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Is there a particular circumstance where the U.S. president can be tried for declaring war against another country? Is there a particular circumstance where the U.S. president can be tried for declaring war against another country? What are the criteria for the president to be tried for declaring war? Is there even a set criteria, or is the president immune in this situation no matter how or why the war was declared?	The President can’t declare war It’s not a power given to the President, the Constitution reserves it for Congress - Article One, Section Eight: Congress shall have power to ... declare War Congress has declared war 11 times, the last being on June 4, 1942. Declarations of war are largely an anachronism. However, that just begs the question ... Is there a particular circumstance where the U.S. president can be tried for [engaing in military action] against another country? Yes. If the President authorizes military action that is or is conducted in a manner that is against US domestic law then she can be impeached by the House and tried by the Senete. If it is a violation of international law then she could be tried by an International War Crimes Tribunal. However, this could not be the International Criminal Court since the US does not acknowledge its jurisdiction. It would need to be a tribunal established by the UN which means not vetoed by the USA - an unlikely circumstance. If he came into the custody of a foreign power, then they could try him under their own laws assuming they were willing to ignore the principle of sovereign immunity.	Sharing intelligence is an act of war inconsistent with neutrality However, so is supplying arms to a belligerent. A neutral State must never assist a party to the armed conflict, in particular it must not supply warships, ammunition or other war materials directly or indirectly to a belligerent power, but otherwise its trade with the belligerent States remains unaffected. However, it’s not a war crime.	There's not any well-defined notion of what a person with a Red Notice is "allowed" to do. The notice doesn't have any legal force of its own. You can read more about Red Notices on Interpol's web site: INTERPOL cannot compel any member country to arrest an individual who is the subject of a Red Notice. Each member country decides for itself what legal value to give a Red Notice within their borders. So it would be up to the US authorities to decide what, if anything, to do about the Red Notice, in compliance with US law. We can only speculate as to why they declined to flag his passport and/or detain him. Without knowing anything about the specific case in question, here are some possibilities: They may have felt there wasn't sufficient evidence against him to justify detaining him. The conduct of which he was accused may not have been a crime under US law. They may have believed the Brazilian arrest warrant was primarily politically motivated. They may have wanted to annoy the Brazilian government, or make a political statement against its actions, by failing to cooperate. They may have decided that it simply wasn't a good use of their funds to pursue the case. They may have been lazy or incompetent or oblivious and simply not known where he was or what he was planning to do. The fact that he was intending to travel to Brazil voluntarily may or may not have been a factor in their inaction.	There are two kinds of immunity: absolute and qualified. Absolute immunity is limited to the official discretionary acts of judges, prosecutors in the litigation process (but not in the investigatory process) and the President. And, in the cases of judges and prosecutors this is only immunity from civil liability and not criminal liability. Thus, for judges the scope of absolute immunity extends to legal rulings and conduct related to being a judge in a courtroom. In the case of a prosecutor, it pertains to litigation conduct (but not conduct physically dealing with a defendant or investigating a crime). This is usually an open and shut question which can be determined on the face of the legal complaint against the official. Only the President has relatively broad kinds of activities covered and his saying he is immune doesn't mean that a judge trying a case will agree with him. If he's murdering his wife, no judge will believe that he's acting in his official capacity to do so. Other government officials generally have only "qualified immunity" which means that they have liability if they intentionally violate clearly established law, which basically means that there is a binding judicial precedent governing the facts and circumstances at issue.	First of all, the wording in your question hints at the UK deliberately launching a missile (even if it is a test one) towards the USA. Nothing in the news piece you link to support that supposition, the general idea is a missile that was launched towards the Atlantic Ocean that steered off route. From your link: The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states. The NPT limits other states from researching (including testing) nuclear weapons and/or delivery vehicles. In exchange, they get access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Treaty preambles are general, introductory texts that explain the intent of the treaty. They are not binding, and the language clearly shows it (Hint: It states "Desiring to", "Recalling to". Binding agreements use "Shall", "Shall not", "May" or "May not", and are more specific about what are the restrictions). As stated above, the test was not "in North-America". It was from international waters "towards Africa", probably to be sunk before it reached land1. There is no notion anywhere that there was an intention of violating the airspace of any country. Certainly, the UK would be responsable if one of their missiles test fails and the missile ends causing damages, and the USA can protest any violation of its airspace, even if unintentional. But it is not "a test of ballistic missiles in North America", and certainly the USA has no more rights outside its territorial waters than, say, Gambia does. The only restriction would be the internationally stablished procedures for testing missiles, which are setup to avoid any kind of issues (the test scheduled date and path is published2 with time enough for third parties to take notice). So yes, it is business as usual. 1Idea: African countries are countries, too, and they have the same right as the USA for their airspace not to be violated by the military from other countries. 2Both to allow for air traffic to avoid dangerous areas, and to ensure that anybody detecting the launch does not think that it is an attack.	Because the nations that made the list (which was modified at the time of the SCOTUS hearing) were selected based on their ability to provide the US with documentation for vetting of immigrants (or rather their lack of an ability), not religion, and the courts give the legislature (Congress) and the executive branch (President) wide discretion when matters of security are involved as they are related to foreign relations where the Judiciary have very limited powers. The specifics of the law which the Executive order modifies do not limit the President beyond a bona fide reason for which the selection was made. The court also ruled that the document contains no mention of any religion specifically or any matters pertaining to religion, and that several nations on the list have no Muslim Majority (they cite 2, but I am only aware of Venezuela being on the list). Additionally, the nation of Chad was removed from the list after their standards were brought up to scratch. In the original opinion, they did say that the campaign remarks were considered in that they pointed to the plaintiff's standing in the case (you need to show a potential harm is inflicted on you by the law in order to get a court case. Or in other words, I cannot ask the court to hear a case on rights of a vampire, because I am not a vampire) but found that the request to probe for malice in the minds of the President and his staff was not an area they could tread as there was a good reason for the law and several prominent Muslim Majority nations were not included. Basically, if the government could show that the order was made by some objective standards that neither favored nor disfavored a religion, then it is not a violation of the first amendment. For five of the justices, the government satisfied this requirement.* *Note, I am still reading through the ruling... my PDF of it keeps crashing and I lose my place.	To start, for this hypothetical to happen, a whole bunch of decisions contrary to sanity have to happen: The Vice President and President Pro Tempore do not invoke the 25th Amendment to temporarily remove the President from office Congress does not issue Articles of Impeachment The President does not pardon himself The District Attorney decides to prosecute the sitting President rather than waiting for his term to be over There are probably more I'm missing. With that out of the way, in theory there's no law that says a President cannot serve while in prison, and simply being a felon does not disqualify him from the Presidency. The judge might order that while he was still serving as President, he serve his time under house arrest - he'd constantly be surrounded by police officers, so it would be pretty difficult for him to run, and it would keep him as as able as possible to keep performing the official functions of the office. The judge could also just defer his sentence. Putting him in regular prison would have serious national security implications, both in terms of protecting his person and in allowing him to effectively serve as Commander-in-Chief, so the government could probably make a compelling case against putting a sitting President in prison. According to this Senate Report, the President will also continue to receive Secret Service protection once he leaves office, so long as he is not removed by Impeachment. There doesn't seem to be a provision against that protection if the President is in prison, so the Secret Service would be obliged to find a way to protect him while he is in prison. Most likely this would mean he would be put in an isolated prison wing, possibly with Secret Service protecting his section.	The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question.
Isn't the rule of precedent inherently flawed in the adversarial system? In the adversarial system, who wins in a court proceeding basically depends on how the parties present and argue their cases. That is, the same facts and evidence could yield diametrically opposite results depending on who the parties were, how determined they were to win, how prepared they were, how quickly they think, in what mood or state of health they were in etc. etc. (Who the judge was is also a big factor, but this is true in the inquisitorial system too.) Yet court decisions become precedents that lower courts are bound by. That is, if a someone lost a case merely because they did not come up with an argument which, should they have come up with, would convince the judge to rule in their favour, and that case has become a precedent, the fate of any following cases in lower courts with comparable facts will be decided by that unluckily slow-thinking litigant/lawyer. How is that considered coherent / just / fair? Isn't the rule of precedent inherently flawed in the adversarial system? (I accept this question has a flavour of politics and hence may belong to Politics.SE).	Short Answer The concern raised is a real one, but it is much less serious than one might naively expect. Long Answer Precedents Apply Only To Resolve The Legal Arguments Presented On The Facts Found To Exist At Trial A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Develop Facts At Trial Isn't A Serious Problem A precedent determines the law as applied to a particular set of facts found by the trial court and confirmed as properly in the trial court record by the appellate court, as to a particular legal issue. Failure to prove facts at trial due to the fault of counsel for a party in the trial court changes the scope of the precedent. Failure to establish facts in one case that sets a precedent, doesn't prevent a similarly situated party, in a case with essentially the same actual facts, from doing a better job and thus presenting a set of facts that are not governed by the same precedent. The precedent from the ill argued case would not apply because the facts as found by the trial court would be different. A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Present Legal Arguments Isn't A Serious Problem if a someone lost a case merely because they did not come up with an argument which, should they have come up with, would convince the judge to rule in their favour, and that case has become a precedent, the fate of any following cases in lower courts with comparable facts will be decided by that unluckily slow-thinking litigant/lawyer. Likewise, suppose that due to incompetence of counsel, a key legal argument isn't made. When a trial court lawyer makes that mistake, the precedent will merely resolve the legal arguments that were resolved by the trial court. This won't preclude a future litigant from making different legal arguments that are stronger in the same circumstances since the precedent won't resolve those legal arguments. For example, suppose that a trial, a lawyer for one side fails to argue that the statute of frauds (which requires certain contracts to be in writing) bars the claim, and the judgment in favor of other other side on an oral agreement is upheld on appeal. A lawyer in a new case with the same facts can move to dismiss the other side's claim based upon the statute of frauds, because the precedent upholding the oral agreement didn't resolve the question of whether the statute of frauds could be used to dismiss the claim arising under that agreement. There Aren't Better Alternatives To Sift Through Legal Arguments No lawyer can make every argument. The incentives of the system and the professional regulation of lawyers, however, increases the likelihood that the strongest arguments will be made to the court setting the precedent and in the trial court before an appellate court considers the issue, relative to pretty much any other means of clarifying ambiguous issues in the law, where the advocates for different legal rules usually don't have the same strong incentives to argue their cases as well as they possibly can. The Risk Posed By Ineffectual Rhetoric In Favor Of Good Rules Of Law Is Real But Limited This doesn't mean that bad lawyering doesn't give rise to bad precedents. But when this happens it is usually because for a given argument and set of facts, the lawyer for one side is so much more rhetorically effective in making a legal argument than the lawyer for the other side which is proposing a "better rule" of law. But the exclusion of people who can't finish law school and pass the bar exam from the process makes a truly decisive advantage for one party over another in rhetorical effectiveness fairly rare. To the extent that rhetorical failure in appellate briefing is the cause of a bad precedent, the long term systemic effect of this problem (some would call it a feature of the system rather than a flaw) is that the side with more resources that can afford to hire better lawyers will tend to produce legal results that favor similarly situated parties going forward. Thus, it produces a sort of diluted "natural selection" effect (a bias that is equally, if not more concerning, in the duel of lobbyists for all sides of an issue in the legislative process). The other safeguards discussed below, limit this risk, although not completely. Other Safeguards Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The requirement of an actual "case and controversy" for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the requirement of "standing" for subject-matter jurisdiction are designed to prevent someone from intentionally making straw man arguments on appeal that produce precedents that are bad law. Thoughtful Appellate Judges When Opinions Are Published Also, appellate court precedents are made by a panel of multiple (usually three at the first direct appeal level) experienced and esteemed judges who are acutely aware that the decisions that they are making in precedent setting cases influence the law in other cases which causes them to look beyond the arguments of the parties to resolve the dispute. It isn't at all uncommon in such cases for an appellate court to resolve a case on appeal on the basis of arguments not made by either party in their briefs, or precedents or statutes not mentioned by either party. Furthermore, most appellate court decisions are unpublished opinions that expressly determined by the panel making the decision not to make a binding precedent, which allows panels of judges in these cases to take less care to run afoul of the risk of making a bad decision due to bad lawyering by a party. So, in the minority of cases that are published and create binding precedents, judges are especially careful to consider this risk. Five More Safeguards The other main safeguards in the case law system against bad precedents due to poor lawyering by a party are: (1) the ability of uninvolved third-parties to file amicus briefs in connection with an appeal presenting perspectives on legal issues not presented by a party, (2) the ability of a state supreme court or the U.S. Supreme Court (or both) as the case may be, to overrule intermediate appellate court precedents that were wrongly decided, (3) the ability of legislatures to change non-constitutional legal rulings by statute, (4) the procedural requirement that the relevant state or federal attorney general be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in cases challenging the constitutionality of a law, and (5) the ability of the political process to amend the relevant constitution to address a bad binding precedent by a highest court on a constitutional issue that the legislature cannot fix. Collectively These Safeguards Help Somewhat None of these safeguards are fool proof. But, collectively, these safeguards reduce the risk of a bad precedent being established due to bad lawyering in an adversary system, that the inherent limitation of a precedent being limited to particular facts and particular legal arguments provides as a primary means of preventing. Other Causes Of Bad Precedents Are More Of A Problem In general, once all of the considerations above are taken together, the risk of a bad precedent being made due to bad lawyering, while it is real, is significantly smaller than the risk that a bad precedent will be made because the appellate judges rendering the precedent making opinion are bad judges. Bad judges usually end up as judges with appellate precedent making power because they were selected more based upon political considerations, as they are in many states, and in the federal system, rather than primarily based upon the soundness of their legal judgment. When one risk factor that can lead to a bad decision is much larger than another risk factor that can lead to a bad decision, further improvements in the smaller risk factor will rarely make all that much of a difference in the overall likelihood that the system will produce a bad precedent. So, the adversary system, is, on balance, good enough make the risk of bad precedents arising from bad lawyering a not very troubling problem with the system, even though it is a real risk that sometimes does produce bad precedents.	Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court.	Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case.	Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it.	Acrimony Mowzer makes some good points. Another one is the parties may just hate each other. In some strands of legal theory, it's considered a type of transaction cost that keeps people from bargaining before and after litigation.	Decisions that break with precedent do happen with some regularity, but far "from all the time" in the US. When they do happen, they are generally only at the top level of a state or federal court system, that is a State supreme Court (or equivalent, some states use a different term) or the US Supreme Court. There are several factors which discourage judges from simply ignoring precedent. First of all, all the training a lawyer receives teaches him or her to respect precedent, and to find rules by examining past cases. precedent is literally the stuff with which a lawyer works, rather more than the wording of statutes (although those are also important). Secondly, as a lawyer works as a litigator, judges will usually ground their decisions on precedents, particularly in appellate cases, explaining their decisions largely in terms of how they conform to or extend precedents. Thirdly, if a lower court judge fails to follow precedent, that judge will often be criticized by an appellate judge or justice, often in the course of an opinion overturning the lower-court judge's ruling. This does not feel pleasant to such a judge. Fourthly, decision that fail to follow precedent are often (although not always) criticized by legal scholars, particularly in law review articles and treatises. Fifthly, lower-court judges who often fail to follow precedents, are less likely to be recommended by senior judges for promotion to appellate positions. However, the actual appointments are controlled by politicians (in most cases) not other judges, so this factor may not be as strong it it would first seem. Only once a judge gets to the level of the Supreme Court of a state, or the Federal Supreme Court, is that judge (now a Justice) expected to alter precedents as needed, and most justices have said that they make such changes only reluctantly. I am not aware of any US state or federal statute or regulation that specifically;y requires judges to follow precedent. The most common way to alter precedent is not to overrule or ignore it, but to distinguish a prior case. This happens when a judge says something like: In the previous case of A v B when had situation X which lead to outcome Q. But in this current case we have the very different situation X1. In the case of X1, the outcome should be S instead of Q. If the new case becomes persuasive the old case A v B may apply to only one specific set of facts that almost never comes up, and the new rule apply to almost all other possible situations. The old case may cease to be cited or applied without ever being formally overruled. And, of course, where the rule is statutory, it may be changed if the legislature alters the law. If the rule is constitutional, it may be changed by a constitutional amendment. For example the 1830s case Barron v Baltimore held that the US bill of rights did not apply to the states, only to the Federal Government. But after the 1868 14th amendment, courts started to incorporate much of the bill of rights into the Due process clause of the 14th, and apply it against the states. This took place gradually, mostly during the period starting with 1898, up until about 1970, but with some incorporation coming as late as 2010 (Heller)	The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made (ratio decidendi) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different (obiter dicta). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions.	It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.
What would happen if there is an attempt by police to deceive a judge to get a warrant? Would I be correct in saying that police have a duty to fairly represent the facts to a judge when they attempt to get a warrant to search premises? Is there some sort of oversight in regard to how warrants are issued? Or is the oversight having your lawyer contest the validity of the search at your trial? If a judge thinks the police are, either through neglect or incompetence, withholding information that would keep a judge from issuing a warrant what would happen then? Is this grounds for a policeperson losing his or her job or can a judge just then choose not to issue any further warrants with that department, making there job just that bit harder?	You are correct. A judge may only issue a warrant when it is supported by an affidavit, in which the officer seeking the warrant swears under oath to the facts supporting the warrant. Lying on the affidavit would constitute perjury. But judges very frequently just rubber-stamp the warrants without meaningfully reviewing the affidavits, so the primary form of oversight would be the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge asserting that the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause. If a judge does review the warrant application and finds the officer's statements not to be credible, he can refuse to sign the warrant, and he is free to also carry that credibility determination to subsequent warrants sought by the same officer or other officers in his department.	So, lets say for argument's sake the search is illegal (we'll discuss scenario later). Is the murder weapon inadmissible? No. Evidence seized in an illegal search is inadmissible for use in court, as to allow it would reward the state for breaking the law. At time of arrest it's still evidence and depending on what other evidence comes out might not be inadmissible (More on this later). If the knife is the only thing linking the driver to the murder, then it's inadmissible. What would happen to the driver, who was most likely the murderer? At this stage, the driver might be arrested and charged... inadmissibility is a matter for pre-trial motions, which takes place after the cop made the search. Whether the guy is a murder or not, he is a suspect who has been accused. Can the police arrest him, and investigate him with the hope of finding other evidence that would be enough to sentence him for the murder, despite the inadmissibility of the actual weapon? This all takes place before the inadmissibility of evidence is declared, so they certainly could investigate the guy, cuff him, read him his rights, book him, Danno, and put him in jail to help build their case. HOWEVER, if the knife is the only thing linking the man to the crime, then all of this becomes what's called "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree". Because the knife was used as the sole evidence to secure search warrants against the suspect, and should the knife become inadmissible, anything that resulted from the execution of the warrants is itself inadmissible. is the murderer in practice immune from being charged for this case, since the weapon cannot be tied to him? Not entirely. Rarely is a murder weapon needed to secure a conviction. Not only that, but while the search is illegal, there is an exception called "Inevitable Discovery" which holds that evidence seized illegally initially may still be admissible if the cops can show that the legally obtained evidence would have led to the knife. Suppose they had CCTV footage and captured the man entering the area of the scene and found out he had a connection to the victim, and got a warrant that would have included his car... that would mean the knife is admissible even if the search was illegal. If the weapon is considered inadmissible, is it returned to the suspect? If yes, would it also be returned even if it is of a type that the suspect is not legally allowed to own? Yes to both, though when it would be returned is subject to possible use in other investigations. Additionally, while I don't know of any knife ban laws in the U.S., there are examples of contraband seized by arrest for a different offense was not returned when the initial offense was overturned on appeal, meaning the contraband evidence was no longer validly seized and thus that half of the case was overturned... but the defendant wasn't returned his drugs. Is the weapon permanently inadmissible for all future, or could it be used in a later court proceeding? No. I'm starting to suspect I know the TV show and episode that inspired this question, but the search violated suspect 1's rights and thus was inadmissible for his trial. However, if a second suspect was discovered as the evidence was developed, and the investigation lead to the knife (say... suspect 2 had access to suspect 1's car... like say... through his job at a car wash that suspect 1 was patronizing... and planted the knife in suspect 1's car to frame him) then the knife is admissible because of inevitable discovery rule. Now, the TV Show I alluded too, and you'll forgive me as it's been a while, the events were that the cop pulled over suspect 1 for a valid reason (busted tail light, intentionally done by suspect 2 to get attention) and saw the knife on the backseat of the car, which is not a violation of search and seizure rules. The bloody knife was in plain view and gave probable cause to arrest and search the entirety of the car. If you leave evidence in a place where the officer can see it, they can seize it in a car at least. Places like the glove box, under the seats, or the trunk would properly hide it and not allow the officer to search the car, but through the windows is just fine.	Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? Of course. If holding a baby could immunize people against arrest, every criminal would have a baby around whenever possible. Similarly, suppose an officer legitimately fears for his or her life or safety, or the lives or safety of others, on the basis of a suspicion that someone carrying a baby is about to produce a weapon and use it against someone. Courts, at least in the US, give wide and explicit deference to police officers in stressful situations like that, and they recognize that even if, in hindsight, it is perfectly clear that there was no danger, the officer must be allowed the leeway to act on his or her suspicions in case they are correct. The officer will of course have some obligations to ensure the welfare of the child after separation from the adult, but the only immediate recourse the adult has is to appeal to the officer directly, or perhaps the officer's supervisor if he or she is available. Any other enforcement of the officer's obligation will have to take place in the courts after the fact.	The IRS Criminal Investigation division is typically going to be the arresting agency, assuming that (1) the offense is treated as a criminal matter; (2) a warrant is actually issued; and (3) anyone actually sets out specifically to serve the warrant. It is usually the case, though, that the violation is handled as a civil matter. When it is treated as a criminal violation, the defendant and the Service often reach an agreement that eliminates the need for an arrest. If there is a warrant, though, any police agency could theoretically make the arrest if they happened across the defendant. But if it's a time-sensitive investigation -- if the defendant is expected to flee or destroy evidence, for example -- it's a safer bet that you'll see an actual warrant execution. In that case, you would have CI taking the lead, perhaps with assistance from other agencies.	Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.	If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."	Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.	You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.
In the US are you allowed to impose restriction on the government when they want to enter your house without a warrant? If the government wishes to enter your house without a warrant and they ask your permission to do so, if you impose restrictions on what they can do or a part of the house they can or cannot enter, are they forced to comply with your restrictions or can they do whatever they like? I would also be interested if your consent with restrictions was disregarded if that would be grounds to have the search deemed illegal.	They must comply with your restrictions, via the principle that consent can be withdrawn. One relevant Supreme Court case is Walter v. US 447 US 649, which declares that When an official search is properly authorized—whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant—the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its authorization Likewise in Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, A suspect may, of course, delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. In US v. Williams, No. 16-3547, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21304 (3d Cir.), the court elaborated that a consensual search satisfies the mandates of the Constitution only if conducted within the boundaries of the consent given. This recognition establishes that it is the subject of a consensual search who decides the terms of the search. and furthermore, That a party may terminate a search by withdrawing his consent is a corollary of the recognition that the subject of a consensual search determines the parameters of that search. Bear in mind that you have to be crystal clear on any limits on the scope of a search. If this is more of a business call (the electrical inspector) and not a search, they don't have any special powers to enter your house. If the inspector enters your basement study without permission, that is trespassing, but you can't sue him because of that unless there was actual damage done. You can complain to his superior.	It depends on the type of warrant. Failure to pay a fine is not necessarily an arrestable offence. The Police Scotland Warrants Standard Operating Procedure (710 kB PDF) states: 5.3 Whilst there is no legislative requirement for Officers to physically possess the warrant to force entry / effect arrest, it would be considered best practice if a forced entry is anticipated. There may be instances where this is not practically possible to obtain the warrant in time or it may be geographically challenging to do so. Possession of a scanned copy of the warrant would be good practice on such occasions, again where the circumstances permit. and 5.5.1 By virtue of Section 135 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 an apprehension warrant implies authority, where it is necessary for its execution, to break open shut and lock fast places. Entry into any house or building, therefore, may be affected by any constable in order to execute the warrant in accordance with its terms and only as a last resort. and 5.6.1 An Extract Conviction/Means Enquiry Warrant (back fine warrant) is issued by the Clerk of Court when an accused person fails to pay the fine imposed within the period allowed for payment. This extract is a sufficient warrant for the apprehension of the accused, but unlike an ordinary warrant of arrest, it does not authorise a constable to break open doors in order to affect arrest. Sheriff officers are not police - they are closer to what in England and some parts of the USA would be termed bailiffs, used for civil recovery of debts etc.	Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant.	The government must have reasonable suspicion to stop you and ask you questions. The government must have probable cause to arrest you. The government cannot question you if you have invoked your 5th Amendment rights The government must release you if you post bail which is set by a magistrate in some cases but can be posted without conferring with a magistrate for many minor offenses for which the amount is set in advance. Also, you can only be constitutionally held for a certain period of time without appearing before a court for an initial appearance at which you are charged and typically you have an attorney assigned for you if you cannot afford one. Generally speaking a lawyer for a defendant will either post bail on behalf of the client, or will seek to invoke the client's 5th Amendment right to silence and 6th Amendment right to counsel (including the right of a lawyer to visit his client in jail) making further detention much less useful, while challenging law enforcement to articulate probable cause for the arrest with the implication that a civil lawsuit and suppression of evidence and loss of credibility with the local judge could follow if they fail to do so. If the client is not brought before a court by the constitutional deadline (unusual, but not unheard of), the lawyer can bring this to the attention of the court and have the court demand that his client be brought before the court. Of course, strictly speaking the defense lawyer can't force the police to do anything. Instead, the defense lawyer persuades the police to do something based upon what a court is likely to do, or has already done, as a result of their conduct so far. Also, of course, it isn't always possible for a lawyer to get his client out of jail. If the police do have probable cause and the offense is not one for which bail is set in advance, it is not possible for the client to be released until bail is set by a judicial officer such as a magistrate and bail (if granted at all) is posted, which may be beyond the client's means in the case of a serious offense, particularly if the client is considered by the magistrate to be a flight risk. On TV and books, the person that the police have arrested is usually someone that the police had no probable cause to arrest but suspect of a crime anyway, and the police usually fold when called on the fact that they lack probable cause by the lawyer. Less commonly, on TV and in books, the lawyer facilitates the payment of bail on behalf of his client.	An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?	With respect to 4th Amendment protections, which guard against unreasonable searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 held that "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not". Cat burglar consent may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances, as could guest consent. The difference between the two is that with the cat burglar, you (as owner) can't overcome the reasonableness of the police assuming that the owner gives consent since you're not there, but with the party guest consenting, you can contradict the impression of control that the guest gave, and you can deny consent (if you are there and can contradict the guest). Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 addresses that point: "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". As far as I can tell, there is no specific obligation for police to verify that the person ostensibly consenting is authorized. They don't have to ask, and they don't have to independently verify implications (e.g. if the third party says 'our apartment', they don't have to ask 'does that mean that you live here?'). A third party could say something that would make the "occupant" assumption unreasonable.	So, lets say for argument's sake the search is illegal (we'll discuss scenario later). Is the murder weapon inadmissible? No. Evidence seized in an illegal search is inadmissible for use in court, as to allow it would reward the state for breaking the law. At time of arrest it's still evidence and depending on what other evidence comes out might not be inadmissible (More on this later). If the knife is the only thing linking the driver to the murder, then it's inadmissible. What would happen to the driver, who was most likely the murderer? At this stage, the driver might be arrested and charged... inadmissibility is a matter for pre-trial motions, which takes place after the cop made the search. Whether the guy is a murder or not, he is a suspect who has been accused. Can the police arrest him, and investigate him with the hope of finding other evidence that would be enough to sentence him for the murder, despite the inadmissibility of the actual weapon? This all takes place before the inadmissibility of evidence is declared, so they certainly could investigate the guy, cuff him, read him his rights, book him, Danno, and put him in jail to help build their case. HOWEVER, if the knife is the only thing linking the man to the crime, then all of this becomes what's called "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree". Because the knife was used as the sole evidence to secure search warrants against the suspect, and should the knife become inadmissible, anything that resulted from the execution of the warrants is itself inadmissible. is the murderer in practice immune from being charged for this case, since the weapon cannot be tied to him? Not entirely. Rarely is a murder weapon needed to secure a conviction. Not only that, but while the search is illegal, there is an exception called "Inevitable Discovery" which holds that evidence seized illegally initially may still be admissible if the cops can show that the legally obtained evidence would have led to the knife. Suppose they had CCTV footage and captured the man entering the area of the scene and found out he had a connection to the victim, and got a warrant that would have included his car... that would mean the knife is admissible even if the search was illegal. If the weapon is considered inadmissible, is it returned to the suspect? If yes, would it also be returned even if it is of a type that the suspect is not legally allowed to own? Yes to both, though when it would be returned is subject to possible use in other investigations. Additionally, while I don't know of any knife ban laws in the U.S., there are examples of contraband seized by arrest for a different offense was not returned when the initial offense was overturned on appeal, meaning the contraband evidence was no longer validly seized and thus that half of the case was overturned... but the defendant wasn't returned his drugs. Is the weapon permanently inadmissible for all future, or could it be used in a later court proceeding? No. I'm starting to suspect I know the TV show and episode that inspired this question, but the search violated suspect 1's rights and thus was inadmissible for his trial. However, if a second suspect was discovered as the evidence was developed, and the investigation lead to the knife (say... suspect 2 had access to suspect 1's car... like say... through his job at a car wash that suspect 1 was patronizing... and planted the knife in suspect 1's car to frame him) then the knife is admissible because of inevitable discovery rule. Now, the TV Show I alluded too, and you'll forgive me as it's been a while, the events were that the cop pulled over suspect 1 for a valid reason (busted tail light, intentionally done by suspect 2 to get attention) and saw the knife on the backseat of the car, which is not a violation of search and seizure rules. The bloody knife was in plain view and gave probable cause to arrest and search the entirety of the car. If you leave evidence in a place where the officer can see it, they can seize it in a car at least. Places like the glove box, under the seats, or the trunk would properly hide it and not allow the officer to search the car, but through the windows is just fine.	There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.
I am an animator producing a video of dancing cicadas, and would like to use a copyrighted song. Under what conditions is it excusable? To be clear, this is me fooling around—I am making zero money off of this. I also believe that the band for the song I'm thinking of—specifically Caravan Palace—can and definitely should receive all benefits from any use of their music. (They're brilliant, and I'm a fellow artist and big fan.) This is most certainly not about dodging copyright claims. It's about working with them. I'm midway through a project involving animated, dancing Brood X cicadas, and would like to put it to music. This will involve a good bit of animation work, as it needs to be to-the-beat. In the worst case, I might use something old enough to be beyond significant copyright concern, or mix something together myself from licensed sounds; but if I wanted to use this particular track, what would my concerns be? Granted, I'm not making anything but reputation off of it, but that doesn't mean that the band and its producers shouldn't receive income from their work regardless of context. So, I'm not sure whether this qualifies as "fair use" or not. If I did get a hold of the record company, what could I be expected to pay, or agree to, for licensing? I'm sure this isn't the first time this issue has come up. I've published a lot of material on YouTube so far and I'm quite familiar with the copyright checker; and it's never had anything to complain about with my videos before. I want to do this right, or find another option. I heard once that it's possible for the video, given an established interest, to send ad revenue to the copyright holders instead of me, which would be fine; but I'm not entirely sure how I would rig that. Since we're talking about potentially a couple of weeks of work, I would like to figure this out sooner rather than later.	An audio recording clip of recorded music is almost never fair use, outside of a music performance review or in a music appreciation class.	The lyricist and composers already have copyright. Copyright exists for the moment of creation: registration is not necessary to enforce copyright rights and to grant licences. Registration in the US is merely useful if you want to prove that you own the copyright which otherwise would require providing evidence of the date of creation, priority etc. Most countries do not have copyright registers. Similarly, you will have copyright in the derivative work of the soundtrack from the moment of its creation.	No If YT#1 gets a license from artist A, that permits YT#1 to do whatever copying and reuse is stated in the license. It might be narrow or very broad. Usually such a license will only grant permission to the person who asked. Unless the license also grants permission to YT#2, or to some broader group which includes YT#2, YT#2 cannot claim any rights under such a license. Assuming that the license does not include him or her, YT#2 has the same rights as any member of the public would, but no more. In general, pitch raising a piece of music is a way of creating a derivative work. In the US, under 17 USC 106 one needs permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work. Otherwise doing so is copyright infringement. The laws of other countries, and the Berne Copyright Convention have similar provisions on this point. Creating a derivative work requires permission in all countries that I know about. "Piggybacking" is not a thing in copyright law. A copyright owner can give permission (usually called a license) to any person or group of persons that the owner pleases. The permission does not extend to anyone else. This is true in all countries. I should be clear that YT#2 needs permission from both YT#1, and from A. The way the question is worded I have been assuming that YT#2 had permission from YT#1, but a comment from grovkin made it clear that I needed to be more explicit about this. It is possible for a license to permit a person to pass on the license to others. For example, all CC licenses and all copyleft and most open source licenses do this, and others could. But the license must explicitly grant such permission. The one way in which a person might create a derivative work without permission and without it being infringement is if an exception to copyright applies. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more detail on fair use. Fair use decisions are made on a case by case basis, and generally depend on the detailed facts of the ase. But based on the limited info in the question, this would not qualify. It seems to use the whole piece of music, which tends to weigh against fair use. The new work does not seem to be transformative, that is, it seems to serve the same general purpose as the original. The new work might harm the economic value of the original, or might if many people did this. The original is creative, not factual. All of those weigh against fair use. Different countries have very different exceptions to copyright, and I do not know all of them. But the use described in the question does not seem to fit any that I know of. In any case, an exception to copyright applies to anyone, and does not depend on another person's license. It is thus never a form of "piggybacking". By the way, the question describes pitch raising ads "illegal". Making an unauthorized derivative work gives the copyright owner grounds to sue. If the owner does sue, and wins, s/he might be awarded money damages, and the court might issue an injunction ordering the infringer not to infringe again. But it would not normally be treated as a crime, and law enforcement would not be involved. In the US, only bulk copyright infringement, carried out as a business, is usually prosecuted (for example a factory churning out unauthorized music CDs).	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.	The Harry Potter company and John Williams may or may not want credit, but they almost certainly want money. You have to get their permission, at least for their creations. In the case of Für Elise, you can freely use the original score to "rework" that piece, but you can't "rework" a version that is itself a recent "reworking" (known as a derivative work). Anything that Jon Williams created is protected by copyright, so you need to negotiate a license to create a derivative work, and he/they get to dictate the terms (like, half of the 69 cents per copy). That might include some attribution statement such as "with permission, copyright Warner Brothers", or whatever is stipulated in the license agreement.	general things on copyright Copyright law is very similar globally, due to the Berne convention on copyright. Ány country's copyright law grants the copyright to an author. Copyright is the exclusive right of an author to authorize ("license") copies, performance, and derivative works. In case multiple authors jointly create a work, they own the right in their respective parts, or jointly. The copyright holder can deny making derivatives. If a derivative is made without authorization, it is copyright infringement. If the author was asked, denied the authorization and it is made anyway, it is wilful copyright infringement. Relinquishing your rights in the altered work does not make it not copyright infringement. The only way to not commit copyright infringement is to get a license. Naming the original author of a work you adapted is not just politeness, it is mandatory in all copyrights that follow the Berne convention on copyright. Licensing Fees The Verve's agreement to get the license was specifically to pay all the proceeds to the Rolling Stones, but that was an extraordinary case. License fees for recording a cover version (with the unaltered lyrics!) are usually mandatory to be available. for example in the united-states, it is mandatory to grant a mechanical license to create cover recordings for a licensing fee, for which for example the Harry Fox Agency is collecting and distributing the required payments and royalties. Those Royalties are about 9.1 cents per copy for a sub-5-minute song's recording. This license does not allow to alter lyrics. However, synchronization (tone and video) is not mandatory to be granted, and those start at a flat 4-digit and are rather open-ended. Without a sync license, you may not make video recordings of a work being performed. A public performance of a work requires a different license. A performance license is required for any public performance, and those are not regulated either, but typically not too expensive - yet alteration again is not within the scope of such a license. Granting a performance license is typically handled by Performing Rights Organisations such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, taking the required fees and distributing the royalties. Making an adaptation or alteration is a derivative work. Making a derivative work requires a license that is different again. Those can only be granted by the copyright holders, and if they say no... Close the folder. The price of copyright infringement Wilful copyright infringement, especially after you were told no, can be super expensive: In the US, the rightsholder can get 150 000 USD and the lawyer fees for willful infringement. The rightsholder can sue in the US if they are there. Recoverable costs plus damages are also available in the UK, capped at 60 000 GBP for costs and 500 000 GBP in damages.	Is it a violation of copyright to publish a computer program that exactly produces such a piece, without containing the piece itself in the program? Yes. A program that reproduces a particular work is functionally a derivative work and is a copyright infringement. A program that composes music not tied to a particular work would be patentable, but the algorithm would not be protected by copyright, although derive works based on the code implementing the algorithm might be protected by copyright. Of course, this assumes that the person devising this algorithm knows about the original work that it will produce. If the person devising and the person using the algorithm are ignorant of the existence of the prior work that it produces, it is not a copy or a derivative work and is not infringing. The source of the creation of an allegedly infringing work in relevant in copyright law even thought it is not relevant in patent and trademark law. Copyright protects independent inventors of the same work from infringement liability, although this may be hard to prove. In theory the burden of proof to show copying is on the personal bringing the lawsuit alleging infringement. But, a copyright infringement plaintiff can meet their burden of proof in a copyright case by inferring that copy was made from the circumstantial evidence of the allegedly infringing work's similarity to the allegedly infringed work without direct evidence of copying or deriving the work from the original work.	Even if I give credit to the composer, and I will make no profit from the performance, will it still be illegal to use my transcription? This definitely infringes the composer's performance and derivative work rights under the composer's copyright. There is a mandatory right to cover someone else's composition outside of a movie or TV show (roughly speaking) for a statutorily fixed royalty, but the bureaucracy is such that it would be impractical to do here. Whether or not the "fair use" defense applies in this case is a "colorable" argument, but really, when you perform the entire work as written except for transcription, winning a "fair use" defense in a infringement action would be a long shot. The fact that it is somehow connected to an educational activity would be the strongest argument in this case. Also, as noted in a comment, your school may have obtained express permission to cover the work: Your music school may have a license with a PRO (performing rights organization) that covers your song. You might make some inquiries with the administration as to whether this is the case. Radio stations obtain similar licenses to play a large catalog of music without individually obtaining licenses to use each work separately from the author. This said, this kind of activity is often done, despite the fact that it is a copyright infringement, and most of the time, if the performance isn't too widely broadcast, most copyright owners will never pursue copyright infringement claims over something like this and indeed often won't even consider doing so. Still, copyright is an absolute bar to infringing rights without permission, even if there is absolutely no money received for the work and even if there is full attribution of its author. I'm not a great fan of the law as it is, and it is often disregarded, but that is the law. Also, this answer is based upon U.S. law, but there isn't much international variation in this part of copyright law in countries that meaningfully enforce copyright laws in their courts. But, as another answer notes, in some countries the mandatory right to do a cover of songs in the U.S. is much easier bureaucratically, in some other countries: In several countries, there are organizations that deal with the copyright issue globally. That means you pay a certain (quite small) fee to be allowed to perform a piece of music publicly, and the organization deals with the individual right owners. That makes reusing works much simpler.
Are there federal or international law equivalents of the Maxims of Jurisprudence of the California Civil Code? Specifically, does Civ. Code § 3517 "No one can take advantage of his own wrong" have such an equivalent? Any others are welcome or anything similar.	Some jurisdictions codify maxims, many do not, but these maxims still exist. Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no one can take advantage of his own wrong) is a generally recognized principle of equity, broadly connected to the principle "who comes into equity must come with clean hands" and the covenant of good faith. Some civil law countries (e.g. France) recognizes Nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans (no one can be heard to invoke his own turpitude).	There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.	As @cpast says in their comment, these are not equivalent punishments, the fine is for the lower end of the scale where incarceration is not warranted and the maximum gaol term is for the most egregious cases. That said, your supposition is almost certainly correct; statutes tend to be a "set and forget" thing, legislatures have a lot to do and going back to old laws to update fines in line with inflation is probably not high on their list of priorities. In order to overcome this problem all jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the Penalty Unit; fines in statutes are stated as a certain number of penalty units and the value of a penalty unit is set in various ways that usually do not require a vote in parliament.	I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.	I don't see the contradiction. The ACLU article you link to explains that the Supreme Court found against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in principle in the 2018 ruling. Instead they found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had taken a dismissive attitude to the religion of the bakery's owners, and that in itself was religious discrimation and a violation of their First Amendment rights. I would say the 2018 ruling paved the way for the more recent one, which is why the article you link is titled: "In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins the Battle but Loses the War"	The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.	if necessary it is possible to simplify it to USA vs EU The European Union is by no means a homogeneous area of law. I will assume france because it is the one I am most familiar with, but bear in mind that much of what follows might not apply to Spain/Germany/etc. The USA is a federal state. In particular, Louisiana law is heavily influenced by civil law for historical reasons. Other states and federal law do, however, follow more or less the same general principles. in common law there is the idea of a precedent, while in civil law not The first part is true. Common law usually hold the principle of stare decisis according to which precedents are binding. That means that the holding of a court binds the same court to rule the same way on similar matters raised later. I would note, however, that courts can be... let’s say "creative"... in finding ways to differentiate the case at hand from the previous one, when the judge is motivated to do so. The latter part is false, or at least, exaggerated. It is true that courts in civil law are not bound by previous holdings; an appeal that raises as its only argument "the court’s decision in my case was different from that in another case without offering any differentiation" would be rejected. However, there is the concept of jurisprudence constante where repeated precedent is highly persuasive. In practice, even simple precedent is persuasive. Furthermore, lower courts are bound by the holdings of higher courts, both in civil law and common law jurisdictions. (That’s more or less the meaning of "higher court".) in common law a judge plays a role of a person evidence at a court is provided to, while in civil law a judge tries to investigate too in addition That is a distinction between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. The distinction does not exactly map to the civil/common law systems, but in practice the criminal part of civil law systems is often inquisitorial whereas common law systems are often adversarial. I will first note that the "inquisitorial" part where the judge conducts investigations is vastly overblown. That only occurs in complex cases that require extended investigations with more coercitive powers (for instance seizing documents etc.) Wikipedia says: In 2005, there were 1.1 million criminal rulings in France, while only 33,000 new cases were investigated by judges.[5] The vast majority of cases are therefore investigated directly by law enforcement agencies under the supervision of [the equivalent of district attorneys]. The numbers sound plausible to me, but here’s the ref it gives if you want to check (which I did not bother to do). The most visible part of the distinction is the way witnesses at trial are handled. In an adversarial system, the parties will ask to cite certain witnesses. There are pre-trial motions to exclude certain witnesses for certain reasons, but parties have a wide latitude of which witnesses they want to call. Each witness will come labelled as to which party asked for its appearance. At trial, the witness will be asked questions by the party who called them (direct examination), which will usually take a long time and include nondisputed background information (who are you, for how long have you worked with the defendant, etc.). Then, the opposing party will ask questions (cross-examination), emphasizing points that cast doubt on the witness’s reliability (because they are lying, because they do not remember well, etc.) or on the other parties’ narrative (highlighting details that were conveniently "missed" in direct examination). In an inquisitorial system, witnesses are chosen by the judge. Parties can ask to have witnesses added to the list, but the list does not come with labels that X is coming from the prosecution, Y from the defense. When a witness is called, the judge will ask most of the questions at the start, before giving the floor to the parties. Roughly speaking, the judge does the direct examination, and parties do a cross-examination afterwards. Note that in many cases the parties will ask few or no questions - high-profile cases that you read about in the media are abnormal in that respect. In particular, an inquisitorial-system court maintains a list of expert witnesses, which are called when technical points are required. That expert is paid by the court, not by the parties (however, when one party requests an expertise and the other party opposes it, the requesting party has to pay the cost upfront - they will shift it to the other party if they win the case). That is very different to the adversarial system of having each party introduce testimony by an expert they commissioned and paid. distance between public law and private law is smaller in common law legal system I am not sure I understand that question. It is true that "private" (tort) law operates in an adversarial system both in civil-law and common-law. Therefore, one could argue that the distance between civil-law’s criminal system (inquisitorial) and tort system (adversarial) is higher than between common-law’s criminal and tort systems (both adversarial). However, that is in my view a highly artificial distinction. The distance between practice areas within a single (common law or civil law) jurisdiction is large in any case. You would not want a lawyer specialized in drug-dealing cases to take your case about sexual harassment or unlawful dismissal, and vice-versa, in any jurisdiction.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
Using "Sting" confessions In USA, if I am not mistaken, if the police fail to warn someone that "anything you say may be used against you," then whatever he says to them is inadmissible. I don't understand then why a confession gotten by the subterfuge of someone else with a hidden recorder is admissible.	Because a "sting" does not trigger the prerequisites for the warning The Miranda Warning has triggering events: The circumstances triggering the Miranda safeguards, i.e. Miranda warnings, are "custody" and "interrogation". Custody means formal arrest or the deprivation of freedom to an extent associated with formal arrest. Interrogation means explicit questioning or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Constitution does not require that a defendant be advised of the Miranda rights as part of the arrest procedure, or once an officer has probable cause to arrest, or if the defendant has become a suspect of the focus of an investigation. If you voluntarily speak to a police officer (uniformed or undercover, identified as such or not) while not being both in custody and subject to interrogation, that speech can be used in evidence.	To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.	Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.	In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't".	From a US perspective, in a word, "no". Firstly, "presumption of innocence" is in a trial, not in police interactions. Being arrested does not violate the presumption of innocence. Police do not need any reason to interact with you or ask you questions. Police can arrest you if they have probable cause to suspect you have committed a crime, but this is not always necessary. More on this later(in the fourth section). Secondly, I wouldn't describe requesting to see your ticket, or any document as a "violent communication", in general. It may be rude or insulting, but not violent. (Also "violent communication" is not a legal term. The closest legal terms, verbal assault and threatening communication, are also not this.) More over, there is no indication of am implication of lying in this request. Thirdly, there are many situations in which possessing a document or credential is not sufficient; one must legally display or present them upon request. For example, multiple occupational licenses such as liquor licenses and barber/cosmetology licenses require that the licenses be prominently displayed; whereas, in California at least, a vehicle driver on a public road must not only possess their driver's license and proof of insurance, they must produce them upon the request of any law enforcement officer (Source: https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffvr18). Fourthly, there are situations in which you can be legally searched and questioned without reasonable suspicion. Examples of this include boarder searches and sobriety checkpoints. Sources: (US Supreme Court rulings): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Martinez-Fuerte; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_Department_of_State_Police_v._Sitz A note on sources: bdb484 and I have opposing court case sources. My sources have binding precedent over all courts in the US, save the US Supreme Court, whereas theirs don't have any binding precedent, but are more directly on-topic.	If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent?	Cops conduct undercover operations and don't have to tell you they're cops. (Unless maybe they're under oath in a courtroom, for example.) Mostly because it would be really stupid and impossible to conduct undercover work otherwise. Rumors and popular media about this are wrong. This is also true for federal agents and actors. (FBI, DEA, ATF, Secret Service, etc...)	Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.
Assent to modified terms? Let's say there is a contract between ARTIST and COLLAGER. The contract says that COLLAGER will arrange several of ARTIST's specified works into a collage for some price, using a layout that ARTIST approves of. It also says that ARTIST retains all copyright of the individual works and the final collective work. Both agree. COLLAGER then sends ARTIST a proposed layout, which has "© COLLAGER [year]." written unambiguously on the collage. COLLAGER asks ARTIST to "Please approve this by signing next to the copyright statement". ARTIST does. Is the copyright statement on the layout proposal considered an offer? And is signing next to it considered assent? As long as COLLAGER doesn't say that the previous contract is void/replaced, does ARTIST have any risk of losing copyright ownership to COLLAGER?	The artist and collager have a contract that states that the artist retains the copyright to the final collective work. To arrive at any other outcome, they both must agree to a new contract. One could argue that no new contract was agreed to for two separate reasons: Firstly, the request to "approve by signing next to the copyright statement" is not very specific, understandable contract language that unambiguously is intended to transfer the copyright to the collager. Whether the specific language the collager used to make the new proposal is indeed a contract is debatable. A contract requires "mutual assent", which is tested legally by how a "reasonable person" would interpret the contract - it's far from guaranteed that most reasonable people would interpret the correspondence as a mutual decision intended to transfer copyright. Secondly, a contract requires consideration - one cannot enter into a contract where one side gets unilateral benefit and the other side gets nothing whatsoever. Even if the language used would constitute terms specific enough for a contract, there is certainly no consideration involved - the collager is proposing that they get the copyright to the collective work, while the artist gets nothing. Because there is no consideration for the artist, it is not a valid contract. For these two reasons (especially the second one), the artist has a strong case that they have not entered into any other contract or contract amendment other than what they originally agreed to, which states that the artist owns the copyrights to both the original and collective works. The legal argument is that collager never proposed a valid new contract, because they used ambiguous language that did not result in mutual assent, and did not offer anything in return.	The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.	First Sale Doctrine One of the rights a copyright holder has is an exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending". 17 U.S.C. 106(3). This is distinct from the reproduction right they have to make copies or derivative works. So, absent a licence, you can neither make the model nor distribute the model. If you are operating under a licence, that is a legally binding contract between you and the copyright holder. If it says that you cannot give away models, then doing so is a breach of that contract and a breach of copyright for which you could be sued. However, if you did sell or give away the model to a third party, that would be a lawful transfer of title in the object itself, even though it is a breach of contract. An innocent third party (i.e. one who has no knowledge of the breach) would be a lawful owner and could do what they liked with the object and, under the first-sale doctrine, is not bound by the licence. If you were to die, the executor or administrator of your estate would be bound by the terms of the licence (whether they knew about them or not), and if they breached them, they would be liable for that breach. If done in good faith, they could seek indemnity from the estate, but if the estate has insufficient funds or has been finalised, they would be personally liable. This is largely theoretical as the copyright owner would have to pursue their claim so promptly that unless they were actively monitoring the death notices for anyone who ever downloaded their model, they would miss their chance. A third party who received the physical model from the estate, either by buying it or being given it as a beneficiary, would own it and have first-sale doctrine rights. Although originally a US concept (Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus 1908), it is my understanding that the first-sale doctrine has since spread to all common-law countries. The last was Australia in Calidad v Seiko Epson [2020] HCA 41. ... the public ... The above analysis presumes that the people you are gifting the models to are "the public". This may not be the case where the models are distributed to a small circle of people like family and friends. In that case, there is no general right of distribution, and the copyright owner would need to rely on their right of reproduction. That is, in making the copy in order to give the object away, you breached the licence. This becomes problematic when your decision to give away the object happens later, possibly years later, possibly after you're dead. So, it might not be a problem for the executor or administrator to distribute the object to a beneficiary, but it might be a problem to sell it at a deceased-estate auction. The former is not distribution to "the public"; the latter is.	The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.	Here is an example: The Author agrees to hold harmless and indemnify the Journal and The University against any legal claim or action or expense of any nature arising from any claim of infringement of copyrights or proprietary rights resulting from publication of the manuscript or claims of libel, obscenity, unlawfulness or invasion of privacy arising out of anything contained in the manuscript as furnished by the Author. Suppose Author infringes the copyright of Jones, by copying large parts of it into Author's work. Author is now in legal trouble because he illegally copied stuff into his manuscript, but Journal is also in big (bigger) legal trouble, because it made many copies of Jones' word and sold them. Jones will now sue everybody, mostly the Journal (since Journal has money, and Author doesn't). Thanks to the indemnity clause, when Journal gets sued, all of the costs (of litigation and judgment) have to be born by Author. The primary purpose is to protect Journal from suits by third parties. Nothing can keep you from getting sued, but such a clause (theoretically) means that the person whom your contracting with has to cover the cost of his wrong-doing (assuming that he is not a turnip). The term "hold harmless" is there to guarantee that Author can't decide to sue Journal for publishing a libelous or infringing article. The functions are similar, but not totally the same: this and references therein could be interesting reading, by way of more details. He argues against using both terms, and instead you should use only "indemnify". In this case, the court said "When two words are used in a contract, the rule of construction is that the words have different meanings", which caused the court to assign distinct meanings to the words (which are typically used as though they mean the same thing), which doesn't seem to have been the original intent.	It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.	The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION.	First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.
In which United States District Court should a permanent resident file a lawsuit against the USCIS? A US permanent resident has recently moved to western VA. VA has two United States District Courts: Western and Eastern. The permanent resident would like to file a lawsuit against the USCIS. One of the defendants is the head of the USCIS Field Office at Norfolk, VA, which is now responsible for the permanent resident's case, based on his zip code. So, the permanent resident resides in one district (the Western district), but his rights were violated by the USCIS field office which is in another district (the Eastern district). The permanent resident wants to file a lawsuit according to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b): (b) Request for hearing before district court If there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this title before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the examination is conducted under such section, the applicant may apply to the United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the matter. So, the law specifies that the permanent resident should file his lawsuit in the United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides, i.e. the Western District. However, it would be reasonable to say that the actions or inactions that violated the permanent resident's rights occurred in the USCIS Norfolk Field Office, which is in the Eastern District. A quote from the US District Court for the Western District of Virginia's PRO SE HANDBOOK: 3. VENUE: Is the Western District of Virginia the appropriate federal court in which to file my lawsuit? If you decide that there is jurisdiction to bring your claim in a federal court, you must then determine in which federal court to file. In order to decide a case, a court must have some logical relationship either to the litigants or to the subject matter of the dispute; this is called venue. There are two United States District Courts in Virginia: the Eastern District and the Western District. Generally, you may only file an action in the Western District of Virginia if the actions or inactions that you believe violated your rights occurred within the boundaries of this District. According to the above resource, the permanent resident should file his lawsuit in the United States district court for the district in which his rights were violated, i.e. the Eastern District. In which district should the permanent resident file his lawsuit then?	Generally, you may only file an action in the Western District of Virginia if the actions or inactions that you believe violated your rights occurred within the boundaries of this District. When a lawyer uses the word "generally," it typically signals the existence of exceptions. The specific statutory provision of 8 USC 1447(b) supersedes the general rule expressed in the handbook. I am not a lawyer, so I hope that the lawyers on this site will correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that this provision establishes "subject matter jurisdiction," and the statute explicitly grants that jurisdiction to the court for the district in which the permanent resident resides. The "application for a hearing" should be submitted to the court for the western district. If I were you, I would try to find out whether "applying for a hearing" is in fact the same as filling a suit; it sounds to me like they may be different. In the latter case, you submit a "complaint," which makes you a "plaintiff." The use of "apply" and "hearing" suggests that different procedural rules may be relevant. If that is the case, it supports the conclusion that the general rule expressed in the handbook does not apply, since the talk of rights violation also implies a complaint and a potential trial rather than an application and a hearing. After writing the previous paragraph, I found a few discussions online that make it clear that "apply for a hearing" does mean "file a suit," but it's still not clear to me who the defendant would be. Another open question is when the 120-day period begins. It seems that different courts have different opinions on the matter.	It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.	In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), the Supreme Court held: A federal court may “look through” a §4 petition to determine whether it is predicated on a controversy that “arises under” federal law; in keeping with the well-pleaded complaint rule as amplified in Holmes Group [535 U.S. 826], however, a federal court may not entertain a §4 petition based on the contents of a counterclaim when the whole controversy between the parties does not qualify for federal-court adjudication. Discover sued Vaden to recover a credit card debt in state court. Vaden filed a counter-claim challenging the charges under state usury laws. Discover filed a claim in federal court seeking to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. §4, which provides: A party aggrieved by the alleged failure … of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction … of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed … "Look through" analysis gives effect to the bolded words. A dispute about arbitrability itself is not sufficient to attract federal jurisdiction. But the petition does not need to be based on an existing claim in federal court, either – the court can "look through" the petition for a claim that would attract federal jurisdiction. Although Discover's debt recovery claim was based solely on state law, Discover asserted that the court would have had federal question jurisdiction because §27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act preempted the state laws supporting Vaden's counterclaim. The Supreme Court agreed that the district court should "look through" the §4 petition and consider the possible existence of federal jurisdiction, but reversed the court of appeals' finding that Discover's claim "arose under" federal law for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1331. The Supreme Court applied the "well-pleaded complaint rule" to Discover's §1331 claim, which required the court to focus on Discover's original (state law) claim, not its response to Vaden's counterclaim. To answer your question, "look through" analysis does not require the court to consider the "merits" of a federal claim before compelling arbitration. However, it is not sufficient that the dispute "seems to be of federal nature"; the court must conclude that (but for the arbitration agreement) it would have jurisdiction. The disagreement between the Supreme Court and the court of appeals in Vaden, which related to the scope of federal jurisdiction rather than the application of "look through" analysis, demonstrates that disputes about whether jurisdiction would have existed can become very complex. Thus, in general, a federal court should not decline to compel arbitration of a federal claim because "the case would have been dismissed summarily had the court been asked to rule on it." However, the court must dismiss the petition if the federal claim is so insubstantial that federal jurisdiction is not attracted at all. As the Supreme Court held in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974): Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit," "wholly insubstantial," "obviously frivolous," "plainly unsubstantial," or "no longer open to discussion."	There's been recent publicity about an American diplomat in Britain responsible for a car accident that killed someone. She claimed diplomatic immunity and left the country. Could the victim's family sue her in an American court? They could sue, but the case would probably be summarily dismissed, often one of the following two grounds: (1) related to diplomatic immunity, but not specifically covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, such as common law sovereign immunity which bars suits against individuals or their employers for actions taken in an official capacity on behalf of a federal government employer (the scope of which is interpreted broadly in the case of diplomatic personnel abroad, much as it is in the case of what conduct of the President of the United States constitutes an action taken in an official capacity), unless waived. Cf. Cruikshank v. U.S., 431 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977) ("Alleged activities of agents of Central Intelligence Agency in opening and photographing sealed, first-class letters mailed by plaintiff to colleagues in the Soviet Union fell within purview of general waiver of sovereign immunity statute, despite claim that Central Intelligence Agency agents involved could not have been legally authorized to carry out such activities and consequently, as matter of law, were not “acting within the scope of their office or employment,” as that phrase is used in this section.") If a diplomat is acting in an official capacity, lawsuits can be filed against the U.S. government, but not against the individual, and can't only be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and only then if an exception to it does not apply. The FTCA is the "exclusive means by which a party may sue the United States for money damages ... in tort" (28 USC § 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy). Accordingly, an FTCA action "can be brought only in a United States District Court" (28 USC § 1346(b)). Regarding the timing of filing, FTCA's § 2401(b) states that the action must be brought "within two years after the claim accrues," or "within six months after ... notice of final denial of the claim by the agency". In addition, under the FTCA, "Liability is determinable in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" (§1346(b)(1)). More fully, 28 USC § 1346(b)(1) states: Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. But, 28 U.S.C. 2680(k) expressly precludes the exercise of jurisdiction under the FTCA over "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (FTCA does not apply to claims arising in Antarctica). "It is a longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' " Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Basically, sovereign immunity is absolute for torts committed abroad in an official capacity by a U.S. government official of any kind. So, if the official capacity conduct claim is barred by diplomatic immunity where it occurred, it is barred everywhere. or (2) in cases not arising from actions taken in the diplomat's official capacity, on the discretionary quasi-jurisdictional grounds of forum non conveniens, even thought American courts, as a general rule, have jurisdiction over all civil claims of private persons arising anywhere in the world against a person who is domiciled in the state where the state or federal court in question is located. For over a quarter century, federal judges have assumed that foreign injury cases, particularly those filed by foreign plaintiffs, are best litigated abroad. . . . Federal judges approach the forum non conveniens decision as if it were a species of choice of law, as opposed to a choice of forum question. Elizabeth T. Lear, "National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens", 41(2) U.C.-Davis Law Review 559 (2007). One of the leading forum non conviens cases pertinent to this fact pattern is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), involving an airplane crash in Scotland in which U.S. defendants were allegedly at fault. Potential loopholes in that decision have been closed by subsequent cases. Federal judges are all that matter in a lawsuit between a foreigner and a U.S. person involving claims in excess of $75,000 (which essentially all personal injury cases worth bringing internationally do), such as the one contemplated in this case, which fall within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be removed from a state court to a federal court. (And, state courts tend to defer to federal precedents in diversity cases in claims which are not removed from state court to federal court.) The Alien Tort Claim Act expressly authorizes certain lawsuits in U.S. Courts for violations of international law or treaties committed abroad (although whether the judicial power extends to cases where all of the defendants are non-U.S. persons is an issue of ongoing dispute), but not for simple common law torts like the negligence actions that are the basis of most automobile accident cases. There are also other specific statutes that might authorize lawsuits (e.g. civil rights statutes, patent laws, copyright laws, etc.), but none of them would ordinarily apply to a simple automobile accident allegedly causing a wrongful death. It is conceivable that an attorney could find some way to thread a needle through these two strong limitations on bringing suit against U.S. diplomats in U.S. courts for personal injuries caused by ordinary common law torts committed abroad which are barred by diplomatic immunity where they occurred, but it would take extraordinary facts that do not appear to be present in this relatively routine automobile accident allegedly wrongfully causing a death of a non-U.S. person. Could she be criminally prosecuted in America because of what she did in Britain? No. The Vienna Convention only directly limits criminal prosecutions of people with diplomatic immunity in jurisdictions where someone is a credentialed diplomat or head of state. But, usually criminal cases can only be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where they are committed or the jurisdiction to which the crime was directed if a crime is committed outside a prosecuting jurisdiction but directed at a victim or target in the prosecuting jurisdiction. There are federal statutes criminalizing conduct victimizing various U.S. government officials, but very few criminalizing conduct that would otherwise not be a crime subject to U.S. criminal prosecution if it is committed by a U.S. government official abroad (in some cases, a violation of civil rights claims might apply, but not in a car accident case like this one). Note that I am limiting this to a criminally culpable automobile accident against a non-U.S. person while diplomatic credentials were in force. There might be a U.S. prosecution of a diplomat, for example, for espionage in the form of revealing U.S. secrets, or as another example, for a rape of one U.S. person who has diplomatic immunity by some other U.S. person at the same embassy. The cases could arguably be directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person. The most negative U.S. consequence that could arise from criminal conduct that did not take place in the U.S. and was not directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person (for civilians not subject to the U.S. Code of Military Justice) would usually be termination of employment at the U.S. State Department and termination of diplomatic credentials, both of which would have prospective application only.	Can the subject actually sue me in England, or is it possible to sue only in the EU country I posted the article from, or in the US where the article is actually hosted? Yes. If the online encyclopedia is available in the UK, then you have libelled them in the UK and, indeed, in every country where it is available. They can choose to sue in and under the laws of any country where they were libelled. If the subject can and does sue in England, what happens exactly? This is laid out in the Civil Procedure Rules Am I correct in presuming that I will be notified of this by mail and asked to enter a defence? You will definitely need to be served with the Particulars of Claim, however, this may come by other methods than snail mail. If so, what happens if I ignore the matter? Will a default judgment against me necessarily be entered, or will the court duly consider the plaintiff's case, perform the bare minimum investigation/reasoning necessary to determine which arguments of theirs are (un)sound, and so possibly rule in my favour? A default judgement will be entered providing the Particulars of Claim show a cause of action on its face. The court will not examine any evidence or enquire into the veracity of the statements made on the Particulars of Claim. In short, unless the plaintiff has ballsed something up - you lose. If I do choose to respond, can I hire an England-based lawyer to handle everything remotely, or can I be compelled to physically attend the court in England? You are generally not required to attend court in a civil matter unless you need to testify. Even then, arrangements can be made for remote testimony. If the court rules for the plaintiff and awards damages, can this judgment be enforced in the EU, or would it apply only in the UK? It can be enforced in the EU. As a courtesy or by treaty, domestic jurisdictions will enforce foreign judgements in most cases. If the court rules in my favour, would I recoup my legal fees? You will probably recoup some but not all of your legal fees, say 50-60%. Costs orders are complicated - talk to your lawyer.	Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).	The cited case (Ross [2012] UKPC 3) is not a Canadian case. It is from St Kitts and Nevis, an appeal from the Court of Appeal of that small Caribbean country to the Privy Council. The two barristers are from the same firm based in Canada (WeirFoulds LLP), a firm which also has a cross-jurisdictional practice encompassing several countries in the eastern Caribbean who share their appellate court system. Those nations also have a common pathway for onward appeals to the Privy Council, for essentially historical reasons dating from the era of the British Empire. Thus, counsels' appearance in this case is not because they are Canadian, but because of their separate entitlement to appear in Caribbean appeals. Frank Walwyn's biography (linked in the question) says he is "He is licensed to practise law in Canada, and is also a member of the bars of Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Dominica, Grenada and St. Kitts and Nevis." (my emphasis). Membership in the St Kitts bar was enough for him to be able to also appear before the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and therefore the JCPC as well. Bryan Finlay's biography does not specify, but as senior partner in the same firm he may well have the same status. In any case, since "duly qualified members of the Bar in countries from which appeals to the Queen in Council lie have a right of audience before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" (Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 66, para 795, 2020 ed.) he could appear before the JCPC whether or not he was allowed to do so in lower courts. Regarding your Q2 (Why Canadians?): In this case, the appeal was from St Kitts, which is a very small country of about 50k people. This would give a small talent pool from which to draw, if only barristers from St Kitts were eligible to practise in appeals. That is why the shared Eastern Caribbean court system exists and why there is some added generosity about qualifications between the participating countries. While the appellant Ross might have had many choices, he himself is "a Canadian lawyer who was at the time [= 1983] practising in Halifax, Nova Scotia", and could therefore have been drawn to a Canadian firm with a Caribbean practice. The appeal, moreover, does not appear to have turned on any local peculiarity of St Kitts' law. It was mainly about how certain commercial documents should be interpreted. The issues arising would be accessible to practitioners from many common-law countries. Canada is not especially at an advantage or disadvantage, and neither is England. There are several barristers in London who have Caribbean experience and qualifications and who are more commonly instructed to appear on Caribbean-related cases (London is a nexus for commercial litigation, and several Caribbean jurisdictions are commercially important in this way, such as the Cayman Islands). I have no data on your Q1 (How many Canadians?). I expect that there are not many, because the natural choice of counsel might be either a London-based barrister, or one from the jurisdiction of origin who has been handling the case so far, rather than from a third country with no recent history of JCPC appeals. You could gather your own data from case reports if you are so inclined; as far as I know there isn't a systematic pre-existing study available.	No. The original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court for disputes between states applies only to disputes between the state entities themselves, not suits on behalf of their citizens. Something like this was attempted, and failed, in the litigation following the 2020 election producing a ruling in December 2020: [In] Texas v. Pennsylvania, Georgia, Wisconsin and Michigan? Texas sought to overturn the presidential voting results in those four states. It urged the justices to prevent their presidential electors from meeting and to require state legislators to appoint a new slate of electors. Texas ran into two huge problems in seeking the Supreme Court’s review: standing and the Electors Clause. Standing is the key to the courthouse door under the court’s appellate or original jurisdiction. The Constitution mandates that federal courts exercise judicial power only over cases and controversies. Texas had to show it had suffered a concrete and particularized injury to a legally protected interest “that is fairly traceable to the challenged action (causation)” and that injury can be remedied by a favorable ruling. Texas argued that the four states it was suing had used the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse to “usurp” their legislatures’ authority and unconstitutionally revised their state election laws through executive action or friendly lawsuits. Texas claimed that the four states’ actions threatened Texas’s voting rights. Texas, it said, had standing to protect its citizens. But here was where Texas also ran into the Constitution’s Electors Clause. As Pennsylvania chief deputy attorney general told the justices, the text of the Electors Clause itself “makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the (Pennsylvania) General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution.” The Electors Clause is found in Article II, Section 1, clauses 2 and 3: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States shall be appointed an Elector.” The justices also consider with the issue of standing a related question of whether the state suit involves a justiciable controversy, that is a controversy that can or needs to be addressed by the court. As Georgia argued in its response to the Texas complaint, Texas wanted to alter how the four states appoint their electors. But there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” to each state’s political branches for how the state appoints electors—once again the Electors Clause. Georgia added: “This Court has never allowed one state to co-opt the legislative authority of another state, and there are no limiting or manageable principles to cabin that kind of overreach.” Thus, there was no justiciable controversy, much like the Supreme Court found with excessive partisan gerrymandering. The Supreme Court, in an unsigned order, denied Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. The court’s order said the motion was denied “for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections.” Justice Samuel Alito Jr., joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, included in the order a statement that said: “In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdiction. I would therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other issue.” Justices Alito and Thomas believe the text of Article III, Section 2 establishes the court’s original jurisdiction in mandatory terms. They emphasize the word “shall” in that section and see no justification for their colleagues’ reading that word to mean “may.” They are presently the only justices who read the section as requiring the court to take original jurisdiction of all cases between two or more states. It’s important to remember that those two justices said they would allow Texas to file its bill of complaint, they also said they would not give Texas the remedy it was seeking—to invalidate the four states’ electors chosen by the votes of their citizens.
Can a company force a worker to work in 40°+ degrees Celsius and not allow any concessions for basic comfort to stay more safe? Can a company force a worker to work in 40°+ degrees Celsius and not allow any concessions for basic comfort to stay more safe? This question is a result of this question on Lifehacks SE: How to stop sweat from running into your eyes while at work in 40+ degree Celsius weather? Last year I was asked to remove my 3” high-vis orange brim hat in lieu of their standard black baseball hat. The hat definitely keeps the heat off my neck and shoulders. This year the heat is worse with 40+ degrees Celsius. Are companies allowed to insist on their dress code in extreme weather conditions or can an employee make reasonable adjustments for basic comfort and safety? I would like to know the laws according to both Canada and the USA.	I limit my answer to U.S. law. The Right To Quit And Its Impact On Unemployment Benefits First, absent narrow exceptions (e.g. soldiers), any employee can quit at any time, from work with a bad employer. Normally quitting forfeits a right to unemployment insurance payments, but if the employee can convince the unemployment eligibility hearing office that the conditions the employer established were so bad that there was a "constructive discharge" the employee will be treated as having been fired for purposes of unemployment insurance. The employee can't get an advisory opinion on constructive discharge, however. The employee must act first and argue that there was a constructive discharge afterwards at risk of not getting any unemployment benefits if the employee loses. Occupational Safety and Health Laws Second, the employer is obligated to follow workplace safety law. Outside the mining industry (which does not include oil and gas work), workplace safety regulations are primarily promulgated by OSHA (the Occupational Safety and Health Administration) which is a subdivision of the federal department of Labor. Many states have a parallel state agency. (The mining industry is governed by MHSA a parallel and much more powerful body.) Violating workplace safety rules established by OSHA can result in the employer being fined and being required to correct the situation going forward, although the amounts of the fine even taken together with worker's compensation packages, are often far less than the amount of liability that the employer would have in a third-party negligence lawsuit. The government and not the employee receives the fine paid if one is imposed. Also, OSHA is vastly understaffed and routinely ignores worker complaints out of sheer lack of manpower, since it is responsible for all safety issues for 98%+ of all employees in the entire United States. OSHA has protocols related to requirements for employees working in extreme heat that are discussed here. In particular, OSHA states that: Washington, Minnesota, and California have specific laws governing occupational heat exposure. Federal OSHA has a General Duty Clause (Section 5a of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970) that requires employers to provide a place of employment that is “free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees.” The OSHA Technical Manual Chapter on Heat Stress establishes that OSHA uses WBGT to determine if a heat hazard was present. Thus, outside those three states, rather than having detailed requirements in a regulation, OSHA has general suggestions and provides a framework for evaluating heat related safety and occupational illness issues that gets evaluated on a case by case basis if OSHA asserts that an employer has violated these general safety requirements, which will be resolved in a hearing, if necessary, if a citation issued by OSHA on this basis is issued by OSHA and disputed by the employer. Worker's Compensation Third, the employer has liability without regard to fault for all work related injuries, illness and deaths under worker's compensation law. The employer has liability even if the employer didn't violate any OSHA regulations or standards. But, the recovery allowed is much more meager than it would be between strangers suing each other for negligence. It is largely limited to lost wages, medical expenses, and funeral expenses, although if a deceased worker has dependents, their dependent survivors are also entitled to worker's compensation lost income benefits. The existence of worker's compensation coverage, however, bars an employee from bringing a lawsuit other than a worker's compensation claim against the employer, however. Collective Bargaining Rights Of Unionized Workers Fourth, in a unionized workplace, the union could raise a grievance with the employer under the collective bargaining agreement governing the workplace which will universally require the employer to follow safety rules. If there is a dispute, these disputes are typically referred to an arbitrator in union-management arbitration. The arbitrator has considerable freedom to fashion remedies if the arbitrator feels that the safety rules were not followed. Neither side can appeal the arbitrator's ruling. If the employer does not follow an order from an arbitrator, this is converted to a court order at an ordinary court with jurisdiction over the employer and the court will make the arbitrator's order a court order which may be enforced under pain of contempt of court sanctions (including incarceration or punitive fines).	From the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) website: An employer must have a certain number of employees to be covered by the laws we enforce. This number varies depending on the type of employer (for example, whether the employer is a private company, a state or local government agency, a federal agency, an employment agency, or a labor union) and the kind of discrimination alleged (for example, discrimination based on a person's race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information). All employers are covered, whether or not a particular regulation covers a particular employer is dependent on the number of employees. For example, age discrimination is covered by employers who have more than 20 employees and Equal Pay Act coverage is for virtually all employers. From the same web site: People who are not employed by the employer, such as independent contractors, are not covered by the anti-discrimination laws. Figuring out whether or not a person is an employee of an organization (as opposed to a contractor, for example) is complicated. If you aren't sure whether a person covered, you should contact one of our field offices as soon as possible so we can make that decision. The EEOC has regulations covering: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act The Equal Pay Act of 1963 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 The EEOC is an agency responsible for creating rules and regulations and enforcing civil rights laws against workplace discrimination. The regulations and enforcement actions are based on a large number of laws, any one of which may or may not apply to a particular employer. Exemptions are based on a particular anti-discrimination law, not on the agency itself. Each anti-discrimination law has a different set of entities to which the law applies and different sets of exemptions.	Certain kinds of pay secrecy measures are illegal under the National Labor Relations Act, a 1935 law. It's not the strongest prohibition, however, because the consequences of violating it are rather weak (especially compared to other employment claims). Some government entities or contractors are under more stringent rules by executive order, and states may have their own laws. Here's a Department of Labor fact sheet. Here's a 2014 NPR story on the subject.	I believe that under federal law, the franchise owner cannot avoid overtime in this way. A similar case was considered by the Labor Department in 2005 (FLSA2005-17NA): This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the overtime requirements of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees who work at two different health care facilities operated by one management company. It is our opinion that all hours worked at any of the facilities must be combined for the purpose of calculating hours worked under the FLSA. The letter explains the logic pretty clearly, with citations. When an employee is "jointly" employed by two or more employers, then the hours are all combined for overtime purposes. 29 CFR 791.2(b) explains how "jointly" is determined: Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. Paragraph (1) applies: the two employers (the two restaurants) have an arrangement to share the employee's services (the owner is explicitly dividing their hours). Paragraph (3) also applies: both employers are under common control, since the same person owns both. They certainly are "not completely dissociated". The same logic would seem to apply even if the two locations are different restaurants, or different types of businesses. The 2005 letter explains further: Factors that are relevant in finding joint employment include, for example, whether there are common officers or directors of the companies; the nature of the common management support provided; whether employees have priority for vacancies at the other companies; whether there are any common insurance, pension or payroll systems; and whether there are any common hiring seniority, recordkeeping or billing systems. These also seem likely to apply in your hypothetical cases.	Yes and no. While there are no general laws that ban the display of offensive symbols, they are prohibited in certain circumstances. Significantly, this is in the workplace. It is illegal to discriminate on the following bases in the workplace: Race Sex Pregnancy Religion National origin Disability (physical or mental, including HIV status) Age (for workers over 40) Military service or affiliation Bankruptcy or bad debts Genetic information Citizenship status (for citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents, refugees, and asylees) For instance, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998), the majority found: a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic claim of so-called "disparate treatment." Since you haven't been specific about the nature of the offensive symbol, some examples might be: displaying a swastika displaying sexually offensive material displaying racially offensive material These are likely only to apply if the employer ought to have known, or did in fact know, that an employee (or in some cases, the customers) of a business would be offended, or it would amount to discrimination. Of course, a single display of only the symbol is not likely, on its own, to create a hostile work environment - it would need to be considered with the rest of the facts - but it can certainly be a contributing factor. It's a bit difficult to list all the situations where similar laws might apply, but this is one of the most prominent (and, to be honest, one of the ones that I'm personally interested in).	Bonded labor is illegal in India, but enforcement is lax. Read Right against exploitation in Fundamental rights in India. The right against exploitation, given in Articles 23 and 24, provides for two provisions, namely the abolition of trafficking in human beings and Begar (forced labour)... As per law, they cannot make the contract binding if it relates to bonding of the laborer. But a general contract may stand in court if they have made you sign the contract and paid the duty to government for the contract. This contract will be mild form of Bonds/begar-contracts. As per the requirements of the contract, usually they will ask you to give them your original documents and degree certificate. Do not do that. That will give them control, and it's illegal. From personal experience, such companies are phonies and they want to exploit you. Visa thing is a scare. As per they wont give me Experience letter and Releasing letter; they might do that, and so you will not be able to show experience. You can file a lawsuit against them. (But you know it's a waste of time in Indian courts) As per first three things you mentioned: It is written on my company's letter head. It doesn't contain any stamp paper. It doesn't contain any company seal. It's not a contract. Do not provide them your actual signatures. Make a strange signature so that you can later argue that it's not your signature. But think about the consequences: You are going to that (probably shady) company, do you think they will hold any of their promises later, at all. Think: Will the company stay in business until your bond is over? Then how will you get an Experience certificate? That ends the answer. A few suggestions I'd suggest finding a different job. I'd suggest talking to a lawyer. It's cheaper than your life being screwed up. I'd suggest talking to your family about it. Nothing written here constitutes legal advice. Talk to a lawyer to get a legal opinion on the matter.	Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to.	In Texas, as in most of the US, the law is "Employment at Will". This means that an employer is free to fire people at any time, for any reason, or none, as long as it is not for one of the few reason forbidden by law, such as racial or age discrimination. Hourly employees are entitled to overtime pay in such cases, but "exempt" employees are not. Nor are they entitled to comp-time as a matter of law, that is at the option of the employer. (The question seems to imply that the employee in question was "exempt" but does not actually say so.) The only really effective recourse against that sort of "death march" is to quit and find a better job, or to threaten to do so while they still need you, unless the conditions return to acceptable ones. I have heard of people in such a situation who "get sick" every day at 5:30pm, because local law forbid requiring ill employees to work. But that is pretty much inviting an arduous and possibly expensive administrative and/or legal battle, and will depend on the specifics of the state/local law. In any case, it is too late for the person in question to try that. On the facts as stated, there might be a valid claim of age discrimination. But additional facts would be needed to establish this, and it would be in my view unwise to try it without consulting a good employment lawyer. Such a lawyer could advise exactly what must be proved and how, and what the probable chances of any recovery would be.
Fireworks just got banned. Are people entitled to return them? My state just announced that fireworks are banned this year due to high risk of fire. Unfortunately, they announced it too late, and some tents have already opened and some people have already bought fireworks. Usually, fireworks are not returnable, but I am wondering if the ban changes that. I feel like normally, the answer would probably be, "They were legal at the time of purchase, and they will be legal again in the future. Just put them in storage" - but I think this case might be different, because the people selling the fireworks were obviously well aware that buyers were planning to use the products on July 4, 2021. They will now not be able to use them on this date. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund?	I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks...	If you innocently took the oven glove by mistake there is no possibility of criminal consequences. Now that you know it is not yours, you must return it as soon as possible. You may be liable for the losses caused by taking the glove, and that could extend as far as some fraction of the cost of a replacement glove if they have already replaced it. You cannot (legally) hold his glove hostage for the return of your desk. Deciding which glove is which is tricky. Given the cost of new oven gloves, I would go round with both and ask him which is his. Even if he takes the nicer one which isn't his, you are only down a few dollars. The messy hall should be a separate question (and risks being closed as asking for specific legal advice - I think you need your own paid-for lawyer for that).	This is a general common law answer; specifics in California may differ. Yes, they are committing the tort of trespass and you could sue them for whatever damage they did to your property; probably nothing. On the other hand, if you keep the ball, you are committing the tort of detinue (wrongful detention of another person's goods when the owner has requested their return) and they can sue you for whatever damage you have done to them; the cost of a new ball probably. TL;DR No, it isn't; give it back.	It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."	I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.	Banning you from the museum raises questions about your due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights. Generally speaking, a person banned like this would be unlikely to collect any damages, but may be able to obtain injunctive relief to prevent the museum from enforcing its ban. Of course, it would depend on the reason for the ban and the procedures the museum went through in imposing the ban and permitting you to challenge it. In your case, though, the ban has already been lifted, so there's probably not much room for any kind of legal action. EDIT: Since there are several people contesting -- with no law to support them -- the validity of this answer, here's a case discussing the First Amendment implications of access to museums: As a limited public forum, there are certain First Amendment activities permitted on [National Civil War Museum] grounds and others that are not. For example, lectures or programs on a Civil War topic authorized by the museum and the public's attendance at these activities would be permitted uses, but activities concerning other topics (including the immorality of homosexual activity) would not. Diener v. Reed, 232 F. Supp. 2d 362, 385 (M.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 77 F. App'x 601 (3d Cir. 2003).	The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.	While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance.
Can you become a U.S citizen even if you carry the last name of a non U.S citizen? U.S citizen pregnant with non U.S citizen baby both living in Germany. If baby does not carry my last name but her fathers last name can she still be entitled to become a U.S citizen?	Under US law, names do not matter, what matters is the citizenship of the parents. As a US citizen, your children are automatically also US citizens. Whether or not the child also gains citizenship in the father's country depends on the laws of that country. Under Kosovan citizenship law art. 6, if one parent is born outside of R. of Kosova and both parents agree in writing that the child shall acquire Kosovan citizenship (which does not preclude US citizenship). The child does not gain German citizenship (unless the other parent is a German citizen).	Under German law, yes sure. As long as you keep to all regulations. You have to declare your taxes. This is income, whether it comes from inside Germany or not and whether it is paid into a German bank account or foreign. You have to have a health insurance and likely need to pay into the social security and pension funds. As your employer most likely does not do this for you as a German employer would be required to, you will need to pay both the employee and the employer's part yourself. So yes, if you pay your taxes on it and have health and social security insurance, Germany does not care where the money comes from. Now whether the company in Mauritius is legally allowed to hire and pay you under their law? I have no idea. Please note that filling out all the right forms correctly is not for the faint of heart. And finding out that you did it wrong only years later is painful and costly. Also calculate your costs before you do anything. Paying both parts for your health insurance for example can easily be up to 400€ a month more then a German employee at a German company, so run your numbers. You may be better off being officially self-employed or even incorporated. Just because it's legal, does not mean it's a good idea. Hire a professional to advise you on the economic and bureaucratic side of this.	Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment makes a person born on U.S. soil a U.S. citizen at the moment of birth. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. This is not a "loophole," because it is exactly what the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying to achieve. There are narrow exceptions because of the "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause: The children of an ambassador are held to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince. ... Thus the children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 155-56 (1830).	No. Both your country of origin and your new home country will only care of your name as in the documents issued by each of them respectively. Mind though that absence of obligation to synchronize your names does not mean that you can freely use both identities within one country. For example, opening a bank account in the US using your original passport/name when you are already officially using another name there would be a very grey area bordering with identify fraud as it would effectively enable you to operate two different identities to gain any benefits not otherwise available.	When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent.	The law was changed several times, and different versions apply to different age groups because certain rules were not changed retroactively. The page you link describes the situation for children born after the year 2000. My advice: citizenship is such a serious matter that you should consult a specialized lawyer, not a random crowd on the web.	You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too.	Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the United States? Yes. There would need to be first, a legal establishment of paternity if that is not already in place, and then an application to a court for a child support order. The question of whether one should proceed in a U.S. court or a Brazilian court is a tactical one that would be evaluated based upon the circumstances by the lawyers involved in doing so. Generally, that would open the door to child custody proceedings as well in the same, or a parallel case.
Understanding "Statement of Justice Thomas respecting the denial of certiorari" In the matter of "Standing Akimbo, LLC, et al., v. United States" (https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062821zor_6j37.pdf at around page 28), Justice Thomas attached a statement to a denial of certiorari. Not a lawyer, I'm just trying to understand exactly what this statement is/means/represents. As I understand it, the appellate decision was that the IRS is permitted to compel state authorities to surrender information it wants on this marijuana dispensary. The writ of certiorari then was an attempt to get SCOTUS to overturn that, correct? Which they have denied, hence effectively supporting the government's stance on cannabis. So, with that in mind, this statement is kind of a rant (totally righteous IMO, FWIW) on why the US position toward cannabis is incoherent and inconsistent. Assuming all that is correct, what is the function of the statement? Is it a "yeah, this sucks and the US position is ridiculous but you're stuck with it"? Or a "dissent" from the denial of certiorari? And is it normal for there to be a statement associated with a denial of certiorari?	I'd say it's more like a concurrence than a dissent. Justice Thomas isn't saying the Court should have taken the case; he's just raising question about the (implicit) reason the Court isn't taking the case. Most experienced observers will read the statement as a signal that he is open to reversing Raich and hoping that someone will bring the right case in which to do that. But in the end, t amounts to pure commentary and has no legal effect. The practice of filing these types of statements is not "normal," as the Court rejects probably more than 95 percent of the cases that come to it, and it does so without comment. But it is hardly unprecedented to see these types of statements, and I assume that every justice (except perhaps Barrett, given her recent arrival) has made similar statements. From a quick search, I can find statements from Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, from Roberts, and from Breyer.	I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.	Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either.	There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage.	Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956.	First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings.	My research has turned up no instances of anyone successfully advocating these ideas in court. These are crackpot pseudo-legal theories that have no legal validity whatsoever. And are also a bit troublesome and problematic for the rest of us. They are mostly advocated by people who: don't want to pay taxes or otherwise conform to laws they don't like; are conspiracy-minded; and have come across a pseudo-legal theory that helps them justify their position. For example, an author of this Wikipedia article explains: "Freemen" believe that statute law is a contract, and that individuals can therefore opt out of statute law, choosing instead to live under what they call "common" (case) and "natural" laws. Under their theory, natural laws require only that individuals do not harm others, do not damage the property of others, and do not use "fraud or mischief" in contracts. They say that all people have two parts to their existence – their body and their legal "person". The latter is represented by the individual's birth certificate; some freemen claim that it is entirely limited to the birth certificate. Under this theory, a "strawman" is created when a birth certificate is issued, and this "strawman" is the entity who is subject to statutory law. The physical self is referred to by a slightly different name – for example "John of the family Smith", as opposed to "John Smith". In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington tried and convicted Kenneth Wayne Leaming for retaliation by making false claims and wrote: Defendant [Kenneth Wayne Leaming] is apparently a member of a group loosely styled "sovereign citizens." The Court has deduced this from a number of Defendant’s peculiar habits. First, like Mr. Leaming, sovereign citizens are fascinated by capitalization. They appear to believe that capitalizing names has some sort of legal effect. For example, Defendant writes that "the REGISTERED FACTS appearing in the above Paragraph evidence the uncontroverted and uncontrovertible FACTS that the SLAVERY SYSTEMS operated in the names UNITED STATES, United States, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and United States of America . . . are terminated nunc pro tunc by public policy, U.C.C. 1-103 . . . ." (Def.’s Mandatory Jud. Not. at 2.) He appears to believe that by capitalizing "United States," he is referring to a different entity than the federal government. For better or for worse, it’s the same country. Second, sovereign citizens, like Mr. Leaming, love grandiose legalese. "COMES NOW, Kenneth Wayne, born free to the family Leaming, [date of birth redacted], constituent to The People of the State of Washington constituted 1878 and admitted to the union 22 February 1889 by Act of Congress, a Man, "State of Body" competent to be a witness and having First Hand Knowledge of The FACTS . . . ." (Def.’s Mandatory Jud. Not. at 1.) Third, Defendant evinces, like all sovereign citizens, a belief that the federal government is not real and that he does not have to follow the law. Thus, Defendant argues that as a result of the "REGISTERED FACTS," the "states of body, persons, actors and other parties perpetuating the above captioned transaction(s) [i.e., the Court and prosecutors] are engaged . . . in acts of TREASON, and if unknowingly as victims of TREASON and FRAUD . . . ." (Def.’s Mandatory Jud. Not. at 2.) The Court therefore feels some measure of responsibility to inform Defendant that all the fancy legal-sounding things he has read on the internet are make-believe...... Paper Terrorism One particularly problematic "successful" tactic employed by these individuals is the filing of false liens. They take advantage of the fact that property liens are not vetted prior to being recorded. These false liens illegally cloud the title to real property and adversely affect the sale of property by adding unnecessary time and expense to the process.	What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission & editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).
Destroying U.S. dollars and getting replacement ones I remember reading a short story which involved a man trying to smuggle a large quantity of dollars out of USSR. The soviet agents detain him at a border crossing, search all of his belongings, but fail to find anything. When he is questioned, he says that he showed the money to an embassy worker, who told him that all of the money is counterfeit, and he burned all of the money. Later, the P.o.V character, the investigator, realizes that the man intentionally burned all the money in front of embassy workers, who witnessed it, and provided signed affidavits and other paperwork that money was destroyed (the story is lax in the details as to which exact paperwork was made), and he intended to use those documents to get replacement dollars from the treasury. Could this story have been true? Are there laws that allowed for this kind of trick to be done?	There's some artistic license in play there - the US Treasury will replace damaged (or "mutilated" as they call it) currency for free under certain conditions. Lawful holders of mutilated currency may receive a redemption at full value when: (1) Clearly more than 50% of a note identifiable as United States currency is present, along with sufficient remnants of any relevant security feature; or (2) 50% or less of a note identifiable as United States currency is present and the method of mutilation and supporting evidence demonstrate to the satisfaction of the BEP that the missing portions have been totally destroyed. From your description they fail the first condition - they've burned it all so they aren't presenting > 50% of a note, 0% is clearly less than 50% [citation needed] and they also fail the second condition as it doesn't seem that they are carrying any "identifiable" portion of the money. Further: No redemption will be made when: (1) A submission, or any portion thereof, demonstrates a pattern of intentional mutilation or an attempt to defraud the United States. In such instances, the entire submission will be destroyed or retained as evidence. The "mutilation" was clearly intentional in this case. and (4) Fragments and remnants presented are not identifiable as United States currency. Seems to reiterate that you have to present some identifiable remnants. I suppose if the Embassy worker was a Bureau of Engraving and Printing representative, or the affidavits they provided were sufficient to convince the BEP that currency of x value was present, and completely destroyed etc. then the only hurdle would be the "intentional mutilation" aspect. The "intentional mutilation" itself is illegal under 18 U.S. Code § 333: Whoever mutilates, cuts, defaces, disfigures, or perforates, or unites or cements together, or does any other thing to any bank bill, draft, note, or other evidence of debt issued by any national banking association, or Federal Reserve bank, or the Federal Reserve System, with intent to render such bank bill, draft, note, or other evidence of debt unfit to be reissued, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.	If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts.	In the US, the various crimes regarding mail theft, tampering are federal crimes, esp. 18 USC 1708 and 18 USC 1702. USPS has a web page about reporting mail theft here, and ultimately it would be prosecuted by the US Attorney's office. However, it is not guaranteed that the US Attorney will prosecute every case brought to his attention, instead, the case might be turned over to local authorities. Many (all?) states have their own laws covering mail theft, such as Cal. Pen 530.5(e), so it is possible that the prosecution (for the state crime) would be carried out by the state's district attorney. I do not know if there are any statistics on how frequently state and federal prosecutors decline to prosecute for throwing away or opening someone else's mail, compared to them prosecuting. The Dept. of Justice suggests accepting pleas to misdemeanors before Magistrate Judges over felony prosecutions, for less serious violations. Reporting the crime to the USPS Postal Inspector seems to be the standard first step.	This doesn't sound like fraud (against you, at least), but it does sound like an unfair or deceptive trade practice, which is outlawed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and perhaps the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, both of which prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. I don't know about Pennsylvania, but the FTC has on many occasions taken action against companies for engaging in just this kind of behavior. To find out whether you would be able to take action against the other company, you'd want to find a good competition lawyer in Pennsylvania. For some more basic background on the FTC's rules, check out this primer.	...the public is susceptible to misinformation by bad actors in the financial system and therefore are protected by the SEC... The SEC governs fixed laws about financial transfers, disclosures, etc., and investigates illegal acts regarding those laws where there are quantitative facts, i.e. who moved how much money to where, who engaged in information for insider trading, and other situations based on hard evidence. Bad actors are deterred by the fact that can be prosecuted for their crimes by the SEC and other authorities. Shouldn't... political campaigns be audited for truthfulness? There is no government authority that audits or regulates political ads and/or claims; such authority or laws would clearly violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution - Wikipedia as to the government regulating or attempting to control or manipulate free speech. In a non-partisan fashion, government authorities can and do routinely supply publicly available documents that can be used by the public, fact checkers and the press. False political claims are investigated by the press and various non-profits, also under the same 1st Amendment protections so that the press can operate free of government intrusion. See https://www.google.com/search?q=political+fact+checking for different political NGOs and media outlets which do fact checking. Such resources themselves can be fact challenged and partisan themselves, of course; news outlets can be under the editorial control of a political agenda, and a "fact checking" website or NGO can be funded by partisans. ...why shouldn't the same be done in the political system? Within a political system such as the US, people are responsible for their own thoughts and actions; and they are responsible for assessments of what may or may not be factual, and for what they believe (which, of course, can be removed from a factual basis). The idea that a government should be involved in auditing or otherwise having control over political speech is a political question, not a legal question.	Under US regulations pertaining to Iran sanctions, §560.201, Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, the importation into the United States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, other than information and informational materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is prohibited. where that acts grants the President the authority to regulate various things but The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly... the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not include those which are otherwise controlled for export under section 4604 3 of this title, or under section 4605 3 of this title to the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18 So information isn't generally regulated, except potentially under section 50 USC 4604 – which was repealed. For the moment, here is what that law said (huge, not gonna copy). But that doesn't matter too much because the exception to the exception is for exports, not imports: it is legal to import technology into the US. (OTOH, how is it possible to import programs without exporting at least shred of programming technology?) Also under §560.419 The prohibitions in §560.201 make it unlawful to hire an Iranian national ordinarily resident in Iran to come to the United States solely or for the principal purpose of engaging in employment on behalf of an entity in Iran or as the employee of a U.S. person, unless authorized pursuant to §560.505. See also §560.418 with respect to the release of technology and software. You cannot bring an Iranian resident to the US for this purpose, unless you get authorization. It does not say you can't pay a guy in Iran to work remotely. And finally, §560.505 which is about the "authorized pursuant to" clause: The release of technology or software in the United States, or by a United States person wherever located, to any person violates the prohibitions of this part if made with knowledge or reason to know the technology is intended for Iran or the Government of Iran, unless that technology or software meets the definition of information and informational materials in §560.315. There are other clarificatory notes attached to this section. Finally, §560.505 explicitly allows importation of certain non-immigrant services, but what you intend doesn't seem to be covered. So it is not crystal clear, especially since your plan might involve "exporting technology". It's not safe to interpret these regulations on your own, and you need to hire an attorney who specializes in this area, where you would discuss in detail what you will be "exporting" (even if you don't think it is exporting, it could be legally deemed to be exporting). That, I think, is the main legal issue.	When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well.	Your question (when read with your follow-up comments) is somewhat complex, so I am going to make a few assumptions and break it down into several sub parts. Assumptions The conviction occurred in a state where the expungement statute allows you to tell employers that you were never arrested and convicted. When you say “public records websites” you’re asking about sites like atlaspublicrecords.com. That atlaspublicrecords.com is a US based company. They don’t list an address and the website used a private registration services, so can’t easily determine that they are US-based. Your questions and follow-up Considerations After I get it expunged, will it be removed from public records websites . . . . No. Websites like atlaspublicrecords.com do not link to actual public records. I searched a couple of common names and feel safe in assuming that it only collects and publishes the information—it does not actually link to court records. Nevertheless, it would not be available from the actual government agencies that keep those records. By getting your records expunged the convictions and arrest would no longer be available as public records that someone could request from the courthouse, police department, or whatever state agency does criminal history in your jurisdiction. do I have to show them proof of the expungement . . . . Yes, if you believe what the website claims. I can’t find a physical address for the website and don’t know if they are real or a scam, so understand that when you give them information about your expungement—or pay their silly fee, they might collect the money and do nothing. My opinion is that the company is shady and seems to operate in a gray area of the law that I will explain below. Options if they don’t remove the post: You could try to sue them for some type of secondary dignitary tort like defamation or false light. But these would have some significant legal hurdles. See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that commenting on an expunged criminal records was not defamation or invasion of privacy because it was the truth. You could try to argue that they are a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). If they're governed by the FCRA, you have some additional legal remedies (like civil penalties/fines) if they don't remove/clarify an expunged record. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to credit reporting agencies, like Experian & Equifax but also covers companies that compile and sell information for background checks. This includes criminal records. See the Federal Trade Commission’s Advisory Opinion to LeBlanc (06-09-98). But . . . this website is operating in a gray area that appears to comply with the law. The FCRA only applies to consumer reporting agencies, which are defined as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) Because they’re not charging money or a fee to access the reports and they’re not a nonprofit cooperative, they probably do not meet the definition of a CRA. Bottom-line is that you're best option is to give them the expungement documents once you obtain them.
The court does, but does your attorney have any duty to assume you are truthful for the sake of a problem spotting? When a complaint is first filed, per case law, courts have a duty to assume each allegation you make on information and belief as long as they are each not contradicting any other statement or other evidence present at the time of filing for the purpose of evaluating if there is any actionable causes. What authority governs any similar duties of your own attorney when you make similarly non-contradictory, consistent statements to them until you assert that you relayed every fact you deem relevant? Is the denial of believing their client before they asserted that each and every fact they deemed relevant was relayed a breach of fiduciary duty absent contradiction in evidence? I presume it is since without all the facts present, it is not plausible to presume that any facts that may be relayed would not over turn any conclusion made before that time. I am interested in attorney-client duties and privileges based on laws in effect at any given time between the period from 2017 to our present day in the U.S. and California; any other jurisdictions or eras may be interesting, too!	When a complaint is first file, per case law, courts have a duty to believe each allegation you make on information and belief as long as they are each not contradicting any other statement or other evidence present at the time of filing. This isn't true. The court doesn't have to actually believe you. The court merely has to assume for sake of argument that the things said are true for the narrow purpose of evaluating whether they describe a legal wrong in a formal sense. Also, under modern federal pleading rules in the U.S., the judge doesn't have to believe you and can dismiss your complaint if it is not "plausible." Your attorney has a duty to not merely assume that everything that a client tells the lawyer is true. In federal court, the governing rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which states that when an attorney files and signs a document in court that the attorney: certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. The California state law obligations is more or less identical in substance, although the procedural rules of California are codified differently than the federal rules. So, a lawyer is required to reasonably inquire into whether the client is telling the lawyer the truth about the client's motives and about the facts. It is a breach of the lawyer's duties to the court and the profession to simply take what a client tells the lawyer at face value, accepting it uncritically.	If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.	The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful.	The issue is more one of what an attorney is ethically authorized to disclose pursuant to professional ethics rules (Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 as enacted locally) more than one of attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client privilege governs what someone can or cannot be compelled to disclose without their consent (usually by subpoena). Attorney confidentiality, in contrast, governs what an attorney can disclosed when not compelled to do so by something like a subpoena. Generally, disclosure of confidential client information is allowed if it is in furtherance of the representation or authorized by the client (there are also other exceptions but those aren't really any different in a two lawyer v. one lawyer situation). Often when two attorneys represent the same person (and the disclosure won't waive the privileged nature of the information vis-a-vis third-parties under a joint defense theory), disclosures from one attorney for a person to another attorney for a person will do that. In practice, however, the analysis could be quite fact specific and there isn't really a bright line rule governing when it would or would not be allowed.	The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.	The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error.	Any google review would be hearsay. That means, it would be proof that someone posted a review, and what was written in the review, but it wouldn't be proof that any facts claimed in the review were true. As it is proof of posting, anyone who feels slandered could sue for slander and be successful (depending on circumstances). But trying to claim that the contents of a review is a true fact will fail. You can of course try to contact the person writing a review, and they might be willing to appear in court as a witness. That would make it a statement by a witness which would be taken seriously, and not just hearsay. Since lying in a court as a witness is a serious matter, someone posting a false review will very likely not be willing to appear in court for you.
Is a child car seat required in California cabs? I have heard that it is ok to not have a child car seat if you are coming / going to an Airport. I googled it and found conflicting opinions. Is it allowed as per law to not use child car seat in a cab? As per my understanding, at all times we need to use a child car seat, whether cab or your own car.	If the cab driver is not a parent or legal guardian too and they verify that the child or ward is accompanied by a parent or legal guardian as passenger, no and there are other exceptions. Quoting Vehicle Code § 27360, (a) Except as provided in Section 27363 a parent, legal guardian, or driver shall not transport on a highway in a motor vehicle, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision ( ) (c) of Section 27315, a child or ward who is under eight years of age, without properly securing that child in a rear seat in an appropriate child passenger restraint system meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards. (b) Subdivision (a) does not apply to a driver if the parent or legal guardian of the child is also present in the motor vehicle and is not the driver. Note that (b) is an important clause in some cases. Further exemptions are provided for in Vehicle Code § 27363 do not include anything general related to transport to or from airports; most relate only to the regulations that state that children must be in a rear seat. Here are the main ones: (a) The court may exempt from the requirements of this article any class of child by age, weight, or size if it is determined that the use of a child passenger restraint system would be impractical by reason of physical unfitness, medical condition, or size. The court may require satisfactory proof of the child’s physical unfitness, medical condition, or size and that an appropriate special needs child passenger restraint system is not available. (b) In case of a life-threatening emergency, or when a child is being transported in an authorized emergency vehicle, if there is no child passenger restraint system available, a child may be transported without the use of that system, but the child shall be secured by a seatbelt. (c) A child weighing more than 40 pounds may be transported in the backseat of a vehicle while wearing only a lap safety belt when the backseat of the vehicle is not equipped with a combination lap and shoulder safety belt. (d) Notwithstanding Section 27360, a child or ward under eight years of age who is four feet nine inches in height or taller may be properly restrained by a safety belt, as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 27315, rather than by a child passenger restraint system. (e) Notwithstanding Section 27360, a child or ward under eight years of age may ride properly secured in an appropriate child passenger restraint system meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards in the front seat of a motor vehicle under any of the following circumstances: (1) There is no rear seat. (2) The rear seats are side-facing jump seats. (3) The rear seats are rear-facing seats. (4) The child passenger restraint system cannot be installed properly in the rear seat. (5) All rear seats are already occupied by children seven years of age or under. (f) Notwithstanding subdivision (e), a child shall not be transported in a rear-facing child passenger restraint system in the front seat of a motor vehicle that is equipped with an active frontal passenger airbag. (6) Medical reasons necessitate that the child or ward not ride in the rear seat. The court may require satisfactory proof of the child’s medical condition.	I am aware of a view of the California law that if a pedestrian looks like they might want to cross the street, any car must stop, but this is not supported by the law, which is about "yielding". The law incorporates both "yield" and "stop", the former being "and allow the other person to proceed". Ignoring the photo for a moment, the requirement to yield (not stop) allows a car to continue driving when the driver is e.g. 10 ft from the crosswalk and the pedestrian is three lanes over when they enter the crosswalk, remaining in compliance with the law. The pedestrian and the driven can continue with their journey because there is no conflict. The requirement to yield states whose right to proceed is subordinated to the other person's, in case of conflict. Turning to the video which shows what is in front but not behind, it is evident that the vehicle did not actually conflict with the pedestrian, who did not slow down in order to let the vehicle pass. The violation of social conventions is clear, in that the pedestrian enters the crosswalk while the car is 5 or so car lengths back, and can safely slow down so that there would be zero chance of hitting the pedestrian (it starts to slow but only trivially one the pedestrian is visibly 'crossing the street'). As far as I can determine, California case law has not established any numbers that constitute "not yielding". While I would stop in this circumstance, I don't see that there is a conflict between the pedestrian and the vehicle.	When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well.	What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.	Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first.	Child custody (and alimony) are determined by state courts, so the exact details are state-dependent. There is no legal basis for a person preventing thrie former spouse from moving (assuming the host country doesn't deny a visa), but the courts would be involved in determining whether the child can be taken along: parent A cannot legally just pack up the kids and bolt. When parents don't agree, then the court must determine what outcome is in the best interest of the child. If the children want to move, that counts in favor of them moving ("counts in favor" does not mean "decides the matter"). If the moving parent doesn't have viable employment prospects abroad, that counts against them moving. The amount of time each parent spends with the children also matters, not to mention the laws of your state (here is what the California courts say: "Move-Away" Situations). Generally speaking, the moving parent has to provide notice, then the non-moving parent has to file a legal action to block the move. Your attorney will discuss all of the relevant considerations with you. The fact of a parent moving to another country does not per se invalidate court-ordered support, but the court can modify an order if circumstances warrant (there's no obvious reason why moving to France would result in modification of such an order).	It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot.	As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.
Is it legal to exclude customers from your surveys knowing that they might be displeased with your service? Imagine the following scenario: the company is a service provider. Its service quality is going down lately. They send survey links to their customers a couple of days after the service is completed. It is now a problem because the reviews are bad, so it might hurt the company's image. Is it legal not to send surveys to those customers that they know for sure that are going to give bad reviews? Or is it just morally questionable?	There is no requirement that a service company do customer surveys at all, or that it report the results. If they use customer surveys in advertising and the results are falsified or misleading, that might constitute false advertising, and be subject to government enforcement. But if the report survey data as of a particular date, and mentions that date in the ad, that is probably not misleading enough to be unlawful, even if the company knows that later surveys show different results. If the company just tosses all bad survey results and reports only the good ones, that is probably misleading. But they can report specific "customer testimonials" even if they are not typical, as long as they do not claim that they represent the average customer experience.	Why isn't forcing users to accept new Terms of Service by threatening financial loss, (like denying access to purchased content, or inhibiting or prohibiting the ability to earn an income), considered extortion and therefore illegal? Usually this is not illegal, and even if it is, it usually doesn't constitute extortion (or extortion's civil counterpart, which is called "duress", which is an affirmative defense to contract enforcement). Generally speaking, exercising a legal right someone already has, for a purpose that is not improper, does not constitute extortion. A TOS Rarely Creates A Reasonable Expectation That It Won't Change Most importantly, in the case of terms of service governed information technology services, the firm that creates the terms of service reserves, at the outset, the right to change them at any time. So, the user has no reasonable expectation that the terms of service won't change in a manner that they dislike. There is no implied promise to never change anything material about the service. Terms of service are usually specifically drafted from the outset to avoid creating something that looks like a property interest on the part of the user in having the service continue to work in a particular manner. TOS Terms May Not Be Unconscionable Both the original terms of service and any subsequent amendment of them, is not permitted to be "unconscionable" (e.g. it can't make the life of your first born child a liquidated damages provision that applies if the terms of service are breached). But, there isn't much of a legally protected reliance interest in not having the terms of service changed in this situation (although almost every general rule could conceivably have some exception to it, probably far more factually extreme than the fact patterns identified in the question). If a term is unconscionable, it may not be enforced as contrary to public policy, without regard to what prior versions of the same agreement may have stated. TOS Changes Are Usually Prospective Only On the other hand, a terms of service amendment is generally only effective prospectively and does not generally change rights that have fully accrued and vested prior to their amendment, at least until the user takes some act to affirmatively continue to use the service going forward. When there are vested rights under old versions, the remedy is not to characterize the change as extortion, however. It is to not apply the amendment to the terms of service retroactively to the already vested rights. For example, if the old terms of service did not contain an arbitration clause, and litigation was in progress under the old terms based upon old transactions, and then a new terms of service were adopted that mandated arbitration, this amendment would not generally be applied to require the pending lawsuit in court to be stayed and transferred to an arbitration forum. The right to litigated vested when the lawsuit was filed.	No They will list the price they are charging you. This will normally be greater than what they paid because that’s how business works. The amount they are allowed to charge is what you agreed in your contract with them (which may incorporate a price list) or, if the contract is silent, a reasonable amount. What is reasonable will be related to what the market in your geographical area charges. While this is indirectly related to the input cost of a given item, business can and do charge what the market allows.	Not in the state of California. California law prohibits discrimination based on source of income; only discrimination based on amount of income is allowed. See the California Government Code, section 12955. It is not even legal to indicate a preferred source of income in the advertisement; landlords may ask prospective tenants about the source of income, but may not discriminate or indicate preference for a particular source (provided it's a lawful source). Also, you can't really force a city to re-zone based on "I'll make sure this bad thing doesn't happen." If the city doesn't want to re-zone, they won't re-zone. You have no right to force them to re-zone; this is especially true when the property was purchased under those zoning rules (if the buyer didn't like them, they didn't have to buy).	Not all disclosures are disparagements, an NDA will typically cover the release of any private information, whether positive or negative. Publishing the company's future product plans might violate an NDA but would not be disparagement. Not all disparagements are disclosures, a negative opinion does not require the release of any private information. Making a blog post stating your opinion that the company's CEO is incompetent or that their products are overpriced is likely not disclosing any private information that would be covered by an NDA, but is disparagement.	I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.	Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.	You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.
Does using some software for research (intended for publication) count as "public performance"? A specific example is section 2.1.3 of the NVIDIA license agreement: https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/drivers/geforce-license/, from which I quote: No Sublicensing or Distribution. Customer may not sell, rent, sublicense, distribute or transfer the SOFTWARE; or use the SOFTWARE for public performance or broadcast; or provide commercial hosting services with the SOFTWARE. So what does it mean for some software to be used for "public performance"? Hypothetically, say I want to publish a research paper, and I use an NVIDIA GPU to obtain data/results (e.g. training neural networks), and put that data in my paper. Does this count as public performance and violate this agreement?	"public performance" is a term used in copyright law mostly for music, dance, drama, and audio-visual works, where it means to actually perform the work in front of an audience. For a book it could mean to read the book aloud in front of an audience. It is not largely used for software. I suppose that demonstrating or running the software in front of an audience would be a public performance. Running the software and using its output in a publication would not be a "public performance" as I understand it. As long as the user has the right to access the software, which normally includes the right to run it, the output may be used with no further or special permission.	Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely.	You can't patent an algorithm, but I'll assume you are talking about the case where you have patented a machine or process that uses an algorithm, but that adds significantly more, and that the software being distributed implements much of this process. Courts might find an implied licence or promissory estoppel when distributing software under an open source licence that doesn't explicitly exclude patent licencing as part of its terms. It would be prudent to state your patent rights and explicitly exclude a patent licence if you intend to enforce your patent rights. As an example, this software implicates a patent , so they allow "permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its documentation for educational, research, and non-commercial" purposes. Users that want to use the software commercially need to contact the authors who also happen to be the patent owners, and I assume would negotiate a patent licence at that point.	If you develop a program yourself and it wasn't a work made for hire, then the program is yours to do with as you please. You hold the copyright to it. Many developers choose existing licencing arrangements or they can choose to create a license on their own, or using an attorney. And sometimes they choose to release their programs into the public domain. If you release it into the public domain, you are essentially giving up your copyright. The IDE (Integrated Development Environment) you used to develop your program does not dictate what licenses you can use. There are some existing licenses that others use (which you are free to use or NOT to use) give varying protections to you regarding what you are allowing others to do; right of others to copy, right of others to modify, right of others to distribute, rights to sub-licence, and so on. One of the licensing schemes is the GNU General Public License (GPL). But there are many others, too many to list here.	You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders.	The question that you need to answer is whether, when you embed, you "copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content". It seems that you have done that, i.e. you didn't just "watch". The next question is whether you have "prior written consent of YouTube". Youtube requires a license from contributors granting users the right to "access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service". To fill the gap, you have to determine whether your act of embedding is permitted by the Youtube TOS. Their TOS states §2A that "The Service" includes the YouTube "Embeddable Player". It also says §4 YouTube hereby grants you permission to access and use the Service as set forth in these Terms of Service, provided that: (A) You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player). On the face of it and as long as you do the stuff that follows in B-I, you have complied with that requirement and therefore you have written permission from Youtube.	Disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. This advice may be materially inaccurate. What does redistribution mean? Redistribution means you have somehow caused the software to make its way to another person. Things that probably count as distribution: Placing the file on a public website. Printing the binary in hex onto paper and giving that paper to someone else. Putting the file onto a USB drive and handing it to someone. Putting the file onto your own computer, then giving that computer to someone else. Putting the file onto a shared network drive. Things that probably don't count as distribution: Copying the files onto your own computer(s) Compiling the program Placing the program on your phone. Printing out the source code on paper, but not sharing it. As a practical matter, I recommend ensuring that BSD license accompanies any instances of the software, even if you don't intend to distribute those instances. If you don't distribute it, then nobody will see it. If you "inadvertently" distribute the software, then including the license means you are in compliance. Should you include the license in the exe or in the same folder: The specific clause is: Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Including the license in the exe (e.g., via some sort of credits menu) is typically fine. I'll note that this is the approach used by Chrome (help->about chrome has a link to "other open source software" which includes these licenses). This approach works well for software which makes use of an installer, since users probably won't be looking in the install folder. Including the license in the folder adjacent to the exe is also typically fine. If your application does not have an install process (e.g., installed via xcopy deployment), then this approach works well, since users will easily be able to find the license. If your software is sold in a physical box, then printing out the license and including that license inside the box also works. What if I violate the license by not including the BSD terms? If you violate the license, you are subject to a lawsuit for copyright violation. What happens next depends on how the copyright owners wishes to proceed: Some copyright owners will sue. The actual results/penalties for such a violation will depend on a variety of factors. Some copyright owners will ask you to comply with the license. If you respond by apologizing and then complying, that's as far as it will go. Some copyright owners will ask you for money (with threat of lawsuit). I would expect this result if the copyright owners offers a dual-licensing scheme (i.e., where you can pay the copyright owner to exclude the acknowledgement).	All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests.
Naturalized Certificate required for Shall-Issue Firearms License In my state of Massachusetts, before being able to purchase any firearms, you must obtain a Firearms Identification (FID) license or a License to Carry (LTC). Suppose that someone is in the process for applying for an FID, which according to our general law (140 S 129B) is a "shall issue" license. Suppose that this person was born in Germany and immigrated to the United States at a very young age. Once the applicant's parents obtained citizenship through naturalization, the applicant was also given citizenship because s/he was under 18 and their child. The applicant's clearest proof of citizenship is having a US passport. A town official tells the applicant that because s/he was born in Germany, they required a certificate of naturalization. When asked if a passport would be accepted instead, the police officer strangely stated that it could not be accepted because a passport has an expiry date. Furthermore, the police department's page for firearms licensing states: For a Firearms Identification Permit (FID): ... A naturalized citizen within the above age restrictions (applicant must present proof of naturalization); and ... There is the option of filing for a Certificate of Citizenship (Form N-600), however the average processing time for these applications is over a year. Everyone has a right to bear arms guaranteed by the second amendment and this is a "shall issue" firearms license. It seems quite insane to me that a person would need proof of naturalization despite being a US citizen. Is this legal? Can the applicant do anything besides applying for an N-600?	The police are mistaken because they don't understand immigration law. Usually, the first step to resolve this problem would be to explain the situation in a letter to or telephone call with the town attorney, elevating it from a police officer who has no training in citizenship and naturalization paperwork, to an attorney, who should either know better, or should be able to find out more easily.	This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.	This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.	The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature).	This is weird. Within the EU, a passport is proof of identity, and it is also proof that you are allowed to take a job in the EU. There is nothing that a birth certificate would add to this. Either the bar manager is badly misinformed, or he doesn't want to give your brother a job, and will come up with something even more ridiculous if he gets the birth certificate.	As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.	Each state, each local government, and each government agency can make their own rules on this question (if it was another U.S. state, a provision called the "full faith and credit clause" requires all other states to honor it). Usually, the Turkish name change document will be honored by any U.S, state or local government agency or institution if (1) the name change document or a copy of it, is certified or notarized, (2) there is an apostille from the appropriate Turkish national government official stating that the certification or notarization is valid, and (3) there is a translation of the document into English that accompanies the original document or certified copy of the document that is supported by a sworn certification from a foreign language translator that the translator is qualified to translate the document and that the translation of the document is true and correct. Sometimes, an agency or institution will also reserve the right to not honor a document if the relevant civil servant has a reasonable belief based upon some relevant fact, that the document is a fake. But, some agencies or institutions could have more relaxed, or more cumbersome, requirements by adopting regulations that say so. For example, many states have laws that allow you to do a name change for purposes of a driver's license from a pre-marital name without any other proof other than simply by declaring under oath that you got married on a particular day and changed your name, since that situation is rarely suspicious and covers the vast majority of cases. An alternative option would be to bring a name change petition to a U.S. court and to have it declare the the Turkish name change is valid, usually with essentially the same kind of evidence, but sometimes with the court allowing you to explain why you can't comply with some formality, because, for example, your country is at war and isn't issuing apostilles or your country doesn't have the concept of notarizing or certifying this particular kind of document, or because you would face persecution in that country if you had to go back to it in order to get that paperwork. Once this was done, all U.S. government, state, and local agencies and institutions would have to obey that court order, and if there are lots of agencies or institutions that have different or onerous requirements, this may be easier to do. There are also some states that recognize the concept of a common law name change. In these states, any name (and sometimes all names) that you voluntarily go by, or answer to, are legally your name, even if you don't have any paperwork to back it up.	One official form of ID should be enough. Two pieces of ID is more than most people ever carry. And not selling to you because you’re black would be illegal discrimination. But that would be hard to prove. The most likely explanation is stupidity. Or lack of training. Might be an employee who is already deep into overtime, or just not mentally present. Some people go on auto-pilot and if you showed them an age card that isn’t accepted that’s fixed in their brain. Or maybe the passport photo doesn’t look like you. If it is an unusual form of ID like a 100% valid Japanese driving license, or a damaged passport, or a library card, those might be reasonably rejected. The best course of action would be to ask for the manager. The manager should either be able to give you a sensible reason why your passport is not acceptable, or give you the goods. And if not, your case for illegal discrimination is much stronger if a supposedly competent manager refuses to serve you. (Reading the other answer: Obviously if you are too young to buy the item, which is not true in your case, then showing 100 legal IDs wouldn't get you the item. And if you look so young that a reasonable person would think it's more likely that your ID is an excellent forgery than you being 18, they could deny the sale).
Miranda warning - requirement to be "read" Colloquial commentary, TV cop-shows and the like often make reference to the Miranda warning being read to a suspect although this is not mentioned within the linked Wikipedia article. The dictionary meaning of the verb to read includes: Speak (the written or printed matter that one is reading) aloud. Is the use of the word "read" purely customary, or is/was there a specific requirement for an officer to actually read from a physical piece of paper etc.? Or is it legally acceptable to just say the warning out loud, as is the case in England and Wales for example? (I assume that each state may have its own procedures in place, as might national/federal law enforcement agencies.)	This article goes into Miranda variants in some detail. The basic answer is that there are no SCOTUS-mandated formal requirements on the warning, and there exist up to 900 variants of the warning. The court only requires clear communication of those rights and appropriate waiver of them. The specific requirements, if any, are set by the jurisdiction. Since this is a constitutional issue, every jurisdiction must satisfy SCOTUS (and not the state's legislature). Some jurisdictions include a statement about providing a lawyer "if and when you go to court", which was found in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 to not render the warning inadequate (although it suggests that you only get a lawyer when you go to court). This gives rise to variants in New Jersey, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Alaska (but apparently not in Indiana where the warning originally arose). The city of Seattle policy is stated here. When advising a person of Miranda, officers will include the following statements: “You have the right to remain silent.” “Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law.” “You have the right at this time to talk to a lawyer and have your lawyer present with you while you are being questioned.” “If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before questioning, if you wish.” Officers will establish that the suspect understands in one of two ways: By asking “Do you understand” after each of the four Miranda warnings, or By asking, “Do you understand each of these rights?” after reading all the warnings. Officers may then begin asking questions. If the arrestee makes a comment that causes the officer to believe that the arrestee might be requesting an attorney, officers will ask the arrestee to confirm, with a “yes” or “no” answer, whether the arrestee is requesting an attorney. There is no verbatim text that must be strictly adhered to, and the officer just has to "include the statements". The following section speaks of including an additional clause when "reading" Miranda to juveniles, but the previous section does not say that you have to literally read the warning from a card. Analogously, pattern jury instructions are theoretically read verbatim from a script, and yet they are not (always?, ever?) transcribed into the record exactly as dictated by the jury instruction committee. In general, verbatim language is not legally required, especially in speech.	england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop & Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop & Account provisions.	This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.	If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal.	In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.	There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.	england-and-wales - present day... Would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? No Although it is possible to argue that the letter is a communication to the lawyer (albeit by mistake) its purpose is not in relation to seeking or receiving legal advice, so it fails to meet the definition of legal privilege: There are two forms of legal professional privilege: Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice. Litigation privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers, clients and third parties made for the purposes of litigation, either actual or contemplated. Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Yes, No, Maybe If the lawyer is a suspect/defendant then there is no requirement to answer any questions whatsoever. Similarly, there is no obligation on a witness to answer questions unless a statutory provision has been triggered, such as the lawyer being given a Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 Disclosure Notice. Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? Yes Although there is no general requirement to report a crime (of this nature) to the police, the lawyer's profession is in the "regulated sector" which requires Suspicious Activity Reports to be submitted to the authorities: ... in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering... What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? None that I can see ETA The status of legal privilege in 1925 seems to have been the same as now, and this Wikipedia article, under the heading History offers this in support: The common law principle of legal professional privilege is of extremely long standing. The earliest recorded instance of the principle in English case-law dates from 1577 in the case of Berd v Lovelace ([1576] EngR 10 (& Ors))	Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".
Why is stealing from an employer a criminal act when stealing from an employee is a civil act? Here is the full question with all the context and details: In the majority of cases in the U.S. about theft at a workplace, why is the matter usually tried in a criminal court when the employer is stolen from, yet is tried in a civil court when the employee is stolen from? For example, if a bank owner refuses to send the last paycheck to someone who has just quit or been fired, it has to be fought in civil court. If a bank employee sneaks extra money from the branch, it has to be fought in criminal court. The following comments or something similar may be made, so I will address them before they are made: The reality for both examples above is that most of the time, it is not fought in court at all, and the injustice is just allowed to pass. I'm talking about which court it would be brought to, only considering all the times that the matter is actually brought to court, so this is an irrelevant point. The answer is as plain as day. It's because "bill 9, section 9, article 6, subarticle 7, clause 45" says so, you can read the legal document at this reference. I know it's because the laws say so, I'm asking why the laws say so. What is the legal history behind this imbalance, and why have things become the way they are today?	Because one is theft and the other is breach of contract Theft is taking someone’s property with the intent of permanently depriving them of it. It has always been a crime, in fact, it’s a toss up whether theft or murder was the first crime ever. Not giving someone something you lawfully owe them but that they never possessed is not theft because it lacks the dispossession aspect required of theft. That’s simply failing to pay a debt and that is just breach of contract. Now, there was a time, back in the nineteenth century when not paying your debts would land you in debtors prison but society moved on. Now, there are jurisdictions (australia) which are considering making wage theft, the deliberate and systemic underpayment of workers a crime. Perhaps society is moving on again?	The only excuse would be if you didn't know that your actions were a crime (not ignorance of the law, that's not an excuse, but ignorance of facts). For example, if your boss doesn't want you to serve a customer because that customer is gay, and your boss tells you "don't serve that customer, he was here last week and didn't pay the bill", you would be fine. Or if the boss of a demolition company sends a crew out to demolish the house of a personal enemy (surely a crime), the crew would have no idea that their action is a crime, so they should be fine. But if the boss of a bar or club orders a bouncer to beat up a customer, then the bouncer would know that he's committing a crime, and there is no excuse possible.	This is common law Larceny While some jurisdictions may have statutorily redefined larceny; it is a very old common-law crime. For example, the common-law definition is still in use in new-south-wales (even though the punishment is statutorily specified in the Crimes Act 1900) and the first element of the crime is that "the property must belong to someone other than the accused". The suggested jury direction from the Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book says: The law differentiates in a number of contexts between possession, control and ownership. Each of those concepts can become quite involved and complex. Fortunately, in the circumstances of the present case, it is neither necessary for me to seek to explain all their refinements to you, nor for you to understand all of those refinements. However, to give you but the broadest of examples: if you were to buy, say, an expensive diamond from a jeweller, assuming that it was legally [his/hers] to sell to you in the first place, then, the moment you took physical delivery of it you would own it, have the control of it, and be in possession of it. If, however, you proceeded to place it in a bank security box for safe keeping, you would, for some legal purposes anyway, cease to possess it, although you would still own it and be in control of it. If a robber broke into the bank and took your diamond, the robber would then be in possession of it, even though you would, in law, continue to be its owner. When I direct you that the property must belong to someone other than the accused, all that is required is that, at the time of the taking, it must be owned, controlled or possessed by someone other than the accused. Thus in this context, the law uses the concept of belonging in the widest possible sense. The overzealous shopper both controls and possesses the toilet rolls even though they are owned by the supermarket.	First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties.	Possibly I am Australian so I am not familiar with Albertan labour law but I have done a little research and the underlying common law principles are similar. I will assume that you are covered by Albertan law and not the Canada Labour Code. The next part of the answer is based on A Guide to Rights and Responsibilities in Alberta Workplaces. First, if you lost it they would need to ask you to pay for it, they could not deduct it from your pay without a garnishee order (p. 10). Second, if the device is safety equipment, and it is certainly arguable that it is, then it is the employee's responsibility to use it and the employer's responsibility to keep it in safe working order; this would include replacing it if it were lost (p. 12). The common law position depends on a) the contract and b) if any negligence were involved. Contract What does your current employment contract say about your use of the employer's equipment generally and this item in particular? If it says something then, unless it is an illegal term, that is what happens. If it is silent, then it turns on the particular circumstances. Also, a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, if they are trying to introduce a new term then you have to agree to it; remembering that there may be consequences to taking a stand against your employer, you should say that you do not agree - this removes the risk that the employer could argue that there was tacit agreement. Negligence In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, as an employee this is virtually a given; breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), this would depend on the circumstances of the loss or damage. You have to take reasonable care of the equipment - this is not a subjective standard, you need to do everything that a person in your position can do to protect the equipment from loss or damage; the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff. This has to do with the "proximity" of the harm, if for example the device needed a battery change and you took it to a technician who damaged the item in changing the battery then your actions are not proximate to the loss; and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Well, if it is lost or damaged this is pretty unarguable. So, if you take reasonable care of the device and, notwithstanding, it is lost or damaged then you would not be liable for negligence ... probably. Talk to your union rep; this is exactly the sort of stuff that they are there to sort out.	While it seems like a simple question, the answer is somewhat complicated. As is frequently the case for "white collar" misconduct, There are several civil and criminal legal theories that could be applied, depending upon the nature of the offense, at both the federal and state levels (e.g. how was it done and what is the relationship of the offender to the victim). The penalty will generally be specific to the legal theory under which punishment or compensation is sought. One of the more obvious ones (if the stolen files are legitimately classified as trade secrets) is violation of the state's trade secret law: If a court finds that a defendant has unlawfully taken a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following penalties and remedies: Criminal Penalties: Unlawfully taking a trade secret (defined above) constitutes the crime of larceny in Massachusetts and is punishable by up to five years imprisonment, or by a fine of up to $25,000 and up to two years imprisonment. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30. Damages: A court can make a defendant pay money damages to the plaintiff in an amount up to twice its actual damages. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42 Injunctive Relief: Massachusetts law gives a court the power to restrain the defendant from "taking, receiving, concealing, assigning, transferring, leasing, pledging, copying or otherwise using or disposing of a trade secret, regardless of value." See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42A. It appears that a court could order you not to publish a trade secret if it found that you had unlawfully taken it from the plaintiff. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution may limit the court's authority to do so, however. Another would be a civil action for conversion of intellectual or intangible property, or a criminal action for theft or sale of stolen goods. Depending upon the means by which the files were obtained, it might implicate common law fraud and criminal fraud offenses (including wire and mail fraud), and state and federal laws involving computer crimes. Another legal theory could be tortious interference with contract or tortious interference with business prospects. Less aggressively a common law constructive trust could probably be imposed on the digital files and the proceeds from them, and the person receiving the proceeds of the stolen files could be sued for unjust enrichments/restitution. In many cases, it would be a civil and criminal federal copyright law violation (if the victim owns the copyright and the files are copyrightable material). The proper offenses and hence the available remedies, would depend to a significant extent both legally and from a practical and litigation tactics perspective, on the means by which the digital files were obtained.	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.	The reason this section exists is pretty well stated in an English case: Holmes v. Governor of Brixton Prison and Another. In paragraph 12, they discuss the law of theft in England, and note that under the law there as it stood in 2004 (and reaching back to principles of common law, which are often but not always shared with the US), deception required causing someone to believe something. A machine has no mind, cannot think, and can't be made to believe anything -- it sees an input and mechanically performs some response in response to that input. For instance, suppose you were to discover someone's bank account number and printed a check of your own that had that number on it. You then make that check up to look like it's a check from the someone else to you, and deposit it to an ATM; you then withdraw however much is available immediately. In all likelihood, no human will see that check until the victim looks into why they're significantly poorer than they remembered, so no human was deceived. The only things that were possibly deceived were the computers involved in the check-clearing process. But they don't have a mind: as far as they're concerned, they see pixels, pass them through an algorithm, and then send a message to another computer at the bank with certain information (which a human recognizes as an image of a check and an amount of money, but an ATM doesn't know what it means for something to be an image of a check). The machine then mechanically pushes bills out a slot. They don't think the check's real, don't think it's fake, and don't think it's a check: they're just piles of semiconductors and wires acting in accordance with the laws of physics. If you gave a check like this to a check-cashing place, it's clearly theft by deception: you make the human there (falsely) think you have a legitimate check, and they then pay you money based on it. But these days, a lot of this stuff is automated. Alaska's legislature didn't want you to get out of theft by deception charged because something was automated. So, they said that a machine could be deceived. This isn't a crime by itself; you can't be charged with deceiving a machine. You are charged with an offense under the chapter that involves deception. What 11.46.985 does is say you can't argue "this wasn't deception because only the machine was deceived."
Somebody's mother was scammed by a car dealer. What laws might apply? Imagine that earlier today, a person was buying a car. They are in their 70s, but relatively competent. They landed on what they thought was a pre-owned 2020 Mazda CX-5 Signature, valued at about $31,000 according to edmunds.com. They paid $34,500 for it, signed the paper work, and drove it off the lot. During the sale, the salesperson was very vocal about it being the top-of-the-line Signature trim. A few hours later, the buyer realized they actually bought a pre-owned 2020 Mazda CX-5 Grand Touring, valued at about $26,500 according to edmunds.com. None of the paper work says it was the Signature trim. The state is Florida. So the buyer was verbally lied to about which car they were buying, but there is no paper trail. What laws might be involved?	Misrepresentation At common law, if you are induced to enter a contract by a material misrepresentation then you can rescind the contract and/or sue for damages. The person concerned would have to prove on the balance of probabilities that: the misrepresentation was actually made, which, if it was only verbal and there were no independent witnesses will be problematic, the misrepresentation caused them to enter the contract. If the dealer were to deny everything, and it came down to a "he said, she said", then, on the evidence, the person should lose. The facts are equally consistent with the buyer making an unprompted mistake as to the model of the car. Unfortunately, while most cases are compelling when you only have one side's story; when both sides get to have their say the facts become less easy to determine. Outside of misrepresentation, the person can complain to whatever government consumer protection agencies there are in Florida.	From a legal perspective co-signing a loan isn't the same thing loaning the money to the other co-signer. When you co-sign a loan with someone else both you and the other person are equal parties in the loan, both jointly responsible in fully paying off the principle and interest. If loan is defaulted on, the bank can pursue legal remedies to try to recover its money against either or both of you. If you end up having to pay part or all of the loan, then whether or not you can recover any of that money will depend on whatever agreement you made with the other person. Given that you probably wouldn't a have a signed written agreement with the other signer in case like this, it'll probably come down to whether or not you can prove (on the balance of probabilities) that the other party promised to you to pay off the full amount of the loan. It will help if the loan is specifically tied to a car, a house or other property that the other party benefits from but you don't. Note that you'd have to give serious consideration to whether the other party can actually pay the amount owed. There's no point going to court to obtain an unenforceable judgement. I also should say that from a financial perspective it does make some sense to think of it as if you were loaning out the money yourself. While there's a big and significant difference between the two, in that your bank account isn't affected unless the other person defaults, if they do the result is going to be pretty much the same. Indeed in that case it's not much different than just giving the other person the money. When co-signing a loan you really need to trust that other person.	The Consumer Rights Act gives you an initial 30 days to reject it, if it is faulty, and claim a full refund from the dealer that sold it to you. After that time your rights are pretty strong for at least 6 months. It is not completely clear to me what the exceptions are, but if it is the timing chain then there can be no case that this is "wear and tear" as they last something like 80,000 miles or 10 years. Which and Citizen Advice have tools to determine your rights.	(Converting comment into an answer) You could sue for criminal damage, if any actual damage is caused during the removal of those notices - however, that will cost you an initial outlay in solicitors fees and court costs and isn't guaranteed to have a successful outcome. You could also just take this as a learnable event and not park in other peoples spots? The owner of the parking spot may have the legal right to have your car removed at your expense, and/or issue you with a penalty charge if suitable notices have been posted, so you might consider yourself to have got off lightly here perhaps?	What do I do? Contact the police, and henceforth make sure that all your interactions with the business owner are in writing. That evidence will facilitate the police investigation in this fact-intensive matter. Can I actually be arrested? Yes, you are at risk of getting arrested regardless of whether you eventually prove the business owner is the one who broke the law. Hence the importance of contacting the police before it proceeds on the basis of his fraudulent accusations. The business owner has committed crimes including --but not limited to-- forgery, larceny, and attempted extortion (People v. Ramos, 34 Misc.3d 914, 920 (2012) and Matter of Spargo, 68 A.D.3d 1242 (2009) reflect that also the attempt of extortion leads to being charges and convicted, respectively). The timing of events could be indicative of the extent to which the business owner's criminal conduct was premeditated. For instance, it is unclear whose idea was keep the vehicle in his company's name notwithstanding that you had not acquired the company yet. If it was his idea, this will tend to weaken his denials of mens rea (given his subsequent course of action). Likewise, it is unclear what dissuaded you from purchasing the business. You need to assess whether he lured you in order to get your money for the car, and thereafter cause you to change your mind about the business.	Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.	In all honesty, this completely depends on the judge you happen to get that will hear your case. There's no straight-forward "yes this will work" or "no this won't work" answer in a case like this. But a couple things to keep in mind: The fact that he was from out of town doesn't matter. If signs were displayed, then he has to obey the signs. Your argument about the placement of the signs may or may not work, again depending on the judge. But make sure you take more evidence than just some numbers derived from guess work (you'll need pictures of where the car was parked, where the signs are at, and exact measurement between the two signs and the vehicle, pictures of obstructions, etc). It's up to you to decide whether collecting all of that is worth the $45. Someone has to pay the ticket. You cannot just go to court and get it dismissed because you weren't driving. By default, the parking ticket obligation falls onto the owner of the vehicle. If you know you weren't driving, you can then request the person who was to reimburse you, or even sue them for reimbursement if they refuse. Continuing from #2, in some jurisdictions and especially if the parking ticket was issued by a private company (like at a strip mall) that doesn't use police enforcement for parking, you can provide them with the name and address of the person who was driving and have them re-send the ticket to the correct person, but not always. However, relying on this is a bad idea. The ticket, while issued to another person, is still attached to your vehicle and if the other person refuses to pay, it's your vehicle that will be impounded, booted, etc if the ticket is left delinquent. Then you just have even more hassles to deal with. Having outstanding tickets for your vehicle could also affect your insurance premiums. Don't let this linger for too long. Get on top of it and decide what the two of you are going to do as soon as possible.	Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).
The nature of honesty Lawyers seem to be accustomed to the phrase "reasonably ought to have known." Lawyers also sometimes have occasion to be concerned with the concepts of honesty and dishonesty. If you reasonably ought to have known that the sky is blue, but didn't and thought it was green, and said so, when, if ever, would lawyers consider that dishonest?	Honesty is about actual knowledge, not "knew or should have known" which is a standard that the law holds people to. In criminal law, "should know" is important because many crimes have a scienter requirement, but you will usually have a hard time proving beyond reasonable doubt that a person had actual knowledge of some fact. It is almost commonplace that people who are not fluent speakers of English "know" things that are untrue and that a "reasonable" person would know to be wrong, such as being confused about the referent of "eye" versus "ear" (tragic, in the context of "___drops"). A reasonable person would not judge a factual mistake as being dishonest, and in general would never impute evil motives (dishonesty) to what appears to be an incomprehensible response (e.g. saying "Yes" to the question whether the sky is green). Lawyers are reasonable people, so they don't actually impute dishonesty to people at a surprisingly higher rate that other reasonable rate.	australia It's dishonest. Dishonesty is not, in general, illegal. Dishonesty is illegal when it is used to obtain someone else's property or financial advantage through fraud. It's also illegal if it's part of a statement made when applying for an authorisation or benefit. It's potentially misleading. Misleading people is not, in general, illegal. Misleading is illegal when it takes place in trade or commerce. It gives you a title you don't hold. Claiming a title you don't hold is not, in general, illegal Claiming a title you don't hold is illegal if it is a protected title under Australian law. For example, there are protected titles under the National Health Practionioners Registration Scheme: "medical practitioner" is a protected title; "doctor" isn't. Further, holding yourself out to be able to practice in certain professions when you are not (e.g. law, engineering in some states etc.) is illegal. Context matters Putting on a white gown, wearing a stethoscope and calling yourself "doctor" when attending a fancy dress party is not illegal. Doing it to angle for a free upgrade on your airline ticket is.	First thing is, the statement has to be with a specific governmental sphere, such as in a submission to a court, or a document with some legal weight submitted to a party where the government has mandated that the declaration be "sworn" (an employment application involving security clearances; a DMCA takedown notice which has a connection to copyright law). Second, the statement has to be material, i.e. has "a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed" Kungys v. US, 485 U.S. 759. Third, you have to know that the statement is false (mistakes of knowledge are not perjury): the lie has to be willful. Fourth, the statement has to be literally false (Bronston v. US, 409 U.S. 352). W.r.t. the Bronston standard, a desire to not reveal a fact when testifying in a proceeding does not render the statement perjurious, when the statement is literally true but incomplete, thus telling the whole truth is not required (attorneys are expected to detect incomplete responses and press the issue on things not said). The edges of "literal truth" are a bit murky. What distinguishes Bronston from a number of cases of literally true perjury is that Bronston's testimony contained a clear sign that it was incomplete, but other "literally true" false statements (de Zarn, for example) contained nothing that an alert attorney could focus on. See US v. Robbins where defendant offered "11th and MacArthur" as the name of a corporation, the one in question, then falsely testified that it had no assets – the name of the corporation was actually "MacArthur and 11th Properties, Inc.".	While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.	Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar.	Although there have long been requirements to disclose certain types of defenses -- alibi, insanity, etc. -- common law jurisdictions have more recently moved in the direction of greater disclosure obligations for the criminal defendant. Virtually every jurisdiction now requires the defendant to disclose his witnesses and his evidence to the prosecution at some point before the trial, at least if the defendant has made discovery demands of the prosecution. For more information on common-law discovery rules, see here.	If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.	In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't".
Legal issue when contracting a company outside of the U.S If I contract a company from the U.S. is the contracted company bound by U.S. laws and also how can we insure that this company can be sued within the U.S. jurisdiction if they are located outside of the country. How does that work exactly?	Choice of law A contract can include a choice of law clause that states the laws that apply to the contract. For the USA this would usually be the laws of a particular state. Most courts in most jurisdictions respect the choice of law clause - that is, if say a suit is brought in a new-south-wales court on a contract with a choice of law of californina, the court will (probably) apply Californian law to the contract. However, a choice of law clause does not affect non-contract law like torts, equity, criminal law, consumer protection law, and "no contracting out" laws. So, for the above example, while the contract will be interpreted using California/USA law, other claims will be assessed under New South Wales/Australian law. For an example of how this works in practice, see ACCC v Valve Software. It was never in doubt that the contract was under Washington, USA law, however, the "no refund" term, while valid in Washington violated Australian Law and was unenforcable and, more critically for valve, was misleading and deceptive, costing them AUD 3 million in fines (plus legal costs). Choice of Forum In addition to specifying the relevant law, a contract can also suggest the appropriate forum: "disputes shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of Californian courts". A clause that oversteps the suggestion and states the forum categorically is likely to be void on public policy grounds: a contract cannot exclude courts that have jurisdiction. A choice of forum clause is one of the factors a court will consider if one of the parties petitions that it is the wrong forum and the case should be transferred to the right forum. They are influential but not determinative and go into the mix with all the other relevant factors. Arbitration A well-drafted binding arbitration agreement will almost always be effective if it complies with local law. Courts have a very strong bias in favour of enforcing arbitration clauses.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	Copyright law is not based on contracts, and does not require agreement. No one may distribute copies of a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright holder. For instance, in the US, both Persons A and F can be sued because Title 17, Section 501 of the US Code says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. (b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it. Copyright infringement isn't an issue of violating terms you agreed to with a private entity. Your duty to not infringe copyright was imposed by your country's legislature, who does not require your personal agreement to do that.	Germany may be different, however in the United States this would be considered work-for-hire and the employer would be the rightful owner of the source code. Regardless of jurisdiction, and from a more practical point of view, you are better off not having a copy of the source code. Using it as reference or example in the future could easily turn into (unintentional) copyright infringement. If, in the future, you write code you would like to be able to freely keep and reuse in any project, make sure the owner/employer licenses it using something like the BSD, MIT, or ISC license.	Greendrake's answer says that a country can declare any jurisdiction it likes. This is true, but in practice it is the convention that a country should claim jurisdiction only over its territory and its citizens. The point about "citizens" is normally not pushed, as when you go to a foreign country you are normally subject to its laws rather than those of your home, but for instance there are laws against child sex tourism where the perpetrators can be prosecuted at home for offences committed abroad. However this basic principle gets more murky with long-distance communication such as the Internet. Someone in country X can, for example, provide a service to someone in country Y which is illegal in country Y. At this point the laws of country Y have been broken by someone sitting in country X. Y is not claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction; the crime occurred inside its own territory, but the criminal is currently resident in X. From a legal point of view this is the same as if both had been inside Y when the crime was committed, but then the perpetrator fled to X before they could be arrested. So in the Kim Dotcom case, Dotcom is alleged to have committed criminal copyright violations by supplying movie files to people in the US. In the Meng Wanzhou case, Meng is alleged to have made fraudulent statements to American banks to the effect that Huawei was complying with US sanctions law (otherwise those banks would not have been able to do business with Huawei). The accounts I've read don't say whether Meng was in the US for those meetings, but the fact that they were made to American banks in order to do business in America makes the precise location of the meeting irrelevant.	What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes	Is this how it works? Am I supposed to pay the full quote regardless? No. The contractor is plain wrong. Your agreed commitment to obtain materials directly from the retailer supersedes the initial agreement that totaled 30K. In other words, you two amended the contract. Since then, your obligations under the amended contract were to provide the materials he requested and to pay for labor costs. the contractor is insisting on the full amount, claiming that had I not paid the material I wouldn't have known the difference in cost and he was taking the risk with the quote. That is inaccurate. Once he delegated to you the task of obtaining materials directly from retailer, he exempted himself from any and all risks of giving an inaccurate estimate of the cost of materials. In fact, he shifted to you that risk.	UCC section 2-509 is the law pretty much everywhere in the United States, and it addresses your situation: Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier ... if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier. Although the statutory language is a bit convoluted, it all boils down to whether you have a shipment contract or a destination contract, i.e., whether the contract calls for the seller to ship something to you or deliver something to you. Because you asked for a shipment contract, the risk of loss shifts to the buyer upon delivery to the shipping carrier (USPS). If the package is destroyed in transit, that becomes a problem for you and USPS to sort out. If you didn't purchase insurance for the shipment, you're probably screwed. Note that because this is the statutory default, the seller didn't "contract away" anything; instead, it alerted you to what was already true, giving you an opportunity to contract around the rule, purchase insurance, or otherwise mitigate the risk you were taking on.
Can Chelsea Manning be sued in civil court by anyone named in the documents that were leaked? Since Chelsea Manning's name is in the news, the following question seems interesting: Manning leaked a large set of documents Some of them could have clearly had a negative effect on specific persons (e.g. loss of reputation). As such, can a person who was negatively affected by the leak sue Manning in civil court? (assuming they have a reasonable claim that they were indeed damaged by the leaks meaningfully). By "can," I mean "has a reasonable chance of having a meaningful lawsuit that proceeds, instead of it being thrown out by a judge as ridiculous due to obvious legal problems".	Assuming that the documents were either true, or Manning reasonably believed that they were true, there would be no cause of action for defamation. Many of the documents disclosed would have been confidential in some sense, but usually a violation of a confidentiality statute has a criminal sanction associated with it, but does not carry with it a private cause of action – in part, because conceptually, the party actually harmed is considered to be the government and not the person about whom information is revealed. It is also possible that Manning could utilize the state secrets privilege as a defense and have such a suit dismissed on the grounds that a full and adequate defense of the claims would require the disclosure of official state secrets. For example, if a covert agent were murdered due to a wrongful disclosure of information, usually official disclosure of the fact of being a covert agent would be required to prove the case, and that evidence would be barred by the state secrets privilege, effectively barring the lawsuit entirely. Constitutional claims of privacy violations under the 4th Amendment generally relate to the wrongful acquisition of information and not its wrongful disclosure. The constitution bars unreasonable search and seizure, not unreasonable disclosure of information. The only privacy tort that might be applicable is "Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts." (A sister privacy tort, Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into privacy affairs, is directed at the collection of data phase and not the dissemination phase). See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B and 652D. But, this tort raises serious First Amendment concerns and has not been widely adopted. Realistically, this tort is unconstitutional in the absence of an affirmative contractual or quasi-contractual duty not to reveal facts that runs to the person making the disclosure, and in general, Manning would not have that kind of relationship. The classic public disclosure of embarrassing private facts case would involve a lawyer's or psychotherapist's revelations about a client. Also, in the case of the public disclosure tort the basis for damages is largely personal emotional distress and violation of trust, as opposed to damage to reputation, per se. The requirement is that the disclosure be embarrassing or breach of contract, not that it harm someone's reputation since you have no legal right to a reputation that differs from the truth.	Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case.	It may not be libel, but it may violate other statutes and may support a judgement against the person publishing this information as long as there is an injury-in-fact ("an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"). A recent case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 578 U.S. ___ (2016) considered the case where a company created a profile for a person. That profile stated "that he is married, has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate degree". The plaintiff asserted that all of this was incorrect. The plaintiff made a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act because the information was false. However, mere violation of statute is not sufficient to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing. Congress can't create standing via statute. Injury-in-fact still requires a "concrete" injury. This does not need to be a physical, tangible injury. But, it does need to be concrete. On its own, publication of false information, even when statute prohibits it, does not create standing. There must be an injury-in-fact.	These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.	The relevant question for libel under US law is "would a reasonable person understand this to be a statement of fact about the plaintiff, or to imply a statement of fact about the plaintiff." It doesn't directly matter if the name was changed or not; what matters is if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are talking about an actual person (the plaintiff) and are stating (or implying) actual facts, or if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are pure fiction and don't say anything factual about the plaintiff. Changing the name tends to make it seem more like fiction, but that's not always enough: suppose I write a long fictional story about Theodore Bau, who is active on the Pile Market series of online Q&A sites, particularly a history one and a board games one, who published an economics book in 2004 and was an econ and history double major, and fills in more details from Tom's SE bios, and in the book talk about how Mr. Bau stole money from clients; I then send thto potential clients of Tom Au. The fact that I changed the names and said "this is a work of fiction and any similarities are coincidental" isn't exactly an automatic get-off-scot-free card. On the other hand, if I'm telling a story about Tom Au that uses a fair bit of your backstory, with no disclaimer that any similarities are pure coincidence but Mr. Au lives a secret life as a legitimate supervillain, a reasonable person is unlikely to conclude that I'm saying that you actually have a volcanic lair and that you are actually plotting to capture a US and a Russian missile sub to provoke a nuclear war. In this case, the court determined that a reasonable person familiar with the context could understand the book to be talking about the plaintiff's actual behavior, instead of just talking about a fictional character. The fact that it was fiction and the names were changed suggested that it wasn't talking about the real plaintiff, but the details of the book could make it go the other way.	In the united-states, those actions would be fully protected by the First Amendment. Andy has a constitutional right to speak freely about essentially whatever he wants -- including Mary's criminal conduct -- unless his speech falls into one of several narrowly defined categories, none of which would apply in this case. And because Mary has already put this information out on the Internet, it is likely not sufficiently private to support an invasion-of-privacy claim. However, the unfortunate reality is that complainants, police, prosecutors, and judges frequently ignore First Amendment protections. Indeed, many states have laws against "cyberstalking" and "telecommunications harassment" that are incredibly broad, and that clearly apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment. For instance, Ohio's telecommunications harassment statute makes it a crime to send an e-mail "with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person." This means that many people who engage in First Amendment-protected speech end up getting prosecuted anyway. If they pay for a good lawyer who knows how to properly raise a First Amendment defense, they may escape any penalties. But because most defendants do not have those resources, and because many lawyers are unaware of the First Amendment implications of such prosecutions, most defendants in such situations likely end up being convicted despite behaving perfectly legally. In the united-kingdom, though, the situation is very different. Even if Mary is breaking the law, and even if Andy limits himself to strictly factual information about what's he's learned about her conduct, he may still be held civilly liable. Mary may also be able to pursue Andy criminally for harassment if his e-mail causes her substantial emotional distress, and civilly for "harassment by publication." The fact that this information is already public is likely not going to go very far in changing the analysis. Andy's best course of action is therefore to play it safe by keeping his mouth shut. Doing so has both legal and nonlegal benefits: He avoids exposure to the hassles of defending himself from criminal charges and he gets some time to examine the resentment, jealousy, paranoia that makes him want to humiliate his "friend."	Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of "Murder for hire" which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible.	Can you be sued for publishing a negative review of a contractor Yes, because the import of your review suggests that the contractor stole the coins. See Bellemead, LLC v. Stoker, 631 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2006): a court looks to "the plain import of the words spoken" in order to ascertain whether the words constitute slander per se. [..]. To be slander per se, the words "are those which are recognized as injurious on their face — without the aid of extrinsic proof. (citations omitted, quotation marks in original). Even prefacing your narrative with language such as "I think" or "in my opinion" might not suffice to preempt that import. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990): If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement, "In my opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, "Jones is a liar." Accordingly, you will need evidence that supports the conjectures you portrayed in the review. In this regard, the police's response suggests that you have no evidence with which you could avail yourself of the defense of truth. The contractor's position would be reinforced if the narrative in your review omits the police's response. That is because your decision to withhold that information tends to deprive the contractor of the benefit of the [readers'] doubt.
Can an author get commission if he writes books from prison? I'm reading the Anti-Tech Revolution by Ted Kaczynski, the following is noted in the front matter: Theodore John Kaczynski does not receive any remuneration for this book This led me to wonder, what are the regulations behind taking commissions when writing from prison in US, or was it the authors choice?	While a convicted felon can legally receive royalties for writing about his crime (in light of the unconstitutionality of Son of Sam laws), a court can also order seizure of assets for victim restitution. Thus the case of US v. Kaczynski where the 9th Circuit upheld a plea deal that included a restitution provision of $15,026,000. The federal government wanted to just take his writings, he sued to have them returned, he prevailed. The court noted (fn. 13) that Any effort by Kaczynski to publish or otherwise profit from this property following any return to him will, of course, remain subject to the $15 million restitution lien.	Federal law governing copyright, and state and federal law governing trademark, do not make any stipulations about the person enjoying the particular property right. In lieu of a specific restriction, the person may be an alien, a prisoner, a public employee, a corporation, or an astronaut. There are limits on minors and contracts, but no contract is required to write a book, make a sculpture, or create a distinctive business mark. (Those limits potentially raise questions about a minor signing away their author's rights if they create a work for hire, which you didn't ask about. A contract is typically necessary to profit off of such a creation, but not always). The copyright office even says that you can register copyright (important, registration is necessary to get maximal protection). There is a bit of an issue that a minor has limited ability to sue (for infringement), so in Utah Rule 17 you would need a guardian to sue for you, likewise in federal court (same number!).	In the U.S, at least for some time in our not too distant history, there were a substantial number of jurisdictions that allowed people to "read in" to a law degree, meaning exactly what @cpast said in his comment - that people who were so inclined and with the intellectual aptitude to understand old english common law and modern stare decisis (essentially, appellate precedent), as well as statuary and regulatory texts, could simply study their way to a law degree. It was assumed (quite rightly) that if one could manage to pass a 2-4 day bar examination that they should be considered eligible to apply for a license to practice through admission to the bar just as legitimately as those people who earned their juris doctorate. This is keeping in mind that passing the exam does/did not guarantee licensure/being sworn in, as in depth background checks and ethical fitness analysis are also conducted which form the final determination for fitness to be admitted. California was, for a long while, known as the most challenging state's bar exam to pass. For a long while, it was a true "read in" state, meaning anyone had the right to take the bar exam. Because of this, the California Penal system actually turned out quite a few amazing street-smart criminal lawyers; men, who spent years in prison reading the law, who came out to take and pass the bar exam. It is also true that in CA, as well as other states, conviction of crime (even felonies) does not necessarily mean exclusion from licensure based on failure to pass the background/fitness inquiry (it can, but it isn't automatic if you can establish rehabilitation). Excluding crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury, embezzlement, certain thefts where a fiduciary duty existed (those were the only crimes that were considered automatically exclusionary), one could be allowed to make a plea of rehabilitation to the Board of Bar Overseers ("BBO"). Crimes that account for the bulk of prison sentences, like aggravated violence, drug dealing/trafficking, etc. are not crimes of moral turpitude. However, there are no longer any states in the U.S. where you can truly "read in" to the law. @Jason Aller is exactly right, that in the early 80's the ABA, as well as the association of accredited legal institutions (not to be robbed of their mortgage of the mind) lobbied and cajoled the practice right away. There are still the states that allow an education of apprenticeship, whereby rather than being self-taught, you are allowed to be mentored by a senior attorney with a certain level of experience, where they would attest that you worked a certain number of hours (usually each week or month – typically something akin to full time) under their tutelage. Each of the states Jason Aller cites has some form of this. After a certain number of years, those individuals are allowed to sit for the bar. However, that does not mean they can be lawyers ... even if they pass. I recently read a journal article discussing how each year more and more states seem to further delimit who can be lawyers, for the sole purpose of not wanting to create too much competition in the profession. Background analysis now puts a great focus on financial responsibility: meaning if one's credit score isn't up to par they can be shut out of the practice because it's argued that if they cannot be financially prudent with their own finances, they cannot be trusted to manage client funds. About a quarter of all people who take the bar on the first shot fail. Those who don't pass by the 3rd try usually never do, and if they do, they are unlikely to practice as they are unlikely to get jobs (unless they hang out a shingle, so to speak). Most states require having graduated from an accredited law school. Massachusetts has at least one unaccredited law school (it was two, but I believe one just got accredited). A grad of that school can only be licensed in MA, nowhere else, except maybe one or two other states. More and more states are also deciding not to let lawyers from other states practice in their jurisdictions by "waiving in", which is where you can pay to get licensed and transfer your scores (instead of experienced lawyers having to take the bar again) from reciprocal states. It is a club where membership is purposely limited and continues to be more and more exclusive (and not in a good way). You can probably see from all these trends that there is a big push to keep people out, for no other reason than fear of competition. If this trend holds, it seems likely that the apprentice's right to "read in" will sooner, rather than later, become altogether a thing of the past too. Law school education is undoubebly valuable in that it teaches you how to learn in a socratic way. It shows you how to spot issues and understand archaic text, and helps you to understand the rules of procedure in a theoretical and comprehensive way. However, for most, what it does not do is teach you how to practice law. When I was in law school, I was lucky enough to go to a school with the choice of a clinical semester or year (I also broke the rules and worked full time as a law clerk, year round, from year one). Many schools had no clinical programs. Students who weren't able to do these things didn't know what a pleading was or how to draft one, had never seen a motion for summary judgment, had no idea how to take or defend a deposition &ndash all things lawyers must be good at doing and that are not taught in law school. At that time, over a decade ago, the machination of legal scholars had contemplated adding yet another year to law school curriculum, to require a clinical year, so that graduates did have a clue what practicing law was all about. Opponents argued that instead the 3L elective year should just be traded from classroom to clinical (rather than adding another year and another 40-70 thousand tuition dollars). Neither side could agree so neither has become the norm. But what has happened since then is that more and more states have limited the right to take the bar exam by right, from having learned the law thru the practice of "reading in", which had already become the highly regulated practice of "documented apprenticeship". My guess would be that those persons who learned by apprenticeship may not be as adept at picking apart cases or legal research as a law school grad (but may be), but they would almost certainly be more informed in the actual practice of law. Here is a fairly comprehensive article about the U.S. states that allow it, and what their rules are for completing the apprenticeship "degree". It cites that of nearly 90k people taking the bar, 60 took this route. From the perspective of a practicing lawyer with what I like to call "a mortgage of the mind", I find this trend pretty disheartening. One shouldn't need to pay a quarter-million dollars to gain the knowledge and right to sit for the bar.	The modern rule in the UK is that copyright lasts until the end of the calendar year following 70 years after the death of the author. So if the author died in or later than 1953, it would be under copyright under this general rule. However, this wasn't always the rule and the museum speaks of a copyright revived in the 1990s. So I went down that rabbit hole of historical UK copyright legislation. I personally find it interesting, but it turned out to not be entirely determinative. It all turns on publication date and date of death of the artist, neither of which I can find, with the museum only stating the artist was active in the 1930s. But even assuming the most favourable facts for this to still be copyright under a "revived" copyright, the latest date I can find for copyright to still remain under that regime is end of 2015. Per Copyright Act 1956 s. 3(4)(a): in the case of an engraving, if before the death of the author the engraving had not been published, the copyright shall continue to subsist until the end of the period of fifty years from the end of the calendar year in which it is first published; For the fact pattern I'm outlining, we must assume the author died before publication. As for the engraving bit, s. 48 defines that lithographs are engravings, and while I am far from an expert in this field, skimming the Wikipedia article on lithography, it does seem quite possible the poster could be a lithograph. I'll note here since you bring up who precisely would be the owner of the original copyright, that it does seem likely that the poster was a work for hire, following the provisions of s. 4(2). As such, the copyright would have indeed ultimately transferred to British Rail. Jumping ahead a bit, the more precise year which the museum states is "the 1990's" is 1995 (we'll get to why). So in order for copyright to have first expired as per the museum's statement and the authors active years, we must assume a publication date between 1930-1945 (or thereabouts, I'm not being super careful in this answer about the months things happen in, so there may be accumulation of off-by-one errors). Because of those years, I now have to quickly address why the Copyright Act 1911 isn't relevant. The transitional provisions outlined in the Seventh Schedule reveal that only for photographs are the copyright duration provisions maintained from the 1911 Act. Now we can jump into the modern law, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA). The transitional provision in the Schedule 1 s. 12(2)(b) directly maintains the 1956 copyright duration in this case which given our possible publication years, would have led to copyright expiry sometime between 1980-1995. However, in 1995, the UK passed The Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995. This was in accordance with European legislation harmonizing copyright duration, in Directive 93/98/EEC (itself since replaced by Directive 2006/116/EC). Side Note: 1995 is a peculiar year for copyrights in Europe due to that directive and so is exactly where I started my research for this answer, because it caused weird quirks for copyright terms in some countries in some cases. For the UK, s. 5 of the regulation amended the CDPA, basically establishing the general European standard of copyrights expiring 70 years after the author's death. More importantly for our case though is the regulations own section explaining in which cases the new copyright term expires. In s. 16: The new provisions relating to duration of copyright apply— (a) [...] (b) [...] (c) [...] (d) to existing works in which copyright expired before 31st December 1995 but which were on 1st July 1995 protected in another EEA state under legislation relating to copyright or related rights. Now, I'm not going to go through and look at all the EEA contries legislation to confirm, but it seems incredibly likely that one of them would have had engravings protected for life+70 in 1995, given that's what Europe has now standardized on (since we're assuming pre-publication death for an author who was active in the 1930s). Notably, s. 17 even defines cases of expired works re-entering copyright as "revived copyright", matching the terminology the museum's statement used. It would have been great if the 1995 regulation explicitly spelled out the relationship with CDPA's Schedule 1 s. 12, but in judicial interpretation, newer legislation takes priority, so the 1995 law would control. Note: The answer is getting long enough so I'm not going to fully research/cite this, but for regulations vs. legislation, we have a weird case of a regulation amending a statute. I'm fairly certain this is due to UK Acts passed for European Community membership elevating regulations to primary legislation when they are passed for compliance with European law. So given our assumed facts, the poster would have revived copyright per the 1995 Regulations. However, you may note (as I belatedly did after first posting this answer) that even given revived copyright, that revived copyright is still life+70. And the assumptions made for copyright revival under this clause requires a posthumous publication date of 1945 at the latest. This means at best any copyright under these particular circumstances would have expired in 2015. There is a bit of a middle ground here. If the poster is not a lithograph, or the publication was not posthumous, the work would have gained a life+50 term per aformentioned Copyright Act 1956 s. 3(4). But then for copyright to expire and be revived, we still have to assume a 1945 death date at the latest. Alternatively, instead of copyright revival, it could have gotten extended from life+50 to life+70 per the 1995 Regulations s. 16(c). But because we are more than 20 years from 1995, it mathematically works out that it doesn't matter anymore and we can just work with the life+70 rule. A combination of 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) and posthumous publication though does actually give another reasonable way for the work to still be under copyright. If published in 1988 before the CDPA entered into force, it would have followed the cited 1956 rules of copyright expiring 50 years after publication. The 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) specifies that longer existing terms can continue. So that results in 2038 as a latest possible year through this method. In the end I think there are two or three reasonable interpretations: The museum is correct the work is under copyright, but incorrect about the reason. It's instead because the work is under copyright because the author died after 1953 (or is still living), or The work is still covered under the 50 years after posthumous publication rule for engravings established in the Copyright Act 1956 (publication years 1973-1988 for copyright expiry at the end of calendar years 2023-2038). The museum is correct that copyright was revived, but I can't find a way for this to be true and for the work to still be under copyright (with 2015 the latest year I can find for the given facts). Note that this is my own reading of legislation, please take it with a grain of salt.	There are jurisdictions that do not allow authors to place their work in the public domain, such as Germany. Main reason is the strict monistic approach the German copyright law bases on. Key feature of this approach is the concept that, in principle, the copyright/author’s right itself can neither be transferred to another person nor waived by the author herself. The German author’s right consists of two parts, the moral rights and the exploitation rights. The moral rights are – as a rule – personal rights that are bound to the person of the creator (or, after her death, her legal heirs), i.e. they can neither be transferred nor waived. Since moral and exploitation rights are considered as inseparable parts of the author’s right as a whole (monistic approach) the exploitation rights cannot – in principle – transferred or waived by contract as well. CC0 is supposed to get you as close to the public domain as possible in your legal system. CC0 helps solve this problem by giving creators a way to waive all their copyright and related rights in their works to the fullest extent allowed by law. CC0 is a universal instrument that is not adapted to the laws of any particular legal jurisdiction, similar to many open source software licenses.	What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.	The relevant question for libel under US law is "would a reasonable person understand this to be a statement of fact about the plaintiff, or to imply a statement of fact about the plaintiff." It doesn't directly matter if the name was changed or not; what matters is if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are talking about an actual person (the plaintiff) and are stating (or implying) actual facts, or if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are pure fiction and don't say anything factual about the plaintiff. Changing the name tends to make it seem more like fiction, but that's not always enough: suppose I write a long fictional story about Theodore Bau, who is active on the Pile Market series of online Q&A sites, particularly a history one and a board games one, who published an economics book in 2004 and was an econ and history double major, and fills in more details from Tom's SE bios, and in the book talk about how Mr. Bau stole money from clients; I then send thto potential clients of Tom Au. The fact that I changed the names and said "this is a work of fiction and any similarities are coincidental" isn't exactly an automatic get-off-scot-free card. On the other hand, if I'm telling a story about Tom Au that uses a fair bit of your backstory, with no disclaimer that any similarities are pure coincidence but Mr. Au lives a secret life as a legitimate supervillain, a reasonable person is unlikely to conclude that I'm saying that you actually have a volcanic lair and that you are actually plotting to capture a US and a Russian missile sub to provoke a nuclear war. In this case, the court determined that a reasonable person familiar with the context could understand the book to be talking about the plaintiff's actual behavior, instead of just talking about a fictional character. The fact that it was fiction and the names were changed suggested that it wasn't talking about the real plaintiff, but the details of the book could make it go the other way.	Overview Under Near v. Minnesota it is very hard to "legally restrict" any publication in the US. The "Banned books" linked to in the question have, in some cases, been removed from particular school curricula or from library collections. A few have been challenged as obscene, but none of them are unavailable to the general public at this time. A work can be "legally banned" or "legally restricted" under US law for only a few reasons: Security A work that is actually classified cannot be lawfully distributed. However, referring to it or quoting from it would be legal unless the quoted content includes actual classified information. A problem with this is that one often does not know just what aspects of a document are in fact classified, short of asking the government. In many cases the restrictions on distributing classified material apply only to those who have accepted a security clearance or otherwise agreed to be bound by the classification system. However under the Espionage Act and the Atomic Energy act, and perhaps other laws, in some cases people who never accepted a clearance may be enjoined from disclosure, or possibly held criminally liable. This was challenged in United States v. Progressive, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (The "H-bomb Secret" case). But that case was dropped as moot when the information was published by others, and the DoE announced that they would not prosecute anyone involved. No final binding decision on the issues was made. A\n attempt to enjoin publication of classified information was famously overturns in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers" case). In that case the material sought to be classified was historical, not of current operational importance. Obscenity A work found obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) is illegal to distribute. But it is legal to refer to such a book. It is legal to quote it, unless the quoted section is itself obscene under Miller. Note that content will not be found obscene under Miller unless it violates a specific law, usually a state law. Unless there is such a law, a prosecution does not pass the Miller test. This means that generalized laws such as "disturbing the peace" cannot be used to punish allegedly obscene content. Laws may prohibit content not obscene under Miller from being knowingly provided to minors, or shown in movie theaters under ratings which would permit minors to enter. A work containing child pornography is unlawful to create, distribute, or possess under 18 U.S.C. §2251 and subsequent sections. Quoting a part that includes child pornography as defined under those laws would be equally illegal, but quoting a part that does not include such content would not. Referring to such a book would not be illegal. Note that in the US only actual images of real children constitute child pornography. Drawings or computer images not based on any real child, and text, may not be banned under these laws. In some other countries, such content may be highly illegal. Defamation Republishing a work found to be defamatory would in many cases be defamation also, and could give rise to a successful lawsuit, but it is not a crime. A quote that did not include any of the defamatory statements would be lawful. A quote that did include defamatory statements may be protected under some circumstances, such as news reporting of the court case. It is lawful to refer to such a work. Criminal Libel Criminal libel was once common, but prosecutions for it are now very rare. According to the ACLU: Twenty-four states have laws that make it a crime to publicly say mean things about people, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. These laws violate the First Amendment and are disproportionately used against people who criticize public officials or government employees. The ACLU has filed a lawsuit challenging the law in New Hampshire. According to Wikipedia: Criminal libel is rarely prosecuted but exists on the books in many states, and is constitutionally permitted in circumstances essentially identical to those where civil libel liability is constitutional. According to The First Amendment Encyclopedia's article: Although libel or defamation is now primarily a civil claim, it once was primarily a criminal offense, prosecuted by the government and punishable by imprisonment or a fine. In the United States, courts have based decisions regarding slanderous or libelous statements on the First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of the press. ... There was also a growing sentiment against criminal libel, which led the drafters of the 1962 American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code specifically to exclude the crime of criminal defamation. ... [The US Supreme] Court ruled, in Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), that truth must be an absolute defense to criminal libel. The Court also held that the actual malice requirement in Sullivan applied to criminal libel prosecutions stemming from statements about public officials ... The Court’s most recent ruling regarding criminal libel was Ashton v. Kentucky (1966), which held that Kentucky’s unwritten, common law crime of libel was too indefinite and uncertain to be prosecuted. This ruling effectively eliminated common law criminal libel. In short, while criminal libel still exists in the US it is of very limited importance and rare occurrence. referring to a document publishing a criminal libel is not an offense. Quoting such a document could be an offense if the quotation includes the allegedly libelous statement(s). Copyright Infringement Distributing unauthorized copies of a work, or copies of an unauthorized derivative work, may be copyright infringement and be grounds or a successful infringement suit. Referring to such a work is lawful. Linking to an infringing work may in some cases be held to be contributory infringement. Quoting from such a work will in most cases be lawful, unless the quotation itself constitutes infringement. Quoting an excessive amount may itself be infringement. Note that a valid defense of fair use may mean that distributing copyrighted content is lawful, so that a suit will not succeed. Fair use issues are highly fact-driven, and no clear bright line can be drawn between what is and is not permitted. This seems to be by legislative intent. Fair use was originally a judge-made doctrine, incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976. Note also that copyright infringement is usually a civil matter, so that if the copyright holder does not file suit, there is no enforcement. Only in willful bulk commercial infringement are criminal charges brought. Trade Secrets It is unlawful to publish, distribute, or use a trade secret to which one has gained improper access. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), specifically section 1.4: "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. "Improper means" of learning a trade secret (under the USTA, sec 1.1) include: theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. "Proper means" include: discovery by independent invention, reverse engineering, licensing arrangement, and published literature. The 2016 US Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1836) and the earlier US Economic Espionage Act of 1996 offer protection to trade secrets on a federal level. Note that like copyright, violation of a trade secret is a civil matter, not a crime. If the owner of a trade secret does not file a suit or take other legal action, there is no enforcement. It is not unlawful to refer to a trade secret or a document that discloses one. It is not unlawful to disclose a trade secret that has already become public knowledge, although an actual document may well be protected by copyright. Conclusion Simply referring to a work is almost never unlawful. Quoting from a work that is actually legally restricted will generally only be unlawful if the quoted content alone violates the same law or is on its own the same tort.
What law makes watching pirated movies illegal? I understand that distribution of copyrighted content is illegal, but have always thought that receiving that content was legal. However, I recently read a news article stating that people streaming pirated movies were being sued. What law prevents you from watching these illegal movies? What if the movie is being illegally aired on TV (and I was aware of this)? Would I have to immediately change the channel? What if a professor distributed photocopies of a book without the author's permission? Would I have to avoid looking at those pages and throw them away as soon as I had a chance?	If by "streaming," you mean "having my web browser create temporary copies of media from an online source so that I can view it," then Canadian law is unclear. I can't really do better to demonstrate than to cite a few articles on the subject. According to Alex Buonassisi and Jennifer Marles of IP law firm Oyen Wiggs: [...] it is not entirely clear that receiving an unauthorized stream of a copyrighted work in Canada does not infringe copyright. At best, this activity could be said to fall within a grey zone. According to Sandy Kang writing for law school blog IP Osgoode: As for users of such websites, it is currently uncertain whether their act of streaming video would be found to infringe. According to Michael Geist, a University of Ottawa law professor specializing in IP: The most controversial sources are unauthorized streaming websites that offer free content without permission of the rights holder. [...] Those accessing the streams are unlikely to be infringing copyright, however. As you can see, there is a variety of expert opinions on whether streaming pirated movies is an infringement. The section under debate is 30.71 on temporary reproductions, especially subsection (b): It is not an infringement of copyright to make a reproduction of a work or other subject-matter if (a) the reproduction forms an essential part of a technological process; (b) the reproduction’s only purpose is to facilitate a use that is not an infringement of copyright; and (c) the reproduction exists only for the duration of the technological process. I don't want to duplicate what articles above have already stated, but I'd like to dive deeper into Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, cited by the first two articles as a similar case (reaffirmed in 2015 after a few rounds of statute amendments). In it the Supreme Court held that prerecorded "ephemeral" copies used to facilitate a broadcast was an infringement. The key piece of reasoning is: [... the broadcaster] has not established that, at the time of their enactment, the sections of the Act providing for the right to broadcast a performance must have been understood to include the right to prerecord. Even now it remains fully possible, and quite common, to broadcast live performances. To me, there are two key differences why this logic might not directly transpose to the streaming pirated movies situation: "Ephemeral" prerecorded copies aren't necessarily "temporary" copies within the scope of section 30.71 above, particularly subsections (a) and (c) might not strictly be met. This case discusses the point of view of the broadcaster which is analogous to the hoster, not the end-user. While making ephemeral/temporary copies might not be strictly necessary for broadcasting, viewing online content necessarily creates at least a temporary copy on the end-user's computer. Two other random notes: None of the involved sections have a "reasonableness" or "should have known" clause whereas they are present in other parts of the Copyright Act. This means whether its legal should theoretically depend strictly on the facts (i.e. if it turns out to be illegal, pleading "oh I didn't know it was pirated" won't work). Funny enough, I don't actually see anything in the law that would differentiate between streaming online pirated video and your example of something illegal being aired on TV provided its digital (presumably some part of the TV has a temporary copy too).	You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry.	At least for the US, there's a good overview in The Atlantic of the SCOTUS benchmark case concerning home recording, still applicable in these days of DVDs and streaming content and torrents and thepiratebay.org: ...the Supreme Court's decision to allow home recording in the landmark 1984 case, Universal Studios vs. Sony Corporation of America, went 5-4; one justice flipping and you wouldn't have to imagine that alternate reality because you'd be living it. See http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/the-court-case-that-almost-made-it-illegal-to-tape-tv-shows/251107/ The case revolved around whether recording a television program was "fair use" under copyright law. Fair use is a legal doctrine that promotes freedom of expression by permitting the unlicensed use of copyright-protected works in certain circumstances. See https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html So yes, you can make yourself a copy, because "that the making of individual copies of complete television shows for purposes of time shifting does not constitute copyright infringement, but is fair use." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc. Time shifting as in watching it later, and much later again, as long as you don't distribute that copy, sell admission to watching it, and anything else reasonable when it comes to only you using the copy.	Apparently Such Files May be Distributes or Sold Section 5.e of the Google APIs Terms of Service reads: e. Prohibitions on Content Unless expressly permitted by the content owner or by applicable law, you will not, and will not permit your end users or others acting on your behalf to, do the following with content returned from the APIs: Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header; Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, publicly display, or sublicense to any third party; Misrepresent the source or ownership; or Remove, obscure, or alter any copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights notices; or falsify or delete any author attributions, legal notices, or other labels of the origin or source of material It might seem that 5.e.2 prohibits the suggested use. But if the text is in fact in the public domain,"applicable law" (that is, copyright law) permits you, or anyone, to "Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of" or otherwise use the content. Thus 5.e.2 does not apply. Points 3 and 4 would seem to indicate that the source, including title and author information, must be included or preserved in the output files, but seems to be the only relevant restriction that applies. Response to Comment A comment by user Brian Drake questions the theory of this answer, stating: The most you can say is that copyright law does not prohibit certain conduct (and even that is not clear: just because the text is in the public domain does not necessarily mean that the audio is in the public domain); this does not mean that copyright law expressly permits that conduct. US Copyright law does not define what constitutes the public domain. Rather it defines what is protected by copyright, and specifies some cases in whch a work is not protected. (For nexample, 17 USC 105 provides tht works of the US Federal Government are not protected.) Anything not included in the protection of copyright is in the public domain. This has been confirmed by many cour cases and legal writings. Law generally follows the rule "Anything not forbidden is allowed." Audio as Derivitive Work An audio recording of a person reading a text aloud would be a derivative work of that text, and would normally have its own copyright, if created lawfully. (If the recording was of a text protected by copyright, made without permission and outside of fair use, it was not made lawfully and the infringer has no copyright in the recording at all.) But US courts have held that a work created by a mechanical or automatic process, including many computer programs, is not an "original work of authorship" and thus is not protected by copyright at all, and is thus in the Public Domain. The case of the "Monkey Selfie" is on point. ("Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, § 313.2" (PDF). United States Copyright Office. 22 December 2014. p. 22. "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being.... Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants." Moreover, if the audio were protected by copyright, it would presumably be owned by the person who ran the program, and 17 USC 106 specifically grants the copyright owner permission to distribute copies. Sources The Wikipedia article "Public Domain" reads in relevant part (citations omitted): The public domain consists of all the creative work to which no exclusive intellectual property rights apply. Those rights may have expired,[1] been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. ... As rights vary by country and jurisdiction, a work may be subject to rights in one country and be in the public domain in another. Some rights depend on registrations on a country-by-country basis, and the absence of registration in a particular country, if required, gives rise to public-domain status for a work in that country. ... Definitions of the boundaries of the public domain in relation to copyright, or intellectual property more generally, regard the public domain as a negative space; that is, it consists of works that are no longer in copyright term or were never protected by copyright law. According to James Boyle this definition underlines common usage of the term public domain and equates the public domain to public property and works in copyright to private property. However, the usage of the term public domain can be more granular, including for example uses of works in copyright permitted by copyright exceptions. Such a definition regards work in copyright as private property subject to fair-use rights and limitation on ownership "How Can I Use Copyright-Free Works (in the Public Domain)?" by Nolo Press reads: Copyright law gives creators certain exclusive rights. These rights include the exclusive ability to copy, distribute, and perform the copyrighted work. But copyright is not infinite. Rather, it provides copyright holders with protections for a limited duration. When a work becomes available for use without permission from a copyright owner, it is said to be "in the public domain." Most works enter the public domain because their copyrights have expired. The Legal Information Institute (LII) article "public domain" reads: The public domain includes every creative work that is no longer protected by a copyright, trademark, or patent. Creative works that are no longer protected are owned by the general public rather than the original creator. As such, the work is free to be copied, performed, or otherwise used by anyone. "Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain" from Boston College Libraries reads in relevant part: "Public domain" works are not protected by copyright. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. An important caveat regarding public domain material is that collections, new editions, and derivative works of public domain material may all be protected by copyright. With collections, an author could collect public domain works in a book or display them on a website, and the collection as a whole could be protected by copyright, even though individual works within it are not. "Welcome to the Public Domain" (Stanford libraries) reads in relevant part: The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. Wikipedia article "Monkey selfie copyright dispute" "A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos" (AP) reads in relevant part: A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos, a federal judge said Wednesday. U.S. District Judge William Orrick said in federal court in San Francisco that "while Congress and the president can extend the protection of law to animals as well as humans, there is no indication that they did so in the Copyright Act." NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People forthe Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER; BLURB, INC., ; WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD." (Ninth Circuit full opinion April 23, 2018 No. 16-15469, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324-WHO) reads in part: We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court	In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way.	Summary Downloading from the internet constitutes an act of reproduction according to EU law, however The EU allows Member States to implement an exception permitting personal-use copies from lawful sources, and Germany implements such an exception, but Germany's personal-use exception is narrower than the base EU exception and doesn't generally apply in this case. Note: My answer concerns whether or not the private copying exception applies to the download specified in the question. There could be other avenues to explore, such as Section 60c mentioned in the question and phoog's answer. Downloading as an act of reproduction As a literary work, a scientific monograph is given protection against unauthorized acts of reproduction by the EU's Copyright Directive in Article 2. This includes an end user downloading from the internet. While it was surprisingly difficult to find an authoritative direct statement to that effect (most sources just assume this to be true), the Filmspeler ruling contains such language in paragraph 22 and paragraphs 69-72. The EU's private copy exception Despite the protection given by Article 2, Article 5(2)(b), henceforth the private copy exception, is one way to legally create copies without authorization. It allows Member States to enact exceptions: (b) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, [...1] While this provides a baseline for private copy, in order to fully understand its scope, we must examine the landmark ACI Adam ruling. In it, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the private copy exception cannot apply when the source of the reproduction is unlawful (paragraphs 56-58). Additionally, according to analysis by Eleonora Rosati on the the IPKat blog, ACI Adam clarified that Member States cannot expand on the allowed copyright exceptions, they can only make them more narrow. Following just the baseline EU private copy exception, the download specified in the question is legal provided that the source is lawful2. Germany's private copy exception Germany transposes the baseline EU private copy exception into section 53(1) of its copyright act (German link, footnotes are mine): (1) It shall be permissible for a natural person to make single copies of a work for private use on any medium, insofar as they neither directly nor indirectly serve commercial purposes, as long as no obviously unlawfully-produced model3 or a model which has been unlawfully made available to the public4 is used for copying. [...] While private copying is therefore generally allowed in Germany, it implements a limiting exception to the private copy exception in section 53(4) as allowed by ACI Adam. The clause prevents unauthorized non-manual copies in the case of sheet music, periodicals, and books, unless they've been out of print for 2 years. Therefore in Germany, the download in question is only legal under the private copying exception if the source is not obviously unlawful and the book has been out of print for at least 2 years. Footnotes Two other restrictions on private copy not particularly relevant to this question. One is not circumventing technological locks, the other is that the rightholder must receive "fair compensation." In practice, this isn't handled by the private copier, but by collection societies which get funds from levies on storage media then redistributes them to rightholders. However, while I've not found a reference for it, I highly suspect the downloading of an entire in-commerce book would be found to violate the Berne three-step test, implemented in the EU in Article 5(5), which requires that copyright exceptions only apply in "certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder." The edges of "obviously unlawful" are a little fuzzy. In ACI Adam, it was determined at the EU level that the private copying exception must only apply to lawful sources, and so the German law might be inconsistent with EU law. Reading through the decision, however, the logic could also apply to sources which appear to be lawful so there's still hope for the German law. This is (debatably) the approach that was taken in Filmspeler. However, that ruling didn't address Article 5(2)(b), but Article 5(1), the temporary reproduction exception. If you're interested, I have a lengthy answer discussing the Filmspeler ruling. The translation here is poor and perhaps that's because it's not 100% clear in German either (I'm not fluent, I'd rate myself weak intermediate). Online sources conflict as to the exact meaning of this clause. Some say this clause prevents download from any public source, others only if it was made publicly available in an obviously illegal manner. I would lean towards the latter because that's closer to what the Justice Ministry thinks (German link). Editing note: This answer has changed significantly since its original posting. This is partly because I failed to notice section 53(4) the first time around, but mostly because of the incredible amount of intelligent comments and chat the original posting generated.	This is a complicated question because adblockers have grown increasingly complex in recent years. What it means to "block ads" from both a legal and technical perspective is more complex than it was just a few years ago. First the broad strokes: It's not illegal to block ads. Multiple court cases have defended users' rights to control the information that enters their computers / devices. You have the legal right to view or not view whatever you like. But... that doesn't mean your use of an adblocker isn't in violation of US law. The crucial issue with legality when it comes to adblockers is less about blocking ads, and more about circumventing a websites measures to defeat adblockers. The US DMCA has strict wording regarding 'circumvention of access controls'. If a website has taken active measures to prevent access by adblocking users, and your adblocker circumvents those measures -- this is very likely a violation of the DMCA. The important point here is that the legal transgression isn't blocking ads. It's the circumvention of access controls which in attempt to limit access to adblock users. There's a good write-up on this topic here: https://blockadblock.com/adblocking/adblockers-dont-break-the-law-except-when-they-do/ Additionally, a website's "Terms of Use" agreement may address adblocking. As we all know, website ToU's are not always legally binding on the site visitor. But sometimes they are. There's a good exploration of how to implement a ToU that addresses adblocking here: http://blockadblock.com/adblocking/addressing-adblocking-terms-use-agreement/	No, you cannot ever legally use copyrighted property without a valid license from the copyright owner. It is understandable that when government restrictions prevent people from licensing intellectual property, people will turn to piracy and black markets to obtain them. However, whenever you find yourself in a region where you can legally license the property, you are (presumably) also in a region where intellectual property rights are respected, and it is illegal to use the property without a proper license from the owner. I.e., the fact that you paid a pirate for a copy – even where that was the only option to obtain one – does not give you a license. You have to obtain a license from the owner.
Question regarding Heller decision I was perusing the SCOTUS Heller(thanks to poster in another question) decision and found this within PDF We therefore assume that petitioners’ issuance of a license will satisfy respondent’s prayer for relief and do not address the licensing requirement From my interpretation, when a case is brought to SCOTUS, they do not address whether a law is constitutional or not. Instead, they judge/rule only on what the plaintiff is seeking relief from?	They can decide to make narrow decisions that just resolve the specific case before them and they can also decide to use the case as an example of a broader issue and make a sweeping ruling. In some cases were one side caves and makes the narrow issue moot they make no ruling and in other cases they decide the (technically) moot issue could come right up again (recent CA COVID restrictions as applied to home bible studies for example) so they do rule.	Why has this never been interpreted by SCOTUS? It has never been interpreted by any court, because the interpretation you're advocating is nonsensical, and nobody has ever tried to advance it in any court. Therefore, no court has had an opportunity to rule on it. Congress, however, has (at least implicitly) interpreted this clause to mean that all natural-born citizens are eligible to be president if they also fulfill the other requirements, regardless of when they were born, so that is the prevailing interpretation unless someone manages to challenge the interpretation either before congress or in a court. If such a challenge is made then there will be an explicit ruling.	I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.	What are the legal consequences of substantive factual errors in an opinion? None. I assume that this specific ruling is not affected in any way by the text of the opinion? Correct. I assume that even an opinion of the form "We got high and decided to rule wrongly for fun" wouldn't actually negate the ruling? Probably not, but it might precipitate a constitutional crisis or lead to an impeachment. How does this affect the precedent? It doesn't. Will courts in the future consider the true facts of the case (whatever they perceive them to be), No. will they accept as legal fiction that the facts were as the Court describes them? Yes. Could it be legal for the district to repeat exactly the same set of actions in exactly the same set of true circumstances as before, since those won't be the same circumstances that the Court claimed to rule on? In such a case, is the lower court bound by the Supreme Court's characterization of the facts of the case, Generally speaking the lower courts are bound by characterizations of the facts made by the appellate court. But, it depends to some extent on the procedural posture of the case. In most cases, the findings of fact made by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing are binding on appellate courts in the U.S. unless they are not supported by any admissible evidence presented at trial, but there are some exceptions to this rule and there is considerable art as well as science that goes into properly characterizing the evidence presented at trial. But, for example, many appellate cases are appeals from a dismissal of a case on a motion to dismiss at the outset of a case, in which all allegations of the Plaintiff's complaint in a civil matter are taken as true for sake of argument, and the legal issue presented is whether the Plaintiff can prevail if all of those facts are true. In a case in that procedural posture, assuming that the appellate court reversed the trial court and found that the facts alleged state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then the remand would be to move forward with discovery and other pre-trial procedures in the case and ultimately a trial, if necessary, to determine the actual facts of the case as opposed to the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff in the complaint or petition. Not infrequently, when appellate courts are divided over what happened in the trial court, one side of the debate, looking at the raw testimony and exhibits presented at trial, will conclude that the admissible evidence presented at trial did not support the findings of fact in a mixed question of fact and law made by a trial court judge, while another side of the debate will accept the trial court judge's findings of fact uncritically. It often isn't easy to know, from reading an appellate court opinion alone, which side is which in this regard. can it use the true facts of the case as long as it obeys the ruling itself? Usually not. Usually, facts relied upon by an appellate court are by definition the correct facts (apart from clerical errors - e.g., an appellate court once misspelled my name in a court opinion, and the lower court wasn't bound by that mistake). This said, as noted above, the precise procedural posture of the case, nature of the court's opinion, and scope of the remand order is highly relevant to what a court can do on remand.	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	Yes, there is indeed a conflict, often described as a balancing act. Similarly, the principle of free speech protected by the First Amendment requires that the public tolerate lies in political rhetoric, and hateful public speech and insults, but can be balanced against an individual's interest in reputation in a libel case. See Near vs Minnesota and NY Times vs Sullivan for leading cases on this issue. There is also tension between the right of a newspaper to report on a current criminal case again under the First Amendment, and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial before an unbiased jury, which might be influenced by newspaper publicity. In these and similar situations, there is no way to fully serve both protected interests, and courts must strike a balance and prefer one right over another, or find some compromise. In the 5th vs 6th situation, courts have mostly favored the 5th. That is, the court will not require a witness to give up the right not to self-incriminate, and usually will not grant a defendant an acquittal because desired testimony is unavailable. It might be that a defendant expected to rely on the testimony of a witness who has since died, or has fled the country and cannot be brought before the court. The sixth does not and cannot assure perfect justice, and the courts do not attempt to make it do so. In the situation described, the defendant may compel the witness to appear and be asked the relevant questions. The jury will hear the answer, and may assume what it would have been without the invocation of the Fifth. The defendant's lawyer can try to find a question that the witness will answer, and can argue that the refusal to answer is consistent with a not-guilty verdict. That is all that the courts provide. When the prosecution calls a witness, knowing or having good reason to know that the witness will invoke the 5th on more or less every relevant question, the US Supreme Court in Namet v. United States 373 U.S. 179 (1963) has held that this may be error requiring overturning the conviction. This was confirmed and expanded in Douglas v. Alabama 380 U.S. 415 (1965). But neither of these are relevant when the defense calls the witness.	I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at 11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at 2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.	In Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 U.S. 514, SCOTUS ruled in a manner applicable to this case. In that case they assumed (did not decide, but operated from that initial position) that the information was illegally obtained, respondent knew that, but did not play any role in obtaining the information. They say that In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, this Court upheld the press' right to publish information of great public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party and held that privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy. Florida Star v. B.J.F. 491 U. S. 524 in a similar vein cites a principle (from Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97) that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. In other words, this is a matter where any restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Similar results are found in Boehner v. McDermott 332 F. Supp.2d 149. However, in Peavy v. WFAA-TV Inc, the TV station had a more active role in violating the law, so they were not protected by the First Amendment. As for the initial source, it is said to be unknown (to NYT) where the documents came from, though they were verified by Jack Mitnick. There are federal laws that would prohibit government agents from disclosing a person's tax return, but there is no general law against disclosing a tax return. Without more information on the source, it is impossible to determine whether that act was legal.
Can a natural person issue stock in a private project they’re working on? I’m trying to find out about the legality of issuing stock in some project you’re working on if you’re just a natural person, by which I mean that you haven’t knowingly founded any sort of organization for the project. I’m most interested in the law in English- and German-speaking countries at the moment, but information on any country would be helpful. Specifically: Is this possible at all or do you automatically found some sort of legal entity the moment you do this? Does such a stock issue have to be registered with the country’s equivalent of the SEC or are they exempt? If the latter, do you have to apply for such an exemption or is it granted automatically? Is this regulated on a federal, state/cantonal or municipal level or does the issuer have to comply with the law on all levels? Are there relevant court cases that show what the penalties are for getting this wrong? Does it make a difference in practice if the market capitalization of the project is almost certainly always well below $1 million? Example: One member of a group of friends is good at planning vacations and enjoys it. Let’s call her Cynthia. The whole group wants to go on an expensive vacation together, but Cynthia doesn’t have the money to pay for everything up front. So she sells shares in the vacation project – on paper or using tokens on a blockchain – to the other members, and uses the raised money to pay for flights, hotels, etc. and to compensate herself for her time. Some of the shares change hands: The hotel rooms are already booked when a new member of the group wants to join the vacation. She’s happy to pay a bit extra, so one shareholder agrees to sell all his shares to her at a bit of a profit. Eventually the final shareholders all enjoy a great vacation together.	There are certain legal arrangements that are implied in law when a project or activity is carried out without forming a legal entity. The classification of the legal arrangements in question govern the legal rights of the parties. These arrangements are surveyed below. This is followed by a brief list, for contrast and completeness, of the main different kinds of entities that must be formed expressly and registered to come into existence. This overview is then applied to the specific questions asked. One is a trust. A trust arises by operation of law when a person (called a settlor) provides money or other property or legal rights to another person (the trustee) for the benefit of one or more persons (people who are called beneficiaries) and often for some purpose specified by the settlor. In the U.S. this was historically governed by case law from both courts of law and courts of equity. The concept of a trust and the broader concept of a fiduciary as a general concept are particular to common law systems and don't have a direct analog in civil law legal systems, although there are legal arrangements in civil law countries that have material differences from common law trusts that can be used in circumstances where trusts are used in common law countries. But, now, many states have adopted a statutory trust code that covers most issues of trust law fairly comprehensively. Guardians, conservators, and receivers, sometimes with rights arising by operation of law, or a private non-governmental appointment, but more often arising from a court order, are close cousins of trustees of trusts. Trustees, guardians, conservators, receivers, and agents are part of a group of kinds of people who are often collectively grouped in a larger category of people in charge of other people's property or rights called "fiduciaries." Most often, the enterprises and properties managed by fiduciaries are not considered to be entities, even though the arrangement is similar to an entity. Some jurisdictions require some kinds of fiduciaries to file some sort of registrations or public filings, but these statutes typical regulate people who are already fiduciaries by operation of law or a court order, rather than requiring registration for the legal arrangement to come into existence. A related form of entity, which requires government registration as an entity in some jurisdictions, and can be formed without registration or similar formalities in others, is a business trust which will often have transferrable beneficial interests, the most common examples of which is a real estate investment trust (REIT) or a mutual fund, both of which are sometimes, but not always, organized as business trusts. Most businesses organized as business trusts are subject to considerable government regulation as securities and under tax law, and also under other laws specific to those entity forms. Another related concept in common law countries is a "bailment" (holding the property of another for safekeeping) by a bailee for a bailor and an escrow arrangement. France has a similar set of concepts in its civil code translated into English as "deposits" meaning "bailments" and "sequestrations" meaning escrow arrangements and similar relationships in Articles 1915 to 1963 of its Civil Code. Another is a general partnership. A general partnership arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on business for the purpose of making a profit (whether or not they actually do), without forming some other entity. There is a uniform state law adopted in every state in some version or another, with minor state-specific variations, that governs general partnerships. A joint venture is almost indistinguishable from a general partnership. While codified now, in common law countries, general partnership law is a natural and organic outgrowth of the laws of trusts, fiduciaries and agency, that has evolved and been modified in the process of codification; while in civil law countries, general partnerships are just another kind of entity that isn't necessarily registered as an entity per se (although civil law countries generally have a category of registration-like regulation and accounting and banking rules that apply to all "merchants" whether or not they operate through entities). A third is an unincorporated association. An unincorporated association arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on an activity for purposes other than making a profit, without forming some other entity. In some jurisdictions this is governed by a statute pertaining to them, while in others (and in part, even in states that have a statute) it is governed by common-law case law (drawn historically from both courts of law and courts of equity). In France, the civil code provides for a similar kind of unregistered entity known in English translation as a "Partnership for Non-Commercial Purposes" in Articles 1845 to 1870 of its civil code. A fourth and related notion, which is somewhere between an unincorporated association and a simple contract – which is not a general partnership because it is not carried out for profit – is a domestic partnership or civil union which is sometimes just a subcategory of contract, but in other cases is treated as a special kind of arrangement subject to case law or statutory regulation. Many state and local governments, and some national governments outside the United States, adopted domestic partnership and/or civil union laws that vary widely in their details, before same sex marriage became legal in the United States, to address the needs of same sex couples and/or unmarried opposite sex cohabitants and/or domestic arrangements involving more than two people. Along the same lines, while all countries allow qualified opposite sex couples and sometimes qualified same sex adult couples to form a marriage with a license from the government or government registration, some jurisdictions recognize marriage-like relationships that can be formed without government registration such as common law marriage, putative marriage, and de facto relationships that have legal rights associated with them. France, for example, in Article 515 of its civil code, has "civil covenants of solidarity" (PACS) akin to a civil union in the U.S. which must be formally registered giving rise to formal rights that are significant but less so than those created by marriage. French civil code Article 515 also defines a different category of relationship translated as "concubinage", which is roughly equivalent to "cohabitation" in English which gives rise only to very limited legal rights, and may be (but need not be) governed by a custom drafted domestic partnership agreement called a "convention de concubinage" in French and can, but need not be, formally recognized in a "certificat de concubinage" or a "declaration sur l'honneur" which has only slight legal effect. The law of a "convention de concubinage" is somewhat akin to the kind of contract contemplated in the OP as it is an "atypical" contract that is not heavily regulated and not entered into primarily for the purpose of making a profit. A fifth is a contract. Sometimes a legal arrangement is contractually entered into and has the character of assigning people legal rights and obligations vis-a-vis each other without constituting an unincorporated entity or trust. A contract would typically involve less discretion than an unincorporated entity or a trust, although this isn't a hard and fast rule. In some respects, all entities are basically standardized and regulated contracts. Often, but not always, contractual rights are assignable. Corporations have their roots in the laws of trusts, contracts, and general partnerships, and eventually were given a statutory treatment not directly derived from those sources. This is governed mostly by case law. One kind of contract that bears similarity to what you describe in your example is called in economics a "dominant assurance contract" also known by the registered trademark specific provider of such arrangements known as "Kickstarter" contracts with a refund bonus, and similar in principle but without profit-making objectives, to a subscription agreement. It also bears similarity to a gift registry. Many leases create de facto partnerships and unincorporated associations, as do some real estate covenants. Another important (and heavily regulated) type of contract, which is often mistaken for an entity type since it is used in lieu of a parent-subsidiary relationship between a business headquarters and a particular location of a business, is a franchising agreement, in which the franchisor receives a share of gross profits and a fee from a franchisee who gets the right and the obligation to conduct business under a trademark in accordance with highly detailed central rules regarding how the business is conducted on a day to day basis, even though particular business locations are not enterprises owned by the franchisor. Legal multilevel marketing arrangements, and very similar illegal pyramid schemes are likewise typically organized on a contractual basis. There is also terminology for certain kind of contractual arrangements for non-business purposes, similar to those described in the question, in many civil law countries such as France (as opposed to countries with common law legal systems), but I am not familiar with all of this terminology itself (much of which lacks a direct and exact English language equivalent). A distinction is made procedurally, and in some formalities and requirements, between commercial contracts on one hand, and a category of contracts often translated as "non-commercial contracts" or "civil contract" on the other. For example, in France, arbitration clauses are usually not permitted in non-commercial contracts, and lawsuits to enforce non-commercial contracts must normally be brought at the defendant's domicile. Civil law countries also make a stronger distinction between "typical" contracts, which are spelled out in detail by statute and to which many default rules of law and mandatory rules apply, and "atypical contracts" which are treated with more skepticism by civil law courts and require more detailed express enumeration of the rights of the parties and of the reasons that the government should enforce those rights, than in common law country jurisprudence (although France eliminated this concept from its civil code in lieu of provisions enforcing substantive fairness in many cases, in an October 2016 overhaul of the contract law provisions of its civil code which had only been lightly amended before that since its original adoption in 1804). A sixth is co-ownership of property or other legal rights. Sometimes more than one person owns property and they have legal rights that arise from co-ownership of that property, even in the absence of any contract formation related to their co-ownership, in the absence of any imposition of a trust relationship on someone as a trustee for someone who is not the legal owner of property, and without an intent to carry out any particular enterprise or project with or without an intent to make a profit. This is mostly governed by case law but typically with modest statutory regulation of specific issues (like the right to bring a partition action if one party wants to end the co-ownership relationship). Sometimes co-owners also have a contract governing their respective rights (or a covenant, which is a contract that runs to successive owners of property, usually real estate). France recognizes along these lines "Agreements Relating To The Exercise of Undivided Rights" in Article 1873 of its Civil Code. A seventh is that when someone conducts business for the purpose of making a profit without working jointly with someone else, and without forming an entity, the enterprise is called a "sole proprietorship" (if business is actively conducted) or an "investment" (if profits arise mostly from passive ownership of property). Custom dictates that certain activities, like renting real estate, are considered investments, even when significant active management is involved, while other activities are usually considered to be sole proprietorships, even when they don't involve particularly pro-active conduct. The common law of agency and tax law are important to the operation and regulation of these businesses. In a related issue, a sole proprietorship or other entity (whether or not registered with the government) may often, either by formal registration or merely by dint of using it in the course of business, depending upon the jurisdiction, acquire legal rights in a trade name of an enterprise (also known as a "doing business as name" or "dba") and/or trademarks associated with goods or services sold by an enterprise or sole proprietorship. An eighth is that when someone engages in a project for purposes other than making a profit without working jointly with someone else, or with an intent to make a profit that is consistently not achieved most of the time for a statutory number and proportion of years, and without forming an entity, that has a character similar to conducting a business, the enterprise is called a "hobby" for tax law purposes. This isn't comprehensive, however. Some economic activity undertaken without involving someone else or forming an entity, and without an intent to make a profit, simply doesn't have any name other than "consumer spending" or a "personal and/or household activity." In contrast, entities formed by registration with the government, more or less exclusively, include corporations (both for profit and not for profit, including most corporations sole which are similar to trusts), limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability limited partnerships, limited partnership associations, mutual companies, and cooperatives. Entity formation is typically cheap and easy, although some kinds of entities such as national banking associations require special regulatory permission. Municipal governments, local governments such as school districts and special districts, and many independent government agencies are also often organized as governmental corporations and governed by specific statutes that apply to them. Is this possible at all or do you automatically found some sort of legal entity the moment you do this? This is often, but not always, the case when more than one person is involved, as the list above illustrates. Does such a stock issue have to be registered with the country’s equivalent of the SEC or are they exempt? If the latter, do you have to apply for such an exemption or is it granted automatically? It depends. In the U.S., the threshold question is whether an interest in the project is a "security". There are many kinds of debt and equity investments that are automatically securities (even debt issued by a natural person, rather than an entity, which is transferrable and sold to members of the general public, could be a security). There is also a residual category called an "investment contract" which counts as a security if it meets a multi-factor legal test. There are various exemptions from the securities laws, and some are automatic, while others are not. But there are also some securities laws that apply to transactions involving securities even if the securities are exempt from formal registration with a government entity. The most notable of these is federal SEC regulation 10b-5 that imposes securities fraud liability when there is fraud within the meaning of the regulation in any transaction involving the purchase or sale of a security, even if that security is exempt from registration as such with a governmental entity. Some transferrable rights that are not necessarily securities but have some similarities to them are publicly traded commodities, security entitlements, negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts (particularly negotiable ones), and cryptocurrencies. In addition to regulation under state and federal securities laws, certain kinds of joint activities have other very specific regulations that apply to them (e.g. churches, or pooled investment funds, or cooperatives, or home owner's associations, or political parties, or election campaigns, or buyer's clubs, or timeshares) and there is really no way to know, in general, what those activities will be, without just learning about them from a general knowledge of a jurisdiction's laws. Is this regulated on a federal, state, or municipal level or does the issuer have to comply with the law on all levels? You have to comply with the laws on all levels. Normally, the legal rights of the parties primarily arise under state law in the U.S., and the disclosure requirements normally arise under both federal and state law. But no one level of government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate private activities and it isn't unprecedented, for example, for local governments to authorize certain kinds of private enterprises (e.g. neighborhood associations in places that don't have HOAs, or composting co-operatives). Many local governments require all businesses that operate in their territory to be registered or licensed with them, no matter how they are legally organized, and state and local governments also often require special licenses for all businesses (regardless of form of organization) which are obligated to collect particular taxes such as lodging taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, fuel taxes, alcohol or cigarette taxes, or "head taxes". Similarly, many occupations and professions require government licenses at one level of government or another, and sometimes, more than one level of government. Some licenses are mostly federal (e.g. investment advisors and securities brokers), some are primarily state level (e.g. doctors and lawyers), and some are primarily local (e.g. street vendors and many construction trades). Are there relevant court cases that show what the penalties are for getting this wrong? Yes. But the question is too broad and vague to meaningfully discuss them. These cases are usually particular to the specific type of transaction involved. Does it make a difference in practice if the market capitalization of the project is almost certainly always well below $1 million? This is relevant to the kind of securities law exemptions that apply when a transaction is deemed to be a security under federal and state securities regulations. There are many exemptions and most of them have dollar limitations attached (although some do not). The background is that I want to start an online platform to make this easier for people, but of course I don’t want to get into legal trouble and I don’t want my customers to get into trouble. You haven't even begun to scratch the surface of the myriad legal issues presented. Your example sounds more like some sort of transferrable contract right, rather than a security (although it could be both), since it appears to be purchased primarily for use rather than as a profit making investment. It bears a fair amount of similarity to certain kinds of timeshare rights (and might even qualify as a timeshare under the regulatory and consumer protection rules of some jurisdictions which define them broadly). You need to develop a far more specific idea of what you plan to do and then meet with a lawyer to discuss the entire concept start to finish to spot as many legal issues as possible. This is not something you should try to do without a lawyer.	It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.	not in germany Germany has laws about founding, operating and financing political parties, the Parteiengesetz which demands certain organisatorial structures, and the Parteifinanzierungsgesetz, which is very explicit about how they can finance themselves and what a party needs to report. The only allowed gains are property proceeds (like from owning property or selling goods), membership fees, gifts to the party, and state sponsorship. Also, non-citizens are not allowed to give to a party unlimitedly. The parties also are also obligated under the basic law to report all financing they get, down to the cent. Their organisation form is strictly limited: Parteien sind frei gebildete Personenvereinigungen im Sinne des Artikels 9 Absatz 1 GG, die sich auf der Basis des privaten Rechts nach den vereinsrechtlichen Regelungen des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (§§ 21 bis 79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) gründen. Sie sind in der Regel nicht rechtsfähige Vereine This precludes them from being Aktiengesellschaften: they have to be organizations of people (Personenvereinigungen) that follow the BGB, and thus are not allowed to organize as an AG under the Aktiengesetz, which demands that an AG to not be an organization of people. So, a party can't be a stock company, and selling stock in a political party in Germany is not allowed under the framework and is thus neither possible nor legal.	When does a CEO (or the investor or the board) have to notify employees they will be unable to pay them for work already done? Directors and officers (which includes executive officers like the CEO) but not investors have a duty to ensure that the corporation does not trade while insolvent. In this context, "trading" means incurring new debts and "insolvent" means being unable to pay their debts as and when they fall due. Unfortunately, it is a judgment call by those directors and officers and the exact point where it occurred is generally only clear with hindsight, if then. For example, you describe a "tumultuous week"; quite likely the company was urgently seeking additional sources of funds and until it was clear they had no prospect of getting those, they weren't insolvent. The director's duty is to act reasonably (a broad range of activities) and not be overly pessimistic nor optimistic about the company's prospects. As far as I know, they don't have a positive duty to inform their creditors that they can't pay. If that happens their obligation is to file for bankruptcy and their obligations cease - the bankruptcy trustee then invites creditors to prove their debts. Does an investor have a responsibility to ensure all employees are paid? No. That is pretty much the purpose of limited liability corporations: to shield the investor from the debts of the company. Do the employees have any recourse? Yes. Employees are typically priority creditors in Colorado and rank ahead of many other creditors. However, if the company is not based in Colorado different laws will apply. Of course, you must be an employee of the company - this priority doesn't apply to true independent contractors. Also, the liquidator's fees rank ahead of anyone and unless the bankrupt company has adequate realizable assets, even employees are unlikely to get a dividend. You also need to be clear who you work for as you say "that last Friday was paid for/fronted by the HR company". Do you work for the bankrupt company or this (non-bankrupt) HR company? If the latter then they owe you your wages and the bankruptcy of their principal is their problem, not yours. Is "secured debt" real? And does that reduce the likelihood of receiving a paycheck in a bankruptcy settlement? Yes. There is a priority in the payment of creditors in liquidations and it varies by jurisdiction but a typical arrangement might go like: Liquidator's Fees Employee wages and entitlement accrued within the last 6 months Certain taxes Secured creditors (who may have a ranking among themselves) Unsecured creditors (including employee entitlements more than 12 months old, other taxes, trade creditors etc.) Shareholders (who may have a ranking among themselves) Basically, the lower you rank, the less likely you are to see a dividend. Does any of this change if the company doesn't file for bankruptcy? Sure. Until the company does this it is still a going concern and it has to pay its debts. If it doesn't it's creditors can sue and recover their monies as best they can which may include forcing the company into bankruptcy.	You won't be able to get around self-doxxing yourself. § 5 Abs 1 TMG requires tele-media service providers like you to list den Namen und die Anschrift, unter der sie niedergelassen sind the name and the address where they reside or are established Similarly, Art 13(1) GDPR requires you to provide the identity and the contact details of the controller In a German context, it is generally accepted that both of these involve a ladungsfähige Anschrift, i.e. a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit (not a post box). These requirements exist for both natural persons and legal entities, and for both businesses and non-commercial activities. The TMG Impressumspflicht talks about “geschäftsmäßige, in der Regel gegen Entgelt angebotene Telemedien” but in practice this only requires that the service could be paid (not that you're actually making any money), and that the service is offered routinely/business-like (not necessarily commercially). It does not matter where your service is hosted as long as you live in Germany. The TMG and GDPR might not apply if the forum is run purely privately, e.g. if it is only made available to a few close friends or family members.	Yes The directors of a company have a fiduciary duty to act within the law for the benefit of their shareholders - not to their customers, not to the government, not to the environment and not to the public. A lawsuit against the company will incur financial loss irrespective of if it is won or lost. It is difficult to see how it is in the shareholder's interest for the company to be enabling the funding of a lawsuit against it.	Finding S seems to be hard and I have not much hope, if her siblings cannot provide any information. I think the "inhabitants registry" (Einwohnermeldeamt) is not allowed to give you her first address in Spain ("Zuzugsanschrift im Ausland") (§§ 44 and 45 Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG)). The best option I see is a court auction (Zwangsversteigerung), more precise a "Teilungsversteigerung". If one of S's siblings want money for the land, he can ask for a court auction at the local court (Amtsgericht). The court will get S's first address in Spain (§ 34 BMG) and if it cannot deliver its letter to S, there will be a "public delivery" (öffentliche Zustellung) through a posting in court. It would take a while, but in the end the land could be yours. Be prepared that the cost for the court auction will be much higher than the 1000€. If you plan to take this way, ask a lawyer for detailed advice. Also you need one of S's siblings to participate in the process. If the trees are really a danger for your house, the heirs could also have an obligation to remove them. Maybe this could help you too.	The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.
Does Texas have a legal right to leave the Union or secede? Many people, possibly even including recent Texas governors, think that Texas has a right to secede from the Union. Does it, or does it not?	The U. S. Supreme Court ruled in 1869 that states may not unilaterally secede. The state litigant in the case was Texas. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_v._White	Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).	UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a "Presidential election" of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. "This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states," said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.	The fire department is entirely within its rights, which are the same as any other property owner. The fact that property is owned by a governmental body does not mean that members of the public can't be excluded that property. Some governmental property is public, but lots of it is private, and this would usually include most parts of fire department property. As long as you have not been denied any access to a public road by this fence, there is nothing improper about it. Anyone can walk through their parking lot, park their car there, meet friends, whatever, This is almost surely inaccurate. The fire department does not have to allow members of the public to have any access to their property and probably would demand that most of the uses you describe stop if they interfered in any way with the performance of its duties.	Can a state make a law that deputizes individuals to sue individuals in other states? This question (apart from the question below that implicates federalism concerns about a sister state court process in the secondary question below) would be resolved by the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law. A state can have a law that authorizes a lawsuit for non-judicial system conduct against a non-resident of the state if it meets the requirements of "long arm jurisdiction." The most succinct description of this requirement is that the person being sued "personally availed themselves" of the laws of the state whose law authorizes the lawsuit, in a manner that would reasonably be understood to subject that person to the state's legal authority. This could involve a lawsuit against someone outside the state arising from an incident that took place in the state. It could also involve a lawsuit against someone who took tortious action directed at a state or people in a state that caused harm, or a lawsuit arising from a business transaction that could reasonably be considered doing business in the state imposing that law. Constitutional law requirements on "choice of law" require that the state or foreign jurisdiction whose law is applied to a question in a dispute must have some meaningful connection to the disputed issue (subject to the backdrop rule that the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum where a case is litigated is presumed to be identical to that of the law of the state where the case is being litigated if no party provides any evidence or legal authorities to the contrary). Case law on state level qui tam litigation (which involve statutes that empower private individuals to sue someone who has wronged the government on its behalf for a share of the amount recovered for the government), the case law regarding private criminal prosecutions that are available in a handful of U.S. states, and some California consumer protection laws (which authorize suits without personal showing of actual damages in some cases when there are fraudulent advertisements) might also be relevant. So would the authority granted to bail bondsmen that is similar to law enforcement authority but limited to people authorized a person posting a bail bond for a criminal defendant who is subject to that authority. Concretely, if the constitutionality of the Texas law was upheld<1>, Texas probably can authorize a lawsuit against a California resident who would be involved in an abortion that took place in Texas that was illegal under Texas law. And, a judgment from a Texas court in a case like that would probably be entitled to full faith and credit in California. But, Texas probably couldn't constitutionally authorize a lawsuit against a California resident in connection with an abortion that took place in California. There would be, of course, many edge cases with no close past precedents, where the application of constitutional jurisdiction and choice of law limitations would be far less clear. <1> The majority opinion by five conservative justices other than the Chief Justice deciding not to stay enforcement of the law specifically limits itself to whether the proper parties were joined to the request to enjoin the statute and states "this order is not based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the Texas law, including in Texas state courts." A decision that has not been resolved on the merits. The Courts have merely declined to stay enforcement of the law pending the current litigation over the law's validity. Upholding the law on the merits would require courts to overturn existing precedents related to abortion restrictions and other legal issues. Is there any extra legal barrier that would prevent states with pro-choice legislatures from passing laws designed to counter the anti-abortion deputies? For example, California could pass a law that deputizes private California individuals to sue people who sue abortion providers, and could reimburse their court costs up to $10,000. This seems to be a separate question from the question in the title. A law of this character would probably not be upheld. Basically, it would make a state authorized legal process in one state's courts, actionable as illegal in another state. Generally speaking, interference in another state's legal process would either violate the "dormant commerce clause", or the "full faith and credit clause", or constitutional limits on jurisdiction and choice of law, or constitutional standing limitations (even though they don't apply in the same way in state courts as in federal courts, or the "due process clause" of the 5th or 14th Amendments, or the "privileges and immunities clause." The exact legal theory isn't clear because there is really not history of litigation over this kind of legislation and you'd need to resort to vaguely analogous cases. The effort of Texas to litigate Pennsylvania election law administration following the 2020 election was recently dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing and that is suggestive of how this case might be resolved, even though it isn't strictly analogous. It is also informed by the long standing common law rule, that could conceivably have constitutional dimensions, that litigants participating in a court process in good faith are immune from collateral litigation in another lawsuit over their conduct in the original lawsuit. There isn't a lot of precedent one way or the other with laws having this kind of purpose, and none on a law exactly in this form. Indeed, a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by the Chief Justice and two of the liberal justices (with which the third liberal justice states he agrees without formally joining that opinion) stated that: The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unusual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The last time there was significant litigation of laws with a similar purpose that were adjudicated was in the pre-U.S. Civil War period in abolition of slavery oriented legislation. But, the post-Civil War amendments to the U.S. Constitution and subsequent development of constitutional case law would render most precedents from that time period infirm.	If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.	"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
Why is it necessary for a belief of imminent deadly force to be subjectively reasonable? I've recently come across this video by Attorney Tommy John Kherkher regarding the subject of using deadly force in self defense. In his video, he presented a checklist of things which are required for a case to be considered self-defense and not murder or manslaughter. The list is as follows: There is a belief of actual, imminent threat of deadly force (grievous bodily harm) Belief must be OBJECTIVELY and SUBJECTIVELY reasonable Threat is unlawful and immediate Must have clean hands Confronted with imminent peril Force must be immediately necessary Response was necessary Retreat may be required if: Duty to retreat There is an entirely safe place to retreat to Safe place is known to the person retreating Exception: Castle Doctrine and Stand Your Ground The requirement for a threat to be objectively reasonable is pretty clear: Even if I have an irrational fear of something and that perceived threat seems subjectively reasonable to me, it is generally unreasonable. The example presented was his girlfriend "attacking" him with a purple plush unicorn and him supposedly being deadly afraid of said plush unicorn. However, the requirement for a threat to be subjectively reasonable isn't obvious to me. If there is an objectively reasonable threat of deadly force (e.g. a stranger pointing a gun at me), why is it necessary to determine if I subjectively believed this to be an imminent danger to me? Is there an example of a situation in which a threat would be objectively reasonable, but subjectively unreasonable?	Because your buddy routinely points loaded firearms at you First, you should probably get friends who don’t do this but, even though this is objectively a threat, you know that you are in no danger (barring accidents). Self-defence is not justified. This is why there is the dual requirement that the danger is clear to both: an objective observer, and the person under threat.	In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.	Fault, in English law, is "blameworthiness". While it covers both the act and the mental state of the defendant, it cannot equate to the subjective criminal intent of the defendant known as mens rea. In other words, you can be at fault for negligence without having the requisite intent to commit a criminal act. This is perhaps best pointed out by the next sentence after the one in bold: It would be perfectly possible for a criminal code to provide separate crimes of negligence, with lower maximum sentences, at appropriate points in the hierarchy of offences. There are also examples of such offences in English law already. For example, careless, and inconsiderate, driving ("driving without due care and attention") contrary to Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is an offence that requires fault without mens rea. The defendant merely has to be careless and inconsiderate — they do not have to be in the state of mind where they know or believe that what they are doing is criminal in some way. In contrast, dangerous driving contrary to Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 has the implied requirement of mens rea because of the word "dangerously". This implies the defendant must have a subjective belief that what they are doing is dangerous (or otherwise be reckless about it), and therefore criminal.	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412	If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.	Illinois has a "Castle Doctrine" which includes dwellings and other qualified buildings, but not a general "Stand your Ground" doctrine. Normally, to claim self-defense one has to show that they were not able to retreat and had to use force, but in Illinois you do not have a duty to retreat if you are preventing criminal interference with a dwelling or with real property that you or a family member owns, or you have a legal duty to protect (see Ill Code 720-2 and Ill Code 720-3). In order to use deadly force in any case, it must be to prevent a forcible felony, which is defined as (720 ILCS 5/2-8): "Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. So, assuming you have no legal duty to protect the 7-11, you would not be justified in using deadly force against rioters merely on the basis that they were committing a forcible felony against the building. On the other hand, if you were in the store or could see someone in the store being attacked, you may be able to successfully defend deadly force used to protect yourself or that person.	Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.).	As I understand, the limited liability that police enjoy, requires that people bringing civil cases against police must prove that the police person should have had a reasonable knowledge of the civil rights that you accuse him of breaking, for the civil case to be successful. This isn't quite right. The test you are referencing is the one for qualified immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on government officials only for violating a "well-established" constitutional right. A rule of law is "well-established" when there is controlling case law in that jurisdiction when a factually similar binding precedent exists in that jurisdiction to show that the alleged conduct is unconstitutional. This test is employing the legal fiction that police officers are familiar with all of the binding precedents in the jurisdiction regarding what constitutes a violation of a constitutional right, which is held against officers. Of course, in reality, almost no police officers have that exhaustive a level of understanding of the law. What the test does, however, is to prevent police officers from being held civilly liable for money damages when they take action which, in fact, violates a constitutional right, but which no case law in a factually similar case that was binding precedent established before the incident took place. Thus, police officers are relieved of liability for incidents that they would have to predict that a future court would find violated a constitutional right. This is sometimes phrased as being justified because a reasonable police officer could not have foreseen a new rule of constitutional law or a novel application of an existing rule of constitutional law to a new situation. One of the reasons that the qualified immunity rule is controversial, however, is that courts have the discretion to decide a case on qualified immunity grounds without determining if the underlying action indeed did violate a constitutional right, and this prevents constitutional law from evolving normally over time to applications in new factually novel situations. The key point, however, is that this requirement that a constitutional right be well-established to be enforceable in a civil action is an "objective" test in that it is decided without any reference to what the particular individual being sued actually knew about the law in the particular circumstances presented. A police officer who acts without actually knowing the law does so at his or her peril.
What legal provision in the U.S. law allow the Catholic Church to discriminate against women? What legal provision in the U.S. law allow the Catholic Church to discriminate against women? Women aren't allowed to become priest yet, but isn't this against the discrimination law? If not, what legal provision allows the Catholic Church to practice discrimination without any legal punishment?	This is known as the "ministerial exception", which protects the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, which include the right of religious groups to determine who is and is not a member of their clergy, and emerges from the case-law of the US Supreme Court. The most recent leading case on this is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); as Chief Justice Roberts put it in that case: the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own	Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.	The words of the prohibition in 24 CFR 100.60(a)are that It shall be unlawful for a person to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling to a person who has made a bona fide offer, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin or to refuse to negotiate with a person for the sale or rental of a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, or to discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of handicap. It would be discriminatory for the landlord to refuse to rent to a person because they are or are not of some sex. Based just on the plain language of the prohibition, the author of the app or operator of a website is not renting / refusing to rent. Nevertheless, Roommate.com was sued, and found not liable, though not on the grounds that they hadn't discriminated Fair Housing Councils v. Rommate.com addressed an attempt to punish roommate.com on discriminatory grounds. The court states that "The pivotal question is whether the FHA applies to roommates". The court's reasoning is a clear application of the notion of "Congressional intent". As they say, There’s no indication that Congress intended to interfere with personal relationships inside the home. Congress wanted to address the problem of landlords discriminating in the sale and rental of housing, which deprived protected classes of housing opportunities. But a business transaction between a tenant and landlord is quite different from an arrangement between two people sharing the same living space. We seriously doubt Congress meant the FHA to apply to the latter. Consider, for example, the FHA’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Could Congress, in the 1960s, really have meant that women must accept men as roommates? Telling women they may not lawfully exclude men from the list of acceptable roommates would be controversial today; it would have been scandalous in the 1960s The court continued on other grounds, observing that given that the FHA is a remedial statute that we construe broadly... we turn to constitutional concerns, which provide strong countervailing considerations That is, even if you ignore congressional intent, there is a constitutional reason why FHA cannot apply to roommate choice. SCOTUS in Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 stated that "the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights", and "Courts have extended the right of intimate association to marriage, child bearing, child rearing and cohabitation with relatives". Then in order to "determine whether a particular relationship is protected by the right to intimate association we look to 'size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship'". After extensive analysis centered around the point that "Government regulation of an individual’s ability to pick a roommate thus intrudes into the home, which 'is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people'", the court "adopt[s] the narrower construction that excludes roommate selection from the reach of the FHA". TL;DR the FHA doesn't apply to roommates and it's legal to select one's roommates based on their race, color, religion, sex, sexuality, etc...	Clause (c) says that while schools cannot generally restrict otherwise legal expressions by students, a school run by a religious organization can restrict such speech in terms of its tenets. It then becomes a matter of fact to be proven in court that the church has a particular tenet. So if you are asking whether it is correct that the religion exception is narrowly limited to contradictions of the religion's tenets, that is correct.	With respect to disciplining its students and employees, a private school can basically do whatever it wants. There's more freedom to do so with respect to students than with employees, who have greater protections derived from anti-discrimination laws, collective-bargaining agreements, and the like. If a private school wants to impose a No Burger Tuesdays and a complete ban on political activity, that's probably going to be permissible. The First Amendment will protect the school's right to associate with only those who meet its standards, as absurd as those standards may be. Again, there are exceptions to this rule, like Title IX, which requires equal educational opportunities regardless of sex, but they don't have much bearing on your question. Even for a public school, there will be quite a bit of latitude here, because these rules don't actually regulate off-campus conduct. If a student wants to attend an off-campus public gathering, the campus police aren't going to lock him in his room or arrest him for leaving campus. The rule is simply that if you attend a public gathering off campus, you may not come back on campus afterward to threaten the lives of your classmates.	Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.	No. Only specified means of disposition of bodies are allowed by law in Kentucky and this is not one of them. The statute that applies once the body comes into the possession of a coroner is here. The statute that applies when a death appears to involve suspicious circumstances is here. Dispositions of a body that constitute the crime of "desecration of a dead body" crimes in Kentucky are described here. But, the the scenario in the question, while not within any of the clear exceptions to that particular crime, is also not clearly within the definition of that crime. Instead, it would probably be a violation of state funeral home regulations, which are mostly civil rather than criminal offenses. A subtle point is that certain transformations of a dead body such as cremation and certain kinds of treatments (such as plasticizing) that can cause a body to cease to rot also have the effect of causing the dead body to no longer count as a dead body legally for purposes of laws regulating the disposal of dead bodies. Kentucky law does not expressly authorize something quite similar to the original post which is the Tibetan Buddhist and Parsi (a.k.a. Zoroastrian) religious practice of "sky burial". But, the free exercise clause of the freedom of religion granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and incorporated against the states via the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (a federal statute), may either render this state prohibition unconstitutional or pre-empt it under federal law, because religious practices have greater legal protections than artistic practices. This would be a close call because sky burial can present public health risks that overcome first amendment freedom of religion rights.	Federally, in places of public accommodation, discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This was upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 379 U.S. 241. As summarized in that case, "Public Accommodations" cover: any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence any restaurant, cafeteria . . . any motion picture house . . . any establishment . . . which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or . . . within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment . . . In Oregon, there are additional restrictions imposed by the Equality Act of 2007: Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation, without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age if the individual is 18 years of age or older. In Oregon, a "place of public accommodation" includes: Any place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, transportation or otherwise. Other states may not have these extra prohibitions or different prohibitions. They may also have statutory exceptions for peoples' sincerely held religious beliefs. Why the legislature chose to specifically protect these classes is a policy question better asked on Politics.SE.
Can a company prevent you from leaving, because if they left they wouldn't be able to operate at all? Can a company prevent you from leaving, because if they left they wouldn't be able to operate at all? I am wondering if there's a law that prevents you from leaving a company. I got hired and in my contract there's just the salary and the yearly rate, but there weren't any condition in there. I might have signed other contracts though although I don't remember what those contracts were exactly.	united-states The Thirteenth Amendment forbids slavery and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime. This means that, outside of unique situations like the military, an employer cannot keep you as an employee against your will. Any contract that denies you the right to quit your job is illegal. A contract might require a reasonable notice period or something along those lines, but it cannot bind you to work for the company for as long as the company wants. While you can sign an employment contract without it being involuntary servitude, the Thirteenth Amendment is also generally read to mean that your employer can only sue you for money if you refuse to work. A US court cannot order you to work for an employer and threaten to hold you in contempt of court if you refuse. This doctrine predates the end of slavery, but the Thirteenth Amendment is among the reasons now cited to justify it.	This depends on your employment agreement, if any, with the organization, and on the company's contract with the organization. You can quit your job with the organization, giving whatever notice your contract provides. The company can end its contract on whatever terms that contract permits. Most service contracts specify a fixed term, with renewal possible or in some cases automatic if notice to end the contract is not given by some specified date before the renewal date. But many other arrangements are possible. If no term is specified in the contract, and there is no provision for how much notice is required, then the company should give "reasonable" notice, which will probably be in line with the norms and customs of the industry involved in the relevant country. The specific law of that country may or may not provide a required minimum notice period. The contract between the company and the organization might provide that they would not hire any employees or recent ex-employees of the organization without consent for some period, perhaps a year. If there is such a provision it must be complied with unless it is not enforceable under the law of the jurisdiction. Different jurisdictions have very different attitudes toward such contract provisions. If such a provision were violated, and it was enforceable in the jurisdiction, the company would be liable for damages if the organization choose to enforce its contract. The contract between you and the organization might include a provision that you not leave to become employed (within some time limit) by one of the organization's customers, or perhaps by one you had worked with. If there is such a provision, it might or might not be enforceable in your jurisdiction. If it is enforceable, you must comply or be liable for damages. Even if there are no contract provisions preventing such employment of you by the company, you must not without permission take with you and use for the company's benefit any confidential information that is the property of the organization and is not already known to the company through legitimate means. If you do, both you and the company might be liable for damages under trade secret law. In the absence of any enforceable contractual provisions, and if no confidential information is taken by you, there should be no legal problems. The moral issues I am in no position to offer an opinion on, and are off-topic here anyway. If you were to quit, and the company were to then seek to break its contract because, in your absence the organization could not provide proper service, and you were then to accept employment with they company, and if further the company had known of your plans, both you and the company might be liable for damages to the organization, depending non the details of the law in your jurisdiction. This could be a tort of "interference with a contractual relation" or something of the sort. You should be very careful in agreeing to any such procedure. If there is a question as to whether a provision of a contract between the organization and either you or the company in enforceable, or whether a provision prohibits you leaving the organization to be employed by the company, that would need to be addressed by a lawyer who knows this area of the law in your jurisdiction, and the specifics of the contract, or eventually by a court. It is out of scope for this forum. Nothing in this situation will be a problem if the organization agrees to whatever is done. All possible problems occur only if it does not agree, and claims to have a legal right to prevent it or seek damages.	Quitting before the start date: is the non compete enforceable? The non-compete is unenforceable unless the employer has provided you with material information that you can use to the detriment of the employer. Even in that case, the non-compete as outlined in your description seemingly exceeds the legitimate interests of the employer (see art. 2089 of the Civil Code of Québec). This means that the non-compete clause would be curtailed in court because the employer cannot prove that his business (or market share) encompasses the area depicted in the clause. The reason of being of non-compete clauses is to protect the employer from a potential misuse of information the employee obtained pursuant to his employment, such as trade secrets and information about clients. The fact that you are a fresh graduate suggests that you are dealing with just some typical intermediary who really has no "trade secrets" and who is not providing you with key information, let alone for a job that is scheduled to start five months later. Non-compete clauses that are overly broad contravene public policy in that they would singlehandedly exclude civilians from the labor market and disproportionately impair free trade.	You can't sue for false promise per se, but it might enter into a suit for something else. It sounds like your employer offered you a choice between coming in to work (extremely difficult), termination or furlough (extremely undesirable), versus working at home (the preferable option), and the latter was contingent on you doing things that relate to being able to work at home (get a computer and so on). Relying on that promise, you purchased a computer: but then they decided that you had to come in to work. Based just on that, you could sue them for damages (maybe the computer, maybe the added cost of finding a new babysitter, possibly loss of wages). They might want to argue that they don't owe you anything, but your lawyer would (legally) prevent them from making that argument, using what is known as promissory estoppel. You took certain actions based on their promise, so you are entitled to rely on that promise. Their counter-argument would probably be that you didn't do what you were supposed to do, and your attorney would respond that the company obstructed you from doing what had to be done, or had not taken reasonable steps to say in advance what was required of you.	Yes From clause 7 of the Ebay agreement: When you enter into a transaction you create a legally binding contract with another user, unless the item is listed in a category under the Non-binding bid policy. You have a contract, if you don't fulfil your obligations under it you can be sued. You can only terminate a contract a) if the contract provides for termination and the relevant circumstances have happened, or b) due to a breach of a condition (but not a warranty) of the contract by the other party or c) some very limited and highly technical circumstances at law. The fact that the other party is rude doesn't fit within b) or c) and, barring some very unusual contract terms, won't fit in a) either. Make good on your legally enforcable promise.	I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.	Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them.	Yes, the employee can choose not to accept the contract offered at the end of the probationary period and thereby allow the probationary period to end without accepting a long-term position. This is usually called "quitting".
Is there an exceptional situation, where leaking classified military documents is not subject to criminal prosecution? Is there an exceptional situation, where leaking classified military documents is not subject to criminal prosecution? I am wondering if everyone who leaks classified military documents are going to be charged criminally by the U.S. government in the U.S.	Yes In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (aka the Pentagon Papers case) The court specifically permitted public disclosure in national newspapers of information that had been officially classified. This was, of course a request for an injunction, not a criminal proceeding, but it is hard rto imagine that a criminal proceeding could have succeeded after the decision, and in fact no prosecution was attempted. At the start of the unsigned opinion, the court wrote: We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." (emphasis added) This makes it clear that the content of the "papers" wa officially classified. In concurrence, Justice Black (joined by Douglas) wrote: I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed, and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. The question asks: I am wondering if everyone who leaks classified military documents are going to be charged criminally by the U.S. government Even when such charges are constitutionally permitted, the government has the authority not to proceed with them, if it so chooses, for whatever reason it sees fit. Specific laws 18 USC § 793 prohibits conveying various information about the national defense, military equipment, or preparations for war: with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation § 793 does not refer to classification status at all, and it has no explicit excptions, but it would not apply where ther is no "intent or reason to believe" the information will harm the US or help another country. 18 USC § 794 has an intent requirement simialr to that of 793, but covers different kinds of information. Some of its provisions apply only in wartime, and then the required intent is that the information "will be communicated to the enemy". Again classification is not mentioned. 18 USC § 795 Covers making images of "vital military and naval installations or equipment" protected by order of the President. Permission of the relevant military commander is required. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 796 is similar to § 795 but limited to images obtained by use of aircraft. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 797 prohibits publication of images taken in violation of § 795, unless approved by a censor. It is in form a prior restraint. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 798 Prohibits disclosure of information about cryptographic systems. No exceptions are listed, but I think there is caselaw limiting the coverage of this section. 18 USC § 799 prohibits violation of NASA security regulations.	Is there such a phrase in jurisprudential or legal thought? In those instances it is common to say that the evidence is inconclusive. Accordingly, it is unavailing because that evidence does not prove the party's allegation.	What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information".	The most apparent potential offences would be under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, but these require the mens rea of "knowingly" or "intentionally" doing things without authorization, or doing so "with intent to defraud", etc. See also the Department of Justice's manual entry on this family of offences. Particularly relevant is this quote: As part of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant was aware of the facts that made the defendant’s access unauthorized at the time of the defendant’s conduct. Given your stipulation that the person has unintentionally viewed or downloaded the material without authorization, this would not be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030.	It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two.	Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.	The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.	In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so.
Can someone be convicted of possessing illegal images if no evidence can be found on the suspect’s computer? Perhaps it might technically be possible, but can someone be convicted of possession of illegal images if nothing can be found on his or her computer? For instance, suppose a website hosting normal legal material and illegal material was seized and its databases looked through, and authorities found Bob’s email address on the server, as well as access logs with his IP address relating to illegal material. Is this enough for a search warrant, and if so, if nothing relevant to a criminal case could be found on Bob’s computer or anywhere else searched, is this still enough to convict Bob of possession of such materials? I’ve never heard of any such cases where someone is convicted of stuff like child pornography where evidence could not be found on the suspect’s computer of some kind, so I wonder if it’s even possible at all.	Probably not. Let us take the case US v. Lowe where the evidence seems even more damning. Lowe was convicted, because his computer actually did contain hundreds of child porn images. Police had IP logs that indicated that someone at Lowe's address was hosting a porn-sharing network and they downloaded some porn from the network. After a raid, illegal images were found on one computer, and forensic evidence provided a bit of evidence regarding when some of the files were downloaded, which was also connected with a person opening an invoice file containing the defendant's address 40 minutes before one of the porn files finished downloading. Lowe moved for acquittal and did not enter any evidence. The court denied the motion. Even so, the court commented that I have to say, in this case, it has been particularly difficult, even though it’s my job to do so, to discern where that line [between speculation and reasonable inference] is and where what might be a reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record evidence becomes nothing more than an invitation for the jury to speculate as to what the evidence may be or what it may show Lowe was convicted. On appeal, the court concluded that no rational juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at trial. A juror could conclude that there was porn on the computer and that the defendant occasionally used the computer. But without improperly stacking inferences, no juror could infer from such limited evidence of ownership and use that James knowingly downloaded, possessed, and distributed the child pornography found on the laptop. The court noted that there were two other individuals in the house who also had access to the computer. In particular, no evidence was presented to prove that defendant's wife had not accessed the computer at the relevant time. There is a long list of things that the prosecution failed to prove (e.g. they provided no evidence regarding what the defendand and wife did for a living, which was relevant to the evidence regarding "opening an invoice". The court sums up by saying the evidence presented here fell well short of what we have found sufficient to convict in other cases involving multiple possible users of a single device. (Citations include US v. Oufnac, 449 F. App’x 472; US v. Mellies, 329 F. App’x 592. The court also found that the evidence did not permit a juror to conclude that James knew the HP Pavilion laptop contained child-pornography files and permitted them to remain on the computer. since the files were buried in a Shareaza file-sharing library, and no evidence was introduced to prove that the defendant had opened the file-sharing program. If you apply the findings in this case to your hypothetical, you could not possibly get a conviction that would not be overturned by a reasonable appeals court. The details of Lowe's trial are not clear from the appeal, but it appears that Lowe (or his attorney, if there was one) failed to create doubt regarding the government's case. Legally speaking, the defendant is not required to create doubt, but the instruction on reasonable doubt may have contributed to the problem. The jury is told that "Possible doubts or doubts based purely on speculation are not reasonable doubts", but since there was porn on the computer, a juror would have had to speculate that someone else downloaded it. The jury is told that "it may arise from the evidence, the lack of evidence, or the nature of the evidence". We do not know to what extent defense failed to make the argument that the government's evidence was severely lacking.	This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.	It appears you would need to contact the Calgary courts directly to discover more about the case(s) as any case files will likely be held with them. It's possible that the case was dropped, or that they were found "not guilty" which would explain the lack of further news on them. I searched the Canadian Legal Information Institute's website for you but wasn't able to find any criminal cases involving them — only some civil cases around bankruptcy and creditor claims.	Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say "Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill", because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe.	Physical evidence must be authenticated to be admissible as evidence in court. In other words, the person seeking to introduce it as evidence must show that it is what it claims to be by some means (there are many legitimate ways to authenticate evidence). A chain of custody is used to authenticate physical evidence. Even if physical evidence can be authenticated sufficiently to be admissible as evidence, evidence that there was a break in a chain of custody could create a reasonable doubt that physical evidence which is key to obtaining a conviction is really evidence that was collected, for example, from a particular crime scene at a particular time. This doubt could provide a basis for an acquittal of a defendant in a criminal trial if that piece of evidence was an important part of the case to show that the defendant was guilty.	This question, along with a number of articles on the Internet, misconstrues what the rule change is about. The rule change does not say that you can get a search warrant, that is to enter premises with/without machineguns etc, solely on the basis that someone is running Tor on that premises. The rule changes actually has nothing to do with search warrants. The rule change is about "remote access" warrants and, specifically, the question of which magistrate you need to get the warrant from. The background is that statute grants the FBI the power to hack into a computer (that is, obtain "remote access") to search for and retrieve evidence in a criminal investigation. One of the preconditions for doing so is that they identify which district the computer is in, and apply to a magistrate in that district. (By way of further background, under the American way of distributing power, it is seen as a bad thing for (for example) a magistrate in California to be able to issue a warrant to an FBI agent to conduct a search in North Carolina.) When the target computer is desired to be hacked because it is running a hidden Tor service, then how does anyone know what district it is in? Where does the poor FBI agent apply for his or her warrant? This rule change resolves this practical problem by saying that, where the use of Tor or a similar system precludes any knowledge of the physical location of the target computer, then the FBI can apply for a warrant with any magistrate. See further http://www.fed-soc.org/blog/detail/amendments-to-federal-criminal-rule-41-address-venue-not-hacking-powers	If you commit a robbery but then return the money, can you be prosecuted? Yes. Similarly, if you breach copyright and then stop, can you be prosecuted? Yes, however, you will probably not be because: Your offence may not have been noticed by the copyright holder, and/or The damages they would get are probably not worth the effort.	As an example, read Ross Ulbricht - Wikipedia. He was convicted of "money laundering, computer hacking, conspiracy to traffic fraudulent identity documents, and conspiracy to traffic narcotics by means of the Internet," not the actual possession of drugs. He thought he was smart enough to escape culpability if he didn't directly handle the actual merchandise sold on the Silk Road (marketplace) - Wikipedia, but there was overwhelming evidence that he conspired to sell the merchandise, the merchandise was illegal, that he had proxies to accept money and launder it and proxies to ship the merchandise, and that's what convinced the jury.
How does Ohio handle intestate inheritance of jointly owned property My best attempt to summarize the situation; Ohio property purchased as JTWROS by A, B, and C. A and B are married. C is adult child of A and B. Unfortunately, A suddenly passes, not leaving a will. Considering Ohio dower rights, what respective percentages of ownership do B and C now hold in the property?	Each party had a 33.3% interest in the real estate. When A dies, B gets A's share so has a 66.6% interest. Per Ohio intestate succession law and given that C is the child of A and B, B gets 100% of everything that is A's, see ORC 2105.06(B).	Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.	Transferring the domain to a single person before the LLC is officially formed would appear to be creating the same situation which you are trying to resolve currently. The percentage of ownership and the eventual financial contribution to the renewal of the domain name by each prospective member should be clearly settled before any transfers of ownership or formation of LLC occur. All of these matters can be negotiated before and included within the articles of incorporation of the LLC. Transferring ownership of the domain before the LLC is formed appears to be premature at this stage of the formation of the concern and might lead to further confusion as to whom owns what and what their responsibilities are and will be in the future relevant to the asset.	Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job).	Parents do not have the right to their child's property. See this question. The parent cannot sell the house as they don't own it. The minor does- there is no law that says they cannot own real estate. There are limits on what minors can and can't do with it but this simply means that the legal guardian would be involved in selling it. Even if the parent was the legal guardian they would be selling it on behalf of the child. Depending on the age of the child this would involve either their consent or this being in their best interests. The contents are more complicated. In theory, if they were also inherited by the child, no. In practice it would be difficult to prove ownership. The most reliable way to prevent this would be taking physical possession of any important items by removing either the item or the parent from the house.	Neighbors(including us) around the property started to mow the part in front of their yard(the weeds grew very high) and continue to do so(is it illegal for us to mow this overgrown land?). There are probably city codes around maintenance of lawns, cutting grass and clearing weeds. You should alert the relevant authorities and they will make sure that the maintenance occurs. You should probably not do it yourself since (a) you don't owe the owner any favors and (b) you might cause trouble for yourself. Recently there was some mowing by large tractors but very little was cut and most of it grew back. The question is really whether their activities bring them into compliance with applicable city codes or not. If they are compliant and you simply don't like how they maintain their property, that is tough luck. If they are not compliant, you are well within your rights to vigorously report them to relevant code enforcement authorities. This overgrown golf course is home to many wild animals(coyotes, snakes, foxes, alligators, etc..) See above 1) Is there any legal action that we can take to force the land owner to maintain the land? See above 2) Could this land somehow under some law be divided and given to the maintainers. This is an interesting question. Technically there are circumstances wherein you could take what's called adverse possession of part or all of the property. This would probably include doing things like actually residing on some piece of that land and establishing a residence there - perhaps getting mail or paying taxes there or paying utilities or operating a business - for a certain period of time without any interference from the technical owner. If you can meet the requirements of adverse possession then you might be able to become a legal owner. Unless you have little to lose, however, actually doing it might be difficult. 3) Is it legal to walk/drive on this land. (I see people walking their dogs, and driving atv's and motor bikes on the golf course) Unless you have been given notice otherwise, it is perfectly legal to walk wherever you like. It is the owner's responsibility to provide reasonable notice and take reasonable precautions against unwanted trespass; e.g., putting up a wall or fence, closing and/or locking a door or gate, posting signs and/or hiring security to patrol the property and enforce property rights - or occasionally checking to make sure their property isn't overrun with squatters.	I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.	You are not legally responsible for your spouse’s acts or omissions. However, in most jurisdictions most assets of a married couple are legally jointly held which means any judgement against your spouse exposes the jointly held assets.
Can you get sued or charged criminally for financing a group seeking to secede from the U.S. government? Can you get sued or charged criminally for financing a group seeking to secede from the U.S. government? Let's say there's this group in Hawaii that wants to secede from the U.S. and you decide to finance them, can the U.S. government charge you criminally for doing so, or is it within the rights of any American citizen to do so?	Supporting a secessionist movement is protected by the First Amendment. Terrorism, in the name of a secessionist movement or otherwise, or support of terrorism is a federal offense. See 18 USC 2339A and 2339B. The latter applies to foreign terrorist organizations, the former applies to to anything in violation of a specific list of crimes (§§32, 37, 81, 175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 1091, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, 2442 of Title 18, and a few other things). Advocating secesion is not a crime, so supporting the advocacy of secession – in the US – is not a crime. §2339B determines what terrorist-organization status via 18 USC 1189, which is basically a finding by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General that "the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States". Here is a current list. Advocating the forceful overthrow of the US government or that of any state or lower political subdivision is a crime under 18 USC 2385, likewise abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of such overthrow.	It might possibly be illegal. For criminal law, usually you need to obey the laws of three countries: The country you are a national of (by personality principle) The country from where you make the sale (by territoriality principle) The country that hosts the attacked interest (by territoriality principle) Then it depends on the jurisdiction (and other factors) whether the sale is legal or not. I'll use the example of my country, Czech Republic. There is a crime called "Unauthorized access to a computer system or data storage device". For example, you commit this crime by exploiting a vulnerability in a web application and copying the web owner's data on your computer. It is also codified that whoever wilfully facilitates the committing of a crime by providing the criminal with resources (such as the exploit) is considered to have also committed the crime. For this to apply, you must have known or expected that the exploit will be used to commit a crime. The courts would decide this.	You need a nexus The company doesn’t operate in the USA. Therefore the damage they caused you can’t have happened in the USA. Therefore, no US court has jurisdiction.	In theory its only a crime if you know, or reasonably suspect, that it is stolen. The fact that you have to ask means that you have some level of suspicion, so that's not good to start with. In practice merely being investgated by the police will bring you a world of hurt long before it gets to trial. How much can you afford to spend on legal fees, and will you be able to make bail?	I want to file a Federal criminal (not civil) complaint You can't. Only the US government can do that. https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case Individuals do not file criminal charges in U.S. district courts. A criminal proceeding is initiated by the government, usually through the U.S. attorney's office in coordination with a law enforcement agency. Allegations of criminal behavior should be brought to local police, the FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. There is an analysis of the relevant law in the case of Smith v. Krieger, No. 09-1503 (10th Cir. 2010). In his second claim, [Smith] sought to prosecute crimes allegedly committed by the defendant judges against the United States. Mr. Smith claimed he had “inherent authority” to raise his first claim under “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 51, ¶ 255. With respect to his second claim, he contended he was “authorized to prosecute crimes committed against the United States by virtue of his inherent authority as co-sovereign, pursuant to powers reserved under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and crimes committed against his person and/or property in particular.” [p.13-14] [...] Mr. Smith’s second claim fares no better than his first. Congress has by statute conferred the power to prosecute crimes in the name of the United States on the United States Attorney General and his delegates. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519. The long-standing view of the Supreme Court is that such power is exclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”) (emphasis added); id. at 694 (“Under the authority of Art. II, [§] 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. [§] 516.”); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (“Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney . . . .”) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the district court concluded, Mr. Smith has no right to initiate a criminal prosecution in the name of the United States under the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, or otherwise. [p.19] Smith was fined $3000 for bringing this frivolous and "abusive" case (which included several other claims besides this one.) Also of note is the 1973 US Supreme Court case Linda R. S. v. Richard D.. Here, Linda R. S. took a slightly different route: in effect, she sought a court order requiring her local district attorney to prosecute Richard D. for a state crime. (Or rather, she sought to enjoin the district attorney from declining to prosecute him.) The Supreme Court ruled: The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.	In the UK, broadly speaking it is not illegal to pay a ransom. However, there may be circumstances such that arranging or paying a ransom constitutes a terrorist financing offence - although a prosecution might be deemed against the public interest. I'm not aware of any such prosecutions. Section 15 (3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to provide money or other property if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17 makes it an offence for a person to enter into or become concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available or is to be made available to another, and the person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17A makes it an offence for an insurer to make a payment under an insurance contract against kidnapping and ransom if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the money or other property has been, or is to be, handed over in response to a terrorist demand. Section 18 makes it an offence for someone to enter into or become concerned in an in an arrangement which facilitates the retention or control by or on behalf of another person of terrorist property. If a person becomes aware in the course of his trade, profession or business (e.g. the banker assembling the money) that someone may be arranging a ransom to pay a terrorist, section 19 makes it an offence for that person to not disclose to a constable as soon as reasonably practicable his belief or suspicion and the information on which it is based. In terms of maritime piracy kidnappings in the area of Somalia for example, although the Government has tried to link them to terrorism there is no direct evidence of systematic links. But if it became known that such a connection exists, then the knowledge or suspicion element of the terrorist financing offences might be provable. In Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member [2011] EWCA Civ 24 (a case partly about whether ransom payments by shipowners to pirates were as a matter of English law against public policy) the Court of Appeal was not aware of illegality in the payment of ransoms under international law. The UK Government supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2133 in January 2014, which among other things "Calls upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages".	The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.	The most commonly used definition for statehood is the declaratory theory, codified by the Montevideo Convention. This says that statehood doesn't depend on recognition by other states; it merely requires four things: A defined territory A permanent population An effective government The capacity to enter into relations with other states. You immediately run into issues around the defined territory (you don't really have one) and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. But let's ignore those for a second. Meeting these requirements in some abstract world doesn't mean you get treated like a state. If no one else agrees with your claim to statehood and they act inconsistently with it, you have little recourse. You might get them not caring enough to do anything about it, but if they decide you're not a country you're out of luck. You have some misconceptions about statehood as well. A country is allowed to forbid trade with any foreign country, even ones it recognizes as sovereign states. See: US embargo on Cuba. It is also entitled to deny foreign ships access to its ports. Ships flying the flag of a sovereign state are entitled to innocent passage through territorial waters of another state, but not to the use of that state's ports. A country can certainly allow people to be killed and still be a country. See: the US, which has the death penalty for certain crimes. But if you're killing nationals of a foreign country, that foreign country is likely to take a keen interest in your activities. If the killings are judicially-ordered executions based on violations of your penal laws, that's one thing -- Australia might consider it awful that an Australian citizen was shot by Indonesia for drug smuggling, but they recognize that Indonesia is a real country with its own laws that it has a right to apply. If it's just lawless there, the keen interest might culminate in a travel warning. But in more extreme cases, or where the killings are of people who didn't willingly enter your territory, you're looking at potential military action.
Is asking a banker the pros and cons of linking my SSN to my bank account considered requesting legal advice in California? I opened a checking account in California and had the option to link my SSN (Social Security Number) to my bank account. The banker refused to tell me the pros and cons of linking my SSN to my bank account, on the grounds that it would constitute legal advice. Would her answer have construed legal advice?	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.	Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface.	It doesn't seem as if the bank is discriminating in the way you suggest. They offer two types of account: (A) accrues or charges interest and (B) does not accrue or charge interest. The bank says you can choose A or B whatever your religion. You the customer choose A or B, possibly depending on your religion. So I do not see what cause of action you have or what damages you have suffered. Therefore I don't think you could sue them.	Yup, it's illegal. You want something, they have something you want. They let you have the thing provided that you do certain things, otherwise they won't give it to you. So providing a credit card is material to the contract. You know that the credit card number is false, you are representing that it is true, the card is a material fact, you intend to get them to allow you in using this false representation, they don't know it is false and they rightfully rely on your truthfulness. They have been harmed by your false representation (maybe: it would cost you a lot in attorney fees to try to challenge on this point). This is fraud.	Some portions of your inquiry are confusing, as in "I insisted that we were going to continue to send money to the mortgage company if we don’t understand what the fees are for". It is unclear why you would continue to send money without understanding the reason for fees, especially since you purportedly sent "the complete payoff" already. What is an appropriate response to an email from a lawyer that says she’s going to withdraw from my case, because I would like to understand the additional fees and charges my mortgage company is charging (over and beyond the plan payment/payoff)? Rather than replying to the lawyer's email, it is more important that you timely file in court a response (with 2 or 3 copies) to her motion to withdraw and that you attend the court hearing (if any is scheduled). Don't forget to also mail your attorney a copy of your response. In the response, you will need to argue that your lawyer's refusal to adequately address your inquiries is in violation of the rules of "professional" conduct (with which attorneys are supposed to comply). By granting the attorney's motion, the court would improperly release her from pending obligations she has with respect to you. For instance, Rule 1.4 of Michigan RPC states: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and comply promptly with reasonable requests for information. [...] (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (note: other jurisdictions in the U.S. have equivalent rules, so you will need to refer to their corresponding label) By pushing you to pay another $850 without actually explaining you the details of the "settlement" with mortgage company's counsel, your lawyer clearly is failing her duty to reasonably inform you of the matter for which you retained her. Therefore, your response should substantiate that a granting of the attorney's motion to withdraw ought to be conditioned on the fulfillment of her obligation to provide you with reasonably sufficient information which you as her client are entitled to obtain. It will help if you attach to your motion & brief an exhibit showing that the mortgage company actually directed you to inquire of your lawyer the clarification(s) you are pursuing. Once you take care of that issue, I encourage you to seriously assess (and proceed accordingly) whether your attorney's misconduct merits being reported with the entity in charge of disciplining lawyers for their legal malpractice. If I were knowledgeable of bankruptcy law, I would be happy to address your first question. I can only suggest you to do some research on leagle.com to become acquainted with how courts decide bankruptcy issues. Be sure to set parameter "Search By Court" to "Federal Bankruptcy Court".	You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.	I can't prove a negative, but it seems quite clear from my research that providing name and badge number is policy, not law. i.e. Many departments have a policy that their officers will provide name and badge number on request, but the punishment for failure to do so would be at the employment level not the legal level. This site has a fairly good selection of various police department policies I will note that Massachusetts appears to be an exception as mentioned by jimsug in his comment to another answer, they do require police to carry and show ID upon legal request (I did not look up what a "legal request" is)	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.
Enforcement of agreement by subsequent party I am trying to get my head around how the law perceives and deals with an element of how countries deal with contractual obligations where the contracting parties change. The specific case is this Party A limited trading as A enters into an agreement with party B to perform work for them. Party A limited subsequently sells their business to party C (and stops trading). Party C continues the business "trading as" A. Party A neglects to send formal notice to party B advising that they have sold their business and obligations to party C Party C works with party B and performs the obligations and of party A. Party C then bills party B. Party B refuses to pay (but does not specify the reason for their refusal) Party C sues party B for non payment in a disputes tribunal, and it is only at this point that party C discovers the reason for non-payment. Party A and Party C are willing to work together to recover the debt from party B. If Party C amends their filing, does party A become a joint applicant, a third party or something else? Does Party A need to make a demand on party B and restart the whole application? (As this is in New Zealand, a New Zealand perspective would be appreciated, otherwise how would this typically be handled in a commonwealth country?)	If Party C amends their filing, does party A become a joint applicant, a third party or something else? A is a non-party. It is unclear from your description why C would need to amend the filing, but there is no need for A to become a joint applicant. By virtue of C's buyout of A, only C has standing to sue B. Your description does not specify B's reason for non-payment, but generally speaking that does not defeat's C's standing for suing B. Had B's contract with A reflected that B's intent is to not be in a contract relation with C, the matter might involve (1) rescinding B's contract with C; (2) a judgment on grounds of equity; (3) C's claim against A for the latter's omission; or (4) a combination of these. But the description has too many gaps in that regard, thereby precluding a more precise assessment. Does Party A need to make a demand from party C and restart the whole application? No. A has no viable claim against C. And A's sale to C implies that A can no longer have a viable claim against B either.	What do the contracts with your suppliers and the policy with your insurer say? Changes in government regulation do not ipso facto relieve Parties of the obligations under a contract under common (English) law. Contracts are allowed to allocate the risk of force majeure (and indeed, to define it because it has no common law meaning) but if they don’t, then each party bears their own risk and if they fail to honour their obligations they are in breach of contract. Common law does have the doctrine of frustration, however, that is much narrower and must result in the inability of the contract to be completed at all. And then there are consumer rights which may apply. When the dust settles, we are likely to see a lot of litigation around force majeure. Your venue appears to be complying with both the law and their obligations under the contract so you have no breach of contract claim against them and no trigger for the insurance policy. If you choose to cancel, then you broke the contract. Importantly, the position is reversed in civil law jurisdictions - a party unable to fulfil their obligations under a contract is not in breach.	(Preliminary remark: Your "question" contains at least six questions, half of which are so broad that you might be better served by studying some introductory material on international law.) (Re ¶1) International law is "the legal system governing the relationships between countries; more modernly, the law of international relations, embracing not only countries but also such participants as international organizations and individuals (such as those who invoke their human rights or commit war crimes)." Black's Law Dictionary (11th edn, Thomson Reuters 2019). "International law" does not refer to some big book of statutes (if that is what you mean), it's just the totality of all the treaties, agreements, regulations, etc. that exist. A treaty is "an agreement formally signed, ratified, or adhered to between two countries or sovereigns; an international agreement concluded between two or more states in written form and governed by international law". Id. Similarly, the Vienna Convention defines "treaty" as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation". Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, art 2(a). As one can infer from that, agreement is a broader term (encompassing informal agreements, for instance). Of course, the fact that something is called an agreement does not mean it is not, technically, also a treaty. (Re ¶¶2&3) The consequences depend on the particular treaty and on what the parties have agreed on. The WTO, for instance, operates a sophisticated dispute resolution mechanism (see the Wikipedia article). If a particular treaty contains no such stipulations, it us up to the parties to decide what course of action they intend to pursue if they believe that another party does not fulfill its treaty obligations. States are generally bound by art 2(3) of the UN Charter, which provides that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered". In resolving disputes, they must furthermore obey art 33(1): "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Judicial means of dispute resolution are available, most notably in the form of arbitration courts/panels and the ICJ; however, this always requires that the two countries agree to bring their dispute before such a body. It is important to keep in mind that there is no "World Court". If country A believes that country B violates a treaty and B refuses to take action, then that's it. This might be cause for political sanctions by other countries, but there is no body that could somehow "make" B comply with its treaty obligations.	You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form.	It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.	Generally a signature is binding even if you have not read the document you have signed; as far as the law is concerned you should have and it's too bad for you if you didn't. Of course, this presumes the contract is otherwise valid. In the circumstances you describe you should ask to see the document before signing. If that is not possible, then instead of signing you should write "I do not agree" instead and take the printed statement - only 1 in 100 people will actually check that you did sign. If you have signed and do not wish to be bound, you should contact the company immediately in writing and say that and that they can collect whatever goods they have supplied.	UK-based answer: In essence there are two separate agreements: A loan agreement between the borrower and the lender A guarantee agreement between the guarantor and the lender. To answer your question, both parties in the 2nd (guarantee) agreement, can choose to terminate the guarantee contract. This is called discharge by agreement, and requires consent by both parties and consideration (i.e payment, a nominal fee would be enough) Moving on with your question, you as a third party are not privy (directly involved) in the guarantee agreement, you are only involved in the original loan agreement, and therefore you cannot force them to follow the agreement. In any case, even if they don't dissolve the guarantee agreement, if you are unable to pay the loan, the lender can always go for you first, and if you don't have enough money, the lender can go for the guarantor for the rest of the balance.	on behalf means that the party of the agreement is the landlord, not the property manager. The contract both entitles and obliges the landlord, not the property manager. The property manager is not a party of the contract. So the fact that the property manager is fired completely unrelated to the existing contract. Additionally, in most jurisdictions that I know of, even if the property changed ownership (the landlord sold or gifted it, or the landlord died and it was inherited by someone) the contract would still be in force, as the change of situations would not invalidated the rights and obligations of the other parties.
Is it illegal to share my medical bill online? Is it illegal to share my medical bill online? I'm asking because I want to post it to complain about it, but I'm always scared I may get in trouble with some law I don't know about. Like defamation or something like that.	It is legal for you to publicly distribute your medical records, and it is legal for you to publicly distribute your bills. Defamation would be a concern only if you make a false statement that does harm to someone. A medical bill is a statement made by someone else (in both senses of "statement").	This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.	You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)	There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.	That release needs to be provided in writing to each legal entity (read: office) that provides you with medical care. Providing the release verbally (ie: 'I say that my assistant speaks for me') does not cut it; the offices that agreed are technically in jeopardy of some hefty fines and are just trusting you won't turn around and report them. Most offices are going to have their own forms for this and won't accept some generic letter that you write up, sign, and send all of them. Have your assistant call each office and ask for them to fax over a copy of their release form. List your assistant as an authorized contact, sign it, and send it back to them.	There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.	As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years.	Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough.
Is a party liable for damages stemming from contract concealment? Suppose a consumer signs contract of adhesion with corporation. Corporation represents that the contract will be available online at any time. Consumer doesn't make a copy, based on that representation. Several years pass. Contract is not available online. Consumer, not in possession of the contract, proceeds to arbitration over a dispute, assuming arbitration is forced. Shortly before the hearing, after consumer has spent significant time and money, corporation discloses the contract -- no mandatory arbitration provision exists. Is the corporation liable for the consumer's wasted time? EDIT: From @ohwilleke's answer: In practice, this fact pattern is unlikely, because the consumer needs the relevant details from the contract to commence arbitration. Rule R-12 of the AAA Consumer Rules, which is oftentimes expressly incorporated into consumer contracts, requires that the business register arbitration agreements in a public registry. Say a large corporation has many different contracts containing arbitration clauses with materially different terms (e.g. choice-of-law), or perhaps no clause at all, and has registered those clauses in a misleading way, or failed to register some of them over time -- a consumer could easily file for arbitration with the wrong clause. Concrete example: Some businesses have a pre-purchase contract and multiple post-purchase contracts (e.g. a clickwrap paperless billing contract). Those contracts are oftentimes not updated in lock-step, leading to conflicting terms.	No. Arbitrating rather than litigating when not required to do so by contract is almost never considered to be a legally compensable harm as a result of pro-arbitration legal policies. The consumer would be required to continue arbitrating and couldn't change course at that point. In practice, this fact pattern is unlikely, because the consumer needs the relevant details from the contract to commence arbitration. Other examples of unavailable contracts are hard to compare. It is a fact intense analysis.	Can a party unilaterally prohibit any of its output from use as evidence in litigation? The disclaimer is not really a prohibition, but a warning against relying on the underlying report or product for any of the listed purposes. Thereby the issuer informs that it did not apply, did not attempt to apply, and/or ought not be presumed to have applied, the standards that are requisite or reasonably expected for the listed purposes. Absent a disclaimer of that sort, the issuer exposes itself to liability for losses that could have been prevented had the issuer informed the consumer on what to expect from the product as well as the limitations thereof. Will the courts respect such disclaimers? The disclaimer primarily substantiates a party's objection to the adversary's intent (if any) to use the report or product as evidence. If all parties stipulate that such report be used as evidence, the judge might still have discretion on whether to admit it. But that is different from construing the disclaimer as something the issuer prohibits.	Is that legal given that the original deal was as a contract-to-hire basis? No, unless the contractor agrees to an amendment/contract that incorporates a non-compete clause. A party is not allowed to unilaterally modify against a counterparty's will an existing, binding contract. What you describe seemingly falls short of being a cognizable amendment to the contract. What would someone do if they were offered employment and then the contracting agency threatened to sue the person? The person might want to educate the intermediary/agency about the invalidity of unilateral amendments that are not agreed upon. The intermediary's awareness of this tenet of contract law --or its awareness that the threatened person is knowledgeable of that principle-- might dissuade the intermediary from litigating its unviable claim. Regardless, given the prospect of litigation, the person needs to make sure that henceforth all his communications with the intermediary are in writing. The person might also want to inquire of the employer whether its contract with the intermediary contains a clause entitling the employer to hire the intermediary's contractors. If it does, the intermediary's threats to the person sound in intermediary's breach of that contract. A claim of tortious interference with relation is unavailable unless the intermediary's misconduct actually disrupts the relation or prospect between the employer and the person, but it is clear that the intermediary's acts are in the direction of frustrating that relation. Even if there is no such clause between the employer and the intermediary, the person might want to update the employer on how the intermediary is trying to disrupt their tacitly agreed contract-to-hire basis.	If at the time of a claim, the valuation is found to be incorrect (too low = underinsured) the insurer may avoid the claim or apply an averaging clause, effectively meaning they pay less than they would if you had valued the item(s) correctly and paid a higher premium as a result. This is I believe termed a qualifying misrepresentation. A qualifying misrepresentation is the consumer's "misrepresentation for which the insurer has a remedy against the consumer" (s4 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012). This is available when the consumer misrepresented a fact deliberately or recklessly, or carelessly (s5 CIDRA). s5 (4) It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless. (5) But it is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown— (a) that the consumer had the knowledge of a reasonable consumer, and (b) that the consumer knew that a matter about which the insurer asked a clear and specific question was relevant to the insurer. If a qualifying misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless, the remedy is that "the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, and need not return any of the premiums paid, except to the extent (if any) that it would be unfair to the consumer to retain them." (Schedule 1 CIDRA). At the time of application for or renewal or mid-term adjustment of a policy, the consumer must take reasonable care to answer the insurer's questions. Including what is the value at that time (not 15 years ago). s3 Reasonable care (1)Whether or not a consumer has taken reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation is to be determined in the light of all the relevant circumstances. (2)The following are examples of things which may need to be taken into account in making a determination under subsection (1)— (a)the type of consumer insurance contract in question, and its target market, (b)any relevant explanatory material or publicity produced or authorised by the insurer, (c)how clear, and how specific, the insurer's questions were, (d)in the case of a failure to respond to the insurer's questions in connection with the renewal or variation of a consumer insurance contract, how clearly the insurer communicated the importance of answering those questions (or the possible consequences of failing to do so), (e)whether or not an agent was acting for the consumer. (3)The standard of care required is that of a reasonable consumer: but this is subject to subsections (4) and (5). (4)If the insurer was, or ought to have been, aware of any particular characteristics or circumstances of the actual consumer, those are to be taken into account. Necessarily the Financial Ombudsman makes its findings on a case-by-case basis. The Ombudsman corresponds with both parties about who said what when. If this case hinges on an insurer's question, the Ombudsman reads the question to determine if it was a clear question. The Ombudsman examines the evidence - letters, phone call recordings, emails, websites. A few of the case studies at the link you supplied involve changes to property or policy over time. https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/insight/insight-in-depth-underinsurance-misrepresentation-non-disclosure Case study 3: 15 years ago the consumer got cover for a watch valued at the time at £1,500; when she was asked at renewal times if she wanted to make any changes to her claim limit she said she didn't (and presumably paid for the policy on that basis). Years later she lost the watch; at the time of her claim it was valued at £5,000 and the insurer refused to offer her more than £1,500. The consumer complained she should have been offered more - the Ombudsman disagreed. Case study 5: there was no evidence to suggest the consumer knew that the previous owner of her car had added alloy wheels. The fact that the insurer's expert was able to spot the alloys was not a reasonable argument to "avoid" the policy on the grounds that the consumer claimed the car had not been modified in any way. The Ombudsman disagreed with the insurer's position that the consumer knew or didn't care that the information she provided was wrong. Case study 6: the consumer replaced his VW Polo with a VW Golf and contacted his insurer to make a mid-term adjustment. The insurer asked him if the VW Golf had been modified in any way from the manufacturer's original specification, for example with alloy or sports wheels. He said no, it hadn't been modified in any way at all. Subsequently he made a claim on the grounds his car was stolen; he told the insurer that the car had sports wheels fitted when he bought it that he thought added a minimum of £1,000 to its value. The insurer decided to "avoid" the policy because the consumer deliberately misrepresented the car had been modified. The Ombudsman agreed with the insurer that the policy could be "avoided". Buildings, contents, vehicle and jewelry policies tend to be provided on an annual basis and (among other things) what it could cost to replace them at application or renewal time. What it was worth 15 years ago is irrelevant (and might well be too little or too much). It is also unclear (to me) who is responsible for the valuation with buildings insurance. The consumer is responsible for taking "reasonable care" about it. If you consider car insurance. The valuation of a car is typically determined by the insurer using a "glass" guide. A consumer might reasonably expect something similar to apply for building insurance based on property values. Buildings insurance providers ask "how much it would cost if you had to rebuild your home?" They don't ask how much you could sell your home for. Some providers suggest you could hire a residential property surveyor or use their 'calculator' or 'comparison tool'. Expensive jewelry: if you bought it recently then have you got a receipt? If you haven't got a receipt then get it professionally valued. Car insurance: you answer the insurer's questions about your car, e.g. make, year of manufacture, transmission, modifications, the insurer puts your car into one of 50 insurance groups that are a factor insurers use to price your policy. Some providers go into much detail about this kind of thing.	Yes, a licensee of Sketchfab is only required to cooperate with this audit process because it was agreed to in a contract. Copyright law does not (in the US, or anywhere else that I know of) give a content creator such a right to demand proof that something is being used in accord with a license. If a content creator or copyright holder thinks that some content is being used without permission, or is an unauthorized derivative work, the holder has only a few possible courses of action. The holder can send a cease and desist letter. This has no legal force, but puts the alleged infringer on notice, makes further infringement clearly "knowing", and may well cause an infringer to stop infringing for fear of an expensive suit. The holder can send a takedown notice if the content is online in a venue that accepts such notices. But there is not a legal obligation to honor such a notice, and a counter-notice may lead to the content being put back up. Finally the holder may sue for copyright infringement. This has significant upfront costs, and requires significant time from the holder or the holder's business. The holder may therefore be unwilling to bring suit unless significant recovery seems likely. Once suit is brought, the holder will have discovery rights to demand answers to relevant questions from the alleged infringer, including the source of the content in question.	Could the victim report this as fraud, theft or some other related crime? They could, but it's unclear whether they would be successful. A criminal conviction would require intent on the part of the company or an employee, and that will probably be difficult to prove. In a big system like this, individuals can usually claim misunderstandings and errors of omission, which makes such a proof difficult. They could try to establish criminal corporate liability, but again this is difficult to prove. So while possible, it's probably not worth it. Would the answer to the previous question differ based on whether the victim was eventually able to recover the money through litigation or by disputing the charge with their bank? Probably not. For a criminal conviction, it's necessary to prove that the company or an employee deliberately took money they knew was not theirs. Whether they later gave it back is not relevant for determining guilt (though it may reduce the sentence). Would the company itself or the specific employees involved be liable? In principle, both could be held liable. Again, this depends on what can be proved in court. Would a binding arbitration clause in the contract have any effect on criminal liability No, arbitration clauses cannot protect from criminal liability, only from civil liability (within limits). Off-topic: The fastest way to resolve such situations is usually to write one stern letter explaining why you are owed the money. If that does not work, sue them - if the situation is clear-cut, you will most likely win, or the company will settle. Many jurisdictions have simplified court proceedings for clear cases like this, for example the Mahnverfahren in Germany.	Consumer Protection In addition to whatever the provisions of the contract may be, consumer protection laws will apply to this transaction, and will override any contrary provisions in the contract. There are federal protections, mostly administered by the FTC. The State of California also has consumer protection statutes, the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and False Advertising Law (FAL). Contracts may not override these laws except where a specific provision permits such contract terms. Federal Rules The official FTC page "What To Do If You’re Billed for Things You Never Got, or You Get Unordered Products" states: The federal Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule applies to most things you order by mail, online, or by phone. It says: Sellers have to ship your order within the time they (or their ads) say — that goes whether they say “2-Day Shipping” or “In Stock & Ships Today.” If they don’t give a time, they must ship within 30 days of when you placed your order. If there’s a delay shipping your order, the seller has to tell you and give you the choice of either agreeing to the delay or canceling your order for a full refund. If the seller doesn’t ship your order, it has to give you a full refund — not just a gift card or store credit. ... Disputing credit card billing errors within the 60-day dispute period By law, you have to dispute a credit card billing error in writing within 60 days of the date that the first statement that has the billing error was sent to you. Otherwise, you may get stuck with the bill. ... Disputing credit card billing errors after the 60-day dispute period ends What if you agreed to delivery on a date in the future that turns out to be more than 60 days after your statement showing the charge was sent to you — but the delivery didn’t arrive or you rejected it because it was not what you agreed to purchase? Can you still dispute the charge? You’re likely outside the protection of the Fair Credit Billing Act. Still, some credit card issuers may extend the 60-day dispute period when a shipment is delayed. Send a dispute letter to your credit card company. Include copies of any documents showing the expected and actual delivery dates, including any notice the seller sent you about the shipment delay. See also the official "Business Guide to the FTC's Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule" The actual Federal Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule is at 16 CFR Part 435; relevant parts of this rule provide: (435.1 (b)) "Prompt refund" shall mean: (1) Where a refund is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2)(ii), (d)(2)(iii), or (d)(3) of this section, a refund sent by any means at least as fast and reliable as first class mail within seven (7) working days of the date on which the buyer's right to refund vests under the provisions of this part. Provided, however, that where the seller cannot provide a refund by the same method payment was tendered, prompt refund shall mean a refund sent in the form of cash, check, or money order, by any means at least as fast and reliable as first class mail, within seven (7) working days of the date on which the seller discovers it cannot provide a refund by the same method as payment was tendered; (§ 435.2) ... it constitutes an unfair method of competition, and an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a seller: (a) (1) To solicit any order for the sale of merchandise to be ordered by the buyer through the mail, via the Internet, or by telephone unless, at the time of the solicitation, the seller has a reasonable basis to expect that it will be able to ship any ordered merchandise to the buyer: (a) (1) (i) Within that time clearly and conspicuously stated in any such solicitation; or (a) (1) (ii) If no time is clearly and conspicuously stated, within thirty (30) days after receipt of a properly completed order from the buyer. Provided, however, where, at the time the merchandise is ordered the buyer applies to the seller for credit to pay for the merchandise in whole or in part, the seller shall have fifty (50) days, rather than thirty (30) days, to perform the actions required in this paragraph (a)(1)(ii). (a) (2) To provide any buyer with any revised shipping date, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, unless, at the time any such revised shipping date is provided, the seller has a reasonable basis for making such representation regarding a definite revised shipping date. (a) (3) To inform any buyer that it is unable to make any representation regarding the length of any delay unless: (a) (3) (i) The seller has a reasonable basis for so informing the buyer; and (a) (3) (ii) The seller informs the buyer of the reason or reasons for the delay. (a) (4) In any action brought by the Federal Trade Commission, alleging a violation of this part, the failure of a respondent-seller to have records or other documentary proof establishing its use of systems and procedures which assure the shipment of merchandise in the ordinary course of business within any applicable time set forth in this part will create a rebuttable presumption that the seller lacked a reasonable basis for any expectation of shipment within said applicable time. (b) (1) Where a seller is unable to ship merchandise within the applicable time set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, to fail to offer to the buyer, clearly and conspicuously and without prior demand, an option either to consent to a delay in shipping or to cancel the buyer`s order and receive a prompt refund. Said offer shall be made within a reasonable time after the seller first becomes aware of its inability to ship within the applicable time set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, but in no event later than said applicable time. There are further provisions which deal with the situation where a delayed order is further delayed, and what consent the buyer may have already given to any delay. In short, where the seller is unable to meet its estimated time for shipment of the order, the seller must promptly inform the buyer, in no case later than the original estimated shipment date, and must offer an option to cancel the order. Unless the buyer explicitly consents to the delay (definite or indefinite) the seller must send a prompt refund, which means within 7 working days. No contract purporting to waive or modify these rights is valid or enforceable on these points, although if the initial order explicitly states that the date of shipment is indefinite, and the customer agrees to this, no shipment date can be enforced under this rule. California Laws California Civil Code section 1723 requires that a retail store selling goods allow returns or exchanges for at least 7 days, or else prominently post its actual policy. But that does not apply to goods ordered for later delivery. The California Business and Professions Code section 17500 makes it unlawful for: any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature whatsoever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, or to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning that real or personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact connected with the proposed performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading This would include advertising a shipment date which was not reasonably achievable, and which the seller knew or should have know was likely not to be met. The California Civil code section 17770 makes unlawful: (10) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity. This may not apply to the fact pattern described in the question, depending on what the seller knew and when.	Of course Unless you waived your right to go to court in the contract. For example, if the contract contains an arbitration clause, disputes must be arbitrated, you cannot use the courts. It is also possible that an English court may not have jurisdiction. For example, if the contract had a choice of forum clause requiring disputes to be resolved in the courts of the UAE, then an English court would possibly defer to that and refuse to hear the case. Whether you will succeed depends on the terms of the contract and whether the airline had a duty to provide you with accurate information. It is quite likely that the contract contains disclaimers as to the accuracy of information given. These may succeed in defeating your suit.
When courts set a new precedent, are the negatively impacted parties given any leniency? Suppose the courts set a precedent by interpreting ambiguous law in a way that negatively affects one of the parties of a case. When deciding on remedies, damages, or a criminal sentence, will courts sometime show any consideration for the losing party since they could not know how the law would be interpreted?	This answer is under United States law. Usually, when a court interprets the law in a way that was previously ambiguous, parties are not given any leniency for not knowing in advance how an issue will be resolved. Sometimes, when a court overrules prior precedent with a new precedent the court will grant some leniency, if there is an easy way to do so. For example, in the Colorado case of Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, the Colorado Supreme Court made the level of detail required in documents commencing civil lawsuits in the state was made much more strict, reversing long standing prior binding precedents in the state on the issue. The U.S. Supreme Court had done the same thing in federal cases, but the Colorado Court of Appeals at the time had repeatedly declined to apply the federal standard to state court cases. In Warne, the party whose legal documents were held to be insufficiently detailed was allowed, on remand to the trial court for further proceedings, to try to amend those documents to meet the new standard (for what it is worth, he didn't succeed on remand). This is usually not done, however, in "writing on the wall" situations where the new decision overruling prior law was obvious from an amendment to the statute that an older case interpreted, or from a previous new court precedent that overruled prior law in some circumstances and made it very likely that addition related binding case law would also be overruled, even if the previous landmark precedent didn't necessarily have that result. An exception applies in cases where a law enforcement officer is accused of violating someone's civil rights. In those cases, liability is only imposed on the officer if the fact that the conduct violated the plaintiff's legal rights was "clearly established" by statutes and case law at the time that the law enforcement officer took the action giving rise to the lawsuit, under a doctrine known as "qualified immunity". If the law was ambiguous at the time that the law enforcement officer took action, "qualified immunity" bars the lawsuit. Similar considerations apply in favor of the government in some habeas corpus litigation in federal court (where a state court conviction is collaterally attacked after direct appeals are exhausted).	Most advice that a lawyer gives is subjective; facts are objective but opinions are always subjective. What a lawyer does when they advise a client is typically called a "legal opinion". The reason it is subjective is that, as Dale M said, there are numerous variants that go into an opinion, and reasonably trained professionals (attorneys) can disagree as to the outcome of a specific factual predicate. Often times, case outcomes will differ based on the application of the facts to the law, so much so that the case outcome can differ based on the choice of words a witness uses, or even the way a judge interprets the law. This is why unlike truly objective discipline such as mathematics, where there is a right and wrong answer, no lawyer can ever say a case will definitely go one way or another. It will always be dependent on perception, which is the very definition of subjective. So, whoever indicated that lawyers don't give subjective advice was simply misinformed. They do. What they try not to do is make value-judgments, saying that things are good or bad; rather, they are trained to indicate whether something is illegal or not, or likely to get you sued or not. However, these are all legal opinions.	Does this create precedent? NO This was a Crown Court case, only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can set precedent which it did with similar circumstances in R v Hill 1989	Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.	Acrimony Mowzer makes some good points. Another one is the parties may just hate each other. In some strands of legal theory, it's considered a type of transaction cost that keeps people from bargaining before and after litigation.	The precedent is very clear and was accurately applied by the judge A treaty does not create domestic law and is only applicable to the extent that it is incorporated into domestic law. She extensively quotes the relevant precedents in the judgement at [42-49].	When the US Supreme Court "overturns" a precedent, it does not usually mean that every case which previously cited the older holding instantly vanishes or is upset. Indeed, often the older case is not truly overturned, but "distinguished", meaning the circumstances of the new case are different enough that the old rule does not apply. But, at least in theory, a case exactly similar to the old one would still follow the old rule. Sometimes such "distinguishing" cases pile up until nothing is left of the old rule. Even when one case overturns an earlier one more dramatically, it may not be instantly total. For example, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) directly overturned Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) and by implication Lochner v. New York (1905) But the tide had started to turn against Lochner some years earlier in Nebbia v. New York (1934), and Lochner continued to be cited favorably in some cases until United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938). In Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co (1949) Justice Black (appointed 1937) wrote that the Lochner line of cases had been "repudiated". A more dramatic case of an overturned precedent was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (the 2nd flag salute case) which directly ruled the exact opposite of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The membership of the court was largely the same, and the time lapse quite short. The Court essentially changed its collective mind, largely adopting the view of the dissent in the earlier case. Another example of an extreme reversal is Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), which denied that any black could be a US citizen. This was overturned by the outcome of the US Civil War, and the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. In general when an earlier case is overruled, the change is not retroactive. Old cases are not undone. But new cases will be less likely to cite the overturned case (except possibly as a bad example), and it will no longer be considered good law to mandate a decision in a lower court. This is particularly true if several new cases, over a period of time, follow the new rule or principle.	I am wondering if the government can still implement it and force people to pay even if the decision is challenged in court. Laws are not automatically put on hold because they are challenged. For an action or a law to be halted by the Court before a decision is made, the applicant would have to seek an interlocutory injunction, which are granted only if, as established in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, (i) is there a serious issue to be tried, (ii) will the party seeking the injunction suffer irreparable harm if it is not granted, and (iii) does the balance of convenience favour the party seeking the injunction. The first issue is rarely a problem, especially for a controversial issue like this. I am thinking the government might be able to tax people and then refund people if the court doesn't uphold the decision instead of a court challenge being able to postpone the tax indefinitely. A quantifiable financial harm is rarely irreparable (in private law cases). However there is an important exception for Charter cases where a financial harm is assumed to be irreparable because damages are often not awarded in constitutional cases. Though in this case it might be considered reparable because the quantification of damage and the method of redress are straightforward. For the third question, the Court needs to weigh both sides' interests in the case where the injunction is granted. Even if the damage is deemed irreparable, the Court may (or may not) still find the public interest in health outweighs the financial interests of the unvaccinated.
Can the U.S. government challenge, reverse or appeal any court decision made by the European Patent Office? Can the U.S. government challenge, reverse or appeal any court decision made by the European Patent Office? Is there any official channel through which the U.S. government can challenge, reverse or appeal a court decision made by the EPO on behalf of a U.S. company?	Can the U.S. government challenge, reverse or appeal any court decision made by the European Patent Office? Not unless it has an interest in the patent itself (e.g. to a military device transferred to it by a defense contractor pursuant to a procurement contract), which would be exceedingly uncommon. Otherwise, it would lack standing. If a patent application were filed by the U.S. government, of course, possibly with co-applicants, it would have the rights of any other party. Is there any official channel through which the U.S. government can challenge, reverse or appeal a court decision made by the EPO on behalf of a U.S. company? The U.S. government could request that the European officials take a different approach through diplomatic channels, which isn't really a "challenge" and certainly isn't a "reversal" or "appeal." It is more akin to what a lobbyist for a private corporation could do. In some contexts, the U.S. government could probably file an amicus brief or the equivalent.	Can the subject actually sue me in England, or is it possible to sue only in the EU country I posted the article from, or in the US where the article is actually hosted? Yes. If the online encyclopedia is available in the UK, then you have libelled them in the UK and, indeed, in every country where it is available. They can choose to sue in and under the laws of any country where they were libelled. If the subject can and does sue in England, what happens exactly? This is laid out in the Civil Procedure Rules Am I correct in presuming that I will be notified of this by mail and asked to enter a defence? You will definitely need to be served with the Particulars of Claim, however, this may come by other methods than snail mail. If so, what happens if I ignore the matter? Will a default judgment against me necessarily be entered, or will the court duly consider the plaintiff's case, perform the bare minimum investigation/reasoning necessary to determine which arguments of theirs are (un)sound, and so possibly rule in my favour? A default judgement will be entered providing the Particulars of Claim show a cause of action on its face. The court will not examine any evidence or enquire into the veracity of the statements made on the Particulars of Claim. In short, unless the plaintiff has ballsed something up - you lose. If I do choose to respond, can I hire an England-based lawyer to handle everything remotely, or can I be compelled to physically attend the court in England? You are generally not required to attend court in a civil matter unless you need to testify. Even then, arrangements can be made for remote testimony. If the court rules for the plaintiff and awards damages, can this judgment be enforced in the EU, or would it apply only in the UK? It can be enforced in the EU. As a courtesy or by treaty, domestic jurisdictions will enforce foreign judgements in most cases. If the court rules in my favour, would I recoup my legal fees? You will probably recoup some but not all of your legal fees, say 50-60%. Costs orders are complicated - talk to your lawyer.	The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.	The law you cite says that the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request That includes specific individual returns. That it was intended to include such returns is made clear by the provisions restricting identifiable individual data to executive session. Whether this ought to be the law might well be debated. Whether the House ought to use this law as a way to get at Trump's returns could also be debated. Those are matters of politics, or perhaps ethics, not law. Whether some other provision of law overrides this provision in this case is pretty clearly going to be argued in court, and we will see what the decision is. I won't try to predict it here.	Yes. Contracts do not excuse a site from obeying the law, and the law requires sites to obey court orders. "It violates my contract with a third party" is not a valid reason to disobey a court, and disobeying a court order is contempt. On the other hand, contract law (at least in the U.S. and U.K.) says that contracts that violate the law or public policy are invalid, and so you could not win a breach of contract suit if the defendant could not legally comply with the contract. Now, a contract might require the company to attempt all possible legal ways to get the court to revoke its order, or to avoid the order in the first place (for instance, if Google does no business in China, a U.S. court might not excuse them from a contract because they capitulated to the Chinese government). However, when push comes to shove, private contracts are lower priority than court orders.	In the US, it depends on why you are doing this, and how you go about performing the operation. There are approved devices and procedures, and there is the other stuff. In an emergency that is life-threatening or threatens severe debilitation, it is permitted for a physician to try an extreme measure – if the state has a "Right to Try" law. Otherwise, a review and official approval by the relevant IRB is required. The devices are regulated by the FDA, but the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so the feds don't have a say in whether a procedure is allowed. Nevertheless, use of unapproved devices can be taken to be evidence of failing to meet the required standard of care, in the case of a malpractice suit or punitive action by the state regulatory board. There is no specific law prohibiting removing lots of organs and replacing them with prostheses, though arguable what happened was that the brain was removed (it's not that a replacement shell was built around the person). Ordinarily, intentionally "killing" a person is illegal (except in case of sanctioned execution or self-defense). There is zero case law that would tell us whether removing a brain from a body "kills" the person. Most likely, there would be a prosecution for unlawfully causing a death, and either the legislature would tune up the law w.r.t. the definition of "causing death", or the courts would do so.	Taking the US as an example, the Constitution states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Congress or a state government hasn't prohibited you from comparing platforms. Another private entity has. And, that's fine. You're free to launch the app as a separate website, or print out the flyers and hand them to people on the bus, or publish your own monthly magazine comparing various platforms, so you still have freedom of speech and of the press. As an example, if you write a letter about how great the government of North Korea is to the letters department at Stamp Collectors Magazine, and they don't publish it, have they violated your human rights? The app store restriction may be quite dumb. After all, the built-in web browser allows the reading of the exact same news. But there's no law against being dumb.	The constitutional basis for all US patents is Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the US Constitution, which grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See "Intellectual Property Clause" from Cornell's WEX Legal Information Institute. US Patent law requires an applicant to include with a patent application "disclosures". As the page "Patent Disclosure: Everything You Need to Know" from UpCounsel states: [A] patent disclosure is a public claim of data about an invention. In general, it is any part of the patenting process in which data regarding an invention is disclosed. A good disclosure tells someone else how to create the product. [Emphasis added] The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the right to offer exclusive rights to people for their inventions for set periods of time. This is only if and when the inventor agrees to adequately disclose the invention in writing. [Emphasis added] A formal patent disclosure ... stipulates a set of claims regarding the invention, as well as other data that reveals the unique nature of the product. It should be expressed in writing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as part of the patent application. What Is Included in a Patent Disclosure? The Specification. A primary disclosure or "specification" is a main document in a patent application. It describes the ways in which the invention is innovative compared to similar inventions and explains the scope of monopoly the applicant believes he or she has to the invention. The specification describes the item and the way to make and to use it, in clear and exact terms. Someone in the field must be able to reasonably create it with these instructions. Further, the specification notes the patent application filing date on which inventor can the rely. It also offers evidence that the invention belongs to the person in question. The Enablement. This explains how to create the object and how someone in the field can do so. The instructions cannot be vague or unclear, but must be exact and detailed. When the patent expires, the enablement should still be usable. This section should include any figures or drawings, with explanations. Again, you will want to show how your invention is special. So, you might want to include many details and different variations of the invention. Later, many of these variations may be deleted from the document as unnecessary. This section may be numerous pages long. Best Mode Requirement. The path revealed must be the best way of creating the item within the author's awareness at the time of filing. Therefore, it may include specific or unique techniques. There should be no concealment. A poor-quality disclosure can risk the appearance of concealment. [Italics added] Claims. This area tells the reader the exclusive rights the patent offers to the inventor.... The official page "Duty of Disclosure, Candor, and Good Faith" from the USPTO cites 37 CFR 1.56 on the duty to disclose information material to patentability. This regulation provides, in the relevant part: A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim ... These disclosures include the state of prior art, as kown to the applicant and the applicant's associates. The page "BEST MODE: Noncompliance with the Duty of Disclosure is Not an Option" states: When you apply for a patent in the United States, you have a legal duty to disclose prior art that could be used to reject your application — in essence, information that may be used against you by the examiner of your application. While persons accused of a crime have a right to remain silent, so as to avoid self-incrimination, inventors applying for a patent have no such right. To the contrary, an inventor’s failure to comply with the duty of disclosure risks any resulting patent being unenforceable. The page "THE PATENT BARGAIN AND THE CURSE OF RETROACTIVITY" states: One of the requirements for the USPTO to issue a patent is that the applicant’s claimed invention be fully disclosed in the application and published in the patent. This is sometimes referred to as the “patent bargain.” This is at the opposite end of the spectrum from trade secrets law, under which a company can sue for © misappropriation of a trade secret but only if it takes reasonable measures to maintain confidentiality of the trade secret. ... Under patent law an inventor must fully disclose his or her invention before enforceable patent rights come into being. This disclosure requirement is sometimes termed the “patent bargain,” under which an inventor gains the right to exclude others from practicing a patented invention in exchange for disclosing the invention so that it may be known by the public and indeed practiced after the patent term has expired. ... [Emphasis added] In general a patent application is not just a description of a specific industrial process. It includes the research by which that process was discovered or developed. That research can benefit others in the same field, and so "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" in helping others to do further research and make further discoveries, which can often be done without infringing the patent itself. Of course, once patent protection expires, anyone may use the patent, and the final patent documents are supposed to include sufficient information that "one skilled in the art" will be able to build the invention or use the process that had been patented. This is in contrast to the situation which would exist had the inventor retained the discovery as a trade secret. In that case no one would have been able to use the patented discovery until some other person independently discovered and disclosed it.
PD Vs SO Vs ST. What is this all about? I have read alot about this and have gotten so many mixed answers, I have a headache. Does the Sheriffs Office command over City Police, and do the State Troopers command over Both of them? I know the Police Rules over the city, The SO rules over county, and the ST rules over all of the state, but can a Trooper tell a sheriff, or police what to do, or a sheriff take over a Crime Scene from police?	united-states First of all, I would not say that any police organization "rules over": any area, unless serious corruption is being implied. The usual term is "has jurisdiction" meaning that they may enforce the law, make arrests, and generally act as police. The rules are going to vary by state, and not all states even have all of these types of law enforcement organizations. But here are some ways in which they often work: A Sheriff is generally a county official, and may have jurisdiction anywhere in the county. If so, so will all the officers under the sheriff, who my all or mostly be Deputy Sheriffs. (This term is very old, going back to "shire reeve", the chief administrative officer or bailiff for a shire, or county, in England, prior to the year 1000, and on through to the modern era.) In many states the Sheriff has authority except in incorporated cities within the county. The Sheriff often supplies court officials or bailiffs, and also runs the county jail. This post tends to be more important in the western part of the US. City police generally have jurisdiction within the boundaries of a city. They may be a tiny or huge organization, depending on the size of the city. State level law enforcement may or may not be able to supersede them, county level often cannot. The state police, often known as "state troopers" have jurisdiction through the state. In some states they mostly do highway patrol and traffic enforcement on state highways. In some states they provide primary law enforcement for all areas not part of a municipality with its own police. They may provide backup and resources for small police departments not equipped to handle major crimes, particularly villages and towns that do not have the status of cities. Or that may be handled by the Sheriff's office. Many states have a Division of Investigation, sort of a state-level version of the FBI. This is sometimes administratively part of the State Police, sometimes not, but even when it is it is in practice a separate organization. It can and does investigate serious crimes anywhere in the sate, and often handles matters where the conduct of the local police is or might be in question. It may be called by different names in different states. This organization can and does take over cases from local police and sheriff's offices. They may also run central crime labs with facilities more advances than local police departments have, to whcih evidence may be sent for testing from local departments or sheriff's offices.	if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation.	It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.	There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around.	If the police are able to attain a warrant that for some reason identifies your room and your things in particular, then they can search your room and seize your things. Ideally the police would have to give the judge or magistrate reasonable suspicion that their target has put some evidence in your room, or that some of your things are evidence relating to the purported crime. In practice, warrants err on the side of generality, so the police can easily get a warrant to search "the whole residence" without contemplating the nuance of which tenants use which rooms. Likewise, when determining what to seize, the police can certainly choose to err on the broad side and seize anything that meets the criteria of the warrant without stopping to determine who owns what. "Respect" of any sort is not a legal factor in the execution of an approved warrant.	For Mr. Petersen, the questions in general should have been elementary. The fact he did not know them is actually quite deplorable. To your questions specifically: Should Mr. Petersen, as a Juris Doctor, know of those things in his sleep? This is the wrong question. The question is: should an individual who has accepted a nomination to serve as a federal judge on the U.S. District Court know of those things in his/her sleep? The answer is unequivocally yes. One could almost argue - one would likely be scoffed at, but one could - that an appointment to a higher court, the U.S. Circuit, could get away not knowing those things 'in his/her sleep,' because appeals courts would not deal with, e.g., abstention doctrines or whether to admit expert scientific testimony, as often as a trial court does. Simply put, lawyers should at least have heard of those things (he looked/sounded absolutely dumbfounded at the words that were being said to him), litigators should know them, and federal trial court judges absolutely need to know those things to do the job. Is his excuse valid when he says that he has no background in the field(s) (he mentioned litigation once) the terms are corresponding to? If he was just some lawyer talking to some guy at a bar, sure, totally valid. If someone is a corporate M&A or project finance attorney, sure, don't expect him to win any trial court vocabulary contests. However, when sitting before a panel of U.S. Senators carrying out their Constitutional duties of "advice and consent" on presidential appointments, not knowing those things can, should, and indeed did end in complete humiliation for the person ignorant enough to try and go through with that. I'm sure his hearing was scheduled some time in advance. The fact he obviously made zero attempt to know anything is actually insulting to everyone involved. For context, I wrote a motion in limine at my first internship. If I live to be 1,000 and never step foot in a court room, I'll still be able to say more about a motion in limine than "I would probably not be able to give you a good definition right here at the table."	No The police and the office of the public prosecutor have discretion in which cases they investigate or prosecute. The court may refer an instance of criminality to them but they are under no obligation to do anything with that referral.	"I don't know" is a better answer than most, but you should only say that if it's the truth. The three most important rules to follow when being questioned by a police officer are as follows: Do not lie. Do not incriminate yourself. Be cooperative (to the extent that you're not lying or incriminating yourself). "Do you know why I pulled you over?" or "Why do you think I stopped you?" are perfect opening questions for law enforcement to ask because there is no good answer. Any answer you give puts you at a disadvantage for the rest of the stop because you've tacitly accepted the officer's assumption that you did something wrong. The best response would be to simply reply back with their own question. "Why did you pull me over, officer?" If you say it right, it's rational, polite, and cooperative without actually answering anything. Your position from the very beginning should be that you did nothing wrong (even if you know that you did). It's the officer's job to make the case. It's not your job to help them.
Does a secured loan create obligations beyond the collateral assets? Suppose that a lender lends a debtor $10000 with the collateral of 1 Bitcoin. Now, if the debtor defaults the lender can sell the collateral and recover the original debt. However, suppose the collateral declines below the original value of the loan. Suppose the debtor defaults and now the collateral is only worth $9000, so after selling the debtor still owes $1000. Does the rest of the debt become unsecured debt? Can the lender recover from the general estate of the debtor? I am generally interested in how this applies in the United States, but if you wish to answer for another jurisdiction, please indicate which jurisdiction your answer assumes.	Short Answer Does a secured loan create obligations beyond the collateral assets? The vast majority of the time it does. Long Answer The default rule is that security interests in assets other than real property is a recourse debt under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (a model statute that individual states can enact voluntarily) and the applicable common law (which is uniform almost everyplace except Louisiana and Puerto Rico). This means that deficiency judgments are allowed if the seized collateral is insufficient to pay the loan in full. It also means that the lender can sue on the debt without foreclosing the collateral at all if the lender wishes to do so. A note and security agreement can be made expressly "non-recourse" which limits recovery to seizure of the collateral and precludes a suit on the debt itself. A secured loan can also become non-recourse if the unsecured debt is discharged in bankruptcy, or if the deadline for filing a claim expires in a probate case. Neither bankruptcy nor the probate claims process extinguish the rights of a secured creditor in the collateral, even if the right to bring a suit on the debt itself is terminated. Special tax rules (that, in substance, disallow tax losses with no economic effect) apply to non-recourse debts (especially the special case of limited liability companies which are taxed as general partnerships but subject to special non-recourse debt rules). When filing a claim in bankruptcy, if the collateral is worth less than the debt, two claims must be filed. One secured claim in an amount equal to the value of the collateral and a second unsecured claim in the amount by which the debt exceeds the value of the collateral. In the case of secured debts in real property, most states mirror the personal property rule (which is very close to Uniform since every state, territory and district in the U.S. had adopted Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governing security interests in property other than real estate). But in a few states (including California), security interests in owner occupied residential real estate (a.k.a. mortgages, liens, encumbrances, or deeds of trust) are truly, or in practice are, effectively non-recourse. Be aware also that there are a handful of isolated, mostly state specific but some federal exceptions. The most pertinent federal exception is for swap agreements and certain other kinds of derivatives (exceptions which are found primarily in the bankruptcy code) involving setoffs. There is a section of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 involving "strict settlements" that rarely applies except in pawn arrangements. There are also a number of statutory liens (mostly perfected by possession of the collateral rather than by a UCC-1 financing statement) that create a security interest in collateral by operation of law without a signed security agreement that are sometimes non-recourse (e.g. auto mechanic's liens in selected states).	A business owned by a debtor is not itself liable for the debts of its owners. But, a membership interest in an LLC is one of your assets and is normally not exempt from creditors, so legal process may be used to collect a money judgment obtained by a creditor in a suit against the membership interest owner from this asset. There are several ways of doing this that a creditor can utilize, each of which is discussed below. Charging Orders And Writs of Garnishment The presumptive way for a judgment creditor to collect a judgment from a debtor's LLC membership interest asset to do this is to either garnish any monies the LLC owes to you with a writ of garnishment (so that the LLC would pay the amounts due to the debtor to the creditor instead), or to impose a "charging order" on the LLC interest, which is like a writ of garnishment that remains in force until the full amount of the debt authorizing the charging order is satisfied. The downside of a writ of garnishment or charging order is that the people who control the LLC can often defer distributions to the members indefinitely, which deprives you of the funds that would otherwise have been distributed to you, but doesn't let the creditor have those funds either. Some LLCs require that certain distributions be made to owners and require that the LLC be liquidated under certain circumstances (e.g. the completion of a real estate development project). But, those LLCs are the exception rather than the rule. Normally, an LLC only makes distributions to its members when the people who control that LLC decide to do so by a majority vote of the managers or of the managing-members as the case may be. Writs of Execution Directed To Membership Interests There is a split in authority between states (with many states not having resolved the issue) over whether you can enforce a money judgment against the owner of a membership interest not just by collecting money due to the owner as a result of the membership interest and instead use a writ of execution to seize the membership interest and sell it in a sheriff's sale to whomever bids at the sale (much like someone might seize a parcel of real estate or a car to pay a debtor's debts to a judgment creditor). In most states, even if this is allowed, the buyer at the auction gets the right to distributions from the membership interest seized, but not a vote on how the business of the company is conducted, unless the other members agree to grant the new owner voting rights or the operating agreement of the LLC provides otherwise. All of the remedies so far presume that the asset to be collected out of consists of the ownership interest in the LLC (analogous to shares of stock) rather than the assets of the LLC itself. Reverse Piercing Seizing assets of the LLC itself, rather than merely the ownership interest in the LLC, is called "reverse piercing". Usually, reverse piercing is not allowed. But, there are some circumstances where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed. Almost all jurisdictions allow reverse piercing in some circumstances, but those circumstances vary considerably from state to state based upon both the language of the relevant LLC statute and the relevant case law. There are four main circumstances that justify reverse piercing. Single Member LLCs One is the case of a single member LLC where the creditor obtains ownership of 100% of the LLC. In these circumstances, courts have allowed creditors to dissolve the LLC and reach its assets, because neither the debtor nor any third party other than the creditor has any legitimate ownership interest in the property. Alter Ego Cases Another is the case where the assets of the LLC and the personal assets of the debtor are co-mingled or there is not clear documentation existing prior to the litigation establishing which underlying assets belong to the LLC and which belong to its owner. In these cases, reverse piercing is allowed because the existence of a company identity has been disregarded and there is no de facto distinction between company assets and personal assets. This justification for reverse piercing is sometimes called an "alter ego" theory. Fraudulent Transfers A third case where reverse piercing is allowed is where the contribution of the asset to the capital of the LLC was a "fraudulent transfer" from the individual debtor to the LLC (e.g. if the $1 million parcel of real estate was sold to the LLC for $100 at a time when the debtor was insolvent or rendered insolvent as a result of the transfer). Contributing an asset to the capital of an LLC in exchange for a membership interest with a capital account in the LLC's books set based upon the fair market value of the asset contributed to the LLC is usually not considered a fraudulent transfer, but could be in particular facts and circumstances where it has the intended effect of hindering creditors or concealing an asset. Equitable Reverse Piercing Based Upon Control Of The Entity A fourth case where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed is where the debtor does not own 100% of the LLC but has the ability to dissolve the LLC or force its assets to be distributed in kind to him, without the assent of the other LLC owners, because the debtor controls the LLC. Whether this is allowed or not is another issue upon which there is a split of authority and in many cases simply an absence of authority which would make such a case one of first impression in a state.	I have heard that this interest rate is illegally high for a loan. Is this correct? Yes. This is an annualized interest rate of 715,586,124,880,210%, which is far, far in excess of the maximum interest rate allowed by law. The maximum legally allowed interest rate in British Columbia is 60% per annum. So, an interest rate of 65 cents or more in a five day period on a loan of $100.00 is illegal. I don't know his current address. Lending money without collateral to people without knowing their current address is just plain stupid when it comes to lending practices. Nobody does that without a primarily donative intent. Would have holding collateral been a legal solution? Potentially. This is essentially the business model of a pawn shop. In the case of a pawn shop, the borrower delivers tangible personal property to the pawn shop owner who takes custody of it, which serves as collateral for a small loan with a set, legal interest rate, for a fixed period of time much greater than five days (typically several weeks or to several months). If the loan is not repaid, the collateral becomes the property of the lender in full payment of the loan, and the parties haggle in advance over the fair market value of the collateral against which the customer may borrow the full amount. A pawn is essentially equivalent to an outright sale of tangible personal property (almost always used) in exchange for cash, with a right to rescind the deal for a modest interest charge within X number of days after the sale. Since the pawn shop owner has some asset of the borrower to collect from in the event of non-payment, and the loan is "non-recourse" (i.e. collection rights are limited to taking ownership of the collateral), it isn't important to even know the address of the borrower, and no lawsuits are necessary for the lending pawn shop owner to be made whole if the loan is not repaid. The down side of running a pawn shop is that the owner needs to have considerable skill to value the collateral at a price sufficient to repay the loan together with a fair share of the administrative expenses of the operation on a case by case basis, for the very modest profit margin associated with a typical pawn shop. Most people who are skilled enough to value tangible personal property accurately enough to make money running a pawn ship are also skilled enough to do other things that pay better. Late Charge: Any payment not remunerated within 10 days of its due date shall be subject to a belatedly charge of 5 percent (%) of the payment, not to exceed $500 for any such late installment. Late charges are considered in the maximum interest rate calculation, so you need a much longer term loan and a much lower interest rate for this to be legally permissible. Collection fees: If this note is placed with a legal representative for collection, then Borrower agrees to pay an attorney's fee of ten percent (10%) of the voluntary balance. This fee will be added to the unpaid balance of the loan. Not sure what is meant by the "voluntary balance." It isn't inherently improper to include the costs of collection in a loan agreement, and indeed, I think that this may be the default rule of law in British Columbia without any contractual term under loser pays rules of civil procedure. But, a court can decline to award more than the "reasonable" legal fees incurred to collect a debt, and it is not at all clear that even the minimal amount of legal fees one could incur to collect a debt would be reasonable to collect a loan of $100 and interest. Likewise, while there are "hard money loans" (i.e. loans secured only by collateral and no personal obligation to pay that can be enforced against an individual's assets in court), where it is customary for the legal costs of drafting the loan documents to be paid by the borrower rather than the lender, for the most part, this simply makes no sense, because even 12 minutes of legal time (0.2 hours in the typical legal billing format) is an excessive amount to charge for a $100 loan for a five day period of time. This would typically be $50-$60 or more. It would probably be treated as an interest charge and hence would be illegal in British Columbia. Would a term like "if the lender needs to resort to legal action to enforce a term of this agreement, the borrow will reimburse him for all related expenses and his time" be enforceable? Reimbursement for out of pocket court filing fees and any photocopying costs and process server costs is likely to be enforceable. Reimbursement for the lenders own time to enforce the loan in the event of a default is probably not enforceable in the case of a $100 loan, even at minimum wage. Making small loans has historically been a marginal economic sector for precisely this reason. Even if the default rate is low, the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing (in the event of defaults) a small loan and the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing these promise for a much larger loan are similar. But the dollar amount of interest generated by a small loan is much smaller relative to the administrative costs involved than the interest on a large loan. Credit card companies and similar lenders make small loans affordable by automating the lending process, screening borrowers based upon credit ratings, making many loans each month to the same borrower, and making loans to many, many borrowers to spread the risk out. But making small loans on a one-off basis is not a profitable venture. Business models that charge enough to be profitable with small loans, like payday lenders and car title lenders in the United States, usually have some sort of collateral or de facto collateral (like a post-dated check), and tend to be shut down by regulators because their interest rates typically need to be on the order of 150%-400% per annum to make a profit, due to high administrative costs involved in making small loans relative to the amount of the loan. But interest rates this high are considered exploitive and are illegal. Another business model, which essentially describes the business model in the question except for the enforcement method, is called "loan sharking". The main difference between legitimate or almost legitimate small loan lending and loan sharking, is that loan sharks enforce their loans by having organized crime enforcers beat up people who don't pay, rather than using lawsuits to deal with loan defaults. This is, of course, completely illegal and a serious crime.	They recently took me to court (I am now 20) to have me start paying for the bill, under distress I signed paperwork stating that I'd start paying them, however I find this entire situation very aggravating. Short Answer You are almost surely screwed at this point and can't do anything but abide by the settlement that you agreed to when you signed the paperwork. Preface Regarding The Applicable Jurisdiction I am answering based upon the majority rules of law in U.S. states, because there is almost no other country in the world where you could end up in this financial situation due to universal healthcare systems that exist in most countries other than the United States. Also, this isn't an area of law with a great deal of state to state variation, although the law isn't exactly the same in every single U.S. state. The Minority Defense You quite possibly had a minority defense before you signed the paperwork. The minority defense is based upon an inability to give adequate consent to a contract. Whether the minority defense would have worked in this case, however, is a close call, because there are exceptions to the rule that would probably apply in this case. Settlement, Ratification and Duress The legal standard for "duress" in contract law usually means situations where there is literally a gun to your head or they're going to kill your dog or something like that, not the kind of economic pressure or persistent harassing collection efforts that I suspect you are referring to in this case. Of course, if they did steal your dog and threaten to kill it if you didn't sign the paperwork, then you really would have signed it under duress and you should probably both take legal action to repudiate that paperwork (because agreements entered into under duress are generally voidable, rather than void), and you should probably report the incident to the police as a crime. So, anyway, the paperwork you signed is probably enforceable, despite the pressure that they put on you to sign it. Once you sign a settlement agreement as an adult (which is almost surely what you did) you have ratified the agreement made when you were a minor and forfeit any way to fight it. You are stuck with what you agreed to at this point and there is nothing you can do about it short of going bankrupt. I would not recommend going bankrupt over a debts owed to a single medical provider unless that debt is so huge that ruining your credit for seven years and paying a bankruptcy lawyer is worth it to get out of this debt. For most twenty-year-olds facing debts for a few chiropractor treatments this would not make sense. Lesson learned: Talk to a lawyer before you sign paperwork, not afterwards, because once you've signed on the dotted line, there is usually little or nothing that a lawyer can do to help you at that point. Guarantors As a guarantor of the obligation to pay for your care, your mother would no doubt be on the hook in any case, whether or not you settled, and whether or not you went bankrupt. Unless the settlement agreement that you signed says otherwise, they can still attempt to collect the bill from her as well as from you. Of course, as you make payments towards the total balance due, the total balance due goes down. Your mother, as a guarantor, is only obligated to pay the portion of the bills that remain unpaid when they try to collect the debt from her. The Necessaries Exception To The Minority Defense Even though the minority defense might apply in this situation, most states recognize an exception to the minority defense when a purchase of "necessaries" is made by a minor. Bills for medical care would usually count as "necessaries", because you would have had no choice but to buy if you had been an adult anyway, so your lack of consent to pay isn't something that caused you material harm. Honestly, in the medical industry, an agreement in advance to pay a negotiated price is the exception rather than the norm. Often the providers themselves have no real clear idea what their patients are billed for their services, although chiropractors tend to be more informed about the financial arrangements than medical doctors in most cases. Void Contracts v. Voidable Contracts In any case, minority is a defense to a contractual obligation that would ordinarily only make the contract voidable, rather than void. In other words, a minor can repudiate a contract that is voidable on account of minority and successfully get out of it within a reasonable time of becoming an adult (or sooner while you are still a minor through a parent or guardian or next friend), but it is not automatically invalid. There is a good chance that a court would consider a two year delay in trying to repudiate the contractual obligation too long, even if it concluded that the necessaries doctrine did not apply because, for example, the court considered this to be elective, luxury care rather than medically necessary services. Unjust Enrichment Claims Also, in addition to suing for breach of contract, the chiropractor might be able to sue for quantum meruit. This legal theory is not based upon mutual consent the way a contract claim is, although this is sometimes called a "quasi-contract" or "implied contract" claim (it is also sometimes called a "restitution" or "unjust enrichment" claim). As a result, minority is not usually a defense to a quantum meruit claim. Instead, a quantum meruit claim is based upon preventing you from being unjustly enriched, (1) from benefits that you received, (2) that were not unwelcome, (3) from the efforts of someone else who did that work, (4) with a reasonable expectation of being compensated for the work, (5) in situations where there is no binding contract between the parties. (Different lawyers and different courts might break up these elements into more or fewer components, but the gist of the claim would be the same in pretty much any state.) In a quantum meruit case, damages are based upon the fair market value of the services rendered, rather than an agreement of the parties, since there was no mutually agreed price under a contract that they are seeking to enforce. Quantum meruit claims are frequently brought as a backup claim to a claim for breach of contract by failing to pay for services, in cases where the contract claim may be infirm for reasons such as minority.	First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea.	I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious.	Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud.	If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime.
Should Bob sue a company on his home field? Bob uncovers and obtains overwhelming evidence of several, major consumer exploitation ploys consisting of several distinct schemes, practices and policies of a major auto manufacturer of his new motor vehicle therethrough he personally was harmed, damaged or injured by the manufacturer. Assume Bob has several counties of the same state where he a court would assume jurisdiction. The manufacturer is of the size of any auto manufacturer. There is some specific benefits to Bob filing suit in the county of the seller (i.e. it is also Bob's home county, it has the highest probability for exemplary damages be awarded etc.) Considering the financial and political power of a major auto manufacturer and a primary employer as it typically the case in any county of any of these giants, how reasonable is it to file suit in state court and specifically do so in their home county? Most attorneys advise that judges are really cold to such fraud cases while you would assume they are waiting for them "with open arms to hug and kiss you". Would it be wiser to file in federal court or in another county? Are there any statistics about companies being sued and relieved in there home county vs. elsewhere?	Bob has to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction To enliven jurisdiction, there has to be some connection between the parties or the event and the jurisdiction. Since Bob, the manufacturer and (presumably) the harmful incident all took place in County X, of State Y or Country A then they are the only jurisdictions that might be competent. The courts of County Z, State M or Country B are all going to say "not my problem". For the USA, there are only State courts and Federal courts. States may have courts that are called county courts but they are enlivened by the state sovereign - counties and cites are self-governing administrative districts, not sovereign states. Federal courts have jurisdiction where the subject matter is about a Federal Statute, the Constitution or a treaty. This dispute would appear to be based on tort or contract law which is a state matter. Federal courts can have jurisdiction if the parties are in different states and the amount in dispute is more than $75,000. This would not appear to be the case. So, as a state matter, the plaintiff can bring the case to any competent court. The defendant can apply to have it moved to a more convenient court. Arguments will be heard and, at some cost, you'll probably end up where you should have started.	Rob is responsible. No Bull! Around the world, the law of wandering cattle depends on the details. New Zealand is no different. This case is covered by s 26 of the Impounding Act of 1955, Damages for Trespass. As you said, S 26(1)(d) says Bob is entitled to damages whenever his "land (whether fenced or unfenced) is situated in a city." This is different to the rest of the country, where animals must be fenced out. S 26(2) of the Impounding Act says the damage is owed by Rob, as the owner of the stock: (2) In any case where damages are payable under this section the amount of any damage shall be recoverable by action from the owner of the stock. It may be that Rob and Alice have some arrangement that Alice will indemnify Rob against any trespass damages. But that agreement does not change the underlying law; it only allows him to recoup his loses (by suing his mother, if necessary!). Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, "Order without law," sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.)	In Washington, there is no criminal sanction for installing an "aftermarket" product on your vehicle. If we are speaking of non-commercial vehicles, the penalties for violating the various safety regulations is a ticket. The federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards can be consulted here. The criminal penalty provisions are here, as authorized by 49 USC 30170 – basically, lying in a report to the government will get you in trouble. You would have to track down all of the provisions in the regulations, but here is the bumper prohibition. The rule prohibits manufacture or importation of a car or a part that doesn't meet the standard. Subsection (b) addresses the "then added later" question, generally saying that there is little prohibition against you tweaking your car. First, if you "had no reason to know, by exercising reasonable care, that the vehicle or equipment does not comply with the standard", you are not subject to penalty. Usually, people have absolutely no reason to know that some part is unsafe, which is not the same as non-compliant, but you might pick up a really cheap bumper having been told that it is cheap because it totally ignores the applicable standards: then you would have reason to know. Used cars and parts are not subject to any federal scrutiny. The concept of a "vehicle in violation" is a legal misconception. Certain acts violate, objects do not violate. The chokepoint that controls car parts is the "manufacture or sell" part of the law, which prevents Auto Zone from selling you a bumper made of clay (it does not prevent you from installing such a bumper – unless your state has a specific law to that effect). The shop is in violation, not the customer.	For starters, you can't "use the antitheft law" because you are not a criminal prosecutor. I'm not sure that the criminal statute would support a civil action for replevin, at least until you've paid all the fees that the towing company is explicitly authorized to charge and they still refuse to release the vehicle. And if that was the case, you wouldn't need the criminal statute — the title to your vehicle should be sufficient. See Baltimore County Code (2003) §18-2-203 for the police department's authority to remove and store cars with expired registration "by contract." See also §§ 21-16-111.1 et seq. and §§21-16-123 et seq. regarding police initiated towing and licensing of towing companies. The latter set of statutes and the fee schedule fixed by the county are available here.	An individual has no authority or legal basis to demand a personal "fine" for a perceived offense. The actions in the two scenarios would both be blackmail. although whether they would be prosecuted is quite another question. It would be reasonable for the shopkeeper to demand compensation for the lost merchandise. The offender (or the offender's parents) might offer to pay, either because they thought it the right thing, or in hopes to induce the shopkeeper not to call in the police. But if they specifically made "no police" a condition of payment, that would be bribery or attempted bribery. The resident in scenario 2 could demand compensation for an alleged civil wrong of excessive noise, whether or not the passer-by was speeding. ote that the amount of noise made would not be directly related to the speed of any driver (although no doubt there would be some relation) and no one driver would be responsible for keeping the resident up. I doubt that a civil suit, if pressed that far, would prevail, although it would depend on the factual details. The specific law of the local jurisdiction would also matter. But the moment there is a threat to bring evidence of a possible crime to the police, and a request for money instead, that is blackmail.	"Lemon laws" are about new cars and manufacturing defects. Used vehicles are sold "as is", except that dealers are obligated to offer a 30 or 60 day warranty that the vehicle will continue to function. Using the term "owner" suggests that this is not a dealership sale. Generally speaking, you are out of luck, except for the verbal add-on to the sales agreement. If there is no written agreement, just a verbal contract and exchange of money for truck, you may be able to enforce the contract in regular court. The prospects decrease if there is a written agreement that does not include the money-back guarantee, and become effectively zero if there is a clause that says "This is the whole agreement, the car is sold as-is". Assuming there is no written agreement, then you and perhaps the third party would testify as to the money-back guarantee, the seller would testify that there was no such guarantee (or that you misunderstood what he said), and the court would decide which version of the story is more believable.	Very briefly in terms of contract law, by hiring this person to haul away your trash, you're entering into a contract with him/her for the disposal of the trash. The fact that he says he has a legal place to dispose of the trash is part of your contract. That fact - either verbal (or in writing) in that contract - should really absolve you of any responsibility of what happens to the trash. You don't need to actually know all the details of his legal dumping place, but you can hold him/her to the agreement if it happens that they do illegally dispose of the property they have been hired to remove. In reality, this person is advertising this service as a business (on Facebook) and has been operating for some time, so they are probably legally disposing of refuse in a landfill while making some money from whatever might be valuable. The trash hauler probably depends on some of your trash being valuable, in terms of recycling or repairing or selling collectables ("old toys"), and not all of that will be disposed of in a landfill. I suppose it's possible a municipality could accuse you of illegally disposing of the trash if it was somehow tracked back to you, i.e. personally identifiable items or papers in the trash that was found illegally dumped. But you have the contract with the trash hauler to show you acted in good faith. Ask in the Facebook group if indeed this person disposes of trash in a legal manner, or ask others who have hired him/her. Clearly outline your stipulations for legal disposal with them. You can even ask to see their business license from the city/county.	If he is a professional engineer, then he is almost certainly (supposed to be) licensed and insured. You could probably recover damages simply by reporting them to his insurer. Also, some states have insurance pools that provide for claims against professionals that they license.
Eminent domain use Is the government taking legally? Basically every road in the us or anything is built with eminent domain. If we're doing this a million times a year on 100k plots that's $100b. I see nowhere in the government budget where it is spending such an absurd amount to satisfy the takings clause. Is the government following the fifth amendment or is it just illegally taking everything?	The various governments invovled do use eminent domain. An authoritative website about roads, the American Road and Transportation Builders Association says - Between 2000 and 2016, the U.S. built an average of 30,427 lane miles of roadway per year, adding 63.4 square miles per year to the amount of land covered by roads. If all of it needed to be purchased and it was all in Los Angeles (2.7 million per acre) it does, coincidentally come out to 111 billion. Since it will not all be purchased by one entity - every state and the feds make roads and most of the land will be 1/10 of the cost of LA real estate, you will not find anything like that number in a Federal budget.	Who Owns The Bunker? Your relative obviously owns the cellar up to their land property boundary. The people who own the other land would have originally been the owners of that portion of the bunker, assuming that it was not permissive (if it was permissive, an easement by estoppel probably would have arisen). So, then the question is, whether the people in the chain of title to the relative acquired ownership of that portion of the bunker by adverse possession. Normally, adverse possession is acquired when someone occupies land under a claim of right that is open, notorious and hostile. While the use of the bunker would be "hostile" in this case (because the other property owners didn't have access to the bunker), it is not at all clear that it was "open and notorious". Indeed, apparently, the other land owners weren't aware that it existed. So, there would probably not be "squatter's rights" in this situation. Also, adverse possession can't run against the sovereign, so to the extent that the bunker goes under public land (e.g. a public street), that also can't be adversely possessed and that portion of the bunker remains the property of the sovereign land owner. @PaulJohnson in a comment to another post notes that: It sounds like your relative has one of the secret bunkers built for the "Auxiliary Units" who were to wage guerilla war from behind the lines after a successful German invasion. bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-37947840/… If this were the case, and the government authorized its construction, there would probably be an implied easement that would allow the bunker to be the property of the person owning the entry to it, rather than the other property owners. But, as you note, proving that case would be difficult. It might be possible to scour declassified civil defense records from the WWII era to determine if this was the case, but you might need to employ an archivists or historian to get to the bottom of this question. What if they sell it? Suppose that they do sell it. What happens? Since title is certificated in Britain, there would be no title insurance company to compensate the buyer if someone later claimed to own the property. Your relative would have a warranty of title inherent in the deed to the portion of the property that is legally described in the deed (unless the property were sold by a quitclaim deed specifically disavowing any promise that what was sold was owned by the seller), but that warranty would probably not include the portions of the bunker outside the boundaries of their lot because that is not included in the legal description of the property on the property certificate or the deed. So, if it was sold, the buyer might not have any claim against the seller if the buyer did not get good title to the entire bunker, and would have no one to sue at all, if your relatives died before litigation over ownership of the bunker arose. The buyer might sue your relatives for common law fraud if the bunker were described in the marketing materials for the sale, but if they were told that some of the bunker went outside the lot and that its legal status was unknown, or if the property was sold by a quitclaim deed, that suit would probably not be successful. Other Options Depending upon whether the owner is on good terms with his neighbors, the owner could probably buy the subsurface rights or some sort of easement to that property from the neighbors under whose land it runs, and might even be able to purchase such rights from the local council where it runs under a street. Negotiating the price would be tricky. On one hand, it doesn't hurt the other owners at all. On the other hand, they have the power to deprive your relatives of all use of the property. Often deals like this are done for nominal consideration between people on good terms with each other, but for extortionate prices when people are not on good terms with each other.	user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says.	Yes. You go into the court of relevant jurisdiction, and file a lawsuit to "quiet the question". Usually there is a counterparty who has something to say on the subject; sometimes not. If there is an apparent counterparty, they must be served notice of all aspects of the case. Let's say I manage a pipeline property management company; we are wholly owned by a pipeline company and we buy the land and lease it to said pipeline company. I need a parcel of land to complete a pipeline connection, and as part of my offer I gently remind the landowner, Beth, that we do have the legal right to take the property by eminent domain, with the hopes this will inspire them to a sensible price. Beth says "Bunk! Your LLC doesn't run any pipelines! You don't have eminent domain rights! 500% market price, or go away." Well. So, for the sake of moving the negotiation along, I go to court and ask the judge to quiet the question of whether we have eminent domain rights. Mind you, I don't go any further than that; I don't want to actually take it by eminent domain if I can talk Beth out of a consensual sale. The judge will, of course, suspect this applies to an imminent case, and will ask... so I might as well disclose the Beth situation. As such, I will have to serve Beth and keep Beth fully in the loop, so that Beth has full right to make the other side of the argument. Since it could affect others as well, the judge will probably also require publication in whichever newspaper handles legal notices. (Many newspapers are propped up financially by being official legal-notice organs for their county. They have six pages of editorial content, and 18 pages of legal notices and other ads.) Most likely, the judge will cowardly refuse to rule on whether a pipeline's land holding company has eminent domain, and simply rule that the pipeline company itself does, and could simply buy the land itself then transfer it to my company as a trivial, taxless transaction. So the judge would grant eminent domain conditional on that transaction being done. Beth then offers 133% of market which we haggle to 120% of market + legal fees. Good enough! Or, Beth refuses, in which case we file an eminent domain action in the same court and before the same judge; being already aware of the facts of the situation, there is nothing left to litigate, and the gavel drops quickly and predictably. This is how "quieting a question" works. It is somewhat less confrontational with the counterparty, since you are going to court, sort-of together, to resolve a hypothetical question; once we know whether we are on solid legal footing, we then are able to continue negotiating. Courts love this, because they really want people to negotiate and make consensual settlements. And if a party insists on filing a suit to on the quieted matter, they can pay their filing fees and lawyer fees to get a lecture: "we already resolved this." (Or alternately, to present new facts which mean the past ruling is no longer on-point; e.g., Beth discovers we don't want the land for a pipeline at all, but for an access road.) You can also do this with the IRS. This is called a Private Letter Ruling, and it will set you back a $750 filing fee (and legal costs, of course). You'll still get audited, but then you wave the Ruling in front of them and done. Doing this preemptively in a criminal matter would be adventuresome. Your biggest problem would be the press: it would be impossible to do this discreetly, as the case would be fascinating; and it would put every cop and prosecutor on notice that you have a mind to do the potentially illegal thing.	The overwhelming majority flats in England are leasehold, not freehold; older buildings typically have 80 or 100-year leases, newer buildings usually have 999-year leases. Therefore you are dealing with the freeholder as a landlord for the matters that a HOA would deal with in the US. Depending on your landlord you may want to reconsider your statement that HOAs "are pure hell". It is possible for the leaseholders to collectively buy the freehold although it is time-consuming and expensive and happens very rarely. If they do they set up a body similar to a HOA.	It occurred to me after that the fence would have been at the edge of the Canadian landowners property and the land between the fence and the border was a road allowance on crown land. This is one possibility, others are: The border post is in the wrong place The fence is in the wrong place Both are in the wrong place The US rancher owns land in Canada as well as the US Obviously the Montana Rancher is using Canadian land, but where is his fence supposed to be? Well, its not so obvious but anyway: Who says he has to have one? I am not aware of a law that requires a person to fence their property. Should it be right on the border? Assuming that is the edge of his land (which it might not be, see above) and assuming he wants to put a fence up (which he might not want to do) and assuming that he wants to put it on the edge of his property (because he could put it inside if he wants to) then yes. Or is there a strip of land there which is national land reserved for border patrol purposes? You don't know, I don't know - if you are really keen land ownership is public information; check with the governments of Alberta and Montana.	You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.	The fire department is entirely within its rights, which are the same as any other property owner. The fact that property is owned by a governmental body does not mean that members of the public can't be excluded that property. Some governmental property is public, but lots of it is private, and this would usually include most parts of fire department property. As long as you have not been denied any access to a public road by this fence, there is nothing improper about it. Anyone can walk through their parking lot, park their car there, meet friends, whatever, This is almost surely inaccurate. The fire department does not have to allow members of the public to have any access to their property and probably would demand that most of the uses you describe stop if they interfered in any way with the performance of its duties.
Can UK doctors legally prescribe drugs online? The online pharmacy Kiwi Drug claims to dispense drugs legally from their online NHS-affiliated doctors, who prescribe drugs online. Kiwi Drug provides an online doctor service through its UK affiliate, which is registered with the Care Quality Commission to provide prescriptions online. Prescriptions are dispensed by an NHS pharmacy regulated by the General Pharmaceutical Council. Kiwi Drug's affiliate's doctors are GMC registered. Most are experienced GPs. They are all trained in providing prescription medicine online. The doctors are individually responsible for the prescriptions they issue. Registered pharmacists are responsible for dispensing. Assuming the pharmacy's claims are true, is it actually legal for a doctor to give prescriptions based on an online "consultation" in the UK?	Yes, this is correct. The Care Quality Commission is the regulatory body that oversees the adherence of private medical practitioners to health industry standards, regulations and laws. The Health and Social Care Act 2008 confers broad powers on the Care Quality Commission to regulate health and social care services. The The National Health Service (Pharmaceutical Services) Regulations 2005 provides for electronic prescriptions to be issued. In the definitions: "electronic prescription" means an electronic prescription form or an electronic repeatable prescription ; "electronic prescription form" means a prescription which falls within paragraph (b) of the definition of " prescription form"; "prescriber" means a doctor, dentist, independent nurse prescriber or a supplementary prescriber; "prescription form" means- (a) a form provided by a Health Board, a Health and Social Services Board, a Local Health Board, a Primary Care Trust, an NHS Trust or NHS Foundation Trust, and issued by a prescriber; or (b) data that are created in an electronic form, signed with a prescriber's advanced electronic signature and transmitted as an electronic communication to a nominated dispensing contractor by the ETP service, to enable a person to obtain pharmaceutical services or local pharmaceutical services, and does not include a repeatable prescription;	You missed a bit: Unless, of course, the patient was a private patient and the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble: As well as the state-run National Health Service (which is generally free to most patients) the UK also has a number of private health care providers where patients pay, for example, to be treated sooner than they would if they went with the NHS. Some NHS doctors also work on a self-employed basis in this private sector, called private practice, which creates the contractual relationship alluded to by Lord Devlin. Re: Don't NHS doctors receive consideration, even if patients don't pay? Yes they do. But not from a (non-private) patient - they are paid by the NHS (or related entity). There are different contractual relationships available, such as being on a salaried payscale or in a partnership but all remuneration comes from the NHS.	Doctors are obliged to act in the best interest of their patients. If it would be in your best interest to see another doctor (due to the doctor being out of practice for that particular diagnosis), your current doctor would be obligated to tell you and refuse treatment. The physician‑patient relationship is fiduciary in nature and certain duties arise from that special relationship of trust and confidence. These include the duties of the doctor to act with utmost good faith and loyalty[.] MvInerney v. MacDonald Now, onto your question about the counselors assessment; probably not worth it's weight in salt. They likely have little to no training regarding diagnostic medicine and are by no means an expert.	In the united-kingdom it is a breach of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules for an athlete to have a "Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers" in their sample. No mention is made, as far as I can see, that the intent to use a placebo as described by the OP would fall foul of these Rules. The only relevant mention of intent seems to be when the substances etc are present: It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters their body. An Athlete is responsible for any Prohibited Substance or any of its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their Sample. Accordingly, it is not necessary to demonstrate intent, Fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part in order to establish an Article 2.1 Anti-Doping Rule Violation; nor is the Athlete's lack of intent, Fault, negligence or knowledge a valid defence to an assertion that an Article 2.1 Anti-Doping Rule Violation has been committed.	.. if a EU country decides that the vaccine should be mandatory, especially when they promised again and again it would not be compulsory, wouldn't that raise law-related problems? Is it legal? Yes, it is legal since public health is classified as a shared competence where the European Union does not exercise its own competence and therefore within the competence of a member state to decide. Supporting public health in Europe EU health policy focuses on protecting and improving health, giving equal access to modern and efficient healthcare for all Europeans, and coordinating any serious health threats involving more than one EU country. The European Union coordinated the creation and implementation of the EU Digital COVID Certificate, but it is up to the member states to decide under what conditions (and to whom) a certificate is to be issued and used. (shared competence) Protection of health, due to experiences of the past, is often considered (depending on the jurisdiction) a major task of national governments. During the Black death (where no vaccination was available), many countries took extreme measures to protect their population. Although the concept of isolating people to prevent the spread of disease had already existed, the term quarantine originated during this period. Since the early 19th century (1807 in Bavaria), some countries imposed compulsory vaccinations to eradicaticate smallpox where it was deemed as a danger to the whole population. History has shown, when faced with no other choice, a country will exercise any extreme measure needed for the benefit of their population. Division of competences within the European Union ... The EU has only the competences conferred on it by the Treaties (principle of conferral). Under this principle, the EU may only act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the EU countries in the Treaties to attain the objectives provided therein. Competences not conferred upon the EU in the Treaties remain with the EU countries. ... Exclusive competences (Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — TFEU) areas in which the EU alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts. EU countries are able to do so themselves only if empowered by the EU to implement these acts. ... Shared competences (Article 4 of the TFEU): the EU and EU countries are able to legislate and adopt legally binding acts. EU countries exercise their own competence where the EU does not exercise, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence. ... Supporting competences (Article 6 of the TFEU): the EU can only intervene to support, coordinate or complement the action of EU countries. Legally binding EU acts must not require the harmonisation of EU countries’ laws or regulations. ... ... Due to the smaller amount of Exclusive competences in important areas, the European Union is more of a Confederation than a Federation (such as Canada and the United States). Sources: Division of competences within the European Union EU Digital COVID Certificate \| European Commission Confederation - Wikipedia Federation - Wikipedia	This article from 2007 indicates radio frequency identification microchips are not considered medical devices by Health Canada's Therapeutic Drugs Directorate, so there's no requirement to obtain licences for their sale or use. Health Canada spokesperson Carole Saindon says the devices do not have a therapeutic use, so they fall outside the ambit of the Food and Drugs Act. “Health records, or the mechanism by which they are stored or retrieved, are not considered to be medical devices,” says Saindon. Because this microchip technology is unregulated, it isn't known whether any Canadian facilities have implanted chips in humans. If it were positively required that the device be deemed to have therapeutic device in order for it to be legal to implant, then they would have said that the chip can't be implanted in Canada. It seems that there are no direct restrictions against chipping people in Canada, therefore a doctor may legally do it.	You must follow the lawful and reasonable directions of your employer As an RN you have obligations under the law that are independent of your employment. Almost certainly, one of these is not to practice in an area which you are not skilled or qualified to do so (unless you are under adequate instruction and supervision). Remember, as an RN you, personally, are legally responsible if your advice leads to harm and you were not acting reasonably. There are plenty of nurses who have gone to jail for delivering a lethal dose of medicine that was wrongly prescribed by a doctor. Even if your advice is unlikely to lead to this, you can still be deregistered - seems a waste of a lot of education just to become an Uber driver. Further, most jurisdictions make it illegal to mislead or deceive in trade or commerce. This one won’t send you to jail. So, it appears that the instructions are unlawful and it is not misconduct if you were to, politely, refuse them. This would not give your employer grounds to fire you. However, you should document your concerns and reach out to your union and possibly consult a lawyer.	I think it really is a state-by-state answer. From a web site for doctors getting involved in Telemedicine. Some medical boards such as Alabama, Montana and Oregon offer a special purpose telemedicine license. Other states that regulate telepractice in medicine include Texas, Florida, California and Colorado. The levels of regulation vary greatly by state. For example, California and Florida, similar to New York, require full licensure to perform any function relating to patient care, with some exceptions for consultation in some instances. Other states are exploring the issue of telepractice and in general, how to regulate it. That site has a state-by-state break out of the rules. I see other things about reciprocity among some nearby states. Three states (MD, NY, VA) and Washington DC provide reciprocity to bordering states. Alabama and Pennsylvania have agreements with other states to grant licenses to out-of-state physicians who have licenses in states that reciprocally accept their home state licenses. In Connecticut, an out-of-state physician can obtain an in-state license based on his or her home state standards.
Can I inspect my rental property in between lease terms? I have tenants in a rental property (in Philadlephia, PA) who are going to be renewing their yearly lease. Am I allowed to request/dictate a visual inspection of the property as a conditional requirement for the renewal? If not, am I just supposed to perpetually hope that they’re not destroying the place on the inside until they decide not to renew?	Your lease should contain terms on periodic inspections It is completely normal for a lease to allow the landlord to inspect periodically, usually at six-monthly intervals.	I assume you are already living there? No, you can't use that clause, specifically because the "previous renter" is the person(s) who occupied the apartment prior to your moving in (the "start date", or the first date that your lease is valid). That clause doesn't allow you to break the lease if one of the current renters vacates the apartment and leaves their stuff. This only means that if the apartment was not ready for you to occupy due to the previous tenant not vacating, that you are allowed to walk away from the lease without any payments (other than a credit verification fee). This pretty much requires you to not "move in" in the first place. If you've already moved in, you don't have a legal leg to stand on since you deemed the property fit to move in (and should have done a walk-through prior to accepting the condition of the apartment). If this is you "getting on" the lease, and the lease specifically says that you are being added and your "start date" is some date in the future that you intend to move in, you may have a leg to stand on since this is more like sub-letting individual rooms with a common area. It isn't clear to me if this is the case for you. Once the other person is off the lease they have basically abandoned their property and you may be able to dispose of it, or have the leasing company dispose of it.	No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons?	No they can't. The lease says the premises need to be cleaned without going into details how. You cleaned them yourself before moving out. If the landlord was not happy with that, they should have raised their concerns and discussed options. The security deposit that the landlord holds is only supposed to be used when something goes wrong. When something goes wrong, the landlord is supposed to talk, not to silently chop off a slice of the deposit as they please (unless the lease allows it, which it does not here). If the landlord refuses to refund, read the manual and go to small claims court to tell them where to get off.	Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.	Not even real roaches are an emergency. The event was foreseeable and scheduleable. According to the terms of your lease, you are entitled to a 2 day warning. From your description, the landlord did not violate the lease, but he came close to it, perhaps to the point that the courts would consider it as good as a breach. In Chicago, §5-12-050 of the municipal code mandates 2-day notice, and the following section says that If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated unreasonable demands for entry otherwise lawful, but which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, or terminate the rental agreement pursuant to the notice provisions of Section 5-12-110(a). In each case, the tenant may recover an amount equal to not more than one month's rent or twice the damage sustained by him, whichever is greater.	If it says "no pets" in the leasehold, then yes, that is enforceable. It doesn't have to be reasonable (in your opinion, or objectively) to be enforceable. Your choices are to either negotiate different leasehold terms, or to find a different leasehold.	There are two distinct questions here. One is what happens when a lease expires and you don't vacate and the landlord doesn't try to evict you. Generally, in the absence of holdover tenant provisions expressly in the existing lease, the lease becomes a month to month lease on the same terms as previously in force. If the lease does provide for holdover tenant provisions, that lease remains in force. The second issue is what happens when the landlord transfers ownership of the property. Basically, the lease runs with the land, regardless of who owns it, and the legal analysis is no different from what it would have been if the landlord had remained the same. So, if a lease with no holdover provision expires, no new renewal of the lease is signed, and a new owner buys the property from the old one, you have a month to month lease with then new owner on the same terms as the old lease, until the tenant and landlord agree otherwise, even in the absence of an express agreement with the new owner.
Is a companies domain inherently included in the sale? The situation is that I'm contracted for a company to do a website migration of the company's official website. The company was bought 7 years ago and the former owner remained contracted to manage the website. Now the new owner of the company wants to take control of the website, and the former owner is refusing to hand over the data such as database and source code. Is the domain inherently included in the sale of the company? There could be no mistake about the fact that the website belongs to the company whatsoever. However, since I'm only contracted to help the migration, what legal courses does the new owner have? I'm only curious to perhaps predict the possible outcome of this situation.	It will depend on the specific facts Let's define a few terms: Company A was the original company, Company B is the current company (which may be the same as Company A or a different company), Owner A was (and may still be) the shareholders of Company A, Owner B are the shareholders of Company B, the Business is the enterprise that was carried on by Company A and is now carried on by Company B, the Domain is the licence from the Domain Name Registrar which may be owned by any of the above (except the Business because it's not a legal person). Owner A and Owner B might be an individual natural person or an individual company or a group of natural persons/companies. Both the Business and the Domain are assets just like a car or office furniture that can be bought and sold independently of the Company that owns them. Who owned the domain registration? This might have been Company A in its own right or Owner A in which case Company A would be using it under some sort of licence, probably an implicit and undocumented one. Was Company A or the Business bought? Both are possibilities, see Is it possible to keep assets from being taken when a company is bought by another? If the company was sold the Company B is Company A. If the business was sold then Company A is different from Company B. Company A owned the Domain and Company A was sold Company A/B continues to own the domain. There is no room for dispute here. Owner A owned the Domain and Company A was sold Owner A continues to own the domain but Company A/B retains the benefit of the licence. There is scope for dispute over the terms and duration of that licence. Company A owned the Domain and the Business was sold The terms of the contract would need to be consulted to determine whether the Domain was part of the assets that comprised the Business. There is scope for dispute here, see the Peanut Butter Wars over whether trade dress was part of the business (spoiler, it was). If it was, then Company B owns it even if it is legally still held by Company A - they would be holding it on trust for Company B pending legal transfer. There is no scope for dispute here. If it wasn't, then one has to ask how has Company B been using it for 7 years? There is scope for dispute here. It's possible that they were using it under a licence, if so, what are the terms? It's also possible they have a right to it as a result of other IP they own, usually a trademark. Owner A owned the Domain and the Business was sold The terms of the contract would need to be consulted to determine whether the licence in the Domain was part of the assets that comprised the Business. There is scope for dispute here. If it was then Company B retains the benefit of the licence. There is scope for dispute over the terms and duration of that licence. If it wasn't, then one has to ask how has Company B been using it for 7 years? There is scope for dispute here. It's possible that they were using it under a licence, if so, what are the terms? It's also possible they have a right to it as a result of other IP they own, usually a trademark.	For a large organization, software licensing compliance is a very broad and intractable problem. The licensing environment is very different for the big company than it is for little tiny you. Many large companies are subject to audits by software vendors (i.e. Adobe, Oracle, etc.) in which they have to show licenses purchased for each active seat. There's a whole new INDUSTRY around maintaining license compliance. An employee bringing in their own software and installing it on a company computer complicates this vastly. That is the environment that the question should be considered within. The large company makes the decision somewhere along the way that your individual efficiency in performing your individual tasks is less important than maintaining auditable software licensing compliance. Since they own the computer/laptop/server, it's their decision. Many times it seems that corporate policies as they apply to the individual worker are obstructive and limiting, but there's a bigger picture to the situation.	are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.	When a company is bought by another company, then all their intellectual property is usually transferred to the buyer. That means when Adobe bought Macromedia, then all the copyrights to all Macromedia products presumably went to Adobe. So Adobe can take legal actions when you violate their copyright on Macromedia Adobe Flash 8. I said "usually" and "presumably", because there might always be some contract clause in the purchase agreement between Macromedia and Adobe which says otherwise. And that agreement might not be public knowledge. When a company "disappears", then things can get even more complicated. When a company goes bankrupt, then their assets get liquidated. That means everything they own - material or immaterial - gets sold to the highest bidder. Who that bidder is is not always public information. So the copyrights might land somewhere where you wouldn't expect it. In fact there is a whole industry of "copyright trolls" who buy IP from defunct companies just so they can sue anyone using that IP. When a company is dissolved voluntarily, then any of its assets either get sold off to the highest bidder just like during a bankruptcy, or become the personal property of the company owner(s). Who might be private people or a parent company. Sometimes a company might "nominally" go out of business by sacking all employees and ceasing all business activity, but might still exist on paper. That means whoever owns the company could at any time decide to go back into business just to start a lawsuit. In some cases it might be hard to tell what actually happened to the IP rights to a specific piece of software. The information might be in some contract deeply buried in some file cabinet. Or perhaps there is no documentation at all, so finding out who owns what can become an immensely difficult lawsuit. Bottom line: Who owns the copyright on what is not public information. Just because you can't find out who currently owns the copyright to some intellectual property does not mean nobody does. And when you violate their copyrights, that person might suddenly appear with a lawyer and make all kinds of demands, including suing you for statutory damages (which does not require them to prove that you actually caused financial harm to them).	The analogy in the other answer isn't particularly helpful because a company isn't tangible property like a truck. It is a legal entity that has not only assets and liabilities such as tangible property (trucks, computers), intangible property (trademarks), and loans, but also owners (shareholders), a board of directors, and officers. In an acquisition, another company buys up all the stock of the entity being acquired. The acquired company may continue to exist as a subsidiary, in which case it continues to have its board and officers, or it may be dissolved, in which case its assets and liabilities would be transferred to its new parent (or to another subsidiary of the new parent).	From point 4: transferring all rights and obligations of Company A to Company B Among those rights and obligations are the rights and obligations arising from Company A's agreement with Employee. Employee is therefore still subject to the agreement, which is enforceable by Company B. If the agreement is carefully drafted, it will make explicit mention of Company A's "successors in interest" or some similar phrase or phrases. Even if there is no mention, the rights and obligations associated with this agreement will transfer (perhaps unless the agreement explicitly provides that they will not, but, let's be realistic, of course it does not so provide).	Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).	The price is not one of the terms and conditions of the CC-SA license. You may chose to attach a price to a derivative work (which you have the right to create under license section 3.b). But any person who receives the derivative work legitimately (from you or from someone who got it from you, directly or indirectly) must get it under the CC-SA license, and has the right to redistribute it, and may do so at no charge if that person so chooses. Also, you may not impose any copy protection or other technological measure that would prevent exercise of the reuser's rights. Whether selling a work that may be redistributed freely is good business is your decision.
Will res judicata kill Bob's case before its advent? Bob, an unsuspecting auto buyer of the State of California, purchases a new motor vehicle with a balance on its new car warranty ("Cab"). Rob is the previous buyer also within the State of California. Company is the manufacturer, retail seller, and repair facility. Company sold Cab to Rob, and Rob returned Cab to Company for a substantially impairing nonconformity, one likely to cause death or serious injury if the vehicle is driven. Company created an estimate about Cab; however, omitted to present or provide it to Rob. Company omitted to put the actual nonconformity Rob complained to Company about Cab into the estimate. Company entered a different job item to falsify the record and create grounds for reacquiring Cab not for a nonconformity Rob ever provided notice to Company at least once or was even aware of. In fact, Company texted Rob implying the two had an agreement of repairs about a second nonconformity only to compel Rob to burst out he never brought Cab back for the second nonconformity or knew about one, and had sought repairs for the one she brought Cab in for. Company, buys Cab back from Rob, and sells it to Bob although Rob never authorized the buyback. Without a notice to having reacquired Cab from Rob for a nonconformity. Rob sues Company. Bob learns about the buyback and that Company omitted to comply with its duties relating to either nonconformities, and moves to sue Company for an unbranded lemon. Rob and Company are entered final judgment, and Bob files late though within statutes of limitations. Will Bob be dismissed per res judicata when he files? Under what scenarios he will and he will not be? Will Bob get to seek punitive damages even if Rob is already awarded some? What scenarios are possible and what are likely?	Will Bob be dismissed per res judicata when he files? No. His claim is different from Rob's. These are two separate contracts, involving different parties, and the company's torts are different in each matter. Your description reflects that only Rob's claim(s) has(have) been adjudged. Will Bob get to seek punitive damages even if Rob is already awarded some? Section 1974(c)(1) of the California Civil Code entitles Bob to "a civil penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages" if Bob proves that the company's noncompliance was willful. These remedies do not depend on whether Rob was awarded damages (punitive or otherwise) as a result of his claim against the company. There is no indication in your description that Bob's suit is a class action or that he is bringing an action of behalf of others in addition to himself. Therefore, the exception in the latter statement of section 1974(c)(1) is inapplicable.	If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft.	The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though.	Given that you voluntarily turned the car over to the buyer, it isn't your car anymore. The correct procedure would be to file a civil case against the buyer for breach of contract, where he would have been required to turn over the pump or compensate you monetarily. You both violated the law and are subject to punishment. Forgery is a crime in California punishable by up to a year in county jail. Stealing a car is grand theft, which has a range of penalties from misdemeanor to up to 3 years prison, depending on your prior history and the circumstances. You can file a complaint with the police over the forgery, and it will inevitably be revealed that you stole his car. So you should call an attorney right away to try to get yourself out of this mess. Your main interest would be not getting prosecuted for grand theft, or at least minimizing the penalty. Assuming that he did indeed forge your signature (a signature on the title is required, and surely DMV would not issue a new title without a signature, but you don't indicate what evidence you have that he forged your signature), he could be motivated to cooperate – your respective attorneys can work out an equitable arrangement. The windshield issue will probably be central to the case. Did you crack the windshield after you struck the deal? Did he have an opportunity to inspect the car? Did you fail to disclose a material fact that affects the value of a car? If you replace the windshield, that could tilt the scales of justice in your favor. Get a lawyer and try to keep it out of the courts.	In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.	The insurer can absolutely deny paying any claims if they discover that you misrepresented something in obtaining your policy, or you failed to notify them of relevant changes in accordance with the policy's terms. In fact, even changing the "garage" location within a state can affect your premium. You should call your insurer and provide them an honest and complete description of the regular use of the car. It is up to their underwriters whether they will continue to provide insurance for that use, and whether they will change your premium accordingly. Update regarding the question update: The insurer could not legally deny a claim for any insured damage prior to notice of cancellation, so long as there was no misrepresentation and you had paid your premiums. As to when an insurer can legally cancel a policy: This is first a contractual question, and their policy should include terms and conditions that address this. (E.g., they might reserve the right in the policy to cancel it for any reason at any time, in which case it's almost certainly legal.) Note that all policy terms must be approved by a state's insurance commission. I happen to remember that Massachusetts has some very unusual terms and restrictions for car insurance, so I wouldn't be surprised if the Massachusetts entity discovered that their policy on the out-of-state car was non-compliant and they had to cancel it. The great thing about the tight regulation of auto insurance is that if a claim on a policy is denied, or if a policy is improperly cancelled, then you can file a complaint with the state regulator, and those tend to get resolved quickly and in the insured's favor. Therefore, you should simply review your policy terms and the cancellation notice. If anything seems out-of-order you can call both the insurer and your state regulator.	Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York can include one automobile within a family, here is the main form and a companion form. But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable).	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.
Could Hungary be ousted from the EU by member states leaving by Article 50? Could the rest of the EU simply create a new entity and leave to resolve the autocratic problem Hungary creates and letting it be the “EU” with Poland? Could they pre-sign agreements so they come into force once they are legally out? Would such an agreement violate EU law? I hope to find answers to this in light of the LGBTQI-persecution law that came into force yesterday.	No, this would be a huge issue because there are many many treaties, institutions and other agreements which are tied to the EU itself, which would then basically be owned and fully controlled by Hungary. The nation states leaving via Article 50 would have zero claim to those EU-owned assets, and would basically (in the case of the European Central Bank for example) be handing huge amounts of power and wealth over to Hungary. Talk about cutting your nose off to spite your face...	Note that the answer to most of your questions has nothing to do with the GDPR specifically, but has to do with the legal force that an EU Regulation has. Here's a related answer on EU Regulations vs. Directives. That said, here are my answers to your specific questions: So member states can define a different age, even though the GDPR says that it should be 16. But is this an exception? Yes. Are there any other exceptions? Yes. Scanning the Regulation for instances of "Member State" is a good way to find them. In my opinion, the biggest area of the GDPR where Member States have influence is Article 6, "Lawfulness of Processing". In some circumstances, it allows Member States to specify what could be considered a lawful basis for processing. Must these exceptions be explicitly stated in the GDPR? Yes. As a Regulation, exceptions must be explicitly stated in order to be permissible because Member States have no authority to overrule EU law. I'd like to understand to what extent the GDPR must be followed by member states, and to what extent it could be amended in national laws. "Amended" is a fuzzy term. It can mean adding, changing, or removing from the law. Unless otherwise specified, Member States could not change or remove provisions, but there could very well be additions consistent with the GDPR. Some Member States dispute this statement when it comes to constitutional issues.	(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)	Before getting into the technical answer to this question it is worth noting that when matters of a constitutional nature are involved then in practice it is not just a matter of a technical "legal" answer. Students and academics like to pose hypothetical questions such as "What would happen if the Queen refused assent to a Bill?" or "If Parliament is supreme, could it abolish the courts?" etc. The practical reality is that a liberal democracy, such as ours, ultimately relies on those in positions of power to respect the democratic conventions and preserve the constitution. When there is a legal angle to some constitutional issue the courts will play their part but, whatever legal analysis their judgments may contain, they will always have in mind the importance of maintaining our democratic system. It is also worth noting that where an Act contains an "ouster" clause (saying that a certificate of X shall not be questioned in any court of law) the courts always find a way to interpret that so that it does not apply in any case where the courts think they should adjudicate! Those preliminaries out of the way, I think the technical legal answer to your question is that first of all the Speaker decides and provides a certificate under s.2(2). You will see that s.2(1) deals with "any other bill" (your third bullet point) and s.2(2) requires a certificate from the Speaker that "the provisions of this section have been duly complied with" (i.e. that it is indeed in the "any other bill" category). Of course there is a further question of whether, if the Speaker gets it wrong, the courts could intervene and exactly how that might happen (the so-called "John Bercow question" of what if a Speaker goes rogue), but the initial technical answer to you question is "the Speaker of the House of Commons".	On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).	The liability shield is the big one, and it can't be achieved with a contract. Just because the contract says you're not liable, that doesn't make it true. If I sign a contract with my friend that says "Nate Eldredge is hereby the King of France", that won't make me the king, nor will it force anyone except maybe my friend to acknowledge me as the king. By its nature, a contract can only bind the parties to the contract, and has no effect on the rights of anyone else. Suppose, then, that Alice and Bob agree to start a pizza delivery business, using a contract like you suggest. Their delivery car crashes, injuring Carol, a bystander, who incurs medical bills that exceed the assets of the business. Carol decides to sue Alice and Bob personally. Sure, Alice and Bob have a contract, and maybe it prevents them from suing each other, but it certainly doesn't prevent Carol from suing them; Carol never signed it. So Carol can still go after Alice and Bob's personal assets. Thus contract law cannot give them a liability shield. However, the government can, since it makes the laws about who can sue whom under what circumstances. And it has made laws saying that Alice and Bob can be protected from such suits, but only if they form a company according to the process that the law sets forth. So that's what they have to do.	In theory, this should be protected by the UN Dec. of Human Rights: Article 13 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Since it does not specify the type of movement, or restrict its dimensions, this could be construed to include freedom of movement through time as well as space. Other than that things like this there is no real law regarding this.	This is a hard question, but a good question. The following relates to the issue from the perspective of the USA. You ask "...if the US wants to invade France, can they officially declare war by...", You have to make clear what you mean by "can". If you mean whether or not the US has the physical ability to do this, then of course they do. If you mean whether they are allowed, then this is another question. When you ask whether something is allowed, then you have to make reference to a moral code or a law that determines what is and what isn't allowed (legal). Normally each country will have laws that govern what is and what isn't legal for it's citizens to do. That hard part is how this applies to nations. There are two sides to the question. (1) What are the leaders allowed to do under their own laws, (the domestic laws) (2) what are countries as entities allowed to do? (the international laws) It sounds a bit like you are asking about the second thing. Here treaties govern what is and what isn't "legal". However, usually when someone breaks a law, other entities have the power to enforce that law and decide (judge) whether the person has broken the law. The question is: who decides whether a country has broken a treaty or an international law? And if a law is broken, what exactly can be done about it? This is hard to answer. Consider for example the conflict in Ukraine. Here many will argue that Russia has piratically invaded Ukraine. There should be war between the nations. But Russia denies this and other world powers have done little beyond imposing sanctions. This illustrates how hard it is to deal with this question. One question that comes up is what the purpose of international treaties are if a country can just violate them without much consequence. Pointing out two points about this. (1) If, for example, a president wants to convince his/her own congress that the country should engage in war, then it makes a stronger point if you can show how the country you want to engage has violated international trities. (2) After you have won a war, you might want to prosecute the leaders of the loosing power. Here you will stand stronger if you can make references to some international law that existed before the conflict started. This second point is illustrated in the Nuremberg principles. Here it was exactly stated that "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." According to the US constitution "Congress shall have power to ... declare War". That means that historically Congress has the power to decide where to wage war. The War Powers Resolution says, for example, that "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities ...". Note that this doesn't mean that the US has do formally declare war before going to war. Example: The Iraq War was authorized by Congress, but there never was a formal declaration of war. It is interesting that you ask about the timing for when the declaration should be given. The Japanese wanted to deliver their declaration of war just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But because of issues with decrypting the message from Japan to the Japanese Embassy, the declaration wasn't delivered until after the attack. Remember also in all of this that the winning party to a conflict, usually decides what was and wasn't legal! One good reference for more on all of this is the report by the Congressional Research Service called "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications". Here you can see more on what I have tried (and failed?) to say above.
Can a prosecutor hold back charges so they can try again? Assume I was alleged to have been involved in a bank robbery gone wrong - guns were fired, people were killed and injured, some robbers were arrested at the scene, some escaped etc. Obviously, there are a plethora of charges available to the prosecutor: murder, manslaughter, grievous bodily harm, assault, aggravated robbery, conspiracy, deprivation of liberty, resisting arrest, offensive language etc. Can the prosecutor charge me with some, run the case to its conclusion and then, win or lose, charge me with others. Rinse and repeat. In a civil trial, this would not be permissible due to the principle of res judicata which requires a plaintiff to bring all of their claims against a specific defendant arising from a single event at one or forgo them. You can't sue someone for breach of contract, lose and then go again for negligence - you have to bring all your causes of action at once. Is there a similar principle in criminal law?	united-states For a particular sovereign in the United States, the criminal law test for this is from Blockburger v. United States (emphasis mine) 12 Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 342, 31 S. Ct. 421, 55 L. Ed. 489, and authorities cited. In that case this court quoted from and adopted the language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433: 'A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.' Compare Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11, 12, 47 S. Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505, and cases there cited. Applying the test, we must conclude that here, although both sections were violated by the one sale, two offenses were committed. What this says in more plain language is that a person can be prosecuted under two different statutes for the same logical act as long as there is at least one fact that has to be proven for each count which doesn't have to be proven for the other count. This does mean, for example, that a person could not be prosecuted for aggravated assault, acquitted and then later prosecuted for simple assault on the same facts if there aren't any facts required for simple assault that aren't required for aggravated assault. For the example in the question, this does seem to mean that if, for example, a robber was first prosecuted for murder, and then later separately prosecuted for carjacking after the murder, this would not be double jeopardy. I would guess in practice that courts wouldn't appreciate this kind of game-playing since it wastes the court's time as well to adjudicate two trials when there could just be one, but I don't know if there's a hard rule against it. Blockburger was actually arguing that multiple convictions from one trial should be overturned because some of them relied on the same facts as another. In this case SCOTUS ruled against Blockburger, but on the basis that the facts did not overlap, not that the legal basis of the argument was unsound. I noted in the beginning that this applies to particular sovereigns, which in terms of US law means either a state or the US Federal Government. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine (e.g. Gamble v United States), if the same set of facts of a case constitute both a state crime and a federal crime, or the also likely case that a federal crime requires all the facts of a state crime plus a few more, both the relevant state government and the Federal government can prosecute the person under their own statutes. This would technically also apply if two states wanted to prosecute someone, although it's unlikely that there is any way to have the exact same set of facts break two different state's laws since state laws generally can only cover actions taken inside the state or affecting that state in particular.	(assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions).	There are great jurisdiction by jurisdiction differences in the statutes of limitations that apply to crimes. Some jurisdictions have no statute of limitations for any serious crime (e.g. Canada and if I recall correctly Virginia). Others have statutes of limitations for almost all serious crimes other than murder (e.g. Colorado). Where there is a statute of limitations, the primary issue is that the ability of the prosecution and defense to secure reliable evidence that will allow a jury to enter an accurate verdict. This potential to conduct a fair trial can be compromised by a delay in pressing charges. Alibi witnesses can die or disappear to someplace that they can't be located, the location of the alleged crime can change in ways pertinent to proof, memories of witnesses in general can fade. Records or correspondence that could show intent can be destroyed. This is particularly a burden for an innocent criminal defendant who did not know that he or she needed to prepare a defense and gather evidence to respond to criminal charges. Some states toll statutes of limitations during a period of a victims minority or incapacity when brining charges may not be feasible. Other states have a long statute of limitations in rape cases where there is DNA evidence available that can conclusively tie a defendant to the scene of the crime (lack of consent would still have to be established), but a shorter statute of limitations in other rape cases. Murder and fraud are the most common offenses to lack a statute of limitations, in the first case, because it is considered the most serious crime and because the victim is unable to report the crime, and in the latter case, because fraud, by its nature and by the perpetrator's design, may go undiscovered for very long periods of time. Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution? While I've given some examples of the considerations that apply, ultimately, this is a legislative and political decision and not a legal one. You can't determine by reason alone which classes of crimes will have a limited window for prosecution. Different legislative bodies make different decisions on the same issues at different times and in different places.	The DA decides The decision to prosecute a crime is vested in the district attorney (a.k.a. the prosecuting attorney, a public official in charge with bringing criminal cases in court). The DA can prosecute someone even if the victim doesn't press charges. It isn't the victim's call. It isn't law enforcement's call (although the DA will never get to make that decision if neither the victim nor law enforcement tell the DA about it). Critically, in U.S. law, unlike most countries with "civil law" legal system in Continental Europe and Latin America and much of Asia and Africa, prosecutors don't have a legal duty to prosecute all crimes of which they are aware. Civil law systems sometimes give vetoes over prosecutions of particular kinds of crimes to victims, but the general rule is that a prosecutor must press all charges that can be proved and that the prosecutor has resources sufficient to prosecute. In the U.S., the decision to bring charges or not is in the absolute discretion of the prosecutor. Also, unless the suspect and the DA reach an express agreement to permanently drop the charges, the DA or a successor to the DA can change their mind at any time until the statute of limitations on the crime expires. In the example in the question, a DA might initially decide not to bring charges, but then change her mind and bring the charge from this incident and a lot of other ones, when the DA learns that the suspect is operating a full fledged criminal enterprise and not just exercising bad judgment on an isolated basis. The DA usually honors a victim's wishes Usually, a DA and law enforcement will honor a victim's wishes, both because it is the harm to the victim that the DA is primarily vindicating, and because a case can be hard to prosecute without the victim's cooperation. Lots of people are pressing to have scarce law enforcement and DA resources applied to their problems. When someone voluntarily withdraws their request to have the DA and law enforcement use those resources, and no one personally involved is unhappy about that, this is normally seen as a win for everyone, and as a way of empowering victims. DAs and victims alike are also well aware that a criminal case can have very severe impacts on the life of the criminal defendant and the criminal defendant's family. Sometimes it can literally ruin a person's life. Other times it presents a major bump in the road to someone who was overall getting on the right track but had a lapse of judgment. When deciding whether to bring charges, DAs routinely weigh whether the harm done by breaking the law justifies the consequences of bringing a criminal case against someone from the point of view of society as a whole in the long run. In this example, the victim got moral vindication, an apology and admission, and presumably, his stuff back. The victim and law enforcement clearly saw this as justice enough if this is really just an isolated incident in a case involving a fairly minor misdemeanor offense. Exceptions to the general rule In the unusual case where a DA brings a criminal case notwithstanding the victim wanting to drop the charges a variety of things can motivate that. Sometimes, for example, in an intrafamily domestic violence or child abuse or elder abuse scenario, the DA may conclude that the victim is asking to drop charges under duress, or figurative "temporary insanity" due to being blinded by love in a way that the victim will later regret. In a variation on this fact pattern, fraud victims often have lawsuits for compensatory damages against fraudsters that will be harder to collect if the fraudster is in prison and may ask to drop charges for that reason. But the DA may want to bring the criminal fraud case anyway, because it is likely that the future income that will used to pay the current victims from their lawsuit will just come from some new fraud perpetrated against someone else. Sometimes, a DA presses charges because even though the victim doesn't care, the DA or law enforcement believes that the criminal is a high risk for being a repeat offender. This is especially true in cases where the collateral consequences of a conviction (e.g. disqualification from possessing a firearm) may help to prevent a future crime. Also, keep in mind that the DA is either an elected official, or a political appointee, or reports to someone who is. Usually, victims who get what they ask for from the DA build up political support. But, sometimes, a criminal case will be popular with the general public to prosecute even if the victim doesn't want that to happen. So, that is another reason that a DA might prosecute a case over the victim's objections. Conclusion Still, the basic thing to keep in mind is that prosecutors bringing charges over the objections of the victims are the rare exception, because prosecutors do care about what victims want, and to some extent see victims as proxies for being their clients, even though their true client is the government or the abstract concept of "the People." Also, victims who don't want to press charges are themselves pretty rare.	There is a defense against criminal charges, the defense of coercion. In Washington state (under the name "duress") (1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that: (a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he or she or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and (b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and (c) That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved.	Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.	I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).	Is there any way to prosecute someone and bring them before a judge if the states attorney office declines to? No Or can I sue the states attorney and force prosecution? No. You can't bring a private criminal prosecution in Maryland. There are a handful of U.S. states where you can, but Maryland is not one of them. You can bring a civil lawsuit for money damages and/or injunctive relief against someone who has caused you injury as a private individual.
How can i check a curent investigation of a company? I'm interested in crypto, and unfortunately there's what i suspect to be this huge scam going on the market, its called tether, although legally i can't claim it is a scam. Basically they've had a bunch of investigations by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the United States Department of Justice and others, to the point where im even confused on what investigations are opened, which are close. What i basically want to know is a list on every investigation/ lawsuit/legal problems that are stacking against the company which is called similar to the coin, Tether Limited, and if its possible informations about the investigation(although im fairly certain that those wouldn't just be provided to the public until the lawsuit ends i guess) Im not native to America so im very confused about the law "rituals" and day to day bureocracy so a more general answer would be greatly apreciated.	"Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well).	There is no law in the US that says you must tell the truth on the internet. Some places where one must tell the truth are: When speaking to police, the FBI, and most government agencies When filing your taxes with the IRS In certain business contracts When testifying before Congress But on the internet, you can claim to be the first man on the moon with impunity. If someone is gullible enough to believe you and send you money, that is their fault and responsibility. As far as eating a Pangolin, why should she "admit" it, when it was documented on Instagram? There is no duty to officially apologize for it. You can try to report her to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which enforces the Endangered Species Act, but as it occurred outside the USA, they will be powerless. Her claims are dubious, and possibly incorrect. Her treatment of an endangered animal is reprehensible. However, you posted this to a law site, asking about "reporting it" (to some sort of authority), and tagged it "criminal law". Her behavior is troubling, but I don't see anything that is remotely illegal or criminal.	Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.	A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals.	As an academic matter, the US system has struggled with this, and law professors spend their lives debating it. As a realistic matter, I'd bet that company in your example gets nailed. On the theory, the issue here is but-for cause. Civil liability requires that the jury find it more likely than not, or over 50% likely, that but-for D's actions, P's injuries would not have occurred. Your hypo puts it at exactly 50, and tie goes to the defendant, so in this case even the theory is clear. But, say you change it a little bit to make it more like 65 or 70%. Now, you're getting into the territory of the classic blue bus case. A man is hit by a blue bus. Two companies in town own blue busses, and one company owns 90% of them. Can he recover against that company with no other evidence? The black letter answer is no, that naked statistical evidence doesn't cut it. The rationale is that if it were the other way, anytime someone got hit by a blue bus, that company would automatically have to pay out unless they had some evidence to disprove their liability. The burden of proof has been shifted, violating a fundamental tenet of our legal system. But, this doctrine obviously poses an issue for plaintiffs like yours. It's one thing to say that someone hit by a bus needs to have more evidence. Theoretically, they could go out and get it: they could find the bus routes and schedules, examine where they were, and show that X company had a bus going by there at that time. They can also canvas for witnesses. It's much harder when, as your excellent hypo touches on, the science is so complicated. One controversial solution that has been debated a lot recently is market-share liability, but that doesn't seem pertinent here because you have mentioned another company. On the legal realist side. As far as I can tell the system usually finds a way to hold the company responsible. One example is the tobacco litigation. My understanding is the science couldn't definitively prove that smoking caused cancer, but it could prove that it raised the risk significantly. Here's some information on that https://www.tortmuseum.org/the-tobacco-cases/ from the American Museum of Tort Law, which, yes, is a real thing.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	The short answer is that a few individual trades would be legal (e.g. if you sell some to a friend), but doing so on a regular basis for profit (e.g. offering a sale price and a bid price to all comers) would not unless you get the appropriate licenses and comply with relevant laws. Doing this is onerous. Any kind of "money services business" is subject to federal regulation. The federal definition is a business trading more than $1,000 per day, so in theory as long as you keep below that you wouldn't have to worry about federal law. In practice you might find yourself having to prove to the Feds that you have not exceeded the threshold on any day in the past. There is also a separate licence regime for Virginia which you must also comply with. Finally, if you sell Bitcoins to someone when you have a reason to suspect that they are planning to do something illegal with them then you are breaking the law. Edit: While its not strictly a legal issue, some people who have traded Bitcoins outside of recognised exchanges have had their bank accounts closed because the activity has triggered the bank's money-laundering detectors. Edit 2: All the above applies if you are trading directly with people who you found on something like localbitcoins.com. Trade via an exchange such as BitStamp is legal: all the AML and KYC regulations are their problem not yours. You merely have to provide the necessary identification to open an account.	There are professionals who are doing penetration testing in an attempt to find security vulnerabilities with the target company. They will have a clear, written contract with the target company to permit the attack. Professional conduct means making sure that the permission is genuine before starting the attack. Their aim is to map weak points in the security, not to extract personal data. There will be non-disclosure agreements to make sure. Reports go to the target of the attack, not to any third party. As you describe it, it looks as if scammers are setting you up as the fall guy for their schemes. They and the money will be gone, you go to prison.
Is cub art illegal and considered Pedophilia I was told since a friend of mine has an anthromorphic furry cub drawing, they will be charged with possession of child pornography. but it’s a drawing and not an actual child, so I’m confused…. Is cub art really pedophilic? (United States)	It depends In the united-states "Pedophilia" is not a legal term for the prohibited content. The relevant legal term is "child pornography" The US DOJ offers a useful "Citizen's Guide To U.S. Federal Law On Child Pornography" which mentions key federal laws on the topic, including: 18 USC §2251 18 USC §2251 (Sexual exploitation of children) prohibits having a minor (person under 18) engage in sexual activity "for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct" So if a drawing is modeled from an actual child who engaged in sexual activity, it is illegal under 18 USC §2251. That section also makes it illegal for a parent, guardian, or custodian to permit such sexual activity and the making of a depiction of it. It also prohibits the advertising and distribution of any such depiction. All offenses under 18 USC §2251 involve an actual child at some point. 18 USC §2252 18 USC §2252 (Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors) makes it a crime when someone knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; under certain circumstances, mostly involving intestate or foreign transmission or distribution. The same section also makes it a crime when a person: knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction... if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct; So again to be covered under 2252 an actual child must have engaged in sexual conduct at some point, but a drawing modeled on such a child would be covered under this section. 18 USC §2252A 18 USC §2252a (Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography) makes it a crime if anyone: knowingly mails, or transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any child pornography knowingly receives or distributes any child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce ... [or] any material that contains child pornography [that has been similarly mailed shipped or transported] or who possesses such child porn. This section does not define "child pornography" but 18 USC §2256 (8) defines it as: any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; It would appear that under this section an image that "appears to" be a depiction of an actual minor engaged in sexual acts or is advertised as such may count as "child pornography" and thus be criminal. Whether this can apply to a wholly fictional character not based on any real child is not clearly stated in the law. I don't find any reported conviction involving an invented child character under this section. However in United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) aff ’d, 09-3935 WL 677398 (2011), the US 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that an image created by combining the image of the face of an actual child with the body of an adult in a sexual situation was child porn under this section. That case involved computer morphing to in effect paste photos of the heads or faces of children onto the bodies of adults engaged in sex, but a combination done by an artist's skill would presumably face the same ruling, if the child was recognizable. 18 USC §2260 18 USC §2260 makes it a crime if anyone outside the US has a minor engage in sexually explicit activities in order to make a visual depiction of such activities, and imports that depiction into the US, or who participates in the import or attempted import of such a depiction into the US. 18 USC § 1466A 18 USC § 1466A (Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children) makes it a crime when anyone knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and is obscene; or depicts an image that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse ... lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Simple possession of such a visual depiction is also a crime under this section. In United States v. Whorley No. 06-4288. (2008) the 4th circuit Court of Appeals wrote: Counts 1-20 [of the indictment] charged Whorley with using a computer on March 30, 2004, to knowingly receive obscene cartoons in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. The 20 cartoons forming the basis of those counts showed prepubescent children engaging in graphic sexual acts with adults. ... We also reject his arguments that ... cartoons depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct must depict real-life minors to violate § 1466A(a)(1). ... The clear language of § 1466A(a)(1) and § 1466A(c) is sufficiently broad to prohibit receipt of obscene cartoons ... The Supreme Court declined to review Whorley Leaving this holding in place. First Amendment issues In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) the US Supreme Court held that obscene content, which it defined by a 3-part test somewhat looser than the previous test in Roth, was not protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under 18 USC § 1466A have no first amendment issues, because only obscene visual depictions are prohibited under that section. in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) the Court held that child pornography was not protected by the first amendment. However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) the Court limited this to visual depictions of actual children that are produced by the abuse of such children, and found that depictions of fictional children that are not obscene under Miller are protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, §2260 and related sections of 18 USC have no first amendment issues, because all of these are limited to the depictions of actual minors. Some of these sections, however, also criminalize possession or distribution of images that "appear to be" minors, or are advertised as being of minors. Prosecutions under those provisions for images that do not in fact depict any actual child and are not obscene might be barred by the US first amendment. I have not found any reported case in which such a claim has been raised and decided, one way or the other. Conclusion "Cub art" as described in the question will not be protected under the US first amendment simply because it is a drawing rather than a photograph. A drawing which recognizably represents an actual child engaged in explicit sexual activity will probably trigger prosecution under one or more of §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, or §2260. Even if the child was not actually abused, using the recognizable image of an actual child can be treated, under Hotaling (cited above) as child pornography and therefore criminal. If the art does not depict any actual child, but the image is found to be obscene under Miller, then a prosecution could be brought under § 1466A. Note that whether a given image is or is not obscene is a matter of fact, ultimately for a jury to decide, based on the Miller standard. As Whorley shows, completely fictional cartoons may be the basis of a successful prosecution under § 1466A. Anyone reading this answer should be aware that anything that might be considered "child porn" is taken quite seriously by US law enforcement. Penalties for conviction are severe. Even if the materiel is found to be protected by the first amendment, an arrest may lead to significant expense, loss of employment, and other negative consequences. It should also be noted that a "minor" or "child" under the sections of US law mentioned here means anyone under the age of 18. The age of consent under state law is not relevant. Thus it might be lawful for a person of 16 to engage in sex in some US states, but it will still be criminal to distribute or poses a photo or other image of such an act. People should also be aware that the law on such matters differs significantly between different countries. Content that US courts have held to be protected by the US first amendment may be criminal to posses, receive, or transmit under the laws of other countries. Penalties are potentially severe. The question of whether any given image is protected or criminal is not always easy to resolve, and finding out via an arrest and a criminal trial could be a very unpleasant and expensive way to determine this. Consulting a lawyer skilled in such matters might be wise if any content in one's possession is even arguably questionable on such points.	The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it.	Can you unambiguously, legally, and conclusively determine what is and is not a "porn site"? I'm sure many are easy... but what about that "Swimsuit modeling" site, or the "Artistic Nudes" site featuring classic French Renaissance paintings? There will always be a grey area. What makes a "site" in a legal sense? Consider all the blog sites filled with user generated content: If just a few pages out of tens-of-thousands are hardcore, indisputable porn, would you require the entire domain to be classified XXX, even if 99% of its content is completely innocent? Who would enforce this? Are you proposing an "Internet Police" force to review all new domain names and their content before they get approved? That is called "Prior Restraint on Free Speech", and is established law. Suppose a site does get approved, then immediately changes the content of their pages from Cooking Recipes to hard-core porn. Who is going to review and approve every update to every website, when sites are updated constantly?! Maybe you're proposing that any individual who finds porn on a .ORG site has the right to sue for damages? This would likely clog the courts with endless vigilante lawsuits about what content belongs on which domain. This is a flat out horrible, poorly thought out idea.	First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.	It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement.	Can he name a particalur one, like Linkin Park? Or that would be considered non-allowed type of advertising? Generally speaking, that does not constitute unlawful advertising. Public figures are allowed to broadcast their preferences on issues that are more sensitive than topics of music. There might be few, rare exceptions where something like this would be outlawed, but most likely that has to do with a regime's censorship of specific bands or music styles rather than with a general prohibition.	Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).	The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.
If a person is dressed up as non-human, and is killed by someone who sincerely believes the victim was not human, who is responsible? I've seen several videos about pranks when someone dresses up as a zombie or other kind of monster, to scare people. I would assume that if such an actor dressed up as a monster suddenly attacks someone who out of sheer reflex harms the actor, then the victim of the prank is not culpable if a reasonable person would likely have reacted the same way (please correct me if I'm wrong). But if an actor dressed like a monster just wanders around the street, especially around Halloween, and is attacked by someone, then the attacker is culpable, as no reasonable person would have thought the actor was a threat. (please correct me if I'm wrong) But let's consider the following scenario: Alice has a close relative, or boyfriend, or someone she cares deeply about, let's call him Bob. Alice thinks Bob is too lazy, too comfortable, and wants to enact a scenario to thrill Bob up a little, and make him more self-confident and courageous. So Alice hires Darren who is a well known stage illusionist / prankster / movie director, to put Bob through a scenario which seems dangerous (but is actually harmless), in order to instill some courage in him. Darren creates an elaborate setup, for example fake news broadcasts made specifically for Bob, movie props, a big cast of actors, stage illusion tricks etc. to make it seem like there is an apocalyptic scenario, or that mythical monsters are real, or something similar, and the scenario is so professionally done that most reasonable people would be convinced it is real. Charlie is one of the actors hired for the show, and is dressed up as a mythical monster (zombie, vampire, lich, whatever) which reasonable people in real life know not to exist, but due to the elaborate setup mentioned above, Bob is gradually convinced is real. Bob attacks and kills Charlie, sincerely believing Charlie to be the aforementioned mythical monster. During this, Charlie wasn't actively attacking Bob, it's Bob who sought out and hunted down Charlie. Neither Darren, nor Charlie, nor Alice intended this to happen. In fact Darren made all reasonable precautions to prevent such accidents, but despite all these precautions the tragedy still happened. Darren is a professional who organized similar events previously, without a single previous incident. Who is culpable for Charlie's death? What will the three of them be finally charged with? Addendum : would it be different if Charlie hadn't played the role of a non-human, but a human instead (like an evil necromancer who is responsible for the apocalyptic scenario), so Bob killed him knowing he was a human but believing to be a threat to the whole world, and believing the scenario to be truly apocalyptic?	Laws on self-defense vary greatly from nation to nation. Generally, one cannot hunt down a hypothetical threat but one can defend against an actual threat or even a mistakenly assumed actual threat where no actual threat exists. Alice set it up so that Bob would feel threatened. In many jurisdictions, the self-defense defense for homicide rests on the state of the mind of the suspect, insofar as it can be determined, and failing that on a "reasonable person" standard. Presumably Bob genuinely felt threatened by Charlie and says so afterwards. "I thought he/it/whatever was trying to harm me. I didn't know it was a harmless actor." Just how much harm Bob needs to make self-defense stick varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It could be fear of imminent, serious bodily harm, or fear of being victimized in any sort of crime (stand your ground laws). As the comment by user6726 points out, just protraying a zombie or whatever isn't enough, there has to be threat to Bob. Bob cannot hunt Charlie down because Charlie "is" an evil lich or whatever. Bob can defend himself against attacks by Charlie and (in some jurisdictions) against intrusions by Charlie in his property. So it makes a difference if Bob hunts in his own backyard or further afield. The well-documented and extensive efforts by Alice and Darren to fool Bob should support Bob's statement. Say the court/jury believes that it was reasonable (or at least "not entirely unreasonable") for Bob to be afraid. Since the perceived self-defense would apply even if Bob thought the attacker was human, thinking that it was non-human should make little difference. Except that it would further showcase the degree to which Bob was fooled to see a threat. If the whole endeavor by Alice and Darren broke laws, the death might fall into felony homicide in some jurisdictions. This one could come to technicalities because Bob wasn't their accomplice. Otherwise, Darren's track record might prevent the two from being charged for negligent homicide. Consider the well-publicized cases where either the police or civilians shot unarmed people, and say that they thought the victim was armed and a threat to them. If doesn't matter if the victim drew a gun or a wallet, it matters if the shooter can make his or her fears plausible enough.	Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case.	Errors in the Question Of course, this is not actually what really happens. What really happens is that the original crime is not tried. It is simply ASSUMED to have taken place and there is a presumption that the original actor was guilty of some crime. Obviously this is incorrect and unjust. This is incorrect. To convict a person of being an accomplice, in either US or UK courts, there must be evidence proving that the crime took place. This an essential element of the crime. It need not be proved who committed the crime as a principal, although there is often evidence about that. But an essential element of the crime of being an accomplice is that the underlying offense is a crime and did occur. Like all other elements of a crime, this must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. That is not the theory that the legislatures of either the US or the UK have adopted. Indeed I do not think that any common-law country has adopted this theory. The law could be changed, and one might argue that it should be. But what the law should be, as opposed to what it is, is not generally on-topic here, as opposed to in politics.SE. Accomplice The LII Definition of "Accomplice" is: A person who knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally gives assistance to another in (or in some cases fails to prevent another from) the commission of a crime. An accomplice is criminally liable to the same extent as the principal. An accomplice, unlike an accessory, is typically present when the crime is committed. Nothing there suggests that the principal must be convicted first. The Wikipedia article "Accomplice" says: An accomplice differs from an accessory in that an accomplice is present at the actual crime, and could be prosecuted even if the main criminal (the principal) is not charged or convicted. An accessory is generally not present at the actual crime, and may be subject to lesser penalties than an accomplice or principal. ... The fairness of the doctrine that the accomplice is still guilty has been subject to much discussion, particularly in cases of capital crimes. Accomplices have been prosecuted for felony murder even if the actual person who committed the murder died at the crime scene or otherwise did not face capital punishment. In jurisdictions based on the common law, the concept of an accomplice has often been heavily modified by statute, or replaced by new concepts entirely. In The Wikipedia article "Accessory (legal term) In the section on "England and Wales it is said: A mens rea {guilty state of mind] is required even when it is not required for the principal offender (for example, when the principal commits a strict liability offence). The defendant must intend to do the acts which he knows will assist or encourage the principal to commit a crime of a certain type. In R v Bainbridge (1960) 1 QB 129 the defendant supplied cutting equipment not knowing exactly what crime was going to be committed, but was convicted because the equipment supplied was not used in the ordinary way, but for a criminal purpose instead. The accomplice must also know of all the essential matters that make the act a crime ... In the section "United States" it is said that: U.S. jurisdictions (that is, the federal government and the various state governments) have come to treat accessories before the fact differently from accessories after the fact. All U.S. jurisdictions have effectively eliminated the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, either by doing away with the category of "accessory before the fact" entirely or by providing that accessories before the fact are guilty of the same offense as principals. The Model Penal Code's definition of accomplice liability includes those who at common law were called accessories before the fact; under the Model Penal Code, accomplices face the same liability as principals. It is now possible to be convicted as an accessory before the fact even though the principal has not been convicted or (in most jurisdictions) even if the principal was acquitted at an earlier trial.(Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(e) (2d ed. 2003).) 18 U.S. Code § 2 - Principals provides that: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. Note that there is no requirement that a principal be first tried or even identified to convict one who abetted a crime. All accomplices are abettors, although not all abettors are accomplices. The Model Penal Code (MPC) published by the American Law Institute says, in section 2.06 of the code, that: § 2.06. Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the Code or by the law defining the offense; or (c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits such other person to commit it, or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. (4) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. ... (6) Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a victim of that offense; or (b) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (c) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. (7) An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. (Emphasis added) The official commentary on subsection (7) says: Subsection (7) speaks to the relation between the prosecution of the accomplice and the treatment of the person who is alleged to have committed the offense. In accordance with modern developments, this subsection provides that the accomplice can be prosecuted even though the other person has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, has an immunity to prosecution or conviction, or has been acquitted. The MPC was the result of a 10-year review of the laws then existing in the various US states. It was an attempt to rationalize existing laws and provide a consistent framework for criminal law in the US. It was offered to the states for adoption in whole or in part, and several states have adopted significant sections of it, and others have been guided by it in revising their legal codes. Section 2.06 (7) makes it clear that no previous prosecution of a principal is required for prosecution of an accomplice in any state that has adopted the MPC. Effect of the Theory of the Question The question asserts: Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. If courts adopted that as a rule, it would mean that if the principal escaped, or died, no accomplice could be prosecuted. Indeed consider the case of a crime boss, who is often an accomplice to the crimes of his (or her) henchmen. Such a boss would need only to have the actual criminal sent out of the country, or killed, to be quite safe from prosecution under the proposed rule. Hardly an improvement to my eyes. Such a rule would also mean that an accomplice could not be pressured, by means of a threat of prosecution, to disclose the actual criminal, or testify against that criminal. Again, not desirable. Use of UK Law I would add that in my answer to the linked question, sources from several US states were cited, and no UK sources. Indeed UK law does not seem to have been cited in the comments either, but this is a matter on which US and UK law are quite similar.	Probably murder. Because "victim 2 was then shot by this man in self defense" hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting. He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a "rightful death" call on his own, (is there such a thing?) and dispose of all the evidence. Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1. There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge.	If I can summarise: Jane gave money to Joe on the understanding that he would give it to Bob, Joe kept the money. This is matter between Jane and Joe, Bob is not involved. Edit The OP has stated that Joe did give the money to Bob. In that case, Joe was acting as Jane's agent and he discharged his agency. This is a matter between Jane and Bob, Joe is involved only so far as he was a witness to what happened.	Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established.	According to a blog post (written by a lawyer who actually has had multiple people ask about that), it depends on several things. The gist is that they're not getting away with this "brilliant plan" unless they take so many steps to make it look legitimate that it will, in fact, become a legitimate porn production enterprise — in which case, why bother with the ruse in the first place? To find you guilty of prostitution, a jury would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of prostitution and not just making porn. But putting a camera in the room doesn't necessarily make it First-Amendment-protected porn; sometimes it just means you're giving them evidence of your crime. Since juries can differ, there's not really a bright line. But some things look bad to judges and juries. If the director is also doing sexual acts in the film, that looks bad. If he's also never directed or acted in porn before, that looks bad. If a person in the film is paying for the "actresses" instead of getting paid for "acting", that looks very bad; see United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 1975). Having an actual script, on the other hand, may look good. Keep in mind that if the film is not just pornographic but actually obscene, obscenity laws could still apply even if you convince them it isn't prostitution. The First Amendment does not protect obscene materials. Additionally, if you claim it's porn, you will need to properly keep records of the names (and all former names/aliases) and dates of birth of your "actors" and "actresses", unless you want to be guilty of a federal felony. This includes making a copy of their photo ID. The records must also made available for inspection by the Attorney General and his inspectors for a minimum of 20 hours per week, with no advance notice given by them. Is everyone involved really going to be OK with all of this - especially since the law specifically notes that the records may be used as evidence in a federal obscenity prosecution?	Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft.
Is presenting a play showing Military characters in a bad light a crime in the US? Or does the First Admendment prevent this? This is a followup to Is it illegal to wear military surplus clothing? US Law 10 USC 771 provides that only members of the US military may wear: ...the uniform, or a distinctive part of the uniform, of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps; or a similar uniform, except as otherwise provided by law. To do so without authorization is a crime. 18 USC 702 has almost identical provisions. 10 USC 772 gives a list of exceptions: circumstances in which people not currently in the military may legally wear the uniform. Of these, paragraph (f) reads: While portraying a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, an actor in a theatrical or motion-picture production may wear the uniform of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force. (emphasis added) It seems to me that the bold section would, if enforced, constitute an impermissible regulation of symbolic speech, in that it is a content-based regulation. Can it really be made criminal for an actor to portray a "member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps" as a tyrant, or a bigot, or in some other way that "tend[s] to discredit that armed force"? There are some historical situations where an accurate portrayal might well "tend to discredit" a military service: For example the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam, or the Andersonville prison during the civil war, just to name two. Or a completely fictional portrayal of a modern Captain Queeg could be seen as discreditable. For the matter of that, the portrayal of the Captain in the classic WWII film Mister Roberts could be so seen. Of course, this only arises as an issue if someone tries to prosecute in such a situation. If it were, would a First Amendment defense be likely to prevail?	Yes, A First Amendment defense would apply. This is no longer a crime. Schacht In Schacht vs. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) the US Supreme Court held the final clause of 10 USC 772(f) unconstitutional on just this ground. In that case anti-war protesters rehearsed and performed a skit in which soldiers shot and killed a character dressed as a member of the Vietcong, only to discover and proclaim that the character was a pregnant woman. One of them, Daniel Jay Schacht, was indicted in a United States District Court for violating 18 U.S.C. 702, ... He was tried and convicted by a jury, and on February 29, 1968, he was sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and to serve a six-month prison term, the maximum sentence allowable ... In the opinion by Justice Black, the Court held; This clause on its face simply restricts 772 (f)'s authorization to those dramatic portrayals that do not "tend to discredit" the military, but, when this restriction is read together with 18 U.S.C. 702, it becomes clear that Congress has in effect made it a crime for an actor wearing a military uniform to say things during his performance critical of the conduct or policies of the Armed Forces. ... ... it follows that his conviction can be sustained only if he can be punished for speaking out against the role of our Army and our country in Vietnam. Clearly punishment for this reason would be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech. The final clause of 772 (f), which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment. To preserve the constitutionality of 772 (f) that final clause must be stricken from the section. Hamilton In United States vs Hamilton (2012) the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals limited 18 U.S.C. § 702 (wearing a military uniform without authorization), and 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) and (d) (wearing military medals and other insignia without authorization). Hamilton had, among other actions, appeared at a Vietnam Veterans’ Recognition Ceremony in the dress Uniform of a Colonel of US Marines, wearing numerous medals and awards including two Navy Crosses, four Silver Stars, one Bronze Star, and seven Purple Hearts. He had in fact been medically discharged years earlier with less than 1 year of service, after an accident to his hand, with the rank of Private First Class (PFC). He had not been awarded any of the medals or decorations that he wore. (He had previously been apprehended on military bases three times wearing the uniforms of a colonel (once) and a lieutenant general (twice), but was not charged on those occasions.) The Fourth Circuit wrote: We observe that the Ninth Circuit applied such a limiting construction to Section 704(a) in United States v. Perelman, holding that the statute created a criminal offense prohibiting the unauthorized wearing of military medals only when the wearer "has an intent to deceive." (658 F.3d at 1137-38) In our view, the imposition of a limiting construction requiring an "intent to deceive" is appropriate with respect to both Sections 702 and 704(a). ... Accordingly, we hold that persons violate the insignia statutes if they wear a military uniform without authorization, or wear military medals or imitations of such medals, respectively, only when they do so with the intent to deceive. The Fourth Circuit went on to hold these provisions constitutional when so limited, and to uphold the convictions under them, quoting Schacht is support of this holding.	In US Law, banning speech based on its content is called "Content-based" speech regulation (shocking, I know), as opposed to "Content-neutral" speech regulation like requiring all protests to end before a specific time. Content-based speech regulation can be constitutional if it passes strict scrutiny, but in the case of banning swastikas, it would fall under an even narrower subset of content-based speech regulation called "viewpoint regulation." I haven't found a case where the swastika or Nazi flag was banned in particular, but we can find reasoning that appears to safely protect the peaceful display of the Nazi flag and ideology from government restriction in Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), a case in which Chicago banned picketing within 150 feet of a school except in the case of labor disputes related to the school. The Supreme Court found that this amounted to viewpoint-based discrimination, writing in the majority opinion: But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. As with all rights restrictions, a particular restriction may be Constitutional if it passes "strict scrutiny," namely, it: is necessary to a "compelling state interest"; is "narrowly tailored" to achieving this compelling purpose; and uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve the purpose. In general, a ban on the peaceful display of Nazi imagery or promotion of Nazi ideas would fail the first test, as the government does not have a compelling interest to suppress ideas which might be distasteful to some or even the majority of people. I have seen an argument that because the Nazi regime's stated goal included genocide, that promoting that ideology amounts to advocating violence. Speech which advocates violence or criminality may be criminalized, but only under a specific "imminent lawless action" test expressed in Brandenburg v. Ohio: Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case was brought against a KKK member who advocated various violent acts at a rally. The main distinction is that his speech did not call for specific violence, but merely advocated for it in general. This almost exactly mirrors the rationale for banning the Nazi ideology based on its advocacy of violence, and shows that a ban on such grounds would be unconstitutional. "Imminent" was clarified in Hess v. Indiana to mean that the action must be intended to produce actual lawless action at a specific point in the future, not simply advocate for it in general. Hess was a protester who was being forced off a street by police, said "We'll take the fucking street later" and was convicted of disorderly conduct for it, which the court reversed as his statement "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time" and was therefore protected by the First Amendment.	Whether or not a war between political entities can result from some action is completely political and strategic, and not legal. The specific incident is probably legal, given US and international law regarding military action. Unless the order was self-evidently unlawful there is no possibility of arrest and prosecution under US law, however there might be a framework for legal action by Iran, if e.g. a drone operator were to fall into Iranian hands. The specifics of the order are not generally known, though we know that DoD states that this was due to a presidential order. This article discusses targeted killing from a legal perspective. In the context of war, killing is legal though not entirely unregulated. There was a failed attempt to sue the US in the case Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, which involved a targeted killing of a US citizen involved in planning terrorist attacks, a suit which was dismissed. One problem is that the suit "failed to state a 4th Amendment claim", and also failed to state a 5th Amendment due process claim since Al–Aulaqi's deaths was unanticipated. The court notes that a Bivens claim allows damage action against a federal officer for violation of clearly-established constitutional rights. However, No case has discussed precisely whether a plaintiff can proceed on a Bivens action that claims deprivation of life without due process based on the overseas killing by United States officials of a U.S. citizen deemed to be an active enemy. In the discussion, the question arises whether special circumstances counsel hesitation (Doe v. Rumsfeld and citations therein), which the Doe court notes would "require a court to delve into the military's policies", and they will not do that lightly. All of this is about US citizens. Soleimani was not a US citizen.	That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.	It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted.	There is no crime of "police misconduct" in the US, but murder or theft are certainly crimes which would qualify as "police misconduct". To take a real case, an officer in Georgia was convicted of aggravated assault, violating oath of office, and making a false statement (not murder, though he did kill the victim). In principle, he would also be liable in a lawsuit by the victim's family. However, these would be separate legal processes, the criminal prosecution being conducted by and at the discretion of the government prosecutor, and the monetary lawsuit being conducted by and at the discretion of the victim's family (on behalf of the victim). It is possible that an officer will be convicted yet not found civilly liable, or vice versa; or both, or neither. The victim (or family) doesn't necessarily have any connection to the criminal case, although they typically can testify during the sentencing phase. In some jurisdictions (e.g. California), the victim has a right to testify at a sentencing hearing. The result of a lawsuit can never be imprisonment – that has to come from criminal prosecution, and criminal prosecution does not result in a monetary reward to the victim (any criminal fine goes to the government).	Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.	Some parts of his personnel file are improper to disclosure, although mere data on his history of promotions is probably not among those private parts of the file, as his rank would be widely available information displayed on his uniform every single day and probably publicized in every public communication he had with anyone. Every promotion is a commissioned officer is actually printed in an act of Congress, since all commissioned officer promotions must be approved by Congress. In any case, generally speaking, in U.S. law, liability for disclosure of classified information extends only to the person who improperly obtained that information, not to the person who published it, as the Pentagon Papers case attests.
Would it be legal for a minor to participate in social gambling? Someone is holding a poker game, would it be legal for a minor to participate? This is in Texas.	Generally, it would be a juvenile offense for a minor to gamble and a crime for an adult to do so (assuming that the minor is old enough to be prosecuted for juvenile delinquency, you can't prosecute a two year old for playing poker). There are affirmative defenses to this crime (and the parallel juvenile offense) if: the actor engaged in gambling in a private place; no person received any economic benefit other than personal winnings; and except for the advantage of skill or luck, the risks of losing and the chances of winning were the same for all participants	So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent.	In Texas, as in most of the US, the law is "Employment at Will". This means that an employer is free to fire people at any time, for any reason, or none, as long as it is not for one of the few reason forbidden by law, such as racial or age discrimination. Hourly employees are entitled to overtime pay in such cases, but "exempt" employees are not. Nor are they entitled to comp-time as a matter of law, that is at the option of the employer. (The question seems to imply that the employee in question was "exempt" but does not actually say so.) The only really effective recourse against that sort of "death march" is to quit and find a better job, or to threaten to do so while they still need you, unless the conditions return to acceptable ones. I have heard of people in such a situation who "get sick" every day at 5:30pm, because local law forbid requiring ill employees to work. But that is pretty much inviting an arduous and possibly expensive administrative and/or legal battle, and will depend on the specifics of the state/local law. In any case, it is too late for the person in question to try that. On the facts as stated, there might be a valid claim of age discrimination. But additional facts would be needed to establish this, and it would be in my view unwise to try it without consulting a good employment lawyer. Such a lawyer could advise exactly what must be proved and how, and what the probable chances of any recovery would be.	It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.	You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know.	The ultimate question is whether an obviously joke enterprise constitutes a real offering of securities or just performance art (a Ponzi scheme is one of many types of securities fraud). An unregistered offering of securities that does not fall within an exception is per se unlawful under federal law, but a security is generally defined as something offered with at least a prospect of making a potential profit for the investor which is not something that is true of this offering. (And if less than $1,000,000 are sold it might even be within an exemption to securities laws). State securities laws are divided into two categories. Most allow any offering of securities so long as proper disclosures are made and the offer is restricted to the right kind of investors. A minority impose substantive quality standards on offerings and this offering might violate the law in those states (although this still would present the question of whether a known money losing opportunity is really a security since there is no evidence of an intent to potentially make a profit from the investment). I do not believe that California imposes substantive quality of investment standards on public or private offerings of securities. Any deal whether or not it is a security is actionable if it is fraudulent. Normally an element of any claim for fraud is justified reliance upon a representation or upon a failure to disclose information. But, in this case, it is hard to see how anyone could say that they were justified in relying on any representation in making a purchase because they were told that they were being cheated. So, it is hard to see how a fraud claim would be sustained here either. I'm not sure that this cleanly falls into the category of gambling either, even though there is money at stake and the outcome isn't entirely certain. This doesn't really seem like a game of chance to me. Indeed, viewed as performance art, this scheme might even be entitled to First Amendment protection. Ultimately, I would not prioritize a civil or criminal action against this enterprise either from the perspective of a private lawyer representing an investor, or from the perspective of a government enforcement authority. And, while I would be a little nervous about running this enterprise, I wouldn't be quaking in my boots. In a civil lawsuit, any award would probably be minimal, and in a criminal case there would probably be an extremely generous plea offered.	I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.	What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes
How should you respond if called to testify in court without committing perjury? Fortunately, I have not been a witness at court yet, and these scenarios are theoretical, but if I were, say if I witnessed a murder, then... How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have?	How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? You have to answer any permissible questions (i.e. consistent with the rules of evidence) asked. If you were doing something illegal you can claim the fifth and not testify unless you are given "transaction immunity" that your testimony will not be used against you in a criminal case against you. Usually perjury prosecutions require that the lie be about a material fact. Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have? Tell the prosecutor on the case and ask the prosecutor to provide protection to you and to go after the people making the threat. The witness protection program was created for these cases.	I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.	You don’t need to hire an attorney If you like, you can represent yourself. Just like you can build your own house, repair your own car or amputate your own limb. You only need to be a lawyer if you are representing someone else. However, there is a saying that goes: A person representing themselves has a fool for a client. Your lawyer is a professional, you aren’t. They know what to do when the other side says “Objection, facts not in evidence” or how to correctly fill out, file and serve a pleading; do you?	I've never heard of a rule specifically addressing this in the united-states, but I expect most courts would disallow it. I suspect a court would believe that the note-taking would be a distraction to the witness, whose focus should be on listening to the questions and providing truthful answers. The note-taking may be perceived as a distraction from the testimony for others in the courtroom, as well. If I were examining the witness, I would probably be entitled to see what the notes say, dragging out the witness's examination. Then the witness would want to take notes about my questions about her notes, and I'd want to see those notes, and you can see how it can get out of control.	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions.	The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.	The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence.
Selling property to low-net-worth buyer Suppose that someone inherited a plot of undeveloped land in a small town in California. The town has a few houses and businesses, but is mostly comprised of undeveloped lots. Even so, suppose this town levies property taxes to suppose the local services (fire, waste disposal, etc.) which are in excess of the market value of the property (a few hundred dollars per year). If there are no conventional buyers of such a plot, are there any legal ramifications to selling said property to, say, an indigent buyer who has questionable means and perhaps low propensity to pay the taxes, but who could be incentivized to purchase the property for only a small loss to the seller?	The question seems to assume that the purpose of the sale is to avoid property tax liability. First, property tax liability on a parcel of property with marginal value is generally only a tiny percentage of the fair market value of the property, and the usual remedy if the property is overvalued is to contest the valuation of the property when it is made. Property taxes on property with a fair market value of a few hundred dollars would almost never be more than $1 per year. Second, the usual remedy for non-payment of property tax, if it continues long enough, is for the property to be sold for tax liens in foreclosure sale. It would be extraordinarily exceptional for a lawsuit against the owner to be pursued to collect (lawsuits against owners are used in California to collect property taxes on tangible personal property that is subject to a property tax). So, the implicit motives behind the question are misguided. But, a property owner is free to sell real estate to an unrelated third-party at any price the seller wants, even if the buyer can't afford to pay the property taxes on the property. The buyer takes subject to property tax liens for unpaid property taxes on the property.	Leaving out who the shipper is for a minute, the primary loss would be the seller's (UCC 2-613) in that the loss would be total and the contract would void (so the buyer has not obligation to pay the seller, and the seller's stuff is nevertheless gone). The seller has a remedy against most shippers, so that UPS or Fedex would be liable to covering their loss (assuming buyer has not assume the liability by agreeing to delivery without signature). However, USPS has special immunity: the government is liable to tort claims, but 28 USC 2680(b) states that The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to... Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter Thanks to Nate Eldredge for raising the case Dolan v. USPS 546 U.S. 481 (2006), where it was held that USPS has very narrowly circumscribed immunity from liability. Under this provision, they are not liable for breaking contents when delivered negligently, but that does not mean that they are not liable for breaking things as a result of their deliveries (they broke Mrs. Dolan, in how they piled stuff on the porch). Although this case does not rule on the meaning of "loss" or "miscarriage", on a plain reading of the terms, theft results in a loss ("loss" is not restricted to "mysterious disappearance"). The court also observes that losses of the type for which immunity is retained under §2680(b) are at least to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal registration and insurance and the court explains that one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid “extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available” (that is, Congress opened the government to tort liability in just those cases where there were no remedies: but there has long been postal insurance).	No, because you are affecting the car's value by selling its parts. The car is collateral to the loan, so if you don't make the payments, the lender has the right to repossess and resell it to recoup their money. If they are unable to recover at least the outstanding balance of the loan through resale, you will be on the hook for the difference. This is called a "deficiency balance". Simply having possession of something isn't adequate basis to decide you can do whatever you want with it. You have physical possession, but the lender is the first lien holder on the title until the loan is satisfied.	The historical record on the question is probably too thin to yield a well-supported answer as to the due diligence and the underlying "what were they thinking" question, that is, I doubt there is any record of any original debate where one side demands resolution of the contradiction, and how that charge was answered. The American Law of Taxation: As Determined in the Courts of Last Resort gives a summary of the ensuing case law relationship between taxation and compensation, as of 1884 (p. 31 of the book, p. 100 in the PDF): Taxation differs from the power of eminent domain in this: that it has no thought of compensation by way of return for that which it takes and applies to the public good, further than all derive benefit from the purposes to which it is applied; in other words, that the support of government and other objects of public utility promoted by taxation are supposed to return to the individual the same which has been taken from him, as his share of the public burden and The limitation in the constitution that private property shall not be taken for public use, refers solely to the right of eminent domain, and not to taxation or special assessments for local benefits. (both quotes with long lists of supporting state law citations). The New York case People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 apparently overturned its prior ruling (I think the citation is 6 Barb. 214, which I can't track down), commenting on the earlier ruling on an assessment. The supreme court reversed and annulled the assessment, holding... That money is property; that it can not be taken from a citizen for public use by the right of eminent domain, without just compensation; and that the enhancement in value of the relators' lands, by the grading and paving of Flushing avenue, is not that just compensation within the meaning of the constitution. The later court gets out of this, noting that Taxation exacts money, or services, from individuals, as and for their respective shares of contribution to any public burden. Private property taken for public use by right of eminent domain, is taken not as the owner's share of contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond his share. Special compensation is therefore to be made in the latter case, because the government is a debtor for the property so taken; but not in the former, because the payment of taxes is a duty and creates no obligation to repay, otherwise than in the proper application of the tax. Taxation operates upon a community or upon a class of persons in a community and by some rule of apportionment. The exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon an individual, and without reference to the amount, or value exacted from any other individual, or class of individuals. In other words, the Takings and Just Compensation clauses are understood to be about the power of eminent domain, which specially burdens the individual, and that is distinct from the general burdening of society that is taxation. There are, as far as I know, no finely-tuned SCOTUS rulings on the relation between the Just Compensation clause and the tax and spend clause. There is case law that holds that there is no contradiction between the power to tax and the Fifth Amendment. For example McCray v. US, 195 U.S. 27: While both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments qualify, insofar as they are applicable, all the provisions of the Constitution, nothing in either of them operates to take away the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, and that power being unrestrained except as limited by the Constitution, Congress may select the objects upon which the tax shall be levied, and, in exerting the power, no want of due process of law can possibly result, and the judiciary cannot usurp the functions of the legislature in order to control that branch of the Government in exercising its lawful functions. And Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U.S. 1: So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance, since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process clause. This however says that taxation laws do not violate the due process requirement.	Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.	As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting.	The United State doesn't have a national sales or value added tax, so the IRS would only care about the phone sale insofar as it might represent income to the seller. Insofar as it's income to the seller, it doesn't matter whether the transaction is cash, bitcoin or barter, the seller is supposed to account for it in their income taxes. If you are suggesting that bitcoin sales could be hidden, well, folks have been hiding cash transactions since taxes were invented. Worst case, the IRS discovers that the seller's spending is wildly out of line with their stated income and they begin a criminal investigation.	De minimis only applies when you are actually dealing with the law, that is, someone ends up in court. I am unaware of any jurisdiction which makes it a crime to "mishandle" food waste. Usually, a company is granted a monopoly over waste management for residences in a certain jurisdiction, the government vaguely indicates what the service is supposed to do (sometimes because the recipient of the waste is a government-run waste facility), then the service communicates to customers what their policies will be. The use of "should" in such communications does not imply "legally and enforceably must". The waste management business has a contract with the individual to provide specified services, which may for example "imply" that you are not allowed to throw yard waste in regular trash. If your trash contains a leaf of grass, that might technically be contrary to their policy, but the possibilities of a consequence for the individual depends on what is in the contract. It is possible that a surcharge can be added to a bill, but typically this only happens in the case of egregious and repeated violations, with multiple prior notices.
What methods exist to provide relief in criminal cases where the state refuses to prosecute? In this question it was shown that it is not possible to bypass the States Attorney before the grand jury. But what relief exists in cases where Prosecutorial Discretion might be used to protect people who are powerful, influential, and/or friends of the Court?	I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.	Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.	In all but a few U.S. states the answer is that you are not entitled to any compensation. This is grossly unfair, but is the dominant rule by far in most jurisdictions in the U.S. As a matter of legal doctrine this is justified on the grounds that a criminal prosecution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and many people who are actually guilty may be acquitted anyway because the standard of proof in a criminal case is so high. The classic example of that distinction is the O.J. Simpson murder case, in which O.J. Simpson was acquitted of murdering his wife in a criminal prosecution, but was found liable for murdering her by the lower civil action preponderance of the evidence standard in a wrongful death lawsuit brought by her family. (In reality, most acquittals involve juries who think that the defendant was innocent, but that isn't reflected in the choice before them to convict or acquit a defendant.) The only compensation to which you are entitled as a matter of law if you are acquitted of a crime, per the U.S. Supreme Court, is a refund of any fines or costs payable only upon conviction of a crime, which you paid or had taken from your assets, prior to your acquittal. See Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. ___ (2017). There would an exception if you can show that a law enforcement officer intentionally brought charges without probable cause in a civil lawsuit you bring against the law enforcement officer, which is realistically impossible in almost all cases. (Prosecutors and judges and jurors (see, e.g. here)) have absolute immunity from liability for their official acts related to the court process.) There are a few jurisdictions where you could bring a civil lawsuit for compensation based upon "actual innocence", rather than law enforcement misconduct. In those places, you could receive compensation if you could prove by a preponderance of the evidence (or with a prosecutor's affirmation) that you were actually factually innocent, so you could get some compensation even in the absence of an intentional violation of your civil rights. Texas is one state that has such a scheme, with important limitations, as explained in this linked case. You would probably have to hire a lawyer with your own funds to bring either kind of lawsuit, and realistically, you wouldn't have been incarcerated for eight months pending trial if you had enough money to do that, because you would have posted bond and been released pending trial. There may be one or two states (I can't recall any from memory) where there might be a right to compensation merely because you are acquitted, but this would be an extreme outlier in terms of U.S. law. Outside the United States, outcomes could vary dramatically from one country to another. They relevant law in England and Wales is discussed in an answer to this question at Law.SE. International human rights law does not recognize a right to compensation in these circumstances.	In a nutshell: Anyone can initiate a prosecution in Canada by laying evidence of each element of the alleged crime before a Justice of the Peace. the Justice sets up a hearing with a Judge who will rule if the accused has a case to answer. If there is a case to answer then the State has the right to intervene by either taking over the prosecution or terminating it. If the State does not intervene then the private prosecutor follows the matter through. In more detail: http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/8090603-burns.pdf Things to note The state has immunity from being sued if the prosecution is without foundation - a private prosecutor doesn't. On the facts you state, you can't initiate a prosecution - having "heard it paraphrased by an alleged former intelligence agent" is not evidence of anything. Investigation Anyone can investigate anything they want for whatever reason they want so long as they act within the law. This is what journalists and private investigators do for a living.	There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process.	The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.	The closest case to this is Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742 (1970): We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady' case, there is no claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty. In Brady, had he not entered a guilty plea, he would have been risking the death penalty. The court recognized: It may be that Brady, faced with a strong case against him and recognizing that his chances for acquittal were slight, preferred to plead guilty, and thus limit the penalty to life imprisonment, rather than to elect a jury trial which could result in a death penalty. They upheld the plea: Although Brady's plea of guilty may well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, and we have no reason to doubt that his solemn admission of guilt was truthful. So, even in the case where the risk of a death penalty may have motivated a guilty plea, the plea has been upheld. All of the above is with respect to actions of the prosecution. In any case, the main test is whether the defendant entered a plea voluntarily and intelligently.	How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
What exactly is banned if the US bans on several Chinese apps go into effect? President Trump issued several executive orders, banning certain Chinese-owned apps in 45 days if they are still owned by their original companies (as I understand it): EO 13942 (August 6, 2020) - TikTok EO 13943 (August 6, 2020) - WeChat EO 13971 (January 5, 2021) - Alipay, CamScanner, QQ Wallet, SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate, WeChat Pay, and WPS Office These executive orders were revoked by EO 14034. The Commerce Department published regulations on the bans: Prohibited transactions with TikTok, temporarily blocked by this injunction and this injunction (part 1 and 2) Prohibited transactions with WeChat (withdrawn, archived at Exhibit A here), temporarily blocked by an injunction. Both of these regulations were rescinded. Hypothetically, if one of these bans had gone into effect, what would have been the actual effect on an app user? Would app stores be required to remove the apps from the app store for users in the US? Would app stores run by US companies (e.g. Apple iOS app store, Google Play for Android) be required to remove the apps from the app store for users outside the US? Would it be illegal for a user in the US to download the app somehow from outside the app store? Would it be illegal for a user in the US to use the app if they have already downloaded it? Would it be illegal (under US law) for a US citizen outside the US to download and/or use the app? Would ISPs in the US be required to try to block network traffic of the app?	I will try to answer some of my questions based on recent developments and other information I've seen. Yes. 2. No. On page 23 of this Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok, it describes: This prohibition would remove the TikTok app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. On page 15 of this Commerce Dept. memo on WeChat, it describes: This prohibition would remove the WeChat app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. 3,4,5. No for WeChat. In letters sent to the opposite party in a lawsuit and filed with the court, the US government has provided assurances that WeChat users will not have any civil or criminal liability for downloading or using the app for personal or business communication. we can provide assurances that the Secretary does not intend to take actions that would target persons or groups whose only connection with WeChat is their use or downloading of the app to convey personal or business information between users, or otherwise define the relevant transactions in such a way that would impose criminal or civil liability on such users. In other words, while use of the app for such communications could be directly or indirectly impaired through measures targeted at other transactions, use and downloading of the app for this limited purpose will not be a defined transaction, and such users will not be targeted or subject to penalties. I'm not entirely sure for TikTok, but the same may be true for TikTok since the prohibited transactions for both are essentially the same. No. The regulations on prohibited transactions do not require the blocking of traffic from the apps. Simply carrying the traffic of the app is not one of the prohibited transactions, as long as the company does not have a contract for internet transit or peering with ByteDance/Tencent, nor are providing hosting or content delivery services to ByteDance/Tencent. On page 23 of the Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok linked above, it says: User data could still be served by data centers, [redacted] operating outside of the United States. On page 7 of this declaration by a Commerce Dept. official further explains that WeChat traffic will still flow through the US: Moreover, this prohibition would not affect Internet transit or peering services in the United States that are not “directly contracted or arranged” by Tencent, and thus would leave the overwhelming majority of Internet traffic, including WeChat data, untouched.	You're completely misreading the goals and purpose of the Export Controls Office - Overview. They regulate the transfer of US regulated information and technology, commodities, and software in the interest of national security and economic growth. Transfer and export are not the same as the use of technology that personal devices contain. The simplest thing to do is simply call the Export Controls Office, and they will explain the difference, and tell what you need to do and what is not required of you when traveling. Some countries do prevent the use of some personal tech or Apps, i.e. Russia and Signal, the encrypted phone app; but that has nothing to do with UC.	That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.	It is hard to prove a negative, but no - there is not rule that an app cannot track a user while the app is in the background. Almost every GPS-function app on every smart phone does the very thing you are talking about.	Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk.	I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.	If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers;	The U.S. could pass a law directing Apple to create software for fair compensation. Similar statutes have been passed in wartime compelling companies to do all sorts of things and companies don't have all of the rights of individuals. If it can be done (not obvious in the case of existing products in the market place), it might be possible for the government to compel it to do so; if it can't be done, it can't be compelled and not all things are possible retroactively. There would also be a constitutional contracts clause issues with such a law impairing contracts between Apple and its customers when applied to existing phones retroactively. Whether it could require Apple to create a law enforcement back door depends upon whether 4th Amendment privacy rights trump the creation of a means to do so. There is an expectation of privacy in electronic records, but it is not absolute. But, there is no law on the books requiring this from Apple. It does not flow naturally from existing powers of law enforcement under existing statutes. It goes beyond what a subpoena would ordinarily require someone to do, and a subpoena is the main means by which governments compel people to provide information. In my opinion, a court faced with that question would rule that a statute requiring Apple to do this prospectively would be constitutional, but no such statute exists. However, this is currently an open legal question because there is no statute of the kind that have been litigated in a manner that produced a binding precedent.
How to attribute a Creative Commons website icon I want to use this icon on a public website. The Creative Commons license says I must give attribution. I've read here that to give proper attribution, you must put the work's name, author's name, source, and license next to the image. Since I'm using the image as a small icon, it won't work visually to put the attribution next to the image. What should I do to provide attribution without needing to put a bunch of text next to the icon?	You are not "citing" the image - a citation is a reference to a (scholarly) work from another work, you are attributing a work that you have directly copied. The licence tells you what you must do: Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. I highlighted the important point: they tell you what you must do, the how is up to you so long as it is reasonable.	Under the Berne Convention, a copyright notice is not required at all, although using one is good practice. Using one usually eliminates the claimed status of "innocent infringement", which, if found true by a court, greatly reduces damage awards. It is usual to place such notices at or near the start of a work. That is where people tend to look for them, and I don't see any good reason not to follow this practice. The book tradition is the the copyright page comes before any part of the actual work, including the table of contents, sometimes with a continuation at the end of the work, if there is more than one page of notices. But that is not now a legal requirement, if it ever was. In short, there are no rigid rules on this, but putting a copyright notice at or quite near the start is good practice, and I would suggest sticking to it.	Yes, if you do not use the trademarked name. In the U.S. the graphical shape of fonts are not protected by copyright. See 37 CRF section 202.1 Typefaces are specifically excluded. Excluded are under (a) "mere variations of typographic ornamentation," and (e) "Typeface as typeface." The computer code that a font/typeface program uses to produce the shapes can be copyright. Importantly, fonts are protected by their trademarked names.	What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.	To the best of my understanding: US copyright law does not have anything in particular to say about credits of this nature, for the most part. The law doesn't even say that you have to credit people at all. It just says you have to get a license (i.e. "permission") to use the item in question. Even that is only required when the work is not a "work made for hire" (i.e. any work by an employee of the production company, within the scope of their job). There are some weird situations where the law does require a credit (e.g. a compulsory license acquired under 17 USC 115 requires the licensee to preserve metadata identifying the original song and artist), but this is the exception rather than the rule. The exact wording and ordering of film credits (and TV/other credits) is typically the product of extensive negotiations between all of the people credited, the production company, and (in most cases) their respective unions. It is thus subject to contract law rather than copyright law. Copyright licenses usually mandate some sort of credit be given, except for certain specialized types of work such as ghostwriting (where the whole point is that you don't get credited). Some licenses are more flexible on this point than others. For example, Creative Commons licenses set out a specific list of things that must be included, and mandate that it must appear alongside other credits if there are any, but other than that, you can basically word and display the credit in any way that is "reasonable." However, one-off private licenses will likely be much more specific and restrictive about how the credit is displayed. Speculating: It may be the case that different attorneys drafted different licensing agreements with different credit phrasings wholly by accident, or for no particular reason, simply due to a lack of direct coordination. In other words, nobody was actively trying to make sure all the credits matched, so they didn't.	Although the exact answer should depend on the country you are, in general private copies of copyrighted works are allowed. General rules are: You need to have got the work in a legitimate way. That is, that you have purchased a copy of the work with permission from copyright owners or you have got the work from an act of public distribution authorised by copyright owners - if you got it from a website that is not making a copyright infringement itself, you are in the second case. That you don't make a collective or commercial use of the work. (I took these rules from Spanish Intellectual Property law (article 31), but most countries have similar rules, specially in the European Union. Anyway, the exact limits of private copying exception may differ). Since private copying might have an economic effect, some countries collect private copying levies to compensate copyright owners - probably you have already paid for those when purchasing the printer. Therefore, you can print a book downloaded from a website (unless the site is hosting the work without authorization of the copyright owners, as pirate sites do) for your own use. You can't sell the copies or made a collective use of them. Although reach of collective use might be hard to assess, I would suggest that if you want all the people in your class have the book, send them the link so that any one could print their own copy. Update about the USA As the OP has now specified now their country I update the answer with a comment, although an additional answer by anybody more knowledgeable on US law would be great. I'm quite sure that for practical purposes the result is that you can print such a book anywhere in the world. However, I don't know which laws regulates that in the US. Google doesn't return meaningful results for "private copy usa", so I suppose it is know there by another name. Furthermore, statutes in common law countries tend to be less explicit and there might be no case law applicable. For example, I nobody printing a copy of a pdf for himself to read at home has ever been challenged in court in the USA, there might be no explicit rule about the subject.	The general idea of such an app is not subject to copyright protection. Ideas never are protected by copyright. So creating an app based on the functionality of a fictional app would not be a copyright violation. The logo might, if it is original enough, be protected by copyright. Any or all of the "name, the logo and the color scheme" might well be subject to trademark protection. (Names and other short phrases are not protected by copyright.) You would be wise not to use these identifying elements of the show, but instead create ones sufficiently different that no reasonable person would be confused into thinking that your app had been used on the show, or was sponsored, endorse, or approved by the show or its creators. An explicit disclaimer saying that you are in no way associated with the show or its creators, and your app is not approved by or endorsed by them would also be wise. Otherwise you might be accused of trying to pass off your work as affiliated with they show, or to trade on the show's reputation and fame. Whether you make your app an open source work is not in any way relevant to copyright or trademark claims. Whether you charge for your app is of only limited relevance to a copyright claim. Whether you sell or market your app, or use it to advertise some other product or service is relevant to a trademark claim, as trademarks are only protected against their use "in trade" which generally means commercially. However, non-commercial use of a trademark may constitute "dilution" of the mark, which may give rise to a cause of action against the person using it.	Your example powers are tropes and their basis in public domain The Queen of Pain's scream is modeled after the Banshee, which had a scream that would kill... and there are LOTS of variants of Banshee. In fact, "Our Banshees Are Louder" is a trope. Hiding in a shadow or walking through it is for example a typical feature of Ninja stories since the Edo Period, and a common Trope as "Shadow walker". That makes those two powers older than You can not have a copyright on concepts, facts, or ideas. Facts are not copyrightable, which was decided LONG ago over Feist v Rural. Neither can you copyright concepts or ideas. You won't get a claim on the concept of a damaging scream or turning into shadow. See also Copyright.gov (emphasis mine): How do I protect my idea? Copyright does not protect ideas, concepts, systems, or methods of doing something. You may express your ideas in writing or drawings and claim copyright in your description, but be aware that copyright will not protect the idea itself as revealed in your written or artistic work.
Can earthquake insurance companies legally ask about "Other Insurance"? California Earthquake Authority. §8 on Other Insurance says a. If there is other insurance that covers earthquake loss to the dwelling or other property covered under this policy,we will pay our share of the covered loss or damage. Our share is the proportion that the applicable limit of insurance under this policy bears to the combined limits of insurance of all policies that cover the same property. This reduces the value of my insurance policy (but not its cost to me) only because I have another policy, potentially with a competitor. It seems to have no purpose other than monopolism. Can it be an antitrust violation? More competitive forms of insurance, such as life insurance, put options, credit default swaps, etc., do not have clauses of this sort. For example, a $1M life insurance policy does not lose value merely because you have a second one. And you can get as many as you like (for example, you get one with each new job, and you can generally keep it way past your time of employment). Obviously these life insurance companies, commodity derivatives, etc. companies can't write clauses like the CEA clause above -- they don't have monopolies and so they would go out of business if they did this. Is there anything legally non-monopolistic about the CEA clause quoted above? Specifically, would CEA be in violation of anti-trust law if they suspended a claim because I either declined to discuss "Other Insurance", or because they found out about "Other Insurance" through some form of anti-competitive collusion?	Is there anything legally non-monopolistic about the CEA clause quoted above? Yes. The clause is not monopolistic at all, since it is not prohibiting you to purchase or retain policies from elsewhere. All it does is notify you about a limitation of CEA's liability to you in the event of losses covered by multiple insurance policies. Note that the clause is not in terms of "other insurers" or "insurance providers" but of "other insurance" (that is, regardless of there being one or multiple insurance providers involved). The clause addresses scenarios of coverage overlap, which has nothing to do with monopolistic practices. In fact, section 10089.26(b) of the California Insurance Code provides that Nothing in this section shall prohibit a participating or nonparticipating insurer from offering a condominium earthquake loss assessment policy for different amounts of coverage other than those offered by the authority. As explained above, the clause you reproduce is compatible with that provision. This reduces the value of my insurance policy (but not its cost to me) Some context is missing in your description, but you might want to inquire of the CEA about your premium on the basis of section 10089.26(a)(2): It is the intent of the Legislature, to the extent practicable, that rates charged by the authority to condominium loss assessment policyholders and residential property owner policyholders are treated equitably, and that a proportionate share of premiums is paid for potential exposure to loss, to the authority. Perhaps the CEA's reason for asking you about your other insurance policies is precisely to adjust/lower your premium. The clause you reproduce simply informs you that withholding that information in no event can result in you obtaining compensation that exceeds the loss you incurred. would CEA be in violation of anti-trust law if they suspended a claim because I either declined to discuss "Other Insurance", or because they found out about "Other Insurance" through some form of anti-competitive collusion? No. The terms of your insurance policy might entitle the insurer to void the policy or deny coverage in the event of intentional misrepresentations. That would have nothing to do with anti-trust legislation, but with your breach of contract: your concealment of information that can be material to the insurer's assessment of risk. If you can prove that concealing your other insurance is not a material breach, or not a breach at all, then the insurer's denial of a legitimate claim would put the insurer in breach of contract (not of anti-trust laws).	I did some research and found the information below. It took me a while to figure out that the issue is known in German as "Insichgeschäft". The quotes below are translations from Wikipedia. The term self-dealing is also used in Switzerland. It is regulated in Art. 32 ff. OR. The Federal Supreme Court has consistently ruled that self-contracting is fundamentally inadmissible because it “regularly leads to conflicts of interest and is therefore not covered by the company's purpose”. The contracting of the agent with himself should only be able to develop legal effects in exceptional cases, in particular if either the risk of the person represented being disadvantaged due to the nature of the legal transaction is excluded (e.g. "purchase of goods with clearly defined market or stock exchange prices"), or if the representative "specifically authorizes the representative to conclude a contract with himself, which in certain circumstances can also be tacit or approve the transaction retrospectively". Now since I am the owner of the business and my company would get a free exclusive license, I assume that the above mentioned exceptional case is valid: However, the risk of discrimination (and thus also the obligation to obtain approval from a higher-level or subsidiary body) does not apply if there are no other shareholders in the AG in addition to the body that has concluded self-contracting. The Federal Supreme Court has rejected the additional requirement that, in addition to the absence of further shareholders, there must also be no corporate creditors. Sole shareholders are therefore free to enter into individual deals. Therefore, such a contract should be legally ok. Finally, to be considered: As part of the reform of the GmbH, the company law (Art. 718b OR), the GmbH law (Art. 814 Para. 4 OR) and the cooperative law (Art. 899a OR) introduced the requirement of written form for contracts that the representative of the company concludes with himself, with the exception of contracts which do not exceed CHF 1,000.	united-states Business Practices There are contracts where consumer deposits are required to be held in trust, requirements that mostly, but not entirely, arise under state law in the U.S. For example, many states require that landlords hold security deposits for residential rental properties in separate trust accounts, and almost all U.S. jurisdictions require that attorneys hold prepayment for legal services in trust for the consumer until the fees are earned. As another example, in Colorado, if a property owner make a payment to a general contractor for work on real property such as building or renovating a building, the general contractor is required to hold those funds in trust and not make payments to itself from those funds, until all subcontractors and material suppliers on the job have been paid in full and have no lien claims. In the same vein, many construction contracts, especially for governments acting as consumers, require contractors to be "bonded and insured" meaning that a third-party bond company is responsible for paying claims against the bonded company even if the bonded company is insolvent. It also isn't unusual in complex commercial transactions between sophisticated big businesses, for the parties to negotiate that certain funds related to a transaction be held in a bankruptcy remote trust, or that the work be done by a "bankruptcy remote entity." But this is rarely the case when large numbers of consumers enter into small transactions with a big business. As @DaleM rightly notes, a business in a position to impose a contract of adhesion on consumers on a take it or leave it basis, can get away with it, and one simply might want to be wary about doing business with financially insecure businesses, if possible, even though financially secure businesses may charge more. A common theme is that consumers (maybe business to business or government to business) insist on trust-like or bond-like or insurance-like or collateral-like protections for deposits in transactions where the loss suffered if the security deposit was lost would be a major economic blow to the consumer in light of the consumer's overall financial situation. In contrast, these protections are foregone when the amount of a security deposit is small enough to be merely a survivable nuisance that may happen some small percentage of the time that the consumer engages in such transactions. This reflects an economic and policy judgment that the trouble of treating small consumer deposits as if they were trust funds isn't worth the transaction cost trouble of doing so. Priorities Under U.S. Bankruptcy Law In part to address the imbalance of power in this situation, claims to recover consumer deposits for unperformed goods or services owed by the debtor do have a priority under U.S. bankruptcy laws relative to general unsecured creditors of up to $1,800 per consumer. Specifically, these are seventh priority claims in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. ¶ 507(a)(7). They are behind claims secured by collateral to the extent of the value of the collateral (priority zero, so to speak), priority one alimony and child support claims, priority two costs of administering the estate, and priority three to six claims which include several kinds of claims that amount to up to about $20,000 of unpaid wages and benefits per employee and about $4,000 of unpaid amounts owed to farmers per farm for their crops. But security deposit claims are ahead of a variety of tax claims, FDIC claims, DUI personal injury claims, and general unsecured creditor claims. They are also ahead of the claims of stockholders. As a practical matter, when you are doing business with a business entity rather than a sole proprietor, there are no child support or alimony claims, and most businesses that have lots of transactions with retail consumers don't buy crops directly from farmers, so consumer deposit claims actually have a very high priority in bankruptcy and are usually repaid in full except in the very most catastrophic business collapses under U.S. law. So, while it isn't quite as good as holding those funds in trust, the bankruptcy priority comes close from the perspective of providing a practical benefit to every day small consumers doing business with large firms that go bankrupt. Canada Compared Superficially, at least, it appears that Canada does not have a similar priority for consumer security deposit claims in bankruptcy, although it could be that this arises in some back door manner invisible to practitioners unfamiliar with it under court interpretations of Section 70 of the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) which governs creditor priorities in bankruptcy in Canada. For example, the consumers may have an implied in law security interest in those funds of which I am not aware. It may also be that there are specific kinds of transaction in which deposits do have to be held in trust, just as there are in the U.S., even if that isn't true as a general rule. Finally, if one pays by credit card, it is often possible to reverse a charge like this one, pushing the risk of bankruptcy loss from the consumer buying with a credit card to the bank issuing the credit card, particularly if action is taken promptly.	An employee is an agent of the employer when working and owes a duty of loyalty to the employer. One of the obligations associated with a duty of loyalty is to refrain from receiving anything other than the employer authorized compensation for the work, rather than benefitting personally from work done on behalf of the employer. By appropriating additional benefit from the customer in a way that is unauthorized by the employer (the employer would be within its rights to sanction and authorize this conduct if desired), an employee who does not turn the profit in this transaction over to the employer has breached a fiduciary duty to the employer for which the employer would have a right to sue the employee for the amount by which the employee was unjustly enriched in the transaction. Would it actually play out this way in real life for these sums of money? Probably not. The stakes involved wouldn't justify the time and money of a lawsuit. But, breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty to your employer in this context probably constitutes good cause to terminate the employment of the employee without paying severance that would otherwise be payable under Canadian employment law (in theory anyway, I've never seen a reported court case on point).	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	Is there any legal doctrine whereby E's agreement with A continued to apply to E in his work for company N? No, because the parties to the non-compete agreement were Employee E and company A, not the human who owned and sold A. What about B? Do they have any standing to block E's going to work for a B's customer? No. My rationale is that the decisions you describe result in a waiver of the non-compete clause. An employment relation between B and E never existed. Thus, the only vestige of B's non-compete rights binding E that could have been preserved stem from E's former employment at A. However, that vestige disappeared at the instant B --apropos of the hospital project-- waived its non-compete clause with N. Given B's waiver with regard to N, N's failure to establish a non-compete clause with E enables the latter to conduct business with (or accept employment at) the hospital. If anything, B would have standing to sue N for negligence or related torts. But neither B nor N has any viable non-compete claims against E.	Did I lose possession of my goods? That seems unlikely. But enforcing it sounds complicated, at least from the standpoint of substantive law (the Code civil). I am not knowledgeable of French procedural law. The difficulty begins with identifying whether your claim is cognizable as unjust enrichment, or --per your subsequent oral agreement-- breach of contract. You might want to read sections "The French Law of Unjust Enrichment" and "Enrichissement sans Cause" in this post. Please note that the French Civil Code recently underwent significant reforms, whence references of its articles are likely outdated. Here I pointed out one example of statutory renumbering in the Code. In the second link, you will read that originally [...] the action in enrichissement sans cause would not be available to the claimant if he or she had any other cause of action, even if that cause of action was blocked for some reason. [...] [B]ut it is perhaps here that the law has relaxed most in recent cases. Thus, the subtleties of your matter can be decisive for identifying the type of claim that is applicable to your situation. Lastly, according to this treatise (on p.54), "[t]he French legal system does not have the principle of [reasonable] reliance as it exists in the American legal system" (brackets added). That makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove his claims under French law.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.
What is the definition of "retail" or "at retail" for the purposes of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act? Bob, a private individual, visits a store in California — where Corp, the manufacturer, maintains a showroom — and proceeds to purchase a consumer goods. Bob, after explaining his needs relevant to the purchase, is brought the product to the store front from the back, and is prompted to make a credit card payment via an otherwise unique and atypical machine. Bob is presented a credit card machine that does not include a screen to present any terms, and he is not presented any other written or oral terms by Corp or any of its representatives. Bob pays and Corp delivers. Bob, however, does not receive an a copy of the otherwise existing owner's manual or an express warranty. The ordinary use, however, has been defined in written statements which entered the bargain in that Bob reviewed and relied on them. Before day 60 of the purchase, and the first successful use of the product, therein, Bob learns that the product does not fit for the ordinary purposes such products are used and/or for which he specified and therefore gave a reason to Corp. to know Bob's particular although not unordinary purpose to use the consumer goods. Bob returns, and Corp. refuses to replace or refund. Corp. refuses to refund or replace the item, and advises Bob that he raise his concerns with the "online sales department", and Corp., therein, informs Bob that his purchase was an online purchase and the retail store does not handle any complaints. Paragraph (b) of Section 1791 states: “Buyer” or “retail buyer” means any individual who buys consumer goods from a person engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer goods at retail. As used in this subdivision, “person” means any individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or other legal entity that engages in any of these businesses. (emphasis added) I have been looking for the relevant authority to define "at retail" for a while, but I could not find a statute that I am sure is relevant here. I found Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007. (a)(1)A defining that: "[R]etail sale" or "sale at retail" means a sale for a purpose other than resale in the regular course of business in the form of tangible personal property. I am not completely sure if this would not be what governs it, but I'm also not sure it is. I couldn't find a definition in U.C.C., neither in Magnuson-Moss. Is there any case law on this or some other statute's definition that applies? Authorities §1791.1 (a)(2), (b) and (c) "“[A] violation . . . is not willful if the defendant’s failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present[...]" (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 853]) ”The [Song Beverly] act provides for both express and implied warranties, and while under a manufacturer’s express warranty the buyer must allow for a reasonable number of repair attempts within 30 days before seeking rescission, that is not the case for the implied warranty of merchantability’s bulwark against fundamental defects.” (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 454]” “[T]he Act does not require consumers to take any affirmative steps to secure relief for the failure of a manufacturer to service or repair a vehicle to conform to applicable warranties—other than, of course, permitting the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle . . . . In reality, . . . , the manufacturer seldom on its own initiative offers the consumer the options available under the Act: a replacement vehicle or restitution. Therefore, as a practical matter, the consumer will likely request replacement or restitution. But the consumer’s request is not mandated by any provision in the Act. Rather, the consumer’s request for replacement or restitution is often prompted by the manufacturer’s unforthright approach and stonewalling of fundamental warranty problems.” (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1050 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 853])	The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open).	It is actually because "this is important". Under US law, disclaimers must be "conspicuous" (UCC 2-316). So you can talk regularly when you're just stating the terms, but if you're disclaiming liability, YOU MUST BE CONSPICUOUS ("to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous"). There are many ways to make text conspicuous, so bold or larger type would do, but all-caps is pretty bullet-proof from a technological perspective. Thanks to ohwilleke for salient citations: invalidation of a plain-type buried indemnification clause, all-caps clause held to be sufficient, law review article on the conspicuousness requirement.	No, it does not. There is indeed a 2-year guarantee for all goods, but "goods" is defined to be a "tangible movable item" according to Directive 1999/44/EC Article 1, subsection 2(b). In less legalese, a physical item; software doesn't count. While there has been discussion about extending this protection to software, I'm not aware of this having been done yet. Even if it were, determining whether goods are "faulty" ultimately comes down to whether it conforms to the contract of sale (Article 2). I think it's likely that vendors in this area would put a disclaimer for unforeseen security vulnerabilities, or something to that effect.	You had bought product A. That constitutes you offering the seller a contract for you to get product A for your money. They keep the money and send product B - and now are in breach of the contract, as that is materially different from the contract both agreed to. Legal recourse is, depending on the customer protection laws, a refund of the payments or getting the correct product A. If you have a right for the Product A depends on exactly how it was advertized and the exact ToS.	Yes, that's true Common words are not trademarkable, as is a descriptive phrase, because a trademark needs to be distinctive. As the Netherland Trademark Office tells you, your mark can't fit in any of these categories: literal - Your tradename or logo must not literal describe or depict your goods or services. promotion - The trademark must amount to more than a value judgment alone. misleading They even have an FAQ about that! The trademark is descriptive - which is the most common reason. A trademark is descriptive when it describes the properties of the product or service or promotes these. For example: the words 'super fast bike' for the product category 'bicycles'. Please note: the wording here is not always in common usage. The trademark 'medi' is not listed in the dictionary as a common abbreviation for 'medical'. All the same, it is a common designation that consumers will understand right away in the discriptive sense. So, this type of trademark could also be descriptive and hence declined. Computerrepair is a literal description of what the business does, just like Biomild on a mild biological yogurt just describes it.	In fact, the first recognition of the First Sale doctrine came about precisely because a publisher attempted to do something of the nature of what you suggest. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. vs Straus, the Bobbs-Merrill Corporation attempted to enforce the following restriction, printed on the inside of a book it published: "The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright." They made the mistake of attempting to enforce it against, among others, R.H. Macy and Co., who they then had to take to court - and lost. This established the First Sale Doctrine, which then later (in 1976) was codified (in 17 U.S. Code § 109. Textbooks recently tested another element of this; in the 2013 case, Kirtsaeng v John Wiley and Sons Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Sale doctrine trumped a notice forbidding selling a book outside of a particular territory or region (Kirtsaeng imported textbooks from Thailand, where they were much cheaper than in the US, and resold them at a profit in the US).	Since you bought these online the Consumer Contract Regulations are going to be in effect here (if the price of the goods was over £42 anyway), (legislation) Where your cutting the tags off and wearing them outside for an hour comes into play is that would probably be considered "excessive handling" and they might be able to make a deduction from the amount of the refund. Your business can make a deduction from the value of the goods if you consider the customer has handled the goods excessively. You can’t deduct monies from the refund simply because the goods have been removed from the packaging or because the goods have been tried on or checked. In essence, distance selling purchasers are entitled to handle goods in the same way that they would in a normal retail store. That therefore includes touching the item or trying it on. Since no retail store is going to let you cut the tags from a pair of shoes and walk outside for an hour in them I'd say that test is probably met here. How much can they deduct? As the CCR puts it (emphasis mine): (9) If (in the case of a sales contract) the value of the goods is diminished by any amount as a result of handling of the goods by the consumer beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods, the trader may recover that amount from the consumer, up to the contract price. Which is likely where the "saleable condition" aspect is coming from - if they aren't in a condition where the retailer can sell them on they've essentially lost their full value. If the retailer makes returned goods available for sale on the site at reduced prices (like the "Amazon warehouse" deals) then a deduction of the difference in sale price between that and full retail is more likely.	Similar to this question and this one, the Uniform Commercial Code requires that exclusion of warranty be conspicuous. While it does not specify the manner in which text should be made conspicuous, putting it in all caps certainly has that effect if the surrounding text is in sentence case. The meaning is that all products come with implied warranties of merchantability (it is good enough to be sold to you) and fitness for purpose (it will do what it's meant to, and what you've been told it will do). This text excludes this product from those warranties (that is, those warranties do not apply). It also disclaims liability for claims and damages, which means that if this software causes you harm or damage, you can't file a suit to recover any loss. Whether this is enforceable would be decided by a court.
Can a gift shop no longer selling your art be actionable discrimination under English law? Inspired by the case of the artist Jess de Wahls, who is considering legal action against the Royal Academy after they discontinued stocking her art in their gift shop because of Ms de Wahls's view that trans women are not authentically women and that non-binary identities are invalid. Such a putative action would apparently under grounds related to the Equality Act 2010. Obviously, the facts of this case may not be entirely known to the public, but as a general question: can the act of no longer stocking the work of a particular artist in an art gift shop really constitute actionable discrimination in England & Wales? It strikes me that all choices of what a small shop made up of numerous artists sells are arbitrary. While Ms de Wahls's views may be protected according to the EAT's recent ruling in Forstater, that doesn't seem to me that it would that a shop has an obligation to endorse those views (but I'm not an expert). For the sake of the question, let us presume as appears to be the case with Ms de Wahls, that there are no breached contractual obligations or an employment relationship between the shop and the artist...	In addition to the points raised by Dale M's answer, it is important to recall the law as clarified by the Supreme Court in Lee v Ashers Baking Co & Ors [2018] UKSC 49 (aka, the 'gay cake case'). This case found that the providers of business services have a right not to be compelled to make speech with which they disagree without proper justification, under the Human Rights Act 1998. To quote from Lady Hale's judgment (emphasis added): [56] Under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, all legislation is, so far as it is possible to do so, to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. I have already indicated my doubts about whether this was discrimination against Mr Lee on the grounds of his political opinions, but have acknowledged the possibility that it might be. But in my view, FETO should not be read or given effect in such a way as to compel providers of goods, facilities and services to express a message with which they disagree, unless justification is shown for doing so. (nb: FETO refers to the statutory equalities instrument in Northern Ireland at issue; the analagous statute here is the Equality Act 2010) Given that the RA stocking Ms de Wahls was seen by critics as a communication of endorsement of the artist, there is a strong argument that the RA have the right not to be compelled to express endorsement of Ms de Wahl's views. (Whether or not stocking an artist is expressing their views is an open question, but I think the relevant point here is that the communicated message to some in the art community was of endorsement, meaning that RA was dealing with the semiotics of seeming to endorse). I think Lees provides support that the RA cannot be compelled to agree with Ms de Wahls's beliefs.	Two people exchanging goods or services on a commercial basis and then pretending it was two gifts is tax evasion. It's not a gift. It's a commercial sale that you lie about by 'putting' a different 'label' on it. Sometimes two people will give mutual gifts, e.g. if you come to my wedding: I give you dinner, you give me some kitchenware. Yet there's nothing commercial about it. So that's not income for either party. However, if you're talking about two businesses making sales to each other, that is very much income, regardless of what you badge it.	Part 3 of the Equality Act is the Part that applies to the provision of services to the public, which includes "the provision of goods." This Part prohibits service providers from discriminating as to the terms on which a provider provides the goods to the customer. Indirect discrimination is defined at Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. It establishes that indirect discrimination is a form of discrimination: 19 Indirect Discrimination (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (3) The relevant protected characteristics are— age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. In characterizing the "practice" that is being applied, the Court of Appeal has said this word is not a term of art and is not to be construed narrowly or in a limited way (see Ishola v Transport for London, [2020] EWCA Civ 112). A fair way to characterize the "practice" being applied in this circumstance is that the store is "selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150 and Nike Jordan 4128s (men's) at £200." (If instead the "pratice" were characterized more narrowly—selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150—then the analysis would not even get past 19(2)(b). Likewise, if the "practice" were characterized more broadly—selling both the women's and men's versions at a discount from time to time, not necessarily at the same time—then the analysis will also have difficulty getting past 19(2)(b).) The question is whether the application of this practice indirectly discriminates against "male purchasers." 19(2)(a): does the Nike store apply this practice to male and non-male purchasers? Yes. (This is why we're in an indirect discrimination analysis rather than direct discrimination.) 19(2)(b): does this practice put male purchasers at a disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that male purchasers are more likely to want to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. (I could also see a tribunal cutting the analysis off at this stage, depending on how much weight they place on choice. I know that Canada avoids inquiring into the "source" of the disadvantage or blaming it on an individual's choice, but I have no idea what the approach in the U.K. is to this aspect.) 19(2)(c): would this practice put a particular male claimant at that disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that the particular claimant wants to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. 19(2)(d): is it the case that the Nike store cannot show the practice to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? My prediction is that the store would be able to justify the practice as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. One example of a legitimate aim: a charging policy at swimming pools that disproportionately affected "disabled swimmers" was found to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, being part of "an overall financial structure which covers the provision of a wide range of public services" (https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2022/1588.html) Other examples of legitimate aims: "running an efficient service," "requirements of a business," "desire to make a profit." However, Economic reasons alone are not enough to justify discrimination. Someone can’t justify discrimination by saying it’s cheaper to discriminate. But costs can be taken into account as part of the justification if the person can show there are other good enough reasons for the treatment. So, depending on the business rationale, and the proportionality of the discount compared to the business need (e.g. cost of holding extra stock, risk of failing to sell stock as a new model comes in, etc.), the price differential could be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. This will depend on the evidence. I predict most stores would be able to justify a modest and occasional price differential, even in the case that the production costs of each shoe are identical. Summary I see four ways through this analysis, each leading to the conclusion that this would not be indirect discrimination: a narrow characterization of the "practice" as simply selling the women's version at £150 (probably too narrow of a view) a broad characterization of the "practice" as selling all versions at a discount from time to time, albeit not necessarily at the exact same time a view that any disadvantage experienced by men is due to their choice not the price discrepancy (dubious) the price discrepancy is a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim (admittedly, a thin analysis requiring more research)	Yes, it's legal. It would be lawful discrimination on objectively and reasonably justified grounds Here's why: On the face of it, this is a case of direct discrimination contrary to Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. however, the company may argue that they are taking positive action in line with Section 158 of the Act (emphasis mine): (1) This section applies if a person (P) reasonably thinks that— (a) persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected to the characteristic, (b) persons who share a protected characteristic have needs that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it, or (c) participation in an activity by persons who share a protected characteristic is disproportionately low. (2) This Act does not prohibit P from taking any action which is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of— (a) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to overcome or minimise that disadvantage, (b) meeting those needs, or (c) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to participate in that activity. It is likely that they will be able to justify direct discrimination on the grounds of positive action. The Government's Explanatory Notes on the section express the intent of the legislation as such (emphasis mine): This clause provides that the Bill does not prohibit the use of positive action measures to alleviate disadvantage experienced by people who share a protected characteristic, reduce their under-representation in relation to particular activities, and meet their particular needs. It will, for example, allow measures to be targeted to particular groups, including training to enable them to gain employment, or health services to address their needs. Any such measures must be a proportionate way of achieving the relevant aim. A clear example is provided: Having identified that its white male pupils are underperforming at maths, a school could run supplementary maths classes exclusively for them. Furthermore, there is case law to establish that such positive action is entirely lawful: R (Adath Yisroel Burial Society and another) v Inner North London Senior Coroner [2018] EWHC 969 (Admin) (emphasis mine): Before leaving this topic we would stress that section 158 does not concern what is sometimes called “positive discrimination”; it is more limited and concerns only what the legislation calls “positive action”. In general “positive discrimination” is unlawful under the Equality Act. Therefore, as a matter of domestic law, prioritisation of some deaths for religious reasons would not be unlawful; to the contrary, it would be consistent with section 158. That position is mirrored in Convention jurisprudence. The point can be well illustrated by the decision in Jakóbski v Poland (2012) 55 EHRR 8. In that case the applicant was serving a prison sentence in Poland. He adhered strictly to the Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules and requested a vegetarian diet for that reason. This was not provided for him. The prison authorities stated that they were not obliged to prepare special meals for prisoners on the basis of religious belief as a matter of Polish law and that to do so would put excessive strain on them. The application before the court succeeded under Article 9. For that reason the Court did not consider it necessary to address separately the right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights in Article 14 (to which we return below). However, in our view, the case of Jakóbski is a good illustration of the principle of equality at work in cases of this kind. What on its face looks like a general policy which applies to everyone equally may in fact have an unequal impact on a minority. In other words, to treat everyone in the same way is not necessarily to treat them equally. Uniformity is not the same thing as equality. While this judgement concerns itself with positive action on religious grounds, it has broad application to positive action on grounds of sex too, and would be consistent with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights—namely that if the discrimination can be objectively and reasonably justified, it is lawful.	Discriminatory pricing is a real thing. See this BuzzFeed video on discriminatory pricing as an example on how men's and women's products cost differently, even if the men's product consumes more raw material yet still costs less. However, it's illegal for hotels to charge different rates for their rooms, or for restaurants to charge unfairly or give preferential treatment; they are "public accommodations" protected under the various Civil Rights Acts. However, colleges are exempt from current laws, and it's not just tech colleges; even traditional colleges require different SAT scores for entry based on race and/or gender, and also charge different tuition. They are private accommodations and are therefore generally allowed to do this. For example, you'll have a much harder time getting in to Harvard if you're of a particular race, even if you can afford the tuition, simply because you'll be expected to have a higher SAT score. There was a class action lawsuit in California over this (the students were above 4.0 GPA, yet denied entry based on race), and as a result of law changes afterwards, California institutions can no longer do this. This is not the situation in the rest of the country, as no Federal law yet exists that protects minorities, gender, sexual orientation, etc, in regards to higher education. Also, sometimes merely proving a gap exists might not be noticeable, as companies are also starting to display pages on their websites based on data-mined information about visitors, possibly including information that would otherwise be discriminatory if it were done in person, and hiding the information from the general public. Discrimination is a difficult beast to tame, and until the law is introduced that all products and services must be offered to all consumers at the same price regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, etc, businesses will continue to find ways to discriminate in legal ways.	It doesn't seem as if the bank is discriminating in the way you suggest. They offer two types of account: (A) accrues or charges interest and (B) does not accrue or charge interest. The bank says you can choose A or B whatever your religion. You the customer choose A or B, possibly depending on your religion. So I do not see what cause of action you have or what damages you have suffered. Therefore I don't think you could sue them.	At the federal level, gift cards seem to be treated as a special case of electronic fund transfer. 15 U.S. Code § 1693l–1 and the corresponding regulations presently regulate disclosure of fees and expiration, and do not directly say anything about sale of such a card. There might be relevant state laws, though Washington state laws mostly mirror the federal law (also allowing issuing a card with an expiration date if given for no value to a charitable organization). You can actually get your last $5 back in cash in Washington per RCW 19.240.020. A gift card / certificate isn't a "thing" in the way that an apple, hammer or table is, it's a contractual relationship. If you own a thing, you can freely re-sell it to whoever you want (assuming there isn't an express statutory prohibition against the sale of the thing). You cannot universally sell (assign) a contract right – there is a default preference that you should be able to, but Amazon has in this case said "No, you can't".	I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.
"Lifetime Warranty" terms and conditions changed after purchase Around four years ago I purchased a pair of William Painter sunglasses through a successful Kickstarter campaign. The campaign advertised a 'Lifetime Warranty', which they clarified in an FAQ on Kickstarter as follows: What are the details of the Lifetime Guarantee? At William Painter we back up the amazing quality of The Empire with an equally exceptional lifetime guarantee. Our Lifetime Manufacturer’s Warranty Covers the following: (You will receive a free brand new replacement pair with no time limit restrictions, but you must return your damaged item at your own shipping costs) Screws fall out Hinges break Breaking under the pressure of your badass life. Paint Chipping Lenses are warrantied if the following conditions occur: Breaking, popping out, or bubbling Lenses scratching in first 30 days Lifetime Manufacturer’s Warranty DOES NOT COVER the following: Does not cover lens scratching after 30 days Hinges becoming loose over time Lost Sunglasses If you lose your sunglasses or they get stolen, we still have your back! We know it sucks to be apart with your amazing William Painter sunglasses, so we'll hook you up a discount to replace your lost pair. (just show us your order number) Last updated: Wed, May 24 2017 1:49 AM AEST Two years ago I did have to go through the warranty process as the hinge had broken. It was no drama, and as outlined on the original Kickstarter all I had to do was organise and pay for return of the damaged glasses. This time when I started the warranty process I was immediately asked to pay around $70AUD in processing fees, in addition to covering the return shipping. Their website now shows the following regarding their warranty: LIFETIME WARRANTY We stand by our products and back them up with our William Painter lifetime guarantee. This means if you break them, shatter them, blow them up, or run them over with a semi-truck we still guarantee them for life. With a small processing and handling fee you receive a brand new pair every time! Don't get me wrong, I understand why they've changed it in the last two years... but is that legal? I purchased the sunglasses because of that fantastic warranty, and now the terms and conditions of it have changed after purchase.	It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention "around $70AUD" which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly "do business in" Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC.	There is no "normal" or "standard situation". The parties are free to negotiate whatever terms they like within any limitations imposed by law. If you're unhappy with the proposed terms then you should either negotiate to include a liability limitation clause, refuse to agree the NDA, or consider whether the benefits of signing it outweigh your concerns. If you are entering into the NDA as a consumer and with a trader, then in england-and-wales, you might have some protection from Section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which provides: (1) An unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer. (4) A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer. For example, a contract which imposes unlimited liability on a consumer, while capping the liability of the trader, could be unfair. This will very much depend on all the circumstances and what the contract as a whole says: (5) Whether a term is fair is to be determined — (a) taking into account the nature of the subject matter of the contract, and (b) by reference to all the circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other terms of the contract or of any other contract on which it depends. A term also can't be assessed for fairness if it specifies the main subject matter of the contract (which arguably a liability clause in a NDA does) and the term is transparent and prominent (see Section 64). "I also don't understand the following wording: ...breach of this Agreement may cause irreparable harm to XXXXXX. Therefore, in addition to any other remedies available to XXXXXX, XXXXXX may obtain injunctive relief in the event of any breach or alleged breach of this Agreement without proving actual damages." What this is saying is that, in addition to all the usual actions that the other party could take against you for breaching the NDA (e.g. suing you for damages in the event that they suffer a loss from your breach), they can also apply to a court for an injunction without needing to prove that your breach caused them any loss. An injunction in this case would be a court order requiring you to stop breaching the NDA (e.g. to stop divulging information subject to the NDA).	Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.	Since you bought these online the Consumer Contract Regulations are going to be in effect here (if the price of the goods was over £42 anyway), (legislation) Where your cutting the tags off and wearing them outside for an hour comes into play is that would probably be considered "excessive handling" and they might be able to make a deduction from the amount of the refund. Your business can make a deduction from the value of the goods if you consider the customer has handled the goods excessively. You can’t deduct monies from the refund simply because the goods have been removed from the packaging or because the goods have been tried on or checked. In essence, distance selling purchasers are entitled to handle goods in the same way that they would in a normal retail store. That therefore includes touching the item or trying it on. Since no retail store is going to let you cut the tags from a pair of shoes and walk outside for an hour in them I'd say that test is probably met here. How much can they deduct? As the CCR puts it (emphasis mine): (9) If (in the case of a sales contract) the value of the goods is diminished by any amount as a result of handling of the goods by the consumer beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods, the trader may recover that amount from the consumer, up to the contract price. Which is likely where the "saleable condition" aspect is coming from - if they aren't in a condition where the retailer can sell them on they've essentially lost their full value. If the retailer makes returned goods available for sale on the site at reduced prices (like the "Amazon warehouse" deals) then a deduction of the difference in sale price between that and full retail is more likely.	Does a situation like this constitute breach of contract and/or a violation of advertising laws? No. There is not enough information that would lead to a finding of either. It is unclear how customers would be allegedly affected (if at all) by the release of a product at a different store, let alone where the goods or services at issue are digital and require no physical presence at a venue or premise. Except for very specific factual circumstances, a change of sales venue would hardly be cognizable as deceptive or unfair practice. Also, prior to purchasing or reserving a game, there is no contract between the public and the developer/supplier. Potential customers typically are not entitled to a specific performance by the developer. Even if [Phoenix Point] supporters' decision were provably based on the prospect of release at Steam, your description nowhere reflects that there was a mutually conscious exchange (or promise of an exchange) of considerations involving the parties' support of a game and the counterparty's release of the game at a specific venue. Absent that meeting of the minds, either party's reliance or expectation on the other is irrelevant. Generally speaking, the sole cruciality of either party's motives does not create legal obligations.	In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.	Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)!	Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) – those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) – in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong – especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform – the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook!
Why might a subset of victims represent the total pool of victims in a criminal court? In 1942 the Coconut Club in Boston Massachusetts caught fire in the second deadliest fire in United States history. The overcrowded club had sealed emergency exits and was filled drastically beyond capacity. When it burned it killed 492 people, and injuring 130 others. The owner, Barney Welasnky had connections to the Boston mob and thus was able to dodge safety standards and fire code using his connections. In fact, the club had been inspected by the Boston Fire Prevention and Safety department a week prior and declared safe. After the catastrophic fire Barney was charged and convicted for manslaughter due to his negligence and disregard for safety. But of the 492 victims only 19 charges were brought against him. The articles I've read said that the victims were chosen randomly to represent the dead, but I don't understand this happened. Ultimately, Barney was sentenced to 15 years in prison, but was pardoned after serving four years by the Governor of Massachusetts. He died of cancer shortly after the pardon. With this context, why might a subset of victims represent the total killed in a criminal court? What was the purpose of selecting 19 victims rather than all 492 or any other number?	Most likely, they chose enough victims to ensure a long prison term while having plenty of additional victims to charge if something went wrong at trial. Plus limiting the number of victims limits the amount of repetitive testimony and evidence the prosecutors had to introduce proving the death of each victim. If you charge with 19 counts when there are 492 victims and something goes wrong at trial, whether you think but can’t prove that the mob paid off a juror or whether you just get an oddball juror that votes to acquit, you can always pick some of the remaining 473 victims to bring charges. The prosecutors could have failed in 24 straight trials for 19 charges of manslaughter and still been able to bring charges a 25th time (though that would have been highly unusual). If you charge a defendant with manslaughter, you have to prove the death of a particular person. So there has to be evidence that Bob Smith went to the club, Bob Smith’s body was recovered and identified, Bob Smith was autopsied and the cause of death was smoke inhalation, etc. That gets repetitive after a time and jurors start thinking of the victims as numbers rather than people. Limiting the number of charges makes it much easier to make the victims seem like distinct humans to the jury. You can show pictures of the victims at trial and jurors can recognize particular individuals not just “1 of 492 dead people”.	Important story, but BoingBoing also doubts the BBC's wording. It could be an attempted summary of a previous story on BBC Newsnight on 18 July: Lord Porter of Spalding, a former bricklayer, alleged corporations were running tests on the safety of their high-rise building materials but refusing to share the results. Releasing the results could allow residents and local authorities to know if their buildings are at risk of a fire following the Grenfell catastrophe which claimed the lives of at least 80 people. There Lord Porter was talking about results commissioned by private companies including manufacturers, where the labs wouldn't provide information because of 'intellectual property rights' of the client, or presumably commercial confidentiality. Under these situations, it is said the private concerns have no obligation to disclose. If this is what the BBC story was referring to, then at least investigations by government or third parties wanting to reveal characteristics of the products wouldn't have a copyright (or patent etc) problem.	Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions.	No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action.	Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.	LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.	It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.	This is an example of the so-called felony murder rule, in which the crime of murder is defined to include deaths related to a felony committed by the defendant. You'll note that the article actually uses the phrase "felony murder". See the Alamaba Criminal Code at 13A-6-2: (a) A person commits the crime of murder if he or she does any of the following: [...] (3) He or she commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, burglary in the first or second degree, escape in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, rape in the first degree, robbery in any degree, sodomy in the first degree, aggravated child abuse under Section 26-15-3.1, or any other felony clearly dangerous to human life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant if there be any, causes the death of any person. It's interesting that "another participant" was apparently held to include the police officer.
Can I temporarily work remotely in a different country than my residence/employer? I currently work fully remotely as a full-time employee for a US company. The office is closed with no plans for anyone to return until at least September. I was thinking of working from home in a different country (within the same timezone) for ~2-3 weeks. I would go to this country 'on vacation' (from a customs/immigration perspective) and then would WFH there for the duration. I intend to tell my company this plan; do they have any grounds to tell me no?	At-will employers can fire you for almost any reason or no reason at all, aside from a few protected reasons for termination (defined by things like gender, race, religion, disability, etc.). "Employees who want to work remotely from another country" is not a protected class of individuals, so the company could almost certainly fire you for this with no repercussions whatsoever. Whether they will or not is an different question that's entirely dependent on your specific situation, but in general, US at-will employers have a very wide latitude to "tell you no" by simply firing you. All you can do is ask your manager. If they say no, then the answer is no. They do not require any "grounds" or justification for their decision.	I don't think so. When it comes to wages, there may be a Tarifvertrag (union-negotiated wage schedule), which may apply even if the employee in question is no union member. It is enough if the employer is member of the employer's association negotiating the schedule, or in certain other cases. (Clever, really, by extending union benefits to non-members they weaken the unions ...) The Tarifvertrag stipulates minimum wages for certain positions, and it may define those positions implement that. An employer could not underpay a skilled machinist by calling her a 'gadget specialist' or similar non-scheduled position. But the deputy department head is likely paid above the highest bracket of the wage schedule, called außertariflich (AT, beyond the schedule). At this level, it comes down to individual negotiations between the employee and employer.	It does not really matter exactly how the employer chooses to count working hours. However, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires, among other things, that the employee is at least paid the official minimum wage for each hour worked, and gets overtime pay for >40 hours per week. The Act also defines what counts as "hour worked" for these purposes. The Fact Sheet # 79D from the U.S. Department of Labor gives more details about what counts as "hours worked" for domestic services under the FLSA. The general rule is that all time during the shift counts, whether the employee is busy or not: Generally, when an employee is “on duty” (that is they must be in the home and prepared to provide services when required), they are working. The only exception is that time spent sleeping may be deducted under certain circumstances: In some circumstances, an employer may exclude up to eight hours an employee spends sleeping at the worksite from the time for which an employee must be paid. The rules are different, depending on whether the employee permanently resides at the place of work ("Live-in employee), has shifts of >=24 hours or shifts of <24 hours. In your case the shift is >=24 hours, so the rule is (see page three of the document): Up to eight hours of sleep time may be excluded from hours worked, provided that: sleeping facilities are available the employee can usually sleep at least five hours without disturbance the employee agrees to exclude sleep time Even then, interruptions of sleep for work must be paid, and if the employee get <5 hours sleep during a given shift, no exclusion is possible. So in summary: For calculating hourly wage and overtime pay, the employer must count at least 16 hours for each 24 hour shift, and more if the employee cannot sleep for eight hours during the shift. It probably does not matter that the employer calls it "12 hours worked", but your mother is entitled to at least "minium wage x 16" for each shift worked, and is entitled to overtime pay (at least 1.5 times minimum wage) if she works more than two shifts per week. If the shift is ever reduced to less than 24 hours, even sleep time may not be excluded.	You'd have to look careful for example at the Taiwanese law. Does it disallow companies in Taiwan to hire minors, or does it disallow minors to take jobs in Taiwan? In 99.99% of all cases the effect would be the same, but in this case the minor is in Taiwan, and the company in the USA. If their law disallows minors to take jobs, then the matter is clear. If it disallows companies to hire minors, then there is the question if the US company hiring a remote employee is covered by this or not. On the other hand, if employment is against Taiwanese law, how can they enforce it? Normally enforcement is against the company, not the minor.	If it is a business expense, yes It depends on the nature of the "job". If you run a business based in the UK and the job is a contract to your business, then the costs involved in performing the work are tax deductible. If you are an employee and the base location of your job is in France, then these are personal expenses and not tax deducatable.	What legal options do I have here? It depends on how much you are owed. If it is less than $5000 (in a city court) you can sue them in small claims. If it is more than that, you'll have to sue them in a different court. Do I have a claim to salary if I quit? Yes, absolutely. You quitting does not relieve the business of its obligation to pay you for work you have already performed. In some states, they may also be required to pay you for accrued leave (sick/vacation time). You should not have to work for a company that does not pay you, we got rid of slavery a long time ago. I'm nearly positive I would not have a claim to the 100% discretionary bonus. Maybe, maybe not. This depends on your contract and what you've been told. If you were told (in writing) that you would be given $X amount for a bonus for work performed in 2018, the bonus may no longer be discretionary because the company obligated themselves to pay it via a promise. Bonuses may be harder to argue in court, but if you have sufficient documentation that you were promised this bonus then you may have a claim to it. If you do decide to go to court with this, gather up as much documentation as you can before quitting, print it out and save it to bring to court or to your lawyer. Make sure to get as much as possible, for example if it is an email, get the whole chain, as much of the headers as possible, etc. If you have voicemails, see if you can save them or record them for later. Do not wait too long, have a lawyer draft up a demand letter the moment you quit outlining exactly everything you are owed, including the bonus, vacation, sick days, etc. Deliver this via certified mail. Don't let them say "well we'll get you taken care of next week/month/pay day". There are statutes of limitations (I don't know what they are for NYC) but you should be making an effort to collect, not waiting on them. After you quit, they don't have an incentive to pay you anymore (even though they are legally obligated to).	If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.	The answer is "it depends," of course. An asylum application may be considered less credible if the applicant entered as a tourist. The applicant would have to explain what changed between the time of entry and the time of the asylum application. (Perhaps a change of government at home? The start of a civil war?) Many countries expect applications for a work permit to be made from outside. Such an application may take much longer to process than a tourist visa, which makes the stay as a tourist problematic. On the other hand, there are countries which allow some tourists to file immigration applications. For instance, Canadian citizens and some others can apply for a German residence permit while they are in Germany.
How work at home effects interstate telephone recording consent Suppose a conversation is recorded between Participant A (consenting to record) and Participants B C D, all three of whom are working in the capacity of employees of a company located in the same one party consent state, NJ -- however, due to the pandemic, it turns out one is working from home in PA, and this is discovered later by Participant A. How serious of a problem would this be if it was brought to a PA court, especially if the participant in PA was functioning in the capacity of an officer of the NJ company at work?	The main legal question is, whose law applies? According to Krauss v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 787, where Krauss (in all-party PA) was recorded by Globe (in one-party NY). Krauss sued Globe in NY under PA law. The court found that the "law of the place of injury" determines which laws hold. Since the recording took place in NY and not in PA, NY law applies, case dismissed. A similar setup (and different outcome) arose in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, 137 P.3d 914 where SSB (in one-party GA) recorded Kearney (in all-party CA). The CA Supreme Court reached the opposite decision, finding that "the failure to apply California law in this context would impair California's interest in protecting the degree of privacy afforded to California residents by California law more severely than the application of California law would impair any interests of the State of Georgia". It is unlikely that functioning in the capacity of an officer of a NJ company at work would be found legally relevant. The main questions would be, where was the recording made, and which court system is deciding the matter? Assuming that the suit is filed in PA and given that Pennsylvania no longer follows the lex loci delicti rule (Griffith v. United Air Lines,416 Pa. 1), the prospects are greater, following the persuasive precedent of the California ruling would tip the sales in favor of a finding against the NJ person making the recording of a party who is in PA (and who files the suit). In a somewhat related PA Supreme Court case Pennsylvania v. Britton, 229 A.3d 590 there arose a "two jurisdictions" problem of recording – involving California and Pennsylvania – the court observes that when an issue implicates substantive laws, such as the privacy rights asserted by Appellant, a conflict-of-law analysis requires the forum court to apply the law of the state with the most interest in the outcome of the controversy which is to say, the PA Supreme Court agreed (indirectly) with the reasoning in Kearney v. SSB.	I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.	Secretly recording a person is a crime in California: consent from all parties to the communication is required, and the maximum penalty is $2,500 and 1 year in prison. It does not matter whether to person has been convicted for some other crime (except that this could be a serious matter for a person out on parole). In addition, the person who is recorded can sue the person who did the recording. However, if there is a regular beep throughout the conversation (as specified in California Public Utilities Commission General Order 107-B(II)(A)(5)), you have implicitly consented (you may not know that that is the meaning of the beep, but it is). The law provides for civil action as well: (a) Any person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may bring an action against the person who committed the violation for the greater of the following amounts: (1) Five thousand dollars ($5,000) per violation. (2) Three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff. You (realistically, your attorney) need to show that you were damaged to recover from the defendant.	Any parent may leave a child in the care of another responsible person. There is no special license required. The parent may use sound judgement in selecting the caretaker. Nor does a caretaker even have to be an adult -- teens are often used as baby sitters. If a reasonable parent would have known that a particular person was not a safe caretaker, then selecting that person might be negligence or child endangerment. Nor is there any legal requirement in most US states that a child be under anyone's direct supervision at all times. See "Free range parenting". Again, if in particular circumstances a reasonable parent should know that supervision is needed, failure to provide it might be child neglect or endangerment. Some US states set minimum ages for children to be unsupervised. NJ is not one, to the best of my understanding.	A party may subpoena materials from a nonparty using a subpoena under Rule 45. A party may generally subpoena anything that is within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, i.e., any material that is relevant, not privileged, and proportional to the needs of the case. Rule 45 also protects third parties from subpoenas that impose an "undue burden," but I would argue that this is essentially the same thing as Rule 26's proportionality requirement. Records of phone calls, e-mails, and text messages are routinely subject to subpoenas under Rule 45, but again, that assumes that the messages are relevant and not privileged. Records to Facebook and Google can be a bit more complicated. I don't know that the question has actually been definitively answered, but social-media companies seem to take the position that access to certain records created by their users is exempt from subpoena under the Stored Communications Act.	Businesses are not required to do what the card says, they are required to do what the card-holder says, to the extend that what the card holder says relates to giving or denying consent to be vaccinated. Since they don't vaccinate people who are unconscious, consent will always be directly obtained from the patient and the card has absolutely no effect. Also, control subjects are selected at random and the subject does not know what group they are in. Possession of such a card therefore has zero scientific effect.	It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more.	I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.
Is Barb entitled to the full calendar month of her rental apartment despite an out-of-sync 60 day notice? In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Barb has been living in an apartment complex in which her lease is month-to-month. The rent is not prorated based on the number of days in the month; each month, she owes the same X amount of rent regardless of the number of days in the respective month. The complex required a 60-day notice to be given by a tenant who wants to move out. Barb gave a 60-day notice on April 30, 2021. 60 calendar days would fall on June 29, 2021 (i.e. 31 days of May + 29 days of June = 60 days). However, Barb was charged full month’s rent on June 1 for the month of June, and, according to the agreement, not a prorate amount (i.e., not ((X/30)*29)). Barb thereafter was told that her move out date was June 29, 2021. Which takes precedence? Considering that Barb has paid the rent for the full month, will she have been imposed a duty to leave before June 30, 2021 since they gave such notice? Will Barb get to stay for the remainder of the month without engaging in any unlawful conduct?	Presumably the lease contains an automatic renewal provision that says unless you give notice 60 days in advance, you commit to another month (otherwise, you can just leave at the end of the month). The landlord may have made a math error, or they may be misinterpreting what the agreement says. Most likely it says that the duration of the lease is a month, meaning a whole month, which can have between 28 and 31 days. Unless otherwise stated in the agreement, that means "to the last day in any given month". A 60 day notice provision states the minimum number of days to stop automatic renewal, not the maximum or exact number of days. The language of the agreement will most likely say something to the effect that the duration of the lease is a month, and that is what the courts will enforce.	Is entry into the yard subject to 24 hour notice? Most likely it is. Note that section § 47-8-3 defines both dwelling unit and premises. The latter encompasses the term "appurtenances", which the Black's Law Dictionary defines, inter alia, as "an adjunct; an appendage; [...] garden [...]". At least in the context of fenced backyard, the fact that § 47-8-3 defines dwelling unit and premises separately does not exclude "premises" from the scope of § 47-8-15. That is because the fence is "a structure [...] or part of a structure [...] that is used as a home, residence". Indeed, the existence of the fence suggests that the backyard is intended for only that tenant's exclusive use/enjoyment, with the implications it has on tenant's privacy.	The agent/landlord responsibility is to ensure that the residents have "quiet enjoyment" of the property during the period it is let. As long as your friend has access to the flat he has that. He can ask, but the agent/landlord have no obligation to provide it. Could your friend appoint someone else to go and get their property? There is no reason why he has to do it in person. He should provide this person with a signed letter of authority (just "I, Joseph Bloggs, hereby authorise John Doe to collect my belongings from 123 Cherry Tree Crescent on my behalf", signed and dated) and also send a copy to the agent. Your friend must have a contract with somebody. If he paid a deposit then it should have been kept in a proper deposit protection scheme, and he should have paperwork to that effect. If that wasn't done, then he can sue the person he has the contract with for (in effect) punitive damages in addition to getting his deposit back. You say your friend was "not the lead tenant", so it sounds like one of the tenants was sub-letting, but its not clear; it may be that this "lead tenant" was just acting as a point of contact for stuff like rent collection. Your friend should have some kind of written tenancy agreement; he can sue the person or company named named on that. If the tenancy was a verbal contract then he can sue the person he handed the deposit to.	B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do.	Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble?	The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).	This would be pointless and wouldn't work. Eviction due to defaulting on rent requires the landlord to give 3 business days notice, in writing. This must include a method by which the tenant can settle their debt. Either the landlord would be forced to accept a payment or this would not be valid. Source Additionally, in this case, there is nothing stopping you physically handing an envelope of cash to the landlord as they live upstairs. However, there is no reason for your landlord to do this. If your landlord hates you that much it would be far easier for them to simply give you 60 days notice and terminate your tenancy that way.	You signed the lease In general, this is definitive of your intention to have a month-to-month lease. Any correspondence that you have prior to you signing that you wanted or even agreed on a yearly lease is only evidence that such things formed part of the negotiations but, for whatever reasons, what was ultimately agreed was a month-to-month lease. If you can prove misrepresentation you might be able to get what you want but the usual remedy is recission (ending) of the contract, not a change to the contract. However, given that the type of lease is such a fundamental feature and is usually prominent on the document, proving you were misled rather than agreeing to a month-by-month lease will be difficult.
How are laws enforced after time passes, which can impact the results? If Person A commits a criminal or civil offense on Day 1, which then becomes lawful on Day 2, can Person A be prosecuted or sued on Day 3 (Day 1, 2, and 3 are not necessarily subsequent days, but happen in this order)? Also, if Person A is a minor when the offense occurred, but is now an adult, would the person be legally considered a minor or an adult if prosecuted or sued? If a statute of limitations is shortened, then does the new one apply or the one that existed when the person did the crime/tort? Note that although I tagged this United States, information on any country would be relevant.	If Person A commits a criminal or civil offense on Day 1, which then becomes lawful on Day 2, can Person A be prosecuted or sued on Day 3 (Day 1, 2, and 3 are not necessarily subsequent days, but happen in this order)? As a general rule they can be prosecuted but the exactly language of the effective date language in the statute controls. It might say, for example, "effective for prosecutions filed after Day 2" in which case it couldn't be prosecuted. Also, if Person A is a minor when the offense occurred, but is now an adult, would the person be legally considered a minor or an adult if prosecuted or sued? Generally speaking, a minor. But this is a function of the language of the statute in question in the case of juvenile prosecutions. If a statute of limitations is shortened, then does the new one apply or the one that existed when the person did the crime/tort? Again, it depends upon the effective date language of the statute. Typically, it will apply to suits filed after the effective date.	There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News.	Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences \| Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.	Children below age 7 (or age 10) aren't granted immunity; they were not tried often because they are arrested in a rare case (less than 2% in all juvenilen offenders) (refering to Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice, National Academies Press) Note that people aged 16 or 17 (or even 15) is already triable for criminal charges (see R v Balham Youth Court). Back to your question, why do juvenile offenders are sometimes not being charged in juvenile courts? There are mainly two reasons: They have less experience than adults. Although adults and juvenile can take a similar approach in making decisions, juvenile lacks experience to make themselves vulnerable to misperceptions. Which could somehow be said that they lost the intention to commit crime (mens rea) Juvenile lacks understanding to legal process. For children under 15, they are not familiar with the rights they have, like the right to have a lawyer, or the right to remain silence. This could make it unjust to order them appear before a judge (or magistrate) to be tried. Therefore, juvenile offenders are sometimes absolved from litigation. Need to note that, in some jurisdiction, juvenile offenders (under 15) can also be charged in juvenile courts summarily and be sent to rehabilitation center, or even be sentenced.	If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.	Direct civil suits are not the only way to obtain remedies for property violations. Other options: Ask. You can send them a simple letter describing the violation and asking them to compensate you appropriately. Complain to authorities. If they engaged in any behavior that constitutes a crime (e.g., criminal fraud) then the state (via district or state attorneys) is responsible for any criminal prosecution. If the state prosecutes and you are considered a victim, the state generally takes that into account if they are able to prevail against the defender. Even if they didn't commit a crime, but they have a sufficiently outrageous pattern of abusing individuals' civil rights, state attorneys may decide to threaten or take legal action. Seek a "litigation investor." If the size of damages likely to be recovered via lawsuit is high enough, then law firms will sometimes take cases "on contingency," which typically means the plaintiff does not front any money, but gives up a significant share of any winnings. There are also independent litigation investment companies that perform the same function based on a similar calculus, but often for even larger cuts of any winnings.	Beating a person up is a crime in every jurisdiction. No privilege to commit assault is created if the person has offended someone, although self defense (or defense of others) is a defense, in case the person is beating someone up. It may be against the law to expose your genitalia in public in your location, and you may call the police to seek justice. In Washington, a first offense of indecent exposure to a person under 14 is a gross misdemeanor. However, the law only allows up to 364 day in prison, and not a beating, for violating the law.	While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.
Someone has recreated (part) of my blog years after it closed. Same domain. Do I have any recourse? I used to have a travel blog - nothing fancy, but at https://www.marksmayo.com (please only visit with adblock to avoid giving them any ad revenue). I let it expire a couple of years ago, backed up everything and let it lapse. I'm sure they have every right to get the URL, that's fine, it's the copied content I have issues with. They've changed the theme and some of the content and names, but even include verbatim text from a couple of my old posts, and my photos, and have the audacity to say 'copyright' at the bottom too(!). I don't know who Mercedes is, but that's definitely one of my old photos and text. How do I go about getting this removed? Does one have any recourse? If it matters legally, I'm based in New Zealand.	The only real recourse you have is to contact the webhost and try to convince them your content is really yours and file a DMCA Takedown request. How you convince them might be an issue; do you have any old screenshots? Original photos? Any proof that the content and photos are yours? The webhost appears to be https://datacamp.co.uk/ , unless the DNS is being proxied, since DNS points to CloudDNS https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=dns:marksmayo.com NZ and UK are members of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, so there don't appear to be any arguments about not applying copyright law. You willingly gave up the domain, so you have no recourse or valid reason to try and regain ownership of the domain. You could try and contact the new owner of the domain by filing a complaint via the abuse email listed by the domain registar at https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?&domain=marksmayo.com But they may not do anything, even if you can prove a copyright violation, since they only handle the domain registration and not the webhosting. How they got the content is another question: who was your webhost when you owned the site? Datacamp? Did they not delete it when you closed your account? How did the new owner come to get it?	Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.	You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime.	There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use.	Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use".	In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.	There's a legal issue, and a practical issue. If you witness a crime, you can inform the police and something may happen. The FBI does actually investigate criminal copyright infringement, but they also don't respond to concerned-citizen complaints, only complaints of copyright holders (and not all of them). You cannot use DMCA takedown to get the service provider to remove the content (or shut down the site, or whatever would be necessary), since only the copyright holder can make the required sworn statements. So you have no legal recourse. A practical solution is to tell Google. This link could have been a way to inform them, but it seems to always resolve to identifying plausible DMCA takedown requests, and if you truthfully answer the "are you the copyright holder" question, you are told to go away. Even if you lie at the preliminary stage, the procedure ends with you making a sworn statement, and you can't lie on one of those. This information might allow you to send them a letter, which they might read. They might simply not consider it worth their time.	You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.
Can you use definitions for adverbs instead of nouns and personal nouns in a legal context? Legal definitions where nouns and persons are defined are common place reality of legal writing. We also see often times events and conduct be subject to definitions, and be referred to by a shortened reference. Is it possible to describe the manner of an event or conduct by defining such manner and using such definition as reference later? For example: Can you say negligently and/or tortuously hereinafter described as "Actionably", and use "Actionably" in lieu of the other 4 words thereafter throughout a legal document? I'm interested in any examples, primarily under U.S. law, but also would be interesting to see if other jurisdictions accepted such languages or Actionably denied. :)	Yes though usually adverbs are not subject to statutory definition, so case law resolves most interpretive questions. But, 18 USC 1515: (b) As used in section 1505, the term “corruptly” means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information. The Model Penal Code defines a number of adverbs: this is applied in Kentucky.	england-and-wales "Lead defendant" is not used, unless colloquially by some, but a comparable term would be "principal defendant" which is more than mere style as it becomes important when establishing the hierarchy of defendants for, say, culpability and at sentencing (i.e. it has some legal implications). It could also relate to the first-named on the indictment (see rule 3.32(1)(b)(ii) Criminal Procedure Rules 2020) and often this is the principal, but the prosecutor has discretion on the order of names on the indictment, because: It is important to bear in mind that defendants are called to give evidence in the order in which their names appear on the indictment. This means that a tactical decision may need to be made as to the order of defendants on the indictment, bearing in mind the evidence and the nature of the case. Source Although tagged united-states, I have followed the guidance from the LawSE Help Centre: "Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"	I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).	united-states But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? Legal Ethics Considerations There are circumstances when commenting publicly on litigation violates the ethical rules for lawyers related to trial publicity See Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (the numbering system for professional conduct rules for lawyers is uniform nationally in the U.S. although the substance of the rules can differ in detail from state to state - Colorado's rule is fairly typical). Mostly this rule calls for avoiding statements that could prejudice a jury unless the other side has already done so and those statements need to be rebutted. This rule states (in its Colorado version): (a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may state: (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation. (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity. (d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a). Statements such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court" are allowed and are not terribly uncommon. But, making a comment about something that can be easily inferred from the publicly available documents filed in court provides little or no positive advantage for a litigant. Also, one doesn't have to say much to create at least a colorable Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 issue that a mediator can raise in settlement talks, or that a judge can be forced to analyze. Even if the claim of unethical trial publicity ultimately doesn't hold water, it still muddies the waters and distracts lawyers and litigants from dealing with the substance of the dispute. The Risk That A Statement Will Be Used Against You Usually, the main concern is similar to the concern about talking to police: Anything you say can and will be used against you at trial. For example, this week former President Trump's public statement about his knowledge of classified documents, which are the subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation of him, seriously harmed his position legally. (His statement was made quite a while ago in a semi-private forum, but at a time when the possibility of a criminal investigation still should have been on his radar screen.) In the civil rape-defamation case against him (as noted, for example, in this Law.SE answer), Trump's decision to continue to speak publicly about matters that were the subject of active litigation against him in an earlier case resulted in an extended statute of limitations and an opportunity to refile the case without having to worry about Presidential immunity from liability for statements he made while in office. It isn't just former President Trump that does things like this, but his conduct provides good textbook examples of what lawyers worry about when their clients talk about cases that are being litigated. Social media statements about pending cases by litigants routinely provide powerful evidence against them in trials. Some clients (particularly politicians and many senior executives of big and medium sized businesses, but also more ordinary people with big egos) are "forces of nature" who can't resist running their mouths, usually to their detriment, when given the least leave to do so. It is easier to teach them to say "no comment" across the board about pending litigation, than to transmit the depth of understanding necessary to comment without saying something potentially harmful. Lawyers spend many hours and sometimes days preparing their clients for depositions for a reason. Avoiding Annoyance To Opposing Counsel, Parties, And Judges Making a comment about pending litigation has the potential to aggravate opposing counsel and can emotionally influence non-lawyer opposing parties with whom a negotiated settlement will be reached 90%+ of the time (only about 1-2% of civil cases go to trial, but some are resolved by default judgments or on motion practice as opposed to by settlement). It can also irritate a judge who frequently prefers to be out of the public spotlight when necessary, even when the statements made aren't prohibited, and judges in the U.S. have lots of discretionary authority.	if someone claims to have "taken advice", and the advice they received was from a non-lawyer, is the claim misleading? No. The language "taken advice" does not imply "taken legal advice", let alone one arising from an attorney-client relation or taken from someone purporting to be a lawyer. The language "taken advice" in and of itself leaves the advisor's capacity unspecified. For instance, the non-lawyer might be an accountant whose advice goes beyond a lawyer's scope or expertise. That being said, it is unclear whether adding that expression is useful at all.	Here is a list of language-regulating bodies. There is none for English, but they exist for Spanish (Real Academia Española), French (Académie française) and Swahil (Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa for Tanzania, Chama cha Kiswahili cha Taifa for Kenya). No language regulator addresses the issues which arise in the interaction between natural language and the needs of legal interpretation. Instead, these bodies generally strive to maintain the historical "purity" of the language. Rather than "define" a word like "sandwich", they decide whether to outlaw (or disparage) the word because it comes from English. The vast majority of language-related problems in law which arise in common-law countries pertains to characteristics of common law and the practice of establishing precedent. There are philosophical conflicts, for example between those to adhere to the text versus those who try to discern original intent. If we had an official agency that precisely defined what a "weapon" is, we would still have the struggle over interpretive philosophies which renders moot any rulings from the national language regulator. In the US, part of the problem of word-definition is the widespread practice of localized redefinition in statutes – the laws that say "In this subsection, 'weapon' has the meaning defined in 18 U.S. Code §920" (fictitious: §921 defines "firearm" undefined "weapon"). Tracking the scope of definition and range of variation of a word within a body of codified law is very difficult. The rule in common law is that words that are not statutorily defined are given their "ordinary" meaning. There is no authoritative resource for "ordinary meaning" in English (there is no such thing as "the" dictionary). In the US, it would require a constitutional amendment to immutably impose a particular dictionary standard for deriving word meaning (e.g. Webster's Fourth New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, forthcoming) and there would be ensuing political protests. A legally precise definition of "repair" would be very difficult to understand, and would require hiring a lawyer in order to engage in the activity of "repairing broken windows", from a legally-safe perspective. And that is just word meaning. Ambiguity in sentence-meaning cannot be resolved by listing the sentences.	Words cannot be copyrighted. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, or short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive or lends itself to a play on words, it cannot be protected by copyright. The only intellectual property protection that might be afforded to such things is trademark.	Language is contextual. When the meaning of a communication is at issue in litigation, that meaning is gleaned from the totality of the evidence, not from any presumption of what a word means in isolation. "Okay" can mean "yes", it might mean only that you understand, it might communicate coerced acquiesence falling short of actual consent. See the discussion in R. c. Byers, 2018 QCCQ 4673: [81] Regarding the petitioner’s pretention claiming that she “clearly express her wish to consult an attorney”, the Court considers that the answer “OK” does not show a clear intention to consult a lawyer. [82] At the most “OK” could mean that she understood, that she heard them and also could [have] signified “Yes, I would like to consult an attorney”. [83] In the decision Ellis, the Court of appeal had to analyze the meaning of the words “OK” as part of evidence of purchasing a firearm, the Court considered that this had an equivocal meaning. [84] Moreover, the Court wrote: “[40] (…) Viewed in the context of the whole of the evidence, we consider it a reasonable inference that the two responses “Ok ok” signified nothing more than an acknowledgement of the prices quoted.” [85] For analysis purpose, the Court will consider that the answer “OK” means “yes”. See also R. v. Potvin, 2012 ONCA 113: The pertinent facts known to the appellant were straightforward. The complainant repeatedly said “no” to sex and then appeared to say “yes” by uttering the word “okay”. Viewed in the context of all that preceded it, we agree with the trial judge that the complainant’s use of the word “okay” was ambiguous. In the absence of further inquiry by the appellant, a single “okay” after five refusals over a sustained period of time was simply insufficient to ground a reasonable but mistaken belief in consent.
Can I buy 2 earthquake policies on the same home? I live in a state with stupidly expensive state-sponsored earthquake insurance. To get a 5% deductible, I basically have to buy 1/10 of a house over my lifetime... but the chance of losing my home to an earthquake over that timeframe is only 1/500. But then I noticed that for half the cost, I could buy a policy with a 20% deductible on the full value, and then a second policy with a 20% deductible on 20% of the value. To effectively get a 4% deductible.... at almost half the cost. Because of the lower deductible, the premium on the first policy drops by half. The second policy is 1/5 of that. The payout with these two new policies is as good as one policy with a 4% deductible. For example, if the home is destroyed, then I collect 80% of the home value from policy 1, and another 16% of the home value from policy 2. So, in total, I get 96% of the value, just as in a 4% deductible plan. Neither policy is paying out any more or less than it would have if I had just one of the two new policies. So I am not causing any harm to either insurer by having the other one. Right? Generally speaking, double-insuring things is legal. For example, I can insure stocks or mortgages that I don't own, and I can have 15 life insurance policies. Nonetheless, I have to ask: is there any potential legal issue with doubling up on earthquake insurance? Is it somehow illegal to attempt to avoid getting ripped off by the state?	It would depend on the law of that state, and the insurance policy. Here is a sample policy from the California Earthquake Authority. §8 on Other Insurance says a. If there is other insurance that covers earthquake loss to the dwelling or other property covered under this policy,we will pay our share of the covered loss or damage. Our share is the proportion that the applicable limit of insurance under this policy bears to the combined limits of insurance of all policies that cover the same property. As you can see, they anticipate the possibility of having multiple insurance policies, so it's reasonable to conclude that it's not illegal to have two earthquake insurance policies, at least in this case.	Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.	If you innocently took the oven glove by mistake there is no possibility of criminal consequences. Now that you know it is not yours, you must return it as soon as possible. You may be liable for the losses caused by taking the glove, and that could extend as far as some fraction of the cost of a replacement glove if they have already replaced it. You cannot (legally) hold his glove hostage for the return of your desk. Deciding which glove is which is tricky. Given the cost of new oven gloves, I would go round with both and ask him which is his. Even if he takes the nicer one which isn't his, you are only down a few dollars. The messy hall should be a separate question (and risks being closed as asking for specific legal advice - I think you need your own paid-for lawyer for that).	The lease requires you to get liability insurance and to insure your own property. If you don't, (para D) one of the owner's options is to get the insurance for you. Then after taking out the insurance that you are required to have, you shall reimburse owner for the insurance that he took out for your benefit. "Reimburse" means "pay back what he paid for you", which means that it is not an arbitrary sum. It is for the kinds of insurance you are required by the lease to have, and not wallpaper insurance. The only people who have to do this are renters who have leases with terms like this, not necessarily every renter in NY.	In general it is illegal to gamble on life. However, you might not even need to go to a bookmaker: A contract that pays money upon the death of a specific person is known commercially as "life insurance." In order to avoid the moral hazard (or reality) of creating a contract killing market, it has long been illegal to trade life insurance with any person or entity who does not have an "insurable interest" in the insured. (See also: The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, by Peter Swisher, who also has a good review of laws and regulations surrounding exceptions to the rule like viaticals and STOLI. Further reading on the subject here.) I don't know if it has been tested, but I think anyone could argue that they would face a significant financial loss if the U.S. President were killed or died in office: the stock markets plunged on JFK's assassination. Therefore, it could be both legal and possible for anyone to buy life insurance on the U.S. President. (Note that, in the U.S., the disputes about third-party life insurance have revolved for generations around the tax benefits associated with insurance premiums and benefits. See corporate-owned life insurance (COLI), a.k.a. "janitor's insurance.")	The primary question is why the trustee is disposing of the asset at all. The trustee has a particular fiduciary duty (we haven't seen the document so we have no idea what that duty is). It could be justified because, for example, the grantor needs cash for a brain operation. Self-dealing (acting in one's own interest, which is a conflict of interest), is prohibited for a trustee. With real estate, "fair market value" is a fluid concept, but within limits one can determine that a sale (to self) at $900,000 undervalued the house and that a sale to another would have garnered $1,100,000, therefore this would be an illegal self-dealing. However, the simple act of a trustees purchasing an asset from a trust that he is the trustee of is not categorially prohibited.	Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.	The simple answer to the question you asked is that they are not mutually exclusive. Self-defense and “castle doctrine” are defenses. A person can be charged and tried for murder, and one or both of those can be their defense. But shooting someone in self defense does not guarantee immunity from a charge or trial. In the first place, you need to show that it was indeed justifiable self-defense. As a source for this answer, see Texas state law library. https://guides.sll.texas.gov/gun-laws/stand-your-ground That site itself says that the laws are complicated and refers readers to “plain English” from which I selected https://www.bhwlawfirm.com/deadly-force-self-defense-in-texas/ For self defense, the site says: Texas law provides for a justifiable defense at trial when using deadly force if the person claiming self defense: Reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary; Had a legal right to be on the property; Did not provoke the person against whom deadly force was used; and Was not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force was used. For protection of property, it says Under Texas Penal Code §9.42, a person may use deadly force against another to protect land or property if: He is the owner of the land; He reasonably believes using the force is immediately necessary to prevent arson, burglary, or robbery; and He reasonably believes that the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means. OK! To summarize the story linked by the OP, homeowner hears and then finds a man outside breaking into homeowner’s shed. He confronts intruder who then moves toward homeowner with a pickaxe. Homeowner shoots and intruder runs off. let us agree that the first shot was allowed under Texas law, preventing a robbery and perhaps an attack with a pickaxe. The homeowner says that he then shot again “into the night.” At this point he is shooting a fleeing person. We can even leave out all of the irregularities once he calls 911 two hours later to report an invasion in progress even though the intruder was dead. In any case, there is also the questions are: Is the homeowner’s version of events true in the first place? If we accept everything he said, was the shot the killed the man justifiable under Texas law? These are for the prosecutor to decide if it is worth trying and the jury to decide. Back to your question of how can they charge him if he had a right to stand his ground? Further, even if a person has a justification for using force, he may still be arrested and face trial. Self defense is a defense against a murder charge, not a get out of jail free card.
International sexting between two minors - Text only A 12-year-old living in the U.S. "sexted" with a 14-year-old in Sweden. Was any crime committed? Are there possible legal consequences for either child having engaged in that act?	In the US, the various "child pornography" laws apply only if there is an actual picture of an actual child. A computer-generated image does not count under those laws, unless it is recognizably of an actual identifiable person who is or was a minor at the time, nor does a description of sex with a child, no matter how graphic or realistic. However I need to point out that any accusation of child pornography is potentially very serious, and any person who has been or might plausibly have been accused of such would do well to consult a lawyer who can review the exact facts and has tools to check recent caselaw. This page from the US DOJ says: Images of child pornography are not protected under First Amendment rights, and are illegal contraband under federal law. Section 2256 of Title 18, United States Code, defines child pornography as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (someone under 18 years of age). Visual depictions include photographs, videos, digital or computer generated images indistinguishable from an actual minor, and images created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict an identifiable, actual minor. Undeveloped film, undeveloped videotape, and electronically stored data that can be converted into a visual image of child pornography are also deemed illegal visual depictions under federal law. That page cites: 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children (Production of child pornography) 18 U.S.C. § 2251A- Selling and Buying of Children 18 U.S.C. § 2252- Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors (Possession, distribution and receipt of child pornography) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A- certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2256- Definitions 18 U.S.C. § 2260- Production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United States The Wikipedia article mentions that: Simulated child pornography was made illegal with the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA). The CPPA was short-lived. In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition held that the relevant portions of the CPPA were unconstitutional because they prevented lawful speech. Referring to Ferber, the court stated that "the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related' to the sexual abuse of children". The opinion in Ashcroft included the statement that: Whether or not the films we mention violate the CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute's prohibitions. If these films, or hundreds of others of lesser note that explore those subjects, contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work's redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene. See Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U. S. 413, 419 (1966) Under Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), it may be a crime for an adult to provide "inappropriate" sexual content to a child, even if the content is not legally obscene, but this does not apply when both parties to a communication are minors. Text, written words, may be unlawful to distribute if and only if it passes the Miller* test, making it legally obscene. The wording of the test is: The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, at 354 U. S. 489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when necessary. Pp. 413 U. S. 24-25. This test applies whether the subjects are children or adults. I do not know\ what rules would be applied by the authorities in Sweden. They are likely to be quite different.	Abandonment is not the legal concept to be concerned with (though the situation might fall within the ambit of a law that uses the word "abandon"), instead the question should be about the legal obligations of a parent. California Family Code is what you want to look at. Though a look at the criminal act of "child abandonment" can be informative: section 271 and following indicate that there are some penalties for abandonment-like actions for children between 14 and 18, but the acts would have to be "willful" and "without lawful excuse" (which probably includes "inability to perform"). In the Family Code, section 7822 states when proceedings can be brought. For example, if (2) The child has been left by both parents or the sole parent in the care and custody of another person for a period of six months without any provision for the child's support, or without communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or parents to abandon the child. Section 3900-3901 says that the father and mother of a minor child have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances. The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first. Nothing in this section limits a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support or the court's power to inquire whether an agreement to provide additional support has been made. There seems to be a formula for computing expectations of support: but the law won't require a person to pay money that they do not have. The law also will not compel a third party to take in an guest, nor will it compel the mother to become homeless (i.e. order the third party to take in the child or eject the mother). The courts could easily require the mother to take financial responsibility for the child.	Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.	According to Blackmail Overview :: Justia (emphasis mine): A blackmailer typically has information that is damaging to the victim, and uses threats to reveal that information in order to coerce the victim. Blackmail is considered a crime regardless of whether the information is true or false. The central element of the crime is the blackmailer’s intent to obtain money, property, or services from the victim with threats of revealing the information. So it's still a crime, at least in the US. But the enforcement problems are tracing the original emailer, which, due to (I assume) multiple email relay IPs, address spoofing, etc, and the big issue of identifying the actual individual who pressed the metaphorical "send" key on the bulk email script, the jurisdiction of that person, etc. As Ron pointed out, BitcoinWhosWho shows no one has fallen for it, even though millions of these emails get sent every day, gauging from the number that I get myself.	Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation).	united-states Are there laws in the United States which obligate adult video websites to retain personal information (such as first and second names) of the actors/actresses in the videos uploaded on their website? If so, could someone please provide them? In the U.S. producers of adult material are required to keep information about the age of their performers pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 2257 and 18 U.S. Code § 2257A which is part of "The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988", and 28 C.F.R. 75 which contains regulations adopted related to that Code section. See also U.S. Justice Department commentary on its website. You can read the full text at the links. The information must be retained for seven years after they are created or last amended, unless the business goes out of business less than two years after the records are created or last amended, in which case the records must be maintained for five years after the business ceases to operate. They key language of Section 2257 states: (a)Whoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, digital image, digitally- or computer-manipulated image of an actual human being, picture, or other matter which— (1)contains one or more visual depictions made after November 1, 1990 of actual sexually explicit conduct; and (2)is produced in whole or in part with materials which have been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or is shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce; shall create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction. (b)Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall, with respect to every performer portrayed in a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit conduct— (1)ascertain, by examination of an identification document containing such information, the performer’s name and date of birth, and require the performer to provide such other indicia of his or her identity as may be prescribed by regulations; (2)ascertain any name, other than the performer’s present and correct name, ever used by the performer including maiden name, alias, nickname, stage, or professional name; and (3)record in the records required by subsection (a) the information required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection and such other identifying information as may be prescribed by regulation. Section 2257A extends this requirement to simulated sexual content. The regulations spell out the details requirements more specifically with more precise definitions. Much of this information may only be disclosed to specified individuals and is not necessarily available to members of the general public in the absence of an investigation authorized by the U.S. Attorney General. But access to these records is not governed by these statutes and regulations. An objection to a subpoena and request for a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 (and related rules) or the equivalent state court rule would be the usual process for litigating that point. Whether the reason asserted is really justifiable would be a question for other law (usually under the law of California where most adult material in the U.S. is produced).	Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.	Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred.
What are the legal ramifications of a legally dead person turning up alive? Context: I am writing an urban fantasy story in which a man dies, is declared dead, and comes back to life via supernatural means on the autopsy table. The existence of the supernatural is not common knowledge in the universe of the story, and his un-death is completely inexplicable as far as medical science and the law is concerned; nonetheless, a legally dead man ends up being alive. What kind of procedures would be necessary to undo the legal death? What happens to his property (note: the reanimated character is a young man with no written will)? If he's a renter, how long will it take for his landlord to push all his stuff out and welcome a new tenant? How much paperwork does he have to fill out? Note: the story is set in the USA, and tentatively set in the state of California in the late 2010s.	What kind of procedures would be necessary to undo the legal death? What happens to his property (note: the reanimated character is a young man with no written will)? If he's a renter, how long will it take for his landlord to push all his stuff out and welcome a new tenant? How much paperwork does he have to fill out? If the person is on the autopsy table, while he may have technically been legally dead, the person's death certificate has probably not even been issued yet, since normally an autopsy is done, in part, to determine a cause of death for purposes of preparing a death certificate. Normally, an autopsy is only prepared when the cause of death is uncertain or needs to be documented for legal reasons (e.g. an accidental or potentially criminal death or one that is just unexplained), and the need for one postpones the preparation of a death certificate. If the cause of death is self-evident and there is no indication of foul play, an autopsy isn't done and the preparation of a death certificate proceeds more quickly. In other words, while he may be "legally" dead (defined as discontinuation of the function of certain bodily processes like brain activity and heartbeat and breathing), he very likely isn't yet "bureaucratically" dead. You can be "legally" dead days before anyone even discovers that you have died, with the time of your death determined only retroactively, but that doesn't have any practical effect until someone discovers it and it makes its way through the bureaucratic and court process. It takes a few days after a death for a probate proceeding to establish death, heirship and the validity of any will (many states have a 120 hour minimum waiting period after a date of death and most autopsies are within 72 hours). Even if a probate proceeding had been commenced, a simple affidavit or notice that someone was not, in fact, dead would cause the case to be summarily dismissed and it is unlikely that much would have happened in the court process since then. With older people, one of the fastest agencies to act is the Social Security Administration discontinuing benefits. But a younger person wouldn't have gotten those to start with, so that wouldn't be a factor. Life insurance companies normally won't pay until a final post-autopsy death certificate with cause of death is in place (so they can look for fraud in the life insurance application relative to the cause of death stated). It would be very usual for a landlord to take action sooner than the month after learning of the death, and often the estate will keep in a lease in force much longer. Next of kin may have removed some valuables prior to any official declaration, and while most people would promptly return them upon learning of the "mistake", a few items might not be recovered. The final death certificate would probably never be prepared. A preliminary death certificate might be quashed as erroneous and not filed with the Vital Statistics Department of the State Department of Health, by the preparing party, through a simple, oral, in office instruction to the person in the coroner's office who handles those filings. Since there isn't a formal judicial declaration of death or a final death certificate, simply informing an agency or person that received a preliminary notice that it was in error, perhaps by letter or email, would suffice. Even if a final death certificate had just issued, the person who filed it could probably fill out a simple correction form so soon (probably just a matter of hours) after it was filed. It wouldn't be that disruptive. The messy cases are when there has been a legal declaration of death and then months of actions have been taken in reliance on the determination that someone is dead.	My question is this in fact unique? Have any other cases in the US federal courts been decided at the appeals or higher level based upon a dead judge's written opinion, and if so, have they then survived appeal? This happens roughly a couple of times a year on average in the U.S. Courts of Appeal, usually when an opinion has been agreed to in principle and a final draft of the opinion has been approved, but release of the opinion is delayed, for example, to allow the dissenting opinion in the case to be completed prior to publication of the decision. The blog "How Appealing" regularly reports this practice when it happens, although its accounts of this practice are not comprehensive. To the best of my knowledge, no appellate court opinion has ever been reversed on appeal because a judge died prior to its publication. For comparison's sake, in the most recent year for which statistics are available (2017) the U.S. Courts of Appeal handled 60,877 cases, so this happens in less than one in 30,000 cases (you have to combine the regional U.S. Courts of Appeal and the Federal Circuit which is reported separately for statistical purposes to get the total).	One of the conditions for a contract to be enforceable is that its undertakings must be legal. This would mean that you cannot, contractually, be indemnified for murder - at least, not in any jurisdiction where homicide is illegal.	I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.	Normally, a recorded deed is taken at face value. If Bob acquires a house and conveys the house to Bob and Clark, his cousin, a joint tenants with right of survivorship, or pays for 99% of the price of a house and directs that it will be deeded to Bob and Clark as joint tenants with right of survivorship, the normal interpretation of that transaction is that Bob made a gift of an undivided one half interest in the property with right of survivorship to Clark. It sounds like the fact pattern is that Bob dies before Clark, giving Clark 100% title of record to the house subject to the mortgage, and Bob's heirs are not cool about that fact and would like to escape that consequence. This is a tall order for Bob's heirs. Normally, at least two important rules of evidence will preclude admission of testimony to the contrary. One is the parole evidence rule. This excludes as a matter of law evidence of discussions entered into prior to execution of an unambiguous written instrument that is not on its face incomplete, even if other evidence, called "extrinsic evidence" is available. The other is the dead man's statute, which is quite tricky in its technical application, but is basically designed to prevent an interested party from offering self-serving testimony that economically benefits them about what a deceased person said. The classic examples would be "I'll sell you these gold bars for $10", or "I'm giving you this painting", or "I agree to let you live in my house after I die rent free for 11 months." A statement regarding an intended ownership interest in joint tenancy with right of survivorship real estate asserting that it is not 50-50 when nothing on the face of the deed suggests that this is case might be barred by the dead man's statute since these are statements of a dead man that favor the person offering the evidence. But, as I say, the application of the rule is quite technical. Also, to the extent that any third-party like a lender or a judgment creditor of the surviving joint tenant gets a lien or other property right in the property that is recorded, and that person had no knowledge of the claims of ownership outside real property records of the relative rights of the joint tenants, that evidence couldn't be used to impair or reduce the third-party's rights in the property by virtue of the recording statutes. If a dispute arose while the co-owners were alive at a time when there were no disputed claims of third-parties to the property, the joint tenancy would be easy to severed into a tenancy-in-common, and the actual relative contributions and right of the parties could be litigated in court with the testimony of those parties. But, usually, the four unities are in practice, a consequence of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship deed being prepared and recorded, rather than primarily being a condition precedent to it. If a single deed is executed that says that grantee are two or more people who are described as joint tenants with right of survivorship, then the legal consequence of that deed is that the co-owners become equal owners with a right of survivorship and unlimited right to possession of the whole. Also, even though it isn't standard, it isn't impossible for property to be in a tenancy-in-common which a side agreement to make a transfer upon death to the remaining tenant-in-common, even if it isn't a true joint tenancy with right of survivorship. So, if one proved by some competent and admissible evidence that a 50-50 ownership was not intended and that it wasn't a true canonical joint tenancy, this wouldn't necessarily invalidate the survivorship provisions on the face of the deed. A judge would be more likely to treat the deed as a non-standard non-probate transfer at death than to treat it as a tenancy-in-common without a right of survivorship, despite language of survivorship on the face of the recorded deed. Now, something other than equal co-ownership might be admissible for some purposes, like tax consequences, but that wouldn't go to who gets the property when a co-owner of the property dies. From an evidentiary standpoint, the case would [be based upon] . . . non-will ledgers, third party banking transactions, and letters of evidence that show the decedent undertook full responsibility for expenses related to the acquisition and maintenance of the property. The joint tenant was involved in the deed and mortgage issuance by the decedent for the sole purpose of mortgage qualification (i.e. credit requirements) This doesn't sound very convincing. First, there is nothing inconsistent with a joint tenancy with right of survivorship with one co-owner being the person who provides the funds for purchasing the home and handling all of the maintenance and expenses. This is more common than not in the case of a married couple or pair of unmarried domestic partners that own the real property as joint tenants with right of survivorship and it used to be even more common. Second, a lender would almost always require that all people obligated on the mortgage be owners of the property, and that all owners of the property be obligated on the mortgage. (Strictly speaking, in California, it would probably be a deed of trust rather than a mortgage, but that is functionally equivalent.) But, it wouldn't be very common as a commercial requirement to insist on joint tenancy with right of survivorship as opposed to tenancy-in-common ownership. Also since providing credit to a transaction is something of value, getting an ownership interest in the property in exchange isn't beyond the realm on possibility and plausibility in a deal that isn't entirely arms length but isn't entire a gift either. Providing credit is probably sufficient consideration to support the deal as a binding contractual agreement. Now, the best strategy might be a letter or exchange of letters that amount to an agreement. This wouldn't bind the mortgage company, but might have some relevant. Still, if the letters predate the execution of the joint tenancy deed, the parole evidence rule might keep the letters out of evidence. Some sort of express trust theory, treating the letters as a trust agreement, might if the language was right, be a stronger legal argument. I'm trying to wrap my head around how a court would interpret documentation vs. intent with regard to the joint tenancy ownership of real property. The key point being that the decedent didn't 'generally' pay for the property, but always paid for it. This is almost completely irrelevant. It is consistent with the alternative characterization of the transaction, but it is also consistent with the deed terms. In particular, if the decedent described the remaining joint tenant as a 'renter' during an interval of co-habitation, and no financial transactions between the two took place subsequent to that. I could imagine bringing a legal action to reform the deed, but the threshold of proof to win that action is pretty high. Absent some sort on undue influence or abuse of a confidential relationship, I have a hard time seeing a deed like this being reformed by a court to reflect a different kind of transaction, even if that was the original intent of the parties, but it isn't impossible if the right facts and evidence were available (which the dead man's statute, again, heavily constrains). If Bob was defrauded by Clark, I could also imagine some sort of legal remedy being available. But it is hard to think that Bob who was the primary mover in the deal would have been defrauded by Clark in this fact pattern. In California, the relevant case law seems to be Kershman v Kershman, Milian v DeLeon, and Cosler v Norwood Kershman v. Kershman is not on point. It is a divorce case dealing with the issues of marital v. separate property under California's community property regime which is an entirely different body of law that doesn't apply to unmarried co-owners of property. Milian v. De Leon is more on point, involving unmarried people with unequal contributions to the property who take title by a deed that says joint tenancy. it found that, “once the court in a partition action has determined that a true joint tenancy exists, it may not order reimbursement or contribution on account of differences in the amounts the parties have paid toward the initial acquisition of the property.” Milian v. De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1195. (Source) This holding is the standard common law rule. It isn't isn't really relevant here, however, because that case applies in the context of a partition action while the co-owners are alive, and not after death when the survivorship feature causes the surviving co-owner to be sole owner by operation of law. Cosler v. Norwood is a much older case, from 1950, and seems to stand for the proposition that the language of the deed regarding equal ownership that flows from calling the co-owners joint tenants can be overcome by extrinsic evidence in the context of a partition action, although it is arguably implicitly repealed by Milian v. De Leon. But it isn't on point for the same reason that Milian v. DeLeon in not on point - it considers the rights of two living parties in a partition action dispute (i.e. a lawsuit to untangle co-ownership of property), not concerning the validity of a survivorship provision in the deed in the presence of unequal contributions to the acquisition price. Changes to the survivorship rights do not obviously at all flow from the existence of unequal contributions.	Code sections cited in this answer are to the New Mexico Criminal code, Chapter 30 as they were in my answer to the linked question, and to chapter 59A. Neither the landlord (whom I will cal LL) , nor any ordinary citizen, is legally required to report information that s/he may have about a crime to the police or other authorities. LL cannot actively conceal or destroy or tamper with evidence (section 30-22-5. of the NM code), nor assist the criminal by more than silence which would be a crime iunder section 30-22-4, Harboring or aiding a felon. If the police question LL about the crime, s/he should not lie. Apparently lying to officers during an investigation is not a crime in New Mexico, although filing a false crime report is, under section 30-39-1. If LL were to make an insurance claim while omitting or misstating a materiel fact (such as that LL knows who broke in) that would be a violation of Section 59A-16-23 paragraph (2) which prohibits: for the purpose of obtaining money or benefit, present or cause to be presented a false or fraudulent claim or proof in support of such a claim for payment of loss under a policy I am not sure if LL owes an affirmative duty to the tenant. If LL does owe such a duty, the tenant may have grounds to sue LL if LL fails to help the tenant recover the stolen property, but it is probably not a criminal matter.	With testamentary succession, the matter is simple: do what the will says. Religion aside, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 says As to what property deceased considered to have died intestate.—A person is deemed to die intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect. Illustrations (i) A has left no will. He has died intestate in respect of the whole of his property. (ii) A has left a will, whereby he has appointed B his executor; but the will contains no other provision. A has died intestate in respect of the distribution of his property. (iii) A has bequeathed his whole property for an illegal purpose. A has died intestate in respect of the distribution of his property. (iv) A has bequeathed 1,000 rupees to B and 1,000 rupees to the eldest son of C, and has made no other bequest; and has died leving the sum of 2,000 rupees and no other property. C died before A without having ever had a son. A has died intestate in respect of the distribution of 1,000 rupees. Then other acts address intestate succession, such as the Hindu Succession Act. If we suppose the will only identifies an executor, then w.r.t. distribution the Hindi Succession Act (etc.) govern the distribution. Those acts are ostensibly specific enough that there is no discretion: except, the law only addresses portions of the estate, and not very specific matters such as who gets the watch and who gets the computer. Indeed, there is a reasonable chance that property is not wholely transferred to a beneficiary, instead the beneficiary gain an interest in the property. There are also related provisions regarding an heir's transfer of his interest in property where other heirs have a "right of first refusal". So in general, the laws of intestate succession remove discretion from the equation. A will could, however, empower an executor to make a decision. The provisions of the will must be in writing. "Challenging" a will is a specific legal process, not the same as "asking about a will". If a legal petition has been filed, the will is challenged. If a person asks a lawyer "is that really legal; what does that mean", that is not a challenge.	In part, we don't know because there are currently no rules that address certain outcomes, so it will depend on who is on the Supreme Court when the issue is raised. A warrantless search will not be legal beyond current doctrines regarding crime in progress and imminent danger, even if it involves time travel. So you will need a warrant, and you will need probable cause to get it. Currently, if you break into a person's house to discover that there is a body there, you can't get a warrant to legitimize that illegal search. Adding time travel does not change anything. In situation 1, I assume they have probable cause and a warrant but the evidence was destroyed by the time of the search at time T+n. As long as prior time T is still after the crime, a warrant to search at time T would not be a problem. In scenario 2, there is nothing preventing them from stopping the crime or arresting the perpetrators in the act. However, if they travel back in time and break in to a suspect's house in order to witness the crime, that is an illegal search. You could likewise arrest a person before he escapes to the phantom zone, if you have probable cause that he had committed a crime – by the time of the arrest. Forward time travel poses a more serious challenge, as articulated in Minority Report. It would, or should, be very difficult to issue an arrest warrant at time T based on knowledge of a crime committed at T+n. Because of the arrest, the crime was not committed and there was no probable cause, so there should have been no warrant (oh no, paradox).
Can a school control an independent student newspaper A friend of me has founded a student newspaper in Germany that has an acronym of the schools name in its title. Like HBS instead of Harvard Business School. Internationally there are dozens of schools that have the same name. The newspaper is not sponsored by the school. Now the school wants to control what articles are being published by adding a staff member that can reject articles without a legitimate reason as defined in the German Pressekodex, a set of guidelines for good journalism. Can the school force the newspaper to align with their proposals?	Students too have freedom of information and expression. The school has no right to interfere with the student's activities outside of school. But is this activity outside of school? If the newspaper is created as part of a student council or a school-supported project group, supervision by a teacher might be appropriate. If the newspaper wants to distribute copies on school grounds, it will need the school's consent. If the name of the newspaper suggests an affiliation with the school, this could affect the reputation of the school which could lead to legal problems down the line (e.g. claims of defamation). Private schools are likely allowed to impose more restrictive rules. While there are legitimate reasons why the school would have to be (or wants to be) involved, it is ultimately not possible for a headmaster to restrict the student's freedoms. There is no legal basis for installing a censor. But a newspaper by students is not necessarily a “student newspaper”. Of course, any newspaper will have to comply with applicable press laws. Ultimately, the exact rules depend on press law and education law in that particular state. Bavaria provides a good online summary of the rules in that state, and Wikipedia summarizes the situation across a few states. Note that some press laws might require the senior editor to have a certain age if there isn't a special privilege for student newspapers.	No it is not illegal A school can ban or block online content from its own computers or connections as its administrators or teachers think proper, and does not need any law that authorizes or requires them to do so. The US Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) requires schools and libraries which receive discounts for Internet access or internal connections through the E-rate program to adopt an "Internet safety policy" This must include measures to block or filter Internet access to pictures that are: (a) obscene; (b) child pornography; or (c) harmful to minors. The policy also "must include monitoring the online activities of minors" and must address several other issues, including "access by minors to inappropriate matter". It does not however, require tracking of usage by specific individuals. But the school may, if it chooses, adopt a policy broader than the requirements of CIPA, which are a minimum standard. The school may block content thought to distract from school work, for example, or that the relevant school authorities think unhelpful or contrary to its goals. This is in no way required by CIPA (unless it is part of addressing the issues CIPA demands be addressed), but is also in no way prohibited, it is the school's choice. Institutions that adopt a CIPA Internet safety policy must "provide reasonable notice and hold at least one public hearing or meeting to address the proposal." But there is no legal requirement for the school to accurately describe which of its policy items are in fact required by CIPA. The only penalty for failing to comply with these CIPA requirement is loss of the E-rate discounts. A school may choose not to comply and forgo the discounts. Knowingly providing obscene content to minors might well be in violation of other laws, however. In short, the school can block whatever it sees fit, for whatever reasons school authorities think proper, unless some other law or constitutional right prevents this. I do not know of any such law or right, although I am researching the matter further. There is not generally a constitutional right to unfiltered internet access in school, or indeed to any access in school at all.	First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.	You can, and many authors and other creators of fiction do, use the names of real newspapers, real brands and products, and real people without obtaining permission from anyone. As long as those names are not being used to market or identify goods or services, the use cannot be trademark infringement. There idea that you cannot "defame the brans" is in fact much narrower than many people think, and than it used to be. Particularly in the united-states free speech rights often supersede protections against so-called trademark "defamation". In the US all of the examples in the answer by Jack Edwards would be clearly legal, an they probably would be in many other countries as well, if they appeared in a work that was clearly fictional. If a work mof fiction uses the name of a real person, and other identifying details that make it clear just which real person is being mentioned, and if statements that seem to be statements of fact, not opinion are made about that person, and if those statements are false and negative, and if a hypothetical reasonable person would believe that those statements are about the real person, not a fictional person, thereby harming that person's reputation, then if all that is true, the person might have a valid claim of defamation.	We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Section 2(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 provides: It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true. If a newspaper prints that a person has been accused of a crime and that person has in fact been accused of a crime, then the statement is truthful and there is no defamation. It would be different if the newspaper printed that the person had committed the crime (which implies they have been found guilty). If you pay close attention to such news articles you will see that they are usually very careful to use words such as "alleged", "accused", "is on trial for" etc. See the case of Christoper Jefferies for an example of a person who was accused of a murder, but subsequently found innocent, and who successfully sued various newspapers for defamation. In that case the articles had gone beyond mere statements of fact: He cited several examples of headlines and stories that had been published, including a headline in The Sun describing Jefferies – a former schoolmaster at Clifton College – as weird, posh, lewd and creepy; a story from the Daily Express quoting unnamed former pupils referring to him as "... a sort of Nutty Professor" who made them feel "creeped out" by his "strange" behaviour; and an article from the Daily Telegraph, which reported Jefferies "has been described by pupils at Clifton College ... as a fan of dark and violent avant-garde films". Jefferies launched legal action against six newspapers on 21 April – The Sun, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Star, the Daily Express, the Daily Mail and the Daily Record – seeking damages for libel. It was held that the media were quick to jump to conclusions regarding Jefferies's arrest. Being a retired English teacher who lived alone, whose physical appearance and "eccentrically unkempt white hair," made him stand out, led people to believe that he looked the type. Stephen Moss wrote in The Guardian: "The unspoken assumption was that no one could look that odd and be innocent."	First of all, even if it is not allowed to test them, you can also refuse to service someone untested - and that is not illegal discrimination, as "untested for COVID 19" is not a protected class. Public Schools however are not companies in the normal way, and the CDC can only advise in the rulemaking of local legislators and executives. And in the current health crisis, the school board and health authorities can order things for the protection of others and this can be enough justification to exclude individuals or several people from groups. After all, being teste or not is clearly not a protected class under the Civil Rights Act, and neither is easily regarded as a form of first amendment speech - unlike a black armband (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community). Being untested is much more akin to being a person on a ship and then attempting to disembark in a quarantine zone - which was decided in Compagnie Francaise & Lousiana Board of Health (there are two of those btw). The majority opinion in the SCOTUS case (1902) writes (emphasis mine): 24 True it is that, in some of the cases relied on in the argument, it was held that a state law absolutely prohibiting the introduction, under all circumstances, of objects actually affected with [a contagious] disease, was valid because such objects were not legitimate commerce. But this implies no limitation on the power to regulate by health laws the subjects of legitimate commerce. 34 [A]ssuming that all the treaties relied on are applicable, we think it clearly results from their context that they were not intended to, and did not, deprive the government of the United States of those powers necessarily inhering in it and essential to the health and safety of its people. Using a similar vein as in Compagnie Francaise, the public health interest might be enough for even a public school to only allow presence in the building with a test and otherwise demand online or remote learning (which isn't always an option) or even just suspend people that are not tested until such a time their presence is deemed safe. A private school is vastly more free in rulemaking, and as even a public school can muster strict scrutiny regarding presence teaching, a private school surely will get away with it. But nothing can force a private school to suspend teaching, switching to online classes or demand to test, unless they like to or their accreditation hinges on it - and here religious schools come in: There are religious groups that to an extent of not allowing medical procedures on their members, including COVID-testing. Those schools could ban people from attending that are tested. Endnote Public Health Interest is a hammer that can be rather heavy. It can't be used to discriminate against HIV, as that doesn't spread from touch and sneeze, but it can be used to ban people from buildings that have Communicable Diseases. While nobody classed COVID 19 as such yet, having such an illness [Plague, Cholera, Botulism, and others] allows the government to isolate you under strict scrutiny or even has been used to quarantine whole areas in the past (see the Compagnie Francaise case). And as you see in the current pandemic, legislative bodies globally do dish out rules for schools and public places in short order, some of which include testing strategies, and ways to overwrite consent via a state order. Some are struck down: some of them on procedural grounds (e.g. wrong body), others on grounds of equality (e.g. religious bias).	If the Kenya legislature passes such a law, they can impose such a requirement on Kenyans who want to create such social media groups. Note that this is a license from the Kenyan government, not a copyright or trademark license. In effect, it is a tax on running a social media group, along with various regulations. I have no idea if this bill is at all likely to pass. If it does pass, it might be hard to enforce, as it would probably require cooperation from Facebook and other social media platforms, and the companies which run those platforms are not located in Kenya, and might not cooperate.
Can Idaho employers ask about dismissed criminal convictions? In California, if a person is convicted of a crime, then later has the conviction dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4, then Labor Code section 432.7 makes it illegal for employers to ask about such a dismissed conviction. Therefore, if a person's only criminal conviction was dismissed per PC 1203.4, then on a non-government, non-law-enforcement employment application, when answering the question "Have you ever been convicted of a crime?", it would be legal and truthful to answer "No", since the question would itself be illegal if its intended scope included dismissals. Question: Is something like that also true in Idaho? Given (only) a California conviction and later dismissal (PC 1203.4), would a person now seeking employment in Idaho be required to answer "Yes" to the question "Have you ever been convicted of a crime?"? The searches I tried that found the answer for California did not turn up anything for Idaho.	I do not believe that Idaho has such a law. This is not the end of the analysis, however. It isn't clear that saying you do not have a conviction, when in fact, you have a conviction that was dismissed, is a permissible ground for an Idaho employer to, for example, justify the termination of your employment for an improper reasons (e.g. national origin) when the employer, after the fact, discovers that you have a conviction that you did not disclose because it was dismissed. An Idaho court could easily rule that the non-disclosure of a conviction which was dismissed was not a material fact upon which an Idaho employer could justify terminating your employment when it was discovered after the fact. Likewise, fraud prosecutions generally require a misrepresentation to be made regarding a "material" fact, and not just any fact. In the same vein, while misstating your middle name might be a misrepresentation, it might not be an actionable misrepresentation of a material fact.	Assuming you have a right of interlocutory appeal at all -- you usually don't -- you would file the appeal in the Courts of Appeal for whichever district. There are some types of cases that can be appealled directly to the California Supreme Court, or where you could petition the federal courts for an order to vacate the trial court's ruling, but these would be uncommon.	Voluntary Dismissal of a case in Maryland follows the Maryland Revise Civil Procedure District Court Rule 3-506 - Voluntary Dismissal: (a) By Notice of Dismissal or Stipulation. Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim may dismiss all or part of the claim without leave of court by filing (1) a notice of dismissal at any time before the adverse party files a notice of intention to defend, or if the notice of dismissal specifies that it is with prejudice, at any time before judgment, or (2) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties to the claim being dismissed. (b) Dismissal Upon Stipulated Terms. If an action is settled upon written stipulated terms and dismissed, the action may be reopened at any time upon request of any party to the settlement to enforce the stipulated terms through the entry of judgment or other appropriate relief. (c) By Order of Court. Except as provided in section (a) of this Rule, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim may dismiss the claim only by order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. (d) Effect on Claim. Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissal, stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim. (e) Effect on Counterclaim. If a counterclaim has been pleaded before the filing of a notice of dismissal or motion for voluntary dismissal, the dismissal of the action shall not affect the continued pendency of the counterclaim. (f) Costs. Unless otherwise provided by stipulation or order of court, the dismissing party is responsible for all costs of the action or the part dismissed. There is a form that explicitly refers to the 3-506 rule	Conducting an illegal search does not amount to a permanent get out of jail free card ("does that invalidate all evidence against you". What is excluded is evidence derived from that illegal search, regardless of what crime they were searching for. It would include later evidence for an unrelated crime where the probable cause was uncovered by the illegal search. The doctrine is not absolute, so a grand jury can inquire about a matter brought to their attention via an illegal search ("the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons", US v. Calandra). Also, the doctrine excludes the product of a bad faith search without probable cause e.g. where the officer lies about the probable cause. There is also a "social cost" consideration, see Pennsylvania v. Scott. Utah v. Strief establishes three related doctrines. Unlawfully-obtained evidence independently acquired by officers from a source may be admittede. Evidence may be admitted if it would have been discovered without the unconstitutional source. Finally, since the poison fruit doctrine is intended to limit illegal police action, it may be admitted when there is a remote connection between illegal police conduct and gathering of evidence (e.g. the existence of an arrest warrant, discovered after the search). Nothing in your hypothetical points to an exception. The "social costs" consideration was specifically related to "social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large", but the potential for wider application is established (however, it is well-established that evidence of ordinary drug possession is excluded, from the myriad cases of such exclusions over the past century).	So what relevance if any does standing have in criminal trials? E.g., are there any examples of criminal cases/charges dismissed for lack of standing, by which I mean that the court decided the government lacked standing? Let's restrict the discussion to federal proceedings, for the sake of not making this too broad. Almost none. Conceptually, this is because a violation of a sovereign's criminal laws is an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest of a sovereign in not having its own criminal laws violated. The violation of the law itself is the injury. Where standing type considerations apply they are usually described as jurisdiction. A sovereign, be it a state or the federal government can enforce its own criminal laws, but not another sovereign's criminal laws except by extradition. For example, a state prosecutor can't enforce a federal immigration crime in state court, nor can a state prosecutor file federal or state charges in a federal court. Likewise, a federal prosecutor can't bring federal or state charges in a state court, and a federal prosecutor can't bring state criminal charges (unless adopted by reference as part of federal law) in federal court. Criminal justice in Indian territory which is handled by the federal courts by federal prosecutors in felony cases, are a special case conceptualized either as a "contract service" relationship or as evidence that Indian tribes are not fully sovereign. The extraterritorial application of criminal laws is likewise usually considered a question of jurisdiction rather than standing. Sometimes the federal government passes a law incorporating some state criminal laws by reference as federal criminal laws in federally controlled territory, but that is an issue of substantive law, not standing. A handful of states allow private criminal prosecutions for select minor offenses, rather than being exclusively brought by the government (mostly on the East Coast). In those cases, standing is an issue, just as it is in civil cases. Only victims can bring private criminal prosecutions, where they are allowed, and only in cases where they are the victim.	In reality, nothing will probably happen. There is no record of anybody being prosecuted for ignoring the census since 1970 (as of 2014, the article hasn't been updated since then). 13 U.S. Code § 221.Refusal or neglect to answer questions; false answers: (a)Whoever, being over eighteen years of age, refuses or willfully neglects, when requested by the Secretary, or by any other authorized officer or employee of the Department of Commerce or bureau or agency thereof acting under the instructions of the Secretary or authorized officer, to answer, to the best of his knowledge, any of the questions on any schedule submitted to him in connection with any census or survey provided for by subchapters I, II, IV, and V of chapter 5 of this title, applying to himself or to the family to which he belongs or is related, or to the farm or farms of which he or his family is the occupant, shall be fined not more than $100. (b)Whoever, when answering questions described in subsection (a) of this section, and under the conditions or circumstances described in such subsection, willfully gives any answer that is false, shall be fined not more than $500. (c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no person shall be compelled to disclose information relative to his religious beliefs or to membership in a religious body. The entire 13 USC Chapter 7 deals with offenses and penalties related to the Census: 13 USC Chapter 7, you as a citizen would fall under sub-chapter 2 "Other Persons". If you don't submit your answers, the Census bureau will send out a person to collect your responses. How you behave with that person may be more of an issue with regards to your liability.	The EEOC states that national original discrimination in employment is illegal, which is supported by 28 CFR Part 44 (discriminate means "the act of intentionally treating an individual differently from other individuals because of national origin or citizenship status, regardless of the explanation for the differential treatment, and regardless of whether such treatment is because of animus or hostility"). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. codified at 42 USC 2000e–2. The internet widely advises that asking such questions is illegal. The EEOC has a more nuanced view of the matter as articulated here: they say We recommend that you avoid asking applicants about personal characteristics that are protected by law, such as race, color, religion, sex, national origin or age. These types of questions may discourage some individuals from applying, may be viewed suspiciously by some applicants, and may be considered evidence of intent to discriminate by the EEOC. If you do not have this information when you decide who to hire, it may be easier for you to defend your business against a hiring discrimination complaint. Before reaching a conclusion, we should check what an employee is (42 USC § 2000e(f)), namely: an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. This just tells us that in writing the law, Congress left it somewhat open what an "employee" is. An Amazon seller is, on the face of it, not an employee of Amazon, instead, a seller is an independent contractor. Of course that is a legal question that can't just be decided superficially, see for example California's AB5 (but even under that law, a seller is not an employee). As articulated by SSA The common law control test is the basic test, using the common law rules, for determining whether a relationship exists between the worker and the person or firm that they work for. Under the common-law test, the employer has the right to tell the employee what to do, how, when, and where to do the job If the Dept. of Labor or the IRS determine that you are (would be) an employee, then this is illegal discrimination, otherwise it is not. Since you are not paid a wage, the prospects for being deemed an employee are extremely dim. The EEOC gives this guidance on the distinction, with a very long list of examples which in general support the position that a vendor is an independent contractor and not an employee.	No. You are a "person of interest" in a criminal investigation based upon a bona fide reasonable suspicion, even though they lack probable cause, and the government has not threatened to say anything that isn't true, so you have no cause of action against the government. You might have a claim against the school or your employer for wrongfully firing you (being a person of interest in an investigation isn't itself unlawful or even a meaningful mark of bad character), but you are probably an "employee at will" and thus may have no recourse against the employer other than to apply for unemployment benefits because you were fired without good cause. Your recourse against the school would depend upon the nature of that relationship.
The Data ownership for an automated server running for years prior to GDPR Regulations Let's go back to the early 2010's. A group of researchers get together to build a collaborative data repository. A server is set up to receive data for aggregation and processing from various nationwide medical centers collecting survey data. This server is automated to receive and transmit data to/from servers at certain times using crontab jobs. If you're no computer expert, you can think of this like an alarm-trigger which will run a certain job without any human intervention at certain times in a day/month, provided that the device is powered on and is not blocked off from hardware resources. So in theory, this server could continue to run the same jobs for decades to come, with no human ever interacting with the device itself. Now, a number of studies are conducted using data collected by this server, over the course of the next few years, with scrupulous adherence to any and all red tape. Ethics committees, patient concerns, you name it! Such was the case until about 2016 when the researchers who were using the system diverted their attention to other projects for a time. Unfortunately for those researchers, this was also around the time that the GDPR was passed, bringing a lot of new requirements that data owners/controllers have to adhere to. The year is now 2021, and the researchers find themselves under investigation for allegedly having breached data regulations. But interestingly there has been no action on the part of these researchers for years! The machine-scheduled data collection/transmission jobs have continued to run all this time, but there has not been any update to this data in years. If anything, a good portion of the code has been commented out; so the network requests aren't really doing anything besides establishing connections. The data did follow an anonymization rule. But the biggest issue this research group now faces, is that they are not able to determine who controls the data. Remember, this system has been self-automated in the confines of a university room for ages. And since it was a collaborative project, the person heading the data was designated only informally, from time to time. And without having ever appointed an official data controller, they find themselves in a difficult position, unable to point to an authority or entity responsible for the data. I understand that these researchers are (likely) immune from retroactive prosecution, but can anyone here tell me how the researchers can hope to build a case in their defense, when the prosecution expects of them to fulfill roles which had never been appointed?	There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access.	The critical part is the nature of the relationship between you, the website provider, and the provider of the material you embed. If the embed-provider acts as your data processor, then things are generally fine. The GDPR does not really distinguish between personal data processing activities that you perform yourself versus activities that you've outsourced to third parties. However, you would remain responsible for compliance. This also means that per Art 28 GDPR, you will need a contract with that embed-provider (sometimes called a “Data Processing Agreement”, DPA). This contract stipulates that the processor will only use the personal data as instructed by you, but not for their own purposes. With the Google Fonts case, it must be highlighted that Google does not act as a processor for this service. Google does not offer a DPA that covers the Fonts CDN. While Google promises that it doesn't use the personal data collected in this context in any nefarious way, there are zero contractual guarantees for website providers. So we have to consider the scenario when the embed-provider is an independent data controller. We as the website provider have no control over what the embed-provider does with the collected data, our control only extends to whether or not we cause the website to disclose data to that third party. But this is still processing as personal data (see also the CJEU Fashion ID case), and we need a legal basis for this data sharing. In the Google Fonts case, the court in Munich found that there was no legal basis for using Google's CDN. There was no consent, no contractual necessity, and no necessity for a legitimate interest. After all, these fonts could all be self-hosted. (Technical remark: and given how modern browsers enforce cache isolation and provide HTTP/2, serving fonts from your main domain is probably faster anyway). Consent management services will typically act as your data processor. You don't need a legal basis for “sharing” data with them, because the processing remains under your control. As far as the GDPR is concerned, loading a script from your processor's servers is equivalent to loading a script from your own servers (which you're probably hosting via a another data processor anyway). Sometimes, the necessary data processing agreement is already part of the standard terms of service, sometimes it's a separate document that has to be signed. Figuring this out is your responsibility as the data controller, before deploying the service. Art 6 GDPR doesn't say that you always need consent. It says that you need a legal basis, for which paragraph 1 enumerates six choices. For a lot of use cases, a “legitimate interest” will be appropriate, though it requires a balancing test. Sometimes, other laws mandate that you use a particular legal basis. For example, the ePrivacy Directive says that you must get GDPR-consent when accessing or storing information on the user's device (such as cookies), unless that access/storage is strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user.	Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.	Please note that Google Analytics do not anonymize the data you collect on its behalf unless you configure it to do IP-anonymization. If you use Google Analytics and do not use this feature, you need to have a DPA (Data Processing Addendum) in place with Google in order to comply with the GDPR. This is a real hassle, so unless you absolutely need fine-grained demographic data, it is strongly recommended that you use IP-anonymization. According to our data protection supervisory authority, this is sufficient to comply with the GDPR vis-a-vis Google Analytics. Does data that is anonymized need to be collect in the event of a GDPR Subject Access Request? No. But as the controller, you need to make sure that is is anonymized.	You quoted the definition of personal data from Art 4(1) GDPR. This definition of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: […] To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. […] If the user ID is unique, then the hashed user ID will be unique as well. Thus, the hashed ID will enable “singling out”, and would still count as identifying in the sense of the GDPR. You also claim that there's no way to reverse the hash. This is not quite correct. Assuming that the hash function itself is secure, then the only way to crack the hash is to brute-force the input. The difficulty of brute-forcing depends only on the entropy of the input data, not on the size of the output hash. It is thus comparatively easy to crack hashes of short low-entropy strings like sequential integer user IDs, IPv4 addresses, or weak passwords. In contrast, it would be difficult to crack long random user IDs, such as UUID version 4 identifiers created from a cryptographically secure RNG (CSPRNG). Even if the hashes can't be cracked, they are not anonymous – you can link them to the original user ID, after all. The GDPR only considers data anonymized if there are no “reasonably likely” means to re-identify the data subject. If this de-identification is reversible, it's called pseudonymization instead. If storage allows, a better technique to generate pseudonymous IDs is to create a table that maps the true ID to a CSPRNG-random ID. Unlike a hash, the random ID cannot leak extra information about the original ID. This pseudonymization technique could perhaps also be turned into irreversible anonymization by deleting the ID mapping, assuming that no “singling out” can happen. Pseudonymization is a very good security measure. It is explicitly mandated whenever appropriate in Art 32 GDPR. So you should probably use it. It's just that GDPR continues to fully apply to processing of the pseudonymized data. Since the pseudonymized data is the data subject's personal data, you may be required to delete it when receiving an Art 17 request for erasure. You may also be required to forward the request to others with whom you shared the data. However, the right to erasure has many conditions and exceptions. If you actually need to keep the data for a particular purpose, chances are good that you can keep it.	I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations.	By itself, a chess position is not personal data. Personal data is “any information relating to an … identifiable natural person”. Since the file in question includes the name of the opponent, it is clearly personal data about the opponent. If the files are used for “purely personal or household purposes”, the GDPR won't apply per Art 2(2)(c). If the files are shared more widely – especially if the files are published – then GDPR becomes relevant. The person/entity who is data controller has to consider GDPR compliance. Data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data (the “why” and “how”). The first question would be under which legal basis this personal data about another person can be shared. The GDPR offers multiple legal basis, notably “legitimate interests” and “consent”. Consent is always an option, but must be freely given (entirely voluntary). Legitimate interests can serve as a legal basis after a balancing test between your interests and the data subject's rights and interests. This balancing test also depends on the reasonable expectations of the data subject, which in turn depends on the more general context. For example, in a chess community where such sharing is completely normal there would likely be a legitimate interest for you to share games as well, if the games occurred in the context of this community. But if you play a game with a friend who is not part of this community, the friend cannot reasonably expect that their name and associated personal data would be shared. The second question would be how you would satisfy further GDPR compliance obligation, in particular the Art 13/Art 14 right to information. When collecting personal data, it is necessary to provide certain information such as your identity, what processing is being carried out, and how the data subject can invoke their GDPR rights (a privacy notice or privacy policy). This might be difficult or awkward to do. Practical solutions to these problems: If you want to share a game but aren't sure that the opponent is OK with this, remove identifying aspects such as names. For example, you could crop a screenshot, or describe the game in textual notation without listing the opponent's name. Play the game via a chess website that publishes the game. This way, the website is the data controller, and you and the opponent are the data subjects. This avoids having to act as the data controller yourself. This might work for private interactions, but not e.g. if you run a chess club and require members to play via that website – you might still be in a data controller role then and have full compliance obligations.	Yes, you can use such eye tracking if you obtain consent in a suitable manner. But obtaining consent is going to be very difficult for you. The processing activity in question occurs within the context of an EU establishment of the data controller. Thus, GDPR applies regardless of where the data subjects are located. Under GDPR, any processing activity needs a clear purpose and a legal basis. Typical legal bases are necessity for performing a contract with the data subject, legal obligations, a legitimate interest, or consent. Conditions for consent are listed in Art 7 GDPR. Once your have a purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can collect the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. For example, let's assume that the purpose is a scientific study for which gaze tracking is necessary. The study's subjects can be informed about the context of the study, about how the data will be used, and can then be asked for consent for proceeding. Of course, participation in the study is only possible when consent is given. This is perfectly fine as far as the GDPR is concerned. But things might be more difficult when data is used for a different purpose, for example in order to track user interests in a web shop. You do have a legitimate interest in optimizing the website, but this interest likely doesn't outweigh the user's privacy interests. Legitimate interest always requires a careful balancing test. If the user cannot reasonably expect the data collection to happen, that is an indication that consent would be a better legal basis than legitimate interest. Accessing a camera feed means accessing information stored on the end user's device. Per the ePrivacy directive, this requires consent regardless of whether the information in question is personal data. Cookies, mouse pointer tracking, or eye tracking with a camera are all equivalent in this regard. Consent must be specific, informed, and freely given. It is an unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes, and must involve some clear statement or affirmative action. Prior to starting the eye tracking, you must provide sufficient information about what is happening, and must make it possible to easily decline consent. You cannot bundle unrelated consent together (e.g. eye tracking consent + cookie consent). You cannot make access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. E.g. a web shop does not need camera access, but an augmented reality does. Still, consent must be specific so consent for AR purposes can probably not be used to authorize eye tracking, which might need separate consent. Browsers do not grant camera access by default, and instead show a permission dialogue where the user can allow access or block further requests. This permission dialogue cannot replace your compliance obligations such as providing the necessary information so that the user can make an informed choice. Since GDPR requires that consent is freely given and can be declined, you might find it difficult to convince anyone to give consent to this fairly invasive tracking procedure. You might be able to incentivize consent e.g. with small discounts on a web shop, but the incentive must remain small enough that there really is a free choice between giving or declining consent. The EDPB has issued guidelines that are relevant to your scenario. These guidelines are not law, but are well-reasoned official interpretations that are frequently cited by courts. Guidelines 05/2020 on consent Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices Practically speaking, I doubt you will find eye tracking to be useful. First, you can likely achieve your purposes through less invasive means. Recall that the GDPR only allows you to process the minimum data necessary to achieve a purpose. Second, eye tracking is difficult for technical reasons. Bad lighting and weird angles make it difficult to obtain a useful feed. Cameras might be in different positions relative to the browser window, so that the eye tracking would have to be calibrated before acquiring data. Eye tracking typically involves processing the video feed on the user's device, but this is computationally expensive that will make the website unusable on lower-end devices, in particular mobile devices. And of course, many PCs don't have a camera in the first place.
Is it legal to put a death row inmate in harm's way if their execution is near? In Death Note, a serial killer named Kira is killing the world's criminals. All he needs is a name and a face. It's not too long before countries realize someone is targeting criminals and hire a detective L to find him. Early in the story L has a news conference in Japan. His full name is "Lind L. Tailor" and he vows to track down Kira. Kira is watching the broadcast, and uses his power to kill Lind L. Tailor while he is live on TV. The real L takes over the broadcast and explains that Lind L. Taylor was a death row inmate that was going to be executed today, and Kira didn't kill the real L. if you did indeed kill Lind L tailor the man you just saw die on television I should tell you that he was an inmate whose execution was scheduled for today that was not me. The police arrested him in absolute secrecy so you wouldn't have heard about him on TV or through the internet. Would this be legal for L to use prisoners to prove his theories about Kira? The story is set in Japan, but would this be illegal in the U.S.A.?	would this be illegal in the U.S.A.? This would almost certainly fail under the US Constitutions 8th Amendment as being a "cruel and unusual punishment": Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted While the inmate has been sentenced to execution, they are still afforded a lot of protection and are entitled to a stay of execution at any point (which is why there is typically an open telephone line to the state governor etc right up to the point at which the execution starts). Being deliberately put in harms way to catch a killer just because they have been sentenced to execution would be both a cruel and an unusual punishment.	Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.	No If she has probable cause, yes. The question is whether "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts [Bob is a thief] are probably true"? Its likely that the answer to this question is yes. None No Charlotte listens to Alice, Charlotte asks Bob questions which Bob may or may not answer. Charlotte can ask Bob to produce the receipt, Bob doesn't have to. Charlotte can ask to search Bob, Bob doesn't have to consent. If Bob tries to leave, if Charlotte has reasonable suspicion the Bob has committed a crime (which she could certainly justify) she may detain him temporarily without arrest. If Charlotte has probable cause to believe that Bob has committed a crime (which she could probably justify) then she can arrest him.	He would be thanked and sent on his way. We don't generally punish people for preventing murders, even if they are rogue cops or soldiers. If you wanted him to plausibly land in legal peril, he'd probably need to do more than simply save someone's life. The most obvious possibility, I think, would be if he were to continue inflicting harm on the attacker after cuffing him. At that point, there's probably no justification for a continued use of force, so he could face assault charges there. Also possible would be that the way he handled the situation -- the amount of force he used, the failure to de-escalate, failing to call for assistance -- just violates some police or military policy. I don't know if that would jam him up in the way you're looking for, though.	It is not as simple as the witness just making the assertion that they are the killer. They will be subject to grueling cross examination to break their story. If the victim was killed at a specific time, perhaps the prosecution can prove the witness was somewhere else at that time, and therefore lying. (No Opportunity) If the victim was killed with a specific weapon, perhaps the prosecution can prove that only the accused had the weapon, and the witness had no access to it, and therefore lying. (No Means) If the victim was killed in a specific way, perhaps the witness doesn't know any of the details of how the crime happened, and therefore is not credible. (No Knowledge) If the accused's DNA is found at the scene, and their shirt is covered in blood, and the witness has no corroborating evidence against them, then the witness is likely lying. (No Evidence) If the witness claims he is the murderer, the prosecution can inquire as to why he killed the victim. The real murderer had a reason: Perhaps money, power, hatred, passion, etc, that the witness may not be able to provide. (No Motive) Planting doubt in the mind of a jury is an effective defense. But lying about who did what, when, how, and why it is not as easy as you suggest.	I am not a lawyer and I have never even been to the UK. You will not go to prison if your neighbor's dog attacks you and it dies as a result of you defending yourself. You might go to prison and/or owe the owner damages if: You are somewhere you do not technically have a right to be. It can be shown you could have retreated from harm but chose instead to stand your ground. The force you used was deemed excessive - it showed intent to harm the dog more than necessary to protect yourself You contributed to the confrontation in a way that a reasonable person would think might cause trouble You might be able to protect yourself from problems by: taking pictures or videos of the dog behaving badly or aggressively note dates and times when you observe the dog behaving badly or aggressively formally contact the dog's owner with your concerns and/or evidence in which you assert your rights to access the areas you walk through and your right to defend yourself in the event that you are attacked by the dog if possible, change your route or schedule to avoid the problem entirely Good luck	Yes the woman is guilty of murder (under the law OP described) The issue of common law mens rea (the guilty conscience) is moot as it is no longer a component of the crime, see here. Almost all jurisdictions today have codified crimes so the common law mens rea is not relevant, for example, in Texas a person commits murder if they "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual"; feeling guilty about it or knowing it was wrong is not an issue. In the facts you describe the person "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual"; the fact that she did not consider the victim to be a person is immaterial. As described, she would have a hard time with an insanity plea in the same way that a white supremacist murderer would for classifying members of other races as "non-persons". You can see why the common law usage would no longer work.	Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.
California: Unauthorized Access to Medical Info I took a Covid vaccine few weeks ago with Walgreens. Suddenly in the news, California states they have an electronic record of everyone's vaccine, just provide the info on a website, and you will get a QR digital copy. Where did California get authorization to receive my medical info from Walgreens? They have a right to keep anonymous survey numbers of How many people received the vaccine in state, however where did they get consent from citizens to track medical vaccine info, of who's taken and not. Seems like Nazi Germany, where California is keeping track of residents without consent. Of course nothing surprises me about California at this point. Is this legal, and can the State be indicted for breach of privacy? https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article252208388.html https://www.northbaybusinessjournal.com/article/industrynews/california-unveils-system-to-provide-digital-covid-19-vaccine-records/ Website: https://myvaccinerecord.cdph.ca.gov/ Seems to be contradictory to information below: HIPAA as the following: "The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) is a federal law that required the creation of national standards to protect sensitive patient health information from being disclosed without the patient’s consent or knowledge. " CDC Website: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/distributing/about-vaccine-data.html How does CDC report vaccine distribution and administration data? "CDC uses the IZ Data Lake to receive, store, manage, and analyze COVID-19 vaccine distribution and administration data from all sources. Data in the IZ Data Lake are deidentified, meaning they do not identify specific people who have been vaccinated. CDC data scientists make sure the data in the IZ Data Lake are correct (validated) and that the system does not double-count any doses or vaccination records (deduplication).	Where did California get authorization to receive my medical info from Walgreens? From HIPAA. Permitted Uses and Disclosures. A covered entity is permitted, but not required, to use and disclose protected health information, without an individual’s authorization, for the following purposes or situations: (1) To the Individual (unless required for access or accounting of disclosures); (2) Treatment, Payment, and Health Care Operations; (3) Opportunity to Agree or Object; (4) Incident to an otherwise permitted use and disclosure; (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities; and (6) Limited Data Set for the purposes of research, public health or health care operations.18 Covered entities may rely on professional ethics and best judgments in deciding which of these permissive uses and disclosures to make. ... (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities. The Privacy Rule permits use and disclosure of protected health information, without an individual’s authorization or permission, for 12 national priority purposes.28 These disclosures are permitted, although not required, by the Rule in recognition of the important uses made of health information outside of the health care context. Specific conditions or limitations apply to each public interest purpose, striking the balance between the individual privacy interest and the public interest need for this information. ... Public Health Activities. Covered entities may disclose protected health information to: (1) public health authorities authorized by law to collect or receive such information for preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability and to public health or other government authorities authorized to receive reports of child abuse and neglect; (2) entities subject to FDA regulation regarding FDA regulated products or activities for purposes such as adverse event reporting, tracking of products, product recalls, and post-marketing surveillance; (3) individuals who may have contracted or been exposed to a communicable disease when notification is authorized by law; and (4) employers, regarding employees, when requested by employers, for information concerning a work-related illness or injury or workplace related medical surveillance, because such information is needed by the employer to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MHSA), or similar state law. See: HIPAA Privacy Rule In plain English... A covered entity (Walgreens) is allowed to use and disclose your PHI without your authorization to public health authorities for controlling and preventing diseases. Additionally, they are allowed to receive this information for the purposes of adverse event recording (reactions to shots), tracking of products (tracking of shots), and notifying you of issues related to the product you were given. Is this legal, and can the State be indicted for breach of privacy? Yes, this is legal, and no, the State cannot be sued for it.	Most likely yes if you are subject to UK or EU laws: The EU ePrivacy directive and implementing laws such as PECR in the UK require that you obtain consent before accessing information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to perform a service requested by the user. Cookies and similar technologies such as LocalStorage are stored on the user's device. Analytics are not strictly necessary to display a website. Thus, you need to obtain valid consent before setting any analytics cookies. GDPR and ePrivacy/PECR have some interactions: Even though the cookies might technically be set by GoSquared, you as the website operator are responsible for compliance. You are the data controller, the third party analytics are usually a data processor who only process data on your behalf. You must ensure that the data processor is compliant. Even if they were a joint controller you'd be responsible for what happens on the website (relevant precedent is the Fashion ID case). While ePrivacy originally had a fairly weak concept of consent (e.g. “by continuing to use this site, you consent …”). However, the GDPR updated the definition of consent, so that valid consent must be freely given, informed, actively given, and specific. If you set cookies for different purposes in addition to analytics, users should be able to give or withhold consent for analytics independently from other purposes. Since consent must be actively given, consent is never the default, e.g. pre-ticked checkboxes are not compliant (relevant precedent is the Planet49 case). Like Google, GoSquared stores data in the US. You are causing personal data to be transferred into the US, which is an international transfer. Before it was invalidated earlier in 2020, such transfers were easy to do under the Privacy Shield adequacy decision. Now, such transfers are only legal if you sign SCCs with your data processor, and your risk assessment indicates that your user's data is sufficiently safe there, despite your processors potentially being legally unable to comply with the SCCs. Fortunately for you the UK's ICO has taken a more industry-friendly stance on this matter than other countrie's data protection agencies. Why do so many websites use Google Analytics (GA) without requesting proper consent? A variety of potential reasons: They are actually non-compliant. After all, GA is not GDPR-compliant in default settings, and Google doesn't do a good job of providing essential information. Many data protection agencies have indicated that cookie consent enforcement is not their focus. GA can be used without using cookies/LocalStorage/…, and thus without requiring consent under ePrivacy or PECR. The websites might not be subject to EU or UK laws such as ePrivacy.	Here is the state of California code regarding the question. I am sure a state by state inquiry could reveal other statutes. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-01000&file=565-566 In California there is no specific registry but registration is performed by marking the container with a registered brand.	You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none: ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive. Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR.	It would merely be a "jerk move". HIPAA only applies to "covered entities": Healthcare Providers Health Plans Healthcare Clearing Houses (i.e. Paying for your health care) Business Associates of the Above) Source: CDC page on HIPAA	As I understand it there is no obligation to 'triage' SARs or keep data 'just-in-case' that would otherwise be deleted as a matter of routine. Can we amend or delete data following receipt of a SAR? It is our view that a SAR relates to the data you held at the time you received the request. However, in many cases, routine use of the data may result in it being amended or even deleted while you are dealing with the request. So it is reasonable for you to supply the information you hold when you respond, even if this is different to what you held when you received the request. However, it is not acceptable to amend or delete the data if you would not otherwise have done so. Under the DPA 2018, it is an offence to make any amendment with the intention of preventing its disclosure. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/right-of-access/how-do-we-find-and-retrieve-the-relevant-information/	In California, psychologists are regulated under Ch 6.6 within Division 2 (Healing Arts) of the Business and Professions Code. §2902 identifies the essential restriction on the business practice, stating that "A person represents himself or herself to be a psychologist when the person holds himself or herself out to the public by any title or description of services..." using various forms of the word 'psychologist', as well as "when the person holds himself or herself out to be trained, experienced, or an expert in the field of psychology". In order to say that you are a psychologist, you have to hold a professional psychologists's license. Likewise to hold yourself out as a nurse, you need a nurse's license. A consequence of being a licensed psychologist is that under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, you may assess a patient's mental state, and you must keep that information confidential. A life coach cannot make a diagnosis, and cannot prescribe cures for mental conditions. §2908 in particular allows other people to do some of what psychologists do: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent qualified members of other recognized professional groups licensed to practice in the State of California, such as, but not limited to, physicians, clinical social workers, educational psychologists, marriage and family therapists, licensed professional clinical counselors, optometrists, psychiatric technicians, or registered nurses, or attorneys admitted to the State Bar of California, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques by referral from persons licensed to practice medicine, dentistry, or psychology, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques which offer avocational or vocational self-improvement and do not offer therapy for emotional or mental disorders, or duly ordained members of the recognized clergy, or duly ordained religious practitioners from doing work of a psychological nature consistent with the laws governing their respective professions, provided they do not hold themselves out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words “psychological,” “psychologist,” “psychology,” “psychometrist,” “psychometrics,” or “psychometry,” or that they do not state or imply that they are licensed to practice psychology; except that persons licensed under Chapter 13.5 (commencing with Section 4989.10) of Division 2 may hold themselves out to the public as licensed educational psychologists. Analogously, we can talk about the law here without running afoul of UPL laws, because "talking about the law" is not the same as "practicing law". It is a fairly formalistic distinction, but I or a life coach can talk about what would be good for your soul, as long as I don't claim to be a psychologist dispensing professional advice.	There is no general law requiring a doctor to report to the government that they have given medical treatment. On the contrary, there is a federal rule (the "Privacy Rule") that somewhat requires keeping medical information private. There may be certain instances where a report must be made, such as the obligation to report gunshot wounds or suspected child abuse. There could be entanglements regarding use of drugs that require a prescription, where there is a required paper trail.
Where is the line between a breach of ToS, a tort, and a crime regarding use of a site? It does not seem to be clear what the difference is, because of the language of the CFAA. Which of these can be categorized in each of the categories above (in increasing order of severity)? Using a fake name/birthday which does not impact eligibility to use the site (like if I use the name John Doe on Facebook) Using a fake name/birthday which would impact eligibility to use the site (like if I was 12, but wanted to use Facebook) Creating multiple accounts with a site that does not allow for this to impose usage limitations. Using multiple free trials without providing inaccurate information. Using multiple free trials by providing inaccurate information. Using an ad blocker. Making a profit without buying the "commercial" version of a software (e.g. Unity or Oracle). These are some examples, but there are many more cases. Note that in most cases, a website owner would probably not sue (they could sue for anything, but it would not be worth it in most cases). I did get an answer at Is inappropriate use of a website solely a civil matter, or will it extend to criminal matters as well?, but it suggests that such actions are in a legal gray area due to the vagueness of the CFAA. I got another answer at What distinguishes civil offenses from theft of services?, which is somewhat helpful, but I would still like more information.	Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.	This is relatively uncharted legal territory, so until multiple cases establish some sort of precedent, we can only guess. I know of no legal requirement that a Browser or User has to submit cookies or referrer data or other meta-information accurately. In that regard, a user is unlikely to be prosecuted just for submitting HTTP headers. It is likely closely related to Free Speech issues. The DMCA spells out that it is illegal to circumvent copyright protection measures. While this law is typically used to make it illegal to copy DVDs, video-games or streaming movies, it is possible that the "3-free articles" policy could be interpreted as a copyright protection mechanism, and defeating it by changing HTTP headers is a circumvention. A good summary is here. A specific site's TOS (Terms of Service) probably contains language that spells out it is a violation to use the site in a manner other than as it is intended. This is a typical anti-hacking, anti-screen-scraping provision. Altering a browser session to circumvent their services is probably a violation of the license to access the site, and may open a user to a civil lawsuit for damages or even criminal hacking charges (the details of which are different state-to-state)	Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.	In general, providing a false name or birthdate (DoB) is only actionable when there is a legal duty to provide the correct information, or when a provision of a contract to which the person agreed requires it. If the falsity is part of a common-law fraud, then it would be unlawful, and possibly criminal. In the cases listed in the question: Sign up for an online service with a false identity although the ToS requires an accurate identity: This would be a breech of contract. Whether there could be a successful suit for such a breech would depend on why the contract demanded an accurate ID, and what harm the lie did or might do. Use a false name at a restaurant or hotel, but with no intent to defraud or avoid payment. I don't think there is any duty to give an accurate name on a restaurant reservation. In some jurisdictions the law requires an accurate name be used on a hotel register, and valid ID presented. But such violations are rarely pursued, unless they are part of a fraud or some other criminal activity (theft, prostitution, or drug dealing, say). Giving a false name when opening a bank account or other financial account. In the US, and I think many other jurisdictions, the law requires accurate identification of all bank account holders, including a SSN, EIN, or TIN. It also requires a bank to make efforts to verify such IDs, and violation are prosecuted. There are legal ways to get an account under an alternate name such as a penname or DBA, but this must be disclosed to the bank and to the IRS. Other cases that occur to me: Giving a false name at a shop when not obtaining credit or avoiding payment: generally legal. Obtaining a credit card under a false name: Can be done legally if disclosed to the issuer. Giving a false name or DoB to a pharmacy for a prescription: unlawful if attempting to access the medical info of another, or rely on another person's history to get a prescription, but may be lawful if this is just an alias, such as a celebrity might use to avoid publicity. Unlawful if done to obtain a controlled substance, or if insurance fraud is involved. Putting a false name on a job resume: lawful, but if hired an I-9 form will require a valid name and SSN or TIN. Employers usually may not require that a DoB be provided. Giving false info as part of any credit application: usually considered fraud, even if there is no intent to avoid payment, as it can deceive the creditor as to the amount of risk involved; specifically criminal in some states. Giving a false name on a date: perfectly lawful, but may cause a problem if a long term relationship develops. Some states require a valid name on a marriage license.	Posting such a pic and statement may give grounds for a lawsuit, but probably not Overview That is going to depend very much on the the jurisdiction, and on the specific facts. If the statement that the pictured person owes a debt is false, this may be a case of defamation, but that was explored thoroughly in Can you post a picture in your business to embarrass or defame a customer? and its answers. See FindLaw's page "What Is Invasion of Privacy?" for an overview of the classic privacy torts. See also this page quoting the Restatement (2nd) of Torts, § 652 See further the Wikipedia article "Privacy laws of the United States" which gives a history of the four torts. Note that not all US states recognize all, or indeed any, of the privacy torts. Nor do all non-US jurisdictions. In some places these torts have been recognized, or blocked, by legislation, in others by court decision. And in the US they are limited by the federal First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Right of Publicity,aka Appropriation There is, in general, no right to privacy in one's physical appearance under any of the standard privacy torts, except that if one's likeness is being used to advertise something, or imply sponsorship or approval of a commercial product, many jurisdictions protect a right of publicity (sometimes called the tort of Appropriation of Name or Likeness). But here it does not appear that the image is being used to advertise or promote or sponsor anything, so that would not apply. Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion The tort of Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion would only apply if the picture were taken on someone's private premises or somewhere else there the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Otherwise it would not apply, there is no general right to privacy for a picture taken in public. Private Facts The tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts could possibly apply if the fact of the unpaid debt had been carefully kept secret, and if its disclosure would be highly offensie to a reasonable person. But nothing that is a matter of public record can be the subject of such a suit anywhere in the US, because under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) publication of facts derived from public records is protected under the first and fourteenth amendments, even against a specific state law granting protection. This will obviously not apply outside the US. False Light If the statement of the debt were true, but in some significant way misleading, the tort of False Light might apply. This is described by the Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 652E as: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. Note that the standard of (b) above is the same as the "Actual Malice" standard for defamation cases where the plaintiff is a public figure. False light cases are in many ways similer to defamation cases, and some jurisdictions have treated themn as identical tro defamation, while otrhrs do not recognize them at all. Nothing in the facts stated in the question would imply a false light claim, but more context might possibly support such a claim,. Conclusion Nothing in the question clearly indicates that any privacy-based tort would apply, but the facts are stated it a very brief way in the question. Further context and detail might clarify the answer one way or the other. This answer is largely based onunited-states law, althoguh some of it will apply elsewhere.	I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.	It may not be libel, but it may violate other statutes and may support a judgement against the person publishing this information as long as there is an injury-in-fact ("an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"). A recent case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 578 U.S. ___ (2016) considered the case where a company created a profile for a person. That profile stated "that he is married, has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate degree". The plaintiff asserted that all of this was incorrect. The plaintiff made a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act because the information was false. However, mere violation of statute is not sufficient to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing. Congress can't create standing via statute. Injury-in-fact still requires a "concrete" injury. This does not need to be a physical, tangible injury. But, it does need to be concrete. On its own, publication of false information, even when statute prohibits it, does not create standing. There must be an injury-in-fact.	Yes, you can. An excellent example is this very website - at the bottom of this page you will find a series of links in the footer, one of which is "Terms of Service". I think you will agree that most people using the Law SE are making no money from it or paying no money to use it and yet the terms of service sets out in black and white what a user of this site can do, and what the repercussions can be if they breach the ToS, so it serves a purpose as an excellent example for your question.
How to refer to a section of a US law in a lawsuit filed at a US federal court? I want to refer to sections of US laws in a lawsuit filed at a US federal court. For example, I look at the INA 1965 (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965). The different parts of the law are described here. Each line seems to include two names for each part of the law: for example, "INA 101" and "8 U.S.C. 1101". What is the difference between the two names? Why are there two names for the same section? Which name should be used in a lawsuit filed at a US federal court?	Those are two ways of referring to the same law. "INA 101" refers to it as a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as amended; most changes to US immigration law since then have been amendments to that act. "8 US Code 1101" refers to it as a section of Title 8 of the US Code, an official compilation of US laws based on subject matter (specifically, title 8 covers aliens and nationality). Some titles of the US Code have been enacted as federal laws by Congress, but Title 8 is just an administrative compilation. Like all general federal laws, the INA has been integrated into the US Code. The two citations are equivalent, and which one you choose is a style thing. In general, immigration specialists (like USCIS and immigration courts) tend to cite to the INA while generalists (like district and circuit courts) tend to cite to the US Code.	This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.	I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.	First, mandamus is always a form of writ whereas injunctions are typically a part of the proceedings in a lawsuit. Writs and lawsuits are each distinct, individual legal actions whereas multiple motions for various remedies like injunctive relief can occur within one continuous lawsuit. The lawsuit and the various motions within it including injunctions have largely replaced the common law writ (including writs of mandamus except those from a higher court to a lower) as legislated in rules of civil procedure federally and in most states	This is called "judicial notice." In federal court, it's covered by Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: (b) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed. The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. (c) Taking Notice. The court: (1) may take judicial notice on its own; or (2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information. States mostly have similar rules for state courts.	This case was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, meaning that it’s a lawsuit between citizens of different states. In most cases, diversity jurisdiction requires “complete” diversity: every plaintiff has to be a citizen of a different state than every defendant. If one of 12 plaintiffs is a Maryland resident and one of 15 defendants is also a Maryland resident, that tiny overlap means the entire lawsuit is kicked back to state court. In this case, the defendants are an Ohio fraternity, an Illinois resident, a Wyoming company, and a person whose residence is unclear. Defendant Smith might be a Wyoming resident, a Utah resident, or a Washington resident. The plaintiffs aren’t sure. However, as long as the plaintiffs aren’t residents of any of those states, there’s complete diversity of citizenship. It doesn’t matter whether Doe II is from Alaska or Florida, just that she isn’t from the same state as any defendant.	While this isn't a simple and direct answer, it should point you in the right direction. There are countries which like the United States have parallel national and subnational court system, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. Different rules of procedure for different courts within a larger overall court system for a federal jurisdiction are not that unusual even in nominally unitary court systems. But, the division between them is on something of a continuum with fine shades of differences between them. Only a few are as close to the extreme of power sharing and a "federalist" approach as the United States, however. Also even unitary court systems (in a geographic and federalism sense) often have parallel court systems on subject matter grounds. For example, France has both ordinary civil courts and labor courts whose rulings could overlap, and England historically had courts of law and courts of equity with a complex relationship to each other (and also ecclesiastical courts with jurisdiction of matters now vested in the civil courts of law like inheritance of tangible personal property). Similarly, Northern Ireland has or has had what amount to different parallel legal systems for terrorism and non-terrorism criminal offense. Most countries also have parallel criminal and quasi-criminal legal systems for civilians and soldiers respectively. I've seen this tension between the two systems as a plot point in contemporary English police procedural dramas, for example. On the other hand, systems with a more unitary legal system rarely are so fierce in their defense of protections against double jeopardy as the United States, and the dual sovereignty doctrine in U.S. double jeopardy law can be seen as a safety valve in practice and as applied in cases where the double jeopardy rule as interpreted under the U.S. Constitution is too strong a bar to legitimate second prosecutions. A comparative analysis of double jeopardy concepts can be found here. It is tricky to reduce the subtly differences between the rules in different countries to a clear yes or no kind of answer. A square answer to your question requires detailed examination of a dozen or more court systems that someone felt the need to write a book about to explain. If I can find a more specific answer I will update this one.	There are some complexities here. First of all, in the US, trademarks may be protected under either state or federal laws. Suits for trademark infringement under either kind of laws may be filed in state courts, although suit under federal laws are more often filed in federal courts. My understanding is that to file a trademark infringement lawsuit, I have to file it in the state where the "infringing activity" is occurring, in other words the location of the defendant. That is not quite correct. The infringing activity occurs wherever sales are made, and often wherever goods or services with an infringing marks are advertised. If goods are sold by mail, the infringing activity may be held to occur where the customers are located. If an infringing mark is being used to sell or advertise goods or services in a particular US state, suit may normally be filed in that state, whether in state or federal court, no matter where the infringer is located. (However it may be much easier to secure damages if a suit is won when suing in the jurisdiction where the infringer is located.) Procedures are different if the trademark is registered than if it is not. Trademark suits are often complex and costly. It would be very wise to consult an experienced trademark lawyer when considering bringing such suits. If goods carrying infringing marks are being imported into the US, the US Customs can seize or deny entry to such goods. A trademark lawyer might be able to advise how to get the customs service to act on such situations, and what the limits of such enforcement is. Trademarks are generally matters of national law. A mark that is valid and fully protected in the US, may not be protected at all in Hong Kong, for example.
I have Power of Attorney for a single relative - do they need a Last Will and Testament also? I have a properly notarized Power of Attorney letter for a single relative in Kentucky. Does that relative also need a Last Will and Testament, or does my PoA cover whatever may need to be done when they eventually pass away?	There are two relevant laws of Kentucky. KRS Chapter 457 is about power of attorney, and KRS 457.100 specifies how the POA terminates, in particular (1)(a) says that it terminates when the principal dies (therefore on death of the relative, you have no power). KRS Chapter 391 governs intestate succession i.e. what happens if you don't have a will. The disposition of the estate depends on what living relatives there are. If the person is unmarried, the estate goes to the children or descendants. If there are no children, it goes to the parents; otherwise to siblings. If there are no living relatives whatsoever, then the estate goes to the state in escheat. A will is therefore necessary if the person wants something other than intestate default. Also, inheritance via intestacy is procedurally inconvenient compared to a simple will saying who gets what.	If that person becomes incapacitated or is deemed unfit to make their own decisions, will I be required to be physically present (for example, to sign something) to make those decisions if called upon? While it is customary for someone making decisions as weighty as removal of life support, to come to the hospital or care facility in person and discuss the issues with treating physicians, it isn't required. When you are physically there it is easier for you to personally assess the patient's condition rather than just taking someone else's word for it, and you have more informal access to everything that is going on in terms of people coming in and out of the patient's room, providers you wouldn't have known to speak to initiating conversations with you (e.g. there is typically an ER nurse for each shift, several residents doing rounds checking on a patient, and often also an outside specialist doctor involved in the treatment team). It is also usually easy when you are physically in a hospital to locate someone knowledgable and familiar with the kinds of issues you are facing at the moment to provide spiritual and religious guidance if you feel this would help you make your decision, while your neighborhood clergy person may not have a good understanding of these issues since they don't come up as often for someone is doesn't frequently spend time around people being treated in hospitals or hospices. And, this kind of pastoral counseling requires not just religious knowledge but an understanding of the options that are being presented through the lens of what is religiously and morally important about the differences between the different options. When I was an attorney for a hospital handling these issues for the hospital, we would have been willing to work with an out of state medical power of attorney agent without their physical presence. But, the fact that this was deep in the Rocky Mountains far from other urban areas (i.e. Grand Junction, Colorado) may have influenced a willingness to be flexible since it would often take a lot of time and money for someone to arrive in person. Also, while the medical power of attorney gives a specific person authority to act, an advanced medical directive is simply a document that goes into a patient's medical record that advises treating providers of the patient's intent and doesn't actually need next of kin approval or a medical power of attorney agent's say so to implement, although better practice is to seek that consent first in case there are any reasons why that advanced medical directive might have been procured improperly from someone lacking capacity or subsequently revoked. There usually will be forms for a medical power of attorney agent to sign, not authorizing a particular medical procedure, but authorizing treatment in general and providing personal and financial information about the patient in connection with admitting that person. But, these days, hospitals are relatively comfortable with handling that paperwork via fax or scanned copies sent via email, and some of the more flexible hospitals will even accept photos of signed documents sent via text message.	When they start giving legal advice ... unless your PA is a lawyer. In a nutshell, legal advice has the following characteristics: Requires legal knowledge, skill, education and judgment Applies specific law to a particular set of circumstances Affects someone's legal rights or responsibilities Creates rights and responsibilities in the advice-giver Unlike legal information - such as information posted on a street sign - legal advice proposes a specific course of action a client should take. For instance, it's the difference between telling someone what to do (legal advice) as opposed to how to do it (legal information). For your specific questions Can they research the CC&Rs, Bylaws or other such states, federal statues to help me better understand the letter? Researching and even summarising is not legal advice. If they give opinions on what you should do as a result of that research it is legal advice. Can they write up a response letter that I would look at and approve ... Yes ... or if minor enough they could just respond? It depends on what's involved. If it is a purely factual response ("Is this your car?") then this is ok. If it is legal advocacy, it isn't. Putting aside the legalities; how does your PA feel about you suing them if they stuff any of this up? If I was your PA, I wouldn't be acting as your agent without an indemnity.	The Kentucky restriction against "hit and run" is KRS 189.580, which says that The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle…is involved in an accident …shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance Notice that the legal requirement is for the operator to do something: the law requires nothing of the vehicle itself. Supposing that you are correct that the vehicle was operated by someone who hit and ran, then if the police gain suspicions that such is the case, and if those suspicions are reasonable, then then could obtain a warrant to obtain evidence from the vehicle, which could be used against the operator. The fact that you (might) now own the vehicle would not transfer legal responsibility to you – responsibbility goes with the actor, not the instrument.	This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code.	Sources Florida Power of Attorney from the Florida Bar Association is a consumer pamphlet summarizing the laws in regard to a power of attorney. The actual laws are in the Florida Code sections 709.2100 thru 709.2402 Health Care Advance Directives from the Florida Health Care Administration is a consumer guide to Living wills, surrogate designations, and related issues. Florida Living Wills Laws from FindLaw lists legal provisions related to living wills in Florida. The relevant code sections are stated as 765.101, and subsequent sections (Health Care Advance Directives). Terminology The person who makes the Power of Attorney (POA) is the principal -- the mother in the situation described in the question. The person appointed to do things for the principal is known as the agent, and is sometimes also called the attorney-in-fact. A Limited POA gives the agent power only over a particular transaction, or over a single or small number of types of transactions. One might give a limited POA to manage a particular investment, or to sell a car or a house, say. A General POA gives the agent power to do anything that the principal could do in person, or anything except for some specifically excluded things. A Durable POA remains in force even if the principal becomes incapacitated (for example with serious dementia). It includes specific language to this effect. It is usually also a general POA. Any POA that is not durable is not in effect when the principal becomes incapacitated. The situation described in the question would often be met with a durable POA. A durable POA: contains the words: “This durable power of attorney is not terminated by subsequent incapacity of the principal except as provided in chapter 709, Florida Statutes,” or similar words that show the principal’s intent that the authority conferred is exercisable notwithstanding the principal’s subsequent incapacity. (Section 709.2104) A Medical POA, sometimes also called a Healthcare POA grants the agent power to make medical or health choices for the principal. It is also known as a health care surrogate designation. It is normally a separate document form a POA dealing with non-medical issues, sometimes called a financial POA, even if the same agent is appointed for each. A living will is "a written or oral statement of the kind of medical care you want or do not want if you become unable to make your own decisions." (from the Advance Directives pamphlet linked above) Living wills and Healthcare POAs are collectively known as Advance Directives. The pamphlet says: [I]f you have not made an advance directive, decisions about your health care or an anatomical donation may be made for you by a court-appointed guardian, your wife or husband, your adult child, your parent, your adult sibling, an adult relative, or a close friend. Under section 709.2102: “Incapacity” means the inability of an individual to take those actions necessary to obtain, administer, and dispose of real and personal property, intangible property, business property, benefits, and income. Agent Any competent adult that the principal selects may be an agent. The pamphlet linked above says: Any competent person 18 years of age or older may serve as an agent. Agents should be chosen for reliability and trustworthiness. Certain financial institutions with trust powers also may serve as agents. The agent may hire assistants, such as a lawyer,, an accountant, or a realtor. But the agent may not delegate or transfer his or her powers as an agent, or appoint a sub-agent. The agent must act as instructed by the principal. When no specific instructions apply, the agent must act in the best interests of the principal, to the best of his or her understanding and ability. Creating a POA The POA must be in writing, and signed by the principal and two witnesses, and notarized. The principal must be competent when the POA is signed -- that is, must be in condition to understand the purpose and effect of the POA, and what is going on generally. (See the definitions section above.) The agent must accept the POA, and often signs the POA to acknowledge the POA and accept the responsibility of acting as agent. A POA may appoint backup agents to act if the first agent is unable to act, or resigns, or dies. It may also appoint multiple agents any of whom may act, but this can cause problems if the agents disagree. The text of a POA may be drafted by a lawyer. But there are also software programs that will produce the text of a POA, after appropriate information is entered and questions are answered as to the desired effects. Such programs normally produce text tailored to ma particular state's laws. Ending a POA The principal may revoke a POA at any time, if the principal is competent. A principal may also revoke a living will or other advance directive at any time. The agent may resign at any time If either agent or principal dies the POA is ended. (If a POA appoints multiple agents, it ends only if they all die or resign.) If the agent becomes incapacitated, the agents power ends. If there is not other agent, the POA ends. If the agent is married to the principal, a divorce or separation or a petition for a divorce, ends the agent's authority, unless the POA explicitly says it will continue after a divorce or separation. If a legal process to appoint a guardian is started, the POA is suspended, unless the agent is the principal's "parent, spouse, child, or grandchild". (This may include stepchild.) If a guardian is appointed, the court will rule on whether the POA continues; often it will not, unless the agent is also the guardian appointed. Florida code section 709.2109 (3) (Link above) says: If any person initiates judicial proceedings to determine the principal’s incapacity or for the appointment of a guardian advocate, the authority granted under the power of attorney is suspended until the petition is dismissed or withdrawn or the court enters an order authorizing the agent to exercise one or more powers granted under the power of attorney. However, if the agent named in the power of attorney is the principal’s parent, spouse, child, or grandchild, the authority under the power of attorney is not suspended unless a verified motion in accordance with s. 744.3203 is also filed. If the POA includes an ending date or condition, it ends when this occurs. A third party, one who is neither the agent or the principal, can only have a durable POA revoked by petitioning a court to do so, usually in connection with the appointment of a guardian. The court will do this only if a guardian is needed, and that the action of the agent under the POA is not sufficient to serve he interests of the principal; or if the agent is shown to have been untrustworthy or neglectful, or has become incapacitated. Living wills normally remain in effect unless revoked, even if a guardian is appointed. Conclusion No one has an automatic right to be appointed as the agent, no matter what relationship to the principal that person has, or for how long a relationship has existed. The principal may choose any agent that s/he trusts and thinks will be able to do the job well. The husband or stepchildren described in the question will not be able to have the POA set aside by a court unless they can show that the son has not acted in the mother's best interests or has acted dishonestly in regard to the mother, or has misused the powers granted by the POA. If they can show that the son used undue influence to get the mother to sign the POA, that might cause a curt to rule against the POA. But they have no automatic claim to cancel the POA, just because they are related to the mother. The Florida laws about a POA are very similar to the laws in NJ and NY that I have had occasion to deal with before. I held a durable POA and a healthcare POA for my father, who lived in NY state.	Attorneys are universally required to tell the truth at all times and generally, they do. They are not allowed to lie on behalf of their clients or themselves. This doesn't mean that someone else's attorney necessarily has your best interests at heart. And, attorneys can, for example, fail to mention options that exist, but might not be the best for the attorney's client. Also, if an attorney's client lies to him or her about the facts, the attorney could conceivably say something inaccurate while believing it to be true. In the kind of meeting you are describing, however, most likely, the attorneys are simply going to explain your parents' estate plan, over which you have no control or say in any case, and there is no reason for suspicion or paranoia.	No. As long as it is owned by him he is free to do as he likes. The wife / children do not have any claims as it is ancestral property and they can have a claim only after his demise. Until then, he is free to do as he likes legally.
Can you refuse to show ID and give information to Border Patrol agents when not at a international border? There are hundreds of videos on YouTube filmed by drivers who refuse to show ID or give information to Border Control agents at interior (non-international border) checkpoints (permanent or arbitrarily) set up along roads, i.e. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLIJF0BnwBU According to United States Border Patrol interior checkpoints - Wikipedia, No documentation is required at a Border Patrol checkpoint for US citizens... Some of these check stations in YouTube videos are within 100 miles of a border; some are not. The Border Patrol can be very adamant at demanding ID and information. Do these drivers have a solid legal basis - stating that they have been illegally stopped for no reason, that there can be no probable cause solely by driving near a border, that the constitution forbids these kinds of stops - for refusing to show ID? Can they legally refuse to show documents and refuse to answer questions as to where they may be traveling to and from? They don't appear to be getting arrested. Can only US citizens refuse? What about Green card holders? How does the Border Patrol know determine they may or may not be citizens if the individuals are successful at refusing to show ID?	tl;dr According to the ACLU, who are experts on this… yes, it is perfectly legal for you to refuse to provide documentation or ID to border patrol, and your refusal cannot be used as a basis for reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation. The ACLU has a very helpful guide to your rights when questioned at Border Patrol checkpoints, whether fixed or random. Emphasis in these excerpts is mine: Refusing to answer CBP’s questions may result in the agent persisting with questioning. If this occurs, you should ask if you are being detained. Another way to ask this is to say, “am I free to leave?” If the agent wishes to actually detain you — in other words, you are not free to leave — the agent needs at least reasonable suspicion that you committed an immigration violation to do so. As I understand it from other legal sources, this means that the agent must have a reasonable suspicion that you are: not a US citizen and that you have violated immigration law And furthermore: You do not have to answer questions about your immigration status. You may simply say that you do not wish to answer those questions. If you choose to remain silent, the agent will likely ask you questions for longer, but your silence alone is not enough to support probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest, detain, or search you or your belongings. … As before, when you are at a checkpoint, you can remain silent, inform the agent that you decline to answer their questions or tell the agent you will only answer questions in the presence of an attorney. In the YouTube videos of checkpoint refusals, you'll see lots of folks declining to answer questions or stating that they will only answer questions from law enforcement in the presence of an attorney. If you are held at the checkpoint for more than brief questioning, you can ask the agent if you are free to leave. If they say no, they need reasonable suspicion to continue holding you. Lots of this in the checkpoint refusals too. The drivers ask if they're being detained and/or if they're free to leave. If you watch closely you'll probably see that many of the Border Patrol agents avoid answering these questions — because they know that they don't have sufficient suspicion to detain the drivers. You can ask the agent to tell you their basis for probable cause, and they should be able to articulate their suspicion. This is also seen in some of the videos. There's a very important caveat about when you are required to provide documentation (other than at the border): A limited exception does exist: for people who do have permission to be in the U.S. for a specific reason and for, usually, a limited amount of time (a “nonimmigrant” on a visa, for example), the law does require you to provide information about your immigration status if asked. While you can still choose to remain silent or decline a request to produce your documents, people in this category should be aware that they could face arrest consequences. If you want to know whether you fall into this category, you should consult an attorney. … If an agent asks you for documents, what you need to provide differs depending on your immigration status. U.S. citizens do not have to carry proof of citizenship on their person if they are in the United States. If you have valid immigration documents and are over the age of 18, the law does require you to carry those documents on you. If you are asked by an immigration agent to produce them, it is advisable to show the documents to the agent or you risk being arrested. If you are an immigrant without documents, you can decline the officer’s request. An agent may likely ask you more questions if you decline a request. No matter what category you fall into, never provide false documents to immigration officials. If you are a citizen you have no obligation to provide documents to establish this; it is not illegal for you to refuse. If you are undocumented, you do not have any obligation to provide documents; it is not illegal for you to refuse. If you are a non-citizen and do have valid documents, you are required to provide them — apparently, it is illegal for you not to do so. So if you're a non-citizen who's legally present in the USA for a temporary term (e.g. tourist, student, business trip, etc.) then you are required to show documents proving this. But if you're undocumented you can — and should!! — do what you see in the videos, and refuse to provide documentation. The Arizona ACLU has a helpful printable sheet with additional pithy points: You may be asked where you were born, how you entered the U.S. or how long you’ve been here. You don’t ever have to answer those questions. Your responses may be used to detain and deport you. … NEVER FLEE A CHECKPOINT!	My own answer to the question is yes, but not directly. As with many other laws it would take a court ruling to definitively spell out how international agreements are applicable to a given situation. Unfortunately it doesn't seem that such a court ruling was ever produced so far: Google Scholar fails to list any US court cases relevant to the Convention on Road Traffic. The only somewhat relevant case is Busby v. State in which the court rules that one cannot drive in Alaska with an IDP after having been previously restricted from driving in Alaska. The court does stress out that: The Convention does forbid a signatory country (or subsidiary state) from imposing or enforcing license revocations in a manner that discriminates against residents of other signatory countries. But Busby does not claim that he was the victim of such discrimination. Busby's license was revoked for conduct that would have led to license revocation if committed by an Alaska resident. (Indeed, Busby's license was revoked while he was an Alaska resident.) And Busby does not claim that he was singled out for prosecution because he was a resident of a foreign country—i.e., that the State would not have charged him with the offense of driving with a revoked license if he had still been an Alaska resident. This could possibly mean that the court believes that the Convention only applies to foreign residents, but its not spelled out specifically. Searching for Canadian court cases likewise doesn't turn up anything useful. The only relevant case is R. v. Lawend where the person in question was trying to drive in Ontario on a foreign license after previously having had their Ontario license suspended. Here the court rules similar to the decision in Alaska in that having a foreign license does not allow one to circumvent locally imposed license restrictions. Searching for UK case law doesn't turn up any relevant court cases. Australian case law is likewise mute on the subject. There is also a relevant legal opinion by the Department of State quoted in the Digest of United States practice in International Law, 2002: Reading these provisions as a whole, we believe that the State of Georgia, consistent with the CRT, (1) must permit an alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license issued by a country party to the CRT only if the alien has been lawfully admitted to the United States; (2) must permit a lawfully admitted alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license of a CRT party only during the first year after the alien’s admission; and (3) may, in accordance with Georgia’s residency laws, require an alien resident in Georgia to obtain a Georgia driver’s license as a condition for continued authorization to drive. By the same token, nothing in the CRT would prevent the State of Georgia from applying more liberal rules with respect to the driving privileges of aliens. In Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 2014 the author further analyses how the 1949 Geneva Convention is applicable within the United States. First, to settle the definition of "international traffic": Nonetheless, the United States ultimately accepted that “the purpose of chapter II was to establish, in effect, an international code of minimum safety requirements. By indirection, the rules of the road set forth in the convention would apply to the pattern of domestic as well as to international traffic. The author the meaning behind Article I of the Convention: Article 1 states in part that no party “shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year.” This provision, on its face, indicates that the parties recognized that the treaty would benefit individuals. In no way does this recognition compel a conclusion that the Convention is self-executing, but it does suggest that the treaty is of a type that the Senate might have understood to be directly enforceable. And finally on the issue of whether or not the treaty is "self-executing": For these reasons, it is likely that courts will continue to treat the Geneva Convention as self-executing. Nonetheless, a court might conclude that, with respect to section II’s rules of the road, the governmental obligation is merely to “take appropriate measures” and that such an obligation is too vague to be enforced judicially. So it seems absolutely clear that the Convention intended for participating countries to allow foreign drivers to drive abroad for up to one year. However international treaties are not self-executing by default in Canada, unlike the US: Canada is bound by the terms of treaties that it enters into and breach thereof may give rise to international claims. However, in Canada treaties are not self-executing; they do not constitute part of the law of the land merely by virtue of their conclusion. So even though British Columbia is violating the 1949 Geneva Convention one cannot directly rely on said international agreement to enforce their rights. But another state party could theorethically sue Canada on behalf of its citizen to request that Canada rectifies its laws with accordance to the agreement.	If a police officer reviewed the footage and then went out and issued a citation in person to the offender, this could probably be used. Many states limit tickets issued by mail based upon camera evidence alone. But, while some state laws have specific requirements, but in general, authenticated video recordings are admissible evidence in court proceedings, and a citizen complaint can be a basis for initiating a traffic offense prosecution. To prove some offenses, like speeding, dashcam evidence of a third-party may not be very good evidence, but for running a red light or a stop sign, it could be powerful evidence.	From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason.	In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.	If the passport that was stolen is a U.S. one, you should report it by any of the channels outlined on the State Department's page Lost or Stolen Passports. The paper-reporting option is via form DS-64, which asks, among other things, whether you filed a police report; so it might be good to do that first. Form N-565 is a similar form for requesting the reissue of a naturalization certificate, and it, likewise, asks about any police report. Withholding someone's ID documents, knowing that they are necessary for travel, would be "false imprisonment" under both state and federal statutes. Also, 18 USC §§1426 and 1427 cover the crimes of "Reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers" and "Sale of naturalization or citizenship papers"; a 10-year felony for a first offence. "Whosoever unlawfully ... disposes of a ... certificate of naturalization, ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ... 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime)," If the police take your report but don't scare the possessor of your documentation into immediately returning it, you could sue him or her for the actual expenses of obtaining replacements in Small Claims court. If the mispossessed passport causes big enough damages, I guess you could sue in any court that has jurisdiction.	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.	The US doesn't do exit immigration checks, so if your hypothetical Israeli overstayer can board a flight out of the US, they'll most likely be allowed to go without detention or other punishment. The US sees no value in spending government money to detain someone who is ready to leave of their own accord. I'm not sure why such a person should have "no valid documentation". Maybe you're confused by the common term "undocumented" for people without legal immigration status, but it usually doesn't literally mean they have no documentation at all. Most such people would still have their passport and other identification from their home country, and the passport is enough to board a flight back home. You say your hypothetical Israeli overstayer had a visa; so they must have had an Israeli passport when they entered the US. Under normal circumstances, they've still got it. If it expired, they could have renewed it at an Israeli consulate within the US; the consulate will issue passports to all Israeli citizens without regard to their immigration status in the US. Even if somehow they lost their Israeli passport and all other identity documents, the consulate would have the ability to verify their identity from Israeli government records (e.g. the photo and biometrics from their previous passport, which would still be in the Israeli government's database), and process their application for a replacement passport.
how do I convince my parents not to break the law against me? My parents are trying to act out malpractice against me. Basically they defame my mental health as much as possible, and they invented a rule in the house to coerce me into doing their demands. Essentially if I don't see a psychiatrist like they want me to, they will kick me out. In fact my dad said he would literally take each and every one of my assets and throw them out the window( mind you, he is the mental one not me). The reason i don't want to sue this right off the bat. Is because I would rather they seek help instead of damaging themselves like they are doing so right now. Anyhow, before I even try any of that. I'm trying to talk my parents out of their sadism. What are effective methods of doing so?	If you have an actual lease under which you reside at your parents' place, they must abide by the terms of that lease – presumably that sets the rent that you pay and states how long the lease is good for, Otherwise, if you're just living there, and have been living there for some time, then the courts may treat you as a month-to-month tenant. That means that they can end the tenancy with 30 days notice. Or, they can initiate an eviction proceeding. The less optimal outcome is that the court may treat you as a house guest, in which case no formal eviction proceeding is necessary. One way or the other, it is illegal to physically give a person the heave-ho from their residence, even if it is a family member. One recourse then is to hire an attorney to persuade your parents of at least that aspect of the law, if it is really in doubt. This gent addresses the matter for parents whose children have moved back home. He also mentions hiring a mediator, which could put the situation on a clearer legal ground. As for psychiatrists, anybody can see a psychiatrist; and anybody is free to hire a lawyer to try to force another person to see a psychiatrist. The prospects of getting a court order to force a child or a parent to see a psychiatrist because they are at loggerheads over some matter is extremely remote. The courts only force psychiatric treatment in extreme cases (e.g. threats of violence, actual delusions).	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	Am i going to jail? I'm so scared. No, probably not. The details depend on jurisdiction, but normally the only crime you could be accused of would be that of forgery. However, forgery by definition requires an "intention to deceive". So my personal advice would be to come clean immediately: Go to your employer, and tell them you did not understand the checkout system and accidentally signed yourself, instead of having the customer sign. If you do that, what you did would not count as forgery, because (as you explain) you did not do it on purpose to trick someone. Now, your boss may still decide to discipline you in some way, maybe even fire you, but that's out of your hand. If they are reasonable, they'll hopefully understand a minor mistake on the first day. That said, it is possible your jurisdiction has special penalties for incorrectly filling out medical documents, so there may be more to it - but I doubt it. To be sure, try asking someone you know and trust who is familiar with the legal rules around medication. Or book a single consultation with a lawyer - this is not cheap (typically around $100 in the USA, or 100€ in the EU), but will give you peace of mind. You could also try asking around if there is a local initiative which offers legal help, possibly a professional organization or trade union.	In the United States, the main statute governing the use of health care information is HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. HIPAA and its related statutes and regulations detail what you can and can't do with medical information. You can't always collect it; if you do, you can't always share it, and you can't always delete it. This is a complex field of law and it's easy to screw up in a way that would cause big, serious, company-destroying, job-ending problems for everyone involved. To put this another way: this is absolutely, positively, not something you want to get advice on from strangers on the internet. You don't just need a lawyer; you need a HIPAA specialist--or the equivalent in whatever other countries you plan to operate in--before you push anything out to real-life patients, especially children.	I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely.	Your beliefs about your past and your mission would probably be considered to be personal religious beliefs. As Israel does not have a state religion this does not have any legal significance (except it may make a difference as to which religious court is considered to have jurisdiction over your family disputes). Your religious beliefs do not override the law, because otherwise anyone could make anything legal for themselves just by declaring a belief that it was moral. Hence you will be subject to all the same laws as everyone else. If you break the law and claim your beliefs as justification then you may be judged unfit to stand trial by reason of insanity and committed to a mental hospital.	What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.	California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.
Canonical format to present email evidence in a pleading (petition) Defendant emails are to be presented in a pleading: conciseness is the key feature of the effective pleading. I am seeking canonical examples and elements of effective &concise pleadings. Is there a equivalent of Strunk & White or the Chicago Manual of Style for pleadings? Not sure if these books would help to write a concise pleading wherein the exhibits / evidence are email.	The equivalent of Strunk & White would be The Redbook. The equivalent to the Chicago Manual of Style would be The Bluebook.	What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.)	If you want to study the basics of law, where should you start? Don't try memorizing individual laws. That would be a waste of energy, in part because --as you rightly point out-- laws change. There are many introductory books. Law 101, by Jay M. Feinman, is an excellent starting point. The next step --broadly speaking-- consists of reading court decisions (aka court opinions). Opinions released by upper (aka reviewing) courts are available online for free. If you are interested in jurisdictions in the US, Leagle.com is one of many very good resources; EU cases are available here; and so forth. Acquainting yourself with court opinions is quite beneficial. First, court opinions [collaterally] teach how to formulate one's legal positions. Rather than merely being formulaic and a copycat, a litigant is to convey that his legal position is more consistent (compared to the adversary) with the laws and underlying doctrines. His points are easier to get across by adapting his presentation thereof to how courts are used to handle the legal principles involved. Second, court opinions identify the statutes that are relevant to the type of disputes that arise between parties. This is indicative of importance that a statute or procedural rule entails in relation to other laws. Third, court opinions reflect how statutes, rules, and doctrines are interpreted. Oftentimes the way how legislation is worded leads "laypeople" to have misconceptions on the interpretation of laws and rules, when in reality these are construed usually in a much narrower way. Law journals are a good source once you have gained some background in law and are interested in a sort of monograph about a topic that is new to you. But, as explained above, court opinions also serve that purpose (perhaps less scholarly). Having a legal dictionary is always a good idea. Courts in the US oftentimes quote definitions from Black's Law Dictionary for crucial terms which statutory law does not define. What is most applicable to real life? Without knowing whether you are interested in a particular field, it is safe to say that contract law is the most applicable. Entering contracts is part of our everyday life even if laypeople don't notice it when they purchase goods & services, reach an agreement, or engage in a course of conduct which reasonably fosters expectations. And good news is that the principles of contract law are largely similar among modern jurisdictions, including the America (the continent, not just the USA), many member states of the EU, and Asian countries. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is a very useful formulation of contract law. Courts in the US very often cite the Restatement for premising their decisions on contract disputes. In countries with a civil law system, the principles of contract law are usually formulated in one or multiple sections of the [countries'] Civil Code. Procedural law (aka rules of criminal or civil procedure) is also highly applicable: Large portions thereof apply to all disputes which are brought to court. To a great extent these rules are very similar across the jurisdictions of one same country, but the litigant ought too ensure his compliance with the rules lest he loses the case for a technicality. Lastly, procedural law can be remarkably boring unless the person anticipates he will be involved in litigation.	It doesn't really require anything beyond your say-so that it is what you say it is; that would be enough to satisfy the requirement for authentication. From there though, as with any evidence, it's going to be up to a jury to decide how much weight to give the evidence. So the more you can show them to prove that the record is real -- and to knock down any questions the opposing party will raise -- the more likely they are to believe it. So if you just bring a printout that looks like it could easily have been forged, the jury may be thinking about that. If you can bring in a data forensics expert to say the document couldn't have been faked, that's probably going to help. Addendum: As a practical matter, I wouldn't expect this to be much of an issue. Unless you're dealing with a savvy opposing party, the authenticity of e-mails seems to be generally assumed. Courts (1) generally assume that parties aren't perpetrating frauds; and (2) are generally run by judges with little to no technical savvy, who don't realize that one could forge an e-mail, let alone all the different ways it could be done. I've personally entered countless e-mail printouts without them being questioned, even though either party could have just gone down into the e-mail thread and changed what the other side had said earlier in the conversation. To avoid the issue, though, it might be that sending the e-mail to a Gmail account would elimimate the question.	This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.	No for the U.S. There is no criteria for graphic complexity in the United States. A signature can still be the historical "X". If it is some representation of your name, as it ordinarily is, it not need to be remotely legible or a representation of your full name. From FindLaw Usually, a signature is simply someone's name written in a stylized fashion. However, that is not really necessary. All that needs to be there is some mark that represents you. It can be -- as many signatures end up -- a series of squiggles, a picture, or historically, even the traditional "X" for people who couldn't read and write. As long as it adequately records the intent of the parties involved in a contractual agreement, it's considered a valid signature.	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	is contract text itself subject to copyright? What are my options? It largely depends on the originality of your contract. C & J Management Corp. v. Anderson, 707 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (2009) points to multiple references against preclusion of "a copyrightable interest in a contract". But you would need to prove that your competitor copied "original elements" of your contract including "a minimum degree of creativity and originality required to support a valid copyright". See Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (1973). Your post provides no information that would help identifying or ruling out this issue in your matter. Without realizing, you might have paid dearly for boilerplate language that your lawyer copied from somewhere else. Indeed, there is so much regurgitation and copy/pasting in the legal "profession" (judges included, as is notorious in judicial opinions they release and in the similarities --verbatim-- among the procedure law of many, many U.S. jurisdictions). That regurgitation is not bad in and of itself, though, since what matters is the expeditious administration of justice and the protection of your rights, rather than obtaining creative expressions authored by some lawyer. You might end up wasting valuable energy and money if you went after the competitor for something like this without first assessing the extent of originality in your contract. Focus instead on the much more detrimental fact that your competitor "plays dirty in general".
Did Las Vegas really ever have such harsh punishments for using/having/selling Cannabis? In the movie "Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas", set in the 1970s, Las Vegas has a big sign saying how possession of marijuana gives you 25 years in prison there (the entire Nevada, I assume?) and that you "should not gamble" with it. Is this complete fiction, or was this actually the case? My perception of Las Vegas is that it has always been the "city of sin", where prostitutes, drugs and gambling is legal or "de facto" legal. Sure, it may have been "Disney World-ified" in later years, but this is the 1970s and earlier. It seems very strange to me that you would get such harsh prison sentences (or any punishment at all) for using Cannabis in a town full of booze, gambling, strippers and neon lights. It seems like the perfect place for this to be legalized as the first place in the USA... Can somebody please straighten this out to me once and for all?	As far as I can tell, it was punished severely, but not quite that severely. I found Nevada's 1971 controlled substances statute, AB 107. "Marihuana" appears in Schedule I, the list of drugs which are most tightly restricted (Section 31, subsection 4(j)). Section 65 makes it a crime to possess such substances. Under subsection 1, a first offense was punishable by 1 to 6 years in prison, a second offense by 1-10 years, a third or subsequent offense by 1-20 years. There were also fines of up to about $2000-$5000. There was an exception in subsection 3 for marihuana possession of less than one ounce: a first offense could alternatively be punished by up to one year in county jail, probably at the discretion of the prosecutor or judge. Second offenses were treated as a first offense under subsection 1, and so on. Selling and distributing drugs including marihuana was punished more severely. Under Section 62, the punishment was 1 to 20 years in prison for a first offense, and for a second offense, life in prison without possibility of parole. If the drug was distributed to a person under age 21, a first offense was punishable by life in prison, but with possibility of parole after 7 years. There was no exception for small quantities of marihuana. I didn't find a reference to the specific 25 year term you mention. It's possible that it comes from some version of the law as it existed before or after the 1971 statute; I didn't check. Also, marijuana was (and still is) also illegal under federal law; I didn't check what punishment federal law would have prescribed at the time. It's unlikely that the City of Las Vegas would have had separate laws; this sort of thing would normally be done at the state level. As far as I know, this is in keeping with other state drug laws of the time, and given the prevailing politics, I'm not surprised by the law. Drug use was treated very differently under the law than the other "vices" you mention. It'd be outside the scope of this site to discuss the possible factors behind this, but you could perhaps take it to Politics.SE or History.SE. Nevada eventually legalized recreational marijuana for adults in 2017, according to https://norml.org/laws/nevada-penalties-2/. It was not the first state to do so; Washington State had taken a similar step in 2012.	California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.	The ultimate question is whether an obviously joke enterprise constitutes a real offering of securities or just performance art (a Ponzi scheme is one of many types of securities fraud). An unregistered offering of securities that does not fall within an exception is per se unlawful under federal law, but a security is generally defined as something offered with at least a prospect of making a potential profit for the investor which is not something that is true of this offering. (And if less than $1,000,000 are sold it might even be within an exemption to securities laws). State securities laws are divided into two categories. Most allow any offering of securities so long as proper disclosures are made and the offer is restricted to the right kind of investors. A minority impose substantive quality standards on offerings and this offering might violate the law in those states (although this still would present the question of whether a known money losing opportunity is really a security since there is no evidence of an intent to potentially make a profit from the investment). I do not believe that California imposes substantive quality of investment standards on public or private offerings of securities. Any deal whether or not it is a security is actionable if it is fraudulent. Normally an element of any claim for fraud is justified reliance upon a representation or upon a failure to disclose information. But, in this case, it is hard to see how anyone could say that they were justified in relying on any representation in making a purchase because they were told that they were being cheated. So, it is hard to see how a fraud claim would be sustained here either. I'm not sure that this cleanly falls into the category of gambling either, even though there is money at stake and the outcome isn't entirely certain. This doesn't really seem like a game of chance to me. Indeed, viewed as performance art, this scheme might even be entitled to First Amendment protection. Ultimately, I would not prioritize a civil or criminal action against this enterprise either from the perspective of a private lawyer representing an investor, or from the perspective of a government enforcement authority. And, while I would be a little nervous about running this enterprise, I wouldn't be quaking in my boots. In a civil lawsuit, any award would probably be minimal, and in a criminal case there would probably be an extremely generous plea offered.	united-states An ex post facto law criminalizes conduct after the fact that was legal at the time, something that is prohibited under U.S. constitutional law. But, as the question states: my question is about actions that were illegal and then had changes made to them. If something is a crime in 2015 and this criminal law is violated, and the conduct is then legalized in 2016, the conduct committed while it was a crime does not cease to be punishable as a crime and may be punished criminally. Often a judge would consider the fact that the conduct was later legalized when evaluating the seriousness of the crime at a post-legalization sentencing, but a judge is not required to do so. A significant number of pardons and commutations of criminal sentences by Presidents and Governors in the U.S. involve people convicted of crimes for conduct that is now legal or is now punished less severely. But pardons and commutations are purely discretionary. As an aside, France has constitutional protections that give newly lenient treatment of crimes retroactive effect, but the United States does not.	I've had a good look at the Vagrancy Act, and I have to say that i can't find the text that you're looking for. It's possibly been repealed, in which case it's not, in fact, the law - even if it were, it is unlikely that this provision would have applied to most games, as it appears to be Games or pretended Games of Chance that it targets.	The relevant legislation is found in sections 5361-5367 of the United States Code. The key prohibition is in section 5363. To fall within the scope of this prohibition, a person must: (1) be "in the business of betting or wagering" and (2) accept a payment in connection with the participation of another person in "unlawful Internet gambling". So you need to look at (1) what is betting or wagering and (2) what is unlawful Internet gambling. Both terms are defined in section 5362 and discussed on Wikipedia. Assuming that you are running a video game that is not a thin veneer over a casino, and the users are gambling in-game items that are not purchased with actual money, then you are unlikely to be found to be engaged in the business of betting or wagering, especially given the exclusion in section 5362(1)(E)(viii) for "participation in any game or contest in which participants do not stake or risk anything of value."	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.
Can China be sued in U.S. court for torts related to COVID? Does U.S. law allow a U.S. plaintiff to sue China for damages stemming from COVID? (I am not asking whether there is sufficient evidence to support such an allegation; only whether U.S. courts assert jurisdiction to impose tort damages against sovereign governments for such a claim.) This previous Q&A notes that 28 USC 1605 allows for some claims against foreign governments, but that for some reason Congress passed another law (JASTA, 2016) to allow claims against "state sponsors of terrorism."	Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 28 USC 1605, subsections (b-d) are clearly irrelevant (mortgage foreclosure, maritime liens). Under (a), the exception to immunity can be because of (1) waiver, (3-4) property takings in violation of international law and other property issues, and (6) contract enforcement. Then there are two more potentially applicable subsections. First there is (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States It would be a stretch to apply this exception, but the law is full of stretches. Then there is: (5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to— (A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or (B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights There is a piece of congressional legal research suggesting that FSIA would not allow the suit, specifically looking at the Missouri suit against China. Missouri does indeed invoke (2) and (5). The analysis points out that there may be some connection between commercial activities and harm in the US, but that the harm is not "based directly on" such commercial activities. For example, operating a healthcare system in China does not directly cause damage in the US, nor does producing medical equipment, nor operating social media platforms (these are three of the claims of Missouri). Nor does conducting "commercial research on viruses by the Wuhan Institute and Chinese Academy of Sciences." SCOTUS explained in Argentina v. Weltover that the damage in the US must follow "as an immediate consequence" of the activity, not just an eventual result. The main problem with the territorial tort claim in (5) is that the tort would appear to be a failure to perform a discretionary function in "allowing the virus to spread," but that reduces to saying that they failed to take sufficiently strenuous action to prevent the spread, and perhaps suppressing information. But the governments have discretion in these matters. So under existing law, it is more likely than not that the courts would not apply an exception to the jurisdiction question.	Judges and justices can file lawsuits like anyone else, but ordinarily the judges who are colleagues of the judge or justice would recuse themselves and it would be assigned to another venue at trial (in the case of a trial court judge), and on appeal would be assigned to judges who don't have a personal relationship with the judge (possibly sitting by assignment from another appellate jurisdiction or by senior judges who weren't on the bench when this judge was on the bench). A U.S. Supreme Court justice's suit would not be considered recusal worth by an unfamiliar lower court judge who is only theoretically in the jurisdiction of the justice and no suit by a U.S. Supreme Court justice has ever been deemed cert worthy. If it did reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justice would be expected to, but not required in any enforceable way, to recuse from hearing the case.	Currently, there is no recourse The Russian state is sovereign. This means the Russian government has to tell the Russian courts that they allow people to sue Russia for specific, enumerated things. If the Kremlin has not done so, then Russia has total, sovereign immunity from such claims. In the united-states, the FTCA regulates how and when you can sue the USA or federal institutions for torts, while FSIA regulates how or when you can sue other countries in the USA. In russia, the Federal Law No. 297-FZ of November 3, 2015 "On Jurisdictional Immunities of a Foreign State and Property of a Foreign State in the Russian Federation" seems to be a very similar law to FSIA. I could not determine if an equivalent to the FTCA exists. Reparations would be handled by a peace treaty with Ukraine Besides a law that allows claims against Russia, a Ukrainian-Russian peace treaty might contain a passus about reparations. There are three very traditional ways how such handle reparations: In one case, such a treaty could establish that Russia pays the reparations to Ukraine, and then claims against Russia are paid out by Ukraine. In the other case, the treaty provides a framework to sue Russia for compensation. And in the last variant, no compensation for civilians is agreed upon at all.	Assuming that both policies actually cover the loss, this is called “double insurance.” Generally speaking, you can claim against both insurers, but you can only recover the loss once. See my answer to another question about double recovery for more about the general principles that apply when a plaintiff attempts to recover the same loss from multiple defendants. In the specific context of insurance, there will normally be terms in the insurance contract as well as local statutes which require the claimant to notify the insurers of one another’s existence, and determine the extent to which the insurer who paid can recover contribution from the insurer who didn’t. This issue is particularly complex in the United States where insurance is separately regulated in each state. Some of the complexities that arise are reviewed in Russ, The double insurance problem – a proposal (1961) 13(2) Hastings Law Journal 183, although this is now rather outdated. In the context of health insurance, the adjustment of liability for doubly-insured risks is referred to as coordination of benefits and may be regulated by model laws promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissions. I am not aware of any model law or legal principles applicable throughout the United States that would determine the outcome in the case you describe of home and car insurance.	The direct answer is "no" and the indirect answer is "yes", that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide).	Without regards to the actual case and the particular countries involved, I am wondering how it is even possible that a court in one country orders the whole another country to do something, let alone when the two countries do not even formally have diplomatic relations. The main statute that is relevant in the U.S. is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA) of 1976. In general foreign states are immune from liability in U.S. courts (and most courts of the developed world) subject to certain exceptions, the most common of which are as follows: Foreign state waives its immunity explicitly or implicitly Commercial activities by foreign state in or directly affecting the United States Property taken in violation of international law is at issue Rights in U.S. property acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are at issue Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury, death or damage to or loss of property caused by its tortious act or omission, occurring in the United States Enforcement of an arbitration agreement made by the foreign state with or for a private party Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking or their support, if the foreign state is a designated sponsor of terrorism Admiralty lawsuit to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, based on commercial activity The exception above in bold was probably the one applied in the North Korean case. The only countries to which that exception applies are North Korea, Syria, Sudan and Iran. (There are also separate similar rules related to countries with whom the U.S. is in a declared war.) There is sporadic ongoing constitutional separation of powers litigation in the U.S. over whether a FISA authorized lawsuit can proceed over the objections of the President as expressed by the U.S. State Department. The argument that FISA is unconstitutional in this context is that diplomacy and foreign policy is exclusively an executive branch power to the exclusion of Congress and the judiciary, but for the most part, this extreme position has been rejected in recent years. A conservative U.S. Supreme Court, however, could revisit this question (conservative judges tend to favor more absolute executive branch authority in foreign affairs). Once a party wins, however, the winner needs to identify foreign assets subject to the jurisdiction of the court from which to collect the judgment, such as gold deposits or U.S. governmental or corporate bonds or ships docked in U.S. ports, owned by the country. In strong contrast to the case above, the UK media recently overtly demonstrated disobedience of a New Zealand court name suppression order: a man arrested in NZ for allegedly committing an appalling crime was granted temporary name suppression, and that was ignored by the UK media. I am wondering if there is anything that would stop a New Zealand court to hold the UK to account just like the US court just did North Korea. In the New Zealand case, the remedy would be to bring suit against the particular newspapers or reporters involved, rather than the state. But, the U.K. might not enforce those judgments if those defendants lost, so enforcement might be limited to New Zealand based assets and persons, and then, only if the New Zealand court found that it had jurisdiction over the defendants under New Zealand law. So, this isn't really analogous. So, in general, are there any internationally recognised laws/treaties/protocols etc. that define if/when a court in one country can assert jurisdiction over the whole another country and hold it to account? Or is that completely up to the court and whatever extremes it dares to come up with? See above in the U.S. case. Most countries have similar statutes or case law to FISA which codified the case law applying customary international law at the time that it was adopted. One example that comes into my mind is the European Court of Human Rights: if a country signed the European Convention on Human Rights, it can be held to account by the court. But what conventions, if any, can be applied to the two cases above? The European Court of Human Rights case is one of consent to the jurisdiction of an international body by treaty. Countries like the UK and NZ have statutes or treaties governing when a foreign judgment (e.g. a judgment from a New Zealand court) will be recognized domestically. There are also usually laws governing when people present in one state will be extradited to another, usually in the form of a bilateral treaty between the affected states.	Greendrake's answer says that a country can declare any jurisdiction it likes. This is true, but in practice it is the convention that a country should claim jurisdiction only over its territory and its citizens. The point about "citizens" is normally not pushed, as when you go to a foreign country you are normally subject to its laws rather than those of your home, but for instance there are laws against child sex tourism where the perpetrators can be prosecuted at home for offences committed abroad. However this basic principle gets more murky with long-distance communication such as the Internet. Someone in country X can, for example, provide a service to someone in country Y which is illegal in country Y. At this point the laws of country Y have been broken by someone sitting in country X. Y is not claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction; the crime occurred inside its own territory, but the criminal is currently resident in X. From a legal point of view this is the same as if both had been inside Y when the crime was committed, but then the perpetrator fled to X before they could be arrested. So in the Kim Dotcom case, Dotcom is alleged to have committed criminal copyright violations by supplying movie files to people in the US. In the Meng Wanzhou case, Meng is alleged to have made fraudulent statements to American banks to the effect that Huawei was complying with US sanctions law (otherwise those banks would not have been able to do business with Huawei). The accounts I've read don't say whether Meng was in the US for those meetings, but the fact that they were made to American banks in order to do business in America makes the precise location of the meeting irrelevant.	This would be virtually impossible to do from scratch. If you had the guidance of someone who successfully pursued a similar legal action it might be possible. In theory you should be able to pursue grievances in court by becoming well versed in the applicable laws and rules, having impeccable attention to detail, exceptional deductive and writing skills, and getting lucky enough to run your filings through patient clerks who will tell you every time you're missing something or doing something wrong. New York Courts even offer this encouraging CourtHelp website for pro se guidance on common actions. But if you really want to attempt a pro se civil action, especially against a government entity, or other entity with essentially unlimited legal funds, you not only need all of the above but also some sort of assistance from somebody who knows the system. I would spend as much time looking for sympathetic advocacy groups and lawyers offering pro bono service as I would reading relevant law and procedure. (One more thing: The word "quick" is never used in conjunction with formal legal actions, except in jest ;)
What can be put in a website ToS? Suppose I wanted to make a website and put something absurd in the Terms of Service like this: "To use the free version of the site, your full legal name must have 20 characters, you must have a pet snake, you must be born on February 29, your age must be an even number, and you must live between 10 and 11 miles of Washington D.C. If you do not meet any of these criteria, you must pay for a premium plan for $10/month." Which of these conditions are enforceable (as in I could collect damages from a person for using the wrong plan)? Does it matter whether these conditions are only in the Terms of Service or displayed prominently on the website (or somewhere in between)? This is a hypothetical scenario.	which of these conditions are enforceable (as in I could collect damages from a person for using the wrong plan)? The validity of the contract does not depend on the outlined conditions being that weird. These weird conditions are merely a way of saying that [almost] everyone is required to pay $10/month for using the website. What determines the validity of the contract is the issue of whether users knew or [reasonably] should have known the ToS. If the website does not contain functionality toward reasonably ensuring that users become aware of the ToS prior to using the website, it will be unlikely or impossible for the website owner to establish that a contract was formed. In terms of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 17-20, users' reasonable misunderstanding would preclude a finding of mutual assent on which contracts are premised.	You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.	Most games have a TOS to playing that include provisions such as sales of in game items through out of game currencies (i.e. real world money changes hands for digital product or account). I believe Pokemon does have this as part of the TOS which could get you and potential customers banned from competition and possibly the modern online trade features, but am unable to look at the current TOS to verify. It should not be hard to find such a document and read for yourself.	I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!	In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.	That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) \| HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act \| Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money.	A website's Terms of Service can be or include either or both rules and terms of contract. Which part is what depends on the circumstances and whether there is a contract at all. Like in case of any physical venue where the owner is free to impose rules on anyone wishing to visit the venue, a website owner is free to impose rules on what the visitors can and cannot do while visiting the website. If you are the owner of a physical store, you may require the visitors to take off any helmets or sunglasses when they enter, and/or present their bags for inspection when they exit. These are rules, or conditions of entry. Similarly, you may require your website visitors to be over certain age, only use certain devices/software for accessing the website, not to engage any robots/scrappers etc. As soon as a contract between you and the visitor is formed, the relevant parts of the ToS may well be terms of the contract. For example, if visitors buy something in your store/on your website, the clauses re shipping, returns/refunds and warranty will be such terms.	You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.
Are directors employees of the company? Directors tell the company what to do but most directors also get paid for their services. Does that make directors employees of the company?	In the U.S. a board member would not be an employee just by virtue of being a board member, even if they were compensated for attending board meetings. The CEO, an employee, might or might not also be a board member. Employees can be fired by their manager. A board member can't be fired from the board but, typically, only removed by a vote of shareholders. They are not assigned tasks by managers of the company. This is 100% clear in CA under employment code 622 (a) “Employee” does not include a director of a corporation or association performing services in his or her capacity as a director. I was a CEO of a private company I co-founded I was a board member as a result of voting myself on the board via my stock ownership. The majority of the board could fire me as CEO but I would still be a board member. If outside board members did get compensation, it would be as a consultant, paid with a 1099. The CA code does say that a board member could take on actual work, like auditing financial information, that might fall under the activities of an employee.	Why do you think they have the same shareholders? There’s no reason to believe that they are related corporations just because they share an address. I am shareholder and director of 4 corporations. 3 have the same shareholders in the same proportion. The other has different shareholders. All of them have their registered office at my accountant’s premises. It’s a small suburban practice so there are probably only a few hundred companies at that address. A large city practice would have thousands or tens of thousands. The property management company probably provides the same service.	am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? No. You are not being “paid in lieu” of anything; you are being paid your accrued entitlement. Payment in lieu refers to payment instead of some other obligation. In employment it usually refers to an employer paying an employee instead of requiring the employee to work out the notice period which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? Neither. The correct rate is the one your employer used - your annual rate divided by the number of days you get paid for. Annual leave continues to accrue while you are on annual leave (or any other paid leave). is there a legal basis for such a request? No.	Since this is a board about law, the legal answer is that New Jersey does not regulate vacation pay: In New Jersey, employers are not required to provide employees with vacation benefits, either paid or unpaid. If an employer chooses to provide these benefits, it is only required to comply with its established policy or employment contract. The specific law cited by that web page is this one, which says that "Nothing in this chapter requires an employer to pay an employee for hours the employee is not required to be at his or her place of work because of holidays, vacation, lunch hours, illness and similar reasons." So whether your boss can count weekend days as part of your vacation will depend on your employment contract and the established policies of your employer. Unfortunately, that's not something this forum can provide advice on.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job.	Do I have rights to the loan as an asset of the company? You, no. It’s an asset of the company and,as such, will be liquidated by the liquidator for the benefit of the creditors of the company. Only if all creditors are paid in full will a dividend by paid to shareholders- this virtually never happens. The loan contract is still valid and the borrower will have to repay as agreed. If the contract has a repay on demand clause the liquidator will probably trigger it. If it doesn’t, they will sell it for what they can get - depending on the risk profile this could be from 50-85% of face value.	Custom is more important than the law AFAIK there is no legal requirement to provide concessional pricing for any goods or services. Custom dictates that this is more common for services than for goods but, for example, cinema’s often don’t provide concessional pricing for blockbuster movies.
Alternative systems without the Right to Remain Silent As I understand it, the "Right to Remain Silent" errs on the side of innocence in the USA justice system. Jurors are usually supposed to rule as if the defendant testified in the manner voiced by his attorney (in opening and closing arguments) even if the defendant does not really testify. What would be the harm in removing this right when questions are asked through his attorney with a long allowed response time? For example, suppose the judicial system (and even the police in the executive system) allowed questions like "Were you inside your house at any time on March 30, 2021?" and required an answer of either "Yes", "No", or "I don't recall" (with allowance for further supplemental information if the defendant wants to clarify further). There might be a limit of only a few such forced questions, but answers to these forced questions are all admissible in court. It's important to realize that the attorney fields these questions for the defendant, so direct police interviews still would be refused. Of course, some defendant accused of murdering his wife on March 30 would rather not answer this question if he was truly at home with her. But, jurors would know that this incriminating evidence was forced out. So, jurors get more information in the end and can stay open to circumstances which allow the defendant to still be innocent. I'm ultimately looking for alternative justice systems which drop the "Right to Remain Silent". There are many cases in the current system where defendants don't even try to give an alibi and this often puts a wasteful burden on investigators. Are there any such candidate justice systems in other countries? or am I missing something that makes such a system impossible?	Overview The "right to remain silent " is a feature of US law, inherited, like much of the basic structure of US law, from the British law of the late 1700s. The right is also retained in modern UK law, in a somewhat different form. The laws of many countries that do not inherit their legal system from the English/British source do not include the right. For example, the legal system of France does not. Such a system is clearly possible and need not be an arrant tyranny. Whether such a right improves the justice and fairness of the system could be debated, but it is not essential. Note that it is not the case that a jury must pretend that a defendant would have testified in accord with a defense lawyer's opening statement. Indeed the jury is routinely told that opening statements are not evidence and should not be regarded as such. But a US jury is instructed that it should not draw any inference or conclusion of guilt because a defendant remains silent. A defendant is entitled, by remaining silent to in effect say to the state "Prove it!" and need not offer a competing version of the events of the alleged crime. In UK law, an accused person's failure to deny the crime may be considered at the trial. Historical origin The right arose as a reaction against certain specific practices considered to be abusive and unfair. In several English courts, particularly the Court of the Star Chamber, the practice arose of compelling suspected persons to attend and asking them under oath if they had commuted various illegal acts. If such a suspect had in fact committed the act asked about, then the suspect had the choice of confessing to a criminal act that carried a severe penalty (often death), or committing perjury, which was both a criminal act and was widely believed to be a grave sin, possibly condemning a person's soul to hell. Or if the accused remained silent, a serious punishment for contempt of court could be imposed, and that might be treated as evidence of guilt. These practices contributed to the abolition of the Star Chamber court in 1641. The right to silence seems to have been established in English law after the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, as described in the Wikipedia article, although it was not fully established until well into the 18th century. Current US Practice The right in the US not only applies during a trial for the protection of the accused. The right permits a person being questioned by the police to refuse to answer questions, with the assurance that such refusal may not later be used in court to help convict the suspect. Many lawyers advise anyone questioned by the police who are or might be under suspicion to refuse to answer any questions at all. The right also means that a witness who is not a defendant may not, in a criminal or civil trial, be required to answer a question if the answer might later be used to help convict that person of a crime. There are other implications of the right, and the details are too long to go into in this answer – whole books have been written about the right and what it does and does not cover, and the reasons behind it. The general principle may be taken to be that when the government accuses a person of crime, it must undertake to prove the crime by its own resources, not compel the accused to assist in the process. A system in which an accused is required to respond to specific questions can be imagined. To some extent it has existed at various times and places. It need not involve torture or coerced confession, but could require an accused, during a trial, to respond to specific questions. It would violate the principle that the state must make its case without help from the accused. The value of that principle can be debated. Other Legal systems In the article "French Criminal Procedures—Surprising Features of a French Trial from Bloomberg, it is said that: The “right to silence” is limited. During a trial, the judges usually turn to the defendant and ask for the defendant’s response to the evidence in the record. A refusal to respond will lead to a strong inference of guilt. A defendant is not, however, put under oath.	The United States gives the accused the right to a fair trial. However, it also gives exceptionally strong protection to the media (and to people in general) to speak on matters of public concern; there are very, very few cases where a US government (federal, state, or local) can legally order someone not to publish something (as opposed to letting it be published and then issuing sanctions). The rule of thumb for content-based restrictions on speech is that they must be the least restrictive way of achieving a compelling government interest. For trials, there are other ways to achieve a fair trial without restricting the press. One of the most preferred ways to do it is to use the voir dire process, in which jurors can be rejected for prejudice. Courts can also move the trial to a new location; they can grant motions from the defense to delay the trial while things cool down; they can sequester the jurors (meaning that the jurors are kept in a central place and prevented from talking to anyone else or reading anything about the case); if none of these are done, a conviction can potentially be reversed on appeal. US courts will, wherever possible, modify the trial to mitigate the damage done by the press, rather than restrict the press to mitigate the damage to the trial. For a review of a few different approaches to this in different jurisdictions, you might want to look at this law journal article.	The Miranda warning only has to be given to a person being interrogated in custody, and on the premise that the wife is not in custody, the police do not need to read her the warning. Therefore, anything she says can be used against her, or somebody else, unless there is a separate reason why the statement could not be used. The wife may invoke the spousal testimony privilege, in which case she cannot be compelled to testify against the husband. The officer could theoretically testify that the wife said "I washed blood out of his clothing", but this is an assertion made by an out-of-court declarant to prove the truth of the question at hand, i.e. hearsay. There are numerous exceptions to the definition so that in some cases, the statement would not be hearsay. If the wife refuses to testify, that cuts out half of the exceptions, but maybe the wife is a co-conspirator.	The question seems to somewhat misunderstand the role of courts in the united-states The United States uses a common-law system, ultimately derived from the law of Great Britain as it was at the time of the US Revolution, and thus incorporating its history largely derived from the practices of English Courts. There was a period in this history where much new law was made by judges, although a great deal of it was also made by statutes, that is by Parliament. In theory such judge-made laws merely "discovered" what the law "had always been" but in practice judges made much new law. Since then the incidence of judge made law has greatly declined in the UK, and has declined even more in the US. I think that it is fair to say that Judges in the US do not now make new law with any frequency. There is, however, a major exception to this. In the US, the Federal Constitution is the "supreme law of the land", and no federal or state statute, regulation or practice may stand if it does not conform to relevant requirements of the federal Constitution. (Nor may any local ordinance, regulation or practice.) But the federal constitution is written mostly in rather broad and general terms, requiring for example that "due process of law" be provided, but but not spelling out in detail what that means. It is therefore up to judges, and particularly to the judges of Federal appellate courts, and most particularly the US Supreme Court, to say when a law, regulation, or practice is in violation of some constitutional requirement, and what must be done to avoid such conflict. One example is the Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) holding that when admissions or confessions by criminal suspects questioned while under arrest were admitted into criminal trials, this violated the defendants' rights against compelled self-incrimination unless they had been advised of their rights under the law, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel. This introduced a new substantive rule of law as a way to enforce a long-existing constitutional provision. The Wikipedia article says: Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood only to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court. It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda warning part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. But the concept of "Miranda warnings" quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing". A more recent example is the case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) in which the US Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment together guaranteed a right to same-sex couples to marry. This again was a new substantive rule, significantly different from the previous practice for most of US history, as a way of defining and enforcing long-existing constitutional provisions. Related to these are cases where a law, or a provision of a law, is held to be unconstitutional, and thus not a valid law at all. An unconstitutional law may not validly be enforced. Such a case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) which held that laws requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance (flag salute) in schools were unconstitutional. These sorts of actions do not occur in those common-law countries which do not have a formal written constitution that is superior to laws passed by the legislature. That is the case in the UK, for example. Aside from that sort of case, where constitutional rights are being asserted or constitutional requirements are being enforced, the main power of US judges over the law is to interpret the law (both statute and regulation) when it is unclear or ambiguous, and to decide exactly what it will mean and how it will be applied. These interpretations can be changed or completely reversed by later legislative action, that is by new laws passed by Congress or by a State legislature. This sort of interpretation occurs in all common-law countries, and also in civil-law countries, although to a somewhat lesser degree in civil-law countries. In general, civil-law countries tend to spell out their law in more specific detail in laws passed by the legislature, leaving somewhat less room for interpretation by courts and judges. By the way, my understanding is that Indonesia is not strictly a civil-law country, but uses a mixture of systems. The Wikipedia article "Law of Indonesia " says: Law of Indonesia is based on a civil law system, intermixed with customary law and the Roman Dutch law. Before the Dutch colonisation in the sixteenth century, indigenous kingdoms ruled the archipelago independently with their own custom laws, known as adat. Foreign influences from India, China and Arabia have not only affected the culture, but also weighed in the customary adat laws. I cannot speak to the specifics of how the courts of Indonesia have interpreted the law on drugs in that country.	If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y.	No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.	In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.	In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't".
How do you protect your intellectual property when you're about to write a screenplay? How do you protect your intellectual property when you're about to write a screenplay? Is there any particular step you can take in order to make sure that the intellectual property stays firmly in your hand and that the people you pitch the idea to don't get to just steal it without properly compensating you for your efforts?	In addition to copyright, the Writers Guild has a registration system for registering scripts, treatments, synopses and outlines. Among other things, the guild agrees to have someone show up in court to give evidence as to the date a document was deposited. Their registration carries weight in the film industry since there are many cross-guild/union agreements that can constrain actions. It is not an alternative to copyright - please register it with the U.S. Copyright office.	You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine.	One reason could be because of the scènes à faire doctrine. Many of the things you notice as similarities are not infringement. I don't know the counts of lawsuits for music infringement vs screenwriting infringement. There may just be more songs than screenplays. Screenwriters/producers do get sued, though. See Cinar Corporation v. Robinson 2012 SCC 25.	Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."	You don't just want to ask, you are required to obtain a license (or in other terms: the OK of the author). Your game is based on a book. That makes your game a derivate work. Under berne convention, any signer state has to make sure that the author has the right to authorize any derivate. That includes translations, films, or games. Without a license, you violate copyright law. It doesn't matter if your game is free. To stay safe, you need to obtain a license. Quite some authors would be happy to cut a deal, license or guidelines for fan-projects. As an example, the late Sir Terry Pratchett OBE has specific guidelines on what is ok and what not. Ask your author* about these questions and consult a Lawyer! Only then make your fan project! * This means the author, their estate or whoever they assigned their rights in the work to. Some examples: For that teenage wizard in a private castle charter school that'd be a certain J.K. Rowling. For those hairy-halflings running all over the continent hunted by orcs that'd be the J.R.R. Tolkien-Estate. And for those space wizards using blades from solid light that'd be The Walt Disney Company or one of their subsidiaries.	You own it In general, if you own an object, you can do what you like with it if you otherwise comply with the law. It is possible that a particular object may be protected under heritage or similar law, but if it isn’t, and you comply with environmental and safety law, you grind that thing into dust if you want to. Of course, if it did, you would never be able to delete a voicemail, email, or throw out used notepaper - they’re all copyright.	You automatically have copyright protection for what you create. A collection of numeric answers to math equations probably would not qualify (lack of requisite creativity), but certainly anything that counts as a "paper" is protected.	Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.
Neither guilty or not guilty This is an entirely theoretical question, but I am not sure how it is explained. Consider someone committed a crime, but due to lack of evidence the charges are dropped. A lot of people would say they are innocent, but that is not the case as they did commit the crime. But they were also not found guilty due to lack of evidence. They they are basically in no where land in the middle. How is that explained legally?	Scotland has a third possible verdict, which covers much of the situation you are asking about: “not proven”. While still an acquittal, it is typically used by judges and juries in situations where they are not suitably convinced the defendant is necessarily innocent, but not convinced the evidence supports a conviction. As recently as 2015, attempts to remove the third verdict from the Scottish legal system were rejected, despite it being seen as an easy way out for courts.	So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).	There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case.	The need to prove a negative arises only from the way you've phrased the problem. In the UK, theft is defined as— dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving its legitimate owner of it. All five elements must be proved in order to secure a conviction for theft. In the case of an item removed from a store, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that— the defendant had a dishonest intent; the defendant appropriated the item (treated it as his own); the item was 'property' (straightforward in this case); the item belonged to someone else (ditto); and the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of it. Clearly proving that the defendant left the shop without paying would be an important element in proving (2) and (5) above. Note that the prosecution must prove that he left without paying, not that he did not pay. In this example, the prosecution might adduce CCTV or witness evidence of defendant leaving without paying. If the defendant did pay for the item but doesn't have a receipt, he can still give witness testimony in his own defence. The prosecution is unlikely to have strong evidence to the contrary if payment was in fact made. The totality of evidence, put before a jury or summary court, will be considered in the round when establishing guilt.	Double jeopardy applies to the same facts, not to the same sorts of crimes. Say if you are tried and acquitted of murder of person A, that won't later save you from being tried for murder of person B. Same applies to your question: if the documents/testimony on the second occasion are different from the first occasion, there is no protection. If they are the same, there is.	Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.	Is mere accusation without evidence other than testimony of the accuser, grounds for arrest in the UK? It depends on the circumstances, especially when dealing with non-recent allegations where independent and corroborative evidence may be difficult to locate and/or recover, but in my experience it is very rarely an option to arrest soley on the say-so of one complainant unless there is a compelling reason to do so. It's also fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a prime example of when it can go horribly wrong. Also, no-one can "call the police and have someone arrested" in the united-kingdom - the police are under a duty to carry out a "proportionate investigation" in to allegations of crime and then make their own minds up on how to proceed based on the available intelligence and evidence. Focussing on england-and-wales, the most commonly used power of arrest* is at s.24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which, along with PACE Code G, requires an officer to: Reasonably suspect that an offence is being, has been or will be committed. On a scale of 0 to 10 - with 10 being total knowledge and 0 being no opinion at all - suspicion may be as low as 2 or 3 whereas belief starts at 7 or 8. And reasonably believe an arrest is necessary. One commonly used mnemonic for the Necessity Test under s.24 is: ID COP PLAN: Investigation - prompt and effective investigation of offence or conduct Disappearance - prevent prosecution being hindered by disappearance of a person Child / Vulnerable person - protection of Obstruction of highway Physical injury to themselves or someone else Public (in)decency Loss or damage to property Address not know Name not known I cannot say why the officer did not make an arrest in the OP's case. I surmise that he did not deem it necessary based on the above mandatory criteria but rather considered that a voluntary attendance interview would be the most appropriate course of action given the circumstances and information available to him at the time. *There are other statutory and common-law powers of arrest, but they all follow the same procedures as above	No If she has probable cause, yes. The question is whether "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts [Bob is a thief] are probably true"? Its likely that the answer to this question is yes. None No Charlotte listens to Alice, Charlotte asks Bob questions which Bob may or may not answer. Charlotte can ask Bob to produce the receipt, Bob doesn't have to. Charlotte can ask to search Bob, Bob doesn't have to consent. If Bob tries to leave, if Charlotte has reasonable suspicion the Bob has committed a crime (which she could certainly justify) she may detain him temporarily without arrest. If Charlotte has probable cause to believe that Bob has committed a crime (which she could probably justify) then she can arrest him.
Tenants not told about planned construction work I have just moved into a new flat in London, UK and there was planned construction work for a shop underneath that me and the other tenants were not informed about. What are my rights at this point? I have to wake up at 8 every morning including Saturdays and the noise is unbearable, sometimes over 80db. Some things might have changed because of coronavirus that I am not aware of. Also, the council will not help at this point as I had a similar issue in the past and they did not really help.	You should contact your local London borough if you wish to lodge a complaint (and you never know, you might get a different result this time). Depending on the nature of work being carried out, and the level of noise, this may fall within either s.60 of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 or possibly under Part 3 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 if it is deemed a Statutory Nuisance Taking the Royal Borough of Greenwich as an example, they say here: General construction work should be restricted to the following hours: Monday to Friday 8am to 6pm Saturdays 8am to 1pm Noisy work is prohibited on Sundays and bank holidays Therefore it seems the 8am start is allowed. As for the noise levels, independent readings will be required to see if your figure of 80db is accurate but if it is, and continuing with Greenwich as an example, it may be over the permitted levels stated at 6.3 of Greenwich's Code of Practice - assuming that the builders fall within the definition of conducting "major construction and civil engineering works". I have not checked many other boroughs, but the above is consistent with those that I have.	This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.	You can take action against the shop directly under the tort of nuisance. The available remedies are damages to compensate for interference with your property rights, and injunction to require the defendant to cease the activity which is causing the nuisance. You could also bring a judicial review action against the council if they refuse to investigate the noise. In England, Wales, and Scotland this would be based on Section 79(1)(g) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 which defines "noise emitted from premises so as to be prejudicial to health or a nuisance" to be a "statutory nuisance". Section 79 places an obligation on a local authority to "take such steps as are reasonably practicable to investigate" a complaint made by a person living within its area. Section 80(1) requires that "where a local authority is satisfied that a statutory nuisance exists [it] shall service [an abatement notice]". Section section 80(4) provides that it is an offence to contravene an abatement notice. Torts and judicial review are complex areas of law and you should seek legal advice if you intend to pursue either of these routes. The limitation period for judicial review is relatively short (3 months per CPR 54.5(1)), so if you are seeking legal advice, you should do so quickly if you have already approached the council.	Because an owner cannot tell another owner what they can and can't do with their own property The quoted paragraph clearly sets out some of the things the leasehold arrangement allows: "... set out the rights and responsibilities of the residents, such as funding the maintenance of the building and placing restrictions on antisocial behavior." When you own land, you own it; and no one can tell you what you can and can't do with it, not even your co-owners (governments excepted). Want to run chickens? Sure: it's your land. Spinal Tap your stereo to 11 at 2 am? Sure: it's your land. Become a hoarder? Sure, it's your land. When there's a single dwelling on the land, none of that is a problem. When there are multiple dwellings on the land, as in a block of flats (apartments for the Americans among us) then some of these are likely to be problematical. But they aren't problems the law cares about because you all own the property. Different common law jurisdictions have arrived at different solutions to this problem but the UK has particular difficulties because people have been owning land there for a long time. A lot longer than in the USA, Australia or New Zealand. This is quite an elegant solution: all the owners own the land but each of them have a lease over their own flat and that is a contract the law will enforce.	I would assume that the seller ('Transferor') still owned numbers 7 and 11 at the time of the sale. If so, this clause means that the owners of 7 and 11 (now and in the future) have a right of way on the path coloured blue on the plan. The land still belongs to number 9, but the owners cannot build on it so as to block the path. (As mckenzm comments, "on foot only" is an important qualification; the neighbours do not have a right to install utilities under the path, and the owner can put in obstacles that prevent bringing cycles down it).	Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.	The only avenue for tenant liability would be if the tenant is responsible for the damage. The courts have not assigned responsibility for damage resulting from other people's disagreement with a political expression to the person expressing the viewpoint. You are generally free to peacefully express yourself, and as a renter this would be part of your right of "quiet enjoyment of the premise". If there is a lease condition that says "no political signs", then maybe that's a violation of the contract, but that might also be an illegal term in your state or city (under landlord-tenant laws). Since you have the right to express your opinion, the courts must respect that right and not deem that engaging in political expression negates your other rights. In general, if someone commits a crime, the law does not say "but you take the blame if you express your political opinion".	Your problem is not just that you don't have a working stopcock, but that you now know that you don't have one. Of course it's not illegal by itself, the problem is what is going to happen if you have an insurance case. Your home insurance most likely has to pay for accidental damage. But any damage that would be caused by not being able to close the stopcock, when you knew it wasn't working, they could claim that this is due to gross negligence. Whether they would succeed with that claim or not, I don't know, but fixing the stopcock seems to be a much, much cheaper solution. PS. Seems I made a wrong assumption here - that it was your home, owned by you. The same reasons that would have made it a good idea for you to fix the stopcock obviously make it a good idea for the landlord as well. So I would make sure that you tell the landlord as soon as possible. If something goes wrong, and the insurance doesn't pay, your landlord would be responsible for the damage. Whether it's legal to not fix the stopcock - that's a different matter. I thought you were the owner. You would have endangered yourself and your property. Nothing illegal with that. But with the landlord it's different; he wouldn't be endangering himself but someone else's property.
Can a soldier refuse to carry a weapon? During WWII, Desmond Doss joined the US Army as a combat medic. Due to his religious belief in nonviolence, he refused to carry a weapon and was eventually allowed to do so, going on to win various medals (including the Medal of Honor) for rescuing casualties in various battles of the Pacific Theatre—his story was later made into the film Hacksaw Ridge. Is it still possible today for somebody to join the armed forces, but to refuse to carry a weapon? Specifically, I am wondering about the US and the UK armed forces, but interesting answers about any other country are welcome. Initially I thought Doss would have been conscripted which may have changed things, but apparently he chose to enlist so that argument doesn't hold up. I've searched but I haven't found anything about whether this would still be possible now or if military law may have changed to disallow it.	Under US Army Regulation 601-210 as of 2016, conscientious objection will normally disqualify someone applying to enlist, but the disqualification can be waived. Under Army Regulation 600-43, if they enlist they’ll typically be assigned to the medical field and will receive modified basic training (as conscientious objectors, they won’t be trained in the use of weapons). As for officers and warrant officers, Army Regulation 601-100 says an applicant is disqualified unless they’re applying to the Army Medical Department or to be a chaplain. Serving personnel can also apply for conscientious objector status if they develop beliefs during their service, also under Army Regulation 600-43. They can either ask to be discharged or ask to do noncombatant service, and if their application is approved then they’ll get whichever one they asked for. While DOD Instruction 1300.06 (the military-wide conscientious objector regulation) says that the services can discharge someone who just requests noncombatant service, the Army policy is to keep them around. If they do ask to be discharged, they can’t decide to enlist again in the future (unlike conscientious objection in general, this disqualification can’t be waived). Lastly, under Army Regulation 601-280, enlisted personnel who are conscientious objectors generally can’t reenlist unless they’re in the medical field (in which case they can reenlist with a contract that will keep them in the medical field). Of course, the fact that conscientious objectors are potentially eligible to serve doesn’t mean they’ll be accepted. That depends on the needs of the Army. If the Army has plenty of people, they might not want someone who’s restricted to noncombatant roles. If they’re desperate for people, they’re much more likely to accept applicants.	united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky.	Your question is about "Would it be kidnapping if I was injured and someone took me to a hospital without my consent", so I don't understand these other answers which say "it depends on the situation". The key point is what you mean by "without my consent". Good Samaritan laws are also relevant, which offer defenses to people who do things that would otherwise be unlawful when they are doing it with good intentions to help someone who they believe is injured or would become injured without their intervention. The main things to consider are the degree of injury, which is a spectrum ranging from no injury at all to being dead, and whether the injured person is conscious. Are you so injured that you are unconscious? In most jurisdictions, being unconscious is considered as you consenting to any actions which are done with the intent of giving you medical assistance, which is on a spectrum of saying "hey are you ok?" or shaking you in order to wake you up, all the way up to treatment including major surgery. So by being unconscious it is usually automatically consent, but if you are awake and are refusing help or treatment, even if you could die if you didn't receive treatment, it would be easy to argue that you were not consenting and that any treatment/assistance etc was unlawful. This situation sometimes happens, and EMTs are often trained to wait until the person goes unconscious to then give them medical assistance/transport etc, but assisting someone before they go unconscious could still be argued as permissible, if the injured person was so distressed that they were unable to give/refuse consent, or at least if the assistor believed that to be the case. This is why if someone has a major medical problem and is unconscious, hospitals can resuscitate them and even perform surgery without them signing a consent form. By being unconscious, it is considered that they are consenting to any necessary surgery to help them, even including amputation or other negative consequences. Conversely, if someone has a valid Advance healthcare directive on file which forbids measures such as resuscitation, they will be considered not to consent, and will usually be left alone without life-saving assistance. Resuscitating/performing surgery on someone in this case can be cause for damages to the injured person, because it would have been clear that they did not consent to such assistance.	What factors go into determining whether or not killing targeted non-combatants is considered a war crime? The cynical answer is "it depends on who wins and who judges". There are various definitions of what constitutes a civilian, all of which are "negative definitions" (i.e. Not a member of an armed force(e.g. an army, navy, etc; actually wielding arms is not required) or "involved in hostilities", meaning not a partisan, insurgent, or other form of "belligerent"). Civilians should not be targeted by military actions under international law. On the other hand, spies, especially those who's activities cause death, are explicitly not soldiers entitled to Prisoner-of-War status, and can be executed. There are some protections provided for spies, but those generally seem to be geared towards soldiers captured during "non spy" activities with regards to past actions as spies, as opposed to "in the field" spies...and it is unclear to me what that means for an "informant" who presumably gathers intelligence in their day-to-day activities. To what extent an informant is a "spy" is unclear. Espionage consists of the access, generally on behalf of a state (or belligerent party), to information that is held by another and considered as confidential or strategic, in the military, security, or economic field. Identities of personnel is very much confidential and strategic information, so passing that information to the government seems to qualify as espionage. Whether or not this equates to being "involved in hostilities" is unclear. The case could certainly be made that an informant, especially one who does not go out of their way to gather intelligence or receive compensation is a civilian. Likewise, the case could certainly be made that they are a de facto belligerent, being no different in their effective activities than a formal intelligence operative or artillery coordinates finder. Wars are messy; civil wars especially so.	It is almost certainly fine as long has you have a "good reason". The police website give a list of examples when carrying a knife would have a "good reason" (like a chef getting a set of knives out of her car, for example). Likewise, a plastic knife isn't considered a weapon as long as you don't start threatening people with it. As long as you don't start swinging it around, you should be fine.	It appears that Plummer v. State is still valid, but only in a very limited fact pattern. It is often quoted on the internet to justify the idea that a person may resist any unlawful arrest with force. That may have been true when Plummer was decided, and it was the clear holding of Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900) But Bad Elk is bad law today -- the wide adoption of the Model Penal Code starting in 1962 removed the right to resist a merely unlawful arrest. The right to use self-defense against excessive force by an officer remains, but is narrowly limited, and courts rarely find such resistance justified. In State v. Mulvihill 57 N.J. 151 (1970) The Supreme Court of New Jersey held: If, in effectuating the arrest or the temporary detention, the officer employs excessive and unnecessary force, the citizen may respond or counter with the use of reasonable force to protect himself, and if in so doing the officer is injured no criminal offense has been committed. However, the Mulvihill court cautioned: State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1965) held that "a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal under the circumstances obtaining." (89 N.J. Super. at 184.) The opinion put to rest the notion that the common law rule existing in some jurisdictions, which permits a citizen to resist, even with reasonable force, an unlawful arrest by a police officer, was applicable in New Jersey. ... Accordingly, in our State when an officer makes an arrest, legal or illegal, it is the duty of the citizen to submit and, in the event the seizure is illegal, to seek recourse in the courts for the invasion of his right of freedom. The Mulvihill court explained the difference in the two csase by saying: Despite his duty to submit quietly without physical resistance to an arrest made by an officer acting in the course of his duty, even though the arrest is illegal, his right to freedom from unreasonable seizure and confinement can be protected, restored and vindicated through legal processes. However, the rule permitting reasonable resistance to excessive force of the officer, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, is designed to protect a person's bodily integrity and health and so permits resort to self-defense. Simply stated, the law recognizes that liberty can be restored through legal processes but life or limb cannot be repaired in a courtroom. And so it holds that the reason for outlawing resistance to an unlawful arrest and requiring disputes over its legality to be resolved in the courts has no controlling application on the right to resist an officer's excessive force. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The Mulvihill court further warned that: [A citizen] cannot use greater force in protecting himself against the officer's unlawful force than reasonably appears to be necessary. If he employs such greater force, then he becomes the aggressor and forfeits the right to claim self-defense ... Furthermore, if he knows that if he desists from his physically defensive measures and submits to arrest the officer's unlawfully excessive force would cease, the arrestee must desist or lose his privilege of self-defense. The court said that the duty to desist and submit if that would stop the excessive force is analogous to the duty to retreat rather than use force in self defense when this is feasible. The Nolo Press page "Resisting Arrest When Police Use Excessive Force" says: It’s rare that someone being placed under arrest has the right to forcefully resist. But in most states, if the arresting officer uses excessive force that could cause “great bodily harm,” the arrestee has the right to defend him or herself. That’s because most states hold that an officer’s use of excessive force amounts to assault or battery, which a victim has a right to defend against. ... An officer’s use of force is “excessive” if it is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm (serious injury). Most states consider whether a “reasonable person” under the circumstances would have believed that the officer’s use of force was likely to cause great physical harm (including death). If the answer is “yes”—if a reasonable person would have felt it necessary to resist in self-defense, and if that person used a reasonable degree of force when resisting, then the resistance is typically justified. But this is a very high standard to meet, such that courts hardly ever find that an arrestee’s forceful resistance was defensible. This article from policeone.com citing California law, says that forceful resistance to an arrest is almost never justified. It does agree that resistance to excessive force can be used; Section 693 requires that even if the officer were committing a public offense (crime), only that "self-defense" force that is sufficient to prevent the offense may be used. In other words, the subject may only use force to simply stop the assault/battery under color of authority and never any more than that. and says that: It is a rare circumstance when this assault/battery under color of authority actually occurs and an officer is charged, not because of some great law enforcement driven conspiracy but because it rarely happens. In short, Plummer is still valid, but limited to the fact pattern when the person being arrested is actually being subjected to excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm, or death, and only justifies sufficient force to prevent such harm. The lawfulness of the arrest does not matter, it the the danger caused by the excess force that justifies possible resistance. As a practical matter, if resistance is likely to escalate rather than prevent harm, it is highly unwise. When Plummer is cited, often with Bad Elk, to justify resistance to an unlawful arrest because of its unlawfulness, that is no longer valid law and has not been for decades. Note that is a person who is not a law enforcement officer (LEO) but who is pretending to be one, tries to make an "arrest" this would not be an arrest at all, but an assault or an attempted abduction, and the victim would be justified in using reasonable force in self-defense, although not excessive force. This is not the Plummer rule, but the normal law of self-defense. However any arrestee should be careful. Claiming that the arresters are impersonators when they are in fact plainclothes LEOs will not go well. If a reasonable person should have known that they were LEOs, there is no right to resist unless excessive force is used. Note further that if non-LEOs attempt to make a "citizen's arrest", not impersonating officers, the right to self-defence only applies if excessive force is used, or there is a reasonable fear of excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm or death. Basically the Plummer rule still applies. Also, all of this is a matter of state law, and while Plummer should be good law in most if not all states, the exact rule may vary by state. In 2012 a few US states retained the common-law rule that any unlawful arrest justified resistance, according to the Nolo page linked above. That may have changed, or may change when a case arises. The question does not specify a state, and a precise answer depends on the specific state.	You do have freedom of conscience but you do not have a blanket right to refuse work you were ordered to perform. You have to perform work you were ordered to perform. If you refuse, you can get an Abmahnung (disciplinary letter). A second Abmahmung would be grounds for firing. The Abmahnung is invalid if the work you refused would have been unreasonable – but you'd have to litigate this. Your freedom of conscience does affect what work you can be reasonably asked to perform. You have the burden of proof to show that the work would have been unreasonable. You are required to alert the employer in advance. If you took a job where you could reasonably have been expected to know that it might come into conflict with your conscience, you should have mentioned this during the interview. Taking the job anyway effectively waives your freedom of conscience. Of course this doesn't apply if your job changed after you were hired. If you successfully claim freedom of conscience, you are not entitled for pay for the work that you didn't perform. Here, your claim of freedom of conscience does not seem to stand on very strong footing. It is normal for web development to include analytics, ads, and social integrations (what you seem to call “trackers”). This is a bit like taking a job as a nurse and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to perform blood transfusions” or taking a job at a defense contractor and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to work on weapons”. Your personal conscience may be more strict than applicable laws, but don't forget that there are laws. You might reasonably see it as your professional obligation to alert stakeholders of their compliance obligations. You have a stronger case for refusing work than the difficult to prove “freedom of conscience” if the work you are asked to perform would be illegal. You'd have a stronger argument for exercising your freedom of conscience if your work would endanger users that live under oppressive governments.	This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list.
IP addresses in criminal cases Are IP addresses enough to convict someone of criminal activity? So for instance, if someone was using their home WiFi network, which would have one IP address, then they use their mobile network which would have another IP address, would this be all that’s needed to convict someone of criminal activity if there was no proof that it was them that committed it? Or are IP addresses not substantial enough?	It depends. If the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that noone else could use that IP address at that particular time then yes. But can it prove so? Maybe yes. Maybe not. Depends on the results of forensic examination of the device, network traffic, any other corroborating evidence etc.	Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences \| Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.	I interpret the sentence "intruder enters your home using the internet" in the question as not as physically entering the home but as virtually entering the home, in other words hacking into the victim's home network remotely. When that interpretation is incorrect, please comment. Note that an action can only be considered self-defense when the self-defense prevents a crime currently in progress from being completed. When A hacked into B's computer and then B punches A in the face later, that's not self-defense, that's illegal vigilante justice. The self-defense argument would only work if it actually prevents the completion of the crime. For example, if A and B were in the same room, A sees B hacking into A's computer right now and uses physical force to prevent B from completing the hack (like yanking the keyboard out of B's hands). Also keep in mind that the intensity of self-defense must be appropriate for the severity of the crime. What is and is not appropriate is for a court to decide in each individual case, and the guidelines that are to be applied vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But causing bodily harm to people when the crime they are committing does not cause bodily harm is often not considered within the limits of self-defense. For further information about what is and is not allowed in self-defense, I recommend the series about self-defense by Law Comic.	The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet.	Using Tor is not illegal. Nor is hiding your IP address, which is - among other things - what Tor does. Going to .onion links is not illegal. What you find and interact with at those .onion sites may be illegal. See Law StackExchange Is it legal to host a directory of .onion urls? Running a Tor Relay is not illegal. That could change. Running an Exit Relay could expose your IP address as the Relay, so that could lead investigators of illegal activity to you. Read https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en As always, check your state laws http://statelaws.findlaw.com/criminal-laws/computer-crimes.html And do your own research with the links above and at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(anonymity_network) and at https://www.torproject.org/	You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished.	That depends on several things: Do the authorities have solid evidence of what happened? Authorities in which country? A screenshot is not evidence, that would be easily faked. It takes access to the metadata. Does the country where the perpetrator lives consider it a serious crime? Note that when two people exchange such messages, who is the criminal and who is the victim can depend on the ages of both, and the exact rules of who is guilty of what may differ from country to country. There are countries which prosecute child abuse by their citizens or residents abroad once they come back. So it may be that nothing happens, or it may be prosecuted.	In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).
What is it called when someone suspects an outlawed behavior has been committed so asks for confessions? I am looking for a legal term in the case where a particular behavior is outlawed. The governing body suspects someone has conducted the behavior but has no proof. The governing body then addresses the population and says “we know who did said behavior, but we want to give that person a chance to come forward. If you come forward, your punishment will be reduced”. What is this called when the illusion of evidence prompts a confession?	In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).	The term doesn’t come up Because, AFAIK, there are no circumstances where being ignorant of the law allow a person to escape culpability. There are, however, laws that allow ignorance of the facts to be an excuse. For example, a person who receives stolen goods where it is reasonable to believe that they aren’t is not guilty of the crime (although the still don’t own the goods).	Most people would refer to this as "defense of others." In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as "Use of force in defense of person." The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used "against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force." Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim "is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law." This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was "lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties" when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable.	Identifying someone as a criminal without charging them and thereby giving them an opportunity to clear their names has due process implications, largely because of the associated reputational damage. DOJ policy therefore advises against naming unindicted co-conspirators: Ordinarily, there is no need to name a person as an unindicted co-conspirator in an indictment in order to fulfill any legitimate prosecutorial interest or duty. For purposes of indictment itself, it is sufficient, for example, to allege that the defendant conspired with "another person or persons known." In any indictment where an allegation that the defendant conspired with "another person or persons known" is insufficient, some other generic reference should be used, such as "Employee 1" or "Company 2". The use of non-generic descriptors, like a person's actual initials, is usually an unnecessarily-specific description and should not be used. The policy comes from a case where they did identify two unindicted (alleged) co-conspirators, and the Fifth Circuit ordered the expungement of the portions of the indictment that named them, agreeing with their claim that they had a right a due process right "to protect their reputations ... against the opprobrium resulting from being publicly and officially charged by an investigatory body of high dignity with having committed serious crimes." U.S. v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). At first blush, the description does seem to fall into the "unnecessarily specific" category, but note that the language doesn't actually say "Individual 1 became President in 2017," it says that Cohen's conduct occurred "in or about January 2017," and that Individual-1 had become President "at that point." So if the conduct occurred before noon on January 20, 2017, we'd be talking about President Obama. That's obviously hyper-technical, but we are talking about the Department of Justice here. Another possibility is that the success of the campaign/conspiracy may be necessary information for sentencing purposes. I'm not all that familiar with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but my understanding is that a sentence may be reduced if a defendant had withdrawn from a conspiracy in time to prevent its fulfillment. Because that did not happen here, Cohen would not be entitled to that reduction.	An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.)	england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.	The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.	This sounds like it would fall under the "extreme pornography" part of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Section 63: (7) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, any of the following— (b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal was real. (7A) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, either of the following— (b) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of a person's vagina or anus by another with a part of the other person's body or anything else, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real. What you describe would likely result in serious injury to the victim, and the video appears to be non-consensual. Note that the actual origin is not relevant; if the videos were actually a brilliant piece of special effects and no anuses were harmed that gets you nowhere. The only thing that matters is what a "reasonable person" looking at the videos would have thought. Context might make a difference; if the videos were made by an identifiable company then a reasonable person might assume the producers would have at least obtained consent and complied with their local laws about safety. OTOH if they look like they were filmed on someone's phone and downloaded from some sketchy file-sharing site then a jury is likely to see this as suggesting to the "reasonable person" that the acts shown were real and non-consensual. Edit in response to comment: The law in question says 'An image is “pornographic” if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal'. So it can still be porn even if it wasn't filmed consensually. If "pornography" could only refer to consensual images then the prosecution would need to obtain evidence of the consent or otherwise of the participants. This might be impossible if a participant is dead or cannot be identified. Also the definition above matches both the dictionary definition and most people's idea of what makes something "porn"; the point of porn is sexual arousal.
Criminal penalties in Portuguese law for rape? How long or short of a prison sentence can one get in Portugal for rape or domestic abuse?	The maximum sentence for any offense in Portugal is 25 years under Article 41 of the Penal Code of Portugal (PCC). Article 152 of the PCC provides that domestic violence is punishable by up to 5 years in prison. Articles 163-174 of the PCC set forth penalties for a variety of sex offenses (incidentally, "rapto" is a false friend in Portuguese which looked like "rape" in English but means "kidnapping" or more literally "abduction" in Portuguese). The most severe penalty available for any of these sex offenses (assuming it is not a aggravating factor of another crime with a more severe penalty like murder or kidnapping) is six years in prison. Most sex offenses in Portugal are punishable by not more than five years in prison. There are punishments in addition to imprisonment that can be imposed in many cases, but the question asks only about prison sentences. The minimum sentences are not meaningful because alternative sentencing options exist.	Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court.	If the police become aware of the domestic violence through you reporting it or otherwise the matter is entirely in their hands. They will decide if they want to prosecute or not.	It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."	This occurred in Hong Kong, so Hong Kong law applies here. Hong Kong law's definition of rape is explicitly male on female (nonconsensual male-male is covered by sodomy laws instead). It is impossible for her to be charged with rape. Assuming you were over 16 at the time, the only offence that could be possible is indecent assault. As far as I can tell, there is no statute of limitations. However, the chance of her being charged is basically zero.	It is constitutional to imprison a person for committing a crime, though I suspect that a life sentence for brawling would be held to be cruel and unusual punishment. It's rather hard to tell what punishments will be held to be cruel and unusual, but 2.5 years for involuntary manslaughter is not unusual. The crime of involuntary manslaughter in Massachusetts does not require any physical aiding. It is unlawful killing unintentionally caused by wanton and reckless conduct... Wanton and reckless conduct is intentional conduct that created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person.... It is conduct involving a grave risk of harm to another that a person undertakes with indifference to or disregard of the consequences of such conduct Whether conduct is wanton and reckless depends either on what the defendant knew or how a reasonable person would have acted knowing what the defendant knew The First Amendment does not give one carte blanche to say anything you want. There are a number of crimes and torts which involve saying something: threatening and extortion, bribing, fraud, incitement to riot, disturbing the peace, defamation, perjury and lying to a government official, and so on.	The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.	How does it conflate civil and criminal laws? It doesn't directly, but it criminalises a process that was until recently purely a civil matter. The so-called triple talaq bill - now enacted as the The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 - makes, at section 4, divorce by talaq a criminal offence: Any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq referred to in section 3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. However, all other modes of divorce, such as The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 for example, fall within the gamut of civil law.

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