rules are a function of the average cost of nursing home care in a state, which varies considerably. Generally, a gift of a fixed dollar amount gives rise to more months of disqualification of Medicaid in a state where the costs of nursing home care is low than it does where the costs of nursing home care are high, because the amount of the gift made in the past five years is divided by the average cost of nursing home care at the time the application is made, to determine the number of months that the applicants are disqualified from Medicaid. More generally, setting up trusts intended to qualify you for Medicaid is a highly technical matter with severe consequences if it is done incorrectly, and I would hope that your parents did so while conferring with a competent elder law lawyer. If they did it themselves, there is a high chance that this will have very severe negative consequences. | It primarily depends on the title that you have to the house: are you "joint tenants with right of survivorship". This could have happened when you bought the house; it also could have been done after the fact in various ways. In that case, the house is outside of your wife's estate (which, under the circumstances, is divided between children and you). The lender might be confused about the status of the property, but they might be right, so the question is, what is your legal "interest" in the house, that is, does the title document say "tenants in common"? Assuming that the property is not recorded as JTWROS, then there are two matters to attend to. First, the lender may need to be satisfied, somehow, that they aren't taking a risk by refinancing when you aren't really the full owner. The second is clarifying actual ownership. Estates Code 201.0002-.003 govern intestate succession with a surviving spouse, where the dividing question is whether it is a community estate or not, which then implies shares for children. In that case, the children are part-owners, so you need their consent to e.g. sell the house (that is, this is a complication that needs to be fixed). Basically, you have to get a lawyer, and straighten this out. | There are several questions in the OP. The answers to all of them depend on the lease terms. If Person A wants out of the lease, is the only option to just try to negotiate a way out of their portion of the lease with the landlord, presumably by payment or other means? Yes, usually. Regardless of who is on the lease, Person A is on the lease. In order to terminate or break the lease, Person A will have to negotiate termination. Most residential leases provide for joint and several liability for lease obligations. That means the co-signed lease is like three non-exclusive leases, one each between landlord and Persons A, B, and C. So Person A has to find a way to break the Person A lease. Other than a breach by either party, that likely can only be done by negotiation with landlord. What rights do Person B and C have if Person A does stop paying? Absent some other relationship or understanding between them (that is, other than the lease,) likely none. Persons B and C are each fully responsible to pay all of the rent. In other words, as far as the landlord is concerned it does not matter who pays the rent as long as it gets paid. If it doesn't get paid, the landlord can evict and sue all 3 for non-payment of rent. But the lease likely does not discuss the relationships between A, B, and C - whether they pay pro rata by time in the unit, by space used, per capita, or whatever. Landlord doesn't care, and is not the counterparty to those decisions. That said, if there is a relationship between A, B, & C (for instance, if A & B had a contract describing who would pay what, and B entered into another contract with C,) that will determine their relative obligations. The landlord agrees to allow the lease to be amended for another person, person C to be on the lease. Person B negotiated this with the landlord without consent of person A. This may create liability between B to A, C to A, or B & C to A. It is even conceivable that it creates a liability from landlord to A, if A had a reasonable expectation that the lease would not be amended absent A's consent. And the amendment may not be enforceable against A. So, for instance, A may be able to kick C out of the unit and bar C from reentry. It will not effect A's liability to pay rent. | The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps. |
Is it illegal to throw away the previous tenant's standard mail? Is it illegal to recycle standard mail addressed to, presumably, a previous tenant of an apartment? Context: I have received the mail for someone who I assume is a previous tenant of the apartment I live in. I have tried writing Not at this address and Return to sender on them and the mail carrier continues re-delivering most of them to my mailbox. Most of the mail is AARP stuff, so I assume it's standard "junk" mail (though they are addressed specifically to the person and do not include "or current resident"). On this question there were two US-based answers: It's a crime to throw away mail It's only a crime if it's first-class mail. It's ok to recycle if it's standard (bulk/junk) mail. A question on Quora similarly distinguishes between first-class and standard mail. The problem is, the person who answered that it's a crime to recycle a previous tenant's mail provided a source (Cornell) and that source starts with Whoever takes any letter It does not distinguish between first-class and standard mail. Whereas the answers on Stack Exchange and Quora that say it's ok to recycle standard mail do not provide sources. Am I safe to assume the mail carrier returning the mail to me is a sign that it's ok for me to recycle them or do I need to keep dropping the ever-increasing stack of mail back into the mail system? | As indicated here, throwing away mail is the crime of obstructing mail. There is no exception for "junk mail" i.e. standard mail. It is possible (virtually guaranteed) that an individual postmaster or the USPS has a different disposition of the two kinds or mail when returned, but that is about USPS and not you. It is highly unlikely that you will find an official statement to the effect that it is "okay" to violate the law in the case of disposition of returned standard mail, even if in fact there is virtually no chance of being prosecuted for recycling. I assume that the junk mail is not addressed to "or current resident", or simply "Resident", because then the letter is addressed to you and you can do what you want. | The official website of the french administration gives details under which conditions a landlord can end a lease in France. As a general rule, the landlord cannot end a lease unless meeting certain conditions. The landlord has to send a letter to all of the tenant (all of them if multiple) named on the lease, and the spouse of the tenant even if not named on the lease. The letter has to be sent at least 6 month before the end of the lease if the residence isn't furnished, or 3 months if the residence is furnished. The letter must contain the reason for the ending of the lease. There are 3 causes the landlord may use to end the lease: The landlord plans to make the residence the primary residence of them, their spouse / partner (of at least 1 year) / PACS partner, or an ascendant or descendant of the landlord or their spouse. The landlord plans to sell the residence. In this case, the tenant has the priority to buy the residence if they wish. If the tenant take the offer, the landlord is obliged to accept the offer. The landlord can also sell the residence with the lease, in which case the lease is transfered to the buyer. Under legitimate and serious cause, including but not limited to not paying rent / regularly paying the rent late, causing trouble to the neighborhood, subleasing the residence... If the tenant contests the cause, the landlord will have to justify to a judge the reason the cause of termination. In this case, the landlord can have ground to end the lease before its end date. Otherwise, the landlord cannot end the lease, and the lease is automatically renewed at the end date without the need of explicit communication. A tenant can be protected if they fall under certain conditions. I don't find anything protecting people with a child, but if the tenant is older than 65yo / taking care of someone older than 65yo and the tenant earns an income lower than a certain limit a given year Then the tenant can be protected from these causes, unless the landlord is also older than 65 or earns an income lower than the same limit as the tenant or offers to help relocate the tenant to another residence close to the first residence which also accomodates to the need of the tenant. Note that, if the ex-tenant found that the cause given by the landlord was fraudulent (for example saying they'll use it as a primary residence but lease it to another tenant), then the tenant can bring the case to court and get indemnized as indicated here. | Since you asked about any jurisdiction, and presumably any common law jurisdiction, in which one of the elements of theft is the intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property, here's the UK* answer. Regarding borrowing specifically, the UK statute referring to theft - the Theft Act 1968 - provides for this in section 6(1): A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. In other words, a thief may say 'I only wished to borrow it', but that won't necessarily amount to a defence under English law. It depends on how long (s)he borrows it for, and how (s)he treats it while borrowing it. In addition, the case law clarifies what is meant by 'his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights'. This has been held to mean: Selling, Bargaining with. R v Cahill, R v Lloyd Rendering Useless. DPP v J Dealing with in a manner which risks its loss. R v Fernandes, R v Marshall Borrowing in certain circumstances. R v Lloyd Pawning. s6(2) Theft Act 1968 Not enough to just deal with it. R v Mitchell So how do we prove whether someone intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently, or at least permanently enough to amount to an offence under the Act? The answer seems to be that we look at how they deal with it, and what condition they leave the property in. If they do any of the things listed above, with the exception of no. 6, then they have demonstrated an intent to permanently deprive; if they merely use the property, then that isn't enough to show such intent. You asked specifically: I am looking for an answer that explains whether someone who credibly asserts – e.g., by advance sworn affidavit – that they intend to return the item can be convicted of theft, or any other crime, for taking someone else's property for an extended but not infinite period of time. In the case of R v Lloyd, the court held borrowing would become intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property if 'all goodness, virtue and practical value is gone'. So if someone swore they were planning on returning the item, the court could nonetheless convict them of theft if they held on to the item for so long, and treated it as their own to such an extent, that all its value was gone. (In R v Lloyd, the items in question were films, and as they were returned in much the same condition as they'd originally been in, this was held not to be intention to permanently deprive, and therefore not to be theft.) *By 'UK' I mean 'English and Welsh'; the answer may be different in Scotland. | You've already found an answer to the question about theft in the linked answer, that since they do not take the goods, nor even intend to take them away permanently there can be no consideration for theft here. There may be a case of criminal damage though, reading up on CPS website brings up some interesting points, notably: Damage is not defined by the Act and what constitutes damage is a matter of fact and degree. The courts have construed the term liberally and included damage that is not permanent such as smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. The damage need not be visible or tangible if it affects the value or performance of the property. It could be argued that by rearranging merchandise in a shop, with clear intent to disrupt its operation you are affecting the performance of the store, and that just may fall under criminal damage. Especially when done regularly, or in an organized way; something that demonstrably affects the business. Though in practice I doubt that anyone, besides the people "hiding" the papers, will care. Shelves in most newspaper stores are inspected and restocked multiple times a day, and as a part of normal customers routine stuff gets moved around and later corrected by staff. | There is no mailbox-specific law. You can take pictures in public, and you can put a camera to take pictures on your property. Whether you can install a camera in a particular place depends on who owns that place. Of course, you also can't aim it to peer into a nearby residence; and it has to be a video-only camera (unattended recording of audio is illegal without the consent of the thief). In some cases, mega-boxes are owned by the USPS so you would need USPS permission. There is a widespread false narrative that the USPS owns all mailboxes, but the USPS does not say that nor does the US Code. USPS describes two kinds of cluster-boxes, private and USPS-owned. The USPS offers no statements on permission or its denial to install a cameras inside a USPS-owned box, so you would have to ask the local post office in case your box is USPS-owned. | 39 USC 3009(b) says that Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. and (a) prohibits "the mailing of unordered merchandise". (d) then says For the purposes of this section, “unordered merchandise” means merchandise mailed without the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient. If you previously expressly request a jar of herring and they deliver a jar of herring, you have to pay for it. If instead they send you a jar of honey, then since you did not expressly order a jar of honey, they have violated the law. It doesn't matter whether they deep-down intended to send a jar of herring and accidentally sent honey, or they deep-down deceptively, deliberately and maliciously sent you honey – you still didn't order honey. So it isn't necessary for the law to say anything about error, since the effect of the law is clear enough without saying "whether deliberately or by error". TOS wording cannot override federal law. | I do not have anything official proving that I gave him the 2-months worth deposit What did you do, hand him a wad of cash? Pay by check, and put what it's for on the memo line. You've been there for nine months and there are several other people who can testify that you've been living there, so it would be difficult to claim that you aren't a renter. If you can show that the landlord is aware of your residence, that definitely helps even further, as does receiving mail there, registering to vote or with the DMV with that address, etc. Question 1 : what would be the best course of action to force the landlord to give me the requested lease agreement? You can't "force" someone to give you an agreement. That's kinda part of the definition of the word "agreement". If you find the conditions unacceptable, you can find another place to rent. When I asked the landlord about what he was planning to do regarding that, his answer was that it was not his business. It doesn't seem like it is. You could take the money you would have given to the other roommate, and give it to the power company instead. If paying for the utilities is part of the renters' responsibilities, and the renters are not paying for the utilities, then it's their choice to not have power. In California, landlords are required to make power available, but that just means that they can't interfere with you purchasing it from the power company, not that the landlord has to pay for it (if the landlord had agreed to pay for it, and isn't, then you can deduct the cost from the rent, but you can't simply withhold all rent, and your question indicates that the landlord hasn't agreed to pay for power anyway). Am I protected in any way, or can the landlord just come in my room and throw everything away, or worse just point me with a gun and force me to move? It would be difficult for the landlord to get rid of you, and would probably take several months to do legally. Performing an eviction himself, rather than getting the sheriff's department to do it, would expose him to serious charges, especially if a gun were used. Besides criminal charges, "If this or other unlawful methods, such as locking a tenant out or seizing his possessions before an eviction process has ended, are used to force a tenant to leave a property, a landlord may be subject to fees up to $100 per day of unlawful method use." http://homeguides.sfgate.com/tenants-rights-utility-billing-california-8073.html However, while the legal process will take a long time, at the end you will still be liable for back rent, and you will have an eviction on your record, which will make it harder to rent in the future. | The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to. |
What are the legal protections to buy if seller refunds instead of delivering what was purchased, which causes monetary losses? I purchased a laptop from a manufacturer from their own website brand new. I bought the laptop because this is the only laptop which contains the feature that I require for my needs. There is no other laptop which comes close. There was one in stock. The manufacturer shipped the item, but in transit, UPS damaged the package, did not attempt delivery, and returned the item back to the manufacturer due to the damage discovered. The manufacturer wants to refund if the laptop inside is in damaged condition. This laptop was purchased for about $1500 during a flash sale. However, this is a much lower price then the present rate of nearly $3,000 for the same laptop. Moreover, the current model and specs are out of stock. There is no comparable replacement since the prime reason for this laptop was the one feature which no other laptop has, and other lower models have lower processor or lower memory, both of which are soldered to the motherboard, making it a permanent downgrade. I am willing to wait for the item to come in stock if the current item is damaged. However, I received an email that they are planning on refunding me if the item is damaged. As a result, I will take a loss on this as I may not be able to purchase this laptop again at a similar price. They are willing to provide some, but not all compensation for the extreme difference of price. This would result in a monetary loss on my part. I believe the seller will have breached the contract since I explicitly did not agree to a refund and only agree to receive the item I purchased at the price I purchased it, even if I have to wait. I do not mind waiting even if it takes a month or so for it to come back in stock. But, if the seller refunds, then I will be out the laptop as well as out of the money that it would take to replace the item. Since it's a brand new top of the line item and the newest model, then it will definitely come back in stock again (as opposed to an older model which might be discontinued, which is not the case here). What buyer protections are there for this? Will I be able to easily sue the manufacturer for monetary losses if the manufacturer refunds me anyway instead of letting me wait for the item to come back in stock? | Short Answer You are legally entitled to the cost of an adequate replacement (possibly a lightly used previously owned computer) reduced by the amount refunded. This is sometimes called a "benefit of the bargain" measure of the relief to which you are entitled. But as a practical matter, there is no cost effective way of enforcing your legal rights under these facts, that doesn't deeply compromise you chances of success. But, trying to litigate the case on the cheap, because it is unlikely to succeed, makes the effort to enforce your rights even less worthwhile. Your best options are those you could take outside the formal legal process (such as social media gripes, or complaining to "the manager" of the person you dealt with first if they refuse to give you what you want or are entitled to under the law). Long Answer Applicable Law The default rules of law, absent an express contractual term to the contrary, are as follows: In every U.S. jurisdiction in an intra-U.S. transaction, this is governed by the following section of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which apart from section and subsection numbering conventions is substantially identical in all of these jurisdictions. It states: § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-delivery or Repudiation. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. (2)Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival. In international transactions between signatory countries, the relevant body of law of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980). The primary applicable provisions of that Convention (to which the U.S. is a party) are: Article 45 (1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) exercise the rights provided in articles 46 to 52; (b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77. (2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies. (3) No period of grace may be granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract. Article 46 (1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. . . . Article 47 (1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the seller of his obligations. (2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance. Article 48 (1) Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this Convention. (2) If the seller requests the buyer to make known whether he will accept performance and the buyer does not comply with the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time indicated in his request. The buyer may not, during that period of time, resort to any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the seller. (3) A notice by the seller that he will perform within a specified period of time is assumed to include a request, under the preceding paragraph, that the buyer make known his decision. (4) A request or notice by the seller under paragraph (2) or (3) of this article is not effective unless received by the buyer. Article 49 (1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or (b) in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. . . . Article 74 Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. Article 75 If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. Article 76 (1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under article 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of avoidance. (2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the price prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods. Article 77 A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. Your Legal Rights This brings us to the question: What buyer protections are there for this? Will I be able to easily sue the manufacturer for monetary losses if the manufacturer refunds me anyway instead of letting me wait for the item to come back in stock? The buyer is legally entitled to the fair market value of obtaining a replacement (perhaps in the secondary market for used laptops) that is equivalent to what was ordered reduced by the amount of money refunded. Practical Vindication Of Your Legal Rights But it is much easier to get the refund than it is to prevail in a lawsuit for the additional damages to which the buyer is legally entitled, a prevailing buyer will probably not get their attorney fees if they prevail, and there is a good chance that the dispute will be sent to arbitration which is, generally speaking (according to strong empirical evidence) a forum with a strong anti-consumer bias (although consumer arbitration can be fairly inexpensive to litigate in, is somewhat more tolerant of lack of legal expertise by a self-represented party, and sometimes despite everything, you win, or can even get an unfair result that works in your favor rather than that of the seller). If you are fighting over $1,500 to $2,500, and you have a fairly complex case to prove that will require expert testimony (and expert witness fees and court costs would be awarded to a prevailing party in addition to the actual damages to which they are legally entitled even though attorney fees are not recoverable in most cases), it will be very hard to find a lawyer willing to take the case. This is because it will take far more than 5-12 hours of attorney work to take the case to its conclusion, which is your maximum cost effective litigation budget, even if everything you win goes to the attorney and you receive no actual benefit. To get even a 50% recovery, your lawyer needs to get the job done ins 2-6 hours depending on your lawyer's hourly rate, which is close to impossible when your legal argument is as difficult to prove as it is in this case. So, basically, the only cost effective way to litigate the case is without a lawyer in small claims court or consumer arbitration, even though representing yourself without a lawyer greatly reduces your chances of success on the merits. On balance, you would usually be better off accepting a refund and acknowledging that you have been damaged in a manner for which the law provides no reliable and cost effective remedy, because the harm is too small. Bad mouthing the offending company on social media (which sometimes results in a PR driven instead of lawyer driven, favorable resolution) would probably be a more fruitful strategy. Complaining to a manager or writing a letter to the President of the company might also be a more fruitful strategy. Sometimes small disputes can be resolved with class action lawsuits, but this isn't a case where this is an option, since it involves just a single individual or a handful of individuals who are harmed. This is also not the sort of case where a state consumer protection agency or attorney general's office or federal consumer protection agency is likely to get involved, since it doesn't involve a systemic deceptive trade practice, just an unfair to you bad situation. Why have these laws if they are so hard to enforce in consumer cases? As my commercial transactions professor in law school (James J. White, the author of the leading legal treatise on the subject) was fond of saying: all legal issues become more interesting if you add more zeros to the amount in controversy. If the computer system you bought had a price of $150,000 that had since gone up to $300,000, this dispute would absolutely be worth litigating. Furthermore, since you could litigate it adequately on the litigation budget that this amount in controversy would make possible, your prospects of successfully vindicating your rights as a buyer, at only a modest discount for unrecoverable litigation costs, would be much greater. Essentially, our system is designed to get close to justice in the most important disputes, as measured by the amount in controversy, while it tolerates small injustices that are not as damaging (in raw absolute dollar terms) as big disputes. This is unfair, but the source of this unfairness is intrinsic to the nature of the problem (rather than simply being a matter of artificial bias created by the people who designed the civil justice system). Also, this unfair bias comes close to maximizing the aggregate improvement in economic value that the legal system as a whole can provide for a given legal of expenditure on this system. Basically, at a fundamental economic level, the economic costs of justly resolving small wrongs can be greater due to the deadweight loss of litigation expenses for the economy as a whole, than the economic benefits of resolving the wrongs fairly (which provides not only justice to those involved but also provides an incentive to act justly in future transactions before one knows whether a problem or dispute will arise). | In general As Dale M explained, if you give the money to someone who is not obviously authorized by the business to accept money and sell stuff in exchange, you have not entered into a valid sales contract. That means you are taking things without permission. Therefore the shop could sue you for any damage this causes (maybe you took something the shop did not want to sell, or the person at the information desk was not an employee and ran away with the money). However, whether this constitutes a crime such as theft will depend on jurisdictions. Germany In Germany, for example, it would probably not, because by definition a theft requires "intention to take posession in violation of the law" (StGB §242). You could argue that you did not intend to violate the law, because you paid the required amount, and only gave the money to the wrong person by mistake. Of course, I cannot guarantee that will convince the judge... England and Wales Similarly, the law in England and Wales defines "theft" in section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft, if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; [...] Furthermore, section 2 says: A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— [...] (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or [...] So, similar to the situation in Germany, you could argue in court that you intended to buy the item legally, and believed that the shop would be okay with that. | Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose? | This is a good example of the life of the law being experience and not reason. While there is a logical argument that this isn't theft, in reality, this conduct would universally be considered an open and shut case of shoplifting and anyone who tried this would surely be convicted of a crime with consequences far more severe than creating a tort debt for conversion of the property. Also, you do intend to permanently deprive the store of its property. The fact that you intend to remedy that by paying for it doesn't change that. You aren't borrowing the property with an intent of returning it. | Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges. | If the common law applies (i.e. there is no statute that changes it) then it depends on if the item was lost, mislaid or abandoned. The US has statute law dealing with lost money but that is not the question here. Property is generally deemed to have been lost if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did not intend to set it down, and where it is not likely to be found by the true owner. At common law, the finder of a lost item could claim the right to possess the item against any person except the true owner or any previous possessors. Property is generally deemed to have been mislaid or misplaced if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did intend to set it, but then simply forgot to pick it up again. For example, a wallet found in a shop lying on a counter near a cash register will likely be deemed misplaced rather than lost. Under common law principles, the finder of a misplaced object has a duty to turn it over to the owner of the premises, on the theory that the true owner is likely to return to that location to search for his misplaced item. If the true owner does not return within a reasonable time (which varies considerably depending on the circumstances), the property becomes that of the owner of the premises. Property is generally deemed to have been abandoned if it is found in a place where the true owner likely intended to leave it, but is in such a condition that it is apparent that he or she has no intention of returning to claim it. Abandoned property generally becomes the property of whoever should find it and take possession of it first, although some states have enacted statutes under which certain kinds of abandoned property – usually cars, wrecked ships and wrecked aircraft – escheat, meaning that they become the property of the state. For your specifics: If I purchase merchandise in a physical store, and then (accidentally or not) leave the merchandise at the store after I've paid for it, is the store allowed to resell that merchandise to another customer? This would be mislaid property and if they cannot find you and you do not return to claim it after a reasonable time (which would be different for a Mars bar and a Boeing 747) then it is theirs and they can do what they want with it: including sell it to someone else. How does this scenario differ from leaving personal items at the store that I purchased elsewhere? It doesn't. | If the stranger was aware of the reward offer at the time of the return you have a legally binding contract - you made an offer to the world, money for return of the phone, and they accepted it by returning it. If they were ignorant of your offer and returned the phone then there is no contract and you do not have to pay: albeit at the cost of being a jerk. Of course, if they obtained your phone unlawfully (e.g. by stealing it) the contract is void. | Don't get hung up on unauthorized resale. That only prohibits unauthorized resale. Authorized resale is ok. From http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1854-copyright-infringement-first-sale-doctrine: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). Since the first sale doctrine never protects a defendant who makes unauthorized reproductions of a copyrighted work, the first sale doctrine cannot be a successful defense in cases that allege infringing reproduction. |
Can a sitting U.S. president be imprisoned without impeachment? A sitting U.S. president can not be indicted for federal crimes as a matter of constitutional separation of powers and DOJ policy, among other reasons. The president's constitutional protections and powers (e.g., pardon power, etc.) do not extend to the state level. For example, POTUS can pardon people (including himself) on federal crimes. But can not pardon people for state crimes. Now imagine a scenario where a POTUS, while sitting in office, is indicted by a particular state Attorney General for a crime, say murder, under state statutes. In that scenario, can POTUS be tried, convicted and jailed for those crimes without being impeached? As a practical matter, could it actually happen? How would it actually play out given the supremacy clause and other practical considerations of jailing the chief federal executive? Edit I do not think this question is a duplicate of Can a sitting president of the United States be indicted by one of the states?. That question is limited to the issue of indictment only. This question assumes indictment powers and deals with trial, conviction and, most notably, imprisonment. Given the existing answer to that question, these differences seem relevant and could lead to different or more qualifications on the existing answer. And, finally and perhaps more importantly, this question also seeks to extract the details of the logistics of how an arrest and/or jailing and imprisonment might or might not be feasible and/or actually occur. | Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president. | The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted. | Yes. The absence of immunity for a U.S. President's unofficial acts was established both in the Nixon Administration and later in the Clinton Administration. In practice, a prosecutor would be loath to file such charges absent very, very solid probable cause, and a court would often be very deferential in accommodating the President's schedule and, for example, in allowing appearances by telephone when allowed by law, or by electing not to seize the President's passport as a bail condition to be free pending trial, as would be common for someone facing felony charges pending trial. But, ultimately, the President does not have the right to either defer the charges until the completion of his term, or to any immunity from charges for his or her unofficial acts. | The president has the power to issue an executive order, which must either be supported by the Constitution or by some act of Congress. If a president were to apparently overstep his authority, someone would have to sue him and the Supreme Court would decide whether he did have that authority. For example, Truman thought that he had the power to nationalize steel mills, but Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 determined otherwise. There have been few cases where courts have overturned an executive order. Matters of immigration are not outside of the executive power of POTUS. Obama issued a dozen orders aimed at stopping deportation of illegal immigrants. The matter ended up in SCOTUS, which tersely declined to overturn the lower court ruling (that he didn't have that power). Congress can restate the law to clearly take away a power (assuming it is not a constitutional power, and immigration is not a constitutional power / duty). In this sense, the president can "write laws" the same way that various federal regulatory agencies can "write laws", or how courts can "write laws". The subject matter of such laws is limited, so while an act of Congress is limited only by the Constitution, executive-branch law has further underlying statutory limits. Only Congress can unilaterally pass a statute: the power to write law is available to pretty much all branches of government. As for immigration statutes, 8 USC 1182 provides the general hook for such a presidential decree – the code would require major rewriting to clearly take away that power. It has to be remembered that Congress creates laws and cannot enforce them: the executive branch enforces them. Any law whatsoever restricting immigration therefore involves the president. | An oath of office cannot be legally enforced through the courts, other than to demand that officials take it in order to take office, and to bar people who have taken it and then engaged in treason or sedition from holding public office in any federal, state, or local office, military or civilian, in the United States. This is something which is required of all federal and state and local public officials under the U.S. Constitution, which states in the third paragraph of Article VI: The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States. The U.S. President's parallel oath of office is found in the last paragraph of Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. It states: Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." But, while taking the oath is required, it is also the case that: An oath is not justiciable. The FBI cannot investigate adherence to oaths because they are not enforceable as codified law. A prosecutor cannot establish that an oath has been broken by proving certain legal elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judge cannot adjudicate it. There is one exception to this rule, however. Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. So, an oath of office does impose a justiciable duty to not engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or give aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, upon pain of not being able to hold any state or federal, military or civilian public office without a two-third majority waiver from Congress (in addition to any other consequences that may flow from this conduct without regard to having taken an oath). But, this is a very slight slap on the wrist indeed for committing treason or engaging in sedition (which are criminally punishable by decades in prison or death) after having sworn this oath. Justice Joseph Story noted in his "A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States" (1842) that: A President, who shall dare to violate the obligations of his solemn oath or affirmation of office, may escape human censure, nay, may even receive applause from the giddy multitude. But he will be compelled to learn, that there is a watchful Providence, that cannot be deceived; and a righteous Being, the searcher of all hearts, who will render unto all men according to their deserts. Considerations of this sort will necessarily make a conscientious man more scrupulous in the discharge of his duty; and will even make a man of looser principles pause, when he is about to enter upon a deliberate violation of his official oath. The purpose of an oath of office is simply to deny public offices to people who are not willing to publicly state that the legal system in which the people taking them will operate is legitimate. An oath to support the constitution is the modern equivalent of the feudal European ritual of "bending the knee" to one's legitimate feudal superior. This ritual was highlighted, for example, in the Game of Thrones books by R. R. Martin, which is based loosely on the fights over legitimacy in 15th century England's "War of the Roses". Another legacy of this historical tradition is the duty of someone in military service to salute his or her superior officer. As a historical note, these seemingly toothless rituals have, historically, been surprisingly effective a screening out hard core extremist leaders trying to bring down a government based upon claims that the whole system is illegitimate when new regimes are established, and following civil wars and insurgencies. Many regimes, democratic and non-democratic, in Western political history, have imposed similar requirements. When they have done so, this has seriously influenced the political tactics used by factions that deny the legitimacy of the state and its incumbent leaders. Simply taking the oath undermines one's credibility as an insurgent leader, even if one does so in bad faith. In the United States, oaths of office were also key preconditions to the post-conflict settlements if the Whiskey Rebellion, the Civil War, and some of the lesser known episodes of a century of Indian Wars. As a more recent example, the requirement of an oath of office has materially influenced the 20th and 21st century political tactics of Sinn Féin, a political movement in Ireland, seeking to make the U.K. political subdivision known as Northern Ireland, which it deems illegitimate, a part of the Republic of Ireland. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), distinguished between a Congressional determination that someone has not satisfied the constitutionally established requirements to have an oath of office administered to them after they have been elected, which can be made by majority vote, and a Congressional determination that a member of Congress should be expelled by a two-thirds majority vote of the house of Congress to which the member of Congress has been elected. A Congressional vote to expel a member of Congress is a non-justiciable question that is not tied to the content of the member's oath of office. Similarly, judicial and executive branch officials in the federal government may be impeached by Congress, and removed from office through that process, only for "high crimes and misdemeanors" and not merely for otherwise failing to live up to their oath of office in a non-criminal manner (although what constitutes "high crimes and misdemeanors" is also a non-justiciable political question). Some legal authorities, however, have held that in some contexts, the oath of office does reflect an intent to empower executive branch officials to refuse to enforce what the President believes to be unconstitutional legislation, when its constitutionality has not yet been definitively adjudicated yet. But, courts have also held, for example, that a member of the U.S. military does not have standing to bring a suit claiming that military action in which he is involved was unconstitutionally authorized. This decision was reached on the grounds that the claim that the service member was forced to violate that service member's oath of office does not constitute a justiciable "injury in fact" to that member for standing to sue purposes. Smith v. Obama, No. 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) at page 10 (as discussed here). | How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent. | New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Virginia still allow private prosecutions that can result in incarceration. See also a state by state summary here. A bar on conflicts of interest (e.g. having the same lawyer pursue a private prosecution and a civil case against the same defendant) greatly limit the practice in Virginia (see also here). There is an argument that this limitation has federal constitutional force. But see, Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387 (1985) (analysed here). Is there anyone currently in jail/prison as a result of a private prosecution in one of the states which allow them? If not, when was the last time this occurred. They are very rare, and often limited to misdemeanors. I suspect that there is currently someone in incarcerated on the basis of one, but it isn't easy to determine as there are no one who maintains statistics regarding this. Convictions in private prosecutions have resulted in appellate decisions as recently as 2020 in Virginia. A private prosecution resulting in a conviction with a one-year suspended sentence and one year of probation was affirmed on appeal in 2001 in Rhode Island. In many Rhode Island cases, this involves prosecutions by police officers (see also here noting that this is also common in "New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Virginia, where police officers can act as prosecutors throughout the entire misdemeanor process—from a defendant’s first appearance through a plea or trial"). A (pay per view) 2011 law review article reviews the practice of victim prosecutions in New Hampshire (where incarceration may not be sought), New Jersey, and Rhode Island. | First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap. |
What does undertake means in the following context? Dos it means to start? In the terms and condition of a building company is written: Company is responsible for planning consent. All other consents reasonably required by the Company to undertake the contract shall be the responsibility of the customer. If the Customer fails to obtain any such consents and the company suffers loss as a result, including any loss of profit, the customer shall be liable to the Company for such losses.’ Can company start the work without party wall consent, because the customer has been responsible but did not obtain it? | What does undertake means in the following context? A priori it means to perform [the contract], to do the construction work. There is no indication in that paragraph that all consents are required prior to starting the work. Can company start the work without party wall consent, because the customer has been responsible but did not obtain it? This depends on the technicalities of the construction profession as well as the project schedule. To a person with no construction background and no context of the project it is unclear whether the building company even needs to start with/nearby that wall. If consent is unavailable by the time the company reasonably needs it (for instance, because thereby it was "compelled" to reschedule or because an inspector fined the company for not providing proof of consent), the clause entitles the company to recover from you that loss. | canada The language is clear in context Covenants and easements are interpreted using ordinary contractual interpretation: Connick v. Owners, Strata Plan VIS7092, 2022 BCCA 52. This means that interpretation should give the words "their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract... The meaning of words is often derived from a number of contextual factors": Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53. A court would have no difficulty determining who "King Charles III, King of England" refers to. | It is done to prevent or at least provide a defence against a latter argument based on Estoppel; which at the risk of trivialising something that is very complex means that if you indicate to someone that you will or won't do something and they act on that indication then they may have a claim if you don't do what you indicated. When lawyers say this they are usually outlining a client's possible future actions so estoppel is in play. If they include this they are specifically saying "... But we might not do that." | No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR. | Let's say I buy a phone. Typically you can buy a phone with something that is advertised as "no contract" or for example "with a 24 month contract". In reality, "no contract" means "we have a contract where you hand over the cash, and the phone company hands over the phone, and there are various guarantees that are either implied or explicit, but there are no terms in the contract that force you to hand over money to the phone company beyond payment for the phone in the future if you don't want to". So there is a contract, but the contract is such that you as the customer have no obligations towards the seller once you have paid for the goods. "No contract" would happen for gifts, or as an example if you download open source software in the USA for free. There will be a difference between a "no contract" contract between business and consumer or between two businesses. Most countries have consumer protection laws so if a deal is advertised as "no contract" and the business demands further payments, they will likely lose. Between two businesses, each side is fully responsible to study the actual contract terms. | If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract. | To form a contract, you must have: Intention to create legal relations Agreement Consideration Legal Capacity Genuine Consent Legality of Objects On the face of it, Alice and Bob's agreement meets these criteria so it is a legally binding contract and Alice would have every prospect of success in a legal action for breach of contract. Specifically: by writing out and signing the agreement they are showing an intention to be legally bound what they have each agreed to do is vey clear; more than many I have seen both parties have provided consideration: dog walking and money there is no suggestion that either was legally incapable of forming a contract genuine consent refers to them actually agreeing what they though they agreed, for example if Alice asked Bob to walk her dog (meaning the Great Dane) and Bob agreed (meaning the Jack Russell) there has not been genuine consent dog walking and paying money are both legal | The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK. |
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