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Can I publish a book with hashes of common passwords? The title says it all. There are already thousands of online websites where you input a character string, and it would output the MD5 hash (or other) or the password. I was wondering about the legality of publishing a book with the, lets say, 100 or 1000 most commonly used passwords, together with their hash values. Note that the book does not endorse/encourage password hacking in any way, it would just be a "hash table" of sorts, combining one kind of information with another. So would it be legal to publish such a book? | Yes (in most jurisdictions), but why should you? There might be some interests in publishing the 1,000 most common passwords, e.g. to support security awareness lectures (or to build rainbow tables for nefarious purposes), but anybody who wants to hash them with a specific algorithm can do so easily. It is probably easier to type the passwords from a printed book and to hash them on the computer than it is to type the hashed passwords -- bad passwords would tend to be easy to type. That being said, computer crime laws are generally lagging behind the state of the art, or they are overly broad, so it might be illegal in some places as a "hacking tool" ... | No, John may not lawfully publish such a book in such a way What John wants to do is not lawful. It would infringe on the copyright on both the 1940 original, and on the 1955 translation. Both of those are still in copyright under the laws of France, the UK, and the US. Someone owns those copyrights: some person or business or other entity. If the owner has no legal heirs, in most jurisdictions the property escheats to the government (in the US to the state government). In the case of a company, its assets will be sold or handed over to some entity. But they will not become ownerless, any more than real estate will become ownerless when the owner dies or the owning company is dissolved. It is possible that the owner does not realize that s/he owns these rights. But if John publishes his book, then owner might then realize the rights that s/he holds. The owner could demand payment, or sue for damages. Under US law the damages could include any economic loss that the owner has incurred plus any profits that John or his publisher have made. John and his publisher would both be liable for these damages. As a result, no publisher is likely to be willing to publish John's book. If John self-publishers, he incurs the risk of such demands and suit. In some countries (such as the UK) there are legal procedures fore dealing with such "orphan works". In those countries one can register with a government agency, and obtain permission to use the work after a search has revealed no owner, paying a rate set by law. But there is no such provision in the US. There, John must either not publish, or gamble that no owner will appear and make demands he cannot afford to meet. | Under US law, words of a language are facts, which are not protected by copyright. Only creative expressions are protected. There are various aspects of a dictionary which are capable of protection, such as the pairing of a word and a translation, the organization of an entry (headword, POS information, the structure of sets of entries according to a grammatical analysis as in an Arabic dictionary). The order of presentation of the words could be protected (relevant for languages with complex morphology where words are grouped according to roots, rather than strict alphabetization). Finally, the criteria of selection for inclusion might involve a smidgen of creativity, but there is no creativity involved in publishing "all of the words that I collected". | The author of the book may have a copyright, because he created a new piece of work from the/a original work. For example, by translating it in another language or in a modernized language, by rearranging the content, by adding images or commentaries etc. You will therefore have to find a book or other source that is not or not anymore copyrighted. | Yes That is very simple - copyright is an exclusive right that starts automatically with the creation of a copyrightable work. The default situation is that the author has an exclusive rights to make copies of the work and derivative works. If the code is published somewhere by the author but the author has not said anything about its licence or copyrights, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. They have the right to just publish it somewhere, others don't. If you try to contact the author and they don't say anything and ignore you, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. If it's impossible to find the author (e.g. I have certain cases with literary works where it's not clear who inherited the rights after the author died), then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. That being said, certain forms of reuse (recreating ideas, learning from them, etc) would not be a copyright violation. But in general the situation with the author not saying anything is almost the same as the author explicitly stating "all rights reserved, you're not allowed to do anything, violators will be shot" - some specific uses are allowed even against author's wishes (e.g. 'fair use' clauses) but everything that needs their permission really does need their explicit permission. | Yes, except for the part where you say "thus". Copyright protection isn't limited to published works, though in the past this was the case with US law. Current US law defines publication as the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. Web distribution is one way to distribute a protected work. The distinction between published and unpublished works matters in terms of registration requirements, it figures into the question of the nationality of the author, the duration of protection for a work for hire and (pseudo)anonymous works, as well as the duration of protection for works created before January 1, 1978 but first published between then and January 1, 2003, and so on. The US Copyright office provides guidance that derives from court cases, and they have this to say about published vs. unpublished. They give as an example of publication ("Offering to Distribute Copies or Phonorecords to a Group of Persons") Publication occurs when copies of a photograph are offered to clients, including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, agencies, wire services, and websites with a license permitting further distribution or display of the photograph. also An offer by the copyright owner on a public website to purchase and download an app that they developed and made accessible on that website constitutes publication of that app. German copyright law makes mention of "publication" as well, for instance The right of publication and of exploitation of the work accrues jointly to the joint authors; alterations to the work shall be permissible only with the consent of the joint authors. However, a joint author may not refuse his consent to publication, exploitation or alteration contrary to the principles of good faith. Each joint author shall be entitled to assert claims arising from violations of the joint copyright; he may, however, demand performance only to all of the joint authors. §6 says that (1) A work shall be deemed to have been published when it has been made available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. (2) A work shall be deemed to have been released when copies of the work have been offered, with the rightholder’s consent, to the public or brought to the market after their production in sufficient quantity. An artistic work shall also be deemed to have been released when the original or a copy of the work has been made permanently available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. One would have to inquire into the specifics of German law to know if "putting one copy on a website" constitutes being brought to the market after production in sufficient quantity. | Copyright includes authorization of derivative works such as translations, so you must have permission of the copyright holder to create a translation. You could be sued for creating the unauthorized translation for your friend. If you attempt to further distribute the book, the chances of getting sued increase substantially. That path probably includes your legal obligation to foot the bill for the publisher and distributor having to defend themselves in court, since your contract with the publisher or distributor probably includes an indemnification clause saying that you indemnify them (pay their costs) against damages for your infringement. So your are at risk, and it increases if you do anything to distribute the translation. | You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data. |
Is it legally permitted to quote from legally restricted materials in US? Is it legally permitted to quote from legally restricted materials in US? Let’s say, US government banned/censored a site or book X legally. Now if I refer/quote something in my writings, blogs, sites, books, articles etc. referring to X, is there any legal issue? For example, if one publishes an article quoting from one of the censored books, can they be legally charged? | Overview Under Near v. Minnesota it is very hard to "legally restrict" any publication in the US. The "Banned books" linked to in the question have, in some cases, been removed from particular school curricula or from library collections. A few have been challenged as obscene, but none of them are unavailable to the general public at this time. A work can be "legally banned" or "legally restricted" under US law for only a few reasons: Security A work that is actually classified cannot be lawfully distributed. However, referring to it or quoting from it would be legal unless the quoted content includes actual classified information. A problem with this is that one often does not know just what aspects of a document are in fact classified, short of asking the government. In many cases the restrictions on distributing classified material apply only to those who have accepted a security clearance or otherwise agreed to be bound by the classification system. However under the Espionage Act and the Atomic Energy act, and perhaps other laws, in some cases people who never accepted a clearance may be enjoined from disclosure, or possibly held criminally liable. This was challenged in United States v. Progressive, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (The "H-bomb Secret" case). But that case was dropped as moot when the information was published by others, and the DoE announced that they would not prosecute anyone involved. No final binding decision on the issues was made. A\n attempt to enjoin publication of classified information was famously overturns in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers" case). In that case the material sought to be classified was historical, not of current operational importance. Obscenity A work found obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) is illegal to distribute. But it is legal to refer to such a book. It is legal to quote it, unless the quoted section is itself obscene under Miller. Note that content will not be found obscene under Miller unless it violates a specific law, usually a state law. Unless there is such a law, a prosecution does not pass the Miller test. This means that generalized laws such as "disturbing the peace" cannot be used to punish allegedly obscene content. Laws may prohibit content not obscene under Miller from being knowingly provided to minors, or shown in movie theaters under ratings which would permit minors to enter. A work containing child pornography is unlawful to create, distribute, or possess under 18 U.S.C. §2251 and subsequent sections. Quoting a part that includes child pornography as defined under those laws would be equally illegal, but quoting a part that does not include such content would not. Referring to such a book would not be illegal. Note that in the US only actual images of real children constitute child pornography. Drawings or computer images not based on any real child, and text, may not be banned under these laws. In some other countries, such content may be highly illegal. Defamation Republishing a work found to be defamatory would in many cases be defamation also, and could give rise to a successful lawsuit, but it is not a crime. A quote that did not include any of the defamatory statements would be lawful. A quote that did include defamatory statements may be protected under some circumstances, such as news reporting of the court case. It is lawful to refer to such a work. Criminal Libel Criminal libel was once common, but prosecutions for it are now very rare. According to the ACLU: Twenty-four states have laws that make it a crime to publicly say mean things about people, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. These laws violate the First Amendment and are disproportionately used against people who criticize public officials or government employees. The ACLU has filed a lawsuit challenging the law in New Hampshire. According to Wikipedia: Criminal libel is rarely prosecuted but exists on the books in many states, and is constitutionally permitted in circumstances essentially identical to those where civil libel liability is constitutional. According to The First Amendment Encyclopedia's article: Although libel or defamation is now primarily a civil claim, it once was primarily a criminal offense, prosecuted by the government and punishable by imprisonment or a fine. In the United States, courts have based decisions regarding slanderous or libelous statements on the First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of the press. ... There was also a growing sentiment against criminal libel, which led the drafters of the 1962 American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code specifically to exclude the crime of criminal defamation. ... [The US Supreme] Court ruled, in Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), that truth must be an absolute defense to criminal libel. The Court also held that the actual malice requirement in Sullivan applied to criminal libel prosecutions stemming from statements about public officials ... The Court’s most recent ruling regarding criminal libel was Ashton v. Kentucky (1966), which held that Kentucky’s unwritten, common law crime of libel was too indefinite and uncertain to be prosecuted. This ruling effectively eliminated common law criminal libel. In short, while criminal libel still exists in the US it is of very limited importance and rare occurrence. referring to a document publishing a criminal libel is not an offense. Quoting such a document could be an offense if the quotation includes the allegedly libelous statement(s). Copyright Infringement Distributing unauthorized copies of a work, or copies of an unauthorized derivative work, may be copyright infringement and be grounds or a successful infringement suit. Referring to such a work is lawful. Linking to an infringing work may in some cases be held to be contributory infringement. Quoting from such a work will in most cases be lawful, unless the quotation itself constitutes infringement. Quoting an excessive amount may itself be infringement. Note that a valid defense of fair use may mean that distributing copyrighted content is lawful, so that a suit will not succeed. Fair use issues are highly fact-driven, and no clear bright line can be drawn between what is and is not permitted. This seems to be by legislative intent. Fair use was originally a judge-made doctrine, incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976. Note also that copyright infringement is usually a civil matter, so that if the copyright holder does not file suit, there is no enforcement. Only in willful bulk commercial infringement are criminal charges brought. Trade Secrets It is unlawful to publish, distribute, or use a trade secret to which one has gained improper access. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), specifically section 1.4: "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. "Improper means" of learning a trade secret (under the USTA, sec 1.1) include: theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. "Proper means" include: discovery by independent invention, reverse engineering, licensing arrangement, and published literature. The 2016 US Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1836) and the earlier US Economic Espionage Act of 1996 offer protection to trade secrets on a federal level. Note that like copyright, violation of a trade secret is a civil matter, not a crime. If the owner of a trade secret does not file a suit or take other legal action, there is no enforcement. It is not unlawful to refer to a trade secret or a document that discloses one. It is not unlawful to disclose a trade secret that has already become public knowledge, although an actual document may well be protected by copyright. Conclusion Simply referring to a work is almost never unlawful. Quoting from a work that is actually legally restricted will generally only be unlawful if the quoted content alone violates the same law or is on its own the same tort. | Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question. | No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract. | Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use. | The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details. | I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.) | There is no special exemption where academic work is unprotected by copyright. You can quote from academic sources to the same extent that you can copy from non-academic sources, without getting permission. In fact, it is legally impossible to tell if a source of "academic" versus "non-academic". Attribution is not particularly relevant for copyright, what matters is permission (when required). It may be that a copyright holder will grant permission for an extensive quote provided you attribute the source, and it may be that academic publishers or authors are more willing to grant permission than other publishers / authors. On the other hand, many academic works are very expensive, so that distributing the text for free may have more "effect on market", and may result in disinclination to grant permission to quote. On the third hand, such quotes are more likely to be squarely directed at the "commentary" motivation behind fair use law. The point here is that there isn't a special law about just academic sources. | Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do. |
Copyright in Origami I'm trying to find any US case law addressing the issue of copyright in origami patterns. Copyright itself does not protect functionality, methods, processes, etc.; and the merger doctrine of copyright law would not allow protection of the expression of an origami pattern if there are only a limited number of patterns to create a particular resultant origami sculpture. That being said, many origami creators claim copyright in their work and books on origami have been registered with the US Copyright Office (although the protection of such registration may only extend to the protectable elements of such book, i.e. the text, photographs, compilation of articles, etc.). However, I cannot find a single case that addresses the issue of copyrightability of origami. Any citations or suggestions? | The resulting figure could surely be covered by copyright, if it is original. A new set of folds to make a known figure might not be separately protectable under US law. In this news story A court in Japan is said to have held that: the folding instructions are indeed a copyrightable subject matter, because (i) the author’s selection of 10 out of 32 folding steps were subject to alternative modes of expression; (ii) the author’s folding instructions, including the organization of the diagrams, the texts, and the drawings, had elements of “style”; (iii) taken in its entirety, one admittedly found room for creative expression (Tokyo District Court Opinion: Case No. Heisei 23 (2011) (Wa) 18968 (Tokyo D.Ct., May 20, 2011). But it further held that the particular diagram displayed was not an infringement of the claimed source. In this tech dirt podcast a suit over an artwork derived from a folding pattern is reported. Tech dirt thinks it is an obvious case of fair use. The British Origami society says: The issue of how the laws of copyright affect origami diagrams and models is an important one. Groups such as the Origami Artists and Creators are working towards an internationally agreed set of guidelines. Dr. Robert Lang has presented his interpretation on his website. Until a common statement is agreed, we refer people to the terms in our constitution. (1) The Society and its Members shall respect all copyrights, registered trademarks and registered designs in all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings and shall observe the laws of copyright, registered trademarks, registered designs and patents and all other provisions relating to intellectual property which are applicable in all the separate countries throughout the World. (2) This article shall apply to all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings whether existing in writing or print on paper or any other hard copy or existing in electronic form, photocopy or microfiche in libraries, public or private archives or on the internet or on recorded discs or tapes of any kind or in any other kind of electronic record and whether made commercially or otherwise publicly or made privately. (3) Before reproducing any model, drawing, photograph or text contained in any publication, a member of the Society shall obtain the consent of the copyright owner before publication. (4) As a matter of courtesy, whether or not required to do so by law, the Society and its Members shall give proper acknowledgement to the original author of any model, design or diagram demonstrated or reproduced in any manner. Origami USA says that: OrigamiUSA is very concerned about protecting and respecting the rights of origami artists, authors, and diagrammers. While "traditional" origami models are in the public domain, the vast majority of published origami designs are of recent authorship and therefore cannot be published or used commercially without obtaining permission from their creators and/or diagrammers. It seems that few suits on origami copyright have been filed, and then appealed to where opinions are published and thus accessible to a non-professional's search. | You are in effect asking if this is a case of Fair use, an important US-specific legal concept in copyright law. Please review this question for an overview of fair use. See also This statement from the US copyright office Deciding whether a use is a fair use is always a fact-driven, case-by-case, process. No one ever knows for sure if a use is a fair use unless that specific use is challenged in court as infringement, and the fair use defense is raised and sustained or not. Courts evaluate fair use claims on a case-by-case basis, and the outcome of any given case depends on a fact-specific inquiry. This means that there is no formula to ensure that a predetermined percentage or amount of a work—or specific number of words, lines, pages, copies—may be used without permission. ("More Information on Fair Use" -US Copyright office) Factors Let's look at the fair-use factors in the case of this photo: Purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes: The use is apparently for clearly commercial purpose. This tends to weigh against fair use, but does not rule it out. Then the is the question of whether the use is transformative. The background image apparently serves its original decorative purpose. Whether making it part of an ad is transformative might be debated. Nature of the copyrighted work: The graffiti is an artistic and creative work, not a work of non-fiction or news reporting or factual information. This also tends to weigh against fair use. Amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: It seems that almost all of the work of graffiti, or at least a significant part of it, is being used. This tends to weigh against fair use to some degree. moreover, the work of graffiti is quite prominent in the background of the work, which ,means it makes a significant contribution to the final work, which also weighs against fair use. Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: If the work of graffiti is currently being marketed, the question does not say so, and i would suppose that it isn't. There could be a potential market: the artist could make photos or prints of the work and market them, for example. Even so, this image probably wouldn't affect such a market much. This factor probably inclines towards fair use, but it is hard to say just how a court would asses it. Case law In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) A poster of a “church quilt” was used in the background of a television series for 27 seconds. This was held not to be fair use. The court was influenced by the prominence of the poster, its thematic importance for the set decoration of a church, and the fact that it was a conventional practice to license such works for use in television programs. This case seems particularly close to the one in the question. In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) posters of Grateful Dead concerts were reproduced in a book. This was held to be fair use. The reduced size of the images, and their appearance in the context of a timeline were considered significant. In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) A modified photo of a Wisconsin mayor was reproduced on a Tshirt and used to raise money for an event. the photo was posterized, background removed, text added, and a lime green outline featuring the mayor’s smile remained. The resulting image of the mayor, the court stated, “can’t be copyrighted.” Defendants removed so much of the original that, as with the Cheshire Cat, only the smile remains. Defendants started with a low-resolution version posted on the City’s website, so much of the original’s detail never had a chance to reach the copy; the original’s background is gone; its colors and shading are gone; the expression in Soglin’s eyes can no longer be read; after the posterization (and reproduction by silk-screening), the effect of the lighting in the original is almost extinguished. What is left, besides a hint of Soglin’s smile, is the outline of his face, which can’t be copyrighted. (I take this to mean that the elements actually copied do not have enough original content to be a copyrightable wqrk.) In Kelly v. Arriba-Soft, 336 F.3d. 811 (9th Cir. 2003) use of thumbnail images in search engine results was held to be fair use. The reduced size and image quality were significant to the court. So was the transformative use of the images to help identify and index the pages. Conclusion This is not a clear-cut case, in my view, but the case for fair use does not seem strong to me. Copyright protection of Unauthorized Graffiti A number of comments and some other answers have raised the question of whether graffiti made without the permission of the owner or tenant of the location, and therefore illegally, are entitled to copyright protection. The first thing to say is that there is nothing in 17 USC (the US copyright law) that conditions copyright protection on the legality of the work, or of its publication. Case law on this precise issue is not easy to find, nor does there seem to be much of it. IPWatchDog's "Preventing a Graffiti Copyright Infringement Lawsuit" (2018) says: Several high-profile companies, American Apparel, Coach, American Eagle Outfitters and H&M who shot advertisements in public spaces, have found themselves inadvertently in the midst of such legal disputes with street artists. Even though an advertiser may have had permission from the property owners, even though the “artwork” was unsanctioned and unsigned or “tagged,” the graffiti artists have come forward after the ads were already in circulation, identified themselves and sought compensation and damages. It goes on to say that: These cases tend to be settled out of court, because regardless of the merit of an infringement claim, they are costly to defend and the unwarranted negative publicity can injure a company’s reputation. ... Also, from a legal standpoint, the question of whether the copyrights of illegally created street art are valid has not yet been determined – so there would be some element of doubt as to how a litigation would be decided. *The Atlantic's article "Can Graffiti Be Copyrighted?" about the case of graffiti artist David Anasagasti's case against American Eagle Outfitters for use of his work (and several other similar suits) quotes Philippa Loengard, assistant director of Columbia Law School’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media, and the Arts as saying: Given what I know of the case, this is one of the most blatant examples of copyright infringement None of the suits mentioned in the story seem to have resulted in a court decision as yet. In Falkner v. General Motors Company, the trial judge held that the art was not "part of" the building and thus the exemption for photos of architectural works under 17 USC 120 does not apply. However it denied plaintiff’s DMCA claim and his claim for punitive damages. The court held that: because the facts in the record tend to establish—if anything—the lack of a relevant connection between the mural and the parking garage, the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that the mural is part of an architectural work under Section 102(a)(8). Thus, it cannot reach the issue of whether Section 120(a) applies to the mural to permit photographs of the mural. In an article in the N.Y.U. Journal of IP & Entertainment Law "Protecting Artistic Vandalism" author Celia Lerman argues that copyright should protect unauthorized, illegal graffiti art. This article notes that: Graffiti pieces increasingly attract the attention of numerous collectors, gallery owners, publishers, filmmakers, and journalists. Pieces from famous graffiti artists have sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars in the art market. Graffiti pieces have even been given as diplomatic gifts. Galleries are seeing record attendance at exhibitions of graffiti works, and publishers have generated a boom of photographic books on graffiti and street art. (citations omitted) The article notes that Tattooed Walls a book by Peter Rosenstein about NYC Graffiti, reproduced images of many works of graffiti without permisison, the author believed that these were fair use because they were posted in public places. Several artist sued, a settlement was agreed to, and the book was withdrawn from publication. The article mentions a suit against Tony Hawk’s Pro Skater 2 Official Strategy Guide, by the author of a work of graffiti which was reproduced. The suit was initially dismissed for lack of copyright registration, but the court said that it “assumed, without deciding, that the work is copyrightable.” When the suit was refiled after registration, a motion to dismiss was denied, and the parties then settled, so there was no court decision on the merits. Other simialtr cases are mentioned. The article goes on to analyze the law and the purposes that copyright law serves, and give reasons why such works should be protected. But none of this cites an actual case where an illegal graffito has been held protected. The Falkner case will not produce such a ruling, because the art in that case was authorized, indeed invited, by the building owner. | Copyright law is a country-by-country matter. Most countries are signatories to the Berne Convention, which provides a common framework, but there are still variations, generally in the duration of copyright or the definition of copyrightable material. According to the Hirtle chart, a video game that was first published in Europe in the year 2000 and subsequently published in the United States is still copyrighted in both the United States and whichever European countries it was published in. It is likely to be a work of corporate authorship, so the US copyright will expire on January 1, 2096 (unless a law extending the duration is passed). In the United States, the requirement to register a copyright was eliminated in 1989 as part of the Berne Convention Implementation Act; registration still provides benefits when filing a copyright-infringement lawsuit. Most European countries eliminated their registration requirements much earlier, if they had them at all: the Berne Convention dates from 1887. Copyright does not simply cease to exist when the owner does, or if the owner cannot be determined. The difficulty of tracking down copyright holders for old or little-known works is the driving force behind orphaned works legislation. There are no orphaned works laws in the United States, and since copyright is country-by-country, European laws won't help you if you're interested in publishing in the US. In order to track down the copyright holder, you'll need to figure out who originally held the copyright (probably the publisher, but it could be either development company, or both, or the game might be a collective work of the individuals who worked on it). If it was a work of corporate authorship, and none of the game-copyright sales mention it, copyright will have been transfered when the company owning the copyright was sold (as part of a general "and all intellectual property" clause). | This topic came up as a sub-point to another question a few weeks ago, I ended up doing a fair bit of research with not much in terms of concrete results. I'll start with the USA since they're basically the only major copyright jurisdiction for which I could find a straightforward answer, then discuss internationally. USA In the USA, Bob would generally not hold copyright in modifications thus there is no copyright for Alice to violate, assuming no copyright exceptions like fair use apply. This is due to 17 U.S.C 103(a) (see also Anderson v. Stallone): The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. While I couldn't find any commentary on this point, the wording does seem to imply that portions of a derivative with additions far enough removed from the original work might qualify for copyright protection. International copyright law The main provisions governing derivative works in international copyright law come from Berne Convention Article 2(3): Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. and Article 12 (with a similar provision specifically for translation in Article 8): Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works. There's the argument that since unauthorized derivatives aren't explicitly excluded from protection that they should be protected, however, there's also the argument that granting unauthorized derivatives their own copyright is in itself prejudicial to the original copyright holder. Note I don't think it's debated that non-infringing derivatives gain their own copyright, including unauthorized derivatives that nevertheless fall into a copyright exception such as fair use. Dr. Daniel Gervais points out in The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than Hedgehogs section III.B that there's a bit of history here. The original Berne Convention 1886 text stated that "Lawful translations shall be protected as original works." However, the word "lawful" was struck out in the 1908 Berlin Convention coming up with wording similar to today's Article 2(3). Gervais's article cites Étude sur la Convention de Berlin de 1908 pour la Protection des Œuvres Littéraires et artistiques by André Petit implying disagreement between the countries about whether or not to protect unlawful derivatives, thus leaving it unsaid. Unfortunately, I'm unable to locate any copies of this source. Additionally, thanks to a fortunate snippet Google Books displayed, I know that La conférence de Berlin (14 octobre-13 novembre 1908) by Georges-François-Joseph Martin also discusses this exact point on page 187, quoting someone who thought unlawful derivatives would be protected now, though I couldn't get enough context to really determine anything. While I could find available copies of this book, for now it's a little on the expensive side for me. Overview of various jurisdictions In the EU, the derivative right is not harmonized and so the question is punted to the Member States. There is no implementation of either Berne Convention Article 2(3) or Article 12 in the Information Society (Copyright) Directive, Article 12 being specifically acknowledged by the Court of Justice in the Allposters case. In the UK, infringing derivatives are probably protected, see Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co. Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 109 (Q.B. Div.) at 120. I can't find the judgement text outside a paywall, but an article by William J. Braithwaite (PDF) quotes the relevant part on page 209 (the square brackets are his): [T]he idea that [the owner of the underlying copyright] should be entitled to reap the benefit of another's original work, by exploiting it, however extensive such work might be, however innocently it might have been made, offends against justice and common sense. Additionally, the justice noted the argument that unlawful derivatives are not explicitly excluded from copyright protection and that parliament has declined to make this explicit. If I understand the English court system correctly, this decision was two appeals away from the Supreme Court (House of Lords back then), but there doesn't appear to have been any appeal. For what it's worth though, the justice who issued the decision ultimately became Senior Law Lord. In Italy, the Supreme Court has determined that derivative works can be simultaneously infringing and protected. | Words cannot be copyrighted. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, or short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive or lends itself to a play on words, it cannot be protected by copyright. The only intellectual property protection that might be afforded to such things is trademark. | It is important to distinguish between a typeface, which describes the visual appearance, a font, which may be interpreted as a computer program implementing a typeface, and the name of the font. These aspects may be subject to different immaterial rights. The name may be subject to trademarks. The font may be copyrighted. The typeface may be protected by copyrights or design patents, highly dependent on the kind of typeface and on the relevant jurisdiction. A copyright for typefaces is not generally desirable, because this copyright would extend to all documents set in that typeface. Therefore, the U.S. doesn't acknowledge copyright for typefaces. Germany distinguishes between artistic typefaces (eligible for copyright) and utility typefaces (not eligible). If a typeface is not protected, it is possible to create a new font under a different name that implements the same typeface. This is an extremely common practice. E.g. the popular Helvetica font was cloned multiple times. Arial is heavily based on Helvetica but differs in a few details. Arial was in turn cloned as Liberation Sans. The TeX Gyre Heros font is closely based on Helvetica. | copyright.gov is the oficial site of the US Copyriuht office, and is here quoting 17 USC 102(b) which is the actual copyright law. Under it, copyright protection extends to expression, but not to any idea, etc. However, these are not in conflict, because using information or ideas from a work to create a new and original work is not "duplication or use of images, diagrams, or text, or other electronic or printed publications" so Site A is also correct. However, a close paraphrase where the words are changed but the sentence and paragraph structure of a text is followed, presenting the same ideas in the same order in sentences of the same structure in the same order, may constitute a derivative work, and thus a copyright infringement. Wikipedia describes "close paraphrase" as: "... the superficial modification of material from another source." It goes on to give an example: Facts and ideas cannot be protected by copyright, but creative expression is protected. The test of creativity is minimal. Hilaire Belloc's 1897 More Beasts: (for Worse Children) illustrates creative expression in his description of a llama: The Llama is a woolly sort of fleecy hairy goat, with an indolent expression and an undulating throat; like an unsuccessful literary man. If this somewhat dubious source was used for the article on llamas and was still protected by copyright, it would be acceptable to say that the llama is an animal with a shaggy coat, and perhaps that it has a long neck. These are facts. But use of the phrases "indolent expression" and "undulating throat" might violate copyright. The original choice of words is part of Belloc's creative expression. Going further, the simile "like an unsuccessful literary man" is also creative, and is also protected. A clumsy paraphrase like "resembling a failed writer" might violate copyright even though the words are entirely different. More than the facts have been copied. So when the question reads: am I allowed to take the facts and information from Site A and use it on my own site? There answer is: "Yes, but the rewriting must be more than superficial, A mere substitution o synonyms will not do, the expressive structure must also be rewritten." However, if the expressive structure is simply a list of facts in an obvious order, such as alphabetical or chronological there is no copyright at all on either the words or the structure. see Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) edit The scenario added by edit looks reasonable. In this case it would seem that the operator of "my site" has probably not infringed the copyright on "Site A". | Ideas are not subject to copyright protection. See 17 USC 102: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work If you want protection, keep your ideas to yourself and create a concrete expression in the form of a program, which is protected by copyright. |
Possible legal steps for psychological damage caused by a company A friend of mine studies at an American university in the UAE. Recently, he was literally escorted out of the campus building on the premise that it was winter break. It is a common notion that the university remains closed during the winter break, but he is a full-time student and was on the campus for more than 24 hours. The university is heavily guarded and is always monitored by a Public Safety department which is actually run by a multinational security corporation (originally based in the US). The presence of my friend was already known and he has been a student for more than 3 years. He was working on a project, and is a kind of person who gets lost very easily in work. First night, he crashed in during the night because he lives in a far away city (in his case, Dubai) and continued working on his project the next day as well. The university is a very student-focused Liberal Arts university, and he was in no way ready for what was to happen. While he was working in one of the labs which is usually 24x7 for student use, two security guards approached him and asked him to leave the campus immediately. The demeanor of the guards was very rough and they kicked out this student and asked him actually to leave the campus (entirely) at around midnight. Now, my friend is literally left devastated by this act which they carried out on him at midnight. He now hates his university and is scared of the Public Safety officers (who are supposed to protect him). He immediately wrote to them asking what the actual protocol was for some student who would come to campus during a break, but hasn't received a response since (almost ten days now). Can he sue the company managing the Public Safety department (for the psychological damage he received)? He has witnesses, including me. On what grounds can he file a case? EDIT: The university is a residential education-based university that means students live there 24x7 except during the break, and during that time only the housing is shut but all the other major facilities are accessible. So all the places my friend accessed were done so using his university issued RFID-based ID card. So far, the Public Safety department has not given any official reply to his question about what the actual protocol is. It seems that there was no such protocol to deal with such a case in the first place but the security officers on duty that night just did it on a whim. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. | There isn't a general answer to this question. It needs to be evaluated incident and sub-incident act by sub-incident act. The use of force is legally permitted to prevent harm to others and to the property of others under some circumstances. Citizens arrests are permitted under some circumstances, but generally, the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the crime while it is in the process of being committed. Some laws prohibit wearing masks under some circumstances, but usually not in all circumstances. Your client's "business model" is not consistent with being able to testify in court, so the criminal justice system will only be able to convict someone whom your client delivers to police if they can do so without your testimony. As a general rule, the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence collected by private parties or to statements obtained by private parties that are not made under duress that are not Mirandized. But, if your client is effectively "deputized" or becomes a "de facto" agent of the state who is called up to be a member of a posse for the police, for example, by using an agreed symbol such as shining a light with a symbol on it on some clouds, at that point, with respect to that matter, the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda probably do apply to evidence that your client obtains, and exclusion of that kind of evidence could make prosecution much more difficult, unless the prosecution can successfully make an argument that the other evidence that the illegally obtained evidence leads them to is not "fruit of the poisonous tree" because it would have inevitably been discovered in due course using only the legally obtained evidence. Even if your client does violate the law, law enforcement is not obligated to investigate his alleged crimes even if the victims complain, and prosecutors are not obligated to prosecute those crimes, even if they have overwhelming evidence of guilt which they could use to secure a conviction. Prosecutorial discretion is basically absolute. Your client might be sued civilly for operating a corrupt enterprise under RICO, for various intentional torts, and for negligence, by people who think that they have been harmed by his conduct, but someone can only sue your client if they can figure out who he is and serve him with civil process. If you are helping your client conduct on ongoing criminal enterprise, whether or not the crimes are prosecuted by the criminal justice system, the attorney-client privilege you have with your client is probably forfeit should you be placed under a subpoena and your may be violating other ethical rules. But, of course, somebody has to figure out that you are part of this criminal enterprise before you suffer any consequences for being involved. | I would imagine that it is a profession that is extremely taxing on ones mental health. True. Lawyers defend many genuine criminals who, after being freed, would go on to continue to commit terrible criminal acts. This is not a significant reason that the profession is taxing on mental health. Indeed, the pretty much complete consensus of the criminal defense bar is that providing a defense to people who are factually innocent of any crime is much more taxing on mental health than providing a defense to people who are factually guilty of some crime. You deeply misunderstand the nature of criminal defense work (which isn't uncommon), and in particular, the things about being a lawyer that make it stressful and that can cause mental distress. Day to day work as a criminal defense lawyer is psychologically, for the most part, more like being a car salesman who is constantly haggling over prices and making deals, day in and day out, than it is a major moral dilemma. That being said, I assume that Larry the lawyer, after successfully defending someone, can't just go to his therapist Theodore and blab "I feel like I just let a murderer go", no matter how important it is for Larry's mental health. Without addressing the issue of whether privileges material can be revealed to someone who is subject to another privilege (which is a tricky legal issue to analyze),it is entirely possible to engage in fruitful psychotherapy without revealing attorney-client privileged material. In part, this is because the things that you think that lawyers find to be the source of their mental health worries aren't what actually is the source of those worries. One thing that is desirable, however, about practicing in a law firm rather than as a sole practitioner without associate attorneys or staff, is that it does provide someone with whom you can readily and on a daily basis discuss attorney-client privileged matters related to your work. This isn't mostly a mental health thing per se. It isn't that you provide psychotherapy to your colleagues. But, some people process the details of their work life better when they can talk through it with a fellow professional and the process of reaffirming and challenging your own professional judgments. This can bring you a general mental clarity about your work that helps to overcome a "lack of bandwidth" feeling that can lead to mental stress. More generally, practicing law outside of a law firm without professional colleagues is simply lonely, which is a mental health stressor in its own way. | Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement. | I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state. | Entrapment is when a law-enforcement organization, or other parts of a government working with an LEO, entice a person to violate a law, and then prosecute the person for that violation, usually arresting the person first. Note that this definition of "entrapment" is US-specific, and does not apply in all other countries, perhaps not in any other county. But then, the question is tagged for California. As the school presumably does not intend any criminal prosecution, these actions are not legally entrapment, even if they are morally similar. Entrapment is not itself illegal even when it leads to criminal charges. That is to say, the police and prosecutor cannot be charged criminally for engaging in entrapment, nor sued for money damages by the person entrapped. However, entrapment can be a defense. If a person charged with crime can show that the crime only occurred because of entrapment, that will generally be grounds for acquittal. In addition, many people consider entrapment to be morally and ethically wrong. Generally, for a situation to be entrapment legally, a person must not only have an opportunity to break a law, but must be actively persuaded or enticed to do so, and the idea must come from the entrapper. However, the question says that the school "has a strict policy against using social media during school time". If the students retain the laptops outside of school hours (as they may well do) it might be fine with the school to use social media during those times, so perhaps school authorities don't think a blocker is needed. In any case there is no legal requirement for the school to install a social media blocking program, even if use of the school-issued laptops to access social media is against school rules at all times. A parent could install a blocker, unless school rules for use of the laptops prohibit doing so. Of course, in later life, people will almost surely encounter situations where they could do something unlawful or forbidden, but should not. An employer might provide access to computers, but forbid using them to access porn, even though no blocking software is in place. It is also not a bad idea to check school-issued laptops for possible privacy violations. There have been cases where school IT departments or contractors routinely activated built-in web-cams, ostensibly as an anti-theft measure, but in fact observing private situations, including inside the student's home. | From the sound of it, you have stated that you gained access to school data, possibly including private information about other students, professors, schedules, grades, disciplinary information, financial tuition or salary info, etc., that you were not authorized to have. The question of whether it was properly secured is rather beside the point. The school will now need to know the precise scope of your snooping: whether you were able to modify any information (i.e. change grades), what purpose to your snooping, etc. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing |
How do you determine who has the best claim to lost and hidden objects? This is a question that relates to the nature of the land -- property law. How do you determine who has a claim over an object they found and in which situations would they have a claim? Say, person A was invited to person B's house so they could dine together. Person A found a £60 note in front of person B's house. Person A also found a £20 note on person B's doorstep and another in person B's kitchen. None of these were the property of person B, originally. Who, in this case, would have the best claim to the property found? Why? | The owner has the best claim The finder of lost property must: Hand it to the venue owner who will make reasonable efforts to find the owner. Hand it to police if it is a type of lost property police will accept - cash is such a type who will make reasonable efforts to find the owner Make reasonable efforts to find the owner. If, after a reasonable time the owner can’t be found, the person with custody may treat it as their own. | What determines whether a mistake is fundamental and ownership passes? Short answer: When the facts show it is a blatantly obvious error. For example: I park my car on my neighbour's driveway by mistake (maybe at night in a driving blizzard). Although my neighbour possesses the car as it's on his land, ownership does not pass to him as it's an obvious error on my part. If he treats the car as his own (i.e., dishonestly appropriates) then he may be guilty of theft. Long answer: The word "fundamental" does not appear in the cited legislation, but has been introduced by the courts to mean something akin to being crucial, pivotal or critical to, for example, a contract - which can be mapped across to the OP's theft scenarios with a similar meaning. Here are some examples of when a fundamental mistake has, or may be, considered by the courts (with thanks to Law Teacher lectures) In Strickland v Turner (1852) 7 Ex 208 Strickland took out an insurance policy on the life of Turner but, unbeknownst to him and the insurance company, Turner was already dead. Strickland sued for the return of his premium payments, and it was held that "a mistake to the subject matter of a contract must be fundamental and persuade each of the parties to enter into that agreement. Since turner was dead at the time the parties made the contract, this agreement was void." The perishing of specific goods will amount to a fundamental mistake, as per Section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Goods which have never existed at all will also amount to a fundamental breach, as in Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Credit du Nord [1989] 1 WLR 255 | Not returning a payment made in error may amount to theft. s.5(4) of the Theft Act 1968 covers this scenario: Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds. And the leading case law is A-G Ref (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182 where, in similar circumstances: The defendant, a police woman, received an overpayment in her wages by mistake. She had noticed that she had received more than she was entitled to but did not say anything to her employer. She did not withdraw any of the money from her bank account. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit. The Attorney General referred a question to the Court of Appeal. Held [on appeal]: It was possible for a theft conviction to arise where the defendant had not withdrawn the money. There was a legal obligation to return the money received by mistake. | Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A. | "Why" someone did something is potentially off-topic, but in regards to your hierarchical image - it lacks provenance so cannot be tested, however according to the official judiciary website: The Master of the Rolls is second in judicial importance to the Lord Chief Justice. | In the small claims court cases I've been involved in the judge has dismissed all aspects of the claim related to time wasted, transportation costs, and attending court in the judgement amount itself. However the court costs one incurs should be a part of the amount that is judged in one's favour. Also the costs of enforcing any judgement (court bailiff fees) are usually considered recoverable. My thoughts are that if one is keen to ensure that the other party pays the full costs of time, collation of evidence, photocopying, phone calls, and anything else one believes they are responsible for, one will have much more luck if one is not self-representing. The predominant reason for self-representing is to keep costs, and thus one's financial risk from pursuing the case, minimal. disclaimer: this is only opinion, and not legal advice | In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important. | You have raised two broad questions. The question about reasonable suspicion asks: when is evidence illegally obtained? That's difficult to answer, because it depends on the nature of the evidence and any statute which controlled the way in which it should have been collected. However, the focus of your question seems to be the second issue: what use can the government make of illegally obtained evidence? This is the subject of the exclusionary rule. The short answer is this: The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy created for the purpose of deterring future unlawful conduct. The rule prohibits both direct and indirect use of illegally obtained evidence ("fruit of the poisonous tree") in a criminal prosecution, but will only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. To give more insight into how the courts have applied this balancing test, I will summarise its history and rationale. I will then set out the modern formulation of the rule, and try to answer some of your specific hypothetical questions. History and rationale of the exclusionary rule The exclusionary rule originated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The government searched Weeks' house without a warrant, seized letters and other property, and charged him with operating an illegal lottery. Weeks applied for the return of the property, but the district court held that "the letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but if competent would keep them and permit their use in evidence." Weeks was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution ... The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the doctrine was extended to prevent indirect use of information derived from illegally obtained evidence, unless the information comes from an independent source. The government illegally searched Silverthorne's offices, and copied the records seized before the district court ordered their return. The district court also impounded the copies, so the government issued a regular subpoena to produce the original documents. The district court held Silverthorne in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. The Court acknowledged the 'complexities' of this distinction in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This case introduced the term 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' and an exception to the doctrine where the connection between the illegality and the evidence presented is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' Nardone had been convicted of defrauding the revenue twice. The first conviction was based on evidence obtained from an illegal wiretap, and was reversed by the Supreme Court. Nardone was convicted again after a retrial, and argued that the conviction should be set aside because he was not permitted to "examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the [illegally obtained] information." Frankfurter J, delivering the opinion of the Court, quoted the above passage from Silverthorne and said: In practice this generalized statement may conceal concrete complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint ... The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established—as was plainly done here—the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin. Development of modern limits to the exclusionary rule The Court clarified the purpose of the doctrine in United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), declining to extend it to grand jury proceedings. The Court held that Calandra was required to answer questions put to him by a grand jury, even though the questions had been informed by the fruits of an illegal search. The Court said: The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim ... Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures ... In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons ... the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The Supreme Court endorsed a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Drugs were found in a search of Leon's house and car pursuant to a facially valid search warrant, but on review the district court found that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. Therefore, the search was illegal although the officers executing it had acted in good faith. After reviewing the cases in which the Court had declined to apply the rule, the Court held that the evidence against Leon should not have been excluded: The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern ... We have now reexamined the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances. In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. In Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998), the Court cited Leon and explicitly endorsed the use of a balancing test in declining to extend the rule to State parole proceedings: [B]ecause the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs" ... A federal requirement that parole boards apply the exclusionary rule ... would severely disrupt the traditionally informal, administrative process of parole revocation. The marginal deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is insufficient to justify such an intrusion. We therefore hold that parole boards are not required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court endorsed an even more circumspect approach to the rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The police executed a valid search warrant and found guns and drugs in Hudson's house, but the search was unlawful because the police did not knock and announce before entering. The Court declined to exclude the evidence obtained in the search, holding that: Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs", which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been "cautio[us] against expanding" it, and "have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application." We have rejected "[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,"—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'" (citations omitted) Current state of the law As of June 2017, the last word on the rule is the Supreme Court's decision in Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016). Again, the Court reversed a State court's decision to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal trial. The Court identified three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: First, the independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source. Second, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source. Third, and at issue here, is the attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that "the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained." (citations omitted) Strieff was illegally stopped and asked for ID after leaving a house under surveillance by narcotics police. After discovering an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation, the police lawfully arrested and searched Strieff and found him in possession of methamphetamine. The Court found that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the attenuation doctrine: The three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), guide our analysis. First, we look to the "temporal proximity" between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider "the presence of intervening circumstances." Third, and "particularly" significant, we examine "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." (citations omitted) [W]e hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff's person was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was close in time to Strieff's arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors supporting the State. The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff's arrest is a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected flagrantly unlawful police misconduct. Specific scenarios Can the past arrests serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop a person? As a basis for inclusion of the person on an informal watch list? As mentioned in the introduction, this question is not really about "fruit of the poisonous tree." It is an anterior question about whether or not a police stop was unlawful. The court asks: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Officers are permitted to consider criminal history, as the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (1997): A prior criminal record "is not, alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion." Nevertheless, an officer can couple knowledge of prior criminal involvement with more concrete factors in reaching a reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. (citations omitted) As probable cause for a future search warrant or arrest warrant or wiretap? As basis for active surveillance without a stop or arrest or search warrant? What if law enforcement set up a sting operation targeted at this individual? As with reasonable suspicion, evidence of the suspect's reputation and criminal history can be taken into account in establishing probable cause for an arrest or search warrant. However, a history of past arrests would probably not suffice in itself to "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed": Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Could the suppressed evidence be used to counter an entrapment defense (which requires a showing that the defendant didn't have a propensity to commit the crime)? Could the suppressed evidence be used to impeach testimony in a criminal case that the defendant had never used drugs before? If the evidence is suppressed then by definition it cannot be used adversely to the defendant. However, if the evidence is shown to have been obtained illegally, it will only be excluded where the deterrence benefits of exclusion outweigh its substantial social costs: Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott. The evidence is more likely to be admitted if it falls into one of the three exceptions set out in Utah v. Strieff: independent source, inevitable discovery or attenuation. In considering attenuation, the court will pay particular attention to 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' Clearly, it is impossible to say, in general, whether unlawfully obtained evidence could be admitted to counter an entrapment defence or attack the defendant's character and credibility. Not only will the application of the exclusionary rule depend on a wide range of considerations, other rules of evidence may need to be applied (such as the rules against character evidence and extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter). Nevertheless, the cases cited above should give some insight into how the court will approach the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. |
Would it be illegal to withdraw a disclaimer that no "National Security Letters" requests have been made *today*? According to EFF: By using NSLs, the FBI can directly order companies to turn over information about their customers and then gag the companies from telling anyone that they did so. Because the process is secret, and because even the companies can’t tell if specific NSLs violate the law, the process is ripe for abuse. Let's say a social media site decides to prominently display a disclaiming banner "No National Security Letters have been sent requesting any information about your account today" to every user when they log in. Would it be illegal for such a website to display such a banner? Would it be illegal to stop displaying it to users against whose personal data such a request has been made? If it is illegal, what's the relevant case law? I am only asking about websites created and hosted in the United States and users physically located in the United States. | What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information". | Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case. | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. | The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings. | Yup, it's illegal. You want something, they have something you want. They let you have the thing provided that you do certain things, otherwise they won't give it to you. So providing a credit card is material to the contract. You know that the credit card number is false, you are representing that it is true, the card is a material fact, you intend to get them to allow you in using this false representation, they don't know it is false and they rightfully rely on your truthfulness. They have been harmed by your false representation (maybe: it would cost you a lot in attorney fees to try to challenge on this point). This is fraud. | The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal. | It could be. Accessing any web page is subject to whatever the terms of use are for the page, and if those terms state that the page may only be accessed from within the US, then accessing the page from outside the US is a violation of the TOS (hence use is infringing): see 2.4(h) of the Netflix EULA. There are EU rules that override such terms, within the EU. The usual way to circumvent technological location-restrictions (where the web page says "I'm sorry, I can't let you do that") is to use a VPN and pretend to be somewhere else. Use of a VPN is not per se illegal in most countries (there are exceptions), but using it to circumvent geo-blocking may be. Again returning to the point that the TOS may itself say "No you may not", the interesting question is what to conclude if there is no such statement, for example I did not see anything in the PBS TOS that restricts access to the US (I didn't look very deeply). Terms of service can't be secret: you can't be held to following rules that you cannot reasonably know of. If you attempt to access a page that uses un-announced geo-blocking technology and it informs you that you can't use the page because of your location, then you have effectively been put on notice that there is a rule. If you happen to be using a VPN and access an un-announced, (reasonably) undetectable geo-blocked site, that would not be a breach of the terms (because you have not been put on notice that location is a term of use). | An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party. |
Could Apple legally steal a leaked design and claim it as their own? Almost every year, millions wait in anticipation to hear about what new products will be announced during Apple's scheduled launch events. Weeks and days before, the press publishes photos obtained from secret sources of what they claim will be revealed during the event. Most of the "leaks" turn out to be made up fake rendered CAD models. A few, however, are good enough to fool many into believing it came from Apple's industrial design group. Consider, for instance, Apple likes one of the fake designs so much, it secretly appropriates it for an upcoming product. Let's say they go even further and legally claim it as their own design. Does the original designer of the fake have a legal claim to their own work, especially after falsely purporting it belonged to Apple? Moreover, could Apple subpoena the publication the fake appeared in to testify against the designer's claim? What about the protection of the press? If the designer loses in court, could Apple turn around press charges against them for theft? Could the publication sue the designer for selling them a fake story? In summary, would it be wise for the designer to seek a claim on their work even if millions of dollars were at stake? | Yes, the original designer (or the designer's employer) would have a legal right to the design, insofar as it included protectable design elements. Copyright on the design of "useful" products is limited, and the exact limitations vary from country to country. However, it might be hard for the designer (or the company for which the designer works) to prove that the creation was original, and was not an actual leak. But if the designer or company has retained sufficient evidence to convince a court, then a suit could be successful. Such a possibility makes me doubt that Apple or a similar large company would do that. The risks are too great when a design of their own creation would probably be quite good enough for their purposes. But that is all speculation. | In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any. | Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties. | On the one hand, there are statutes that prohibit the delivery of instructions which distort or circumvent the official/intended use or safety of a device. For a somewhat related example of this, see MCL 750.540c(1)(3). On the other hand, the company/manufacturer is unlikely to prevail under contract law no matter how clearly and conspicuously its EULA prohibits the disclosure of discovered weaknesses. That is because the prohibition in the EULA is outweighed by the severe vulnerability to which all other unsuspecting customers are subjected. From the standpoint of public policy, people's awareness of the discovered vulnerability is certainly in the public's best interest. The disclosure will warn both (1) potential customers not to purchase a product that fails or misses its primary purpose, and (2) current customers to adopt precautions now that the product's reliability has been disproved. Thus, the effectiveness of broadcasting the discovery of such weakness is in stark contrast with the technical deficits and managerial politics that typically hinder a company's ability (or its will) to respond to the issue. If the weakness was known to the manufacturer prior to the disclosure, the release of that product would constitute fraudulent misrepresentation. The details of the demonstration in the video supports the argument that the manufacturer knew --or should have known-- about that weakness, since a padlock design is supposed to pass all kinds of tests of breakability and not be disabled by a screwdriver. It is hard to deny that the notion that "the padlock is secure" induces customers to purchase the product. As such, the misrepresentation violates the contract law principle that a contract --such as a purchase-- be entered knowingly. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 161-167. With respect to the publisher of the weakness, that misrepresentation renders the EULA-prohibition void. See Restatement at § 164(1). Regardless of whether or not the manufacturer incurred misrepresentation, the manufacturer's decision to sue the publisher is only likely to backfire by bringing more attention to the poor design of the product. In all, the manufacturer's best option is to do a product recall ASAP and enhance the design. | It's highly unlikely that A would even recognise this as similar. It's really bog standard. A coloured patterned background (in a different colour and with a different pattern). Two buttons. A picture and a testimonial. All things that have been done thousands of times. In the end, it is _copy_right. What exactly is B supposed to have copied? | User manuals are indeed copyrighted. On the other hand, since the people building the cranes are most likely interested in people reading these manuals, there is a good chance that you would get permission to copy them, for example as part of a mobile app, if you ask the manufacturer. On the other hand, it is possible that the manual was written by a third party, who receives some fixed amount of money for every manual that the manufacturer gives away to customers for free. In that case, copying would destroy that persons earnings, so permission would be unlikely. You definitely need to ask for permission and can't go forward without permission. It would also be possible that the crane manufacturer will want to check out your app to make sure that everything is correct - if someone damages a crane because of some omissions in your app, that would be very bad for them. | There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained. | Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those. |
If a copyrighted article is published in a copyrighted platform, then who own the copyright? For example, this article Law and Ideology is posted in the platform Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. In the bottom of the article it cites: Copyright © 2019 by Christine Sypnowich [email protected] And in the bottom of the site it says: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2016 by The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University So who has copyright of this article? I guess the author, not the site's owner, but is this correct? Does the site's owner have any right on the article, besides being allowed to post or retract the article on the site? Can the site's owner use the article or grant permission for others to use it (e.g. to translate it) on behalf of the author? | The term in copyright law for such a "platform" is a "collective work" or "compilations ". US law, 17 USC 101, says: A “collective work” is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole. The laws of other countries are similar in this respect. Each individual item in a collective work has a separate copyright, held by the author, author's employer, or whoever the copyright may have been transferred to, as the case may be. There is a copyright in the collective work itself. This protects the selection and arrangement of the individual items, as well as editorial matter such as an introduction, index, and notes on individual items furnished as part of the collection. Even when individual items are in the public domain, the collection may have a copyright. For example, if someone prepares a CD of Best Bach Fugues the individual compositions are of course in the public domain, and the recordings might well be, depending on the circumstances. But the choice of which fugues are "Best", which recordings of those fugues to select, and what order to p-resent them in are all the creative work of to compiler, and those are protected by copyright. If some other person published a CD of Great Bach Fugues copying the selection and arrangement of the individual recordings, that would be an infringement (unless permission had been obtained). This is true only when there is creative effort in the selection and arrangement. A collection of all known Bach fugues, arranged chronologically, would be a "natural or obvious" arrangement, and not protected by copyright, just as would a complete collection of the works of Dickens, say, arranged in alphabetical order. See Feist vs Rural for more on the degree of originality needed in a collection. Of course, sometimes the publisher of a collection obtains the copyrights of individual items. It was once common for magazines to purchase the copyright of articles that they published, but now it is more common that they merely obtain a limited license for their use. But the copyrights are still separate, even if the holder is the same. To quote the US law on the topic, 17 USC 103 provides that: (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. (b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material. M<y understanding is that on this point the laws of most other countries are similar. | I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations. | Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.) | Presumably you are referring to works commonly called "fan fiction." Under copyright law these might be considered "derivative works" and therefore subject to the rights of the copyright owner. However, they might also qualify for exemption from copyright enforcement under "fair use." It appears that the legality of fan fiction is not settled law, and the outcome of legal challenges have turned on facts specific to each case. Decent background on the question is summarized on wikipedia. | When you are citing a source to back up your statements, you may generally quote a reasonable amount. Under US law, this will be a form of fair use Under the laws of other countries, this may be permitted under one or another exception to copyright. The available exceptions and how they work vary from country to country, but reasonable quotes should be allowed in almost every country. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? You should: Make it clear what content is quoted, who originally wrote or said it, and when and where it was published; Quote not more than is needed to support your point. Not quote in such a way that your work can be used as a substitute for the source work. If you are not making a reference quote, but merely reusing an idea from a source, it is usually better to write the idea in your own words, not closely following the structure or wording of your source. However, if you are criticizing or commenting on what another author has written, you may (and should) quote enough to show what your comments or critique refers to. The same principles apply as with a reference quote: make what is quoted clear; attribute the source; and quote no more than is reasonable needed for your purpose. Consider whether you really need to quote "long paragraphs" or can just quote key sentences, perhaps along with paraphrases of the rest. If at all possible, the parts you quote should be only a small proportion of the source work. | You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license. | The general rule is that the author of the software owns the copyright, so that would be the student. This is regardless of whether the student writes the code for fun, or for a thesis. If a student is hired to write that code, then it kind of depends on the university rules, and who hires the student. In the case of a "work for hire", the employer owns the copyright. However, it is non-trivial to determine whether that principle is applicable in the case of a student hired by the university. In part, it depends on which country this is in because work for hire laws are not exactly the same everywhere, and in part it depends on the details of the employment my a university. In a typical US institution RA appointment, it would come down to university policy – some universities declare that copyright in all student-written software is retained by the student. You would need to look for something resembling an "IP Policy" – here is a sample, note that such policies are subject to revision. | It's allowed by the Creative Commons Attribution -ShareAlike license, and intentionally so. The Wikimedia Foundation wants things like this to be possible; that is part of the goal of open content. (This license is also used on Stack Exchange content, so the same applies to e.g. this answer.) However, it is important to remember that this is not a public-domain equivalent license. If you copy from a Wikipedia article (or an SE post), you must comply with the "Attribution" and "ShareAlike" requirements. Attribution: You must give credit to the author. For Wikipedia articles, which typically have many authors, a link to the page is sufficient; editors agree to this in addition to the license when they save their edits. For Stack Exchange content, a link to the post itself should be enough. (To get a link to a post, click the "share" link below the post.) ShareAlike: If you modify the content, you must release your modified version under the same or a compatible license. You can't copy this answer, add more information (or translate it into another language, or make any other change), and keep an all-rights-reserved copyright on it, or release it into the public domain; your version must also be released under CC BY-SA. As long as you follow these requirements, copying is allowed and encouraged. |
What makes a shareholder a "shareholder of record"? In public companies filling some reports with the SEC (10K for example), there is a mention of the number of shareholders of record. Example: "As of April 20, 2021, we had approximately 40 shareholders of record of our common stock." Source: DTST 10K filling A. What makes me legally titled the shareholder of record? B. Is there a minimum equity to be owned to be recognized as a shareholder of record? For example, if I bought 1 stock, am I included? C. Can I view the list of shareholders, or get any information about them, or is it censored? | Companies have a registry of their shareholders. Anyone with at least one share registered in their name is a shareholder of record. However, the vast majority of people who consider themselves "shareholders" aren't actually registered owners of a stock. Instead, almost all public stock in the US is held "in street name." That means that the stock is formally held in the name of a brokerage. What an individual has is "beneficial ownership:" the brokerage passes dividends on to the beneficial owner, will vote how the beneficial owner tells it to vote, and requires agreement from the beneficial owner before it can sell the stock. To make stuff even more complicated, the broker itself generally holds the stock in street name. Almost all public stock in the US is really owned by the Depository Trust Corporation in the name of Cede and Company (a general partnership of a few DTC officers). The reason public stock is mostly held in street name is efficiency. Transferring the legal owner of a piece of stock is a nontrivial process; until recently, it involved physically shipping stock certificates to the new owner. Even now that stock ownership can typically be transferred electronically, it's much easier to tell Cede & Co. "the new beneficial owner is this person." Because beneficial ownership is just a contract, you can skip all the formalities of updating the company's official register of shareholders. | This answer assumes Europe as jurisdiction, not the United States. This will vary wildly across jurisdictions, but given that this question is unanswered for two weeks now, I will provide an answer for Europe, specifically the Czech Republic. It will be somewhat different in other states. First, the list of criminal offenses a corporation can commit is specified in the law. It is exactly that, a list. Of the 300 crimes an individual can commit here, about 100 of them can also be done by a corporation. It is hard to discover why these hundred crimes were chosen specifically. Logic used to make this list eludes me. For example, a corporation can commit Rape, but not Murder. It can commit a Terrorist attack but not Terror. It can commit Threatening a public official but not Oppression. I looked through the explanatory notes for the law and I discoved the reason: Strictly only those crimes were created for corporations that were required by higher european law, which only moves the question higher up. I did not look up what the European Parliament had to say about this. There is one crime that was added specifically, later on, to the list, and that is Usury. In principle, all crimes committed by an individual can be done by a corporation, because a crime is considered to be committed by a corporation if the action is done by an employee in the name of the corporation. | Q1. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose sub-processing arrangements and the names of the organisations involved in this? "The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller. In the case of general written authorisation, the processor shall inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 2 This clearly states that the processor would need to make clear that they are subcontracting the services and get permission for this as part of the contract, but doesn't specify whether the subcontractors must be named and identified. Perhaps there is other prior existing subcontracting legislation that requires them to be named? Some procurement contracts as supplied by controllers may specify a list of nominated (allowed) sub-contractors or require the full identification of sub-contractors though I've not found anything in law that requires they be named other than as part of a specific contractual obligation. Q2. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose the country or countries where data is stored and processed? "Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: ... (h) makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 3(h) This clearly states the data processor must make available to the data controller all details required to demonstrate compliance. It's quite likely larger organisations may choose to make this simple for data controllers by supplying this information in the form of a completed Data Privacy Impact Analysis document. "Each controller and, where applicable, the controller's representative, shall maintain a record of processing activities under its responsibility. That record shall contain all of the following information: ... (e) where applicable, transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, including the identification of that third country or international organisation and, in the case of transfers referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 49(1), the documentation of suitable safeguards; ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 30 Paragraph 1(e) This clearly states the data controller must maintain a record of the country or countries involved if any of these are outside the EU, and so this information must be made available to the controller as stated above. | In principle, the data subject's right to access involves a copy of all personal data the controller holds on them. There are no time limits by default. Of course, the controller can ask a data subject to clarify their request, e.g. to focus on a particular time frame. There is an implied time limit though: personal data may only be processed/stored for as long as the data is necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was collected. Afterwards, it must be deleted. A controller with good data management will be able to limit their effort by having as short retention periods as possible for their different records. Furthermore, a lot of data is not personal data, or falls out of scope of the GDPR because it is not processed with automated means or forms part of a filing system. For example, if thousands of old invoices were archived in paper form in boxes that are only sorted by year, there might be an argument that this isn't a filing system in the sense of the GDPR and that a DSAR would not have to involve looking through all the archived invoices (compare also Art 11). In your scenario, there is a clear retention period of six years. You are asking for records about how that data might have been used further in the past. To the degree that such data is actually available, that could reasonably be personal data and should be included in a response to a DSAR. E.g. they might have information like this: “File #1234 was included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. The entries in File #1234 that are older than 2014 have been purged, so we do not know which entries were included in the data set. The current name on File #1234 is Dave.” This information about the sale would be personal data because it relates to you, and you are identifiable. Of course, the controller might not be set up to perform this search unless specifically asked. However, more unspecific information might not be personal data. For example: “About 70% of our files were included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. We no longer have records indicating whether your file was included.” Since there is no link between the sale and your personal data, I don't think it would have to be included in a DSAR response. The primary reason why you should be told about sales of personal data is that per Art 15(1)(c), you should be informed about “the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed” in a DSAR response. So when making a data subject access request, it could make sense to explicitly referencing this paragraph. So you would be interested in receiving a copy of your personal data as per Art 15 GDPR, and in particular any available information per Art 15(1)(c) GDPR about the recipients or categories of recipients to whom your personal data has been or may have been disclosed in the past. Quite likely the response will be underwhelming, e.g. by just giving a broad category such as “potential creditors who are contractually obligated to use the data only in accordance with our policies”. Whether such responses are compliant (I don't necessarily think so) will not be clear until there's a good precedent, and that would require that someone sorts this out in court. | In general the primary purpose of creating a single-owner business entity is to shield the owner from liability. For example, if it turns out that (unbeknownst to you) your necklaces were manufactured with toxic metals then "you" as a seller could face ruinous liability. If "you" is a company, then you as a person might lose whatever value is left in the company, but at least you wouldn't lose your personal assets. There are many other potential reasons to conduct business through a business entity, and many types of business entities constructed and recognized for those purposes; but they are highly dependent on the jurisdiction, entity type, and particulars of the business. | The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack. | There is no law (that I can find) that requires the mason to keep records, and therefore require them to be produced, for work carried out that long ago. I have not been able to locate the applicable legislation for 2006 but, on the (near certain) assumption that it was either the same as now or has been superceded, businesses only need to keep records for 6 years according to the Revenue's section entitled Keeping records: If you run a business, you must keep certain records for tax purposes. Your records can be used to confirm information contained in your tax returns and they should clearly show the accounting process. If your accounts are prepared by an agent or accountant, they may keep your records on your behalf. However, you are ultimately responsible for your record keeping. If you are in a partnership, the precedent partner is responsible for keeping records. You must keep the original of these documents for six years. This retention period is mirrored for limited companies at section 285 Companies Act 2014: An accounting record required to be kept by section 281 or information or a return referred to in section 283 (2) shall be preserved by the company concerned for a period of at least 6 years after the end of the financial year containing the latest date to which the record, information or return relates. That said, there's no harm in asking. | Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them. |
Sentence given when a Summary only offence has imprisonment over 6 months? I was reading into the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006. At the sentencing section, I note the following: (a)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; (b)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine or to both. I thought that in a Magistrates' Court, the Magistrates could not sentence somebody to over 6 months imprisonment per offence, and in the case of numerous offences the total combined sentence could not exceed 12 months. Based on this, how could a defendant be sentenced to 12 months on summary conviction for just a single offence? | From this website: If the Magistrates/District Judge consider that, due to the seriousness of the offence and any factors relating to the defendant (e.g. previous convictions for assault) that the defendant should be punished with more than 6 months’ imprisonment, they can commit the defendant to the Crown Court for sentence where the greater sentencing powers are available. Or put another way: If the court decides your sentence should be for longer than 6 months, it can pass your case to the Crown Court for sentencing. | The statute of limitations 775.15(13) extends the period, tolling from the victims 18th birthday per (a), or, without limitation under (c) If the offense is a violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before July 1, 2010. Subsection 2 states the general limitations, which are severity-related: (a) A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed. (b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed. (c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced within 2 years after it is committed. (d) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation must be commenced within 1 year after it is committed. A death-penalty or life-imprisonment offense has no time limit, and some forms of sexual battery do carry those penalties, but not the situation described. There is also a provision (16(a)) for prosecution at any time after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused which we may assume is not applicable in the instant case. We may assume from the description that the violation took place before 2003, and the longest limit (for a first degree felony) is 4 years i.e. 2006. However, subsection (b) states a different complicating factor: If the offense is a first degree felony violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2003. In other words, if it is a first degree felony, then it can be prosecuted anytime (given the presumption that the violation was not before about 1999, which seems to be what you're describing). The age of the parties at the time matters, so I assume the minor was under 16 but above 12, and the adult was over 24. Florida Code 794.011 subsumes all forms of sexual battery, and different sections assign punishments (including death) and degree of felony. Subsection (5) defines the possibly-applicable second-degree felony sexual battery charges, which either involve a victim 18 and over, or a perpetrator under 18, which we assume is not the case here. Under (5)(a): (a) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age, without that person’s consent, and in the process does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115. It should be mentioned that a minor is legally deemed incapable of giving consent, thus the "without consent" part is true. There is a further wrinkle in the law: (8) Without regard to the willingness or consent of the victim, which is not a defense to prosecution under this subsection, a person who is in a position of familial or custodial authority to a person less than 18 years of age and who: ... (b) Engages in any act with that person while the person is 12 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age which constitutes sexual battery under paragraph (1)(h) commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. If a teacher is "in a position of custodial authority", then that also applies (and constitutes a life felony). This all said, the opinion of the internet seems to be that the limit is 4 years. Either I'm missing something else, or the specifics of the case matter: first degree violation, took place around 2001 which put it within the SOL on October 1, 2003. | Is there a law against carrying items with an intent to use them in such a way? england-and-wales Yes The offence is possession of an offence weapon in a public place contrary s.1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (1) Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding £200, or both; (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years or a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, or both. “offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person. There are similar provisions (with subtle differences) in scotland and northern-ireland at s.47 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 and s.93 of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 respectively. | Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 sets the limitation period for defamation cases to 1 year. However, under section 32A, the court is, in certain situations, allowed to disapply the limitation period to defamation cases. Essentially a court may lift the period if they think it is just and fair to do so. They will take into consideration factors such as the extent to which enforcing the limitation period would unfairly prejudice the claimant, whether new evidence came to light (and if it ought to have come to light sooner) etc. It all really depends on the merits and circumstances of your case. I would recommend seeing a solicitor on the matter. | What happens to someone who’s committed a murder in the UK? Considering the person will be caught. This is a basic and somewhat vague question so I will provide a basic and very general answer. The name of the court with proper jurisdiction, the relevant criminal procedural rules, and the substantive law that applies varies within the U.K. In particular in Scotland and the various dependencies of the U.K. differ significantly from England-Wales. There are some minor differences in Northern Ireland. England-and-Wales are treated as one for most purposes, but there are some slight differences at the very lowest levels but none materially impact a murder case. If they are caught in England and Wales they are arrested, interviewed, charged then brought before the next available Magistrates' Court who send the defendant to the Crown Court for trial. As a Magistrate has no power to grant bail for murder the defendant must be remanded in custody until he can make an application for bail before the Crown Court, but the default position is that bail should not be granted for murder unless in very exceptional circumstances. In other U.K. jurisdictions, the names of the courts will differ and there may be some other fine details that aren't the same in the pre-trial process but the same general outline applies. If they are outside of the U.K. they will be subject to either an International or European Arrest Warrant and extradited to the UK at the request of the U.K. Government under the terms of the relevant extradition treaties. On arrival in the UK they are arrested for murder and the process proceeds in the same manner. (If they are someplace that does not have an extradition treaty with the U.K., the trial may be deferred until U.K. officials have an opportunity to arrest him and are often dogged in attempting to accomplish, perhaps, for example, while the suspect is on holiday somewhere that there is an extradition treaty.) Prior to the trial, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the defence will prepare their cases and return to court at various times to settle any issues etc before going to the expense of a full trial. Also, at any time the CPS determine the case to be too weak for a realistic prospect of conviction or the suspect is innocent, they are supposed to dismiss or amend the indictment. The defendant is then tried for murder before a jury (almost always, but not in every single case, e.g., if the defendant admits guilt and the plea is accepted in appropriate proceedings before a judge). The CPS instruct a barrister to present their case with another barrister acting on behalf of the defendant. The process is for juvenile defendants is pretty much the same as for adults, apart from added safeguards to ensure the juvenile understands the proceedings and is not put at any disadvantage due to their age. All of the jurisdictions within the U.K., however, will have a trial that involves presentation of sworn evidence and exhibits and opening and closing arguments from both prosecution and defence counsels to a jury, procedural objections, cross-examination, and sometimes offering of additional evidence under the supervision of a single judge; normally with the defendant present. There will be some means of court reporting, and unless the judge orders otherwise (which is only done in relatively exceptional circumstances), the trial will be open to the public and the press to observe. If the defendant dies before the legal process to secure a conviction is not completed, the case is dismissed as moot. If the defendant is convicted of a homicide offense the trial/sentencing judge will impose a prison sentences, which is "fixed by law", with a life sentence in the case of the most serious homicide offense, murder (there are multiple homicide offenses that hinge largely on the intent of the defendant, often a murder prosecution will include less included homicide offenses as options for convictions). Only in exceptional cases this will be a whole-life term, in all others the judge will prescribe a minimum sentence according to the judicial sentencing guidelines after which the defendant may be released on licence, which is what an American would call parole. Any offences committed on licence will normally result in a recall to prison. The U.K. does not have a death penalty and does not authorise corporal punishment. The vast majority of people who are arrested and tried for murder are convicted, although there are sometimes acquittals or hung juries. This conviction may be appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeal (and again up to the Supreme Court) (the intermediate appellate court may not be the same in all U.K. jurisdictions) which reviews the proceedings to determine if the law was applied correctly and if there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. If the court finds that this was not the case, it can vacate the conviction and orders an appropriate revised disposition of the case depending upon the circumstances justifying the reversal of the trial court. If the appeal court affirm the trial verdict then the sentence continues to be carried out. Usually, but not always, the defendant will be in prison pursuant to the sentence imposed pending an outcome of any appeal. Eventually, if the sentence imposed upon a conviction is affirmed (and not a whole life term) the prisoner may be released on licence (which includes some post-release supervision) and is free and to about living their life again, subject to some collateral consequences based upon their criminal record (e.g. inability to work in certain occupations). If the defendant is acquitted, then they go free and cannot be tried again for the same offence, unless the exceptions under the double jeopardy provisions that apply in that jurisdiction apply. The main exception of double jeopardy is for newly discovered evidence of guilt in a case where there was an acquittal. If the person convicted is not a British citizen, they will usually be deported at the conclusion of their sentence if international law allows for it. There are a few exceptions to these rules that come up in a tiny percentage of all U.K. murders that apply (1) in the case of people subject to courts-martial such as active duty military service members, (2) in the case of foreign diplomats with diplomatic immunity, (3) when the murder is classified as an act of terrorism, and (4) in the case that the defendant has a title of nobility that calls for special treatment such as, e.g., Prince Charles (the current heir to the throne) or the Queen. These special cases are really too esoteric for the plain vanilla facts stated in the question and involve unique processes that are very different from the usual one described above. The fourth case is one that does not exist in my country (the U.S.) and in other countries that are republics rather than constitutional monarchies like the U.K., although most countries have some special rules for criminal trials of their very highest officials (like Presidents and Prime Ministers). | Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself). | In the UK, generally there is no duty to report crime. There are circumstances where there is a duty to report suspicious activity or 'knowledge' or 'suspicion' of a crime. These include: financing of terrorism money laundering or dealing in other proceeds of crime (criminal property) or fraud in a regulated sector (e.g. solicitors, accountants, insolvency practitioners, finance, gambling) (unless the information comes to the person in 'privileged circumstances') In respect of such circumstances, as soon as Bob 'knows' or 'suspects' Rob is engaged in such behaviour Bob must report this to the authorities and must not tell Rob about it (the offence of 'tipping off'). Bob commits an offence if he doesn't report it. In terms of failure to report money laundering that could lead to a maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine. Depending on the circumstances an additional risk of failure to report is being perceived to have participated in the commission of the crime. | New York State's sentencing laws do not have sentencing guidelines in the sense that the federal courts do. Donald Trump is an individual with no prior felony convictions who is charged with Class E felonies. The statutory sentencing range for these offenses under New York Penal Law Section 70.02(1)(d) is a determinate sentence of 1.5 to 4 years. Under some circumstances, alternative sentencing (like probation) might be authorized. Essentially the whole ballgame is the discretion of the sentencing judge and the question of whether the sentences of conviction would be served concurrently or consecutively. The sentencing hearing would happen only after a jury enters its verdict on guilt or innocence, and only in the event that there was a conviction on at least one count of the indictment. It would be an evidentiary hearing at which evidence regarding an appropriate sentence would be presented by the prosecution and the defense. I am not familiar enough with the facts of the complaint and the applicable New York State Penal Law provisions to know how the issue of consecutive v. concurrent sentences would be resolved. |
Can you defer capital gains tax with margin trading? Assume I bought 1 bitcoin at $0 and it's now worth $100k. I am worried that the price will drop soon, so I sell my bitcoin. Bitcoin does indeed drop and comes down to $10k, where I then decide to buy back in. Selling bitcoin (even if I'm buying back in) is a taxable event, which means I would be due capital gains tax on the $100k gain. Could margin trading be used to defer this gain to when I actually spend my dollars, and instead allow me to reinvest my profits back into bitcoin without paying CGT now? The logic behind why I think this is the case is as follows... Rather than selling my bitcoin for $100k, I borrow an additional bitcoin (using my original bitcoin as collateral), and then I sell that bitcoin instead (shorting). I close my short when bitcoin hits $10k, using the profit to buy back into bitcoin at $10k. Indeed I would have to pay capital gains tax on the profits made from shorting, but presumably I can defer the capital gains tax on the original $100k gain from when I held bitcoin initially? Also, should bitcoin go up in price I might decide I actually want to get back into bitcoin because I no longer believe it will go down. I could now safely close my short (take a loss), without ever paying capital gains tax on that initial bitcoin investment, and actually I will incur a capital loss which I could use to offset any of my other trading gains. Is my reasoning correct? Answers for any jurisdiction would be useful. Obviously one would have to pay interest on these loaned assets, but whether that is worth it or not would be a separate question. | united-states They thought of that. See IRS Pub 550, page 36: You are treated as having made a constructive sale of an appreciated financial position if you: • Enter into a short sale of the same or substantially identical property, So when you short-sell 1 BTC while still holding 1 BTC, it's taxed as if you simply sold your 1 BTC. This makes sense as the transactions are essentially identical in effect. I don't think it matters that the 1 BTC you held was used as the collateral for the 1 BTC you borrowed. In particular, although short sales are usually reported and taxed as of the date when they close, constructive sales are an exception and are taxed on the date of the constructive sale itself: You must recognize gain as if the position were disposed of at its fair market value on the date of the constructive sale. This gives you a new holding period for the position that begins on the date of the constructive sale. Then, when you close the transaction, you reduce your gain (or increase your loss) by the gain recognized on the constructive sale. So this doesn't help in deferring your taxes. | No, because leaking is also a form of insider trading if the person you leak to takes advantage of the information. Even if you leaked it in a public forum you still have to wait 6 months before it is considered truly public knowledge, and by that time you might have learned something else. If you think that Company X is going to be pulled down along with the rest of the market then your best bet is to short (or buy "put" options on) a representative basket of shares other than Company X. This has the advantage of being 100% legal without having to wait. | You would likely have to show actual damages. And for example if you had a chance to buy a car worth $11,000 for $10,000 and couldn't because of the bank freezing your account, you'd have to convince a judge that the $1,000 possible profit was actual damage. Next you need to show that the bank explicitly guaranteed that your money would be accessible at any time. And assuming that blocking your account to prevent fraud against you was reasonable, how negligent were they when they couldn't unfreeze your account as quick as you would have liked? | Is it legal to sell currency at a price lower than face value? Yes. In fact, to donate is the act of transferring for free the ownership of something. Outlawing a transaction that is less extreme than a donation would be inconsistent with the lawfulness of donations. A significant departure from the market exchange rate does not affect the validity of currency exchange. A "sale" of currency in terms of itself is not illegal, since the transaction can be viewed as a combination of two transactions performed instantaneously and involving the fiction of an intermediary currency. Offers of currency for less than face value also happen very often when transacting the bonds issued by a country's central bank. Any two parties can transact those bonds in secondary markets. The scenario you describe obviates redemption periods, fluctuation risks, and various formalities, but those differences are inconsequential from a legal standpoint. | Suppose I obtain the ability to access someone else's cryptocurrency. This sounds like fraud e.g. I overheard them saying the password to their wallet out loud or I am a custodian of their assets. Nope, STILL fraud, possibly even Computer Misuse aka hacking... and because you use internet: it's Wire Fraud I now borrow those assets, keep them for some period of time, and then return them, without the owner's consent. hmmm, let's take california... Luckjy you, it is not embezzlement because you were not entrusted with the cryptocurrency, you gave yourself access. 503. Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been intrusted. No it is plainly... theft under California law: 484. (a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and in determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent representation or pretense made shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee or employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due and unpaid and every judgment that the employer has been unable to meet shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. Giving it back doesn't matter. The person taking the crypto for any amount of time without being entitled to them is committing theft. You see, California doesn't interest that you just want to borrow. They don't even require Mens Rea for the mere taking - only for fraudulent pretense there is an intent question. In fact, it might even be automatically Grand Theft: 484d. As used in this section and Sections 484e to 484j, inclusive:[...] (2) “Access card” means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access card, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper instrument. 484e. (a) Every person who, with intent to defraud, sells, transfers, or conveys, an access card, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, is guilty of grand theft. YIKES! and now, intent to defraud comes in, but that is actually minimal: that just means taking without being allowed to by the owner in many cases. | Any tax overpayments will be refunded after you file your tax return next year. Accidental overpayment is just one way this can happen. Another common situation is when a person works for only a few months at what looks like a high annual salary. They'd be taxed as if they were making $120,000 / year, for example, but they only work for three months, so their income ends up only being $40,000. They get money back at tax-return time. | It is legal. 18 USC Chapter 17 contains laws regarding what you can/cannot do with US legal tender. It doesn't mention anything about buying, or selling US tender at or above the face value. And there are several businesses in the USA that do this (coin exchanges which purchase coins at less then face value and give you dollar bills in return, etc...). However I would be concerned that your action might look like money laundering to the customs official on your way back home. Or on the way going to the foreign country for that matter. Which could be very bad for you. I would talk to a lawyer about this. | Yes. You could use student loan proceeds for these purposes. Student loan proceeds are not tracked or traced. If you did so on a wholesale basis (taking out loans intending to cancel your courses before tuition it due to raise money for other purposes), you might be engaged in loan fraud, but since student loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, while other loans can be discharged in bankruptcy, that would be a very stupid, self-defeating kind of fraud (which isn't to say that I haven't encountered it once or twice). Some tax preferred accounts (e.g. for retirement) have contribution limits based upon your taxable earned income, however, so while you could use student loan funds to put into those accounts, there would be strict limits on your contributions due to your low income. |
Can republican advocacy be grounds for discrimination in the UK? In the UK there exists a republican movement (i.e., those advocating for the replacement of the monarchy), chiefly focussed around a group called Republic. Technically, advocating the establishment of a republic—even through peaceful means—is still illegal in the UK (though currently not enforced due to incompatibilities with the Human Rights Act 1998). However, the HRA appears to be firmly in the sights of the current government, so that might not be the case forever (though I imagine ‘bring back treason’ might be a hard sell, politically). However, MPs who refuse to make an oath/affirmation of allegiance are treated ‘as if they were dead’ if they try to vote or join a debate, so it is clear that republicanism can still cause headaches in modern Britain.* On the other hand, the Equality Act 2010 defines ‘philosophical belief’ as a protected characteristic that cannot be discriminated against, though with some exemptions. Republicanism appears to fulfil the criteria for such a belief. Given this somewhat ambiguous legal environment, my question is: is it legal to discriminate against someone in the UK for peaceful republican advocacy, such as paid membership in a group like Republic? And then some sub-questions: Given that an oath/affirmation of allegiance is required for membership of the Armed Forces,† Parliament, etc., can these organisations deny or revoke membership for republican advocacy (provided they still make the oath/affirmation and don't breach other rules, such as claiming to represent the Armed Forces at political events)? If the answer to #1 is ‘yes’, is this different for the reserve forces?‡ Can such advocacy be grounds for refusing meetings with royals?§ Notes * Famously, Irish Republican party Sinn Féin refuse to take up their seats in Westminster for this reason. Other republican MPs have tried other tactics. † The Armed Forces are explicitly exempt from four of the protected characteristics of the Equality Act, though not belief. As an answer to a previous question of mine explained, however, conscientious objection is nonetheless grounds for refusal or dismissal, so that appears to be a de facto exemption. ‡ Section 7 of the Reserve Land Forces regulations 2016 (for example) explicitly states that ‘Officers and soldiers of the Army Reserve...have the normal rights and responsibilities of citizens of the United Kingdom’, as opposed to Regular Army personnel. § Part of the reason I'm asking this question is also how I first heard of Republic - someone told me they had purchased membership for a monarchist friend as a joke, and that as a result they would never be allowed to meet a royal. However, I've not been able to find any evidence that this would be the case. | Regarding the question of whether republicanism or opposition to monarchy is a protected belief under the Equality Act 2010, there is still uncertainty about the scope of the law, but it is quite likely it would be protected. A tribunal in 2019 found that belief in Scottish independence was a protected belief, assuming it's a deeply held belief about political sovereignty, which makes it somewhat similar to republicanism. The law doesn't cover political affiliation/party membership and it doesn't necessarily cover all political beliefs, but the judge in that case found that the law protected a belief about "weighty and substantial aspects of human life" and agreed that "how a country should be governed is sufficiently serious to amount to a protected philosophical belief". So a serious belief in republicanism certainly could be protected; the issue would be whether it was sufficiently serious and important and deeply held, not just an opinion which is subject to change. There has been speculation on whether support or opposition to Brexit would likewise be protected, but this doesn't seem to have been tested in court yet. For the armed forces it's likewise a little unclear. Exemptions to the Equality Act apply to situations where they affect the operational capacity or combat readiness of the armed forces. It's hard to see this as directly relevant. However as the answer you cite about conscientious objectors says, their treatment is a result of customs and practices in the army, not primary legislation. Further research may identify how the army has treated individual republicans in particular circumstances. It's not grounds for being refused permission to meet the Queen or other royalty. Here's a photo of Australian republican politician Malcolm Turnbull (who campaigned for the Queen to cease being Australia's head of state) shaking hands with the Queen. She has also met Martin McGuinness who has long campaigned for Northern Ireland to escape the Queen's reign. British writer and gay rights activist Simon Fanshawe didn't let republicanism stop him accepting an OBE. Jeremy Corbyn, former leader of the Opposition met royalty on several occasions, despite earlier republican activism (while later he stated he had no plans to abolish the monarchy but did not deny his republicanism). There are many more examples, e.g. Russell Brand (who Wikipedia says is a republican). Although advocating a republic is theoretically treasonous, peaceful advocacy is allowed by the Human Rights Act: see R. (Rusbridger) v. Attorney General [2003] UKHL 38; [2004] AC 357; [2003] 3 All ER 784. (Source: Wikipedia page on Republic (political organisation)) | This would surely be a constitutional crisis in a country where the constitutional order is spread over many separate laws and traditions. The UK is generally accepted as a genuine democracy which has a monarch for reasons of tradition, and which lets the monarch sign some things as head of state which are decided by elected officials. The parliament dominates the crown-in-parliament, for all the ceremonial importance of the monarch. So by this reasoning, the elected officials should win the power struggle. Yet it also retains vestiges of the old order e.g. in the House of Lords. It would come down if the popularity of the monarch's action outweighs the genuine pride of the Brits in their democratic traditions. | Supporting a secessionist movement is protected by the First Amendment. Terrorism, in the name of a secessionist movement or otherwise, or support of terrorism is a federal offense. See 18 USC 2339A and 2339B. The latter applies to foreign terrorist organizations, the former applies to to anything in violation of a specific list of crimes (§§32, 37, 81, 175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 1091, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, 2442 of Title 18, and a few other things). Advocating secesion is not a crime, so supporting the advocacy of secession – in the US – is not a crime. §2339B determines what terrorist-organization status via 18 USC 1189, which is basically a finding by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General that "the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States". Here is a current list. Advocating the forceful overthrow of the US government or that of any state or lower political subdivision is a crime under 18 USC 2385, likewise abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of such overthrow. | Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have. | Political party membership may be indirectly protected, insofar as party membership is a manifestation of a philosophical belief, but it is not a protected characteristic in itself. Political beliefs (e.g. in socialism) are capable of being protected characteristics, but not always. Nazism is not protected, because it is destructive of the rights of others and unworthy of respect in a democractic society. Businesses can usually choose who they do business with Assuming there is no other bad conduct going on (harassment, violence, discrimination, etc.), there is nothing to stop a shop or other business from excluding certain customers. This is the starting point. Some businesses have positive legal duties to serve the public in general. Your water company can't cut off your water, regardless of your beliefs. Barristers must follow the "cab-rank rule" and take your case even if you are a horrible person. So let's assume we just have an ordinary private-sector business, such as a shop. The protected characteristic of belief Contrary to the term "protected class", which is from U.S. law, the U.K. uses the words "protected characteristic" to mean those personal characteristics named in the Equality Act 2010. These include age and race. They also include "religion or belief", a characteristic inherited from prior equality law. Any discrimination claim relating to the "No Nazis allowed" sign would have to hang on the "belief" arm. Interpretation of "religion or belief" follows the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9. In relation to a philosophical belief, the applicable test is "the Grainger test" formulated by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 2009, The belief must be genuinely held. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Careful readers will notice that 2009 is before 2010; the statute law was different but the point was the same. Classic examples of beliefs meeting the test include vegetarianism, humanism, and pacifism. Political beliefs There is no sharp line between a "philosophical" belief and a "political" one. Support of a political party is not covered (Grainger at 35), but there is room for belief based on a political philosophy. In this way, "left-wing democratic socialism" met the test in GMB v Henderson. On this basis, one might be tempted to conclude that "Nazism" or "fascism" would be similar, even if "membership in a Nazi party" was not. However, Article 17 of ECHR does not protect totalitarian or Nazi beliefs. This is consistent in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in U.K. cases on equality. It is the source of the fifth part of the Grainger test, via earlier cases in the House of Lords and before the European Court. For example, in Forstater v CGD Europe, the EAT held: A philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy Grainger V if it was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by virtue of Article 17 thereof. Employment is more protected In Redfearn v UK [2012], the ECtHR said a bus driver's rights had been violated following his dismissal for being a member of the British National Party. That was in relation to Article 11 (freedom of association) and his Article 9 claim was dismissed. The court noted that the BNP had not been banned in the U.K. and it was also looking at an employment rights issue rather than (as in the question) access to business premises; there is a general set of rights relating to unfair dismissal which were in play. It had not been proved that the driver was actually unfit to do the job. So even though party membership is not protected under the Equality Act, people may still benefit from other legal protections. The case also shows the difficulties of inferring beliefs based on indicators like supporting a political party. If the BNP were banned then it would be another matter, and U.K. law does allow the banning of extremist organisations. (Principally, under the Terrorism Act 2000, part II.) Some extreme-right groups are proscribed in this way, although there is no general restriction of fascism or Nazism. | There is no current authorization to bar any member of the house from the floor, so the answer depends heavily on what actually happens. Since remote voting was approved, no constituency would be disenfranchised. But we could imagine the house adopting a rule barring remote participation, and also barring entry to the House floor for any person not wearing a mask. The House is constitutionally allowed to set its own rules. The House did bar Adam Clayton Powell from being seated, and he did indeed sue. SCOTUS, most importantly, asserted that this is a justiciable question, and most importantly "In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution". This could be overcome by expelling the member who refuses to wear a mask (Congress has the power to expel, but not exclude). There would be a significant conflict of rights in this case. Residents of the district has a right to representation (equal protection clause), but Congress has the right to expel members. But Congress has expelled 5 members, and most recently, Ohio's 17th district was without representation in the US House for a half a year after Traficant was expelled. That did not prevent the House from exercising its right to expel a member. | A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it. | The Scottish Claim of Right makes clear that the people of Scotland are Sovereign, not Westminster. Not so much. It establishes principles of parliamentary monarchy... (for example) That the chargeing of the leidges with lawborrowes at the Kings instance and the imposeing of bonds without the authority of Parliament and the suspending advocats from their Imployment for not Compearing when such bonds were offered were Contrary to Law That the putting of Garisones on privat mens houses in tyme of peace without their Consent or the authority of Parliament is Contrary to law ...while inviting William and Mary to accede to the Scottish throne: The said Estates of the Kingdome of Scotland Doe resolve that William and Mary King and Queen of England France and Ireland Be and be Declared King and Queen of Scotland To hold the Crowne and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome of Scotland To them the said King and Queen dureing ther lives and the longest liver of them and that the sole and full exercise of the regall power be only in and Exercised by him the said King in the names of the said King and Queen Dureing ther joynt lives And after ther decease The said Croune and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome to be to the heirs of the body of the said Queen which failing to the Princess Ann of Denmark and the airs of her body which also failing to the aires of the Body of the said William King of England And they do Pray the said King and Queen of England to accept the same accordingly ... That for redress of all greivances and for the amending strenthneing and preserveing of the lawes Parliaments ought to be frequently called and allowed to sit and the freedom of speech and debate secured to the members In other words, it provides that the monarchy is not absolute, and that its power is circumscribed by parliament. One thing it certainly does not do is circumscribe the power of the Westminster parliament, which had no power in Scotland before the Acts of Union of 1707. Before then, the Westminster parliament was only the Parliament of England. The Acts of Union provided, in part, That the United Kingdom of Great Britain be Represented by one and the same Parliament to be stiled the Parliament of Great Britain With that act, the Parliament of Great Britain assumed the role of the Parliament of Scotland. As a consequence, the Claim of Right Act of 1689 grants power to the Westminster parliament rather than circumscribing its power. To the extent the people are sovereign, this sovereignty is vested in their representatives in Westminster. On the other hand, if you're talking about the 1989 claim, that document has never had or claimed any legal force. |
Recourse if heir (assuming to be only heir) gives away items intended for other heir before the content of the will is known? Please note that this matter was settled to my satisfaction. I have no intention whatsoever to make an issue out of it. I’m asking the question mainly to satisfy my curiosity about what might have happened. TL;DR below. The full story: In the spring of 2019 my close friend Peter, went out on a Friday night to get fish & chips, was run over by a drunk driver and he died on the spot. His only next of kin was his mother Carla. She assumed she was the only heir. Peter was an avid collector of SciFi and Fantasy books (same as me) and had approx. 6000 books in his apartment in Edinburgh. Not knowing what to do with that enormous amount of books Carla called a local charity that runs thrift shops and offered them the books as donation. They send a guy over and he took away about 500 books. He promised to come back a week later with a larger van and more people to carry. I flew to Scotland for the funeral (I live in The Netherlands) and to assist Carla in dealing with the situation. That is when I learned she had given away those books. I explained to her that those particular books were not very valuable and giving them away was probably the best thing to do, but I knew that the entire collection was insured for £ 100.000 and that was most likely under valued. Give it all away seemed silly. She agreed and we notified the charity to put the collection on hold. Two days later Peters will was read. Turned out he was far wealthier than Carla or I knew. (We expected a few 100.000, but well over 10 million is a whole different game.) He bequeathed a substantial amount to a few charities and had made sure that Carla would never have to worry about money for the rest of her live. And he granted me his entire book collection plus an amount of money to cover my expenses for travel and dealing with the books (storage and shipping). Carla was very upset she had given "my" books away. I re-assured her that I didn’t mind at all. I would have given them away myself as that made far more sense for these books than shipping them to my home in The Netherlands. Over the following months I flew back and forth several times to further assist Carla and to deal with the books. Eventually I shipped about 2000 books home and integrated them into my own collection. About 2000 where sold to a trader in second hand books and the remaining 1500 were donated to charity as Carla had done with the first batch of 500. The proceeds of the sale and the remainder of Peters financial grant to me I donated in his name to the same charities that Peter had named in his will. TL;DR: An heir, assuming to be the only heir of the deceased, gives away part of his possessions prior to the content of the will being known. What recourse does the other heir, to who those items were granted in the will, have if this can not be amicably settled? Jurisdiction is UK, Scotland in case that matters. Financial value of the items approx £200 to £250. Presume that the items themselves can’t be retrieved anymore. | I think the key word here is "assume". A person, N, who is clearly the next of kin of a recently deceased person D may not assume that s/he is D's sole heir, or indeed is D's heir at all. N must wait until D's will (if any) is known, and an executor or administrator is lawfully appointed. Only the executor may lawfully dispose of D's property, by conveying it to specified beneficiaries, selling it, giving it away, or by any other means. Anyone who does so without the proper executor's authority is probably technically guilty of theft, although in a case like the one in the question, a prosecution would be very unlikely. But N would be liable to any heir H for the value of items properly left to H but disposed of by N. H might not choose to pursue such a claim, but would be legally able to. N should remember that the value, monetary or sentimental, of objects may not be known to N, and may be much greater to H than N is aware of. I suppose that in the case of objects of slight value which must be dealt with promptly, such as perishable food on D's premises, reasonable steps would not be objected to. | The person getting the item by fraud didn't get any ownership. Therefore when you bought it, you didn't get ownership either. It's still the company's property, and they can do with it what they like (within reason, they wouldn't be allowed to make it blow up in your face). If you sent back the item, good on you, because the item is now with its rightful owner. If you don't like it, you can sue the person who sold the item to you. | Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York can include one automobile within a family, here is the main form and a companion form. But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable). | No, John may not lawfully publish such a book in such a way What John wants to do is not lawful. It would infringe on the copyright on both the 1940 original, and on the 1955 translation. Both of those are still in copyright under the laws of France, the UK, and the US. Someone owns those copyrights: some person or business or other entity. If the owner has no legal heirs, in most jurisdictions the property escheats to the government (in the US to the state government). In the case of a company, its assets will be sold or handed over to some entity. But they will not become ownerless, any more than real estate will become ownerless when the owner dies or the owning company is dissolved. It is possible that the owner does not realize that s/he owns these rights. But if John publishes his book, then owner might then realize the rights that s/he holds. The owner could demand payment, or sue for damages. Under US law the damages could include any economic loss that the owner has incurred plus any profits that John or his publisher have made. John and his publisher would both be liable for these damages. As a result, no publisher is likely to be willing to publish John's book. If John self-publishers, he incurs the risk of such demands and suit. In some countries (such as the UK) there are legal procedures fore dealing with such "orphan works". In those countries one can register with a government agency, and obtain permission to use the work after a search has revealed no owner, paying a rate set by law. But there is no such provision in the US. There, John must either not publish, or gamble that no owner will appear and make demands he cannot afford to meet. | Bob's will leaves everything to Abby. Bob has a brokerage account solely in his name with no TOD on the account. Bob then dies. It is my understanding that for Abby to get the money, you have to go through probate. Am I right about that? Yes, this has to go through probate. I have been told that when you are leaving everything to a spouse you can skip probate. I am thinking that is wrong. You are correct. This said, in a very small dollar estate (e.g. $20,000, with the actual dollar amount varying state by state), some states allow you to transfer assets by affidavit rather than via the probate process, if the sold heir at all and will beneficiary are the same and there are no unpaid creditors with a claim against those funds. New Jersey has two sets of small estate procedures for estates under $50,000. The cutoff is sometimes $10,000, sometimes $20,000, and sometimes $50,000 depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the simplified process sought. It isn't clear to me that they apply in cases where the decedent has a will and therefore is not intestate. Small Estates General Summary: Small Estate laws were enacted in order to enable heirs to obtain property of the deceased without probate, or with shortened probate proceedings, provided certain conditions are met. Small estates can be administered with less time and cost. If the deceased had conveyed most property to a trust but there remains some property, small estate laws may also be available. Small Estate procedures may generally be used regardless of whether there was a Will. In general, the two forms of small estate procedures are recognized: Small Estate Affidavit -Some States allow an affidavit to be executed by the spouse and/or heirs of the deceased and present the affidavit to the holder of property such as a bank to obtain property of the deceased. Other states require that the affidavit be filed with the Court. The main requirement before you may use an affidavit is that the value of the personal and/or real property of the estate not exceed a certain value. Summary Administration -Some states allow a Summary administration. Some States recognize both the Small Estate affidavit and Summary Administration, basing the requirement of which one to use on the value of the estate. Example: If the estate value is 10,000 or less an affidavit is allowed but if the value is between 10,000 to 20,000 a summary administration is allowed. New Jersey Summary: Under New Jersey statute, where as estate is valued at less than $50,000, a surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, may present an affidavit of a small estate before the Superior Court. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit, the surviving spouse shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. New Jersey: New Jersey requirements are set forth in the statutes below. TITLE 3B ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES–DECEDENTS AND OTHERS 3B:10-3. When spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner entitled to assets without administration. Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $50,000, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner upon the execution of an affidavit before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the assets are located, or before the Superior Court, shall be entitled absolutely to all the real and personal assets without administration, and the assets of the estate up to $10,000 shall be free from all debts of the intestate. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit as provided in this section, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. The surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall state that the affiant is the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner of the intestate and that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $50,000, and shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, and specifically the nature, location and value of the intestate’s real and personal assets. The affidavit shall be filed and recorded in the office of such Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.1; 2004, c.132, s.77; 2005, c.331, s.24; 2015, c.232, s.1. 3B:10-4. When heirs entitled to assets without administration Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $20,000 and the intestate leaves no surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, and one of his heirs shall have obtained the consent in writing of the remaining heirs, if any, and shall have executed before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the intestate’s assets are located, or before the Superior Court, the affidavit herein provided for, shall be entitled to receive the assets of the intestate of the benefit of all the heirs and creditors without administration or entering into a bond. Upon executing the affidavit, and upon filing it and the consent, he shall have all the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate and may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, the names, residences and relationships of all of the heirs and specifically the nature, location and value of the real and personal assets and also a statement that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $20,000. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.2; 2004, c.132, s.78; 2005, c.331, s.25; 2015, c.232, s.2. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S. 46:14-7 and R.S. 46:14-8 to take acknowledgments or proofs. | Unfortunately, there is the law answer, and there is the family answer. The law answer is fairly straightforward - she deeds the land to you, and you leave it your husband if you precede him in death. The family answer is different. Many families have been torn asunder by inheritance issues. Your siblings seem to think they deserve a share, which is problematic if you are building there. Your choices are to split the land but buy your siblings out, establish a long-term structure lease on the land, or take the land and deal with sibling fallout. There may be other options an estate lawyer can recommend. Note that if your siblings are co-owners, then soon there will be many more as their children inherit. You need a local lawyer to do any of the above. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. | It should not surprise you that copyright protects the right to (among other things) make copies. There are limited exceptions that are considered "fair use", like if you reproduce a limited amount of text for educational, reporting, or review purposes. Giving your friend a copy of a large portion of the text just because they want it would almost certainly violate copyright. Whether the book is available or out-of-print has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on who holds the copyright or whether your actions violate it. This is very different from giving your friend the book itself. The book itself is covered under the "first sale doctrine", meaning that by buying a copy of the book, you buy the right to sell, transfer, or dispose of that particular copy, but it doesn't give you the right to make more copies. I will note that in practice, it is vanishingly unlikely that the copyright holder would ever learn of your isolated instance of limited infringement in the first place (especially since it's out of print), much less bring legal action against you for making a single copy that did not affect their bottom line. |
Charged with death of self? This is a hypothetical question, but I can use current news as an example. In some jurisdictions, I believe an arsonist can be charged with manslaughter if a fireman dies while fighting the fire, even if the fireman makes a fatal mistake while fighting it. In the arrest of George Floyd by Derek Chauvin, since Floyd allegedly committed a crime which caused the situation that led to a fatal mistake, couldn't that fact be used to charge Floyd with his own death? And if so, would that alter Chauvin's (and future police officers') sentencing? | No In many but not all common law jurisdictions, a person who comitts an "inherently dangerous" crime can be found guilt of "felony murder" (not manslaughter). The Wikipedia article says: In most jurisdictions, to qualify as an underlying offense for a felony murder charge, the underlying offense must present a foreseeable danger to life, and the link between the offense and the death must not be too remote. For example, if the recipient of a forged check has a fatal allergic reaction to the ink, most courts will not hold the forger guilty of murder, as the cause of death is too remote from the criminal act. Floyd was arrested on an accusation that he passed a counterfeit $20 bill. This is not an "inherently dangerous" felony. Nor has it ever been established that he had the criminal intent that would have been required to convict him of a crime. Indeed it has not been proved that he knew the bill was counterfeit. But a finding of criminal intent to commit the underlying felony is essential to invoking teh felony murder rule. MN code 609.632 subdivision 3 requires "intent to defraud" and "having reason to know that the money order, currency, note, or obligation or security is forged, counterfeited, falsely made, altered, or printed". Moreover when the value is under $1,000 the possible penalties are much lighter and may not even be a felony. In any case passing a phoney $20 is not the kind of offense for which the felony murder rule is normally invoked, nor is being killed by an arresting officer a plausible, outcome, althoguh obviously it is possible. Further sources The University of Minnesota's page on "felony Murder" says: When the defendant commits a felony that is inherently dangerous to life, he or she does so knowing that some innocent victim may die. In essence, this awareness is similar to implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. What is difficult to justify is a conviction for felony murder when the felony is not inherently dangerous to life. Thus most jurisdictions limit the felony murder doctrine to felonies that create a foreseeable risk of violence or death. ... Joaquin, who has just lost his job, decides to burn down his apartment building because he can’t afford to pay the rent. Joaquin carefully soaks his apartment with lighter fluid, exits into the hallway, and throws a lit, lighter-fluid-soaked towel into the apartment. He then runs outside to watch the entire building burn down. Several tenants die of smoke inhalation because of the fire. In jurisdictions that recognize felony murder, Joaquin can probably be charged with and convicted of murder for every one of these deaths. In this example, Joaquin did not intend to kill the tenants. However, he did most likely have the criminal intent necessary for arson. Therefore, felony murder convictions are appropriate. Note that Joaquin exhibited extreme indifference to whether the tenants in the building lived or died, which could also constitute the criminal intent of implied malice or depraved heart. The Minnesota code Section 609.19 MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE says: Subd. 2.Unintentional murders. Whoever does either of the following is guilty of unintentional murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years: (1) causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting; [Paragraph (2) deals with death "while intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the victim" which clearly does not apply in this case.] | In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. | The facts of the flower pot would determine the outcome. The legal question is whether the owner was "negligent". A claim of ignorance is insufficient, what matters is whether the owner departed from what an ordinary reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances. You can write dozens of scenarios that yield different conclusions. For example, was the area underneath the flower pot a place where no reasonable person would be expected to be? Did some other person surreptitiously place the pot in a location, or did they release the moorings and give it a shove? How is it credible that the owner was not aware that there was a flower pot on the balcony? Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable since accidents happen. Things fall all the time, they do not necessarily fall because of something that the person directly controls, you have not proven (and we can't assume) that the victim is blameless, and the defendants explanation is quite plausible. You can of course rewrite the scenario to make it clearer that this is blatant negligence. A starting point would be to say exactly how the pot fell and why the victim was under the pot. | It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot. | Assuming that this wasn't a planned murder or assault, the most serious charge would be vehicular homicide. In the US, this is governed by state law, but states are not radically different in whether this is a crime. In Washington, under RCW 46.61.520, vehicular homicide is a class A felony, punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term fixed by the court of not less than twenty years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine The crimes is defined as causing death while driving (a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502; or (b) In a reckless manner; or (c) With disregard for the safety of others. and such speeding is highly likely to be found to constitute the element of recklessness. There are also hit-and-run charges, which is a class B felony (10 years and $20,000). A person can be found guilty of both charges, and the judge can apply the prison sentences consecutively, meaning you add them up, rather than serve the jail time at the same time (in this case, essentially dispensing with the hit-and-run term). The law is written so that a killing is a crime, and if you kill two people that could be two charges (the question is whether there is a single act or two – most likely there was a single act in this particular case). There is no state where recklessly killing a person while driving is legal. First degree murder could be considered under 9A.32.030 if a person "Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". That kind of charge was applied to the Charlottesville driver, but it is highly unlikely to be applied to even the most extreme speeding. The actual penalty imposed depends on the sentencing laws of the state. In Washington there is a complex calculation based on the severity of the crime (16 degrees – vehicular homicide is level 11), prior criminal history, whether there are multiple convictions (vehicular homicide and hit-and-run). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances can also be considered to compute the actual sentence; I don't see any way for a non-specialist to guess what the actual penalty would be in this case. | There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney. | It depends on the law For example, the NSW Crimes Act 1900 s18 defines murder and manslaughter: (1) (a) Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years. (b) Every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter. (2) (a) No act or omission which was not malicious, or for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, shall be within this section. (b) No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who kills another by misfortune only. It is possible that the acts you describe could be prosecuted as either murder or manslaughter. For murder the prosecutor would need to prove that they are an "act by the accused ... causing the death charged, was done ... with reckless indifference to human life" - the hard part is the causal link. For manslaughter it is clear that the act "was ... malicious" and that there was no "lawful excuse" - some cause and effect would need to be demonstrated still. However, the prosecutor has a more certain option under s31C: 31C Aiding etc suicide ... (2) Where: (a) a person incites or counsels another person to commit suicide, and (b) that other person commits, or attempts to commit, suicide as a consequence of that incitement or counsel, the firstmentioned person shall be liable to imprisonment for 5 years. It is important to look at the legal definition of a crime to determine if a given set of circumstances meets all the required elements. |
Will Florida Social Media Bill Allow Trump back Online? Does the Florida Social Media Bill Allow Trump to Be Back on Twitter and Facebook? It prohibits internet companies from banning Politicians on social media. "SB 7072 also bars social media platforms from restricting “journalistic enterprises,” which the bill defines as entities that do business in Florida and have at least 100,000 monthly active users or 50,000 paid subscribers." Florida set to fine social media firms up to $250,000 a day for knowingly deplatforming politicians Florida bill would fine social media platforms for banning politicians | There are two reasons why this will probably not work. First, the law is likely to be considered unconstitutional. Forcing a private entity to host views that they do not want to violates their first amendment rights. If Facebook or Twitter are fined, they can ignore it, have it taken to the supreme court, and win. Second, Florida cannot prevent Facebook from operating there and do not want a situation where that happens. Not only are there potential first amendment issues but Florida are too insignificant. Whereas larger entities such as the EU can dictate terms, Florida would simply be bluffing. | Wave Broadband is a private company; they can probably decide to not provide service to an address that is in arrears or collections. I'm sure there is a clause in their service contract that states they can do that, and there would be local or state laws to support that. Whatever public service commission governs the state may also allow that. It's possible that Wave is breaking the law by denying service to a whole address, but doubtful. You can check with the state level public service commission. | The Quora statement that the word "facebook" cannot be used in a domain name without permission is incorrect, or at least too broad. If a site or app is intended to work with Facebook, it may say so. However it may not use the word "Facebook" whch is trademark, in such a way as to suggest that it is an official Facebook product, or that it is endorsed, authorized, or sponsored by the makers of Facebook, or to cause confusion with the original Facebook. Whether a domain name containing "facebook" does that depends on the details. There are multiple precedents for criticism sites. A domain such as "facebooksucks.com" would not be trademark infringement, and there is caselaw to support this. But that is not what might be wanted here. Perhaps "unofficialfacebookhelper.com" would suffice. But to return to the question asked, use of a word in the hypertext metadata in the "Head" element is a reasonable way of indicating that the site is to be used in connection with Facebook, but there would need to be some additional notice or disclaimer making it very clear to any user that the site is in no way affiliated, endorsed, authorized, or sponsored by the makers of Facebook. The use of a trademark to identify another product with which a given product works is known as nominative use. The law specifically allows it, providing it is not done in such a way as to cause confusion, or to falsely suggest sponsorship, approval, or some relationship that does not exist. However, large corporate trademark owners are known to claim more rights than the law allows them. Such owners may try to suppress nominative use that they hae not approved, although they could not win a trademark lawsuit over such use. US Law 15 U.S. Code § 1125 (c)(3) provides the relevant part: The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services | Governments have power to do whatever their constitutions (written or unwritten) allow them to do. For example, the constitution of Australia provides: The federal Parliament can make laws only on certain matters. These include: ... post and telecommunications; ... The telecommunications power covers VPN and any software that uses the Internet for delivery or communication (i.e. virtually all modern software). In addition the federal government has power over inter-state and international trade (any software that crosses state or international borders) and corporations (any software made, sold or used by companies). If they want to ban a piece of software they have pretty strong constitutional power to do so. | Yes Presidential pardons only deal with breaches of Federal law. So, if the punishment is a fine then that penalty is waived. However, if the fine is punishment for breach of state law, the pardon does not touch it - he would need a pardon from the relevant state Governor(s). But Anthony Levandowski is not being punished with a fine, he was punished with a jail term. What he owes Google is damages for breach of contract or a tort, both civil matters and almost certainly under California law, not a punishment for an offence. This is not something he can be pardoned for by a President (if under Federal law which is unlikely) or a Governor (if under state law). His actions constituted both an offence against the state, which can be pardoned, and caused damage to another person (Google) which can’t. He owes this money as a debt just as if he had bought something from them or borrowed money from them. | There are several House rules and laws that prohibit Members from using their time on the floor or in committee meetings for campaign activities, including rallies. These prohibitions are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the House Ethics Manual, on "Campaign Activity." The general rule covering which resources can be used for campaigns is simple: "official resources of the House must...be used for the performance of official business of the House..., and may not be used for campaign or political purposes." p. 123 The "basic principle" underlying this rule is also simple: "government funds should not be spent to help incumbents gain reelection." p. 123 The ban extends to the use of "House buildings, rooms and offices – including district offices." Since these are "supported with official funds," they "are considered official resources," and, "as a general rule, they may not be used for the conduct of campaign or political activities, and...are not to be used for events that are campaign or political in nature..." p. 127. These rules obviously prohibit members from using the floor or committee meetings for campaign rallies. The House rules also prohibit using tv footage of "House floor...or committee proceedings" in "partisan political campaign material to promote or oppose the candidacy of any person for public office." p. 128. It is also a federal crime to solicit campaign contributions while on government property. In many cases, it is relatively easy to tell when these laws and rules have been broken. Either the Senator called a donor from her office, or she didn't; either she held a campaign rally or she didn't. But in other cases, it may not be so easy to tell when these laws have been broken. For example, suppose a Member throws in several partisan soundbites while speaking on the floor, hoping to make the nightly news. Could this be considered using the House floor for "political purposes"? | The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument. | Short answer: It depends on the state and exactly how you do so. Stating how you voted, by itself, is fine; however, taking a photo of your ballot instead of just saying how you voted is illegal in some states, especially if the photo was taken within a polling place. Laws banning these so-called "ballot selfies" may be unconstitutional, and have been successfully challenged under the first amendment in some cases. There is not a general ban on simply saying who you voted for. This is an extremely common practice, and it is the basis for "exit polling," where voters leaving a polling place are asked whom they voted for in order to collect voting statistics to predict the winner of the election. This type of polling has been upheld by courts, and it sounds like laws banning it were primarily concerned with voter intimidation rather than vote-buying. As of 2016, 18 states banned sharing any photograph of a ballot, while an additional 6 ban photography in polling places. The rationale for such laws is to prevent vote-buying, because if you can't take a photo of your ballot, you can't prove whom you voted for (whereas without the photo, you could simply vote however you like, then lie). However, at least one such law has been challenged in federal court and invalidated as a violation of the first amendment (in Rideout v. Gardner) "because it is a content-based restriction on speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny." If such first-amendment challenges continue to be upheld, it is possible that this practice will be legal throughout the United States. |
Can you avoid capital gains tax by taking out a loan and not repaying debt? Let's say I have 1 bitcoin and I am selling it for $100k, and I bought it for $0 at the time. Assuming a Capital Gains Tax rate of 33% I would owe $33k, leaving me with only $66k. Could I instead get a loan of $100k backed by bitcoin as collateral + some fee for the loan provider. I can then spend that full $100k. Oh no! I'm not able to pay the loan back because I spent it all. How unfortunate... Now the loan provider has no choice but to sell of my bitcoin to get their $100k back, and it looks like I'm after avoiding capital gains tax. Is this legal? I live in Ireland so it would be nice to know what the laws are like here, but it would also be interesting to know what it's like in the US. Or do you have to pay capital gains tax before using something as collateral for a loan? | Yes, you can borrow tax-free Bitcoin (or really, any currency not your home currency) is a security like a stock or bond. Whenever you take a loan using a security as collateral, that is not a taxable event, and so you do not owe taxes on the money you borrowed. Perfect world, you pay it back and this is not taxable either: the loan/repayment is a non-event to the tax authorities. (Although interest might be tax deductible). When this goes wrong: you default If you default and keep your collateral, at some point, the lender decides you'll never pay, and forgives aka "writes off" the loan. This forgiveness is considered ordinary income and it is taxable in the year forgiven. In the US this is waived if you can show that you were insolvent at the time of default. When this goes wrong: forced sale of collateral The collateral is still your property. The bank just has a lien on it or other form of control, like it's in your brokerage account in their bank such that they can flag it, force sale, and intercept funds. When the bank forces sale of your collateral to pay your debt, that is a sale of the security for tax purposes. The proceeds go to you (as far as the tax person is concerned), even though the bank certainly will intercept the proceeds. So the tax liability goes to you. Note that standard capital gains rules apply, so if you owned it less than 1 year when you signed up for the loan, yet the bank forced the sale after 1 year of ownership, then it counts as holding the security longer than 1 year for tax purposes. (e.g. qualifying for the lower "long term capital gains" rate in the US). | The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures. | “Real property” is land and things attached to land Everything else (including Bitcoin) is personal property. Therefore, since the 2017 amendment, Bitcoin is not captured by the s1031 like-kind transfer exemption. However, the article you link to is discussing its treatment before the amendment. | In germany inheritance tax (Erbschaftsteuer) taxes someone receiving an inheritance (or a gift - they are treated the same). If the heir is (inheritance tax) resident in Germany, German inheritance tax is due in principle on the whole received property, regardless of where that property is. Paid foreign inheritance tax on particular types of property and in accordance with tax treaties can be deducted. (Details: see §21 ErbStG and §121 BewG) Wrt the scenario in the question: if that foreign country collects low/no inheritance tax, the heir gets accordingly low or no deduction from the due German inheritance tax. Whether the "more mobile" property in the question counts as foreign property or not depends on whether the deceased was German resident in the sense of inheritance tax law or not (e.g. moved their residence to the foreign country > 5a before their death), but again, that wouldn't lower the total amount of taxes due, it only shifts who gets them. In order to actually avoid German inheritance tax on the mobile property of the question, the heir would need to move their tax residency away from Germany. | This is not theft, this is a contract dispute. You gave them money, they promised to do certain things, the contract says what that is. I surmise that they wanted a deposit to cover their costs in further dealing with you (moving is more complicated and costly than buying a loaf of bread), so in walking away from the deal, you've economically damaged them to some amount. The deposit is "liquidated damages". Your recourse is to sue them for that amount, because... Perhaps you didn't understand why you were giving them this deposit (an act that constitute some level of agreement), but any time you hand over a deposit, there is a circumstance under which you will not get that money back, and you have to understand what that circumstance is. | I have heard that this interest rate is illegally high for a loan. Is this correct? Yes. This is an annualized interest rate of 715,586,124,880,210%, which is far, far in excess of the maximum interest rate allowed by law. The maximum legally allowed interest rate in British Columbia is 60% per annum. So, an interest rate of 65 cents or more in a five day period on a loan of $100.00 is illegal. I don't know his current address. Lending money without collateral to people without knowing their current address is just plain stupid when it comes to lending practices. Nobody does that without a primarily donative intent. Would have holding collateral been a legal solution? Potentially. This is essentially the business model of a pawn shop. In the case of a pawn shop, the borrower delivers tangible personal property to the pawn shop owner who takes custody of it, which serves as collateral for a small loan with a set, legal interest rate, for a fixed period of time much greater than five days (typically several weeks or to several months). If the loan is not repaid, the collateral becomes the property of the lender in full payment of the loan, and the parties haggle in advance over the fair market value of the collateral against which the customer may borrow the full amount. A pawn is essentially equivalent to an outright sale of tangible personal property (almost always used) in exchange for cash, with a right to rescind the deal for a modest interest charge within X number of days after the sale. Since the pawn shop owner has some asset of the borrower to collect from in the event of non-payment, and the loan is "non-recourse" (i.e. collection rights are limited to taking ownership of the collateral), it isn't important to even know the address of the borrower, and no lawsuits are necessary for the lending pawn shop owner to be made whole if the loan is not repaid. The down side of running a pawn shop is that the owner needs to have considerable skill to value the collateral at a price sufficient to repay the loan together with a fair share of the administrative expenses of the operation on a case by case basis, for the very modest profit margin associated with a typical pawn shop. Most people who are skilled enough to value tangible personal property accurately enough to make money running a pawn ship are also skilled enough to do other things that pay better. Late Charge: Any payment not remunerated within 10 days of its due date shall be subject to a belatedly charge of 5 percent (%) of the payment, not to exceed $500 for any such late installment. Late charges are considered in the maximum interest rate calculation, so you need a much longer term loan and a much lower interest rate for this to be legally permissible. Collection fees: If this note is placed with a legal representative for collection, then Borrower agrees to pay an attorney's fee of ten percent (10%) of the voluntary balance. This fee will be added to the unpaid balance of the loan. Not sure what is meant by the "voluntary balance." It isn't inherently improper to include the costs of collection in a loan agreement, and indeed, I think that this may be the default rule of law in British Columbia without any contractual term under loser pays rules of civil procedure. But, a court can decline to award more than the "reasonable" legal fees incurred to collect a debt, and it is not at all clear that even the minimal amount of legal fees one could incur to collect a debt would be reasonable to collect a loan of $100 and interest. Likewise, while there are "hard money loans" (i.e. loans secured only by collateral and no personal obligation to pay that can be enforced against an individual's assets in court), where it is customary for the legal costs of drafting the loan documents to be paid by the borrower rather than the lender, for the most part, this simply makes no sense, because even 12 minutes of legal time (0.2 hours in the typical legal billing format) is an excessive amount to charge for a $100 loan for a five day period of time. This would typically be $50-$60 or more. It would probably be treated as an interest charge and hence would be illegal in British Columbia. Would a term like "if the lender needs to resort to legal action to enforce a term of this agreement, the borrow will reimburse him for all related expenses and his time" be enforceable? Reimbursement for out of pocket court filing fees and any photocopying costs and process server costs is likely to be enforceable. Reimbursement for the lenders own time to enforce the loan in the event of a default is probably not enforceable in the case of a $100 loan, even at minimum wage. Making small loans has historically been a marginal economic sector for precisely this reason. Even if the default rate is low, the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing (in the event of defaults) a small loan and the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing these promise for a much larger loan are similar. But the dollar amount of interest generated by a small loan is much smaller relative to the administrative costs involved than the interest on a large loan. Credit card companies and similar lenders make small loans affordable by automating the lending process, screening borrowers based upon credit ratings, making many loans each month to the same borrower, and making loans to many, many borrowers to spread the risk out. But making small loans on a one-off basis is not a profitable venture. Business models that charge enough to be profitable with small loans, like payday lenders and car title lenders in the United States, usually have some sort of collateral or de facto collateral (like a post-dated check), and tend to be shut down by regulators because their interest rates typically need to be on the order of 150%-400% per annum to make a profit, due to high administrative costs involved in making small loans relative to the amount of the loan. But interest rates this high are considered exploitive and are illegal. Another business model, which essentially describes the business model in the question except for the enforcement method, is called "loan sharking". The main difference between legitimate or almost legitimate small loan lending and loan sharking, is that loan sharks enforce their loans by having organized crime enforcers beat up people who don't pay, rather than using lawsuits to deal with loan defaults. This is, of course, completely illegal and a serious crime. | Suppose I obtain the ability to access someone else's cryptocurrency. This sounds like fraud e.g. I overheard them saying the password to their wallet out loud or I am a custodian of their assets. Nope, STILL fraud, possibly even Computer Misuse aka hacking... and because you use internet: it's Wire Fraud I now borrow those assets, keep them for some period of time, and then return them, without the owner's consent. hmmm, let's take california... Luckjy you, it is not embezzlement because you were not entrusted with the cryptocurrency, you gave yourself access. 503. Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been intrusted. No it is plainly... theft under California law: 484. (a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and in determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent representation or pretense made shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee or employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due and unpaid and every judgment that the employer has been unable to meet shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. Giving it back doesn't matter. The person taking the crypto for any amount of time without being entitled to them is committing theft. You see, California doesn't interest that you just want to borrow. They don't even require Mens Rea for the mere taking - only for fraudulent pretense there is an intent question. In fact, it might even be automatically Grand Theft: 484d. As used in this section and Sections 484e to 484j, inclusive:[...] (2) “Access card” means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access card, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper instrument. 484e. (a) Every person who, with intent to defraud, sells, transfers, or conveys, an access card, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, is guilty of grand theft. YIKES! and now, intent to defraud comes in, but that is actually minimal: that just means taking without being allowed to by the owner in many cases. | If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the "written binding agreements" include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment. |
Are online accounts and phone numbers frozen when "electronic devices" are seized by law enforcement? The recent seizure of the cellphones and computers of Rudy Giuliani by the FBI led me to wonder about the immediate, extra-legal consequences for such an individual. Would this individual be restricted from transferring their phone number to another phone in order to continue using it, or to access their "contacts" list. Same for "social media" and other accounts (e.g. a password manager) – would the individual be locked out of those as well? As a "non-legal" person, at first glance it seems to me that it would follow that the accounts would be frozen in order to preserve any evidence being sought. However, thinking about it further, if the warrants were only for "electronic devices" exclusive of electronic accounts and services (e.g. cell phone and social media accounts), then the individual should legally still be able to access them. Stated a simpler way: what is the scope of a warrant for "electronic devices"? | Assuming that the police have a warrant to seize your cell phone, the scope of what can be seized is specified in the warrant. It is not automatic that seizing a phone entails seizure of some or all online accounts (e.g. automatic backups, collections of passwords in a Google account) and it does not automatically "freeze" or block a person's access to their accounts including phone accounts. It's not that it is impossible to seize an account, it's that it is not automatic: it has to be in the scope of the warrant. Here is a collection of petition templates, asking the court to allow the seizure of various things for various reasons (mostly electronic), including access to bank accounts. If the police suspect that information might be available online after it has been deleted from a phone, they would need to include online accounts in the scope of the petition(s). There is even a template for "give me everything", called "Frankenstein". | It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two. | A warrant is required: you cannot just bust into a home because the owner died. Nothing that you describe resembles the kind of emergency situation that allows a warrantless search. In order to get a warrant, you have to have a good enough reason. Suppose that campus police found a suspicious object at the scene which was evidence of a crime and which had an identifiable connection to his home. Campus police might get a warrant to search the home, to find evidence related to the possiblity that this was a murder. That evidence could be evidence that he had uncovered a terrorist plot to bomb Needles CA, and he was killed because of that. His home computer might contain records of contact between him and the terrorists: so the judge might grant a warrant. The FBI might also go to a federal court for a warrant for a different suspected crime, for example a planned bombing of Needles. Since this involves national security, this could be a FISA court, which is a secret court for surveilling foreign spies in the US. The daughter has the (apparent) authority to consent to a search – police are not required to inquire very deeply into a person's authority to consent to a search. If she doesn't consent, the police of the FBI might have probable cause for a warrant – it has to be an articulable reason, not just a mystical intuition (TV cop shows notwithstanding) that there must have been a crime and the house has evidence of the crime. | Massachusetts is a 'two-party' state. So you'd have to have consent from them to record. You could probably travel to a 'one-party' state such as one of the states listed here and call them while recording. In a one-party state, only one of the parties to the conversation needs to know about the recording. In those states you don't even need to inform them. It would be interesting to see if the law applied to where the call center is located. When calling credit card companies these days, the call may be routed to any number of places depending on call loads, and those places might be out of country as well. | This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals. | Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself. | The relevant Maryland statute is MD. Criminal Law Code Ann. § 9-307 (2021), subsection (a): A person may not destroy, alter, conceal, or remove physical evidence that the person believes may be used in a pending or future official proceeding with the intent to impair the verity or availability of the physical evidence in the official proceeding. Note "that the person believes" and "with the intent to." If you have no reason to think it might be necessary in an official proceeding, you aren't violating this section. If you delete the data unintentionally or for some other reason, then you also probably are not violating the section. (I say "probably" because I'm sure there's some sort of provision for negligence or willful disregard for the evidential value of something you should know has evidential value.) As a practical matter, no copyright lawsuit or criminal trial (and criminal trials over copyright infringement are very rare) is going to depend on the browser history of the defendant's friend. What if my computer has major software issues and the only viable solution is delete everything and reinstall from scratch; am I stuck with a worthless broken computer because reinstalling things from scratch would delete evidence of a crime? If you know of evidence on the hard drive that would be destroyed, you can copy it somewhere else before deleting and reinstalling. Federal law is similar: it requires knowledge and intent. 18 USC 1519: Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. | The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps. |
Is a lie + "under penalty of perjury" enough to be perjury? Suppose I took a piece of paper and wrote on it: 2 + 2 = 5 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on [date]. [my signature] Would I have technically committed the crime of perjury? If not, what more is needed for it to be perjury? NOTE: I say "technically" because I know that I'd never be indicted or prosecuted because of the above. | First thing is, the statement has to be with a specific governmental sphere, such as in a submission to a court, or a document with some legal weight submitted to a party where the government has mandated that the declaration be "sworn" (an employment application involving security clearances; a DMCA takedown notice which has a connection to copyright law). Second, the statement has to be material, i.e. has "a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed" Kungys v. US, 485 U.S. 759. Third, you have to know that the statement is false (mistakes of knowledge are not perjury): the lie has to be willful. Fourth, the statement has to be literally false (Bronston v. US, 409 U.S. 352). W.r.t. the Bronston standard, a desire to not reveal a fact when testifying in a proceeding does not render the statement perjurious, when the statement is literally true but incomplete, thus telling the whole truth is not required (attorneys are expected to detect incomplete responses and press the issue on things not said). The edges of "literal truth" are a bit murky. What distinguishes Bronston from a number of cases of literally true perjury is that Bronston's testimony contained a clear sign that it was incomplete, but other "literally true" false statements (de Zarn, for example) contained nothing that an alert attorney could focus on. See US v. Robbins where defendant offered "11th and MacArthur" as the name of a corporation, the one in question, then falsely testified that it had no assets – the name of the corporation was actually "MacArthur and 11th Properties, Inc.". | Yes! Some states have laws against it. RCW 9A.60.070, for example, makes it a gross misdemeanor in Washington. (2) A person is guilty of knowingly using a false academic credential if the person ... falsely claims to have a credential issued by an institution of higher education that is accredited by an accrediting association recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council: (a) In a written or oral advertisement or other promotion of a business; or (b) With the intent to: (i) Obtain employment; ... (5) Knowingly using a false academic credential is a gross misdemeanor. If a state does not have a law specific to the issue, it depends on whether the statement is made under penalty of perjury under state law. It is not uncommon to have an employment application that asks for educational information and which you sign under penalty of perjury. In addition, if the employer is a federal agency, for example, or if there is otherwise an argument that the resume is within jurisdiction of a branch of the Federal Government, the crime of making false statements could theoretically be used against a person. In reality, in a state without a law specific to this issue, it is much more likely to be a really bad idea that will tank a person's career than it is to result in a criminal charge. Except perhaps if they do it during an FBI investigation or as part of a security clearance process. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | The question to be answered is "did the state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt", the answer to which should have no reasonable doubt. The interests of the defendant are sufficiently protected by the basic burden of proof requirement. The alternative that a single vote of not guilty exonerates the defendant would seriously hobble the interests of the people, and the alternative of automatic mistrial would make trials prohibitively expensive. The unanimity requirement does mean that in case of initial disagreement, parties have to re-think their positions, which is not a bad thing. The question of whethar a supermajority of guilty votes suffices for conviction was decided in a recent case, Ramos v. Louisiana, allowing conviction with a 10-2 vote. The court takes unanimity to be a basic common law right from the 14th century. Louisiana and Oregon had unconventional schemes allowing less than unanimous decisions: the reasoning behind the unanimity requirement is discussed extensively in that opinion. Since Alito, Roberts and Kagan dissented in part, the rationale for the other view is also spelled out. | There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced. | It is allowed to introduce evidence that impeaches the credibility or reliability of a witness, which could include his previous 5 convictions for perjury. This does not constitute "character assassination", so I'm not sure what you mean by that. A felony conviction can be admissible (assuming he was not exonerated). There are limits; for example, evidence of religious belief would be inadmissible, likewise holding an unpopular political belief. The evidence has to be connected to the witness's honesty. |
Why are there no public arbitration proceedings? Despite the ubiquity of binding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, I am unable to find a single example of an actual consumer arbitration proceeding (emails, exhibits, hearing, etc.). This is in contrast to litigation, where millions of dockets are available via PACER. This is surprising as the American Arbitration Association consumer rules do not impose any sort of confidentiality restrictions on the consumer. What explains the lack of public arbitration proceedings? | Because they are private Not private in the sense of confidential, although many are confidential (if agreed by the parties) and the arbitrator is always under a duty of confidence. Rather, private in the sense that they are conducted by private people and organisations who have no obligation to publish or publicise the results. Since most people pay on the decision, most arbitrations never go near a public court and therefore never get published. | You reach a settlement instead of a judge deciding a court case if both sides agree that a settlement is better for them than paying court costs, lawyers cost, the risk of losing, having embarrassing details published, distraction for a business, waste of time, and the stress of a court case. If the plaintiff wants to be able to publish details of the case, there is a lot less reason for the defendant to enter a settlement agreement. You complain that third parties miss out on possible information. That’s exactly why it isn’t there, because the defendant doesn’t want it to be there. The defendant might offer “I’ll give you $ 1,000 if you agree not to say a word about the case.” If the plaintiff says “I want $ 1,000 and tell the world about what happened”, then the defendant will likely say “take our offer, or take us to court and our lawyers will do their best so you get nothing”. The defendant will just not offer the kind of settlement you are looking for. And the plaintiff will do what is best for them, not what is best for anyone else. You have to remember that a settlement cannot be forced upon both sides, it must be something that both sides agree on. It's easiest to agree if you give the other side what they want if it doesn't cost you much, and then get things that you value more in return. As a plaintiff, not telling the world about the case is something that costs me nothing, but may have high value for the defendent. On the other hand, I value cash from the defendent a lot, while the defendent may be rich and can easily afford it. Because both sides have to agree, the terms are likely to incorporate something that both sides want. | Only in a civil case Yes, in a civil case, Alice generally can call Bob as a witness to take the stand. In many cases, this is done very early, locking in their testimony, before expert witnesses or other evidence by the plaintiff are presented to try and undermine the testimony. Alice may ask only questions that have relevance to the case. Let's take for example a dispute about a contract: Alice may ask Bob if he engaged in negotiations to form the contract, about the matter of the contract, if he signed the contract, or how he (or his employees) fulfilled (or not) the contract. Pretty much everything that pertains to the contract or the execution thereof. This does not extend to the settlement of the case or attempts thereof. Alice may not ask if Bob has an affair with Clarice unless that somehow is material to the contract at hand. Alice may not re-ask questions where an objection was sustained in the same way. However, Bob might not need to answer all questions (there are things that are banned from being asked), especially as Bob's attorney will object to questions. A few examples of competent questioning can be seen towards the end of My Cousin Vinnie, though this is a criminal trial. Never in a criminal trial In a criminal trial, not only can the prosecution not call Bob to the stand, he has to elect to go to the stand to even be questioned by the prosecution. That is because he can "plead the 5th". There is a tiny exception for civil cases, where they can do so there too. | Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual. | Judicial estoppel prevents a party from arguing two opposite positions in separate proceedings. Is there a similar doctrine that applies to argumentation in the same brief? No. The general rule is that a party is permitted to argue inconsistent positions in the alternative within a brief. When a party does so without expressly saying so, it is assumed that they are arguing in the alternative unless the party clearly indicates otherwise (and is just being illogical). But the law in the context of arbitration is a special case that doesn't align perfectly with the general rule, and makes different distinctions sometimes. Under the substantive law of arbitration clause validity, sometimes a party can be forced to arbitrate even if there is a possibility that the underlying contract is unenforceable, with the arbitrator making that decision. But, a party cannot be forced to arbitrate in every case where the validity of the underlying alleged agreement is in doubt, simply because an agreement, on its face, contains or references an arbitration agreement. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, certain preliminary decisions are vested in the courts even if a written arbitration purports to provide otherwise, if a party choses to raise those issues. A dispute over which of two significantly different competing arbitration agreements applies to an issue between the parties could be such a circumstance. Thus, a term that provides that "delegates threshold questions such as the 'applicability, existence, scope, or validity' of the agreement to the arbitrator," is partially void as a matter of public policy under the Federal Arbitration Act, although some of its retains its validity. For example, you can't delegate the question of the existence of an arbitration agreement to an arbitrator if that question is disputed, even if the contract says otherwise. In arbitration cases, there is a rather elaborate jurisprudence governing what issues are for a court to decided and what are for an arbitrator to decision when the right of a party to arbitrate, and/or the validity of the underlying contract, are disputed, that makes some very fine distinctions between different kinds of arguments. For example, if a party claims that he never had dealings with a party that presents an unsigned document that is a contract and also asserts that this party is bound to an arbitration agreement, that question can be decided by a court. But, if a party signed an agreement with a plain vanilla arbitration clause but claims it is unenforceable because it was induced by duress or undue influence, the arbitration will usually go forward with the arbitrator deciding the validity of the contract. When a decision is decided by a court, or by an arbitrator, is not easily summarized or manifestly obvious without a review of the relevant case law which is voluminous and intricate. See, e.g., Samson v. NAMA Holdings, LLC, 637 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2011); Santich v. VGG Holding Corp., 2019 CO 67 ¶ 6 (June 24, 2019); N.A. Rugby Union, LLC v. U.S. of Am. Rugby Football Union 2019 CO 59, ¶¶ 20-22, 442 P.3d 859, 863-864 (June 17, 2019);;; | Choice of law A contract can include a choice of law clause that states the laws that apply to the contract. For the USA this would usually be the laws of a particular state. Most courts in most jurisdictions respect the choice of law clause - that is, if say a suit is brought in a new-south-wales court on a contract with a choice of law of californina, the court will (probably) apply Californian law to the contract. However, a choice of law clause does not affect non-contract law like torts, equity, criminal law, consumer protection law, and "no contracting out" laws. So, for the above example, while the contract will be interpreted using California/USA law, other claims will be assessed under New South Wales/Australian law. For an example of how this works in practice, see ACCC v Valve Software. It was never in doubt that the contract was under Washington, USA law, however, the "no refund" term, while valid in Washington violated Australian Law and was unenforcable and, more critically for valve, was misleading and deceptive, costing them AUD 3 million in fines (plus legal costs). Choice of Forum In addition to specifying the relevant law, a contract can also suggest the appropriate forum: "disputes shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of Californian courts". A clause that oversteps the suggestion and states the forum categorically is likely to be void on public policy grounds: a contract cannot exclude courts that have jurisdiction. A choice of forum clause is one of the factors a court will consider if one of the parties petitions that it is the wrong forum and the case should be transferred to the right forum. They are influential but not determinative and go into the mix with all the other relevant factors. Arbitration A well-drafted binding arbitration agreement will almost always be effective if it complies with local law. Courts have a very strong bias in favour of enforcing arbitration clauses. | How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released. | A settlement can include whatever terms the parties agree on, short of terms prohibited by law. Usually one party gives up at lest some claims. Then other party nay also give up,claims, or make a payment, or both. There may be other terms as well, including confidentiality of the details. It is not uncommon for both parties to give up all claims against each other. Settlement agreements are legally binding on both parties. We cannot advise on what kind of settlement a particular person should take in a particular case. For tht, consult a lawyer. |
Are tax crimes' punishments in general proportional to the amount of money? Let's say that I sell 0.001 BTC right now on Bisq (decentralized P2P exchange) and the buyer sends me $500 USD to my bank account. I then use that $500 to buy a pair of headphones for myself. Or I just buy the headphones straight away with Bitcoin, skipping the whole fiat conversion part. For one reason or another, I never report this to the government. Maybe I simply had no idea that such a law existed (actually the case for me up until a few days ago), or I forgot, or I did know but actively wanted to avoid having to pay my money to an evil government. I doubt it matters why; let's just say that I never report it. But then, one day, they find out. And they decide that I'm guilty of withholding $500 worth of BTC from them, of which I'm apparently supposed to pay 30% in taxes whenever I sell/spend them. I'm sure they will punish me somehow, and not care about any explanation I might have. But will the punishment be 40 years in federal maximum security prison, even though the amount of money is ridiculously small? Or will they just tell me to pay it and perhaps add a $20 fee on top of the 30% of $500 that they consider me to owe them? Again, I'm talking "in general". In most countries. Feel free to use the USA as an example, but I'd be interested if it varies wildly. | Short Answer The dollar amount of a criminal tax offense is considered at the sentencing stage, but is only one of many factors and merely helps determine which of several possible sentencing guideline sentences that a U.S. judge uses as a starting point when determining the sentence. While the amount of money involved is a factor, the punishment isn't usually "proportional" to the tax liability in a criminal tax case. But criminal tax offenses make up only a tiny fraction of all punishments imposed for violating tax laws. Most tax law violations are punished with civil penalties that are often proportional to the amount of tax not paid or not reported. The U.S. pattern in this respect is typical of punishments for violating tax laws in the developed world more generally. Undeveloped and developing country economies tend to be less bureaucratic and to have a more criminal law oriented system for punishing violations of their revenue collection laws, and also tend to have narrower tax bases limited to more concrete transactions. Many resource rich countries, like oil rich monarchies, often don't impose taxes on the general public at all. Long Answer I'm sure they will punish me somehow, and not care about any explanation I might have. But will the punishment be 40 years in federal maximum security prison, even though the amount of money is ridiculously small? Or will they just tell me to pay it and perhaps add a $20 fee on top of the 30% of $500 that they consider me to owe them? When Are Tax Crimes Prosecuted? The vast majority of the time, when you don't pay your taxes, tax collection authorities impose a monetary civil penalty, which often is proportional to the amount of money at stake, rather than punish your non-compliance in the criminal justice system. Less frequently, the civil penalty involves the forfeiture of property of the offending taxpayer (e.g. currency received as lawful payments for goods or services that is not disclosed to tax officials), or the loss of some tax law related benefit or privilege (e.g. disallowing a tax credit when a tax return upon which it should be claimed isn't filed by the due date). Strict liability or negligence based penalties for tax law violations are usually civil rather than criminal. Criminal penalties for tax law violations are usually reserved for intentional misconduct. How Severe Are Tax Crime Penalties? Criminal tax crimes usually involve intentional fraud or willful conduct influencing the amount of taxes you owe (as opposed to good faith efforts to lawfully not pay higher taxes than necessary, or negligent or unintentional actions that have that effect), or intentional non-reporting or misreporting of information necessary for the government to determine how much tax someone else owes, or willfully failing to pay or collect taxes when the taxable is able to pay or collect the taxes, or for conduct that thwarts tax collection more generally (like sending fake inaccurate tax forms to random people causing them to pay the wrong amount of taxes or none at all). The maximum penalty for serious tax crimes of this type are typically similar in severity to the maximum penalty for non-violent theft, forgery or fraud offenses not involving taxes, which is typically at the low to medium end for felony criminal conduct and is typically far less than the maximum punishment for violent crimes. Crimes involving willful manipulation of how much tax is owed by someone usually has higher maximum criminal penalties than willful failure to pay or collect taxes. Conduct such as lying to tax investigators, or disregarding legal process during tax audits and litigation, or other fraudulent conduct that doesn't change how much is owed or paid directly but makes it more cumbersome to collect taxes (like intentionally filing a false information tax return, when the taxpayer reports the income anyway, or filing a false information tax return to harass someone who doesn't owe any tax in the first place), are typically misdemeanors with only comparatively minor criminal penalties (perhaps a few days to a year in jail and a fine in the hundreds or single digit thousands of dollars). The main driver of the maximum penalty for the narrow range of tax law violations are actually tax crimes is how clearly malicious and unruly the conduct is, rather than the amount in controversy. Negligently failing to pay $10,000,000, or recklessly taking a very dubious tax law position in a tax return, will usually result in a large civil tax penalty, but no criminal prosecution. Intentionally forging or doctoring a $700 information tax return, or intentionally paying a tax bill with counterfeit currency, will usually have criminal penalties. There are also quite a few crimes that arguably count as tax crimes for conduct like murdering tax collectors, kidnapping tax collectors, assaulting tax collectors, bribing tax collectors, blackmailing tax collectors to act unlawfully, stealing or destroying tax collection agency property, etc. that would be crimes even if there was no tax component to the conduct, that I do not consider in this answer. These crimes are usually punished only modestly more severely than they are in the non-tax context when no government officials or offices are involved, and are usually punished with about the same severity as other crimes against non-tax government officials. Determining The Sentence For A Tax Crime Under U.S. Law In the U.S., the maximum period of incarceration for a federal tax related crime is usually not related to the amount of money that the government was denied in tax revenues, although the civil penalties for violations of tax laws are usually capped at a percentage of the tax not paid. Criminal fines for tax offenses are sometimes related to the dollar amount of the offense, and sometimes aren't related directly to the dollar amount, although they may be determined with the dollar amount of the offense in mind. The length of the sentence of incarceration and the amount of the fine actually imposed by a federal judge upon a conviction for a federal tax related crime between the maximum and minimum sentences authorized by law is governed by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines set by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Commission. The guideline sentence is based upon the specific subsection of the federal tax crime for which you were convicted and then a lot of factors that add or deduct points. Some of the points are related to your prior criminal history. Some of the points are related to your conduct in the litigation (e.g. did you cooperate with prosecutors), and some of the points are based upon the nature of the offense itself, including the dollar amount of the tax loss caused by the crime. Typically, there are several dollar ranges for each crime, and the number of points added to the number used to determine the sentencing guideline range is stated for each of the possible range of dollar values of the money at issue in the crime. The number of points you have after the judge evaluates all of these factors (based upon a preponderance of the evidence with lower evidentiary standards than those that apply at the guilt-innocence phase of the case) to produce a non-binding recommended sentencing range for the crime. The judge than imposes the sentence. A sentence within a correctly determined sentencing guideline range is always upheld on appeal. A judge can impose a sentence that is higher than the guideline range but lower than the maximum statutorily authorized sentence, or below the guideline range by higher than the minimum statutorily authorized sentence, if the judge articulates reasons for doing so that are on a list of reasons that a judge can impose a non-guideline sentence. If a sentence for a federal tax crime conviction is appealed, the appellate court evaluates whether the sentencing guideline range was determined correctly, and whether if the judge imposed a sentence outside the sentencing guideline range, if the reasons articulated by the judge were insufficient to justify that decision and hence constituted an abuse of discretion by the judge. If the appellate court makes that determination, the case is remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with the appellate court opinion (assuming that the conviction itself was affirmed on appeal). | They aren't "imposing tax laws at the state level", and the states are still perfectly free to award whatever credits they like. There's a more complete explanation here. Before 2017, if you paid, say, $30,000 in state taxes, you could take a $30,000 deduction from your federal taxable income, thus reducing your federal income taxes by some fraction of $30,000 (depending on your tax bracket). The 2017 tax bill placed a $10,000 limit on this deduction. Some states responded by creating a provision where you could donate $30,000 to the state and receive a $30,000 credit against your state taxes owed - so you end up paying the same amount to the state, but now you characterize it as a charitable donation, which is still deductible from your federal taxable income. The new IRS regulation says that such a "donation" will no longer be deductible from your federal taxable income; that's all. Your state can still issue you a tax credit for such a donation if they want - the federal government has no control over that - but any such credit will reduce the amount you are allowed to deduct on your federal return, making the whole exercise pointless. The federal government certainly has the power to determine how you should compute your income for the purposes of your federal income taxes, including what you may or may not deduct. That's the power they're using here. | In the UK, broadly speaking it is not illegal to pay a ransom. However, there may be circumstances such that arranging or paying a ransom constitutes a terrorist financing offence - although a prosecution might be deemed against the public interest. I'm not aware of any such prosecutions. Section 15 (3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to provide money or other property if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17 makes it an offence for a person to enter into or become concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available or is to be made available to another, and the person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17A makes it an offence for an insurer to make a payment under an insurance contract against kidnapping and ransom if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the money or other property has been, or is to be, handed over in response to a terrorist demand. Section 18 makes it an offence for someone to enter into or become concerned in an in an arrangement which facilitates the retention or control by or on behalf of another person of terrorist property. If a person becomes aware in the course of his trade, profession or business (e.g. the banker assembling the money) that someone may be arranging a ransom to pay a terrorist, section 19 makes it an offence for that person to not disclose to a constable as soon as reasonably practicable his belief or suspicion and the information on which it is based. In terms of maritime piracy kidnappings in the area of Somalia for example, although the Government has tried to link them to terrorism there is no direct evidence of systematic links. But if it became known that such a connection exists, then the knowledge or suspicion element of the terrorist financing offences might be provable. In Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member [2011] EWCA Civ 24 (a case partly about whether ransom payments by shipowners to pirates were as a matter of English law against public policy) the Court of Appeal was not aware of illegality in the payment of ransoms under international law. The UK Government supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2133 in January 2014, which among other things "Calls upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages". | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | Are the monetary donations collected by the recipient subject to federal taxation according to IRS law? Yes. Usually, money received from an activity from third-parties with no personal relationship to you (assuming that "you" are not a tax exempt organization), are taxable income under Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law, as a form of "compensation for services", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(1), or as "gross income derived from business", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (exactly which prong of I.R.C. § 61(a) it comes under isn't legally relevant for tax purposes in this situation). This is also informed by I.R.C. § 83(a) (which is a general rule even though the balance of the Code section applies mostly to equity compensation in entities), which states in the pertinent parts (material in brackets inserted for clarity): If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of the fair market value of such property . . . over the amount (if any) paid for such property [by the person who receives the property], shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services[.] But, gifts are expressly excluded from income under Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law. One point which the case law makes clear, however, is that an obligation to pay doesn't need to be a legally binding obligation to make a payment something that counts as income rather than a gift. The tax law instead looks at the substance of the interaction and the reality of how decent, well mannered people would act under circumstances in which they receive an uncompensated benefit. Ultimately, whether are voluntary payment made through a private individual or business's website is taxable income or is not taxable because it is a gift is a case by case determination to be made in light of all of the relevant facts. For example, if your mother donates $7,500 to your website on your birthday, even though all of your other "donations" are from third-parties whom you have never met in person in amounts from $5 to $100 and you have provided all of those other third-parties with some kind of service or benefit through your website (e.g. they were allowed to read free webcomics or listen to music you wrote and recorded without charge over the website), the donation from your mother probably counts as a gift, even though the other donations probably count as income taxable income. But, in the absence for any reason for the donation other than gratitude for the performance of the services provided by the website, or for the conduct of the business that the website belongs to, the donation will generally be treated as income under Sections 61 and 83, rather than as a gift under Section 102. The notion of a gift is normally limited by case law and suggestive related section of the Internal Revenue Code that illustrate its intended meaning in the case of gift loans and bargain sales made for donative purposes, to circumstances in which the person making the gift has received nothing in return for it. A donation to a website usually wouldn't meet this test to show a transfer's character as a gift. The most familiar example, upon which there is a great deal of case law and authoritative guidance, is that tips paid to restaurant and hospitality industry workers are income rather than gifts, and are subject not only to income taxation but also to FICA payroll taxation. These tipping situations are closely analogous to voluntary payments made through a website. There are a great many tax regulations, court cases interpreting tax law, and authoritative guidances from the IRS (such a revenue rulings) that address the basic concepts that I've set forth above. And, the income tax law authorities are further informed by the statutes and case law governing gift taxation, which is, as intended, interpreted to define a gift in a matter that dovetails more or less perfectly with the definition of a gift for purposes of Internal Revenue Code Section 102. As the IRS explains at its website discussing the gift tax for which the concept of a gift is defined consistently with the income tax concept of a gift: The gift tax is a tax on the transfer of property by one individual to another while receiving nothing, or less than full value, in return. The tax applies whether or not the donor intends the transfer to be a gift. The gift tax applies to the transfer by gift of any type of property. You make a gift if you give property (including money), or the use of or income from property, without expecting to receive something of at least equal value in return. If you sell something at less than its full value or if you make an interest-free or reduced-interest loan, you may be making a gift. Donations which are not income are gifts and there is a tax on gifts given (paid by the donor rather than the person receiving the gift). But, there is a $15,000 per donor per donee exception per year from gift taxation for gifts under the Internal Revenue Code, in addition to more than $12 million per lifetime per person exemption from gift and estate taxation for gifts in excess of this $15,000 amount (called the annual exclusion) and inheritances left at death. So, usually, if a transfer is treated as a gift rather than as income, no tax will be due. But this part of this answer's short summary of the law is the top level conceptual framework for all of those other subordinate tax law authorities. Also, this income is also subject to self-employment taxation, which is imposed in lieu of FICA on income which is not a wage, salary or employment-related tip. Often self-employment taxes are due on self-employment income even when no federal income tax is owed upon it. if there is a clear answer, do states with personal income taxes do the same regarding website donations? Most states and localities with a personal income tax start from the federal definition of income and modify that definition in ways that the taxing jurisdiction deems fit either to make sense (limiting the tax to income related to the state, for example, at least for non-residents), or to fit local policy preferences (e.g. exempting from income taxation, capital gains made in an investment in the state favored by state lawmakers). Almost no states or localities have chosen to deviate from the federal definition of income for income tax purposes with respect to donations made to websites that are not non-profit entities. | Article 1 Section 8 appears to answer your question - only the Federal Government has the power to regulate the value of currency. Unilaterally forbidding the use of pennies as currency would be a regulation of their value (from 1 cent to 0 cents). A state government might be allowed to refuse pennies for the purpose of paying for a service in advance like a private business can, but like a private business are required to accept them as legal tender for the purpose of repaying debts, judgements, etc. Responding to the edited post, I'm inclined to say that the proposed plan is still "regulating" currency, in the same way that only the Federal government is the only entity authorized to destroy worn out currency (which it obtains by fair exchange). As Nate Eldredge points out, this may also violate the Commerce Clause of the same section, both in terms of interstate transactions and in terms of the exchange of currency between persons of different states and the implementing state. However, if it was implemented as suggested in comments, where businesses were required to exchange whatever pennies they receive with the state government for an equal amount of other currency, it might not run afoul of either of these clauses. This is probably a question the Supreme Court would have to decide, since a lot of hypothetical factors could come into play. At first glance, there doesn't appear to be any factual difference between a state holding pennies in storage indefinitely and the state holding any other currency in storage indefinitely, which they are allowed to do so long as they don't violate any part of USC Title 18, Chapter 17 (e.g., melt the pennies for the copper). On the other hand, the Federal Government could argue that the storage of pennies for the purpose of removing them from circulation is a form of currency regulation even if the action would otherwise be legal, or that the state's actions are impactful enough to affect interstate commerce even though they only directly impact commerce in the state and therefore Congress could pass a law outlawing the practice. | Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing. | My recollection is there's a big difference between money and property. I found a 1929 law journal article that supports my recollection. The owner of stolen property is entitled to have it returned. If the person who obtained it from the thief didn't know it was stolen, the person didn't commit a crime, but must give up the property and is not entitled to any compensation (unless the person can get compensation from the thief). A person who innocently receives money is the holder in due course, and gets to keep it. The victim's only recourse is to get compensation from the thief. |
Naive approach to aggregating all US Federal Laws? I'm a software developer and I've recently found myself curious about the US Federal Laws. There's a seemingly unsolved question of "How Many Federal Laws Are There?" (https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2013/03/frequent-reference-question-how-many-federal-laws-are-there/) After reading some related articles, delving into the Statutes at Large and United States Code, and finding a question in a similar vein (How many lines of text in all currently active federal laws of US?), I'm starting to see the monstrous size of the problem. Assuming you don't care about time, effort, etc., what would be the simplest, most naive approach to compiling all of US law into a single body of work? Is it even theoretically possible? My initial thought was to find all of the relevant information (all the many volumes and documents), but even this seems difficult. How does anyone (citizens, lawyers, judges, other government officials, etc.) even verify that the actions they've taken are legal when the potential applicable laws are so vastly separated from each other being in entirely different series of documents written in format of chronological amendments? | The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes). | Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed. | There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case. | Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned. | These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges. | Now I'm having another conversation with a lawyer and I'm not particularly happy (not to say outraged) that to answer a simple question they require £95 + VAT for 30 minutes Skype session. Maybe it is a common practice in law industry - in my industry (web development) we share our knowledge in an open-source manner. The rate you were charged is actually reasonable for such a limited engagement. Few lawyers are willing to even consider providing any advice on such a limited basis. Most would try to limit their clients to cases generating thousands of pounds in an in person visit. Lawyers are in the business of selling knowledge and time, not documents and results. An open-source approach would undermine their business model just as much as it would for the movie industry or the recording industry. While I appreciate professional legal advice (I know it is required) I have a belief that by obtaining some knowledge first I'll be in a position to ask better questions. This belief is not necessarily very well founded in this context. The reality of information about the law is that the raw data has limited usefulness. One of the main things that a legal education provides is an ability to "issue spot" so that you know what points need to be researched and where to look for them. Without the overall context that a legal education provides, knowing what issues you should be looking for is difficult or impossible, and this is particular true in Anglo-American common law systems, where the law is embedded in an opaque network of appellate cases rather than laid out more or less completely in a carefully organized statute. Also, you are almost completely unqualified to distinguish between a simple question and a hard one. Just as it is difficult for a non-expert to know what is difficult or impossible for a computer to do (e.g. turning raw image input in the models of reality is very hard for computers but easy for people, while intense calculations are simple for computers but hard for people), it is often very difficult for a non-lawyer to know what is an easy or hard legal question. For example, the rights of neighboring home owners when trees start to grow across property lines seem like simple questions but are actually extremely complex legally, as is another simple question such as explaining what a book means in IP terms as a book migrates to a new platform. But, some seemingly complex points (e.g. detailed questions of tax law or civil procedure) can have very simple and clear answers. Finally, keep in mind that in a situation like spousal alimony, if you've done as much research as you state, it is very likely that a definitive answer that you are looking for simply does not exist. There a lots of legal questions that do not have clear objective answers. This is because trial judges in family law matters have wide discretion in a lot of the fine points of alimony decisions, much of it exercised at the trial court level that does not generate binding legal precedents and is not widely available to researchers. Therefore, there is really no substitute in evaluating how judges will exercise that discretion for the collective experience of an attorney who has been through the process many, many times before the particular group of judges who are likely to handle your individual case. In sum, while I understand your frustration, a lot of it is rooted in common, but inaccurate assumptions about how the legal system works. | The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.). | By volume, it's almost certainly Statutory Instruments (SIs). From the relevant page on legislation.gov.uk, we can see that the number since 2010 has ranged from 1241 to 3485 per year. Compare that to, say, Acts of Parliament (23 to 41 per year in that period). The EUR-Lex page has some numbers relating to EU law. For example, in 2018, there were a total of 430 "legislative acts", and 1496 "non-legislative acts". Note that while EU Regulations become law directly in member states, EU Directives have to be implemented by domestic legislation. In the UK, this is normally done with SIs, which contribute to the numbers in the previous paragraph. |
What are the legal ramifications of using Post Nominal Letters from a degree mill? Background This question was sparked by a question about firing an employee with a B.A. from a degree mill To my knowledge, using protected post nominal letters that are related to a professional organization, like M.D. or P.Eng. are enforced by state/provincial organizations that can take legal action against anyone using that title improperly. But with BA, BS, BBA, or others there is no organization that protects these, so what are the legal ramifications here? Scenario: In this scenario, HR discovered that an employee had obtained the BA from an unaccredited degree mill. It isn't stated in the original question whether the person used their post nominal letters on anything, so I'm proposing this as a separate hypothetical scenario where they used B.A everywhere their name appears. Would using the post-nominal letters, B.A. be illegal in anyway? Would it give legal grounds for firing? What about suing for damages against a consultant? What are the legal ramifications here? | To my knowledge, using protected post nominal letters that are related to a professional organization, like M.D. or P.Eng. are enforced by state/provincial organizations that can take legal action against anyone using that title improperly. But with BA, BS, BBA, or others there is no organization that protects these, so what are the legal ramifications here? In the U.S., there is no generalized governmental regulation of degree quality. There are private accreditation bodies, and in some fields, a degree from an accredited institution from a body that the government recognizes as legitimate is necessary to obtain licensure. This said, using post-nominal letters for an undergraduate degree would be a "yellow flag" in the U.S. and is rarely done (and when done is probably most often done for a Bachelor of Fine Arts, BFA, which presents particularly tricky questions of what is a legitimate degree or institution). Likewise, one would need to distinguish between "degree mill" degrees and honorary degrees awarded by institutions to recognize someone's non-educational life achievements, rather than their earned degree work. More often, in the U.S., a degree would be listed only in a resume or website biography. Of course, this is strictly a matter of regional custom. In Tanzania, for example, it is common to use as many post-nominal letters are possible, often including post-nominal letters for a high school diploma and short certification classes (e.g. CPR training), as well as a primary professional certification, and it is common practice to include both a post-nominal professional certification and the degree qualifying one for it, rather than only the former as in the U.S. (e.g. "J.D., Esq.", rather than merely "Esq.") Would using the post-nominal letters, B.A. be illegal in anyway? If the person didn't actually get the degree from the degree mill, it would be fraud, but if they did get a degree, even from a dubious institution, it would be legal in the U.S. Note that this is just how the law happens to be right now. The U.S. Fair Trade Commission (FTC) or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or a state deceptive trade practices act, could easily make it illegal to claim a degree from a degree mill without full disclosure that it is a degree mill (the law can't completely bar truthful speech under the 1st Amendment in the U.S.) by defining what sort of accreditation an institution must have to qualify to be described by an unexplained representation. Would it give legal grounds for firing? The vast majority of non-union, private sector, non-senior management employment in the U.S. (outside Montana) is employment at will. An employee at will can be fired at any time for any reason that is not a violation of a discrimination law (which this reason would not be). If an employee were in a protected class and alleged discriminatory firing based upon membership in that class, and the employer asserted that the diploma mill degree was the reason for firing, which on its face is non-discriminatory and not based upon a protected class, a finder of fact would have to determine if the diploma mill degree basis for firing was sincerely the reason that the employee was fired, or was merely a pretext for an actual illegal discriminatory reason. If it was the sincere reason for firing someone rather than a discriminatory reason, the employer would not have employment discrimination liability. The only ramification of firing someone without cause is that they are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, which someone fired for cause, or someone who voluntarily quits, is not entitled to receive. But the discovery that someone has a degree from a degree mill, while not illegal, might still be considered misleading enough to constitute good cause for firing, so unemployment eligibility if someone were fired for this reason in the U.S. (outside Montana which does not have employment at will and requires severance payments if someone if fired without sufficient grounds to do so) would be 50-50. Montana In Montana, in contrast, the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act passed in 1987 sets forth certain rights and remedies with respect to wrongful discharge. The act declares a discharge is wrongful for employees who would be employees at will in other states, only if: It was in retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy; The discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer’s probationary period of employment; or The employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy. An employee’s failure to adequately perform the task for which they were employed, an employee’s negligence to working lawfully, the employer’s company being dissolved or the interruption of business for any other reason are all lawful excuses for firing an employee. In Montana, for purposes of this statute: "Good cause" means reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason. The legal use of a lawful product by an individual off the employer's premises during nonworking hours is not a legitimate business reason, unless the employer acts within the provisions of 39-2-313(3) or (4). It isn't obvious if an employee representing that the employee has a degree mill diploma in an application that is not fully disclosed would or would not qualify "good cause" so it would be determined on a case by case basis under the relevant case law (if any). The remedy for wrongful discharge in Montana under the state act alone is a severance payment, rather than reinstatement or the greater damages awardable in a discrimination lawsuit. What about suing for damages against a consultant? Not clear what is being asked in this question. Who is the "consultant" in relation to whom? If the "employee" were actually an independent contractor (i.e. a "consultant") for the "employer", the "employer" would not have grounds to sue the independent contractor based upon the degree representation (if factually true, even though it was deceptive) and the independent contractor would probably have grounds to sue for breach of contract if fired for this reason (unless the contract has a termination without cause provision). An independent contractor fired without cause is not entitled to unemployment insurance in the U.S. in most cases, outside the pandemic specific unemployment program for gig workers. Also, the "employer" would be hard pressed to show damages from the misleading representation. Of course, there would also be exceptions. Under a variety of circumstances, when there are damages (e.g. if a client of the employer cancels its profitable contract with the employer upon learning that the employee providing high end consulting services to it had a degree from a degree mill) even a factually true statement that is misleading can be actionable. Among the circumstances where this can happen are: State deceptive trade practices act often raise a higher bar. Representations made to someone in a "confidential relationship" with the employee (e.g. a close relative, a parishioner at a church where the employee is a member of the clergy, a beneficiary of a trust where the employee is a trustee, etc.) are held to a higher standard. Representations made in connection with the sale of securities (e.g. stocks and bonds of a business sold to a passive investor, in which the employee's credentials are listed in a way that tends to mislead) are held to a higher standard. The employee actually knows that the employer has a misapprehension regarding where the employee got a degree (often degree mills have institution names that are confusingly similar to well respected colleges and universities) and fails to correct. For example, say that the employee got a bachelor of science in mathematics degree from "Columbia College" a for profit college in Aurora, Colorado, based upon three and a half years of "life experience" credit that wasn't even verified and three classes which 50 pages textbooks and an easy and short final exam with half a dozen basic high school level math questions each. But at an interview, the employer says, immediately after the employee names the institution from which the employee dot the degree, "so how did you like living in Manhattan for four years" (where the employee never lived, but where prestigious Columbia University is located). The employee might have a common law duty to disclose that the interviewer was confused. On the other hand, there is a "shame on you, shame on me" aspect to the law of misrepresentation, where the employer can be faulted for failure to exercise due diligence regarding a point that is material to the employer. Also, some sort of damages claim would be only authorized if the misleading statement was material. If the employee is a maid in a hotel, or flips burgers, it isn't material. If the employee is a management consultant who provides services on behalf of the employer, or a degree is listed as a job requirement in the posting for the position, it probably is material. If the "consultant" were the person who helped the employee get the degree mill degree, or advised the employee to use it, the employee would have grounds to sue the consultant only if the consultant engaged in some sort of deceptive trade practice or misrepresentation in marketing the degree mill degree. It isn't impossible that such a suit could prevail (often degree mills are misleading themselves to potential purchasers of degrees). But the OP has no facts that suggest this possibility and the degree mill probably has few assets from which a disgruntled consumer who prevails could collect. Also, the degree mill would have a credible defense that it didn't claim accreditation from an institution that didn't accredit it (if true, not that often degree mills create bogus accreditation organizations to endorse them), and that the employee was not justified in relying on the belief that a degree obtained without doing real college quality work for a nominal price would be treated the same as a degree from an ordinary college with a respected accreditation body. Comparative Law, In General Some countries are much less lax about claims of degrees than the U.S. For example, in Germany (and a number of neighboring central European countries like Austria and the Czech Republic) representations about degrees earned are highly regulated and it is usually both a crime and a tort to violate those regulations, and there have been a number of high profile cases of misrepresentations of this kind in business and among elected officials. This is in the context of an economy where almost every occupation (even, e.g., waiting tables in a restaurant in some places) requires a professional certification, regulation of business is more pervasive, and free speech protections are not as absolute. In the 19th century and early 20th century, U.S. and U.K. legal protections for employees were weaker, and regulation of fraud was even more lax than it is today, so the likelihood of a legal remedy for any party in this situation was even smaller. Many countries in the developing world have levels of economic regulation, in practice at least, similar to the U.S. and U.K. in the 19th century. Canada Canada doesn't have employment at will for non-management, non-union, private sector employees who have been employed for at least twelve months, so the "unjust dismissal" analysis or wrongful dismissal analysis there would be different. Federally regulated employers in Canada are subject to the "unjust dismissal" regimes below (which the grounds undefined for the most part and a reinstatement remedy possible), while other employees are entitled to remedies for wrongful dismissal (for which reinstatement is not a possible remedy). The federally regulated employees are: Air transportation Banks Grain elevators, feed and seed mills, feed warehouses and grain-seed cleaning plants First Nations Band Councils Most federal Crown corporations, for example, Canada Post Corporation Port services, marine shipping, ferries, tunnels, canals, bridges and pipelines (oil and gas) that cross international or provincial borders Radio and television broadcasting Railways that cross provincial or international borders and some short-line railways Road transportation services, including trucks and buses, that cross provincial or international borders Telecommunications, such as, telephone, internet, telegraph and cable systems Uranium mining and processing and atomic energy The Canadian Unjust Dismissal statute is as follows: Unjust Dismissal 240 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and 242(3.1), a person who has been dismissed and considers the dismissal to be unjust may make a complaint in writing to the Head if the employee (a) has completed 12 consecutive months of continuous employment by an employer; and (b) is not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement. (1.1) A person shall not make a complaint under subsection (1) if they have made a complaint that is based on substantially the same facts under either subsection 246.1(1) or 247.99(1), unless that complaint has been withdrawn. (2) Subject to subsection (3), a complaint under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the person making the complaint was dismissed. (3) The Head may extend the period set out in subsection (2) (a) if the Head is satisfied that a complaint was made in that period to a government official who had no authority to deal with the complaint but that the person making the complaint believed the official had that authority; or (b) in any circumstances that are prescribed by regulation. 241 (1) If an employer dismisses a person described in subsection 240(1), the person who was dismissed or the Head may make a request in writing to the employer to provide a written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal, and any employer who receives such a request must provide the person who made the request with such a statement within 15 days after the request is made. (2) On receipt of a complaint made under subsection 240(1), the Head must endeavour to assist the parties to the complaint to settle the complaint. (3) If a complaint is not settled under subsection (2) within the period that the Head considers to be reasonable in the circumstances, the Head must, on the written request of the person who made the complaint that the complaint be referred to the Board, deliver to the Board the complaint made under subsection 240(1), any written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal provided under subsection (1) and any other statements or documents that the Head has that relate to the complaint. (4) If the person who made the complaint does not reply to a written communication from the Head within a period that the Head considers to be reasonable in the circumstances and a period of at least 30 days, or any longer period that may be prescribed by regulation, have elapsed from the day on which the complaint was made, the Head may give written notice to the person who made the complaint that they have the period of 30 days, or any longer period that may be prescribed by regulation, set out in the notice to make a written request that the complaint be referred to the Board. (5) Subject to the regulations, if the person who made the complaint does not, within the period set out in the notice, make a written request that the complaint be referred to the Board, the Head may deem the complaint to be withdrawn. 241.1 (1) If the Board is satisfied that the complainant must take measures before the Board may continue to deal with the complaint referred to it under subsection 241(3), it may, at any time, suspend consideration of the complaint, in whole or in part. (2) If the Board suspends consideration of a complaint, the Board shall notify the complainant in writing and specify in the notice (a) the measures that the complainant must take; and (b) the period within which they must take those measures. (3) The suspension ends when, in the Board’s opinion, the measures specified in the notice have been taken. 241.2 (1) The Board may reject a complaint referred to it under subsection 241(3), in whole or in part, (a) if the Board is satisfied that (i) the complaint is not within its jurisdiction, (ii) the complaint is frivolous, vexatious or not made in good faith, (iii) the complaint has been settled in writing between the employer and the complainant, (iv) there are other means available to the complainant to resolve the subject matter of the complaint that the Board considers should be pursued, or (v) the subject matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with through recourse obtained before a court, tribunal, arbitrator or adjudicator; or (b) if consideration of the complaint was suspended under subsection 241.1(1) and if, in the Board’s opinion, the measures specified in the notice under subsection 241.1(2) were not taken within the specified period. (2) If the Board rejects a complaint, it shall notify the complainant in writing, with reasons. (3) Subject to subsection (3.1), the Board, after a complaint has been referred to it, shall (a) consider whether the dismissal of the person who made the complaint was unjust and render a decision thereon; and (b) send a copy of the decision with the reasons therefor to each party to the complaint and to the Minister. (3.1) No complaint shall be considered by the Board under subsection (3) in respect of a person if (a) that person has been laid off because of lack of work or because of the discontinuance of a function; or (b) a procedure for redress has been provided under Part I or Part II of this Act or under any other Act of Parliament. (4) If the Board decides under subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, the Board may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal. 243 (1) Every order of the Board is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court. (2) No order shall be made, process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain the Board in any proceedings under section 242. 244 (1) Any person affected by an order of the Board under subsection 242(4), or the Head on the request of such a person, may, after 14 days from the day on which the order is made, or from the day provided in the order for compliance, whichever is later, file in the Federal Court a copy of the order, exclusive of reasons. (2) On filing in the Federal Court under subsection (1), an order of the Board shall be registered in the Court and, when registered, has the same force and effect, and all proceedings may be taken in respect of it, as if the order were a judgment obtained in that Court. 245 For the purposes of this Division, the Governor in Council may make regulations (a) defining the absences from employment that shall be deemed not to have interrupted continuity of employment; (b) prescribing circumstances for the purposes of paragraph 240(3)(b); (c) prescribing periods for the purposes of subsection 241(4); (d) prescribing the circumstances under which a complaint is not to be deemed to be withdrawn under subsection 241(5); and (e) prescribing the conditions that are to be met before a complaint may be deemed to be withdrawn under subsection 241(5). 246 (1) No civil remedy of an employee against his employer is suspended or affected by sections 240 to 245. (2) Section 189 applies for the purposes of this Division. The statute itself is vague concerning what constitutes "unjust dismissal". Apart from federally regulated employees, in Canada, a private sector employer who is not federally regulated has the right to terminate a non-union employee in one of two ways: a) for cause without notice (getting fired), without payment of a severance package. b) termination without cause, after giving the employee reasonable notice or payment of severance package. One of the main relevant statutes is Canada’s ESA (Employment Standards Act) (British Columbia's version is here). The operative section of the statute states: Liability resulting from length of service 63 (1)After 3 consecutive months of employment, the employer becomes liable to pay an employee an amount equal to one week's wages as compensation for length of service. (2)The employer's liability for compensation for length of service increases as follows: (a)after 12 consecutive months of employment, to an amount equal to 2 weeks' wages; (b)after 3 consecutive years of employment, to an amount equal to 3 weeks' wages plus one additional week's wages for each additional year of employment, to a maximum of 8 weeks' wages. (3)The liability is deemed to be discharged if the employee (a)is given written notice of termination as follows: (i)one week's notice after 3 consecutive months of employment; (ii)2 weeks' notice after 12 consecutive months of employment; (iii)3 weeks' notice after 3 consecutive years of employment, plus one additional week for each additional year of employment, to a maximum of 8 weeks' notice; (b)is given a combination of written notice under subsection (3) (a) and money equivalent to the amount the employer is liable to pay, or (c)terminates the employment, retires from employment, or is dismissed for just cause. (4)The amount the employer is liable to pay becomes payable on termination of the employment and is calculated by (a)totalling all the employee's weekly wages, at the regular wage, during the last 8 weeks in which the employee worked normal or average hours of work, (b)dividing the total by 8, and (c)multiplying the result by the number of weeks' wages the employer is liable to pay. (5)For the purpose of determining the termination date under this section, the employment of an employee who is laid off for more than a temporary layoff is deemed to have been terminated at the beginning of the layoff. (6)If, after 3 consecutive months of employment, an employee gives notice of termination to the employer and the employer terminates the employment during that notice period, the employer is liable to pay the employee an amount equal to the lesser of (a)an amount in money equal to the wages the employee would have earned for the remainder of the notice period, or (b)an amount in money equal to the amount the employer is liable to pay on termination. Like "unjust dismissal", the term "just cause" for a dismissal is not well defined in the statute itself, although case law and regulations may provide further guidance. The act prohibits misleading statements by an employer in hiring, but doesn't expressly regulate misleading statements by an employee in hiring. | Yes. Making statements in a legally protected confidential context is not publishing them, and in most jurisdictions, defamation must be published to create a cause of action. In such a case the patient might well have a cause of action against the therapist for violation of patient confidentially, and a complaint to the relevant authority could get the therapist's license revoked, or perhaps a censure from the licensing authority, whatever it is the the jurisdiction. Note "published" does not have to mean putting them in print, but does mean making them in such a way that general circulation of them is plausible. In addition, such statements may be coered by a qualified privilege. In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978) the Maryland Supreme Court (reviewing a case from the Court of Special Appeals) held (at 135-136) that: ... the common law recognized that a person ought to be shielded against civil liability for defamation where, in good faith, he publishes a statement in furtherance of his own legitimate interests, or those shared in common with the recipient or third parties, ... The Maryland court went on to quote the Restatement (Second) of Torts, (Scope Note preceding § 593 (1977)) which states that if a privilege were not granted: information that should be given or received would not be communicated because of [the] fear of . . . persons capable of giving it that they would be held liable in an action of defamation if their statements were untrue. It would seem that a statement by a person to his or her own therapist, as a part of therapy, and intended to be held in confidence by the therapist, ought to fall under this definition of privilege, although I cannot find any actual case with this exact fact pattern. If the person knew or had reason to know that the therapist was likely to repeat the statement, that would be different. If the person and the therapist were not in a practitioner/patient relationship, with its normal expectations of confidentiality, that also would be different. | I'm not a lawyer, but I am an NHS employee, and can more concretely answer your questions. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Yes, in-fact, several crimes have been committed. Firstly, NHS employees are prohibited from viewing patient's personal information that they are not specifically treating. In opening your letter from the NHS, the nurse in question violated this practice. It's a breach of both privacy and trust. This is taught at the NHS and the nurse would be aware of this. Secondly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse has committed workplace fraud. They have impersonated a patient, and in doing so, cost the NHS money and time it won't get back by cancelling your appointment. Again, this is also taught within the NHS, and the nurse would be aware of this too. Thirdly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse may have put a life in danger in doing so, which is effectively gross negligence at a minimum. Although this can be reported to the police, it'll be more effective to report it to the appropriate NHS bodies. Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker? There are several different approaches, given the various breaches of trust. As BlueDogRanch mentioned, you can file a compliant to NHS England, which includes via email. Be sure to get appropriate information like the nurse's name, address, and if possible any details (like appointment reference numbers) to aid the investigation. Secondly, because of the cost incurred via the malicious cancellation of an appointment, costing time and money (and running the risk of opening the NHS to litigation), you can also report the fraudulent aspects to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. | Yes! Some states have laws against it. RCW 9A.60.070, for example, makes it a gross misdemeanor in Washington. (2) A person is guilty of knowingly using a false academic credential if the person ... falsely claims to have a credential issued by an institution of higher education that is accredited by an accrediting association recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council: (a) In a written or oral advertisement or other promotion of a business; or (b) With the intent to: (i) Obtain employment; ... (5) Knowingly using a false academic credential is a gross misdemeanor. If a state does not have a law specific to the issue, it depends on whether the statement is made under penalty of perjury under state law. It is not uncommon to have an employment application that asks for educational information and which you sign under penalty of perjury. In addition, if the employer is a federal agency, for example, or if there is otherwise an argument that the resume is within jurisdiction of a branch of the Federal Government, the crime of making false statements could theoretically be used against a person. In reality, in a state without a law specific to this issue, it is much more likely to be a really bad idea that will tank a person's career than it is to result in a criminal charge. Except perhaps if they do it during an FBI investigation or as part of a security clearance process. | I infer from the use of the past tense "worked" that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference. | If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same. | You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing. | As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years). |
Is there something else that protects young students who aren't eligible for FERPA? So I was recently reading about the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). After a bit of reading, I saw this: FERPA gives parents certain rights with respect to their children's education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she reaches the age of 18 or attends a school beyond the high school level. Students to whom the rights have transferred are "eligible students." If FERPA only protects students above High School and/or students over the age of 18, what would protect students in Elementary, Middle, and High School? | FERPA protects the privacy of students' records, irrespective of their age or grade level. Age is generally only relevant in determining who can assert those privacy rights. When you enter school at age 5 or whatever, your parents make your privacy decisions for you. When you turn 18, you become an "eligible student," i.e., eligible to assert or waive your privacy rights without parental oversight. | Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect. | Children own their own stuff Legal guardians are legally responsible to preserve it and use it in the child’s best interest. If doesn’t matter if that stuff is real, personal or intellectual property. | Although an academy is state-funded, it is not the government, so limitations on what a government is allowed to do are not applicable, and anyway there is no First Amendment separation of church and state in the UK. I presume your school has a formal faith designation, which means that it is not subject to Section 85 of the Equality Act 2010, which might maybe be a path for escaping the requirement. The "collective worship" requirement is mandated by the government under Section 70 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, which is extended to academy schools by the funding agreements. The requirement is that "each pupil in attendance at a community, foundation or voluntary school shall on each school day take part in an act of collective worship". Section 71 provides an exception: If the parent of a pupil at a community, foundation or voluntary school requests that he may be wholly or partly excused from receiving religious education given in the school in accordance with the school’s basic curriculum, from attendance at religious worship in the school, or both from receiving such education and from such attendance, the pupil shall be so excused until the request is withdrawn. Since a religious academy is not subject to the national curriculum, deviation from whatever the religious requirements are stated in that curriculum is allowed. | The constitutional protection afforded people in the United States for freedom of association is protection from interference by the government and its agents. Until the age of majority, or emancipation by a court of law, parents enjoy broad discretion over the activities of their children including with whom they can associate. Complexities do arise for children of divorced parents who disagree as to who can set the characteristics of how the children are raised. In these cases family court intervention is used to deem what's in the best interest of the child. Complexities can also arise for children facing medical treatment. The most common example would be a parent attempting to refuse specific care for their child. In these cases it's possible to get a court to deem the parents "unfit" in order to force the medical treatment to go forward. This is usually a high-bar to achieve as the courts don't want to interfere in the parent-child relationship unless there is no other choice. Such medical treatment can also apply to mental-health services. New York, as an example, allows the local commissioner of social services or local commissioner of health to give consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services for any child found by the family court to be an abused, neglected or destitute child. Oklahoma created the Parent's Bill of Rights (same link as above) which: prohibited the state from infringing upon parental rights, directed the board of education of a school district to develop a policy listing parental rights related to education, including sex education; prohibited a surgical procedure on a minor without parental consent—excluding abortion— and, prohibited a mental health evaluation of a minor without parental consent. You will find that it will take court intervention to interfere with parental discretion and that court intervention will likely need to find the parents unfit to make the decision. Assuming the advocacy groups you outline in your question are not providing medical care it is extremely unlikely that a court will interfere. The right of association is not implicated in your question because it is not the government preventing the child from participating. | I found a number of news stories and official documents about public schools with such policies including: "Parents face more fines and rules if their children miss too much school" from Public Opinion; "School Adopts Strict Policy on Parents Picking Up Children Late" from the Los Angeles Times; "If you're late to pick up your kid at school, expect more than embarrassment" from The Oregonian; "Late Again? This School Fines Kids Who Aren't on Time" from Parents; "Late Pick Up Policy" from Hazelwood Elementary; and "School Issues Terrifying Threat to Parents Who Pick Up Kids Late" from Yahoo Parenting The last story is about a school that threatened to call the local child protection authorities to take children into custody if parents were late, even by a short time. This was rescinded and apologized for. None of these stories mentioned any source of authority to impose such fines, nor any parent who had legally contested such fines. Public schools do not generally have authority to fine parents unless a law or ordinance grants such authority. Usually a school would need to file a report with law enforcement, and any fine be imposed by a court. But it may well be that parents are simply paying in such cases, rather than insisting on legal authority. If a student is left unsupervised, a school would pretty clearly have the right, and in some cases the duty, to notify the police or the appropriate child protection agency. Parents might fear that resisting the fines would lead to that far more drastic response, and so not challenge any fine. I did not include any of several news stories about similar practices in the UK, as the legal basis would be different there. But there were several such stories. There were also several stories suggesting that such fines can be counterproductive. It seems that some parents tend to come to regard them as fees, and are perfectly willing to pay, and the fine replaces the feeling of social obligation which might have been stronger. But that is not really a matter of law. | The "Right to Party" as defined by the organization known as "The Beastie Boys" is not defined in any portion of their discourse on the matter of the "Right to Party". Rather, the entire discourse poetically describes a youth, presumably under the legal adult age of 18 (given restrictions on smoking cigarettes and owning adult literature in the second verse), who faces restrictions upon his or her rights by his legal guardians, in this case a mother, father, and teacher. Whereas the dictionary definition of the verb form of "Party" is defined by Oxford Dictionary as "Enjoying oneself at a party or other lively gathering, typically with drinking and music." As established, the subject of the proposed treaty on this right is legally barred from drinking, though a party may exist without alcohol and thus would not prevent the subject from engaging in an act of partying. A party or lively gathering would meat the definition of "Freedom of Peaceful Assembly" under the First Amendment Rights of the United States Constitution as well as "Freedom of Association" under the same amendment. Said party may additionally be for any purpose so long as it is peaceful. The state may impose reasonable restrictions on the party, such as noise ordinances, age based restrictions on minors including "Adult Contents", cigarettes and alchohol, as discussed. While typcial, they're absence does not prevent the assembly from rising to the level of "party" as previous defined. Beastie Boys contends that the restrictions place upon the subject of their discourse on the Right to Party is unreasonably restricted by the confiscation of several items, enforced school requirements, and dress code as defined by the legal guardian in their right as authority of the youth's rights. Beastie Boys offers little evidence that these restrictions are unreasonable or prevent the subject from "partying" as defined above. Beastie Boys do propose that the authority known as the father can not restrict the use of cigarettes by the youth as the father "smokes two packs a day". While Beastie Boys is correct that this meets the definition of hypocritical, the father is assumed to be of legal age to purchase cigarettes and is legal allowed to restrict access to them based on reasonable age restrictions and possible heath risks the father wishes to prevent in the youth that he may or may not be suffering from. As there are no formal requirements for a peaceful assembly to rise to the level of party, it can be presumed that these restrictions would not affect the party as defined. It should also be noted that in the Beastie Boys discourse, that the authority figure referred to as mother did not restrict the youths ability to listen to the content of the discourse, nor were any restrictions described tailored in such a fashion as to restrict the discourse specifically. While there is no amendment defining the right to party in the United States Constitution, the 9th Amendment does clearly state that citizens rights are not enumerated in the constitution and other rights not discussed in the constitution may exists and be claimed by the individual. From an originalist standpoint, it is widely accept that a good number of The Framers of the Constitution quite frequently met the accepted definition of the phrase "Drunk off their Ass" and thus, would not reasonably be against what can be defined as a "party". Additionally, many were participants in an event that was known as the "Tea Party", which was agreed by many to be quite the lively gathering at its time and was still viewed as quite the "radical" affair of the day, many wearing costumes such as those who attended in clothing traditional of Native Americans. They were also most likely not drunk during the course of this party. Thus, the intent of the framers was never to restrict or deniegn such a right Thus, a reasonable court in the United States would hold that the Right to Party does exist for all U.S. citizens and is inalienable. Beastie Boys also argues that it is acceptable to fight for one's right to party. This does not conflict with the First Amendment Right to petition government for grievances so long as it is again a peaceable affair. Given the poetic nature of the discourse, we can presume that "Fight" would mean to defend or struggle in a non-violent manor for such a right. This is backed up through originalism as the restrictions placed on many citizens of Boston for their actions during the Tea Party were subsequently fought against for many years, culminating in the Constitution. Thus, it can be assumed that the United States does recognize the right of the people to party and the right of the people to fight for the aforementioned right. This right would still be subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions so long as said restrictions are content neutral to the message of the party. | The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins. |
Who decides DNR decision when patient is non compos mentis? My 83 year old mother's mental and physical health has deteriorated rapidly in last six months. At this point, she asks if her mother (dead 35 years) is coming to see her, if her grandchildren are taking music lessons in elementary school (all graduated from college now), etc. She is married to a much younger man, my stepfather, a good guy who loves her and only wants the best for her, and he has asked if she has a DNR wish. There is no DNR order in effect that anyone knows about, and I'm pretty confident that she would not be considered competent to be able to understand her situation well enough to make her own decision regarding this. My guess is that it would be the husband's decision, even if he asks for and takes the advice of her children (my brothers and sister and I). Is this correct? DISCLAIMER: I'm obviously not asking for binding, rock-solid legal advice here, just wondering if anyone has any idea before we inevitably go to a lawyer. (By the way, the jurisdiction is the State of Florida, USA) | tl;dr Spouse before adult child. Patient’s designated surrogate, and court appointed guardian, before both. Assuming your mom does not have an advanced directive or has not designated a proxy, then her husband would come before you. He can ask whoever he wants and in fact he should get the information he can to determine what she would want. The standard is what the decision maker believes the patient would want, not necessarily what the decision maker wants. For example, if the patient has for as long as anyone can remember said repeatedly “I’m not dying hooked up to machines- when the time comes, let me go.” And the next of kin is of the “try whatever is possible to try” mindset, they should still go with what they believe the patient wants. This can be very hard in real life. In Florida, the decision to withhold (e.g. DNR) or withdraw must be with evidence that that is what the patient would want or is in her best interests. You may recall this coming up in the Terry Schiavo case- husband (who was also court appointed guardian) takes precedence over parents, but parents challenged his decision in court. Florida law laws out the order: 765.401 The proxy.— (1) If an incapacitated or developmentally disabled patient has not executed an advance directive, or designated a surrogate to execute an advance directive, or the designated or alternate surrogate is no longer available to make health care decisions, health care decisions may be made for the patient by any of the following individuals, in the following order of priority, if no individual in a prior class is reasonably available, willing, or competent to act: (a) The judicially appointed guardian of the patient or the guardian advocate of the person having a developmental disability as defined in s. 393.063, who has been authorized to consent to medical treatment, if such guardian has previously been appointed; however, this paragraph shall not be construed to require such appointment before a treatment decision can be made under this subsection; (b) The patient’s spouse; (c) An adult child of the patient, or if the patient has more than one adult child, a majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for consultation; (d) A parent of the patient; (e) The adult sibling of the patient or, if the patient has more than one sibling, a majority of the adult siblings who are reasonably available for consultation; (f) An adult relative of the patient who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient and who has maintained regular contact with the patient and who is familiar with the patient’s activities, health, and religious or moral beliefs; or (g) A close friend of the patient. (h) A clinical social worker licensed pursuant to chapter 491, or who is a graduate of a court-approved guardianship program. Such a proxy must be selected by the provider’s bioethics committee and must not be employed by the provider. If the provider does not have a bioethics committee, then such a proxy may be chosen through an arrangement with the bioethics committee of another provider. The proxy will be notified that, upon request, the provider shall make available a second physician, not involved in the patient’s care to assist the proxy in evaluating treatment. Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures will be reviewed by the facility’s bioethics committee. Documentation of efforts to locate proxies from prior classes must be recorded in the patient record. (2) Any health care decision made under this part must be based on the proxy’s informed consent and on the decision the proxy reasonably believes the patient would have made under the circumstances. If there is no indication of what the patient would have chosen, the proxy may consider the patient’s best interest in deciding that proposed treatments are to be withheld or that treatments currently in effect are to be withdrawn. (3) Before exercising the incapacitated patient’s rights to select or decline health care, the proxy must comply with the provisions of ss. 765.205 and 765.305, except that a proxy’s decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would have been the one the patient would have chosen had the patient been competent or, if there is no indication of what the patient would have chosen, that the decision is in the patient’s best interest. | New Jersey is not a community property state, but it is an equitable distribution state. This means that in a divorce marital property is divided, not automatically 50-50, but in a way that seems financially fair to the supervising judge, or according to an agreement entered into by both spouses. This also means that the state considers a car bought during the course of the marriage "marital property". There are also special rules for property bought before May 28 1980, which do not seem to apply in the case in the question. However, "marital property" mostly applies when a marriage ends which the question says is not in view here. NJ does allow for a car to be titled to only one, or to both. A title with both names may read "John Doe OR Mary Doe" or "John Doe AND Mary Doe". In the AND case both spouses must sign to sell or borrow against the car, in the OR case either signature will do. If only one name is on the title, that person must sign to sell or borrow. If it comes down to a dispute, the person whose name is on the title can decide where it is to be garaged, and who has permission to drive it. If the "sporty" car is in the name of both parents, either could move it to some other location, and either could move it back. Going back and forth could easily get ugly. If both names are on the 'sporty' car's title with an OR, the husband could sell it without consulting the wife. if there is an AND he would need her to agree. If the older car is in the husband's name alone, he could deny the wife or the son the right to drive it. The wife could, of course, buy a different older (used) car and allow the son to use it. Obviously it would be a good idea if the husband and wife came to a voluntary agreement about all this, but no law requires them to do so. | It would be more common to leave a separate direction regarding the disposition of your body in a document other than your will, entrusted with your next of kin. This is because a dead person's body is usually disposed of in less than a week following death, but a determination that a will is valid and effective often has a minimum five day waiting period from death and can take months. Often, this direction regarding your own remains would not be phased in terms of a sale or gift. Instead, it would usually be a "direction" about their disposition. Someone else's remains would be property governed by a will. But, we don't normally think of body parts of a recently deceased person as becoming property, rather than a person, until they are processed in a way that makes them not a biohazard. This would not be the case, obviously, immediately upon your death when the direction regarding your remains is intended to take effect. Also, while selling already processed bones can be permissible, selling organs for transplantation is generally not permissible, although there can be reimbursement for any medical costs or similar out of pocket expenses incurred in connection with that process, again reflecting the distinction between an unprocessed dead body which is often not considered property, and a processed dead body part which often is considered property. | I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level. | Your lawyer must act in your best interests; not follow your directions Lawyers are professionals and they are supposed to use professional judgement in how they run a case. While a client can suggest a course of action, the lawyer is not only not obliged to follow it, they would be committing malpractice if they unquestioningly did so. Just like a doctor would be if they unthinkingly implemented a patient suggested treatment plan. A panel of lawyers I was watching commentate on the hearing said it was a critical error and may have blown the case. So, a group of Monday-morning quarterbacks who weren’t chosen and don’t know all the facts would have done it differently? Perhaps it was a mistake. Or, perhaps the lawyer judged that there was nothing he could say that would help and considered that sounding desperate about the video would elevate its import in the minds of the jury. | I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well. | This is a valid question that comes up from time to time. The answer can be a bit fuzzy and the law on questions 1 and 2 is often not well spelled out. This answer refers only to U.S. legal history without much customization for Maryland in particular, so I may omit references to some relevant Maryland specific statutes or cases of which I am not aware. Often there is no statutory guidance or there is only inconclusive or vague statutory guidance. There is often also little appellate case law precedent to provide guidance. The issue comes up far more often than it is litigated, in part, because these issues tend to become moot before they can be resolved by a precedent creating appellate court, and because statutes addressing the issue tend to be recent and not yet litigated, or non-existent. These issues are often highly time sensitive and don't have an economic prize to spend money litigating over are often not litigate to the maximum extent. Court rulings when cases are presented to them often depend a lot on the procedural context of the way the issue comes up, how the issue is framed by the litigants, and upon the court's gut feelings and upon unwritten social norms. For example, one recent case involving the ability of a priest to visit a man who was sick with COVID-19 in a Maryland hospital notwithstanding hospital visitation policies was resolved in the context of a complaint to the Maryland Office of Civil Rights and would not be generally applicable to an intrafamily dispute as opposed to an allegation of religion based discrimination. The hospital's opinion is often given outsized weight, since it is a "neutral" party in a family dispute, has a vested interesting in having litigation resolved that is more economic than that of the family members, and is likely to have counsel that is most familiar with the issues presented. this is true even though often, a hospital has a religious affiliation or is for some other reason specific to the facts of a case is not truly a "neutral" party in a visitation dispute and takes a position for a non-medical reason. As a young lawyer at a law firm that represented a hospital, I handled cases like these for a hospital when they came up for a couple of years, because nobody more experienced wanted to deal with these emotionally draining and time consuming conflicts with few monetary rewards for the hospital, and because the stakes from the hospital's perspective were low, so junior associate attorneys could be trusted with this cases. Appellate courts also often frame these decisions as fact bound case by case questions decided under general considerations applicable to all forms of injunctive relief in civil cases, rather than questions presenting more general questions of law to which general policy rules apply. Furthermore, the conceptual foundation in which we think about the authority of different family members over an incapacitated person at common law has shifted materially since the 19th century when these issues started to arise, and mostly hasn't been formally discussed by the courts as applied to these particular situations in the meantime. So, even when there are old precedents governing these situations, there is doubt regarding whether they are still good law, because the old precedents are based upon assumptions about spousal and parental and family member rights that no longer hold in other areas of the law. See also an analysis of issues of visitation and medical decision making for disabled persons, primarily under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act and related regulations, with footnotes particular to Maryland's state laws on the subject. Can E block B, C and D from visiting A in the hospital? What legal authorization form(s) can person A fill out and provide to B, C and D to prevent that from happening if this is a serious concern? The right of a private individual to visit someone in a hospital is usually not codified into law and is usually a matter of hospital policy within reason, acting in the best interests of its patients from a medical perspective. Usually E could only block B, C and D from visiting A in the hospital (1) with the cooperation of the hospital based upon its own policies (since as a practical matter, the hospital is generally in control of the situation and has broad authority to restrict access to its patients for health reasons), or (2) with a restraining order or protective order obtained from a court, or (3) as a legal guardian appointed by a court of person A (who generally has the authority to decide who their ward can interact with). In old common law cases (usually mid-19th century or earlier, but sometime in the early 20th century), the spouse of a married person (sometimes only the husband of a wife, but not vice versa), or the parents of an unmarried minor or unmarried person more generally, had the rights of a legal guardian with respect to an incapacitated person, and a family member had authority to make decisions for an incapacitated person as next of kin, in the absence of a parent or spouse. But, for the most part, this is no longer legally enforceable law. The Married Women's Property Acts of the late 19th century and early 20th century generally eliminated the authority of a spouse to act as legal guardian of an incapacitated spouse without a court order, sometimes subject to cases of "necessities", and control of personal family property like a marital residence, household goods, or vehicle titled in a spouse's name alone that the competent spouse used in the ordinary course prior to the incapacity. The authority of a parent or next of kin person to take action for an incapacitated person without a court order was largely abrogated by state probate codes establishing court procedures for guardianship and conservatorship appointments for incapacitated people giving spouses, parents and next of kin priority, but not authority in the absence of a court order, except in the case of minor, unmarried, unemancipated minor children. And, even then, it is rare for statutes for expressly grant parents that authority over the children by statute and the authority is merely assumed as background common law to other statutes limiting that authority in cases of child abuse or child neglect, and some kinds of decisions still need court approval even in the case of parents of unemancipated, unmarried minor children. Documents specifically authorizing visitation are rare (I've never seen one in real life outside a civil union of a same sex couple), although states with "civil union" laws enacted before same sex marriage was legalized, often expressly afford a civil union partner visitation rates with priority over other family in hospitals, despite the fact that the status quo law is often ill defined. Hospital policies that denied visitation to de facto civil union partners were an important driving force in causing civil union legislation to be adopted with the support of legislators who didn't have a strong feeling about gay rights as an overall matter and who were otherwise indifferent to the economic rights of civil union matters but adopted the rights of married couples because it was the mindless default way to adopt a body of pre-existing law with little serious thought or fact rich informed deliberation. This is, in part, because visitation is not a matter over which a patient at a hospital has unilateral decision making power. Hospitals generally have their own policies regarding visits to patients. See, e.g.,, discussing the University of Maryland's hospital visitation policy. Usually, a hospital will honor a patient's reasonable request to not allow someone to visit them (out of general respect for patient autonomy). But, a hospital will often decline to allow a patient to have visitors out of concern for the best interests of the health of the patient even when a patient would like to have a visitor (e.g. a hospital would often refuse to allow someone with a recent positive COVID-19 test to enter an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) even if the patient would like to visit that person). Even here, however, the conceptual foundation behind traditional hospital practices related to visitation have shifted. The modern view is to more strongly respect the personal autonomy interests of a hospital patient than hospitals did in the past (the trend started to shift more strongly to a patient autonomy mindset in the late 1950s and gradually shifted toward greater patient autonomy in that time frame, particularly, following the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill). Hospitals are loathe to create a situation where their express statutory, contractual, and/or common law authority to regulate visitation could be overridden by a patient, and laws related to hospital visitation are rarely adopted by a legislature over the objection of the hospital lobby. What legal authorization form(s) can person A fill out and provide to B and C so that they get precedence in medical decision-making authority over E? Many hospitals would give E priority over B and C and D in making medical decisions for A, if A is incapacitated and there are no court orders or legal documents that provide otherwise, as a matter of policy. And, these policies are often traceable to the mindset associated with the old common law rules that no legal have binding legal effect. But some states have a scheme in which the hospital makes unilateral decisions in the best interests of the patient as they see it, unless B, C, D and E (and possibly other people designated by mutual agreement) jointly agree on who should make those decisions. See, e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-18.5-103 (Proxy decision-makers for medical treatment authorized--definitions). On paper, Colorado is such a state, although in practice, a hospital would offer listen to a spouse over other family anyway. I don't know if Maryland is such a state. I could not easily locate any statute in Maryland governing medical decision-making authority for an incompetent patient in the absence of a health care power of attorney or the equivalent or a guardianship proceeding, although my search was not exhaustive. A document commonly known either as a medical power of attorney, or a health care power of attorney, or a health care proxy designation made by a competent person who does not have a legal guardian appointed for them at the time, can designate someone such as B and C to have priority over E in making medical decisions for them. This document would be controlling absent a court order to the contrary, and usually a court would give authority to the person named in that document (although a court is almost never required to do so without regard to the suitability of the person seeking court ordered decision making power). | What’s the problem? Most likely the situation is 100% sure that he or she wouldn’t have performed the operation without anaesthesia. Therefore anaesthesia was not something his brain needed to remember, therefore it didn’t. He gave a truthful answer. He has no memory of it. He doesn’t need a memory of it, he just needed to make sure it’s done. Do you have any reason to believe it was not done? Operating without anaesthesia would be negligent. Not remembering it is done is not. On the other hand, he would have remembered the patient screaming if he started cutting without anaesthesia. |
If a company actively and knowingly displays user passwords to their staff, is it breaking GDPR laws? I used to work for a company, where they have a team of moderators, who actively monitor which accounts are scammers etc. To monitor this they can find links between user accounts via a users password, so they are able to see all user passwords in plain text. Is this breaking any law or is it more just morally run? | The GDPR does not have specific rules on passwords. Instead, the GDPR imposes a more general requirement to ensure data protection by implementing “appropriate” technical and organizational measures, “[t]aking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons” (c.f. Art 24, 25, 32 GDPR). As of 2021, the state of the art for password storage is a special password hashing function such as Argon2, bcrypt, or scrypt. However, the nature and context of processing could reasonably lead to the conclusion that the usual hashed password storage is not appropriate, for example because the ability to find links between user accounts is more important. There is a trade-off between different aspects of security, and the data controller could reasonably arrive at an unusual conclusion. However: The data controller would still have to implement appropriate measures to protect these plaintext passwords, for example by storing them in an encrypted manner, keeping unforgeable access logs, and limiting access to plaintext passwords to specially trained staff. Encryption is one of the few things that are explicitly required whenever appropriate. The data controller better have a good analysis that shows that this unusual approach to security is appropriate. Even if not explicitly required, an Art 35 data protection impact assessment could be useful. The data controller has the burden of proof to show that these processing activities are GDPR-compliant. So is this data controller breaking the law or doing morally dubious stuff? Not necessarily! It is possible to find a scenario where they are doing the right thing. However, such a scenario is far-fetched and rather unlikely. Without further background, the most likely explanation is that the presented password handling scheme does not comply with GDPR. | You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none: ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive. Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR. | GDPR defines the responsibility of Companies to ensure that Personal Data in their possession is maintained Secure ensuring Confidentiality and Privacy towards the Data Subjects to whom it pertains. Prior to the Articles themselves, there are notes and over (49) one may read that companies must have in place (where applicable) mechanisms like CERT and any other SECURITY assuring tools/ processes. (83) again is all about ensuring Security. (94) reads that if the Controller (company) find it cannot ensure Security it must stop processing activities and report to the Supervisory Authority for guidance and support. Then we have Article 3 (f) establishing that it is the company responsibility to "... ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organizational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)..." Bottom line... T&C Companies must ensure that Personal Data is processed by them (and that includes communications) are Secure while ensuring Confidentiality and Pricavy towards the Data Subjects. The wording "...commercially reasonable efforts..." is wrong, because it is not something that may be a legal requirement or not depending on "cost"; it is a Legal Obligation. Then "... the Internet is not an inherently secure environment and so we cannot guarantee the security of your Personal Information..."; this is just "poor legal advice" for GDPR does expect companies to make the Internet safe, it expects companies to maintain their IT Landscape safe... an analogy can be made about going through a group of sharks in the ocean while just swimming or on board of a big boat... the ocean is dangerous due to the sharks, yet if you are in a big boat, you won't even notice them. Then the "cherry on top"; "... e assume no liability for any disclosure of data due to errors in transmission, unauthorized third-party access or other acts of third parties, or acts or omissions beyond our reasonable control..."; now i really do not know which lawyer has written this, but it basically reads something like: "the law obliges me to ensure you are safe... however I am not able to". Now, I have seen similar "statements", but I must confess it was like 2 or 3 years ago... most companies have corrected them over time and since they become aware that penalties were for real. Just a final disclaimer It is a fact that while in transit (over the Internet) a message being delivered through a T&C Company Services will travel through 3rd party infrastructure contexts, rendering it at risk ... however, if it is properly encrypted (as it should) the transition time will not be sufficient for a successful breach attempt. So, yes they are capable of ensuring all they have stated they can not. | TL;DR In theory there's nothing wrong with your method, it's just a way to authenticate the user, and without authentication a user has no right to request anything anyway. But in practice it looks like your method doesn't have a way to deal with situations where users lose or forget their authentication data and want to be able to recover their account. Failing to deal with that in a modern system might be considered an unacceptable bad practice and so be against the GDPR principles of security and privacy by design. EXTENDED VERSION I might be wrong or not understand the question correctly, but I don't see how this is different from many other common cases where encryption is not involved. Think about it, you aren't able to give the user their own personal data unless they provide the ID and encryption keys. How is this significantly different from the fact you aren't able to (or rather you should not) show a user their own data unless they provide their own username and password, or they convincingly authenticate themselves in any way? Just like you can't ask Facebook to show you all the data collected about Donald Trump only by claiming you are Donald Trump, you can't be required to give a user their own data unless they provide the encryption key. It can be seen as your way to authenticate users (among other things). Edited: multiple IDs/keys I didn't understand your method involved multiple IDs and keys. In theory, the situation is still the same, only with multiple pieces of data for authentication, like the user had to remember multiple usernames and passwords. Failing to provide all IDs and all keys will result in a partial authentication. But with such an approach a potential problem becomes more evident: your authentication scheme might be against the GDPR principles of "security and privacy by design and by default". Basically, your methods might be considered bad practice because they fail to deal with the common issue of lost or forgotten passwords. If a user tells you they have lost a USB drive containing all their IDs and keys and they don't have them anymore, what do you do? You can't delete their data because you aren't able to know what their data is, without another way of authenticating. And their data is now at risk, because somebody else might have their IDs and keys. If you had an email address associated with all the user's IDs and data, then you might be able to confirm their identity (for example sending an email with a link) and delete all their data. As you see, things can get pretty complicated, it all depends on the details of your implementation, and just adding or removing one detail might change the whole scenario. | As @gnasher729 has commented, "a merely hashed password database is criminally insecure. Salted + hashed is the standard, and protecting your database is also required." GDPR Paragraph 78 says (inter alia) In order to be able to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation, the controller should adopt internal policies and implement measures which meet in particular the principles of data protection by design and data protection by default. Hash without salt is hardly good design. | No. As long as you don't see and have no means to access this data, but it is under the control of the user at all times, you are neither the controller or the processor of this personal data, and the GDPR does not apply to you. | Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails. | It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law. |
How can the title "13" be so common? According to the Wikipedia disambiguation page for 13, there are nineteen albums, four songs, two movies, two novels, a card game, a manga, a musical and a play all titled "13", not counting stylizations or alternate forms such as "Thirteen", "13th", "Number 13" or "XIII". Wouldn't there be some trademark issues? | You cannot copyright a word or name in and of itself, so you can't sue someone for having a novel titled 13 so long as their novel is distinct from your own. Trademarks can use certain words or word combinations, but often in a way that is stylized or symbolic of a particular unique style and may include font, coloring, and other unique artistic takes. For example, McDonalds cannot copyright or trademark the letter "M" but it can trademark the "Golden Arches" a unique stylized "M" that they use as signage to at all their locations. If the name is a brand of a certain product such, then the name can be trademarked but only with respect to that product. For example, if the Acme Wash-Master is a dish washing machine they can't sue Ace Wash Master, a unique dog bathing system, for using the name "Wash Master" since it's both styled different (Acme uses a dash between words. ACE uses a space) and non-competitive product lines (most people would not wash dishes in a dog bathing device... and one would certainly hope that no dog owners ever said to themselves "Fido stinks and my tub is busted. The dish washer will do in a pinch!"). | Everything except the summary and the cover art are all facts; facts are not subject to copyright. The summary and cover art would be subject to copyright. You may have a fair use defence given that all you are doing is cataloguing the books. | Some jurisdictions do that. Others don't (see, for example, the Dutch national identity card). My New York driver's license is in all caps, and I rather suspect that it's a holdover from the days in which licenses were processed using a computer system that had only upper-case characters. But that's just a guess. The real answer is that the premise of the question is incorrect. | I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer. | It's not clear to me that your website is, per se, illegal. (Though good luck finding a webhost with a hard drive large enough to store it. Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone is roughly 38,000 characters. If I've done my calculations correctly, storing all of the strings of this length or shorter would require something like 1053760 GB of storage. Give or take.) The main problem is in distributing the "index" of the string containing the text of Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone. This index is just the integer obtained by taking the entire text as a string and treating it as a number in base 26 (A = 1, B = 2, etc.) In other words, all of the information contained in the book is also contained in the index number, and in a relatively simple way. Distributing this number is therefore entirely equivalent to distributing the text; you don't need the website at all. It's entirely analogous to e-mailing the text to someone else; in that process, the text is transformed into a number (in binary, under a different encoding scheme) along the way. But you couldn't seriously argue in a court of law that you were not distributing the text, you were just telling a friend about a very large number. Just to back this up with some actual law citation: US copyright law gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to make and distribute copies of the work. And a "copy" is defined as follows: “Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. In other words, J.K. Rowling (and/or her publishers) have the exclusive rights to distribute that integer, since the work is "fixed" in it by its very nature, and since the work can be reproduced from it. | You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing. | The name can not be copyrighted, but they don't own the rights to the songs and they are telling you they will perform them. They don't want to put it in writing that they are performing songs they legally can't. | A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission. |
Can a real estate agent refuse to show a rental property (apartment) in NYC if I don't provide my eligibility information? I'll email the Nooklyn real estate agents in the New York City area with a question about the property (e.g. floor level, elevator availability, cost of parking, etc.), and they almost always respond without answering the question, and saying they can show the apartment, but then ask for move-in date, income, and credit-score. Answering politely that I'll share my personal information after the viewing, they respond with "we can set up a viewing", and ask again about the above questions. Refusal to provide them with this information, and the agent simply stops responding to emails and essentially prevents showing the property. Is any of this behavior legal in NYC? | Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence). | You did not specify a country or the specific contracts that might rule your condominium. At least in some jurisdictions indeed the repair cost of private portions cannot be shared. Moreover, you may not be required to pay some costs for common portions if you refuse to do so and won't make use of them. Do I have to sue them to fix this issue? A lengthy law-suit is too costly for me. If I refuse to pay $2k and only pay 1.2k, will I be facing any legal troubles? You will probably manage to continue paying just 1.2k, and have them have to sue you if they want to collect that supposedly owned money from you. However, there might be some requirements about providing notification of your refusal in a certain way or before some time elapses. I would recommend you to consult a local lawyer, it will be well-spent money. Plus, that refusal is actually sent by your lawyer (rather than just telling you how/what to say), should make your "law-understanding neighbor" think twice about going forward with their attempt of having you pay for it. | Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client. | If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord. | The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to. | When the fixed term ends, you have two options if you want to stay. The first option is that you and the landlord can sign a new tenancy agreement, with a new fixed term. This new agreement replaces the old one at the end of the current fixed term, so the landlord is free to make changes, including proposing any number for the rent - and you are free to reject it. Alternatively, when the fixed term ends, if you don't sign a new agreement, and you don't leave, the tenancy automatically* becomes a Statutory Periodic Tenancy - often called a rolling contract. This has no fixed term, which means that if you want to leave, you have to give 1 month's notice, while if the landlord wants you to leave, they must give 2 months' notice. Apart from that, the terms of the existing contract, including the rent review clause mentioned in the question, remain in force. The rent review clause suggests that the landlord can unilaterally impose a rent increase after the fixed term ends, but only up to the amount specified. Hence, without signing a new agreement, any increase beyond that would not be allowed. Also, it doesn't appear to make any mention of future rent increases, which suggests that the default rules for rolling contracts will apply, in that the landlord can propose a rent increase, which you can accept or reject. Failing that, the landlord can impose one via a Section 13 Notice, but only once a year. If you feel the requested rent is unreasonable, you can challenge this, and a tribunal will make a ruling based on the state of the property and the rents for similar properties in the area. (* If the tenancy has any provisions relating to what happens once the fixed term ends, then the tenancy may become a Contractual Periodic Tenancy. However, unless those provisions relate to rent, then they may not be relevant here.) | Two factors are relevant. First, the language of the lease sometimes contains an abandonment clause that makes vacancy a default under the lease. This is common in a commercial lease, as vacancies can undermine the apparent viability of a strip mall or mall, but these provisions are less common in residential leases where the rent is current. Second, since this in New York City, there is an issue of rent-control. Rent-control benefits are available only for residential leases, and if you do not live there for long enough, it could be reclassified as a pied-a-terre and cease to qualify as a rent-controlled apartment. If your apartment is not a rent-controlled apartment, this isn't a concern, but if it is, further research related to continued qualification as a rent-controlled apartment in New York City is necessary. | You can do everything that follows the legal rules: It does follow the building allocation for the lot (which most likely reads: Parking lot of lot XYZ, preventing reallocation into other lots) It follows local laws (which might or might not prescribe that condos have to provide a parking space per condo, preventing tearing it up) AND you must find the other party that actually owns the lot willing to part with the lot and sign you over the lot with the rights to modify the land. So while technically you might be legally allowed to get ownership, it seems unlikely just from an economical standpoint: the condo leaser will most decidedly not want to make his condos unattractive (by not providing parking), break the law (by not providing parking) and he might not want to sell the condos together with the building and you have no legal leverage at all to force him to do that. |
How risky is modifying the logos of social media sites? A lot of websites have social media buttons, which allows users to share the page on various sites. These buttons use the logos of these sites. Most social media sites don't allow third parties to use altered logo designs, for example Facebook. But even so, I've seen many websites that use slightly modified social media logos, for example IMDb's circular Facebook "f" logo, when the original is a rounded square. I've even seen some more artistic ones, like these or even these. Is this technically copyright infringement? How risky is it to do this? I've seen some very prominent websites use slightly altered logos. Have any ever been sued? | It's more likely a trademark problem than copyright but it's not easy to identify which legal theory the mark owner would use to enforce compliance with their rules. My first thought was initial interest confusion. But if a person sees the logo what are they going to confuse it with? It's not a typical case where an infringing competitor uses the other's trademark to confuse buyers into buying the infringer's goods. Perhaps if buyers are confused they might NOT click a link because they don't recognize it. In this case Facebook loses a click. But they don't have a right that click so that's a stretch also. The misuse they claim is probably dilution. If someone makes a particularly crappy modification it could be argued that this tarnishes the brand. No confusion is needed for dilution, all that is required is that the mark must be "famous" and used by the infringer in way that causes the dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. This is known as tarnishment. Tarnishment occurs when the plaintiff's trademark is likened to products of low quality, or is portrayed in a negative context. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). See Louis Vuitton vs Chewy Vuiton where Louis Vittuon lost when Chewy Vuiton got summary judgment. ...the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)... provides that the owner of a famous mark can enjoin "another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. But the Supreme Court has held that the dilution statute "unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution." Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003) So this requires that messing with logos actually diminishes a brand and that the company can prove it. I don't know of a case where any of these social media companies tried to enforce their rules. I came across a few blog posts about these rules indicating that the authors had contacted the companies, asking about enforcement theories; no social media company had replied to any of those bloggers. | You would want to establish trademark protection on the phrase "Ball Cube": copyright is not generally a good way to protect names or other short phrases. See, for example, Can I copyright the name of my band? from the U. S. Copyright Office, which notes that "names are not protected by copyright law." Furthermore, you're interested in preventing others from selling a similar object using a similar name, and that's precisely what trademark protection is for. The ball cube design would potentially be eligible for copyright protection, but you should be aware that this protection would not extend to elements of its design that originated in Rubik's Cube, because your design would be a derivative work. | If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA? | Ideas are not protected by copyright, only arrangements of words are protected. If you "rephrase" by only a minor change of wording, leaving much of the wording intact, that is still a copyright infringement unless an exception such as fair use or fair dealing applies (and that seems a bit doubtful in this case). If you "rephrase" so that the wording is quite different, even though the idea is the same, there is probably no infringement. Copying elements of computer code or other IT commands that are essential to making an example work is not infringement. Where there is only one or a very small number of ways to naturally express a fact, copying such expression is not infringement, as facts are not protected by copyright. Adding examples but keeping significant wording unchanged is still likely to be infringement. | If soemoen sues you for infringement of a design copyright, it would be a valid defense that the plaintiff had in fact taken the design elements from your prior work, or indeed from the work of a third party, and so had no valid copyright. Proving this may be easy or hard, depending on the specifics of the situation. Registration will prove that your work existed and you claimed it as original on a specific date. It would not be a perfect defense: if the other party claimed that you had copied prior to that date an infringement action could proceed. The effect of registration is somewhat different in US law and the law of various EU countries. In the US, for one thing, one must register before bringing an infringement suit, and the date of registration may affect the availability of statutory damages, and of an award of the costs and fees for bringing suit. Note that the protection offered by a design copyright is limited: copyright will never protect an ide3a or concept, and so only the specific expression of a design can be protected by copyright. What this means will vary in particular cases. Specific artwork or logos will each carry its own copyright, and if they are original creations of yours, you can register them. (These would not be design copyrights, but ordinary copyrights.) You can also obtain a single registration for the website as a whole. It is very unusual for one who copies a work, or elements of that work, to then sue the original creator for infringement. Given the existence of archive services, it is often fairly easy to prove how a site looked on a particular date. Ensuring that your site has been archived as soon as possible would make it easier to show that it was not copied from a later work. Some services will archive a particular site on request. | When you put a logo that is a legally recognized trademark or servicemark in an acknowledgements section of a document, you are not infringing on the mark. A mark if infringed by someone using it when it is used in a manner that falsely communicates an affiliation with, or an endorsement of, the mark owner of the type of good or service that is protected by the mark. Using a mark in an acknowledgment section doesn't communicate this message (unless, of course, the acknowledgement section falsely says otherwise, which it wouldn't in the case posed by the question). Instead, this use is what is called "nominative use", and this use also expressly acknowledges and reaffirms that someone else owns the mark and has not licensed it to the author of the work containing the acknowledgement. So, this use of these logos does not infringe on the trademarks or servicemarks that protect these logos. | If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine. | The question mentions copyright, but corporate logos are more often protected by trademark law. There are significant differences in the protections afforded, and in where actions can be brought. Copyright Simple logos may not be subject to copyright protection at all. Individual words and short phrases, such as business names and slogans, are generally not protected. But let us assume that the logo in question is a graphic design of sufficient complexity and originality to be protected by copyright. Copyright offers essentially international protection, and the Berne Convention and the TRIPS agreement ensure that the rules are in many ways similar in almost all countries. One can sue in the copyright owner's jurisdiction, or in any jurisdiction where infringement occurred. If the defendant has a presence in the selected jurisdiction, collection of any damages will be significantly easier. Scenario from the Question If I have understood the question, the logo was originally created by P (or more likely by a designer hired or contracted by P) and P holds the copyright on the logo. But S has obtained the logo via B, presumably at a lower price than P would charge. Neither B nor S, I assume, has permission from P to use the logo. B's action in selling the logo to S would be copyright infringement (unless B independently created an identical or similar logo). S's action in using the logo without permission from P is also copyright infringement. P could sue S, or B, or both in Spain, or in its home jurisdiction (perhaps the US), or in other jurisdictions where the pirated logo had appeared. Actual damages, however, will be limited to the value of the logo (say what P would have charged) plus profits made from the use of the logo. But since S is not selling the logo, it will be hard to determine what part, if any, of its profits derived from the use of that particular logo. That is, how much smaller would its profits have been if it had used a different, non-infringing logo. In the US statutory damages are available, which can be as high as $150,000 per work infringed, if the infringement is proved to be "wilful". But that is the upper limit of statutory damages, and the judge has wide discretion to set the amount of the award between the upper and lower limits. (The lower limit is $750.) Modified Scenario Suppose that P had sold an exclusive license to U. U is a US-based firm that is actually using the logo to identify its goods, which are distributed world-wide. The actions of B and S have infringed U's licensed rights in the logo, and U could bring suit for copyright infringement, either in the US or in Spain, or perhaps in other countries. But U would have much the same problem as P, it will be hard to prove sizable damages. Which brings us to trademark issues. Trademark Claims Trademark law is usually used to protect words, symbols, and images used to identify products and services being sold or advertised for sale or rental. Unlike copyright, trademark protection does not expire if the mark remains in use. Also, unlike copyright, single words or simple images can be protected. For example, the "red dot in a circle" logo of the Target stores is too simple for copyright protection. But it has strong protection as a trademark. Trademark protection applies in any case where a reasonable person might be confused as to what the source of the goods (or services) really is. It also applies when the mark's use falsely gives an impression of approval or sponsorship by the trademark holder. Unauthorized use of a mark to benefit from the goodwill or reputation associated with the original product or its makers is infringement. Trademark protection, however, is national. A mark protected in one country may be totally free for use in another country. It is also usually limited to a particular category of use If, say "Scarlet O'Hara's" is used as a trademark for a restaurant chain, the use of "Scarlet O'Hara's" for an anti-virus program is not likely to constitute infringement. Copyright has no such limitations. In some countries there is no protection for a trademark unless it is registered. In other countries, use alone can establish a trademark. The US allows protection without registration, although registration brings stronger protection. Also, trademarks can only be protected when they are actually being used "in trade", that is, to identify or advertise goods or services, or for a limited time while a product is being developed and there is a declared intent to use the mark in the near future. Lack of use or cessation of previous use can cause a mark to lose protection. Scenario from the Question P is selling logos, not using them to identify or market products. Thus it is not using the logo in trade, and has no trademark claim. It cannot sue anyone for trademark infringement, because it has no trademark rights. Modified Scenario (see above) U is using the logo as a trademark world-wide. If it has registered the logo in Spain, or taken such other steps as Spanish law requires, it can perhaps sue S for trademark infringement. It has no trademark claim against B, because B did not use the trademark to identify any goods or services. For a successful suit agaisnt S, U would need to show that confusion between U's products and those of S had actually occurred, or was likely. It would need to show that the products where the logo was used were of a sufficiently similar nature. But if it prevailed, damages could be based on the value of the trade identified by the logo. If S did not sell or market its products outside of Spain, it could only be sued for trademark infringement in Spain. If U did not sell in the Spanish market (or perhaps the wider EU market) it would have no trademark claim. If S started importing its products using the logo into the US, U would have a claim under US trademark law. Thus the details of what logo is used, where and how, and on what products would matter to any trademark claim. |
Can adverse possession be used on land that IS registered? Adverse possession is normally talked about in terms of finding and claiming land for which there is no registered ownership. Around us, a lot of land is listed as registered by the local council including unused/derelict plots. Can adverse possession or something else apply for land which is registered but apparently forgotten? In other words, by the same process of using and tending to the land can an ownership claim become valid? Or, once land is registered is it then non-claimable in perpetuity? | Yes After 10 years the squatter may apply to become the registered owner The current registered owner may oppose the transfer. If they do, they succeed except (complicated reasons). If they don’t oppose or (complicated reasons) the title is transferred. If the title is not transferred and the squatter remains in occupation, they can reapply in 2 years and will be successful. (complicated reasons) are spelled out in the linked article and are quite ... complicated. | The possession is not adverse during the tenancy, so the clock does not run. If the tenancy contract ends or is violated for [appropriate length depending on location] with no reaction from the landlord, that is grounds for adverse possession. | user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says. | It could be. You would have to check the specific address here, although not all properties are covered by By-Law 569-2013. This will give you the allowed uses. Picking a random residential-looking location, you might be stopped by §15.20.20.100 of the zoning bylaw, which restricts service shops to being located in non-residential buildings. There are also specific laws about vehicle service shops, which may included a required 3 meter soft landscape perimeter and fence, depending on what is adjacent to the lot. | Is this legal for the county to enforce? Yes. And can I sue if they try to enforce it? You could, but you would very likely lose your lawsuit. A more fruitful approach would be to go to the county planning board and seek a variance to permit you to do what you want to do. | There are a number of rules related to trespassing vegetation, reviewed in Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355. Virginia law was set in Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, that encroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because they cast shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they happen to encroach upon adjoining property either above or below the ground. However, encroaching trees and plants may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to adjoining property. If so, the owner of the tree or plant may be held responsible for harm caused to [adjoining property], and may also be required to cut back the encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance. so under the circumstances, you can't make him do anything. However, the court continues that the adjoining landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching vegetation to the property line whether or not the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm or possible harm to the adjoining property. You are, however, responsible for damage to the tree caused by such trimming, and you can't trespass onto his property to trim it (fences are often an approximation of property lines) | When selling a residential property in the UK, you normally fill out a form called the TA10 Fittings and Contents Form, which outlines everything in the property included in the sale. This isn't a legal requirement, but your conveyancing solicitor will normally recommend it. Anything else left in the property after the completion of the sale is still, legally, a possession of the previous owner and the new owner is obliged to inform them of these possessions in writing. So, you do have to return it (and most people in such situations do return the possessions without question). However, if the presence of those possessions means you can't be reasonably expected to move into the property, then you can claim compensation from the previous owner for alternative accommodation (i.e. a hotel) until the situation is rectified. Or if the previous owner refuses to collect the possessions, you can likewise claim compensation for the costs of disposing of it. Alternatively, if they do want the possessions back, but take their time getting it, you can charge them fair storage costs. | It is usual for a lease to specify for what purposes and on what notice the landlord is entitled to access. Often there is a provision allowing the landlord access on no notice in an "emergency" which is often not specifically defined. Access for purposes of repair, and for purposes of inspection may be on 24 hours notice, or 48 hours, or some other period, or on "reasonable notice" with no specific period specified. Access for a reasonable purpose (such as inspection) on reasonable notice that does not actually inconvenience the tenant, and that is not demanded with unreasonable frequency will probably not constitute such a breach as to justify ending the tenancy, and may well not justify sizable damages in the absence of other breaches. Much will depend on the wording of the lease or rental agreement, and on the practice of the local courts. One might well ask oneself "what actual harm will an inspection with insufficient notice do me" because a court might ask a similar question if an action is brought. If the inspection does cause a problem, then that should be addressed. |
Is there a law preventing a business owner from publicly displaying your photograph and name, and a debt they say you owe? Can a business owner post your full name and your photograph, with an amount of money they say you owe them, on the wall of their business? Does it violate any right to privacy? Assume for the sake of argument that, unlike in this question, the statement is true. | Posting such a pic and statement may give grounds for a lawsuit, but probably not Overview That is going to depend very much on the the jurisdiction, and on the specific facts. If the statement that the pictured person owes a debt is false, this may be a case of defamation, but that was explored thoroughly in Can you post a picture in your business to embarrass or defame a customer? and its answers. See FindLaw's page "What Is Invasion of Privacy?" for an overview of the classic privacy torts. See also this page quoting the Restatement (2nd) of Torts, § 652 See further the Wikipedia article "Privacy laws of the United States" which gives a history of the four torts. Note that not all US states recognize all, or indeed any, of the privacy torts. Nor do all non-US jurisdictions. In some places these torts have been recognized, or blocked, by legislation, in others by court decision. And in the US they are limited by the federal First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Right of Publicity,aka Appropriation There is, in general, no right to privacy in one's physical appearance under any of the standard privacy torts, except that if one's likeness is being used to advertise something, or imply sponsorship or approval of a commercial product, many jurisdictions protect a right of publicity (sometimes called the tort of Appropriation of Name or Likeness). But here it does not appear that the image is being used to advertise or promote or sponsor anything, so that would not apply. Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion The tort of Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion would only apply if the picture were taken on someone's private premises or somewhere else there the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Otherwise it would not apply, there is no general right to privacy for a picture taken in public. Private Facts The tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts could possibly apply if the fact of the unpaid debt had been carefully kept secret, and if its disclosure would be highly offensie to a reasonable person. But nothing that is a matter of public record can be the subject of such a suit anywhere in the US, because under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) publication of facts derived from public records is protected under the first and fourteenth amendments, even against a specific state law granting protection. This will obviously not apply outside the US. False Light If the statement of the debt were true, but in some significant way misleading, the tort of False Light might apply. This is described by the Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 652E as: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. Note that the standard of (b) above is the same as the "Actual Malice" standard for defamation cases where the plaintiff is a public figure. False light cases are in many ways similer to defamation cases, and some jurisdictions have treated themn as identical tro defamation, while otrhrs do not recognize them at all. Nothing in the facts stated in the question would imply a false light claim, but more context might possibly support such a claim,. Conclusion Nothing in the question clearly indicates that any privacy-based tort would apply, but the facts are stated it a very brief way in the question. Further context and detail might clarify the answer one way or the other. This answer is largely based onunited-states law, althoguh some of it will apply elsewhere. | It depends on what information you are sharing, how you got it, and what rights the business asserts over the information. For example, if it is content created by the business and they claim copyright protection you can only use it without their permission in accordance with Fair use exceptions. If you obtain the information through some limited/conditional access agreement you would be subject to the terms of that agreement. As always: If you want a legal opinion specific to your use case you need to consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction. | Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts. | No You say you won't disclose personal information, therefore, you can't disclose personal information. Now, if your privacy policy said "We won't disclose your personal information except ..." then, so long as you did the "..." that would be fine (subject to privacy law). | Such an image is copyrighted, as part of the movie. You cannot legally use it without permission from the copyright holder, unless the use of the image falls under fair use (note that fair use is a strictly US legal concept. It does not apply anywhere else) or a similar exception to copyright, such as "fair dealing". There are multiple factors which must be considered in making a fair use judgement. No one factor ever totally controls the decision. It is a case-by-case decision. But several things about your proposed use suggest to me that it will not qualify as a fair use. The image is part of a creative work, not a work of non-fiction such as a news report or a textbook. That weighs against fair use. You seem to be using the whole image, although it is only part of the movie. That probably weighs against fair use to some extent. A use in "a social media post regarding a sales vacancy" sounds commercial to me. If so, that would weigh against fair use. The copyright owner might well wish to market images from the film. If so, and if many people used images from the film as you propose to use this one, that might harm the market. This weighs against fair use. You don't seem to be making any comment on the image, or using it in any significantly transformational way. That weighs against fair use. Use of the image does not seem vital or even important to the message you intend to communicate. That also weighs against fair use. In short, I think you would be wiser to use an image that you have or can get permission to use in this way. If you use this image, it is possible that the copyright holder would sue for copyright infringement, or issue a DMCA take-down notice, or both. | By posting an image (or any other content) on an openly accessible page, a person such as Alice is implicitly giving permission to anyone to view or read that content, although not necessarily to make copies of it. A link from a page operated by Bob to such content is not making a copy, nor is it any other form of infringement. However, there are other possible cases. For example, if Alice sells access to her pictures, placing them behind a paywall, so that only those who have paid have a valid ID/PW set to gain access, then if Bob provides a link that bypasses the paywall, that may well be contributory infringement (CI). When Bob builds a business model on encouraging or facilitating infringement, that will be CI. If Alice does not post her pictures, but Charlie gets copies and posts them without permission, a link from Bob's site to Charlie's may be CI, particularly if Bob gets per-click revenue or other benefits for increased traffic. | You don't seem to be distinguishing properly between "original artwork" and photographs of it. A 19th-century painting will be out of copyright, so you can set up an easel copy it yourself, or even take a photo if the owners don't mind; your copy can be used however you please. However, other people can't use your photograph without your permission. Similarly, if you want to reuse a photograph used in an art book, the important thing is the copyright on the photograph, not the painting. | Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy. |
Texas, USA - Is it illegal to have an applicant do work for your company as a "Test?" I've got a college grad I am mentoring and he just drove for 2 days, to apply for a job. The person he met with wanted him to take a programming test, and instructed him to create a website to show his skills. He spent 3 or 4 days doing so, submitted it, and then was told, that they actually wanted him to update their company website as part of their "hiring test" I suggested he look into small claims court for compensation. I believe it would be illegal to get a prospective candidate to do actual company work, that hiring party uses commercially, for free, as a hiring "test." Am I wrong? I don't know where to look to find state law on such a matter. Any relevant code? We are in TX USA. So is the employer. | It seems that this is known as a "working interview". Asking a candidate to do actual work without paying for it is illegal under Texas law. However asking a person to take an extensive, even a multi-day, skills test is not. Asking a prospective web developer to submit a portfolio of prior work, or to design a web site for a fictional company, say for the Acme Company that supplies the Coyote, is legal. Had the applicant created a web site for the actual employer without being paid, the applicant would own the copyright, and the prospective employer would be in violation of Texas minimum wage law, and would have committed copyright infringement if they used the design, without securing permission. Statutory damages for wilful copyright infringement can be as high as $150,000, and as low as $750. A federal suit must be filed to collect such damages. However, if no actual work was done, I doubt that the applicant has a valid claim. One would need to consult a lawyer to see if some other basis for a claim would apply. Many lawyers will offer an initial consultation for free or a nominal charge. Here are some Texas sources on the issues with "working interviews". The page "Are “Working Interviews” Legal?" from the Gay Reed law firm says: If you bring someone in for a working interview you must pay them for their time in compliance with state and federal law and make appropriate withholding. Some believe that since they are only going to be there for a few days, you don’t have to do new-hire paperwork. Just skip the I-9, background check, application, and W-2. Wrong again. If you hire anyone – for 1 day or 1,000, you have to do new hire paperwork. Depending on how long you would like to conduct your interview, we can create a day contract or a week contract for the prospective employee. This will limit your exposure under unemployment compensation laws, and you can even reduce the amount you pay. Where you might pay a good hygienist $20 per hour or more as a full time wage, you can pay them minimum wage during a working interview. The page "What Is a “Working Interview” and How Does It Work? from CEDR HR Solutions says: A “working interview” is the act of assessing a job candidate’s skills and ability to fit with your existing team by bringing them in to perform work for your business temporarily before you officially bring them on board. Traditionally, working interviews take place after a successful verbal interview. ... However, using working interviews does not exempt you from your obligations as an employer, and performing working interviews without understanding their legal implications can actually get you in a lot of trouble. ... If your “interviewee” is performing work for your business that would usually be performed by one of your employees, in a legal sense, that person must be treated as an employee of your business. By testing your applicants’ abilities and knowledge without having them perform actual work for your business, you can get an idea of their skill level without putting your practice at risk. “Skills tests” are especially helpful when it comes to evaluating candidates for clinical positions. ... Instead of performing an unpaid working interview or trying to call someone an independent contractor when they do not fit those requirements, hire them and use a “Getting Acquainted” period to judge whether a new hire will be a long-term fit for your practice (90 days is often a good span of time for this). The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) has a page on "Interviews" which says: Interviews When interviewing applicants, apply the same standard that is applied to job applications - ask only about things that are directly related to the job requirements for the position under consideration. Watch out for tape-recording - the applicant might be tape-recording the interview without an employer's knowledge, and a video- or tape-recording of an interview would be discoverable in a discrimination claim or lawsuit. Tell the managers who conduct interviews to be extremely careful about note-taking during interviews - anything like that can be discovered in a claim or lawsuit - many discrimination cases have been lost due to careless and/or embarrassing comments written by interviewers. Test for whether something should be written down: would you feel comfortable explaining it in front of a judge and jury? "Working interviews" are not the same as pre-hire interviews at which an interviewee might demonstrate how he or she would carry out a sample task - an "interview" during which the worker performs actual work and receives what most companies would call "on the job" training or orientation to the company is work time - a company must pay at least minimum wage for such training time, satisfy all of the usual new-hire paperwork requirements (W-4, I-9, new hire report, and so on), and report the wages to TWC and IRS. The TWC can be reached at: 512-463-2222 The TWC page on the minimum wage says that Texas uses the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hr. It lists several exceptions, none of which seem to apply to the situation described in the question, or rather the situation that would have occurred had the applicant accepted an "unpaid trial" or "working interview". The actual Texas law is Chapter 62 of the Labor Code The exact section is 62.051. | Can a prospective employer require you to pay to take a test as part of an interview? That is unlawful. Section 10 of the BC Employment Standards Act prohibits a person to "request, charge or receive, directly or indirectly, from a person seeking employment a payment for (a) employing or obtaining employment for the person seeking employment". See also section 11. A prospective employer is allowed to require proof of credentials (such as certifications or a diploma) which in turn might entail a non-reimbursable cost to the candidate. However, that is permissible because the credibility inherent to renown credentialing systems facilitates ascertaining that the prospective employer has no ulterior motive (i.e., profit) for requiring candidates to consume services from a certifying agency. In other words, the employer and the certifying agency must be two separate, totally unrelated agencies, for the former's reliance on the latter to be cognizable in a context of screening candidates. The post on WorkplaceSE basically describes a scam. Although that post refers to the UK, it is most likely that many other jurisdictions contain a legislative provision similar to the aforementioned statute. As an example, see M[ichigan]CL 408.478. | It just doesn’t happen. It is prohibited for a patent examiner to get a patent or any interest in a patent other than by inheritance Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 4, patent examiners, other Office employees, and Office officers may not apply for a patent or acquire any right or interest in any patent during the period of their employment with the Office and for one year thereafter. and a patent attorney would lose their USPTO registration and law license at a minimum for violating their oath. Very few inventions have the potential to make enough money to risk a career. You will need to trust in the professionalism of many people on the path to making your idea a profitable reality. | It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions. | I've litigated cases like these before. The IRS enforcement reaction is swift and severe. Penalties for the employer are heavy and rarely waived. It would be rare for a business like this to stay operational long enough to issue a W-2. A business like this would probably be shut down by the IRS and have the people responsible for the payroll function, at a minimum, promptly burdened with tax liens, within four to six months. These cases also constitute a significant share of all criminal tax prosecutions. The odds of someone doing this spending several years in federal prison is high. Generally speaking, if the wrongdoing is fully on the part of the employer without the collusion or knowledge of the employee, the IRS will not force the employee to double pay the taxes that should have been withheld by the employer in this situation. Instead, this IRS will try to recover the amounts that were withheld from the employees but not delivered to the IRS. It will seek to recover these amounts from the employer and also from other responsible persons in the organization (and from outsourced professionals) with the authority to pay the IRS who did not do so. There may be circumstances, if push comes to shove, where the IRS could collect from the employees in a case like this one (I've never had occasion to need to research that issue), but that would be the rare exception and not the rule, in practice. On the other hand, if the employer simply does not withhold taxes or prepare W-2s at all, and either 1099s people who should have been classified as employees (or files no information tax returns at all), the IRS will generally insist that the employee pay income taxes on the full amount owed and that they pay the employee part of payroll taxes. It will also pursue the employer for the employer's share of payroll taxes. The employer will also be jointly and severally liable for any taxes that should have been reported and subjected to withholding that are not paid by the employee (perhaps because the employee spent all the money). Sometimes cases like this are also criminally prosecuted, but it is less common to do so. | Bonded labor is illegal in India, but enforcement is lax. Read Right against exploitation in Fundamental rights in India. The right against exploitation, given in Articles 23 and 24, provides for two provisions, namely the abolition of trafficking in human beings and Begar (forced labour)... As per law, they cannot make the contract binding if it relates to bonding of the laborer. But a general contract may stand in court if they have made you sign the contract and paid the duty to government for the contract. This contract will be mild form of Bonds/begar-contracts. As per the requirements of the contract, usually they will ask you to give them your original documents and degree certificate. Do not do that. That will give them control, and it's illegal. From personal experience, such companies are phonies and they want to exploit you. Visa thing is a scare. As per they wont give me Experience letter and Releasing letter; they might do that, and so you will not be able to show experience. You can file a lawsuit against them. (But you know it's a waste of time in Indian courts) As per first three things you mentioned: It is written on my company's letter head. It doesn't contain any stamp paper. It doesn't contain any company seal. It's not a contract. Do not provide them your actual signatures. Make a strange signature so that you can later argue that it's not your signature. But think about the consequences: You are going to that (probably shady) company, do you think they will hold any of their promises later, at all. Think: Will the company stay in business until your bond is over? Then how will you get an Experience certificate? That ends the answer. A few suggestions I'd suggest finding a different job. I'd suggest talking to a lawyer. It's cheaper than your life being screwed up. I'd suggest talking to your family about it. Nothing written here constitutes legal advice. Talk to a lawyer to get a legal opinion on the matter. | Barrister to instructing solicitor: “Am I working for the plaintiff or defendant?” Plaintiff Your honour, this excellent study and the expert testimony you have heard from the authors, clearly demonstrates that whiteboard testing is sexual discrimination by another name. The clear correlation between the gender of the interviewee and their ability to perform this task, which is unrelated to the job and is actually a test of how good the person is at handling performance anxiety, is being used to prejudicially and unlawfully screen out female applicants. Defendant Your honour, this discredited paper and the inconsistent testimony of the author clearly demonstrated that the methodology was flawed and the conclusions are unsupportable. When pressed, it turned out that the number of females encompassed by the catch-all word “all” was 6 - hardly a sample big enough to draw any meaningful conclusions from. Further, it turned out that the number of men who also improved was unknown because they didn’t test them! So we have the authors of a study with gender discrimination in its very methodology drawing asinine conclusions from it about gender discrimination! It may be that whiteboard testing is better at finding competent actors than programmers and this may make it a terrible recruitment tool. However, my client can run their businesses in whatever inefficient way they choose so long as it isn’t unlawful discrimination - and this isn’t that. | No - there is no general requirement to be fair to all applicants when selecting someone for a job. It's not even clear how this would work - you would need to define what "fair" means in this context, and there would be many competing definitions. Is it fair to prefer an applicant who has more experience because they received help from their parents with landing their first job? Is it fair to prefer someone with a certain look for an acting job? Is it fair to prefer someone who happens to have a similar personality to the person hiring? So if the employer finds it more convenient to use the same test every year, and if they do not mind that this gives some applicants an advantage, they are free to do that. The only exception is that discrimination based on certain, specific factors (often called "protected characteristics") is usually outlawed. The list depends on jurisdictions, but usually includes things like gender, race and age. However, even in that case discrimination is allowed if the business can demonstrate a genuine need - for example, when looking for an actor, it is allowed to hire based on gender. |
Defining the scope over which a vote can be taken I'm looking for the name of something that likely is defined somehwere in Robert's Rules of Order or in some other standard in parliamentary procedure. Before a vote can take place, there must be a minimum number of voting parties present first. This term is called the quorum, and without it, no vote can take place. But what about a term defining the extent and scope to which the group may take a vote on? For instance, the Senate cannot get together and vote on whether or not Bulgaria should legalize marijuana, because Bulgaria is outside of their defined scope. The board of a local homeowner's association cannot convene and take a vote on how many illegal firearm their homeowners can possess, because thats a legal issue outside the scope of the homeowner's association. Whereas quorum defines the number of people required for a vote to take place, I'm hoping there is a word or phrase that defines the scope/domain over which votes can be taken. Does such a word of phrase exist in law and/or governance? | Jurisdiction the authority of a court or official organization to make decisions and judgments A body that acts within the scope of its jurisdiction can expect that its actions will be upheld by the courts - whether that body is the US Congress or a local softball club. | The Declaration of Independence is often cited (along with the Federalist Papers) when the court is attempting to justify a particular interpretation of The Constitution by looking at the intent of the drafters. For example, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 576 U.S. ____ (2015), in establishing that the people have ultimate sovereignty quoted the Declaration of Independence: Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed... Following that (after also quoting some text from the Constitution), Justice Ginsberg concludes: In this light, it would be perverse to interpret the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to check legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in... As a second example, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015), refers to the Declaration of Independence: This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves. | Testing the law means running a case under that law and having a court rule on it. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary does not give opinions on whether a bill proposed or an act passed by the legislature is legal or not - they decide controversies that arise under those acts. The executive is obliged to follow the law so if they do something the law prohibits or don’t do something the law requires then someone with standing (usually someone affected by that act or omission) can take them to court and seek an order for them to stop (an injunction) or to do what they are required to do (a writ of mandamus). In the present situation, it’s my understanding (and I may be wrong) that Parliament has enacted a law that requires the Executive (in the person of the relevant Minister of the Crown) to request an extension from the EU if Parliament has not approved a Brexit deal. Testing the law would mean the Minister not doing that or stating an intention not to do it. A person with standing can then petition the court for a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to do it. If the Minister still refuses they would be in contempt and subject to being gaoled until they did. | An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant. | This is a non-justiciable political question. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (a case involving a federal judge with the surname Nixon, not the U.S. President who resigned on August 8, 1974; Nixon at the time of his conviction and removal from office was a federal district court judge in Mississippi). In other words, it means whatever the U.S. House of Representatives, in voting on the impeachment, and the U.S. Senate, in trying the impeachment, decides it means. But, since U.S. Senate trials of Presidential impeachments must be presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States (see U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 3, clause 6), so that particular judge's opinion regarding what it means may have some influence on the proceedings. The procedures aspects of an impeachment set out in that clause states that: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. | You are looking for extraterritorial jurisdiction: As the term indicates, it connotes the exercise of jurisdiction, or legal power, outside territorial borders. This can include nations claiming jurisdiction over crimes in nearby bodies of water and to specific categories of crimes (such as sexual offenses against underage victims) committed by or against citizens while abroad. Wikipedia has a summary, including a few different nations' application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Cornell Law Review has a very extensive essay, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction? | First, to be clear, this is almost never a state level limitation. To the extent that the link in the question implies otherwise, it is incorrect. Instead, local governments, typically a municipality or in an area that is not part of any municipality, a county, enacts land use regulations, the most common of which is usually called a "zoning code." There are also usually locally adopted building codes that supplement the zoning code. A zoning code typically establishes rules regarding how different kinds of real estate can be used in different enumerated zones. Usually, there are several different zones in which residential uses are allowed and different rules apply in each one. One of the typical limitations in a residential zone is to establish the number of unrelated people who don't own the home who may live there. The purpose of such limitations is to discourage the establishment of boarding houses, group homes, women's shelters, homeless shelters, flop houses, and halfway houses in relatively low density residential zones, on the theory that these uses are undesirable in terms of neighborhood character and cause undesirable people to move into a neighborhood that lowers property values for other people who live there. More crassly, people in affluent neighborhoods want to ban property uses that make it possible for poorer people to live near them. Often the actual scope of the limitations, however, is far broader than is necessary to prohibit these particularly unpopular "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) uses. The drafters of zoning codes are frequently more concerned about preventing loopholes in their restrictions from being identified than about limiting property rights in a respect that most current property owners in the zone don't avail themselves of anyway. For example, in Denver, where I live, the City Council recently passed a Group Living Amendment to its zoning code easing restrictions on uses of residences by unrelated people. This measure was sufficiently controversial that members of the public used their referral powers to petition to have the repeal of the recently enacted legislation places on the November 2021 general election ballot for voters to consider repealing it. As the link in the question notes, homeowner's associations, frequently also impose limitations on this kind of use of a residence, which are often even more strict, and are frequently adopted for the same reason. HOAs have more authority to do so than local governments because as private entities, they aren't required to meet constitutional law limitations on their authority. The question is, if both parties agree to forgo any safety measures that it might be there to protect, who exactly is it hurting if one person pays the other to stay over? In simple terms: why is it illegal? Why does the government care who stays in who's house, while paying money? Is there some 3rd party that is negatively affected if the guidelines aren't followed? The third-party is the neighboring property owners who fear that the quality of their neighborhood will be reduced by this kind of agreement. I am sympathetic to these criticisms. But, they aren't barriers to enacting laws if people with the power to enact legislation disagree. The simple rule is that in the real world, legislation is not required to adhere to a liberal/libertarian ideal in which laws are enacted only to regulate matters in which someone else may arguably be harmed. Subject to light constitutional regulation, the authority of local government's to enact legislation regulating the use of property is frequently plenary (i.e. unlimited) or close to it. The government can do anything it wants that it isn't forbidden from doing by the constitution or a higher level government's statutes. Courts aren't permitted to second guess the accuracy or desirability of these legislative determinations in most cases. Many states, furthermore, have "home rule cities" that are expressly protected from having their legislative authority limited in many respects by state legislation. A regulatory taking, the prevents property from having any beneficial use, must be compensated by the government enacting the regulation of its use. But regulatory laws may reduce the value of property by limiting the uses to which it can be put so long as there is still some beneficial use of the property that remains available. A very light and disputed impact that is perceived to be negative, such as the one in this case, is a sufficient rational basis for a municipal or local government to enact such legislation, and many local government zoning codes do, in fact, regulate this kind of activity. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of local governments to enact this kind of legislation in the United States in the face of a constitutional challenge to it, in the case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. in 1926, although some more extreme versions of limitations on non-related people sharing a home have subsequently been held to be invalid, mostly as a result of later enacted federal fair housing laws. | Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 17 states that "The Congress shall have Power" To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings which then happened in 1 Stat. 130 (1790). It is there referred to as "a district of territory" but more often simply as a "district". Unlike territories, its existence for its actual purpose as seat of government is specifically enabled by the Constitution. Then via 2 Stat 103 (1801), DC was politically brought within the control of Congress, so that residents were no longer residents of Maryland or Virginia. In this act it is consistently termed a "district". |
Can the police legally force you to sit in interrogation? I guess more specifically, when cops order you to sit down in an interrogation room (before you have been charged or arrested), is this a 'lawful order'? I am asking because of the way this is often shown on shows like Law and Order. It seems like this is just so the cops can bully the suspect and be able to dominate them, and so is there a legal basis allowing them to do that? | If the police order you to sit in an interrogation room and you are not permitted to leave, by definition, you have been arrested. Detaining someone against their will for longer than necessary to answer a few questions on the spot (which is a lesser imposition on your freedom called a "Terry stop") is what it means to be arrested. Legally, the police are only allowed to arrest you if they have probable cause to believe that you have committed a crime. I believe that you are confusing arrested (being detained by law enforcement against your will for more than a Terry stop), with being booked, or being charged with a crime. Generally speaking people are arrested first, and then booked next, and then charged with a crime after that, although this isn't always the order in which this happens. In much the same way, if the police observe someone committing a crime, they will first handcuff them which places them under arrest, and then book them sometime not too long later when they arrive at the police station, and then formally charge them sometime after that after a conversation with the prosecuting attorney to see if the prosecuting attorney is willing to pursue the case. Booking generally involves bringing someone to a police station, getting identifying information, taking a mug shot, taking finger prints, and depending upon what the police want to do, searching your person and inventorying your possessions prior to putting you in a jail cell in jail garb. Usually, however, the grand jury or the prosecuting attorney (it varies by jurisdiction) does have subpoena power to compel you to provide information under oath prior to trial as a witness, following the service of a subpoena upon you a reasonable time in advance as set forth in the relevant court rules, unless you invoke your 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and are not granted immunity from prosecution based upon your testimony in exchange, or you invoke some other legal privilege against having to testify. They can, of course, simply ask you to come to an interrogation room and answer questions, and merely imply that it is mandatory without actually saying that you must and without clarifying the situation. In that case, which is extremely common, their legal right to interrogate you flows from your own consent. If you answer their questions, your answers could provide the police with probable cause to arrest you that they didn't have when they started asking questions. Indeed, often, when police interrogate you before booking you, they are doing so because they need your statements to establish the probable cause needed to legally arrest you. This is why criminal defense attorneys counsel people to immediate ask for a lawyer and refuse to answer any questions other than those needed to establish your identity. You can also ask if you are under arrest and if you are free to leave (which are mutually exclusive). If they say you are not under arrest, you are free to leave, unless you are appearing pursuant to a subpoena. | There is an important distinction between moral duty and legal obligation. Even if an officer should arrest a person, given some moral standard, they are not legally obligated to do so. A test for legal obligation is whether an choice results in a negative legal outcome – is the officer sued or criminally penalized for acting or not acting? Unsurprisingly, the answer to the legal question is highly dependent on jurisdiction. I only consider US jurisdiction here (which incidently is not a single coherent jurisdiction, it is a phylum of jurisdictions), though some aspects of the answer extend to other countries. The clearest cases are obligations to not act in a certain way – prohibitions. Police may not beat a suspect in order to obtain information. Period, end of story, no discretion. There is a putative bright line that police cannot cross, namely violating an individual's rights, and that constitutes a major exception to the doctrine of police immunity. If X is a clearly established right, police cannot violate that right and if they do, they can be sued or even prosecuted. Sometimes courts "discover" a particular right in a certain case, so the individual (plaintiff in a civil case) may be vindicated but the officer will not be subject to legal sanctions, since LEOs are not held to be appellate court justices who can divine the future discover of a legal right. 18 USC 242 statutorily describes certain circumstances where a choice is criminally proscribed, and 42 USC 1983 allows for civil suits. This pertains to things that an officer does, saying what an officer does not legally have the discretion to perform an act. Now setting aside proscriptions where "you may not...", the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits civil or criminal actions against the government (including LEOs) unless a specific exception has been carved out. I recommend this (open access) journal issue on Discretion in Law Enforcement. There do exist statutory obligations to act imposed on LEOs, for example see this AG legal opinion from Florida, stating that A law enforcement officer, including a police officer, has a legal duty to provide aid to ill, injured, and distressed persons who are not in police custody during an emergency whether the law enforcement officer is on-duty or acting in a law enforcement capacity off-duty. A famous case regarding (non)liability for police inaction is Castle Rock v. Gonzales. In this case, police declined to enforce a Temporary restraining order (TRO) against plaintiff's estranged husband (who then murdered the children). The Supreme Court observes that the Due Process Clause does not “requir[e] the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors” and also noted the lack of express statutory obligation to enforce that law. In Everton v. Willard, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the question of whether discretionary police power authority to make or not make an arrest and whether a decision not to take an individual into custody constitutes a basic judgmental or decision-making function that is immune from tort liability and they do hold that the decision of whether to enforce the law by making an arrest is a basic judgmental or discretionary governmental function that is immune from suit, regardless of whether the decision is made by the officer on the street, by his sergeant, lieutenant or captain, or by the sheriff or chief of police There have been disagreements on sovereign immunity, for example Huhn v. Dixie Insurance Co., 453 So. 2d 70, which held that when an individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual is entitled to redress for the wrong done (the relevant action was not arresting a person for DUI). As employees of the government, LEOs are subject to the over-arching rules of their employer. They may be ordered by their superiors to refrain from arresting a law-breaker during a riot, on the grounds that doing so will exacerbate a tense situation. The police department might be sued for such a decision, but it is unlikely that the government will be held liable for an essentially political decision. Likewise, enforcement of "no public camping" laws is highly variable, and the courts will most likely not sanction a city for not arresting homeless people who are camping on public property in violation of the law. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). | I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario. | united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky. | There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order. | In the scenario you described, you were both right: Police have no authority to demand that you leave a public space because you are photographing, nor does the government have the right to prevent you from photographing anything that is visible from a public space, including government facilities or employees. However, the police would likely have followed through on their threat to arrest you. In that event, any vindication for wrongful arrest and violation of your civil rights would only come (if ever) at the end of protracted and expensive litigation in the courts. (A plethora of examples is accumulated by watchdog groups like the ACLU and Photography Is Not A Crime.) | If such conversations are reported, it can place the suspect in a dilemma. Consider a man who appears to have overdosed on illegal narcotics. He is taken to the hospital, and the doctor asks what kind of drugs he took, in order to plan his treatment. If the man thinks that what he says could be used to prosecute him, he might lie to the doctor. Then he would not receive proper medical treatment, putting his health at risk. Lawmakers or police authorities might decide that it is better for society for people to always be able to speak freely to their doctors and receive proper treatment, even if it means that it will sometimes be harder to prosecute criminals. That would be one possible rationale for a rule like this. |
Would it be legal in New York to only hire from Harvard Law School? The premise of the television programme Suits relies on a New York law firm so élitist that it only hires Harvard Law School graduates, and rejects all other applications. In real life, would this be legal under New York and federal law, or would it be indirect racial discrimination, given that Harvard Law School graduates are less Black and Hispanic (and more White) than the United States at large? | That’s legal The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination on the basis of “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, marital status or disability”. Federal law prevents employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), national origin, age (40 or older), disability and genetic information (including family medical history). What law school you went to is on neither list. If Harvard’s policies break the rules, that’s not the firm’s issue. However, AFAIK, Harvard is scrupulously fair in their admissions program - so long as you have the grades and the money, they’ll let you in. It’s not Harvard’s fault that most of the people who get the best secondary education and have the most money are predominantly white, Christian, and US born - that’s do to politico-social-historical-economic factors beyond Harvard’s control. | Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this! | A Lawyer may hire paralegals, clerks, secretaries, and other assistants. The lawyer may hire as many as s/he pleases, and assign them whatever tasks s/he chooses. However, some kinds of documents may need to be signed by the lawyer (which ones will depend on the jurisdiction, in the US on the state). During the so-called "robo-signing scandal" it was held that, in some US states at least, a lawyer who signs certain kinds of documents without reviewing them has failed to perform the duties imposed on the lawyer by the law, and the documents may be invalid. Large numbers of mortgage foreclosure cases were dismissed when it became known that the lawyer signing relevant documents had not in fact reviewed them (or in some cases had not even signed them, but had permitted a non-lawyer to sign the lawyer's name). In addition, some functions in some jurisdictions must be performed by an actual lawyer. For example, paralegals and other non-lawyers cannot validly give legal advice. Only a lawyer can represent a client in court. And so on. I question whether one lawyer could in most kinds of practice keep up with the work of "hundreds" of non-lawyers, but that would depend on the kind of work done by the firm. In the US, some law firms are essentially collection agencies. There a single lawyer with many many assistants suffices, I understand, and that structure is not uncommon in the US. | What are the things that I should prepare for this session, in terms of order of dress, language, content? Dress In an actual court room, suit and tie is preferred for men and formal dress for women for lawyers and professionals. Your "Sunday best" or what you would wear to work on a typical day would be appropriate if you don't have a suit and tie or the equivalent. Avoid nightclub looks, any garment or ornament with a message, or more than minimal jewelry or accessories. For a video testimony, solids come across better than complex patterns if the video resolution turns out to be low. Your clothing should not be a message other than that you are a respectful reputable member of the community. Language and Content You should avoid colloquialism or profanity (except in a quotation from someone else about what they said out of court), but should not try to affect an accent or dialect that you cannot speak naturally. If you grew up in rural West Virginia, don't try to pretend you grew up on the Harvard University campus. If you need an interpreter, you should let someone know in advance as this can be arranged. Generally, you should only speak in response to question, and should leave a "beat" between being asked and answering any question in case someone says "I object" before you start to answer. You should listen to the question you are asked, truthfully answer the question you were actually asked (not necessarily the one that was intended to be asked), and stop when you have answered it. (This is harder than it seems.) If asked an open ended question, take whatever time it takes to answer it completely. It is appropriate to instead ask for clarification of a question if you couldn't hear it properly or if you don't understand it because it uses a word you don't understand. If the question assumes something that isn't true, correct that wrong assumption. For example: "what did you see the defendant doing at the football game on Sunday?" "I didn't see the defendant doing anything at the football game on Sunday because he was having dinner with me after the baseball game on Sunday." Don't rush. Most people talk fast when they are nervous or try to over summarize. Everyone has gathered at this moment, in part, to hear what you have to say. Take the time necessary to say what you need to say to tell the whole story in response to the questions you are asked without summarizing the facts. A little emotion can be appropriate in your tone, but stay civil and don't blow your top. As a rule of thumb the person who seems most reasonable usually wins. The judge can be referred to as "your honor". Lawyers can be referred to as "sir" or "ma'm". In content, you will be normally asked to provide your opinion on things like "is there any reason he would be a flight risk" (ideally answering with not just a "no" but a "he owns a home and has deep ties to the community and would never flee."), "is he a threat to the public?", "does he have a good reputation in the community?" ("Yes, I'd trust him with my money and my children."). Don't make things up, but focus on facts that reasonably demonstrate that he is unlikely to flee because he has too much to lose, firm ties, and no place to go. | FDIC Regulation 500 prohibits discrimination in making loans on the basis of "National origin" but not on the basis of immigration status. This story from The Nation says that Bank of America is denying accounts to non-citizens, and arguing that it is legal because of increased risks, although there are current court challenges to this. Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A is a case now pending challenging loan denials based on immigration status. This has particularly come up in regard to DACA recipients, rather than people with LPR status. The US "public accommodation" laws probably do not apply, as a bank is not usually considered a place of public accommodation. Any specific state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status might apply. In short, this is an issue still not clearly settled. There seems to be no law or regulation requiring banks to ask for citizenship information, much less to deny accounts based on it, and it would be well to seek a bank with a different policy if possible. The above is very US-specific. Many countries do limit banking access based on citizenship, i understand. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. Before challenging any bank action, you may well wish to seek advice from a lawyer. | The Copyright Office has determined, in chapter 300 of the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, on page 36, that the copyright bar extends to works created by the President; Congress; the federal judiciary; federal departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, or commissions; or any other officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the course of his or her official duties. So the Senator is a US employee for copyright purposes, at least according to the US Copyright Office. Technically, this is interpretation rather than law, and in theory a court might disagree, but if anyone is qualified to speak on this issue, it's the Copyright Office. In my opinion, it is most reasonable to assume that the Copyright Office is correct in their interpretation unless there is case law directly contradicting them. The only question is whether the letter was created by the Senator "while acting within the course of his or her official duties." I'm not aware of any case law suggesting that constituent building is or is not an "official duty" of a US Senator, and there are reasonable arguments to be made in both directions. On the one hand, the letter is clearly beyond the scope of Congress's lawmaking and oversight Constitutional functions. On the other, the office of Senator is an inherently political office, and a case can be made that campaigning for reelection is part of the job. Perhaps surprisingly, that question was extensively litigated during E. Jean Carroll's first defamation lawsuit against Donald Trump, because Trump argued that his statements about Carroll were within the scope of his employment (and so a defamation claim would be effectively barred under the Westfall Act). To my understanding, the current disposition of that lawsuit is that this is considered a question of fact for a jury to decide (at least according to the Second Circuit). What can be said is who does not hold copyright: The US Senate and/or the US government as a whole. The only way the Senate could acquire copyright in this letter (short of the Senator directly granting it to them) would be as a work made for hire, but the work-for-hire doctrine requires that the work be prepared by an employee as part of their official duties, just like the federal copyright bar. So the Senate cannot acquire copyright in this manner. If anyone owns the copyright, it is most likely the Senator. | Barrister to instructing solicitor: “Am I working for the plaintiff or defendant?” Plaintiff Your honour, this excellent study and the expert testimony you have heard from the authors, clearly demonstrates that whiteboard testing is sexual discrimination by another name. The clear correlation between the gender of the interviewee and their ability to perform this task, which is unrelated to the job and is actually a test of how good the person is at handling performance anxiety, is being used to prejudicially and unlawfully screen out female applicants. Defendant Your honour, this discredited paper and the inconsistent testimony of the author clearly demonstrated that the methodology was flawed and the conclusions are unsupportable. When pressed, it turned out that the number of females encompassed by the catch-all word “all” was 6 - hardly a sample big enough to draw any meaningful conclusions from. Further, it turned out that the number of men who also improved was unknown because they didn’t test them! So we have the authors of a study with gender discrimination in its very methodology drawing asinine conclusions from it about gender discrimination! It may be that whiteboard testing is better at finding competent actors than programmers and this may make it a terrible recruitment tool. However, my client can run their businesses in whatever inefficient way they choose so long as it isn’t unlawful discrimination - and this isn’t that. | I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). |
Is it legal for employers to hire only native speakers? I recently learned that there are some companies (for instance, certain editing, writing, or translation services) that explicitly refuse to hire non-native English speakers for certain positions a priori. Obviously, a person's language abilities are both a relevant qualification for certain jobs, which tends to be a permissible and even desirable form of discrimination, and this is highly correlated with whether they have been speaking a language since childhood or not. However, it is self-evidently not determinative of an applicant's ability to perform the duties of a job, as any "X speaking perfect Y" search will demonstrate. It also seems like the sort of policy that might run into problems due to being considered de facto discrimination against an individual based on their membership in any of various protected classes. Therefore, is it legal for a company to announce beforehand that they will not hire non-native speakers even if they demonstrate all other qualifications for the job, or to tell an applicant who has passed any preliminary steps that they will not hire them because they are not a native speaker? I am interested in answers for the United States of America and the European Union, to the extent that transnational norms around this sort of thing exist in the latter. | Employment discrimination based on the initial or native language of a prospective employee is probably not lawful under US federal law. Requiring the English-language skills actually needed for a particular job is lawful. Doing "editing, writing, or translation" obviously requires language fluency. But unless a business can demonstrate that it is impossible for non-native speakers to achieve fluency comparable to native speakers needed for a particular position, demanding a specific native language would be demanding a particular national origin, and thus be an unlawful practice. According to 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (emphasis added) The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has a page on "Immigrants' Employment Rights under Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws" which says: The law protects people against employment discrimination on the basis of their national origin. Following are some examples of employment discrimination based on national origin. ... Unlawful national origin discrimination may include discrimination because of a person's looks, customs, or language. ... Treating employees differently because they have a foreign accent is lawful only if accent materially interferes with being able to do the job. .... According to Nolo's page on "Language and Accent Discrimination in the Workplace": A job requirement that an employee must be fluent in English is legal if fluency is required to effectively perform the position. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that interprets and enforces the laws prohibiting discrimination, has pointed out that the degree of fluency required varies from job to job, even within the same company. Therefore, blanket fluency requirements that apply equally to the customer service department and the warehouse workers might not be legal. According to Workplace Fairness's page on "Language Discrimination": Language discrimination is a subset of national origin discrimination. Language discrimination refers to the unfair treatment of an individual based solely upon the characteristics of their speech; such as, accent, size of vocabulary, and syntax. It can also involve a person's ability or inability to use one language instead of another. Because language discrimination is a form of national origin discrimination, the same body of law prohibits it. ... Language discrimination is the unfair treatment of an individual solely because of their native language or other characteristics of speech, such as accent, size of vocabulary, and syntax. ... Some courts and government agencies have said that discrimination based on language is a form of national origin discrimination because primary language is closely related to the place a person comes from ... In "What Recent Court Cases Indicate About English-Only Rules In The Workplace" by Rosanna McCalipst (U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, volume 4 issue 2) it is said that: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful to discriminate in the terms or conditions of employment based on one's race, religion, sex or national origin. There are two ways a plaintiff can prevail. Either the plaintiff can prove disparate treatment, meaning the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of one of the protected grounds, or disparate impact, meaning a seemingly neutral employment practice puts an undue burden on members of a protected class. ... The disparate impact analysis was first set out by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). From that case and the decisions of various courts interpreting the holding, a burden shifting analysis has emerged. There are three steps to the analysis. First, the plaintiff must establish that the policy in question has a disparate impact on a protected class. Next the employer must defend the policy by proffering a legitimate business purpose for it. Last, the plaintiff can still prevail if it shows there is a less discriminatory method by which the legitimate business goal can be obtained. According to "Avoiding Claims of Citizenship and National Origin Discrimination When Interviewing, Hiring, and Onboarding Foreign Workers" by the Dickinson Wright law firm: National origin discrimination includes, but is not limited to, discrimination due to place of birth, country of origin, ancestry, native language, and may be based on a perception that the individual looks or sounds “foreign,” or any other national origin indicator. I should add that if an employer is using "native" simply to mean "a very high level of fluency and skill with the language" then such a requirement is not discriminatory under 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2, and quite likely not under any US law. If the employer is using "native" to mean "a very high level of fluency and skill obtained by learning the language as a young child" then the case is less clear, and most of the precedents cited above will be of only limited significance at best. I could not find a case squarely on point where a requirement for a "native speaker" in either of these senses, or indeed in any sense, was challenged. | Unfortunately, you are probably not entitled to the redundancy / severance money since you weren't technically ever made redundant / laid off - there was no point in time where you were willing and able to work where they refused you, and I presume you were paid for all time worked. If you're concerned that they only changed their tune because they knew you had a better job already lined up - well, you can call their bluff or just use it as a learning experience. In what jurisdiction do you work? If the US, you could call their bluff, say you'd rather stay and see what they do. You would then keep the option of simply walking away with your stuff in a box any time you felt like it (assuming at-will employment and no contracts that state otherwise). | Concerning the requirement to interview US workers before hiring workers for H-1B visas, this is covered in 8 USC §1182 (n)(1)(G)(i): (i) In the case of an application described in subparagraph (E)(ii), subject to clause (ii), the employer, prior to filing the application— (I) has taken good faith steps to recruit, in the United States using procedures that meet industry-wide standards and offering compensation that is at least as great as that required to be offered to H–1B nonimmigrants under subparagraph (A), United States workers for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought; and (II) has offered the job to any United States worker who applies and is equally or better qualified for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought. "Industry-wide standards" for the recruitment process typically means posting advertisements and conducting job interviews. Of course, if the company never intended to hire anyone but the H-1B candidate, that's not really "good faith", but this can be difficult for the feds to prove. Note that this requirement doesn't apply to all employers. Section (E)(ii) says that this rule only applies to those employers who are "H–1B-dependent" (which amounts to having a certain number of employees working under H–1B visas) and to those who have been caught willfully violating these rules within the past five years. I am unsure about the rules surrounding federal contracts, so folks should feel free to edit this answer to include such information. | The EEOC states that national original discrimination in employment is illegal, which is supported by 28 CFR Part 44 (discriminate means "the act of intentionally treating an individual differently from other individuals because of national origin or citizenship status, regardless of the explanation for the differential treatment, and regardless of whether such treatment is because of animus or hostility"). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. codified at 42 USC 2000e–2. The internet widely advises that asking such questions is illegal. The EEOC has a more nuanced view of the matter as articulated here: they say We recommend that you avoid asking applicants about personal characteristics that are protected by law, such as race, color, religion, sex, national origin or age. These types of questions may discourage some individuals from applying, may be viewed suspiciously by some applicants, and may be considered evidence of intent to discriminate by the EEOC. If you do not have this information when you decide who to hire, it may be easier for you to defend your business against a hiring discrimination complaint. Before reaching a conclusion, we should check what an employee is (42 USC § 2000e(f)), namely: an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. This just tells us that in writing the law, Congress left it somewhat open what an "employee" is. An Amazon seller is, on the face of it, not an employee of Amazon, instead, a seller is an independent contractor. Of course that is a legal question that can't just be decided superficially, see for example California's AB5 (but even under that law, a seller is not an employee). As articulated by SSA The common law control test is the basic test, using the common law rules, for determining whether a relationship exists between the worker and the person or firm that they work for. Under the common-law test, the employer has the right to tell the employee what to do, how, when, and where to do the job If the Dept. of Labor or the IRS determine that you are (would be) an employee, then this is illegal discrimination, otherwise it is not. Since you are not paid a wage, the prospects for being deemed an employee are extremely dim. The EEOC gives this guidance on the distinction, with a very long list of examples which in general support the position that a vendor is an independent contractor and not an employee. | This is covered by the page Job Applicants and the ADA from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. There it is said: I have a disability and will need an accommodation for the job interview. Does the ADA require an employer to provide me with one? Yes. Employers are required to provide "reasonable accommodation" -- appropriate changes and adjustments -- to enable you to be considered for a job opening. Reasonable accommodation may also be required to enable you to perform a job, gain access to the workplace, and enjoy the "benefits and privileges" of employment available to employees without disabilities. An employer cannot refuse to consider you because you require a reasonable accommodation to compete for or perform a job. The page mentions as plausible required reasonable accomodations: providing written materials in accessible formats, such as large print, braille, or audiotape providing readers or sign language interpreters ensuring that recruitment, interviews, tests, and other components of the application process are held in accessible locations providing or modifying equipment or devices adjusting or modifying application policies and procedures. The page goes on to say that: You must inform the employer that you need some sort of change or adjustment to the application/interviewing process because of your medical condition. You can make this request orally or in writing, or someone else might make a request for you (e.g., a family member, friend, health professional, or other representative, such as a job coach). A letter from a doctor is not automatically required. But in some cases a prospective employer might reasonably insist on nsuch a letter. The page says: If your disability and need for accommodation are not obvious, the employer may ask you for reasonable documentation explaining the disability and why an accommodation is needed. There is no specified evidence or form that an employer need provide in rejecting a request for an accommodation. The employer is only required to provide "reasonable" accommodation, and is not required to provide any accommodation if it would cause "undue hardship" to the employer. If several possible accommodations would reasonably allow the potential employee to apply the employer may choose which one or ones to offer. It need not offer the one preferred by the prospective employee. All this also applies to accommodations for an employee after s/he has been hired or has a job offer. | It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs. | Given that they told me I would get back pay and I worked conditional on that information, am I entitled to it? You are entitled to backpay in accordance with the terms you accepted from HR. The employer's refusal to pay you from October 1st is in violation of Austria's Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch at § 860a. At this point you have fully complied with the conditions on which your continued employment was contingent. From then on, the employer's belatedness in revoking its commitment to backdate your start date to October 1st is not cognizable: Prior to your full compliance with the conditions of academic nature, there was no possible way for you to be aware of the employer's repudiation of its obligations regarding the October-December compensation. The employer's failure to timely notify you of the unilateral change is especially notorious and hard to justify. Your employment & relocation to Austria suggests that the employer had --and waived-- ample opportunity to inform you that any work you perform prior to addressing the contingent aspect will not be compensated. Even if the employer ventures with a dubious allegation of that sort, it is unlikely to survive § 1152. | I think you're viewing the use of pronouns and contracts wrong. You are speaking to the Licensee, not some third person. So you would say "You agree to give us all your bases", not "The]y agree to give us all your bases". If you were to use a third person pronoun in describing what the other person is gonna do and what you'll do for them, calling the Licensee "they" is positively confusing, and more likely to cause problems. I hope they see my point. |
In the US, can the courts intervene if an extremely destructive (but constitutional) law is passed? If the US Congress were to pass an extremely destructive (but constitutional) law that the president then signed, what would the result be and would there be any recourse from the courts or the states? My understanding is that the courts can only clarify laws or reject them as unconstitutional. Some examples: 120% flat income tax rate for everyone Setting the maximum sentence for all crimes to a small fine Illegalizing all pharmaceutical drugs, even for hospitals | Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most "common" crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries. | The First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech", so to the extent that such a definition serves to limit one's freedom of speech, it is unconstitutional. If would also be unconstitutional to reward "love speech" or any other viewpoint. Crimes, such as murder, arson, rape and so on, are not constitutionally protected. The government can therefore define various parameters of severity (various degrees of assault defined in terms of "wantonness"). Assault, arson and murder are not legal forms of "expression", so assault motivated by a viewpoint is not "protected speech" – it isn't speech at all. | The Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision does not apply to the states. The Bill of Rights does not inherently restrain the states at all, merely the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment does restrain the states; notably, it forbids a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have read into "of law" the added requirement that the law be compatible with the fundamental rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; this means that most stuff that would violate the Bill of Rights if done by the feds violates due process if done by the states. However, not all provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated (i.e. applied to the states); the requirement for a jury in a civil trial is one of the few that hasn't been incorporated, because courts do not consider it a fundamental right (merely one protected in the federal courts). Now, many traffic tickets are actually misdemeanor offenses, and a jury-trial requirement for crimes is incorporated. However, even for federal offenses, the courts have generally found that the Constitution doesn't require jury trial for petty crimes (those with a maximum sentence under 6 months). | united-states An ex post facto law criminalizes conduct after the fact that was legal at the time, something that is prohibited under U.S. constitutional law. But, as the question states: my question is about actions that were illegal and then had changes made to them. If something is a crime in 2015 and this criminal law is violated, and the conduct is then legalized in 2016, the conduct committed while it was a crime does not cease to be punishable as a crime and may be punished criminally. Often a judge would consider the fact that the conduct was later legalized when evaluating the seriousness of the crime at a post-legalization sentencing, but a judge is not required to do so. A significant number of pardons and commutations of criminal sentences by Presidents and Governors in the U.S. involve people convicted of crimes for conduct that is now legal or is now punished less severely. But pardons and commutations are purely discretionary. As an aside, France has constitutional protections that give newly lenient treatment of crimes retroactive effect, but the United States does not. | Normally, statutes don't crawl out of law books and enforce themselves. And, government officials have broad sovereign immunity for most of their activities, so in most cases the only remedy available if someone in the government doesn't enforce a law according to its terms is to seek an injunction ordering the government to carry out the law. Impossibility is a defense to an injunction request. Also, enforcement of many laws is vested entirely in the discretion of the executive branch and can't be compelled judicially at all. When compliance can be judicially compelled because someone has standing to do so and the language makes the action required by statute truly mandatory, short of demanding full compliance with the law, a judge can set deadlines for compliance (a recent example of that involved a judge ordering the federal government to reunite migrant parents and children who had been separated). In the absence of a court order, the attorney-general for the jurisdiction (or an assistant AG tasked with the job) and the chain of command managers responsible for the function and often aides on the chief executive's staff will come up with a compliance plan that is within the realm of the possible. If none of those approaches is workable, the chief executive or top aides to the chief executive will typically approach friendly members of the legislature to seek a legislative work around. A substantial share of the bills in Congress or a state legislature at any given time that almost never make headlines are bills addressing situations like these that come up from time to time, for example, when a statutory requirement that used to become workable, ceases to be due to unavailability of resources or some technical barrier. Most of these bills pass on a bipartisan basis as a matter of course without the general public even noticing it. Most large omnibus laws are followed a few months later by a technical corrections bill address problems discovered in trying to implement the law. | The bill was never passed. According to the list of all actions on Congress.gov, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce in April 2019. Evidently, that subcommittee never did anything further with it. The bill was never voted on by either the House or the Senate. | The only real answer is that Congress hasn't (to the best of my knowledge) chosen to pass such a law. But the kinds of forgery that Congress might plausibly and constitutionally prohibit, such as forgery of checks, forgery of legal documents, and forgery as part of a fraudulent scheme are already crimes under state law, and the states handle such prosecutions perfectly well. There is really no need for a separate federal law on such issues. The kinds of forgery covered in the answer b grovkin would probably not be covered by a federal forgery statute, if one were to be passed. But that is speculation. | In general, yes. 1 USC 109 states that: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. Translated into plain English, this means that if you were to smoke marijuana in a Yellowstone National Park campground today, and Congress were to pass an act saying "28 USC 841 is repealed" tomorrow, you could still be arrested and convicted for possession of a controlled substance next week. However, if the act instead stated "28 USC 841 is repealed and no retroactive prosecutions shall take place", then you can't be convicted. (The other half of 1 USC 109 is basically the same thing, applied to temporary laws: if a temporary law expires, you can still be prosecuted for actions taken while the law was in effect, unless the law states otherwise.) |
Is controlled burning of wooden buildings a legal demolition method in the USA? An article on the BBC News website about the "Disaster Girl" meme claims that this photograph of a burning building was taken in 2005 in North Carolina at a "controlled burn", which the BBC explains is "a fire intentionally started to clear a property". I was quite stunned by this information. Was/is this a legal way to demolish wooden buildings in the USA? Is this method used often? (I suppose it's quicker than taking a building apart bit by bit, but the debris becomes unusable, I guess you have to pay the fire department to keep an eye on things, you probably need insurance... I can't imagine it being much cheaper than hiring a bulldozer.) Disaster Girl meme, photograph by Dave Roth | Most controlled burns are used as training exercises. A search of the Mebane FD page (where this picture was taken) shows multiple instances of training burns. Also from local press about training from 2018, “A lot of departments have stopped doing it (control burns). We’re still pretty active with it, we’ve got five to burn in the next two months.” | Disclosures are prescribed by state law. Fair housing, which is a federal concept, pertains to issues such as using prohibited personal facts to determine whether to accept an offer. (Hazardous materials disclosures are also mandated at the federal level, but are are included in state requirements which can get pretty broad). If you are buying in Washington state, RCW 64.06.020 says what and how you must disclose. The list of disclosures is very detailed, covering title and covenants, water, sewer, structure, systems and fixtures, environment, and mobile home related. The only one of the 86 questions about smoke is whether smoke alarms are present. Thus smell of smoke is not a legally material fact that must be disclosed, in this state. The California disclosures, even longer, are here, and there is likewise no "smells bad" disclosure. It is unlikely that any state in the US mandates such a disclosure, since it is somewhere between a subjective evaluation and a self-evident fact. Some people are very sensitive to certain smells while others do not care. The burden is on the buyer to pursue matters of personal concern (in writing!), such as whether any dog has been present in the house in the past 5 years (some people care). You have to look carefully at the response. "Don't know" is usually a safe bet, unless you actually have factual knowledge. From what I can determine, Massachussetts is on the opposite end of the spectrum from California. There are some requirements imposed on real estate agents, and there is the federal lead paint disclosure, but otherwise it appears that nothing is mandated by law. This form seems to be used by the real estate association, and there is a question about "history of smoke/fire damage to structure". The reasonable interpretation of that is "has the house caught fire and suffered damage", so "no" from a cigar-smoker would not be fraudulent. If the intent of the question were to reveal if someone has smoked frequently in the house, that would he the question they'd ask. You can check whether you have this form and see what it says, but "smoke damage" would not normally be interpreted as meaning "smells a bit funny". | You are free to ask them to stop. If they do, great. If they don’t, you legal options depend on if they are legally able to make such noise at that time or not. I am not familiar with UK law but typical laws give wide powers to the owners of infrastructure to construct/repair it. Again, typically, permits may be required but exceptions exist for urgent work. If they have such a permit (or don’t need one) your legal options are nil. If they don’t you can go to court seeking an injunction to stop them until they do. | There are nuisance lawsuits and constructive eviction arguments--you can check with your local attorneys and perhaps tenants' rights organizations for detailed information. Just because marijuana is legal under state law (if certain steps were followed) does not mean that your landlord or another tenant can interfere with your use and enjoyment of your home. Civil consequences--such as a court order to the smoker to stop smoking, money damages, or a partial abatement of your rent until the smoking stops--may be achievable. It is important to follow the rules for your jurisdiction closely when starting a legal action, so you should talk to an expert in your jurisdiction if you want to pursue legal action. But where possible, most people deal with this kind of thing by moving. | I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision. | The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification. | I've gone through this enough times in Pennsylvania to paraphrase the law in this state: If a tree falls it's nobody's fault, unless the tree's owner was given credible advance notice that the tree posed an exceptional risk of failure, in which case the owner is liable for damage it causes if it fails. (For purposes of liability, a tree is "owned" by the owner of the ground where the trunk of the tree enters earth.) In the scenario you describe: A tree owned by your neighbor has not yet caused significant damage, but has been so structurally compromised that it poses an exceptional risk to your property. The standard course of action in such a circumstance is to promptly and formally notify the owner of that fact, and for the owner to remedy the risk. (In this case, it sounds like the only practical remedy is removal of the tree.) As a practical matter, the owner might be able to get an insurer to cover the cost of removal before it does more damage. But that's their problem. As a matter of expedience, you might also notify your insurer, since if the tree does end up causing significant damage to your property, you could subrogate your claim through your insurer. As a further matter of expedience: The township may have codes requiring landowners to address hazardous trees. Thus, if the owner does not promptly remedy the peril you could also notify the township. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. |
Does something have to be original to be a work? I've read the multiple definitions of 'originality' regarding copyright, and I am still not convinced whether something has to be a work first for it to classify as possibly an original one if that's the case. So, for instance, can a speech be called original if the one that is giving the speech has not copied someone else's work? Can it not be called original (even if it is), if it's not a work (fixed)? | In united-states copyright law, anything that is of one of the broad general categories that can be protected by copyright is said to be a "work" whether or not it has been "fixed in a tangible form". If a person sings a song, never having written it down or recorded it, the song is a "work" but has not been fixed, and is therefore not protected by copyright. The same would apply to a speech or a poem that has been recited but never written down or recorded, or a dance performed but never notated or recorded. They are all works, but none have (yet) been fixed, and so there is no copyright protection. All this will also be true in any country that adheres to the Berne Copyright convention, although the word "work" might be translated into another language. If someone later writes the work down, or records it, then it will have been "fixed", and copyright protection will be available provided the other conditions are met. Whether a work is original is a separate issue from whether a work has been fixed. If person A makes up a song and sings it without recording it, it is original but not fixed. If person B hears it and writes it down, it is now fixed, but not original to B. A will then have the copyright. In copyright law "originality" usually means that a work is the separate creation of a person, not copied from the work of some other person. Note that a work may quote or imitate previous works, or use portions of them in some way, and still be sufficiently original for copyright protection. However the term "original" is sometimes used to mean "creative". A mere list of numbers in numerical order is not creative, and will not be protected by copyright (in the US and countries with similar laws). A list of all the names of people in a given town or area, in alphabetical order, is not creative enough to be protected by copyright (see Feist vs Rural). Courts and other writers on copyright sometimes express this by saying the work is not "original". Similarly, a simple geometric design, such as a white square on a black background, is not creative enough for protection, and again this is sometimes expressed by saying that it is not original. A work must be both original and creative to be protected by copyright, although it need not be very creative nor totally original. The rules on originality and creativity vary by country. I am here following US law, but the law of quite a few other countries is similar on these points. The term to look for what is counted as original and protectable is often referred to as threshold of originality. This is what I have referred to as "creativity" above. This is related to the question and answer at Is a work copyrighted on fixation or publication? What's the difference? How is it proved? recently posted. | Derivative work The Kenku first appeared in Dungeon Magazine 27 in 1991 and appears to be an original work as far as I can tell. It, therefore, enjoys copyright protection until 70 years after the author dies - it seems unlikely that the author died before 1950 so the copyright has probably not expired, AFAIK, the author is, in fact, still alive. Your usage is what is known as a derivative work and making derivative works is one of the rights that copyright grants to the copyright holder. You can't do it without permission unless you have a fair use defence: you don't. If you call your Kenku a duck; it's still a Kenku This is the inverse of the well-known duck test much beloved of philosophers and employment-law judges but equally relevant to copyright-law judges. Changing one (or several or even many) aspects of a copyrighted work is still copyright infringement. You are free to write something inspired by the Kenku but once "it looks like a Kenku, swims like a Kenku, and quacks like a Kenku, then it probably is a Kenku". | Four Yes, each version is a derivative work, as mentioned in https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf The following are examples of the many different types of derivative works: ... A new version of an existing computer program | Anything that somebody writes is copyrighted, even if you call it a "press release". That means that nobody can copy it without permission. If you hand it out to a bunch of people and write "press release", the only reasonable interpretation of the designation "press release" is that you are granting permission to copy (as well as paraphrase). | Originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity This was answered in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991): originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might be. Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works, so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. [Citations removed] This connection to creativity is explained more in the United States Copyright Office's Compendium at 308.2, citing entirely from Feist. The US Copyright Office presents eleven categories of things that "do not satisfy the creativity requirement"1 (308.2; 313.4(A)-(K)): mere copies de minimis authorship: "copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity" (citing Feist, p. 363); e.g. substitution of pronouns, correction of spelling, three-note sequences, are not sufficiently creative words and short phrases works consisting entirely of information that is common property; e.g. calendars, schedules of sporting events measuring and computing devices (with the exception of separable creative features distinct from what makes the article useful) listings of ingredients or contents blank forms characters scènes à faire familiar symbols and designs mere variations of coloring Canada has taken a different approach canada For a comparative look, Canada has rejected creativity as the hallmark of originality. In CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, the Supreme Court considered the standard from Feist but took a different approach: an “original” work under the Copyright Act is one that originates from an author and is not copied from another work. That alone, however, is not sufficient to find that something is original. In addition, an original work must be the product of an author’s exercise of skill and judgment. The exercise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise. While creative works will by definition be “original” and covered by copyright, creativity is not required to make a work “original”. Application Many answers on this site apply this standard. E.g. Copyright of retyped public domain text List of answers referring to a "modicum of creativity" You can also browse published decisions applying this standard (a Google search of casetext.com). 1. Although, I recognize for several of these categories there are additional or alternative rationales, and even statutory bars (e.g. 102(b)), for not granting copyright protection. | There is a good chance that the letter in question is in the public domain. Prior to 1978, the copyright laws were very different. Also, if it was published in 1963 or earlier and there was an initial claim of copyright but the copyright was not renewed, it would also be in the public domain. A convenient table summarizing when various pertinent categories of works enter the public domain can be found here. It might be possible to construe depositing the work with the Library of Congress as either a "publication" of the work (which if it happened before 1964 would put it in the public domain), or as a relinquishment of the copyright to the public domain, although I am not a specialist familiar with the legal effect of different forms of donations to the Library of Congress and it could depend upon the facts and circumstances of that particular donation to the Library of Congress. If worse came to worse, I imagine it might be possible to seek a declaratory judgment that your use was a fair use with substituted service on the heirs, and seek a default judgment, although that would not be optimal. The general problem that you face is that the work in question is what is called an "orphan work". Many other countries have special procedures to allow the use of orphan works, but the U.S. has resisted such legislation except for a narrow exception applicable only to libraries and archives at 17 U.S.C. § 108. | You are confusing two separate concepts: trademark and copyright. I'll give you a broad overview of both of these, although the details will differ depending on what country's law we're talking about. A copyright is held by the creator of a work of artistic expression. It gives the creator certain exclusive rights, including the right to create copies of the work and to prepare derivative works. For example: The movie "Star Wars" is a work of artistic expression. You cannot copy "Star Wars," or any significant part of it--including the script, the music, etc.--without the permission of the copyright owner, unless your use fits into one of the exceptions to copyright in your jurisdiction. Likewise, you cannot write your own book featuring the Star Wars characters: that would be a derivative work, a work based on the original work, and would violate the rights of the copyright holder. Without having read the book in question, I'm not going to comment on whether it does or doesn't infringe the film's copyright. But ideas can't be copyrighted. A film review, for instance, isn't a copyright violation--and a longer work discussing the ideas involved in a film isn't necessarily a copyright violation, either. Copyright only protects the expression itself--the language, the images. You are very limited in how much of that you can copy, but as long as you're using your own words, copyright protection is less of a concern. Trademarks, on the other hand, are intended to protect a business from customer confusion. Trademarks are not protected in the same way as copyrights; the key analysis of a trademark infringement lawsuit is: does it create confusion about the origin of the goods? For example: if you slap a swoosh on a shoe, Nike will sue you. If you use a swoosh in a political cartoon criticizing Nike, they won't, because nobody is going to think Nike wrote the political cartoon. So: If you write a book and call it: "Ewoks Gone Wild: A Star Wars Story," Disney will sue you, because it would be reasonable for someone who saw that book in a store to think that Disney authorized that book. If you wrote a book called "Forcing the Issue: The Hermeneutics of Science Fiction Movies from Star Wars to Inception", the case would be less clear-cut. But the important thing to understand is that these issues are complicated. There are exceptions to these rules; there are applications that may not be obvious to the non-lawyer ("initial interest confusion" is one minefield in U.S. trademark law), there are national and EU-specific considerations, there are safe harbors, and there are practical considerations, like whether you can afford to fight a lawsuit even if you're in the right. Therefore, I'm not going to tell you whether your hypothetical work would infringe anyone's copyright or trademark, and I'm not going to give you a set of rules on how to avoid it. The only person you should be listening to that sort of advice from is a real, non-anonymous-internet lawyer, licensed to practice in your jurisdiction, who is familiar with the specific details of your specific situation. | "Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem. |
Use of other calendars in copyright notice and contracts Year If I look at a copyright notice, I see Copyright (c) <YEAR> <OWNER>. The part this question is about is the definition on <YEAR>. The number represented in <YEAR> is based on the Gregorian calendar and shows the number of years passed since Anno Domini (or Common era). As there exist various different calendars around the world, I was wondering how this could affect the legal side, when using another calendar for copyright notice, or in contracts. Context I came across the Holocene calendar which counts years since the Holocene epoch instead of Anno Domini (or Common era) as the Gregorian calendar does. As the Gregorian calendar date can be defined with <YEAR> AD or <YEAR> CE the Holocene calendar year can be defined with <YEAR> HE. So I was wondering if such a year definition format could be used in a contract and especially a copyright notice (for example Copyright (c) 12021 HE <OWNER>). As there exist a variety of other calendars, I guess this question also regards those. As a programmer I know that you should not touch a running system. So using another calendar in the current already well established system makes things more complicated and confusing. But sadly I have not found any resources defining a restriction on which calendar year to use. | Overview There seems no reason why a year in a copyright notice could not be specified with a calendar other than the Gregorian Calander, provided it is made clear what system of dates is being used. US Law In united-states law the provision for a copyright notice is in 17 USC 401 which provides that: (a) General Provisions.—Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by this section may be placed on publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. (b) Form of Notice.—If a notice appears on the copies, it shall consist of the following three elements: (1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word “Copyright”, or the abbreviation “Copr.”; and (2) the year of first publication of the work; in the case of compilations or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. ...; and (3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation ... ... (d) Evidentiary Weight of Notice.—If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified by this section appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided in the last sentence of section 504(2). Note that subsection (a) says that the notice "may be placed" -- it is not required. Its only legal effect is that in subsection (d) where it defeats any claim of "innocent infringement". Note also that while a year is part of the standard form of the notice, no calendar is specified by the law, and presumably any calendar could be used, provided that it was made clear which calendar was meant. Berne Convention Under the Berne Copyright Convention, to which almost all countries now adhere, no notice is required, and the term of copyright is not based on the date of publication except for anonymous works and works published under a pseudonym. History, BA and UCC conventions Under US law prior to the copyright act of 1976, a copyright notice was mandatory -- omitting the notice on a published work would cause loss of all copyright protection. Under that law the period of copyright was always computed from the date of publication, so the year of publication was essential to determine if a work was currently protected or not, and an incorrect year could also cause loss of protection. Under the Buenos Aires Convention, and the Universal Copyright Convention countreis were permitted to require a copyright notice, and many did, who were not then adherent to the Berne Convention. Article III paragraphs 1 of the UCC provided that: Any Contracting State which, under its domestic law, requires as a condition of copyright, compliance with formalities such as deposit, registration, notice, notarial certificates, payment of fees or manufacture or publication in that Contracting State, shall regard these requirements as satisfied with respect to all works protected in accordance with this Convention and first published outside its territory and the author of which is not one of its nationals, if from the time of the first publication all the copies of the work published with the authority of the author or other copyright proprietor bear the symbol © acompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and the year of first publication placed in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright. Notice that a year is required as part of the notice under the UCC, but as in US law, no particular calendar is specified, and presumably alternate calendars could be sued if this is made clear. | For works released after 1989, Copyright notices don't have any legal consequences in the United States. They are just a friendly reminder of who created the work and that they take their copyrights seriously. But those notices are not required anymore to enforce your copyrights on the works you created. If you have proof that you own the copyright on something and when it was created, and if it's still within the term limits, then you can take legal actions against people who violate your copyright. Disney has a history of repeated worldwide lobbying for extending the expiration durations in copyright laws in order to avoid any of their classic cartoons from falling out of copyright protection. So it could be that they try to intentionally muddy the waters and make it harder to find out which of their works expire when. That way people are less sure about what Disney works are and are not in the public domain, making it more risky to use them. But that's just my theory. | The validity of the execution of a contract is governed by the law of the place where it was signed. A location next to the date establishes that place and hence often, the governing law for the validity of that signature. If the contract does not expressly state what law governs, the contract itself is governed by the law of the place where the last signature that causes the contract to come into being, since that is where the contract was formed. The role this plays in allowing someone to prove or disprove forgery is secondary, but sometimes pertinent. The practice of noting a location as well as a date remains in place for notarized documents and court documents even in modern U.S. practice which has abandoned many of the conventions of Roman civil law and no longer routinely includes a locations next to a date line in ordinary contract executions. The location is also important in notarized documents in addition to the other reasons, because the location establishes whether the notary is acting within the notary's jurisdiction which historically involves very small geographical areas, although the modern trend has to expand the geographic range of a notary's jurisdiction. This is particularly important in a place like Switzerland, where there are relatively few good clues regarding where a contract was signed in the absence of a designation (since short distances can result in a change of jurisdiction and multiple countries share any likely language in which the contract is written) and where the substantive law that applies to the contract can vary from canton to canton even within the country. This practice proximately dates to the reception of Roman civil law in the late Middle Ages following a "lawless" period from the fall of the Roman empire through the early Middle Ages. This revived a practice that existed for most of the Roman Empire and predecessor Roman Republic in the middle Iron Age. A similar practice was used, however, in diplomatic and royal correspondence in the broad Eastern Mediterranean and Fertile Crescent region during the Bronze Age. This was done at that time partially for authentication, partially to provide context for a communication (at a time when messages wouldn't necessarily be delivered in sequence), and partially to create a historical record of a diplomat or aristocrat's travels. | It Depends If the person reusing the image (lets call that person R for reuser) is not complying with the terms of the Creative commons license, which include a requirement to provide attribution of the source work, then R cannot rely on the license, and the granting of the license ad the presence of a license declaration is legally irrelevant. R must have some other basis to reuse the image. This could be an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing. Or possibly the image is not protected by copyright, for example because its copyright has expired, or because it is a work of the US Federal Government being used in the US. In the absence of such a basis, R is infringing copyright. In much of the world copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author (or of all co-authors). In some different terms apply, ranging from life+50 to life+100. Sound recordings and photos get shorter terms in some countries. In the US the term is life+70 for recent works, but for work created and published before 1978 more complex rules apply, depending on the date of publication, and whether laws on notice and renewal were complied with. See the well-known chart Copyright Term and the Public Domain for the various cases and when copyright expires in each case. The question asks about fair use. This is a US-specific legal concept. It is designed to be flexible, an is highly fact-dependent. As a result it is rarely possible to say if a use will qualify as a fair use with certainty until a court passes on it. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more on fair use. Not providing attribution is itself often considered to weigh against fair use. The question does not give enough detail to make even a good guess as to whether such a use is likely to be held to be fair use. Identifying the kind of eagle has some educational value, which might favor fair use to some extent, but must be considered in light of the overall purpose of the use, which is not described. There is no indication as to whether the original work is creative or factual, or whether the reuse would be likely to harm the market for the original. Much use of images on social media does not stand up under a fair use analysis. Providing proper attribution might well help any fair use claim. See also Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons? | The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected. | Ideas are not Subject to Copyright Copyright does not protect ideas. This is true in the US, in the UK, and under the copyright laws of every country that I know of. Article 2 paragraph 8 of the Berne Copyright Convention reads: The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. If the ideas of a work have been so re-written or recast as not to constitute a derivative work, the original author has no rights over the new work, which becomes a separate work with its own copyright. In such case there is no legal requirement for any credit or acknowledgement, at least not under copyright law. Also the use of a work whose copyright has expired, or is for some other reason in the public domain and not protected by copyright, may be legally made without acknowledgement of the author, or even under a false designation of authorship. Plagiarism Passing someone else's work off as one's own is generally considered to be plagiarism. Some people consider that using significant parts of another's work without proper credit is also plagiarism. Plagiarism is not a legal matter. It is considered highly improper in the academic and journalistic worlds, and may carry serious consequences there. It is considered unethical by many in other situations as well. However, it does not constitute copyright infringement, and copyright law cannot be used to prevent or punish plagiarism that is not also infringement. Works Created by an Automated Process or Script Whether an automated process can (at the current state of the art) truly extract facts and re-express them to a degree that would constitute a new, non-infringing work, I tend to doubt. Whether even sufficient alteration could be made by an automated process to reliably constitute fair use, fair dealing, or have any similar exception apply I also doubt. The US Copyright Office Compendium of Copyright practice (an official publication of the US Copyright Office) states in item 307: The U.S. Copyright Office will register an original work of authorship, provided that the work was created by a human being. The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor” that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Because copyright law is limited to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,” the Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the work. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) Similar legal limits on AI authorship apply in many other countries. Fair Use Fair use is a specifically US legal concept, and generally does not apply in any other country, although I understand that Israel has closely followed US law in this matter. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. That law specifies four factors which a court must consider in making a decision on whether a use is a fair use. particularly important is whether the new work will harm actual or potential markets for the original, and whether it will serve as a replacement for the original. US Courts also often consider whether a new work is "transformative", that is whether it serves a significantly different purpose than the original does. For example, in a popular song, lyrics are often intended to have an emotional effect. In a textbook on verse, the same lyrics may be used to demonstrate poetic technique, rhyme, meter, etc. That would be a transformative use. The presence of proper attribution or credit is often a significant factor in the decision by a court as to whether a use is fair. Using another's work without proper credit is significantly less likely to be found to be a fair use, although credit is not an absolute requirement of fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and the various questions on this site tagged fair-use for many more details on fair use. Fair dealing and Other Exceptions to Copyright In the UK and some commonwealth countries, there is a doctrine known as "fair dealing" It is somewhat similar to fair use, but is generally more limited. In other countries there are various "exceptions to copyright". Some countries have a few broad exception, some have many narrower exceptions. India, for example, has more than 28 separate exceptions. What is covered varies from country to county. Exceptions for teaching, comment and analysis, and news reporting are common. Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Berne Copyright Convention (linked above) recognizes such exceptions, stating: It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. The convention goes on to state, in article 10, that: (1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries. (2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice. (3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of this Article, mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author if it appears thereon. Thus article 10 paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention establishes an international norm that works used under an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing, shall be properly credited. Web-Scraping The law on computer scraping is still under development, and varies from country to country. If a site operator makes it clear to users that scraping is unwelcome, it may be unlawful, depending on the rules of the country or countries involved. When a Terms of Service (TOS) document constitutes a binding contract or agreement that users must accept, and when such an agreement prohibits scraping or other automated access, that prohibition may be enforceable. in Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) a US Federal district court held that sending a cease-and-desist letter and enacting an IP address block is sufficient notice of online trespassing, which a plaintiff can use to claim a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). However, that decision has been criticized by many, and was not a Circuit court or Supreme Court case. In the recent case of Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) the US Supreme Court narrowed the application of the language in the CFAA making access that "exceeds authorization" criminal. In the case of HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether scraping a public website after a cease-and-desist letter has been sent constitutes a violation of the CFAA (this was the fact pattern in Craigslist v. 3Taps). The Court sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration. The Ninth Circuit Court reaffiremd its prior decision that when the website had been made publicly accessible, the CFAA did not apply, even in the face of a C&D letter. This seems to overrule 3taps. Note that other means of prohibiting scraping may still be legally sound and enforceable. See "hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn" from the National Law Review. (This article and the decision it reports was brought to my attention via a comment by user Michael Seifert.) The article "Web Scraping Watch: Cases Set to Clarify Application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" discusses these cases in more detail, but does not incloude the latest ruling in the HiQ Labs case. Conclusion Unless the results of the "rewrite" done by the "program" are sufficiently original to be neither a quotation, a fair use, nor a derivative work, but a new work using the same ideas, they will need to qualify under fair use or some other exception to copyright (unless permission has been obtained). This may well require a proper attribution of the original article. In any case, such credit is considered to be ethically mandatory by many. The web-scraping done to obtain the initial data may or may not be lawful, depending on the contents of any TOS document, and whether the relevant laws make such a document enforceable, which is still not a fully settled point under the law, and which varies by country. Personally, I would think giving proepr credit much easier and safer than trying to justify not doing so, but that is not law, just my opnion. | In the EU, that's the general rule going forward, but there are two big exceptions I'm aware of. The general rule from Article 1(1) of the Copyright Term Directive: The rights of an author of a literary or artistic work within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention shall run for the life of the author and for 70 years after his death, irrespective of the date when the work is lawfully made available to the public. Note that this is in fact an extension on the Berne Convention, which requires minimum 50 years after death. Big exception #1: Moral rights. Article 9 specifically states the directive does not apply to moral rights. These vary by country, but in the EU, moral rights have the tendency of lasting forever, and most often includes the right to attribution and a right against action which to the author is "prejudicial to his honor or reputation" (see Berne Convention Article 6bis). Therefore, as a rule, you cannot do "whatever you want" with an image (though sale is generally OK – that's an economic right, not a moral right). Big exception #2: Pre-existing longer term. Article 10(1) leaves intact pre-existing longer term limits which Member States had: Where a term of protection which is longer than the corresponding term provided for by this Directive was already running in a Member State on 1 July 1995, this Directive shall not have the effect of shortening that term of protection in that Member State. This of course means, you can't actually 100% rely on this "70 years after death" rule in the EU until 1 July 20661. However, most EU countries did have 70 years anyways. That said there are some interesting exceptions. For example, France has mort pour la France which extends copyright an additional 30 years for those who died on active military service. This means for French citizens who died before 1 July 1995 on active military service, this directive does not apply, and they still have up to 100 years of post-mortem copyright protection. As an aside, Wikipedia has a fairly detailed list on country copyright lengths. Not 2065, because per Article 8, the rule is actually the January 1st after 70 years after death. Then you have to wait till July 1 to be sure the rule 100% applies, because for some reason, they made the Article 10(1) exception start in the middle of the year. | Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.) |
Is there any way to hold a judge accountable for the harm caused by a bad decision? Here's a hypothetical scenario, loosely based on something that actually happened to some people I know. Bob attacks Alice and injures her. Bob is charged with assault and battery. Trial by jury is waived, and Bob appears before a judge for his hearing. The evidence is clear and overwhelming: he did it, he has no remorse (and appears to be psychologically incapable of it), and he needs to be locked up. The judge decides to let him go due to what he deems to be extenuating circumstances. Alice's friends and family quite reasonably disagree on how extenuating they are, given that nothing about them makes it any less likely that he'll do something like this again. A few months later, Bob attacks Charlie, with a weapon this time. Charlie survives, but ends up hospitalized. Bob is currently in jail, awaiting trial on charges of attempted murder. If the judge had actually done the right thing, the attempted murder would never have happened, because Bob would have still been locked up. All of the above being true, in the State of Utah, does Charlie have any sort of legal claim against the judge for taking actions that a reasonable person could have foreseen would lead directly to what happened to him happening to somebody? | NO If there were no extenuating circumstances (or they should not have been looked at as they were not presented), the losing party can petition for reconsideration and appeal the decision as a matter of law. The Judge/court of appeals then reviews the case and decides if the verdict stands. But you can't plead new facts at that stage, so if the losing side's lawyer messed up the case, that's up to them, not the judge. If it was a criminal case, the victim can't force the DA to appeal either, though they can try to get an injunction in related civil cases. But no person, or for the matter neither party, can sue the judge at all for misbehavior on the bench because judges have judicial immunity. Even when they did something so out of scope, such as a judge ordering from the bench that a lawyer shall be beaten up by police because they missed a court date, they get immunity as they acted as a judge (Miles v Waco). Indeed, let me quote from the first section of that SCOTUS case (emphasis mine): A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson *10 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).1 Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). ... Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). In the example OP posed nobody, not even the police, becomes liable for the actions of Bob but Bob himself: Police does not need to help you, even if they know for a fact that something is happening right now. There's a huge error in the case as presented by OP You start to work up a case, and points 1 to 3 are fine. But you start to get off the rails starting in point 4: The evidence does not say that someone is to be locked up, it only indicates what the facts of the case (upon which is to be decided) might be. The decision if someone is to go to jail or not is only up to the verdict - which happened in dot 5. Dot 5 however indicates that the judge looked at extenuating circumstances which is also evidence, so point 4 is presented incompletely. Let me present a more complete version of point 4: Evidence from side A was presented, as was other evidence by side B. To the victim, it seemed that side A (either her attorney or the DA, not clear from OP) had the better evidence and might get a conviction on side B. But the Judge did weigh the evidence differently than the observer and declared a verdict favoring B in point 5 to the dissatisfaction of the victim The missing bullet between 5 and 6 (a motion for reconsideration or appeal) does not seem to happen. Assuming it did not happen, because months go by, the verdict becomes final and the case becomes res iudicata - the case is closed. Point 6 is a different and separate crime. The case files of the earlier case can get pulled to show a pattern of behavior, but not to re-adjudicate the earlier case. Finally: Point 7 does not matter before the law: If-Then hypotheticals can't be adjudicated. Because the counterpoint to the presented argument in this point is: Would the lawyer of Side A have filed for reconsideration and/or appeal, the verdict would not have become final and waiting for the verdict from the court of appeals, Bob might still await the next step of the trial. tl;dr As presented, the rundown of the hypothetical case does not present anything that the judge could be liable for but instead shows that side A did not take the necessary steps to ask for reconsideration or file an appeal to the verdict they didn't like. The separate incident opened a new case, the hypothetical that side B would sit in jail is conclusory. | For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that. | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 | The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc. | The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well. | england-and-wales It depends on Alice's belief about who Mallory is and what Mallory is doing and whether Alice's force was reasonable. If Alice is aware that Mallory's action is lawful, then Alice cannot use force to protect Bob. Is Mallory a doctor who is lawfully withdrawing treatment? (You say there is "no law allowing Mallory to disconnect Bob's life support" but I'm not aware of a jurisdiction that requires indefinite treatment regardless of the circumstances.) If Alice honestly believes Mallory is attempting to unlawfully kill Bob, Alice can use force to protect Bob. Is Bob on life support because of Mallory's previous attempt on his life; is Mallory a hitman, a vengeful spouse or some other person with no lawful reason to kill Bob? Crown Prosecution Service guidance: Self-Defence and the Prevention of Crime: Self-defence is available as a defence to crimes committed by use of force. The basic principles of self-defence are set out in Palmer v R, [1971] AC 814; approved in R v McInnes, 55 Cr App R 551: "It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but only do, what is reasonably necessary." The common law approach as expressed in Palmer v R is also relevant to the application of section 3 Criminal Law Act 1967: "A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large." ... In assessing the reasonableness of the force used, prosecutors should ask two questions: was the use of force necessary in the circumstances, i.e. Was there a need for any force at all?; and was the force used reasonable in the circumstances? The courts have indicated that both questions are to be answered on the basis of the facts as the accused honestly believed them to be (R v Williams (G) 78 Cr App R 276), (R. v Oatbridge, 94 Cr App R 367). To that extent it is a subjective test. There is, however, an objective element to the test. The jury must then go on to ask themselves whether, on the basis of the facts as the accused believed them to be, a reasonable person would regard the force used as reasonable or excessive. | Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives. | Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law. |
Can police interrogate a drunk suspect? Are there any proscriptions on the custodial interrogation of people who are under the influence of alcohol or other mind-altering drugs? If not, are there any laws that prohibit offering intoxicating substances to a person in custody? I am interested not only in the U.S. but also in other countries where coercive interrogation is prohibited. But to offer an illustration: In the U.S. police may arrest a suspect of a crime who happens to be drunk. If, following the Miranda warning, that suspect does not invoke the right to silence or to a lawyer is a subsequent interrogation admissible evidence in a trial? Or, if a suspect is arrested who is not drunk: Police are supposed to provide food and water to subjects in their custody. Is there any legal restriction on offering subjects alcohol or other intoxicants prior to or during interrogation? | SCOTUS suggests in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, that a subject's confession was constitutionally inadmissible if it was adduced by police questioning during a period when petitioner's will was overborne by a drug having the properties of a "truth serum." In Miranda v. Arizona, it is held that If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and we reassert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Subsequently in Colorado v. Connelly, defendant suffered from psychosis that "interfered with his ability to make free and rational choices and, although not preventing him from understanding his rights, motivated his confession." The court found that Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Here, the taking of respondent's statements and their admission into evidence constituted no violation of that Clause. While a defendant's mental condition may be a "significant" factor in the "voluntariness" calculus, this does not justify a conclusion that his mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional "voluntariness." In the Massachusetts case Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 597, the Mass. Supreme Court (in the first ruling) said that We see no error in the judge's finding that the defendant's mental infirmities were such that she did not understand the Miranda warnings, and we therefore conclude that statements made after the interrogation did become custodial were properly suppressed. On remand and after in a second appear, in Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a finding that the defendant was unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of her Miranda rights is not enough, standing alone, to support the finding that her statements were involuntary. The court found that the defendant was competent to stand trial contrary to the trial judge's determination, and said that because we are unable to determine if the judge would have allowed the supplemental motion to suppress without the erroneous findings, we vacate the order for suppression and remand for further consideration. The point here is that being mentally disabled is not per se proof that a confession is involuntary. Turning specifically to intoxication, in Colorado v. Jewell, the trial court suppressed a confession while intoxicated "based on its finding that Jewell was too intoxicated to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent." The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the suppression [b]ecause the facts do not support the trial court's determination that Jewell's intoxication was so severe that he was demonstrably unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights which leaves open the possibility that there is some such degree of intoxication. The court determined that Intoxication only invalidates an otherwise valid Miranda waiver if the court finds through a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was incapable of understanding the nature of his rights and the ramifications of waiving them. Subsequent discussion partially fleshes out how one might determine whether a waiver is unknowing or unintelligent. Citing Colorado v. Kaiser, the court suggested considering whether “the defendant seemed oriented to his or her surroundings and situation; whether the defendant's answers were responsive and appeared to be the product of a rational thought process; whether the defendant was able to appreciate the seriousness of his or her predicament, including the possibility of being incarcerated; whether the defendant had the foresight to attempt to deceive the police in hopes of avoiding prosecution; whether the defendant expressed remorse for his or her actions; and whether the defendant expressly stated that he or she understood their rights.” One issue was raised regarding "cases where, as here, the intoxication is self-induced." A fundamental result of the mass of Miranda case law is that coercive actions by police invalidate a confession. Getting a suspect drunk(er) would be a clear case of a coercive police action, and presumably would be inadmissible under Townsend v. Sain. | It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial. | british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a "minor" to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that "A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time "is a reference to Pacific Standard Time" (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until "the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date. | The question says: Callahan used torture to get the location of the hostage out of the suspect, and information acquired by torture is not admissible as evidence. In general, evidence obtained by torture is indeed not admissible in US courts. This is particularly true when the person doing the torture is a police officer. If it is done by a private citizen, with no prompting or encouragement by the police or any part of the government, different rules may apply. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) for the inadmissibility of confessions obtained through torture or physical coercion. The Mapp decision, cited below, would have extended this to information or evidence obtained via torture. The question asks: It was not merely information what Callahan acquired, but the physical body of the victim. Doesn't that change anything? No. If the evidence was obtained unlawfully, then the evidence so obtained and all other evidence or information indirectly obtained through the unlawful act is inadmissible. This is the "Fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. It applies just as much to physical evidence as to a confession. "Fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is an extension of the "exclusionary rule" and like the basic rule, is intended to deter unlawful actions on the part of law enforcement and government generally, and to ensure that the courts are not complicit in such unlawful actions. The rule was first fully established in US Federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) although versions of the rule go back before the founding of the United States. The rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) although some states applied a version of the rule even before the Weeks decision. There are exceptions, however, notably "inevitable discovery". That means if other, lawful, investigations already underway would certainly have uncovered the same evidence, then it may be admissible. Another similar exception is the "Independent source doctrine". This says that when the same evidence is later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality, it may be admissible. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for both of these exceptions. There is also a good-faith exception where a warrant was obtained on invalid grounds but used in good-faith by offers who thought it valid. I do not see that any of these exceptions would apply in the situation described in the question. It does not matter how "clear" the evidence may be. If it is obtained unlawfully, and no exception applies, it will not be admissible. The question asks: In case of the hideout and the rifle, is such a clear evidence still inadmissible? Can't the "hot pursuit" rules be applied? He didn't have time for a warrant, he was running against the clock. The doctrine of"hot pursuit" alone does not justify entering a private dwelling without a warrant, but there are a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, one of which "Exigent Circumstances" is one, or rather a group of relates exceptions. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), the Supreme Court wrote in its opinion, "A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search, including law enforcement's need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home . . . engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect . . . or enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause." Thus “hot pursuit” can be an exigent Circumstance and justify a warrentless entry, but this will depend on the precise facts of the case. It is not clear that the circumstances described in the question would qualify. The question asks: even if they decide not to press charges because they are afraid they can't win the trial, can't they at least put the suspect under surveillance? Legally, they probably can. Not even probable cause is required to continue an investigation, or to place a suspected criminal under surveillance There might be reasons other than the law of evidence not to use surveillance, for example if the police fear that the suspect will observe the surveillance and thus be alerted. But this seems like a place where the movie plot may have been unrealistic. | In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense. | Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction. | It's important to keep in mind that charges don't really tell us much about what crimes actually occurred. Sometimes cops file charges that aren't justified; sometimes they don't file charges that would be justified. There can be lots of reasons for the gaps between the evidence and the charges. My best guess is that the officers involved don't have quite as much information about his intent as they'd like to have when they go in front of a judge to argue for keeping this guy locked up. If they're going to hold him for attempted murder, they'll need to present evidence about what he was thinking and demonstrate that he intended to cause the officer's death (ARS 13-1104). That's possible, but it's a lot tougher than what they'd need to show for aggravated assault, which only requires a showing that he "intentionally [placed] another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury." (ARS 13-1204) They'll probably bring him up on murder charges, but they probably don't lose much by just booking him now on something easy to prove but serious enough to justify holding him, and then letting a grand jury indict him on the most serious charges. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). |
Do British judges violate judicial conduct if they tell lawyers to "sit down and shut up"? I transcribe 2:39 And I was once before a very senior judge, and the first thing he said was, 'You have to finish your arguments by twelve o'clock. If you can't finish, sit down and shut up'. Very hostile, and before I said anything. This judge's hostility startled me, not least because the interviewee is a famous barrister and law professor in Hong Kong! This isn't just some sharp practice shady lawyer! Professor Johannes M M Chan SC 陳文敏 | Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong is Chair of Public Law, and former Dean of the Faculty of Law (2002-2014), being the longest serving Dean of the Faculty. He is a Visiting Professor of University College London (2018-2023), and formerly the BOK Visiting International Professor of Penn Law School, University of Pennsylvania, Herbert Smith Freehills Visiting Professor of Cambridge University, and a visiting fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University. As a barrister, he has appeared in many major constitutional law cases. In 2003, he was honoured by the Chief Justice by his appointment as the first (and so far the only) Honorary Senior Counsel in Hong Kong. In 2019, he was awarded by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council the RGC Prestigious Fellowship in Humanities and Social Sciences. I don't have any relationship with Hong Kong, so I ask this just for British judges and the Guide to Judicial Conduct. Of note, some Hong Kong law is based on English law, and Hong Kong was a former British colony. | Telling to "shut up" may amount to misconduct: Judicial Conduct Investigations Office can investigate "offensive language". Otherwise, judges are in charge of everything that happens in the courtroom. They have full powers to limit time that a party can speak and tell to sit down and be quiet. Helpful article: Judicial conduct: when it goes wrong | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. | As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them. | The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions. | There is a grievance procedure whereby a student can file a complain against a professor. (The possibility that there is no procedure is negligible: I can find the document if you name the institution). They may have reviewed the situation and taken whatever action they plan to. The person complaining will receive notice of the outcome, but it is unlikely that the outcome will be made public. Supposing that you are just an interested bystander: your right is to withdraw from the university, write a letter of protest, or continue as usual. You have no special legal privileges in this situation, because you were not directly harmed. You cannot sue a person for making society less livable for you. I cannot sue the university because (as a professor at a presumably different institution) I am only ephemerally harmed by university administrations covering their legal interests rather than punishing the wicked. You have no standing (technical term) in a lawsuit. Now suppose you were actually the aggrieved student and the wrong was a wrongful public accusation of plagiarism (defamation). The defamed student can sue the professor. This is true no matter what the result of the internal disciplinary process is – except that the university might cleverly get the student to agree to shut up in exchange for some desirable outcome. | The first thing to keep in mind is that, before appearing on the stand, an expert witness will have given a sworn deposition and delivered a written report of his or her findings. They could expect to be questioned about anything they say under oath that contradicts something else they said under oath. It’s not illegal for an expert to admit they were wrong before, or that there are other facts that support a different conclusion—indeed, a witness on the stand might be obligated to—but it might not do their professional reputation and their credibility with the jury any good, either. In the U.S., the opposing counsel is generally allowed to contact a witness, and take a statement, but may not ask the witness to testify falsely or offer any inducement prohibited by law. (See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 173/Model Rule (MR) 3.4.) It would certainly be illegal for a witness to take money from both parties in the case without informing them or the court, or to swear that whatever the highest bidder pays them to say is their expert opinion. If this happened under direct examination, the lawyer would probably cut their losses by asking no further questions and getting the witness off the stand. Putting the witness on the stand would give the other side an opportunity to cross-examine them. Grilling your own expert as a hostile witness, even if the judge allowed it, would only make your position seem tendentious. Nothing stops an expert witness from giving testimony that is more helpful to the other side. They are witnesses, not lawyers, and their duty is to tell the truth, not to zealously advocate on behalf of some client. | No. Indonesia Law uses Civil Law structures which use an Inquisitorial Trial. The chief difference is that in the United States (which has a Common Law Structure) the judge usually does not decide the case, but interprets the law (Trier of Law) and with a few exceptions, will determine the sentence once guilt is found. The Jury decides the case (Trier of Fact) and pronounces guilt (It is the right of the defense to request a Bench Trial, which gives the Judge both roles. The prosecution cannot object to this request). In a Civil Court, the big difference is that their is no Jury and the Judge has both roles (Trier of Law, and Trier of Fact). As the name suggests, rather than two sides fighting each other (adversarial), the two sides are answering questions posed to them by the Judge or usually a panel of Judges are used and the Judge may initiate further investigation in the evidence. The United States does use Inquisitional Trials from time to time, but they are often seen in misdemeanors, traffic courts, and small claims courts. The latter is a popular daytime TV genre (think Judge Judy) while misdemeanors and traffic court decisions are often time funny and make great Youtube videos. There are not many great Adversarial media as many throw out rules for time sake (real U.S. trials have many long boring periods during testimony) and story/drama sake. I would recommend "My Cousin Vinny" which was written by two lawyers who were fed up with Hollywood messing up how court room drama works and is hilarious to boot. When viewing either, take them with a grain of salt. | In the west, the profession of being a "lawyer" came into existence under the Roman Empire, though there were sorta-lawyers in Ancient Greece (orators, who could not receive a fee for pleading on behalf of another). In Egypt, Sumer, Babylon, Persia and so on, there was nothing like a lawyer – you were to plead your own case if you ended up in a dispute / being accused of a crime. As far as I know, there were no lawyers under Chinese traditional law. |
Who appointed the judge for Julian Assange's extradition hearing? That is, how are judges in the UK appointed to cases in general and to this case in particular? | how are judges in the UK appointed to cases in general? The Resident Judge or the Presiding Judge of the relevant court allocates cases to their fellow judges. Residing Judges sit at specific courts (e.g. all Crown courts will have a Resident Judge). Presiding Judges oversee specific circuits (e.g. the Western circuit). [how was the judge appointed] to this case in particular? All extradition cases start off at Westminster Magistrates Court, therefore Vanessa Baraitser, the District Judge assigned to this case, would have been given the case by order of Emma Arbuthnot, the Chief Magistrate of England and Wales. This is because the Chief Magistrate is the Resident Judge for that court, although in reality I presume she didn't personally make the decision to assign the case. The case listing system may simply have picked Ms. Baraitser as the next available judge to hear this case. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | Yes, this has come before the Court. Some prominent examples are - Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987), the first time Article 3 was before the European Court of Human Rights, on the complex Belgian system of balancing French-speaking and Dutch-speaking electoral institutions Matthews v United Kingdom (1999), on whether people in Gibraltar should be able to vote in elections to the European Parliament Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2005), on whether the UK could have a blanket ban on voting applicable to all prisoners Riza and others v Bulgaria (2015), on selective interference with the electoral count In all but the first of these, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Protocol. At other times, it has given deference to a State's particular processes, or ruled that a complaint was inadmissible because it did not pertain to the covered type of election. You may be interested to read the Court's guide to its case-law on the topic (a 34-page PDF) which includes many more citations, and an explanation of the legal reasoning involved. | Any duty that exists is not legally enforceable in the courts in the U.S. (there are one or two cases in Canada imposing a similar duty in extraordinary rendition cases). Also, the arguably legal duty to provide diplomatic assistance to one's citizens doesn't apply in countries like North Korea where the U.S. has no diplomats. In practice, the U.S. government will do everything reasonably within its power to secure the release of a U.S. citizen held by a hostile foreign power (even a U.S. citizen who has behaved badly), because that's in the DNA of how the U.S. State Department always acts. But, at this point, short of an extreme Special Operations mission to abduct a prisoner that voluntarily defected from the U.S. while stationed in South Korea, there really isn't anything that the U.S. could do even if ordered to do so. | The time between arrest and being presented to a judge depends on the country you are in: japan You can be in jail for 23 days before you even see a judge and are charged, and that clock resets whenever they officially start to investigate you for a different possible charge. You are not charged, you are just accused of this related and greater crime. This tactic even has a special name: Hitojichi shihō. Someone they want to investigate for murder can be first imprisoned to investigate the deposit of the corpse, then for the actual murder, for a total of 46 days maximum - and if the DA isn't creative to get some other lesser included charges in. Against some Yakuza, some DAs allegedly managed to chain up much more. However, those 23 days (per investigation) are all the pre-trial investigative confinement that the state gets before a trial - the moment the formal charge is entered, the trial has to begin soon after... However, the state also often has the arrestee's confession at that point - partially because a creative DA might manage to keep you nigh permanently and in part because you don't have the right to have your attorney at your side during questioning in Japan. This is partially the reason why Japanese courts have such a crazy high conviction rate: more than 99% of the cases brought by DAs are convictions, in most cases using the confession obtained in the pre-charge detention as a piece of key evidence. england-and-wales If you are a suspect of terrorism, you can be kept for up to 14 days before you need to be either charged or released, as Rick explains much better. Generally, 24 hours or 96 hours for serious crimes, starting at the arrest hours, apply. european-union The EU has the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 5 III): Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. However, what is Promptly is dependant on what the countries implementing say it is. As an example, let's take a (closer) look at Germany. germany While you can be in investigative confinement (Untersuchungshaft / U-Haft) for months or up to a year typically, you need to be already officially charged and a judge has to affirm you are in U-Haft. This decision that you need to be in confinement needs to be repeated regularily in case of long investigative confinements. This Investigative Confinement, "Untersuchungshaft", is defined in STPO §112 (~process regulations for criminal trials), and usually is limited to about 6 months before the suspect is to be released or be at trial, but in extremely difficult cases it can be extended by special motion in the layer of Oberlandesgericht, which is about the highest state court. Still, while an extension to 9 or 12 months is possible, there can be cases where this may be extended even further, even if that might not be entirely correct on other grounds - there had been appeals to the European court for human rights about such. On the other hand, once a trial starts and the court sees a flight risk or that you might pose a potential danger, you stay in (or are taken into) Untersuchungshaft for the duration of the trial. That is different from pre-trial Untersuchungshaft, in that you can't appeal on that your trial didn't start yet. In either case of Untersuchungshaft, any and all confinement is counted as time served, like the case of Fritz Teufel. In his case, his trial was seriously delayed and he was in Untersuchungshaft for 5 years before they convicted him to 5 years. In the end, he had already served all the due time due to the investigatory confinement, so he was released almost on the spot - just a little bit of paperwork and he was out.. Now, that is all court-ordered confinement. How far can we get without the court? What does Germany count as prompt? So, unless you have been put into investigative confinement by court order, you have to be released at the end of the day after you were arrested. End of the day is defined as midnight by the general rules. So if you were arrested Monday, 1st of January at 00:01, you are to be released on Tuesday, 2nd of January, 24:00. So, the absolute maximum confinement outside of the daylight-saving change day is 47 hours 59 minutes and 59 seconds until you need to have been seen by a judge, but because it is nigh impossible to get to see a judge between 16:00 and 24:00, the typical confinement till you are formally charged and possibly transferred to Untersuchungshaft is usually less. On a mere technicality, there is one day a year where you might be confined twice from 2 AM to 3 AM, but that is also always a Sunday. | Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement). | DUI is a crime under Massachusetts law so Kurt would be prosecuted there by that state. Germany would offer consular assistance but this would not extend to preparing or paying for his defence. If convicted, and after serving his sentence, Germany and the USA would coordinate his deportation. The UK would offer consular assistance for the repatriation of Alice's body and for the participation of her family in the trial, again this would not extend to paying for it. They would not assist in any civil action Alice's family might take against Kurt in a Massachusetts court. While DUI is a crime in both Germany and the UK AFAIK they are not extraterritorial: that is the crime must be committed on their territory for them to prosecute it. Some crimes do have extraterritoriality but not DUI. Similarly, their courts would probably not hear a civil case because the correct venue is Massachusetts and they would probably entertain a motion to dismiss on that basis. Even if they did hear it, it would be heard under Massachusetts law. | Yes, you can be compelled by the government to reveal information: All it takes is a judge agreeing with a plaintiff or prosecutor that it has some relevance to a complaint over which the court has jurisdiction. If that point arrives and you want to protect that information you only have three choices: Get a legal team good enough to convince the court otherwise. Face the consequences of contempt of court for failing to supply the information requested. Flee to another jurisdiction before #2 happens. |
Can a realtor show my apartment at will, with notice? My apartment is for sale by its owner, who I'm currently renting from. The owner uses a management company and I deal with that company to pay rent, have things fixed, etc. I've never seen or talked to the apartment owner. The owner is hiring a realtor to help sell the apartment (to someone else; we are leaving after our lease.) This realtor visited and said they'd like to show the apartment over the next few months, before our lease ends, and implied that there could be many showings. My contract is very simple. There's no provision for the management company to enter the property even with notice, though I assume there's some law that allows them to do so. My question is, do I have to let the realtor in with notice? What if they're with the manager? If they wish to do open houses and frequent tours (which they've implied they'd like to), do I have any rights other than obtaining 24 hour notice? I reiterate that there's nothing about this in my very simple renter's contract. | Yes, but not without notice KS Stat § 58-2557 (2015) 58-2557. Landlord's right to enter; limitations. (a) The landlord shall have the right to enter the dwelling unit at reasonable hours, after reasonable notice to the tenant, in order to ... exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, ... | Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners. | First review the existing contract for anything that specifies what happens at the end of the term. I have seen ones that switch to month to month, others automatically extend by a whole year. In the United states the rental law is done at the state level or even more local than that. So I took a look at the UK policies. I focused on England. Guidance How to rent: the checklist for renting in England Updated 24 March 2023 At the end of the fixed period If you want to stay If you want to extend your tenancy after any initial fixed period, there are a number of important issues to consider. Check Shelter’s website for advice. Do you want to sign up to a new fixed term? If not, you will be on a ‘rolling periodic tenancy’. This means you carry on as before but with no fixed term. Your tenancy agreement should say how much notice you must give the landlord if you want to leave the property – one month’s notice is typical. Shelter publishes advice on how you can end your tenancy. I then went to the shelter website How to end a periodic tenancy: How much notice You can give your landlord a legal notice called a 'notice to quit' to end a rolling tenancy. This is a more formal option. Your tenancy will end legally if you follow the rules on how much notice and where to send it. A legal notice must: be in writing give the right amount of notice end on the correct day Here is an example of a notice to quit. A legal notice ends your tenancy and your right to live in your home. Joint tenancies will end for all tenants even if only one of you gives notice. You cannot withdraw a valid notice if you change your mind. Your landlord may agree to let you or other joint tenants stay on after a notice ends. Minimum notice periods You need to give at least: 1 month if your rent is due monthly 4 weeks if your rent is due weekly You can usually give the minimum notice to end your tenancy if your most recent agreement does not mention a longer notice period or if you've never had a written agreement. You may still need to give more than the minimum notice to make sure it ends on the right day. If your agreement says you must give more notice Your agreement might have a 'notice clause'. For example, if it says you have to give 2 months' notice. A notice clause might not apply after your fixed term has ended but sometimes it will. When will the longer notice apply? The longer notice period will only apply if either: you never had a fixed term agreement your agreement says it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy after the fixed term You can ignore a notice clause in your most recent agreement if both: your fixed term has ended your agreement does not say that it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy It looks like the notice period is a month, unless the contract says that the notice period is longer during the periodic tenancy. | The Rent Ordinance para (e) explicitly precludes that possibility: Any waiver by a tenant of rights under this Chapter 37 shall be void as contrary to public policy. If he attempts to enforce such a clause or in any way dislodge you from the unit, he is liable for a substantial penalty. The legality of a rebate scheme is not clear, but probably would also be deemed illegal, because there already exists provision for buyout, which has specific restrictions. For the rest of the week, tenant buyouts are subject to these provisions. The problem is that the horse may have left the barn. The landlord has to have provided you with a Pre-Buyout Disclosure Form (which is to be signed and filed) before any negotiation / discussion with the tenant. Since we're talking about obeying the law, it has to occur to the landlord that there is a buyout option, and then he has to give you and file the disclosure form before he opens his mouth. He also has to know what the requirements of a buyout agreement will be in the future. Starting on Monday, the law regarding buyouts changes (it doesn't clearly make an agreement impossible, but it's a reminder that the law can be changed). In terms of legally-enforceable agreements, you could agree to a buyout in the far future, but the agreement might not be enforceable under future law. For example, the disclosure form requires new information to be provided, so if he doesn't do that, the disclosure is invalid (the preamble to the amendment points out that the change in law was directed at legal actions that were considered to violate the spirit of the law). Hence a buyout for two years in the future is legally risky. | Can the renter declare the contract to be void because of the death of the only other party to the contract? No. The estate of the decedent steps into the shoes of the decedent and the executor of the decedent's estate can enforce the lease. What if one of the heirs comes to the renter and tries to add additional conditions? The heirs do not have the authority to modify the lease without the tenant's consent, although the tenant knows that the lease may be less likely to be renewed if the tenant does not consent. Also, the heirs, strictly speaking, don't have the authority to do anything. Only an executor duly appointed by a court does. | A person who repairs property has a lien on the property and can sell the property to satisfy the lien. There are notice requirements and the property must be sold at auction if it is worth more than $100. I pulled this off of FindLaw, I have no idea of this law is current. http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/LIE articles 8 and 9 N.Y. LIE. LAW § 180 : NY Code - Section 180: Artisans' lien on personal property A person who makes, alters, repairs or performs work or services of any nature and description upon, or in any way enhances the value of an article of personal property, at the request or with the consent of the owner, has a lien on such article, while lawfully in possession thereof, for his reasonable charges for the work done and materials furnished, and may retain possession thereof until such charges are paid. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 200 : NY Code - Section 200: Sale of personal property to satisfy a lien A lien against personal property... if in the legal possession of the lienor, may be satisfied by the sale of such property according to the provisions of this article. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 201 : NY Code - Section 201: Notice of sale Before such sale is held the lienor shall serve a notice on the owner... or mail ( certified mail, return receipt requested, and by first-class mail)the notice if the property is of a value of less than one hundred dollars. The following must be included in the notice. The nature of the debt or agreement which gave rise to the lien. Description of the property Estimated value of the property Amount of the lien and the date of the notice Give them ten days to pay, tell them when and where the sale is happening, and tell them they can bring as action under section 201a within ten days. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 202 : NY Code - Section 202: Sale to be advertised; exception Each sale of personal property of a value of one hundred dollars or more, or of any security, to satisfy a lien thereon shall be at public auction to the highest bidder, and shall be held in the city or town where the lien was acquired. Each sale of personal property of a value of less than one hundred dollars, other than a security, to satisfy a lien thereon, shall be made pursuant to the provisions of subdivision one hereof (auction), or at a bona fide private sale in the city or town where the lien was acquired. A bona fide private sale pursuant to this section shall not be made until the expiration of six months after the time for the payment of the amount of the lien specified in the notice required to be served by section two hundred one or two hundred one-a of this article. Section 204 - keep the money to cover the lien but hang onto the balance. Serve notice on the owner and then in six months if the owner does not claim the money deposit it with the treasurer or chamberlain of the city or village, or the commissioner of finance in the city of New York, or the supervisor of the town, where such sale was held. You don't get this money back, it goes to the owner or to the town eventually. | In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved. | There is nothing in that contract that says anything about 3 months notice period. The 3 months is the legal default for contracts that do not expire on their own, unlike yours, that has all properties of a limited time contract. I would personally see the detailed description of how you can end this contract as overriding any legal default. But as always, with this specific contract in the original language, you need to see a lawyer to know for sure. Your contract clearly states: you can leave your appartment whenever you want, even before the agreed upon time. If you leave between the 15th and the end of a month, you have to pay for that month in full. If you leave between the 1st and the 14th of the month, you have to pay the fair share of the rent for the days you where there. So for example, on a 30 day month if you lived there for 10 days, you still have to pay a third of the rent and the landlord will return the rest if you paid for the month in advance. If you live there for 16 days, you have to pay for the full month and nothing will be returned if you paid for the month in advance. Please note that you need to "hand over" the vacated rental object during normal business hours. So don't go in there on the evening of the 14th at 16:59. And don't try to "hand it over" when you haven't moved your stuff out yet. At the hand over, you give the keys to the landlord and that is it, it is the last thing you do. Very likely your landlord will want to have a look at the rental object while you are there, so they can make sure it is all in order, you did not damage it or did not leave any of your stuff. Generally speaking, there is nothing your landlord could do to you if you decide to leave early. They cannot make you leave even earlier or any other retaliatory shenanigans you may have heard of in other countries. In Germany, such contracts are not adversarial. You don't need to keep it a secret to the last second. If you know you want to leave on a certain date, inform your land lord, make an appointment for the "hand over" well in advance and save yourself (and them) all the stress from doing things last minute. |
Why doesn't the US Supreme Court just forbid the "re-use, capture, re-editing or redistribution" of video footage like the UK Supreme Court? First, I know that US and UK law differ. Here's one common argument against televising proceedings of the US Supreme Court as summarized by the dead Justice Antonin Scalia. Though Scalia said he was sure Lamb’s network would air the proceedings in their entirety, his concern was that “what most of the American people would see would be 30-second, 15-second takeouts from our arguments.” Lamb pressed on, asking how sound bites on TV were different from quotes in a newspaper article. “People read that and they say ‘well that’s an article in the newspaper and the guy may be lying, or he may be misinformed.’ But somehow when you see it live, an excerpt pulled out of an entire, when you see it live, it has a much greater impact. I am sure it will mis-educate the American people,” Scalia declared. Here's my rebuttal. Why doesn't SCOTUS just follow the UKSC's lead on this issue? This footage is made available for the sole purpose of the fair and accurate reporting of the judicial proceedings of the Supreme Court. Although you are welcome to view these proceedings, the re-use, capture, re-editing or redistribution of this footage in any form is not permitted. You should be aware that any such use could attract liability for breach of copyright or defamation and, in some circumstances, could constitute a contempt of court. Can't Congress enact an Act prohibiting "the re-use, capture, re-editing or redistribution of" any video footage of SCOTUS, and make them contempt of court? To take this a step further, why not amend the U.S. Constitution just to do this? I know that amending the U.S. Constitution is AWFULLY DIFFICULT. I screenshot the same warning from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. I know the Supreme Court of Canada and High Court of Australia also televise their proceedings. | No Any such law would violate the US First Amendment as an improper restriction of speech and of the press. If done by the court rather thiygh a law, it would also conflict with 17 USC 105 which says that: Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government Courts have restricted video and still photography of court proceedings, on the ground that the presence of cameras would disturb court sessions and distract witnesses and jurors. But that would not apply to the proceedings of an appellate court. | Not in US law, at least. Under the 1999 decision Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp (36 F. Supp. 2d 191) such images are not protected by copyright. As the Wikipedia article says, the court here ruled that exact photographic copies of public domain images could not be protected by copyright in the United States because the copies lack originality. Even though accurate reproductions might require a great deal of skill, experience and effort, the key element to determine whether a work is copyrightable under US law is originality. This decision has been generally followed in US copyright law thereafter. At the time it was claimed that UK law took a different view, but I understand that more recently the UK also follows the Bridgeman rule, although I cannot confirm that at the moment. See also this article about the Bridgeman case and its effects. The service probably puts that notice onto all its newspaper reproductions, not checking which ones are from originals still under copyright. EDIT: As some comments point out, the formatting used to present the digital version, if not a slavish copy of the original newspaper, might be original enough for copyright protection. Therefore one should copy only the digitized text, or elements obviously a direct copy of the original newspaper which is in the public domain. The digitizing service will not get any copyright on the original text or images, even if the formatting has enough originality for protection. | I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use. | So as per recent Supreme Court decision in Matal v. Tam, the phohibitation of the registration of trademarks that may "disparage" persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols was ruled Unconstititutional. At issue, Tam, the bassist and founder of an all Asian-American band that was named after a slur for Asians (the linked article contains the Band Name, but to avoid a possible rule violation, I will not use the actual term). Tam was unable to register the trademark for his band due to the term being a slur, despite the bands intention to use the term in a re-appropriated manner. SCOTUS held that the act was unconstitutional and that Trademark protection did not constitute government speech beyond that the specific mark was registered with the government and thus protected. The decision found 9-0 in favor of Tam. (The case gained some fame as it immediately ended litigation on the name of Washington D.C. NFL football team as well). The other famous case is that of Jacobellis v. Ohio which held obsecenity is not protected speech, but that obscenity is to be determined by the most local levels of government. After all, what is Not Obscene to Los Angeles could be highly obscene to the Amish in Pennsylvania (Basically, no opinion was agreed too, but this was concurred with and every Justice held a concurring opinion). This case is famous for Justice Potter Stewart's concurring opinion, in which he stated obscenity should be limited to only Hard Core Porn, but famously did not offer a legal definition of that term beyond "I know it when I see it [and the motion picture involved in this case is not that]." Basically, check your local limits for guidance, as there is no federal or state law to help discuss this. Finally, as a small aside, the specific name of the establishment in the OP may be on it's face a little naughty, but "Dick" is a diminutive name for "Richard" and this gets all sorts of playful puns on it's other vernacular uses. For example, in one comic featuring Batman's young ward Robin (Dick Grayson), who was admonishing other heroes for not protecting their secret identity, one character comments to another that "Robin is being such a -" only for the second character to interrupt and remind the first "No real names." Another example is the stage name of a famous parody artist who sepcializes in singing modern pop songs in the style of a Vegas Crooner or Lounge Singer, Richard Cheese. The pun relies on knowing this nickname. For one that is not punning on the body part, The Red Green Show once had a sketch where Red Green (the character's name) was talking with the town's notorious liar, Hap, who in this particular sketch dropped the time he went whaling and chased after the "Great White Whale Moby Richard." Red asks if he meant the titular whale from the novel Moby Dick, to which Hap responds, "I didn't know him that well, Red." | In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue. | As for SCOTUS being willing to overrule itself, here is a table of such cases, starting with Hudson v. Guestier 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 281 (1810) which overturned Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 241 (1808) up to Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) which overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). This is 234 cases since 1798, slightly above once a year. No idea what the rate is for the UK or Canada. | First, while Law and Order should not be taken as an accurate depiction of a New York trial, it especially should not be taken as an accurate depiction of an Australian trial. Australian law, while it has some major similarities with US law (both ultimately derive from the law of England), is not US law. With procedural matters (such as "may jurors ask questions of witnesses"), it can potentially differ from court to court. In general, jurors may not simply ask a witness a question. The jury's job is not to investigate and figure out if the defendant was guilty or not; it's to evaluate the cases presented by each side. US (and Australian, as far as I know) courts use what's known as the adversarial model, where the prosecution and the defense both present the best cases they can and a neutral third party decides which case was stronger. In a US criminal trial, the state is expected to justify why someone should be in jail; the jury shouldn't be helping them justify it. This isn't how all jurisdictions around the world work, but it's how the US does. One concern with juror questions is that it has the risk that the juror will not be impartial. Jurors are not supposed to get into arguments with witnesses, or to go after them to try to prove a point. In your case, the juror might be introducing an entirely different line of reasoning from the one either side is presenting, and that's simply not their job. People have raised the concern that a juror thinking up questions might be deciding the case before they hear all the evidence, and might give too much weight to the answers to their own questions (or read a lot into it if a question is denied). There are also rules on what questions may be legally asked; lawyers know these and jurors generally don't, which is why jurors may almost never directly ask a question to a witness. Where they can ask questions, it's virtually always written questions, which the judge reviews, gives to both sides to see if anyone objects, and then reads to the witness in a neutral tone. | On an issue of pure law, an appellate court decides if the trial judge got it right or wrong from scratch, and if there is a case that is a better match than the one that the judge used that leads to a different outcome in the case, then an appellate court is likely to find that the trial court's ruling is a reversible error. On an issue of mixed fact and law, or on a legal issue where a judge has more discretion in how the law is applied (like many evidentiary issues), a judge is given more deference, and the judge will generally only be reversed if no reasonable judge could have applied the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them, and then, only if an application of the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them would have changed the outcome of the case. There are a couple of ways that this standard of review is described, one of which is called "abuse of discretion" review. |
Can a contract be designed to prohibit an employee from quitting? Suppose a company were to specify, in a contract, that a candidate is bound to remain an employee, with all the work obligations that come with the role, unless and until one of two things happens: The company terminates the contract in writing, Circumstances entirely outside of the employee's control results in the employee's death. Additionally, they throw in a penalty specifically designed to deter termination - such as now OWING the company money, as opposed to being paid. For example, you quit, and now you have to pay back all of the money we paid you throughout your employment here. Would such a contract be legally enforcible? | No, a penalty clause is illegal, end of story. A contract could include a "liquidated damages" clause – this is how late fees are legal – that if you breach the contract in a certain way, you will compensate the company for the damage that you have done (bookkeeping, interest on money owed) in a standard and reasonable manner. Incidentally, what you describe is slavery, which is illegal throughout the US. The closest you could get is if the company offers a benefit for staying with the company for some period of time, then the employee might forego that benefit if they don't fulfill that aspect of the contract. | In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you. | Is a firm required to arbitrate disputes arising after the expiration of employment contract? The wording of this question is problematic. From your description it is doubtful that the contract truly expired at the end of the first year. It is valid for a contract to encompass multiple phases with different provisions specific to each phase. Providing that "[a]fter the first year the employee may continue working for the company, until terminated, as an at will employee" is different from expiration of the contract at the end of the first year. The contract simply outlined what happens before and after that point in time. The employer's allegation that the contract expired at the end of the first year is inconsistent with outlining in that same contract the nature of the parties' continued relation after the first year. Said nature of the employment relation should have been outlined in a separate contract in order to preempt an interpretation of there being one same/ongoing contract. The employer's allegation is vague and untenable also in a scenario where the employer terminates the employee within the first year. The employer's allegation seemingly implies that the employee's deadline for arbitration proceedings expires at the end of the first year. That would give the employer the opportunity to evade the arbitration clause by choosing a timing that de facto prevents its employee from enforcing the clause. Questions regarding arbitration are unanswerable without knowing the exact terms of the relevant clause(s). Just like the contract provides a transition from fixed term employment to at will employment, it is possible --but not necessarily the case-- that the arbitration provision is applicable only to some of the phases that the contract encompasses. | A company is liable for the actions of its agents This is known as vicarious liability and some well-established situations where this happens is in employer-employee and company-officer, "executives", if senior enough, would be both employees and officers. Without it, the concept of a company just doesn't work - a company is only a record in a database, it can only act through human agents. So, if an employee or officer of the company by act or omission causes harm in the course of executing their duties, then the company has caused the harm. It is not enough for a company to have adequate "internal procedures", it (which is to say the people with the power to act for it) must ensure that those procedures are followed and actually work. The allegations include that at least some senior personnel were aware that breaches of the law were occurring and they did not take steps to stop them - what they know, the company knows; what they do or don't do, the company does or doesn't do. | Generally a signature is binding even if you have not read the document you have signed; as far as the law is concerned you should have and it's too bad for you if you didn't. Of course, this presumes the contract is otherwise valid. In the circumstances you describe you should ask to see the document before signing. If that is not possible, then instead of signing you should write "I do not agree" instead and take the printed statement - only 1 in 100 people will actually check that you did sign. If you have signed and do not wish to be bound, you should contact the company immediately in writing and say that and that they can collect whatever goods they have supplied. | A company generally cannot compel an employee to agree to a non-compete, but they have a wide variety of alternatives for inducing employees to do so. Most obviously, they may threaten to fire employees who refuse, whether immediately or at the end of their current term, as another answer observes. Indeed, if Big Company makes an NC a condition of employment then they are likely to insist on the same for employees they obtain from Original Employer. Firing employees for refusing to sign does, of course, put them in the job market as potential competitors, but the company may well find it acceptable to do that on their own terms. In particular, Big Company can ensure that those who won't sign go out the door with minimal knowledge of Big Company's clients, trade secrets, etc. other than those obtained from Original Employer. And that leads into other forms of inducement. Big Company can do some or all of the following things, depending on the particular employment situation: offer bonus compensation for signing promote those who sign and / or demote / reassign those who don't change job duties for those who refuse to sign do all manner of nastier things to be unfriendly to employees who refuse to sign Some of those fit directly into Big Company's perceived interest in avoiding employees using Big Company internal information to jump ship and compete with them, and others could fit into Big Company policy about which jobs require an NC. Some are just pressure tactics, but that does not necessarily make them unlawful (nor are all variations on the others necessarily lawful). | Provincial jurisdiction may need to be specified. But in general, assuming you are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, you can be terminated for any reason or even no reason, as long as the contract is followed, the actual or apparent reason is not discriminatory or otherwise illegal and the termination procedure meets the provincial employment standards. The labour law usually provide requirements for notice periods or severance pay (or both), unless there exists a just cause (e.g. extreme disregard of duty, theft, repeated insubordination, etc.; lack of funds on the part of the employer is not a just cause). shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract? Yes, but the contract is saying it can be terminated under certain conditions, after which time you are no longer "in the course" of your contract. Termination due to lack of funds is usually not considered discriminatory or otherwise illegal. You remain entitled to wages for any period you have worked. Additionally, the employer needs to respect the required notice period or severance pay under the provincial employment standards related to termination with or without cause, regardless of the funding situation. | Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that. |
Is it legal if a company buys you a stock instead of paying you dividends? I have bought some stocks. However I just noticed that I now have one stock that I didn’t buy. Someone suggested that one of the stock companies instead of paying me dividends bought me that stock. How can I find out if this is what happened and if so, if a stock company has the right to do that, without even asking for my permission? | It is not uncommon for a company to issue additional shares to shareholders instead of paying a cash dividend. This is known as a "stock dividend". Such payment may (less commonly) be in shares of another, often related, company. If that is the source of the stock in question there is nothing illegal about it. Your broker should have a record of your transactions and whether any stock came from a stock dividend or some other source. Accordion to the Investopedia article on "Stock Dividend": Also known as a "scrip dividend," a stock dividend is a distribution of shares to existing shareholders in lieu of a cash dividend. This type of dividend may be made when a company wants to reward its investors but doesn't have the spare cash or wants to preserve its cash for other investments. Stock dividends have a tax advantage for the investor. The share dividend, like any stock share, is not taxed until the investor sells it unless the company offers the option of taking the dividend as cash or in stock. A stock dividend may require that the newly received shares are not to be sold for a certain period of time. This holding period on a stock dividend typically begins the day after it is purchased. Understanding the holding period is important for determining qualified dividend tax treatment. The Wikip[edia article "Dividend" says: Stock or scrip dividends are those paid out in the form of additional shares of the issuing corporation, or another corporation (such as its subsidiary corporation). They are usually issued in proportion to shares owned (for example, for every 100 shares of stock owned, a 5% stock dividend will yield 5 extra shares). (emphasis added) So dividends payed in the stock of another company are perfectly possible, although less common. | This doesn't sound like fraud (against you, at least), but it does sound like an unfair or deceptive trade practice, which is outlawed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and perhaps the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, both of which prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. I don't know about Pennsylvania, but the FTC has on many occasions taken action against companies for engaging in just this kind of behavior. To find out whether you would be able to take action against the other company, you'd want to find a good competition lawyer in Pennsylvania. For some more basic background on the FTC's rules, check out this primer. | No, because leaking is also a form of insider trading if the person you leak to takes advantage of the information. Even if you leaked it in a public forum you still have to wait 6 months before it is considered truly public knowledge, and by that time you might have learned something else. If you think that Company X is going to be pulled down along with the rest of the market then your best bet is to short (or buy "put" options on) a representative basket of shares other than Company X. This has the advantage of being 100% legal without having to wait. | No Any conduct that demands someone does something unlawfully is unlawful. Taxes are laws and regulations. Not paying the taxes is unlawful, especially under 26 USC 7201. So the shareholders are not only demanding the company to break laws, they aid and abett such behavior, making them also liable together with the company as there is 18 USC 2: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. It could also be inciting to violate laws. It is not a shareholder's right to ask for someone to break the law. | A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from). | As long as what you are posting is factual, public knowledge then you shouldn't be in violation of any SEC rules. Short-selling in-and-of itself is perfectly legal, so is exercising your right to free speech, in so far as the things you say are true and known. Now if you made up some story about Musk and it caused the stock to fall where you gain, this could be a violation. Likewise if you have come to be in possession of private knowledge and blog about that, you could be in violation of SEC rules. | When a company is incorporated, shares are issued to the shareholders in accordance with the application i.e. a company always has shareholders. However, shareholders do not make the decisions about the management of the company: the directors do. The directors are appointed by the shareholders (and may include some or all of the shareholders) and are answerable to the shareholders and must act in the best interests of the company as a whole but they do not follow the instructions of the shareholders, they act on their own best judgement. If you have not yet incorporated your business then you are operating a common law partnership. Profits and losses are distributed in accordance with the provisions of the partnership deed or, if there isn't one, equally. Each partner is jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of every other partner: that means that if your partner makes a "questionable decision" that costs the business say $1 million, then any or all of you can be sued and the person(s) who has $1 million is the person(s) who will pay. | Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough). |
Stuffed in the Fridge Los Angeles, August 1994. Kyle Rayner returns home to his flat to find a note about a surprise in the fridge, signed A. The door to the same is left ajar. Inside he discovers the remains of his girlfriend, the photographer Alexandra DeWitt. Autopsy shows that she was strangled to death and the body was forcefully made fit into the fridge post mortem. Other evidence points to a fight that had happened between the woman and her murderer, and Clifford Zmeck was encountered by Mr. Rayner at the scene. Mr. Zmek claims to be the perpetrator and threatens Mr. Rayner to "kill you nice and quick" for cooperating, implicating that he'd kill him anyway. Mrs. Rayner and Zmek get into a fight, which destroys, among other things, a sizeable portion of Mr. Rayner's house. Mr. Zmek is a US national and member of the airforce, convicted of murder and rape and sentenced to life in prison. In exchange for a pardon, he underwent experimental surgery in a federal experimental weapons program for the Vietnam War. During the experiment, he was outfitted with bombs under the skin. One such charge has led to the amputation of his left hand. After the lockdown of the program, Mr. Zmek became a mercenary. He was paid to extract an item from Mr. Rayner and information from Ms. DeWitt. We assume that this was not a governmental organization that paid him. Which variant of murder and what other charges can be brought against Mr. Zmek, assuming Mr. Rayner manages to detain him in a citizen's arrest? | Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of "Murder for hire" which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible. | How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders. | This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate." | Hank would certainly have a case that Walter White was the "Heisenburg" cook as Walter had the motive (he needed lots of cash fast), means(Access to chemicals, strong chemistry knowledge, and connections to distribution networks) and opportunity (Walter had time to do the steps required of the operation). Notably, the money doesn't need to be there to show evidence of the crime (Possession with Intent to Sell being the driving one). Hank was, from early in the series, well aware of a list of crimes attributable to "Heisenberg," but didn't have a person to charge with these crimes. What blows Walter's cover to Hank was the book of poetry Leaves of the Grass by Walt Whitman. The Handwritten dedication inside the cover is "To my other favorite W.W. It's an honour working with you. Fondly, G.B." written by Gale, who's death had previously led to a raid on the Meth Lab where Walter White and Gale had worked together and was no known to have been run by Gus Fringe (also deceased). Other evidence in Gale's office were notes regarding the cook operation at the Fringe Lab, with the quotes attributed to then unknown to Hank, "W.W." and his own notes attributed to him as "G.B." (I believe Gale did have Whitman books in his home). Walter had previously told Hank he had no idea who Gale was, so seeing a book that Gale personally dedicated to Walter and attributing him as the other favorite W.W. would be as easy as comparing handwriting samples from Gale's notes to the snippet from the book, thus linking Walter White to the Heisenberg ring. Hank also discusses that he believes Gale is not Heisenberg as Gale was taking extensive notes from another source in meth production and did not have any ties to the known distribution chain outside of Gus Fringe. What complicated Hank's ability to prosecute was that Marie (aka Jesus Christ-Marie) had knowingly accepted dirty money from Hank and Skylar, believing it was from illegal high stakes poker and not drug money... but reporting Walt's source of income meant implicating them in the crime, which Walter and Skylar use as blackmail against them by creating a confession tape that would implicate Hank as the Mastermind of the operation who forced them to perform their illegal actions. This would have cost Hank his career and would have netted the Whites a not guilty plea as too much doubt would have existed to convict (The Schraders would not be convicted by the same reasoning, but Hank was the primary breadwinner and out of a job... and likely not hireable by other LEO organizations as the controversy of the matter would make him untrustworthy to have on, and the inability to realize a close family member was a drug lord made him look incompetent. I call this last part "The Spycatcher's Dilemma" as if there is no evidence of a Spy, the spy catcher is criticized for not finding spies. When a spy is caught, the spy catcher is criticized for not catching the spy sooner.). | In this instance, the police were almost certainly trying to get you to volunteer to be in a line-up with the victim of the crime picking out potential suspects (of which you were absolutely one, and probably remain so). Assuming the chap or chappete who got mugged, who basically only saw the barrel of the gun, picked you out of the lineup at random, you could have expected to be carted off to a holding cell pending an interview, followed by arrest and very likely conviction for armed robbery. You were wise to refuse. You should never cooperate with the police even if you think have an amazing alibi that means that you couldn't have committed the crime. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE | In the first case, under US law, you are not considered guilty in most cases where you are forced to commit a crime under duress (gun to your head would certainly qualify). Murder is a rare exception to this rule, and the patron can be tried for the murder of the prostitute. Given the nature of Doe, who uses situations of duress to force a no win scenario for his victims, a good defense would likely work to get Jury Nullification of this crime, given the circumstance. The likely defense would be to validate that the man would not ordinarily kill a prostitute and thus only under a situation such as the one presented would he. It is still a crime, but the jury could choose not to convict, but it's a gamble as the law of crime of duress is likely to come up in the course of the trial. Situation 2 is a little more grim, as in this case, Doe has already surrendered and is custody and admits to a crime that is personal to the detective. I haven't seen the movie, so I can't suggest if there was an appropriate time for Mills to be pulled from the case prior to this revelation, but if such an opportunity happened, he should have. Since Doe is not threatening Mills at the point of time and he had already carried out his crime and been captured, Mills is an officer of the law who is killing someone in his custody. This is a crime and should be prosecuted. The circumstances might serve as mitigating factors and the jury may nullify, but these are circumstances that are less likely than the above case. Mills is also the lead detective in this case (?), and thus should know how Doe functions and what he is trying to get done. In the role of prosecutor, I personally would not push the crime against the patron as the likely jury would be too sympathetic to the defense. I would prosecute Mills as his responsibilities as a law enforcer and his training would have made him well aware that what he did was a crime. | It's been a while since I've seen the film (and what I remember of it is the ending), but if I recall, Skinner was conspiring to conceal evidence that the restaurant was legally Linguini's so that Skinner could become the legal owner under Gusteau's will. As such, under French Law, an employer may fire an employee for disciplinary reasons that fall into three categories: "Faute Simple", "Faute Grave", "Faute Lourde". In likelihood, since legally Skinner was attempting to steal from the owner of the restaurant, this would likely fall under "Faute Lourde." This is defined as when "when an employee intentionally and willfully attempts to harm the employer or other employees. In this case, the employer must demonstrate intentionality." If not, it would certainly be Faute Grave, which is the same as "Faute Lourde" although the reason does not have to show the intent was malicious, but that it simply harmed either the employer or an employee. At best, Linguini was within his right to fire Skinner without a notice period or pay for the unintentional concealment of his ownership of Gusteau's, though if I recall, Skinner's malicious intention was clear to Linguini by the time he was declared the legal owner. (source) | If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts. |
Is it legal for an 18 year old moroccan man to sext a 17 year old vietnamese girl? Say a hypothetical 18 year old man from morocco has been texting a vietnamese girl online, and they mostly just talk about hobbies and common interests but she started sexualizing the conversation, sending nudes... Would it be legal for him to reciprocate and ask her for more pics/videos? Knowing that in morocco extramarital affairs are illegal so there is technically no age of consent but there is no legislation for sexting, in vietnam I found sources that say 16 years old is the age of consent but I'm not sure, and I don't know what laws for sexting are. Oh and it's hypothetically not a scam. | It is illegal in Morocco to possess or distribute pornographic material of any kind. This includes nudes of the hypothetical Vietnamese girl. | As far as I am aware there is no prohibition against bartering firearms in general. This would be an odd prohibition since it is legal to gift and lend firearms. However, some of your situations change this. could I legally manufacture and exchange a firearm If you manufactured a firearm with the intent to sell you would be required to have an FFL. If this was a one-off sale of a firearm you manufactured at some point in the past for personal use this can be legal without an FFL. There are some additional requirements for the transfer. No party is a known criminal It is illegal to sell or give a firearm to someone you know to be a prohibited possessor. Not all criminals are prohibited from owning firearms, but this helps keep you safe. No party inspects the ID of the other or performs a background check This is state dependent. Some states make you go through an FFL for all transfers, others are much less strict. New Hampshire does not require private sales to go through an FFL if you know the buyer personally. Each party is known to be or appears to be old enough to own a firearm legally This is required for your scheme to be legal. One party barters regularly in this manner using firearms and firearm components This person is now engaged in the business of selling firearms and must be a registered FFL and jump through all the corresponding hoops. No party is licensed to sell firearms Not typically required, unless you do this in a regular basis. | "How can these things be compatible at all"? The law is that prostitution isn't illegal, which means prostitutes cannot be thrown into jail, they cannot be blackmailed by customers or police officers, for example. This protects and is intended to protect the prostitute. If a business owner tried what you suggest, that would be trouble. It's not asking the woman to do something that would be illegal for her to do, it's asking her to do something that you don't have the slightest right to ask her, which probably constitutes sexual harassment at least. I can't really get how you would think that making prostitution legal and protecting women from harassment would be incompatible. The legality actually takes a huge amount of harassment away. | united-states Possibly, depends on the state. Texas law allows early drivers licenses under this circumstance, though there is an age requirement (15 years). California allows such a license for 14 years olds. OTOH, Washington state does not have such hardship exceptions to the general age rule. Also, in various states (e.g. Alaska), a person 14 years old can obtain a learner's permit, which would allow them to do the driving is there is a licensed driver at least 21 years old with at least one year of driving experience in the passenger's seat. | Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child. | It's probably due to GDPR. You will see that around 2018-05-25 when GDPR came into force, many US-based websites changed their terms of service to increase the age requirement from 13 (age below which the U.S. COPPA law applies) to 16 for European users. For example, here are Stack Exchange's terms of service from 2018-05-02, mentioning 13 years, and here is the version one day later mentioning 16 years. The GPDR allows companies to process personal data under a variety of legal bases, such as “legitimate interest”, “necessary for performing a contract”, or “consent”. But children are not able to give consent in this context. If a website wants consent from a child for some data processing, Art 8 GDPR requires the service to make “reasonable efforts” to check with the parents first. This reasonable effort is more effort than just banning children from using the services. The GDPR itself does not define exactly when someone is a child for these purposes – it lets individual EU member states define the exact age limit, which may be anything between 13 and 16 years. Thus, websites that definitely do not want to have to comply with Art 8 GDPR take the upper bound of that limit and mention in their terms of service that the service is only intended for persons aged 16 or older. The text of Art 8 GDPR is: (1) Where point (a) of Article 6(1) applies, in relation to the offer of information society services directly to a child, the processing of the personal data of a child shall be lawful where the child is at least 16 years old. Where the child is below the age of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child. Member States may provide by law for a lower age for those purposes provided that such lower age is not below 13 years. (2) The controller shall make reasonable efforts to verify in such cases that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child, taking into consideration available technology. (3) Paragraph 1 shall not affect the general contract law of Member States such as the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract in relation to a child. | First of all, the only real answer to "Why doesn't the law require this or that?" is "Because the legislature hasn't passed such a law." In the US, Congress or a state legislature could, if they chose to, pass such a law. I see nothing unconstitutional about it. And, it really isn't that hard to do to confirm whether someone is an adult, (at least in the U.S. and with IDs). Actually, it is quite hard to confirm a person's real age and identity over the internet, if you assume that the person is willing to lie, and has access to a credit card and ID of an adult, which many teens can obtain if they wish. The usual means of validating age, say for entry into a bar, involve physical inspection of an ID, and comparison of it with the person by a trusted checker. Not easy over the net. | Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred. |
Idea-expression dichotomy Would it lead to copyright protection if one were to record someone's speech, a speech in which the most half-baked ideas are advanced with such conviction that the general public takes them seriously? What about a speech that someone worked so hard to give? Does that not fall under the 'expression' category? Also, does recording a speech not constitute copyright at all? | When a speech is recorded, it has been "fixed in a tangible form" and would, if it were original, be protected by copyright. The sense or foolishness of the ideas in the speech, the degree to which people would or would not be persuaded by them, and the amount of work the speaker put into the speech are all irrelevant to whether the speech is copyrighted. If no one had recorded the speech, and the speaker had not written it down or in some other way made a physical record of it outside his or her own mind, then it would not be protected by copyright. The ideas in the speech would not be protected by copyright, but the particular expression used to express those words would be. That is, the sequence of words, the sentences, paragraphs, and so on would be protected. For example Martin Luther King Jr's famous "I have a Dream" speech is protected by copyright (and his estate enforces that copyright strongly), although the idea of a world without racism or prejudice is not protected, and has been expressed by others in other ways at other times. See Is a work copyrighted on fixation or publication? What's the difference? How is it proved? | Unfortunately, the "but everyone does that" (BEDT) argument doesn't hold water as evidenced by prosecutions of looters. Would uploading this video be a copyright infringement? It would be hard to answer this part of the question without knowing where and from whom the clips had come from. If the clips came from a company like ESPN or a YouTuber that doesn't give you permission to be able to use their clips then yes this might be a copyright infringement. If you use video/clips that are labeled as creative commons then nt it wouldn't be an infringement. YouTube has a feature for this. Would my actions be fair use? First, we'll need to understand what fair-use is. Fair use is the ability to use copyright material under certain circumstances without permission. To best determine if using copyright-protected material in your work you should weigh it against the four factors of fair use. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; The nature of the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. More information about fair-use here Youtube outlines their fair use guidelines here | There is no IP in ideas! There is copyright in writing it down - they can't use your exact words without permission. However, sending it to them in the form of a suggestion would give them a pretty much unassailable argument that you have given them an implicit licence. You can patent an invention (not an idea), claim IP in a trade mark (also, not an idea), register a design (again, not an idea) and hold copyright in an artistic work (once more, not an idea). They are required to keep confidences but offering them a suggestion probably doesn't count as supplying confidential information. I can see no risk in acting on customer suggestions. Hence, the idea to raise prices can be acted on or not at the discretion of the company. | A statement by a fictional character is part of the fiction, and so is normally protected by copyright. A short exclamation such as "You are not prepared!" might be ruled to be too short and not sufficiently original to be protected if it were used separately, but that would apply just as much to a short statement that was not a quote from a character. But something like one of Gandalf's speeches on "mercy and pity" to Frodo in Chapter 2 ("The Shadow of the past") in book 1 of The Lord of the Rings would clearly be protected. The longer and the more distinctive such a text is, the more clearly it would be protected. Whether it is put in the mouth of a character or is part of the narration makes no significant difference. Note, in a copyright sense a statement does not "belong to a particular universe", rather it belongs to a copyright owner, often the author, or in the case of a video game quite likely thy publisher. As this comment by Kevin mentions, and as I should have mentioned, reproducing a short quotation from a work of fiction, particularly if properly attributed, is quite likely to be fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more specific details. See also the threads tagged fair use If a quote is used for a different purpose than the original, in what is called a "transformative" manner in copyright cases, then it is more likely to be held to be fair use. The smaller of a percentage of the source item the quote is, the more likely it is that it will be considered to be a fair use. The less the use of a quote serves as a replacement for the source, or harms the market for the source, the more likely it is to be considered a fair use. See the links above for more detail. | I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made. | That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money. | I want to use a couple of lines from "What is life?" by Erwin Schrödinger as quote on the front of my thesis. Would i need permission for that form publisher or would that be convered in fair use? There are close cases of fair use, but this is not one of them. This is unequivocally and clearly fair use. It is a brief excerpt of a much larger body of work, it is for non-commercial use by a student, and it is for educational and academic purposes (presumably to advance science). Also do i need to attribute the quote properly Yes. This is necessary both because of the moral rights of the author under E.U. copyright law (assuming that works by Erwin Schrödinger are still in copyright), and for reasons of academic ethical considerations. It is still in copyright, because he died on January 4, 1961, which is 58 years ago. So, in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 50 years (the minimum required by the Berne Convention) this is out of copyright, but in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 70 years (e.g. Germany), the copyright is still in force until January 4, 2031. Also, even if the work were out of copyright, as a matter of academic integrity, you would be required to attribute the quote in an academic thesis in any case. Quoting someone without attribution in academic work is considered plagiarism, and could result in your thesis being stricken and also in your degree being revoked in a serious case. Government ministers in the E.U. have been forced to resign over plagiarism in their academic work as students in recent years. This is taken much more seriously in Europe than it is in the U.S. | Person A has to have created the data to hold copyright; for most kinds of data this has no legal effect because facts are not protected by copyright. A mineable database probably does not have the necessary creative elements for copyright. An algorithm is not protected by copyright (it might be patented). Person C's program is copyrighted. The product created by D is probably copyrighted, depending on what degree of creativity is involved in their transformation. If the transformation is automatic then no, but if creative judgments are applied to the output of the program then maybe. Though the resulting product is another database of facts, and the facts cannot be protected. In terms of "using the model", only C and possibly B have any control. If it is necessary to validate the software using A's data and A has kept the data secret, C might negotiate with A to use the data, in order to complete his program, and that could give A some interest in the program. |
What kind of legal action could be brought against Hogwarts staff? Our stepson, Harry Potter, only received love and respect from both my family and myself during his time at home. Nevertheless, we felt it was prudent to sent him to the best boarding school in the country to further his talents. He spent a total of six years at Hogwarts. Unbeknownst to us, the educational staff at said facility neglected their duty to protect their pupils from physical and emotional harm at several occasions. As a result he was forced to abort his education during his senior year. He required half a year of rehabilitation camping with two other students of his year. As such we want to make sure that no other child has to suffer the same way. Would you mind listing legal actions the staff or affiliates of said school have to fear? Jurisdiction is either England or Scotland, I can't seem to find the castle on a map. It goes without saying that muggle law supersedes any of the "weird people" law. | It goes without saying that muggle law supersedes any of the "weird people" law. In Harry Potter's world, the Queen and the Prime Minister of the U.K. have expressly and knowingly delegated legislative authority over the Wizarding world in secret legislation to self-governance by its own authorities, and also maintain a mandatory rule of silence about that world's existence. So, there would be no remedy in the ordinary courts of the U.K. Any remedy would have to come from Wizarding world authorities. | Without knowing the specifics on Florida Goverment's regulations, the term Umbrella School is used to designate school like organizations that over see multiple homeschoolers and that they are meeting state educational expectations. Often they will hold events which will allow homeschoolers to compete in school sports as well as set curriculums (sometimes), and field trips and social events (A stereotype of Home School Students is that they are poorly socialized compared to those who attend traditional public or private schools.). They should meet legal qualifications, but it's a bare minimum at best. I would recommend calling a local school administration office for best guidance, but saying Home School (Florida Unschoolers Umbrella School) would likely cover your bases. I'm sure you're not the first person to ask this question. | General Resource: the U.S. Department of Education puts out a nice compendium of the various state laws. Below are my jurisdictions. Illinois: (105 ILCS 5/10-22.6) In brief, school administrators may be delegated the authority to suspend students for gross disobedience or misconduct without consulting the board or the parents. In this case they must notify parents of the suspension, forward a full statement of reasons for the suspension, and notify the parents of their right to have it reviewed by the board. Expulsions, on the other hand, require a hearing at the board. Much of the due process for suspensions came frome Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Of interest, language changes took effect in 2011 authorizing suspension for gross disobedience or misconduct using electronic means. North Carolina: (NCGS 115C) In particular, Article 27 deals with discipline. The law distinguishes between short-term, long-term, and 365-day suspensions (...the latter is for firearm possession). This is a fairly good summary of NC School Discipline Laws and Regulations (prepared by ed.gov), while this is a good summary of the governing case law. | It may depend on the jurisdiction (although I can't readily think of one where this is not the case) but deliberately, recklessly or negligently putting a burning object next to someone else's property knowing that there is a real risk of it catching fire (and going ahead with it anyway) will almost definitely make one liable: especially if there is an ulterior motive. In england-and-wales This would be called arson - causing criminal damage by fire - an offence contrary to section 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 Cross posted with the jurisdiction defining comment | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). | The answer is a clear maybe. The school has a set of rules and by not attending you have broken those rules. The rules may (probably do) allow for consideration of extenuating circumstances but, in general, it doesn't have to. There is probably an appeals process, you need to investigate this. That said, if there are no provisions for extenuating circumstances and/or no appeals process then this may make the contract "unconscionable"; in many jurisdictions this makes the contract void. That doesn't mean you get the marks; it means you get your money back. The circumstances of your court appearance matter: the school may grant special consideration if you are called as a juror or witness; they might not if you are a defendant. Ultimately you had a choice, to follow the rules of the court or the school; there are consequences either way. | A school district has been sued for something like that. In Church of God, Etc. v. Amarillo Indep. Sch., 511 F. Supp. 613, plaintiffs successfully sued the school district "to enjoin the enforcement of the Amarillo School District's absence policy which limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays to two days each school year", where "A fundamental tenet of the Church of God is that members must abstain from secular activity on seven annual holy days". The school district imposed an absence polity where "School work missed may be made up whether an absence is excused or unexcused", and "Excused absences shall be granted to students for a maximum of 2 days for religious holidays in each school year". The court concluded that "This policy poses an unquestionable burden on the Plaintiffs' religious belief", and "This burden is not ameliorated by the make-up work provision. The provision does not require a teacher to evaluate the work made up. It in fact directs the teacher to enter a zero for that work". In this case "Summary judgment is granted and judgment rendered enjoining the enforcement of the Amarillo Independent School District's excused absence policy insofar as it limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays". This is not a matter of religious discrimination, this is a First Amendment issue. The policy is in violation of the Free Exercise clause. Eliminating spring break per se is not a problem: doing so and providing no excused absences is the problem. In the above case, there was clear a religious principle of the church to the effect that one must be off the clock on the holiday. As far as I know, there is no requirement to abstain from work or school on Shrove Tuesday, Ash Wednesday or Good Friday. Nevertheless, in recognition of New Jersey state law which allows any student to take off a religious holiday – including Shrove Tuesday and Ash Wednesday, and dozens more – the Board of Education has prepared a list of such holidays, which includes Wiccan, Hindu, Baha'i, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Church of Scientology (and so on) religious holidays. | Natural law does not prescribe particular punishments, that only comes from statutory law. Under Indian law, this would seem to be a violation of IPC 304a, "causing death by negligence". There is no intent to cause great injury, indeed it is a complete mystery why the boy died. The penalty is up to two years imprisonment and a fine. There are more details in IPC 300, focusing on intent to kill under extreme provocation, but the required intent is lacking here. The courts may be lenient, having considered surrounding circumstances, and sentence her to less than the maximum punishment. |
What happens if someone steals an apple juice from a supermarket? I would like to know what is the risk if someone gets caught stealing a cheap item worth $1, such as an apple juice from a supermarket. | I assume that you committed the crime in nevada. Under NRS 205.240, this is a misdemeanor, petty larceny, the maximum penalty for which is not more than 6 months in prison and a fine of not more than $1,000, plus restitution. 8 USC 1227 makes certain crimes deportable offenses, but shoplifting isn't one of them. In France, under Art. 311-3 of the Code pénal the maximum penalty is 3 years and €45,000 fine. The "risk" is harder to calculate, if you mean "the most likely penalty". There is a substantial chance that the maximum penalty will be getting yelled at by the store manager, and even if you are arrested by the police there is a good chance that the matter (as a first offense, right? no aggravating circumstances) will not result in a trial because you will have the opportunity to "negotiate" the matter to probation, to avoid a trial. Rumor is that Walmart is aggressive in its anti-shoplifting policy. | If only the tip is left in such "fake" money, it would not be theft as there is no legal obligation to leave a tip at all (except in those establishments that add a tip or "service charge' to the bill.) If the "money" is not an attempt to imitate real cash, it wouldn't be counterfeiting (leaving monopoly money for example would not be counterfeiting). The server would be understandably angry. The restaurant might refuse to seat the people who left the "fake" another time, if the servers identified them to the manager, but nothing would require them to do so. This is all on a US basis, I have no idea if tips might be legally required in other countries. | Nobody can say exactly what happens. I would assume that everyone in the house would be considered a witness. They might ask your friend "did you ever see your roommate carrying computers, monitors etc. into your apartment"; something like that would be likely. It's highly unlikely that she would be treated as a suspect since she doesn't work where things have been stolen. If the police comes with a search warrant, I would expect that the search warrant would extend to the roommate's room and all shared areas, like the kitchen, a common living room and so on. It's unlikely that a search warrant would allow searching your friend's room. She might want to move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like private photo albums) into her own room. She should definitely move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like drugs, goods that she stole, illegal weapons) into her own room. And obviously they can search your room without warrant and without your permission; they are not allowed to, but unless you have a locked steel door, they can. That would be a violation of your privacy, and any results of the search couldn't be used as evidence against you , but I think they could be used as evidence against your friend. | Yes, of course. Anyone can walk up to a shop owner and ask them pretty much whatever questions they want; police have just as much of a right to do that as anyone else. The shop owner doesn't have to answer, but police are free to ask. | Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability. | Theft in Oregon (and elsewhere, substantially the same) is defined statutorily: A person commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property to the person or to a third person, the person: (1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof... The car is James' property and it is not John's, even though James is dead. There is a legal process by which at some point in the future the car could become John's, but criminal acts are defined in terms of what is the case at the time of the act, not what might happen in the future. James' intent as expressed in the will notwithstanding, it is not guaranteed that John will become the car owner. So until John is actually the owner of the car, John is taking the property of another, and this is theft. | For the offense of receiving stolen goods, "tracing" does not usually apply. It must be the actual good stolen and not proceeds of illegal activity. Tracing could come up in an effort to impose a "constructive trust" (usually by a private party) or "civil forfeiture" (usually by law enforcement) on the proceeds of embezzlement or fraud, for example. Tracing in this circumstance is governed by broad considerations of equity law and are highly fact specific. The methods are fairly ad hoc and mostly come down to rules of reason. For example, a court might find that anything clearly purchased with clean assets that were not comingled with dirty assets are not subject to forfeiture or a constructive trust, but that the entire amount of comingled assets might be subject to forfeiture or a constructive trust up to the total amount less the amount of clean assets which were comingled. This issue came up in the U.S. Supreme Court of Luis v. United States in 2014 over whether clean funds of someone subject to fraud liability could be frozen to protect the solvency of someone who may have already squandered the dirty funds when the defendant wants to use the clean funds for an expensive legal defense of the case (SCOTUS said that assets purely traceable to clean sources can't be tied up so as to prevent them from being used in a legal defense of the case.) Tracing generally does not extend to a bona fide purchaser for value (i.e. someone with no knowledge of wrongdoing is paid fair market value for something or pays fair market value for an asset) of something from the person engaged in misconduct because there was no economic benefit from the transaction to either party's net worth. What if Bob offers a smaller sum of money to many people, small enough that Bob could easily afford to give such a gift to one person, but the combined cost of so many small gifts adds up to an amount bob couldn't/wouldn't have been able to afford without his supplementary income? Could someone argue that the gift they received from Bob came from his legal income, but the other gifts Bob made to others was due to Bob's illegal activities, by claiming Bob was likely to give a gift to them without the extra illegal income but not to the others etc? In this situation, the gifts would be a "fraudulent transfer" because absent his illegal assets, Bob would probably be insolvent (i.e. have debts in excess of his assets), and transfers made without receiving substantially equivalent value in exchange can be unwound by his creditors if he is insolvent himself within a certain number of years. His solvency at the time of the gift rather than tracing from legal or illegal income respectively, would be the relevant legal issue. Of course, if the amounts of the gifts were small, it might not be economic to sue for their return. | There is no intention to commit theft, so there is no criminal act on the part of the customer. Even if there was a criminal act, the ability of the restaurant to detain the cusomer (citizen's arrest) is very limited in most jurisdictions. The restaurant can ask the customer for his name and address, but there is no legal obligation on the customer to provide this. Refusal to do so, however, might be evidence of intention to avoid paying and at that point the restaurant might call the police. The customer can leave, and the restaurant can pursue the debt through the civil courts if they have means to do so - they may have CCTV of the customer and his car registration which can be traced. Petrol stations, where people often fill up and then realise they can't pay, usually have established "promise to pay" procedures where they take the customer's details and the customer has 48 hours to pay before police or civil enforcement action is taken. |
Is there a constitutional reason why there can be no legislation requiring commercial VPN operators to register veneer IPs? For the purposes of this question, let's simplify what VPN operators do as "they allow their customers' internet protocol (aka IP) addresses to appear as other (veneer) IPs to the counter-parties to which those customers connect." I am fully aware that there are private IPs that are mapped to public IPs for the purposes of routing connections. This is not what's at question here. At question here is the arrangement in which public IPs are masked by presenting traffic to site operators as appearing to originate from the veneer IPs of the VPN operators. This allows (for example) users in a country A to route their traffic through a commercial VPN operator in a country B and access services in country B which are restricted to users from country A. This can be used to subvert both intellectual property restrictions on traffic and legal restrictions that site operators attempt to enforce by geography-based restrictions. At first glance, it may seem that it would not be impossible to track all veneer IPs and identify them as such publicly. So a knee-jerk response to this question might be "there is no need for such a law." However, while it may be possible to track all IPs used by a commercial operator of a VPN which engages exclusively in VPN business, it is not possible to track all IPs dedicated to VPN business by an operator which has many other forms of business. So, for example, NordVPN's IPs can be identified as belonging to NordVPN, but IBM's or Google's IPs cannot be identified as used exclusively in their VPN business. Since there is a public policy interest (mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of this question) in knowing which IPs are VPN veneer IPs, Congress may decide to require commercial VPN operators to register those veneer IPs in a way which would make them clearly distinguishable from non-veneer IPs used by the same entities. Would that be constitutional? More specifically, is there any case law which may be relevant to deciding whether this would be constitutional? | Such a law would be constitutional The US Congress could decide to require VPN providers to register the IPs that they provide to VPN customers. The use of such techniques would almost surely be considered "interstate or foreign commerce" and so Congress would have power under the Commerce Clause of the constitution to legislate concerning it. There would clearly be a rational basis for such a law -- the question outlines such a basis. This is not an area subject to strict scrutiny. None of the previously established limits on the commerce power (and there are few) would seem to apply. State laws on this topic would probably be preempted by the dormant commerce clause if Congress does not act, and clearly preempted if Congress does act, unless Congress explicitly permits concurrent legislation. Whether Congress should act on this matter is a policy question not on topic on Law.se. Whether Congress will act is speculation. I can only say that I am not aware of any widespread demand for such action, or any proposed bills, on the topic. However, there is US caselaw to the effect that anonymous speech (or other communication) is protected by the First Amendment , and that laws effectively banning anonymous speech are not acceptable. But there are other ways of anonymizing online speech, so that would not seem to provide sufficient grounds to overturn such a law. | The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it. | It turns out that there is no difference between the ethical answer and the legal answer, in this case. The law recognizes the property right which a person has when they create a thing, such as a font, and that right is encoded in the law of copyright. The relevant US federal code is contained in Title 17, which you can read (essentially identical laws exist in virtually or perhaps actually all countries). The important thing to understand is that there is not a distinction between "privately" trespassing on a person's property and "publicly" trespassing on a person's property. The violation of the owner's property rights comes from taking the material without consent. There is a legally-recognized exception to the owner's rights, in the form of "fair use", which is widely misunderstood to mean "if it's not for profit, the property owner has no legal protection". Simply taking and using someone else's IP non-commercially is not "fair use". | There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction. | The question reads: I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Unfortunately for this view, the law normally sees an NDA as a private contract, except when it is alleged that it violates public policy. If an NDA explicitly or implicitly includes itself in the list of things not to be disclosed, then posting it would be a violation of the contract. In such a case the party posting the agreement would be subject to whatever consequence the agreement specifies for violation, unless that person had a valid defense. The operator of a web site where the document might be posted would not normally ne a party to the agreement, and so would not be liable for hosting it, unless some other limitation applies, beyond the NDA itself. An NDA can indeed be a significant limitation on the signer's freedom to discuss certain topics, and a person would be wise to consider it in detail, and perhaps consult a lawyer, before signing one. But that does not mean that the person should post or distribute it publicly, nor that the person is automatically entitled to consult NDAs that others have signed. There are sufficient sample NDA forms available that a person can compare an offered NDA with other possibilities, and get an idea if an offered NDA goes beyond the usual terms. | This overstates the case. A company must pursue infringements, arguably even when it isn't economically sensible in isolation to do so, to prevent its trademark from being diluted. But, that isn't the case "when it's blatantly obvious that there is no infringement." There is no benefit from pursuing cases that aren't even colorable infringements. The notion is similar to adverse possession. If you let someone openly use your real property without your permission, eventually, the squatter becomes its legal owner. Also, as in the case of adverse possession, an alternative to suing someone for infringing is to make their permission non-infringing by writing them a letter expressly authorizing them to use your mark. Permissive, licensed use does not dilute a trademark. | This is commonplace in many jurisdictions across many profession, trades and businesses The authorisation of the register and the amount of any fee (which can be zero) is spelled out in the legislation. As is who is authorised to collect it and maintain the register: sometimes it’s a government authority, sometimes it’s a professional association. Sometimes the title is protected and sometimes it isn’t. Off the cuff, the following is an incomplete list for australia. Some of these are Federally regulated and some are State based. Some of the State based ones are nationally recognised, meaning if you register in one state you are registered in all, and some aren’t. Some states require registration that other states don’t. Architect Engineer Doctor Nurse Physiotherapist Nutritionist Veterinarian Solicitor Barrister Anyone working with children Plumber Drainer Gasfitter Roofer Electrician Waterproofer Builder Real Estate Agent Used Car Dealer Bus driver Truck driver Taxi/ride-share driver Train driver Ship’s master Second-hand goods dealer Security guard Bartender Forklift operator Crane operator Builder’s hoist operator | I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations. |
Does pulling a gun in self defense still count as an assult? I was speaking with a coworker who was using an example of pulling a loaded gun to drive away a mugger who as armed with a knife, with the mugger fleeing without shots being fired. He said the gunowner's actions were completely legal and no legal action would happen even if the encounter witnessed by police. My understanding is that would still count as an assault (or some other charge?) legally, but that he would have an affirmative defense. He would be found innocent, but he still officially committed an assault and could be forced to justify it. Is it true that no assault, or other crime, was committed by the gunowner in this scenario? | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | The pawn shop has the "use of property" of their own premises. The pawn shop has obviously the right to examine the gun to determine its value, for example, or to clean it if it needs cleaning to avoid damage, or to show it to a potential customer. And the pawn shop is allowed to let the police onto their own premises, even without a search warrant. | There isn't one simple answer. The case prohibited a showing of a "special need" for a concealed weapon to allow one to have a permit. Many California concealed carry laws have similar requirements. But, California doesn't have just one concealed carry law. There is a default rule that applies in small, rural counties, but most larger cities and counties in California have their own specific concealed carry laws and the precise grounds for denying a concealed carry permit would matter. In all likelihood, many provisions of existing California concealed carry laws would remain grounds to deny permission to concealed carry (e.g. age, history of drug abuse, criminal record, restraining orders in place, etc.), while others provisions would no longer constitute valid grounds for a denial. This particular decision is about denying permits based upon lack of a particularized need for one different from other members of the general public, rather than about any possible reason that the permit applicant could be deemed untrustworthy to have a permit. The decision discusses the idea that it is problematic to have unfettered discretion in issuing permits, but doesn't really base its ultimate conclusion on that ground. So, something like a general residual "good character" requirement, while vague, wouldn't be squarely within the scope of the most recent decision. The case also doesn't itself prohibit (nor does the case law) some reasonable fee for issuance of a concealed carry permit. Thus, the new case does not require uniform law with "constitutional carry" for everyone permitted by federal law to own a gun. But, it does prohibit limitations related to a requirement to show a need to have a concealed carry permit. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. | There are no cases interpreting the Second Amendment to have that meaning at this time. Even when regulations on corporate gun dealers are held unconstitutional, this holding, thus far, has always been because the regulations burden the rights of natural persons who own guns to bear arms. But, while corporations do not have the right themselves, they do have standing to bring suit regarding regulations of their corporations that burden the Second Amendment rights of their customers in a way that allegedly violated the right. | I interpret the sentence "intruder enters your home using the internet" in the question as not as physically entering the home but as virtually entering the home, in other words hacking into the victim's home network remotely. When that interpretation is incorrect, please comment. Note that an action can only be considered self-defense when the self-defense prevents a crime currently in progress from being completed. When A hacked into B's computer and then B punches A in the face later, that's not self-defense, that's illegal vigilante justice. The self-defense argument would only work if it actually prevents the completion of the crime. For example, if A and B were in the same room, A sees B hacking into A's computer right now and uses physical force to prevent B from completing the hack (like yanking the keyboard out of B's hands). Also keep in mind that the intensity of self-defense must be appropriate for the severity of the crime. What is and is not appropriate is for a court to decide in each individual case, and the guidelines that are to be applied vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But causing bodily harm to people when the crime they are committing does not cause bodily harm is often not considered within the limits of self-defense. For further information about what is and is not allowed in self-defense, I recommend the series about self-defense by Law Comic. | If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question. |
Can a landlord appoint agents at will? I am curious about something that came up in this question: Can a realtor show my apartment at will, with notice?. In the linked question a comment for an answer states: "The realtor IS the landlord due to being the landlord’s agent - it’s highly unusual for a landlord to attend a showing." I understand this comment to mean that both the management company representative (the person who fixes things here) and the realtor are the landlord's agents. I.e. both have access to the apartment with or without consent, and the later can bring in third parties (prospective buyers). Can the property owner/landlord (in general, not just in my case) appoint representatives at will, who will have access to the property they are leasing out? Or is there a definite legal definition of a representative and how they are appointed? | In general, a person may appoint as many agents as s/he wishes for a particular purpose. The principal is responsible for the actions of all such agents, unless they exceeded their powers or instructions, and in some cases even then. In this particular case all such accesses would have to be "reasonable" taken together, and if the various agents fail to coordinate their requests for access, the result may be an unreasonable burden on the tenant. But as far as I can determine there is no formal process that a Kansas landlord must go through to appoint an agent, nor any specific limit on the number of agents appointed. The general law of agency is flexible on such matters. A tenant would be justified in asking for proof (or at least evidence) that a person is in fact acting as a landlord's agent, or in confirming with the landlord. The complex management is clearly the landlord's agent. | It may not be legal -- in many places zoning restricts running a business from a residential address. If the academy involves physical students, the landlord could reasonably claim an increase in wear and tear, and liability risks. In any case, with a month-to-month tenancy, the landlord can normally raise the rent with a month's notice for any reason or none. | No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated. | When a contract states a thing that you get for a stated price, that means you should get the thing described, and you pay the stated price. If the landlord makes a mistake and wishes he had charged more, he can wait until the end of the lease period and then increase the price as he desires. He cannot raise the price until the end of the contract, and cannot retroactively charge that increase. (It's impossible to imagine there being contract language that allows that outcome, but we will assume there is no such clause). If the stated area is not as stated, especially if the area is actually smaller, the landlord is in breach of the contract, and could be sued for damages. It would depends on how different the areas are, when it comes to assigning damages. For example, 4 sqm in a unit with 800 sqm is not likely to result in any loss to the tenant. If the unit is bigger than stated, the prospects for damages are even less, perhaps a bit for added heating cost. Either way, if the size is incorrectly described, that is the landlord's fault, though probably not worth bothering with a lawsuit. | The law regarding landlords and tenants is Iowa Code Ch. 562A. Part 2 (§562A.27 et seq.) states the legal remedies available to a landlord. §562A.27 specifically spells out the remedies for material non-compliance with lease terms. The gist of that and related sections is that if a person is in violation of a lease, there is a legal process that has to be followed, and if successful, the sheriff will forcibly evict the tenant (though §562A.27A, the clear and present danger section, shortens the process – still, it's not immediate and it does require legal notice etc.). Under the law, you (apparently) have become a landlord and have an unwritten tenancy agreement with the tenant. I assume based on your description of the facts you have a long-term written agreement with the property owner. By allowing this person to live with you, you have entered into a landlord-tenant relationship, which limits your rights. The police will not respond to this situation – a legal squabble – whereas if someone broke into your residence and was trespassing (and you complain in a timely manner, not allowing the person to trespass), the police would respond and not require a court order. §562A.9(5) states that in lieu of a specific term of tenancy, in the case of a roomer paying weekly rent the tenanct period is a week, otherwise it is a month. §562A.6 defines "roomer": basically, if you are a "roomer", so is your sub-lessor. By agreeing to let the person stay with you, you have become a landlord and sub-lessor, thereby subject to the restrictions on landlord actions. That means you have to take the person to court to get rid of them. Failure to pay agreed-on rent is certainly sufficient legal cause, and any monthly lease can be terminated by the landlord after giving legal notice (30 days advance notice). | Your contract is between you and your landlord. Separately, the landlord has a contract between himself and the agency. Your obligation to pay rent is owed to your landlord, not to his agent. Ask your landlord to send you an email (if you don't already have one) which requests you to pay rent from X date onwards to him directly. Then pay him the rent in the way he has requested. Barring some unusual terms of the contract (which you haven't provided a copy of), the agent will not have any grounds to sue you. | You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause. | The difference is that the person was originally invited to live there, so they do have a claim of residency. A tenant recently allowed someone to move into his apartment as his caregiver. This is the problem here, the person was invited to live in there in exchange for a service. This person now has a legal right to occupy the property and the eviction process must be followed. If the person broke into the house and occupied a room, that is trespassing since there was no original legal right to occupy the property. The trespasser cannot claim any legal right to the property and therefore is trespassing. Can it really be so that he is legally bound to allow these strangers to share his apartment with him because of a technicality that classifies them as "squatters"? Unfortunately yes. This should be a lesson to the tenant that they need to properly run background checks and have solid contracts with live-in caregivers/roommates. Unfortunately this is not only inconvenient, but will probably be an expensive lesson as well. |
Can application for leave to appeal be determined by the judge whose decision is being appealed? Appeals to the next level court may first require leave to appeal. Say in New Zealand, where a party wants to appeal a decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal, they may need to apply to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal. Whether or not leave is required depends on the statute that governs the matter. Moreover, in some circumstances, leave to appeal needs to be applied for to the same level court where the decision to be appealed was made. Section 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 goes: No appeal, except an appeal under subsection (4), lies from any order or decision of the High Court made on an interlocutory application in respect of any civil proceeding unless leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is given by the High Court on application made within 20 working days after the date of that order or decision or within any further time that the High Court may allow. (emphasis added) So, say Bob is suing Rob in the High Court. Rob applied for a direction (for example, he wants to join Alice to the case). Bob objected. Judge Judy made an interlocutory order where the direction that Rob sought is granted. Bob is unhappy and wants to appeal to the Court of Appeal. But to do this, Bob first needs to obtain leave from the High Court. If this is declined, then and only then Bob can apply for leave appeal to the Court of Appeal directly (upon the grant of which he can finally file the appeal itself). Now this may create an interesting collision. What if the application for leave to appeal filed in the High Court gets in the hands of the same judge that made the decision that the appeal is against? As per answers to this question, judges will not enjoy if their decisions get overturned. Therefore, they may be personally interested in rejecting the application for leave to appeal, especially if the decision was made publicly available. The High Court has published its Recusal Guidelines here. One possible ground for recusal in this situation goes: 5. Recusal where opinions earlier expressed 5.1 A judge should consider recusing him or herself if the case concerns a matter upon which the judge has made public statements of firm opinion on the issue before the court. 5.2 An expression of opinion in an earlier case or in an earlier stage of a proceeding is not of itself a ground for recusal. So, given that judge Judy's decision has been published, does that hit 5.1 above in a way that 5.2 does not overweight it? Should judge Judy now consider recusing herself from hearing the application for leave to appeal? Can judge Judy not hear the application for leave to appeal for any other reason? This question is not tightly attached to New Zealand — answers re other comparable jurisdictions are welcome. | Yes It's not uncommon. In fact I am aware of at least one case where the trial judge referred it to appeal before he made his decision on the basis that whichever way he decided the law was so unsettled that grounds for appeal would occur. In that case the court of appeal called up the trial judge to sit on the 3 judge appeal a) because he knew the case and b) because you don't get to not make a decision because it's hard sonny-jim. | You didn't bother to state who this appeal is with or even where you are but I'm almost certain I know the answer. Just once. If the appeal is denied, you may be able to appeal to a higher body such as a higher court or an ombudsman. However, any group or court allowing the same appeal ad infinitum until you get what you want would be farcical. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | The government can’t withdraw The government does not have a right to unilaterally withdraw charges once the case is before the court. All they can do is ask the court to dismiss the case as they have done here. It’s up to the court (judge) to decide whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not. It granted, then the case has gone to completion and the defendant is legally not subject to punishment as they were not convicted of the crime, notwithstanding any previous guilty plea. Now, while it would be unusual for a judge to refuse such a motion it’s not impossible and they might do so if they felt that the interests of justice are better served by completing the trial in the usual way. This is possibly more common in civil litigation where a losing plaintiff might not be permitted to settle if the judge doesn’t feel an innocent defendant is being adequately compensated. | No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A. | The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case. | In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures. | The Main Answer: The Judge Can't Appeal; But Other People Can Since the Judge now has an attorney, can this Judge appeal to the Supreme Court (or appeal again starting from a different court jurisdiction) to potentially allow him to continue his decision to review if the Michael Flynn case should be dismissed? Not exactly. It is potentially subject to appeal, but not by the judge. But the question contains an understandable and natural false premise that confuses the issue. The attorney appointed by the Court to present the position abandoned by the Justice Department is not a lawyer for the judge (who has absolute immunity from liability). Instead, the attorney is someone appointed to provide additional representation to "the People" on the theory that the Justice Department in unable to fully represent the interests of "the People" due to an alleged conflict of interest. The attorney appointed by the judge to present a position that the Justice Department abandoned, might have standing to do so, but the judge himself or herself, while listed as the Respondent in the case, is only a nominal party and not a true real party in interest. Also en banc review of a panel decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals can be raised sua sponte by any judge in the Circuit, without prompting from any part for further review (which is what happened in this case). The Archaic Federal Writ of Mandamus Practice Explained There is a general rule that says that only final decisions of trial courts can be appealed to an appellate court.<1> Thus, usually, a criminal defendant can only appeal from a criminal case after the criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime and sentenced for that crime. But, this general rule has exceptions. A request for a writ of mandamus is one way to get around this general rule. A writ is a court order directed at a government official by a court having jurisdiction over the official, usually, but not always, in a matter in which the government official is not alleged to have done anything making the government official eligible for punishment personally. For example, a writ of execution, is a court order directing the sheriff or some other government official, to take action to enforce a court order awarding someone a money judgment that the prevailing part seeks to have the sheriff involuntarily seize. A request for writ of mandamus (i.e. for an order directing a government official subordinate to the court to take a non-discretionary action in a court case) is structured in the old fashioned approach used in federal court as a lawsuit against a judge brought in a court with supervising authority over the judge. But, in substance, this is a legal fiction and formality used (in this context, writs of mandamus are used in more than one way) to provide review of trial court decisions prior to the entry of a final decision on the merits in a case (something also called an "interlocutory appeal"). This process was established in the All Writs Act of 1789 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651) that applied to the federal courts the process in place immediately prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1789 in the courts of the American Colonies. The procedure used in the pre-constitution courts of the American colonies was borrowed from English common law procedural practices then in place. The English practice was in turn originally established during or not long before the reign of King Edward II (reigned 1307 to 1327 CE). Those procedures have then evolved over time. This procedure was formally established in the U.S. in the federal courts by case law interpreting the All Writs Act (the All Writs Act itself is only a sentence or two long). Put another way, the All Writs Act gave the federal courts the authority to order other government officials (including but not limited to judges) to do things to carry out federal court orders, in the same broad circumstances where English common law courts has the power to do so, and using the same procedures. Originally, a writ of mandamus really was a lawsuit against a judge, and there are contexts where a writ of mandamus is sought against a government official other than a judge that continue to be a lawsuit against a government official. But, now that is just a formality and not a real lawsuit in this context, and that has been the case in cases involving writs of mandamus filed against judges for hundreds of years. <1> A direct appeal of right from a final criminal conviction is a relatively new innovation in the federal courts in the U.S.. The right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction secured in federal court did not exist until 1890. And, the right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction is not constitutionally guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights, it exists solely by virtue of a federal statute. Prior to 1890, most judicial review of federal criminal convictions was conducted via writs of habeas corpus (which has much narrower grounds upon which relief can be granted) or via Presidential pardons. The Modern Approach Used In Many Jurisdictions Contrasted The modern approach designed to avoid the confusion associated with nominally suing the judge, is to create a court rule replacing the old fashioned legal fiction of writ of mandamus practice, in which someone files an interlocutory appeal captioned (in a criminal case) as People v. Defendant, or as Defendant v. People (depending upon who files first) which is handled essentially like an ordinary appeal but with shorter deadlines and the requirement that grounds for considering the appeal at all prior to a final order in the case be established. For example, in Colorado, where I practice, the equivalent procedure to a writ of mandamus with the judge named as Respondent in a federal court, is called a "Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion". Further Appellate Options Appeals from interlocutory writ of mandamus rulings made by a panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals are a fairly esoteric corner of federal appellate procedure, and I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of it, but there is a process by which someone with standing could seek further appellate review of the U.S. Court of Appeals panel's ruling. The interlocutory appeal in this case was handled by a three judge panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal. There are two main ways that a ruling of a panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal may be further appealed. One is to seek en banc review of the decision by all of the judges of the circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals whose panel heard the case. The other is to appeal either from an en banc decision or directly from the panel decision, to the U.S. Supreme Court. In both circumstances, further appellate review of discretionary, the en banc panel or the U.S. Supreme Court, as the case may be, first decides the preliminary question of whether to consider the further appeal at all, and then, if that is answered in the affirmative, considers the merits of the issue or the issues raised in a further appeal. In a case of national interest involving separation of powers in which the panel issued a divided ruling, it isn't unthinkable that there would be further discretionary review of the ruling if it was sought by someone with standing to do so. The most controversial aspect of the panel ruling in this case, highlighted by the dissenting opinion, is that the Justice Department and criminal defense attorney filed the writ of mandamus before the trial court judge had a chance to consider and rule upon the motions filed in the trial court. Normally, a writ of mandamus is not considered "ripe" to file until a judge actually rules on a motion with a court order which the person seeking the writ alleges was mistaken, rather than before the judge gets to consider whether or not to grant that motion in the first instance as was done in this case. To paraphrase the dissenting opinion, the dissenting judge felt that the appellate court panel jumped the gun in an unprecedented and irregular manner that deprived it of jurisdiction to decide the issue because it was not yet ripe for decision. Other Ways This Could Have Been Litigated As an aside, it is also worth observing that there were multiple procedural options available in this case to prevent his client from being sentenced and to force the case to be dismissed. The writ of mandamus was brought by the Justice Department seeking to enforce its own institutional privileges. But, the more conventional approach in a case with a similar fact pattern in federal court, would be for the criminal defense attorney to file a separate lawsuit against the warden of the jail where his client is being held (who is also a nominal defendant under a different legal fiction, and who also has absolute immunity, but would be defended in the lawsuit by the Justice Department absent an alleged conflict of interest like the one present in this case) seeking a writ of habeas corpus ordering the warden to release his client, possibly before a different judge, and subject to direct appeal once resolved, rather than an interlocutory appeal via a writ of mandamus. But, it isn't often that the Justice Department seeks to withdraw its prosecution against a criminal defendant who has already pleaded guilty in a proceeding in which the factual basis of the plea has already been established on the record in open court and the case is ripe for sentencing to a serious felony sentence. Update As Of August 3, 2020 This case was selected for en banc review by the entire DC Circuit based upon the petition of the dissenting judge in the three judge panel that decided the case. The Order states: ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, the responses thereto, and the vote in favor of rehearing en banc by a majority of the judges eligible to participate, it is ORDERED that this case be reheard by the court sitting en banc. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the court’s order filed June 24, 2020, be vacated. It is FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument before the en banc court be heard at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, August 11, 2020. The parties should be prepared to address whether there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief” desired. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). A separate order will issue regarding the allocation of oral argument time. Per Curiam |
Can you post a picture in your business to embarrass or defame a customer? I paid a debt to the late husband of a woman who now owns the local hardware store. Without talking to me about the debt, she posted my photograph of me that she copied off my Facebook account. She put my name and that I owed a large amount of money and had not paid. The debt was paid to her late husband, there was never a signed contract or receipt: we made the deal with a handshake and settled the deal the same way with no paperwork. Is it legal for her to post my photograph in her place of buisness defaming me? | That post is probably illegal. Because she is making false assertions about you (that are presumably damaging your reputation), she is likely liable for defamation. Because she has copied a picture of you without authorization, she is likely liable for violating the copyright of whomever owns that picture. Commenters have suggested she might invoke a fair-use defense, but I would expect it to fail. The four fair-use factors are: The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes: Both Plaintiff and Defendant are using using the photograph to identify the holder of an account -- a Facebook account in P's case, a business account in D's. D is using the photograph in connection with a profit-making enterprise, not for educational purposes, and her use is not transformative. The nature of the copyrighted work: Photography is a creative art at the core of copyright's purposes, generally entitled to thick protection. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[P]hotography entails creative expression warranting copyright protection.") The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: There is no indication that D took anything less than the entire photograph. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: The question is not only whether the defendant's use affected the actual market for the protected work, but whether many people doing the same thing would depress the potential market for the work. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (Courts must consider "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market.") The potential market for the image is probably very small, but widespread unauthorized copies, publicly displayed, would undoubtedly depress whatever market exists. So all four factors cut against the defendant. Fair use is a loser defense here. | Under the law of common law contracts, posting a price is an invitation to treat and is not binding. However, in many jurisdictions, there may be (probably is) statutory consumer protection law that make this practice illegal. Whether this means the business must honor the price or merely makes them liable to prosecution and fines depends on the specific law. For example, in Australia the law refers to this as multiple pricing. The law requires that the business withdraw the product from sale until the multiple pricing is fixed (i.e. they take the poster down) or, if they are unable or unwilling to do this, they must sell for the lower price. If they do neither then they have committed an offence and are liable to be fined by the government; the consumer does not get any compensation. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | The Australian government has put out a document entitled RG 96 Debt Collection Guideline. It makes it clear that they consider it forbidden to disclose that you are collecting a debt. They even forbid disclosures that would allow a third party to infer that you are collecting a debt. Part 2, Section 1(b): If you consider it necessary to divulge your identity as a debt collector before being sure that you are dealing with the debtor (for example, if requested by the person you are dealing with), then you may do so if that would not have the effect of divulging that the debtor has a debt. Particular care should be taken when speaking to a person at a debtor’s workplace or when using a medium that may be shared with others (e.g. social media, landline telephones etc). Section 8: Telling any third party the reason for trying to find the debtor will also disclose personal information about the debtor. Caution should be exercised when leaving messages for the debtor that may be seen or accessed by third parties, for example: Business cards or other documentation should not be left for the debtor in any open manner that would allow a third party to infer the nature of your interest in contacting the debtor. Voicemail messages should be phrased so as to avoid a third party inferring the nature of your interest in contacting the debtor. At no stage should contact be made with a debtor’s social media account that would compromise the debtor’s privacy, for example, placing a message for the debtor in a way that would allow anyone other than the debtor to view it. So to your questions: So if I attempt to call a debtors old work place can I disclose that I am searching for him because I am collecting a debt without further information No, you cannot not say that. or should I say that I am prohibited by disclosing my reason for making contact with the individual by the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 section 45(j) You should not say that either, as it would allow the former employer to infer the nature of your interest in contacting the debtor. | The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open). | There may be violations of consumer protection and/or advertising statutes here by the online store, but the common law position is that: The website's owner is making an invitation to treat Based on that, you are making an offer The contract comes into place when the website's owner accepts your offer. The time of contract formation is "when the parties give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract." You would need to read the site very carefully, in particular their terms and conditions, acknowledgement page and/or email to see if they are actually accepting your offer or if there are conditions attached. If there is no clear, unconditional acceptance then there is no contract at that time; this applies even if you have paid for the goods. If this is the case (and I strongly suspect that it would be for most online stores), then their acceptance of your offer and the formation of the contract probably does not come into effect until they "give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract" by shipping the goods. Up until that time there is no contract and their only obligation to you is to promptly refund your money. | Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract. | This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order. |
Using lyrics in an app to learn languages I am working on an app to learn languages, and beside the usual texts, dialogues, and lists of words, I was thinking to include also written lyrics of famous songs, to help the users practicing the languages. I know that "educational uses" are part of "fair uses" of copyrighted material, but I am not sure it this applies to the case in question? Note that the texts will be freely available in the app, so I am not asking the users to pay to read them - the app will monetise though other system (ads, services like statistics on the learning curve of the user etc). Would that be legal? Or if not, how should I proceed? | First of all, this is probably a poor idea even if it is legal. Verse, and song lyrics, are notoriously hard to translate well, and make poor examples for language learning, They tend to employ metaphor, allusive language, and idiom heavily, and will in many cases distort the sense of the language for the sake of rhyme, meter, or other auditory effects. But suppose you still want to go ahead. The developer of such an app could use songs old enough to be in the public domain. "The Star-spangled Banner' for example is not protected by copyright. Neither is the French national anthem, the La Marseillaise. Most well-known songs published before 1900 will not be under copyright. But more recent songs will almost surely be protected. The use of a line or two from a song might well be permitted under fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in those countries that recognize this exception to copyright). Use of the entire lyrics of any given song would be more questionable. The use for educational purposes would tend to favor the applicability of any such exception, but the availability of the whole lyric (or even a major part) might serve as a replacement for the original, and harm the market for the original. No one can ever be sure in advance if a given use will be ruled to be a fair use. That determination depends heavily on the specific facts of each case. It would avoid risk to use songs that are out of copyright, or short sections of songs, if songs are to be used at all. | The author of that work owns its copyright. Barring a licence that gives you the right to use it, you are infringing copyright. (I'm assuming no fair use in this case; i.e. the YouTube clip isn't actually about the audio track.) If you pay for licences, make sure the licence allows for the purpose you intend to use it for. | It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed. | Recording the original work and editing that record is a breach of copyright. You are taking unauthorised copies of the original music and lyrics when you make the notes, and creating derivative works when you alter the notes of the song to match what you think they should be. Performing the songs is a breach of copyright in countries that don't provide for it explicitly (the USA is notably strange on this point). You cannot simply just take a piece of music and perform it this way everywhere, even for church service. In sum, what you're doing is at least partly and could be fully illegal. | The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage. | I want to use a couple of lines from "What is life?" by Erwin Schrödinger as quote on the front of my thesis. Would i need permission for that form publisher or would that be convered in fair use? There are close cases of fair use, but this is not one of them. This is unequivocally and clearly fair use. It is a brief excerpt of a much larger body of work, it is for non-commercial use by a student, and it is for educational and academic purposes (presumably to advance science). Also do i need to attribute the quote properly Yes. This is necessary both because of the moral rights of the author under E.U. copyright law (assuming that works by Erwin Schrödinger are still in copyright), and for reasons of academic ethical considerations. It is still in copyright, because he died on January 4, 1961, which is 58 years ago. So, in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 50 years (the minimum required by the Berne Convention) this is out of copyright, but in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 70 years (e.g. Germany), the copyright is still in force until January 4, 2031. Also, even if the work were out of copyright, as a matter of academic integrity, you would be required to attribute the quote in an academic thesis in any case. Quoting someone without attribution in academic work is considered plagiarism, and could result in your thesis being stricken and also in your degree being revoked in a serious case. Government ministers in the E.U. have been forced to resign over plagiarism in their academic work as students in recent years. This is taken much more seriously in Europe than it is in the U.S. | Here are the jury instructions. These describe how to evaluate witness testimony, burdens of proof, and the four-factor fair use test, among other things. The jury had to answer yes or no to the following question: Has Google shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its use in Android of the declaring lines of code and their structure, sequence, and organization from Java 2 Standard Edition 1.4 and Java 2 Standard Edition Version 5.0 constitutes a "fair use" under the Copyright Act? They answered yes. Juries do not explain their reasoning (different jurors might even have different reasonings), but the assumption is that they followed the jury instructions to arrive at this conclusion. To be clear, the issue wasn't reimplementation of 37 Java APIs, but a more limited taking, including "the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization". | No. The images are copyrighted, and you are using them in a way that would leave you with virtually no argument for fair use. The factors for fair use are set out in 17 USC 107, and they indicate that the courts would reject your use: The purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes: There's no indication that your use would be for nonprofit or educational purposes. The nature of the copyrighted work: Works of fiction and art are highly creative works at the heart of the policy for copyright protection. The amount of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: You are apparently copying entire images, though I suppose you could argue that each image is just one small portion of a larger book or website. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: You are trying to create a board game, putting yourselves basically in direct competition with the makers of D&D. I generally prefer a pretty liberal interpretation of what constitutes fair use, but this just has virtually nothing that would make me comfortable arguing in your favor. |
Is a work copyrighted on fixation or publication? What's the difference? How is it proved? This is in part a followup to this comment in which a user wrote: “fixation” broadly depends on publication. How else d’you think fixation is established? In a later comment the same user wrote: In your context fixation is a fact, but it's also irrelevant. What matters is solely what can be proved, which is publication. Is that correct? Is a work copyrighted on fixation or publication? What's the difference? How is creation of a protected work proved in court? And what does "fixation" mean? This is intended to be a multi-jurisdiction question. | US Law, specifically 17 USC 102 says: (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The Berne Copyright Convention (more formally the "Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works") says, in Article 2: (1) The expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science. (2) It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form. Almost every country in the world adheres to the Berne Convention. According to the Wikipedia article: The Berne Convention ... introduced the concept that a copyright exists the moment a work is "fixed", rather than requiring registration ... Copyright under the Berne Convention must be automatic; it is prohibited to require formal registration. Fixation A work is "fixed in some material form" or "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" when a work is written down, or saved to a computer file, or recorded, or drawn, or set down in some other way. It can occur years before publication. This is known as "fixation". Inventing a work in one's mind, reciting it aloud, or singing or performing it do not constitute fixation. Neither does a radio or TV broadcast, although recording of a broadcast does. Publication Under Article 3 Paragraph (3) of the Berne Convention: The expression “published works” means works published with the consent of their authors, whatever may be the means of manufacture of the copies, provided that the availability of such copies has been such as to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public, having regard to the nature of the work. The performance of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, cinematographic or musical work, the public recitation of a literary work, the communication by wire or the broadcasting of literary or artistic works, the exhibition of a work of art and the construction of a work of architecture shall not constitute publication. Under US law, specifically 17 USC 101 “Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. History Prior to the Berne Convention, copyright was generally created only when a work was registered with the appropriate office for the nation where it was sought to be protested, or in some countries, only when it was published. In the US for example, federal copyright did not apply to unpublished works under the 1909 Copyright Act. More limited state laws provided a degree of protection instead. Originally, copyright had been created in England to benefit the printer or publisher, not the author, and was only available to works officially registered. Similar laws were established in other countries, with generally similar provisions. Such laws often gave little or no protection to works first published in a different country. Eventually international agreements provided protection for copyrights outside their countries of origin, and the Berne Convention, the most successful such agreement, had emphasized protection of all works from fixation from its first version in 1888. In "Protection of Unpublished Works" by William: S. Strauss (1959, number 29 in the series of studies prepared for the US, Librarian of Congress as directed by Congress with an eye to revision of the US copyright law) it is said (on page 2): In earlier days when the public dissemination of copyrightable works usually meant the reproduction and distribution of copies, it may have been logical and practical to define publication in those terms, to protect unpublished manuscripts against unauthorized publication under the established common law, and to limit the copyright statute to published works. Today, when copyrightable works are disseminated widely by public performance to audiences of millions over radio and television and by sound recordings and audiovisual films, the dichotomy of common law and statutory copyright based on the historic concept of publication may be thought to be outmoded. Proof of Fixation When there is a suit for copyright infringement, copies of the work will normally be entered in evidence. This will prove that the work has been fixed. Most often there is no need to prove the date of fixation, as this is usually not disputed. But when it is relevant and in dispute, the date of fixation can be proven in various ways. A witness can testify to seeing a fixed copy on a particular date. The author can testify about fixing the work. When a work is saved to a computer file or in an electronic format, it will usually have an associated timestamp. This is not secure, but provides a degree of evidence. The physical age of writing can often be determined by lab tests for written works. A copy of a work can be mailed, with the postmark providing a reliable date. And in those countries (such as the US) that provide copyright registration, a work can be and often is registered before publication. Infringement of Unpublished Works Unpublished works have been held protected against infringement, and fair-use defenses denied is such cases as: Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990). In general, US courts at least have protected unpublished works more strictly than published ones, and have been less willing to permit fair use defenses. | Often, but not always If the speech is "fixed in a tangible medium" it is protected by copyright. That includes a prepared written version, and an audio recording made as the speech is delivered. Note that fixation only counts if it is done "by or under the authority of the author". Someone else recording or writing down the speech does not make it fixed unless the author has directed that this be done, or at least authorized it. However, if the speech is neither written down, nor recorded, nor in any other way "fixed" then it is not protected until it is fixed. Someone who took notes or simply memorized the speech would be free to use it as long as it is not protected. All the above is true in the US, and in all other countries that adhere to the Berne Copyright Convention or the TRIPS Agreement. Almost all countries adhere to one or both of those. In many cases there is an exception to copyright for news reporting, but not always. In the US this is covered under fair use and is subject to the normal four-factor test for fair use. In the UK this is covered by fair dealing. In many countries there is a specific exception for news reporting, but such exceptions generally have limits, and the individual law's terms will matter. US Law on Fixation 17 USC 101 provides that: A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission. | Broadly speaking, the difference is the "sharealike" clause of CC-BY-SA. Any derivative of a CC-BY-SA work must itself be licensed CC-BY-SA, whereas a derivative of an "MIT with attribution" work can be under any license the author wants. There are a number of other differences in the fine print (eg. CC forbids DRM, where MIT doesn't), but that's the big one. | Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe. | There are jurisdictions that do not allow authors to place their work in the public domain, such as Germany. Main reason is the strict monistic approach the German copyright law bases on. Key feature of this approach is the concept that, in principle, the copyright/author’s right itself can neither be transferred to another person nor waived by the author herself. The German author’s right consists of two parts, the moral rights and the exploitation rights. The moral rights are – as a rule – personal rights that are bound to the person of the creator (or, after her death, her legal heirs), i.e. they can neither be transferred nor waived. Since moral and exploitation rights are considered as inseparable parts of the author’s right as a whole (monistic approach) the exploitation rights cannot – in principle – transferred or waived by contract as well. CC0 is supposed to get you as close to the public domain as possible in your legal system. CC0 helps solve this problem by giving creators a way to waive all their copyright and related rights in their works to the fullest extent allowed by law. CC0 is a universal instrument that is not adapted to the laws of any particular legal jurisdiction, similar to many open source software licenses. | The author, or the copyright holder if the author has sold or assigned the copyright, may register a copyright at any time, even many years after the work was copyrighted. However, for all modern works (since 1978 in the US) the work has copyright protection as soon as it is created and set down in a tangible form (such as on paper or in a computer file), whether it is registered or not. Registration cannot gain or lose copyright protection. It is evidence of the copyright, and it provides some additional rights if an infringement suit should occur. If there are multiple co-authors, one author should ideally register on behalf of all of them, listing all co-authors, but multiple registrations will do no major harm. No one who is not an author or copyright holder of a work (or a valid authorized agent of the author or copyright holder) may legitimately register a copyright in that work. Registration procedures and the exact benefits of registration vary by country. In fact, some countries do not have any copyright registration. Edit: In the US, registration procedures are described in Circular #2 from the Copyright Office. Falsely registering a copyright is a crime under 17 U.S.C. § 506(e), and could be reported to law enforcement. See also Wikipedia's article on "Copyfraud". If a false registration has been made, the true author can file a conflicting registration. This should be sufficient to allow a copyright infringement case to be filed. It would be very wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright infringement issues before taking steps in the matter. Second Edit: It is one of the elements of an infringement claim that the plaintiff owns the copyright, or has been authorized by one who does. often this is not disputed, and is passed by with no significant time or effort. But if a false copyright registration has been made, in which a person who was not the author claims to be the author, then evidence clearly establishing the actual authorship will probably be needed if the case goes to court. A registration establishes a rebuttable presumption that the person who registered the copyright owns it, and this presumption would need to be overcome. | Not very novel What you are talking about is a derivative work. This is arguably the most famous example: It's an interesting example because Leonardo da Vinci did not have copyright in the original but Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia do have copyright in the derivative. Even though the changes are physically small, they are enough. A crucial factor in current legal analysis of derivative works is transformativeness, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. The Court's opinion emphasized the importance of transformativeness in its fair use analysis of the parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" involved in the Campbell case. In parody, as the Court explained, the transformativeness is the new insight that readers, listeners, or viewers gain from the parodic treatment of the original work. As the Court pointed out, the words of the parody "derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison [Pretty Woman] song" is. For an author to have copyright in the derivative they must: Meet the (low) threshold of originality for copyright to exist. Make their derivative lawfully - either because they have permission or because their use falls under an exception to copyright like fair use or fair dealing. However, they do not have copyright in the original elements. For example, I could take the Mona Lisa and give her different clothes, a different background or a hat I will not be infringing their copyright. If I give her a different style of moustache? However, there is an issue with "I have copyright on the contents of the post" when you don't. Even if your work is derivative, you do not have copyright in the original parts and do not have the right to licence them. So, for example, this post is a derivative work of the Wikipedia page linked to above and I have copyright in my original contributions because: They meet the threshold of originality I have permission to make the derivative either through the Wikipedia licence or because my use is fair use. I can give Stack Exchange a licence for my work but I cannot give them a licence for the original work including, for example, the image and quote above. So, someone could quote my entire answer subject to the licence or fair work, but they couldn't copy just the image or quote. | Unless the work has entered the public domain (after the copyright expires, or if a copyright notice or renewal was omitted when these were required, or in other ways) there is always an owner of the copyright. If the copyright was retained by the author, who has died, than the author's heir(s) own it. (If there are no other heirs, it becomes the property of the state. This is known as escheating.) If the author has sold or assigned the copyright (say to a publisher) then the buyer or assignee owns it. If the owner is a business that has ceased to operate, but has not sold the copyright, then the shareholders or proprietor has the right to sell or license it (technically the business still owns it). If the business goes through legal bankruptcy, the copyright would be sold, possibly as a part of "and all its other assets and good will", or else would escheat to the state. It can be hard to find the copyright to a work long unpublished. The original author may have died, and the author's heirs may be hard to track. The copyright may have been sold, and the sale may not have been properly recorded. In the US, the Copyright Office maintains records that try to identify the copyright owner of all registered copyrights. The office will search these, for a fee, but there is not always a correct or useful answer. Under current US law, if one cannot find the correct owner of a copyright, and secure permission to use it, one is simply out of luck (except for musing, where a compulsory license is available for some uses at a government-specified fee). Any use is then infringement (unless it is a fair use) and the owner could always turn up and sue. The term "orphan works" has been applied to works whose copyright owner is unknown and hard to find. The same term is also applied to works whose copyright holder is known, but which are long out of print and unlikely to be reprinted, particularly when there is no paying market for them. In the US, there have been several proposals for dealing with "orphan works" by granting a compulsory licensee for them, or by declaring them to be in the public domain, or by taxing them and declaring them to be PD if he tax goes unpaid. None of these have been passed into law in the US, nor have similar proposals been made law in any other country that I know of. (declaring Orphan works PD might cause a problem under the Berne Convention.) To be honest, as there is little economic value in orphan works, no one will spend much money or energy in lobbying for such a law, and the industries that make their money via copyright (music and film in particular) are often suspicious of and automatically oppose anything that weakens copyright in any way, or seems to. In any case, no such law has yet passed. (Edit I now learn that Canada and the EU have laws giving access to orphan works under some circumstances, and other countries may have such laws.) It is true that the owner of the copyright on an orphan work may well be unlikely to sue for infringement of that copyright. The owner may not even know that s/he owns the copyright. But a user could never by fully safe, because the owner (or a new owner after a transfer) could always choose to sue for any continuing infringement, and any past one if the statute of limitations has not run out. This answer is largely based on knowledge of US law, but I believe that this situation is basically the same in most countries. |
Are causes of death public information? CNN and MSNBC legal analyst Midwin Charles was something of a celebrity, but her cause of death (a month after her first vaccine dose) remains undisclosed, which led to some speculation online. I thought causes of death were supposed to be public in the US. Is there any way to know for sure why she died? | Governmental disclosure of information on death certificates is controlled by state law. In Washington, vital records are controlled by RCW 70.58A. §520 limits the possible recipients of such records. One category is "for research", which involves a review that covers guarantees of confidentiality among other things. §530 allows certain other disclosures, specifically to (a) The decedent's spouse or domestic partner, child, parent, stepparent, stepchild, sibling, grandparent, great grandparent, grandchild, legal guardian immediately prior to death, legal representative, authorized representative, or next of kin as specified in RCW 11.28.120; (b) A funeral director, the funeral establishment licensed pursuant to chapter 18.39 RCW, or the person having the right to control the disposition of the human remains under RCW 68.50.160 named on the death record, within twelve months of the date of death; or (c) A government agency or court, if the certification will be used in the conduct of the agency's or court's official duties. and additionally (10) The state or local registrar may issue a short form certification of death that does not display information relating to cause and manner of death to a qualified applicant. In addition to the qualified applicants listed in subsection (9) of this section, a qualified applicant for a short form certification of death includes: (a) A title insurer or title insurance agent handling a transaction involving real property in which the decedent held some right, title, or interest; or (b) A person that demonstrates that the certified copy is necessary for a determination related to the death or the protection of a personal or property right related to the death. Then finally, and this is as close to a "public information" clause that you get, (17) The state or local registrar must issue an informational copy from the central vital records system to anyone. Informational copies must contain only the information allowed by rule. Informational copies of death records must not display information related to cause and manner of death. Vital records are specifically exempted from the Public Records Act. California also allows disclosure of a subset of death certificate information. The records are exempt from mandatory disclosure under the California Public Records Act, but the registrar will release "noncomprehensive death record indices for public release shall be comprised of first, middle, and last name, sex, date of birth, place of birth, place of death, date of death, and father’s last name". One would first have to determine what state a person died in, in case that state has fewer restrictions on disclosing personal information. | As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for Murder, Manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him? There are basically two distinct issues here. What is the duty? And if a duty was breached, what intent is necessary to breach it? There is not a legal duty to be vaccinated. There is a duty to use reasonable care not to hurt others. The duty not to hurt others could be satisfied by not seeing Bob in person, by wearing a mask around Bob or by having other non-transmission means available, in addition to being vaccinated. But Eve didn't do any of these things. We don't know if Eve had any reason to think that she presented a risk of infection to Bob because she could have passed the virus to him while she was asymptomatic. We also know, by the assumption of the question, that Eve was the source of the infection. But, in real life, proving the source of an infection beyond a reasonable doubt is very challenging or impossible. This must be established for any homicide crime. There is no indication that Eve knew she was transmitting the virus to Bob, or that Eve intended to transmit the virus to Bob (if she intentionally spat in Bob's face intending to infect him that would be a different matter). At most, her conduct was reckless, but if she was asymptotic and has no idea that she was doing something that was actually putting Bob at risk, her intent could be as slight as negligent (for tort law purposes only) or criminally grossly negligent. Since she lacked the necessary intent to commit murder (i.e. either an intention to kill, or an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm), she could not be guilty of the offense of murder. There are three types of voluntary manslaughter in England, none of which apply here: "There are three types of voluntary manslaughter: that resulting from loss of self-control; that resulting from statutorily defined diminished responsibility; and killing in perseverance of a suicide pact." So, this leaves involuntary manslaughter as the most serious possible homicide offense. Involuntary manslaughter could encompass either reckless conduct (i.e. "the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as an act which must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm resulting therefrom albeit not serious harm") and is usually in furtherance of some other criminal offense, or in the case of "gross negligence manslaughter", negligent conduct that is a far greater level of wrongdoing than the negligence that would suffice for civil tort liability. Gross negligence manslaughter is the most plausible charge and is itself a hard call that involves judgement and discretion on the part of the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, and the jury in a jury trial) that is exercised on a case by case basis considering all of the circumstances. Also, to be clear, the wrongful act in a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter case would be transmitting the virus (which could have been prevented multiple ways) and not failing to get vaccinated itself. | Because the law of negligence has developed to include a duty of care between physicians and patients and the standard of care encompasses the things you describe. The common law conceives of the doctor and patient in such a close relationship of neighbor-ness that it makes sense to impose such a duty. The harm that flows from breach of that duty is often reasonably foreseeable. Another distinction is that you come to a physician with an illness and expect care and they purport to deliver it. Their care and advice is often not a product/service that you might have the option of not buying. There is no competing legal duty that pulls the physician in any other direction than to meet the standard of care. There is no corresponding duty of care between an instructor and student to instruct any particular syllabus content. It would be a novel addition to the common law if this were to be recongized. There is no standard of care dictating the content of the syllabus. Any obligation to deliver a particular syllabus would be placed on the professor by the university (perhaps further dicated by professional accrediting bodies). I do not foresee the common law developing to include such a duty of care between professor and student. The value of academic freedom weighs against the law imposing a strict duty on syllabus content and the kind of harm that might flow from presenting out-of-date information is vague and not often reasonably foreseeable. Such a duty could give rise to a spectre of of indeterminate liability. And it isn't clear that the interest in presenting the latest and current theories always outweighs the interest in presenting a historical perspective. These are all reasons why I highly doubt the common law would ever evolve to recognize the duty you're proposing. | germany You have the duty to help others even if they cannot articulate that. There was a case recently where people stepped over an unconscious person to get money from an ATM, thinking it was a homeless person sleeping inside the rather warm entrance to the public bank building. Turned out it was a normal elderly customer who had a medical emergency. Three customers walked around them and did not get help. Only the fourth customer called an ambulance about 20 minutes later. The person died in hospital, doctors said the delay in treatment did not cause the death, the person would have died even if help had been available earlier. Police used the banks security cameras to prosecute all who had just ignored the person and "thought it was okay, they were just sleeping". Newspaper Article: For example Der Spiegel. The actual text of the verdict: AG Essen-Borbeck, 18.09.2017 - 3 Ds - 70 Js 654/16 - 252/17, 3 Ds 252/17 In this case it was monetary fines, but if the person had actively asked for an ambulance, like in your case, and were actively denied instead of ignored, I'm pretty sure that would have made it way worse for the defendants. | There are regulations governing occupational safety, whereby e.g. an employer can be fined for forcing employees to work in a literally toxic environment, for instance breathing chlorine gas. You could file a complaint with a state or federal agency (OSHA). You would need to hire a labor lawyer to get advice about your specific circumstance, to see if there is indeed a provision that covers what you describe, though I doubt it would. OSHA's blurb on disease don't obviously cover your situation (they describe situations that govern healthcare workers in intimate contact with infectious materials). However, certain diseases such as TB or Ebola cause a general health quarantine to be imposed, so if a worker comes in with such a disease, action would be taken by the health department. This does not cover sniffles, and probably not pertussis (but that's a local decision). There are also regulations pertaining to disabled employees, whereby an employee who is disabled by having a severely compromised immune system can be entitled to reasonable accommodation, for example allowed to work in a closed room away from others (if the job is not a receptionist job). That entitlement only applies to the employee, and is controlled by objective health danger (requires a doctor's note), and not the comfort level of the employee. | In some states there is a law know as Caylee's Law, for example Connecticut General Statutes 53-21a(d) which requires reporting a child's disappearance: Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly fails to report the disappearance of such child to an appropriate law enforcement agency shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. For the purposes of this subsection, “disappearance of such child” means that the parent, guardian or person does not know the location of the child and has not had contact with the child for a twenty-four-hour period. Assume that they have done as the law requires, i.e. reporting the disappearance. It could be a crime for the parents to fake the kid's death, depending on what you did to "fake" the death. They might legally do things that could lead a person to think the child died; but telling the police, in the course of an investigation, that the child died in an accident, would be a crime. The parents would not have to convince the school district of anything, though someone at the school might alert the authorities that the child was gone (but they would know that anyway). They might well have to convince the police of something (i.e. that they didn't kill the child). It would certainly be a felony to lie to the IRS (i.e. claim the child as a dependent). It would also be a crime to continue to receive welfare payments or other benefits based on the fact of having a child. | There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order. | Short Answers Does the Coroner have the final say on cause of death? No. The trial judge (or jury) has the final say. Can police pursue an investigation independent and contrary to that of the Coroner? Theoretically, yes. But I would expect that would happen only in unusual circumstances. Like, maybe an internal investigation. Standard procedure is for the prosecutor, police and medical examiner to work together to investigate crimes and prosecute criminals. Does a District Attorney (when not the Coroner) have the means and/or authority to conduct an independent and contrary investigation? Yes. But it's unusual. See answer to number 2. Or do any other offices have the right to investigate a death to look for evidence of homicide in opposition to a verdict of the Coroner? Same answer as #2 and #3. Explanation They work together on the same team The medical examiner is a state employee and usually works on the side of law enforcement. If a medical examiner were to report a cause of death that did not support evidence of a crime, that information would have to be made available to any potential defendant. In the hands of any competent attorney that should be sufficient basis to create reasonable doubt and achieve an acquittal. I doubt many prosecutors would ever consider hiring an outside examiner in this case except under highly unusual circumstances like an internal investigation as mentioned above. The defendant must create reasonable doubt In the alternative scenario, when evidence of a crime is supported by the M.E. report, it would be up to the defendant to produce reasonable doubt by cross-examination or producing expert testimony that contradicts the M.E.'s conclusion. This might or might not include hiring an independent third party forensic pathologist as an expert witness. Dr. Cyril Wecht is a famous one. All opinions are subject to error, disagreement and cross-examination All that said, the "cause of death" reported by the Coroner is just a medical opinion and is subject to error and disagreement like any other opinion. It's just that it's unlikely that disagreement would come from the side of law enforcement in most cases. For further reading, here is a link to the Coroner's Handbook. At the bottom of page 11, it acknowledges: Causes of death on the death certificate represent a medical opinion that might vary among individual medical-legal officers. |
Are exercises in language books copyrighted? Good afternoon, I am working on a language app to learn languages, and I was thinking to include sentences and dialogues for the users to practice their languages. My question is: can I re-use, and to what extend, similar exercises used in other textbooks? Does that fall under the fair use for educational purpose? And more in particular, I am wondering about the following 3 cases: Are vocabulary lists for specific lessons copyrighted? I know a single word (e.g. in Latin) + translation in English is not copyrighted, but what about whole series of words as vocabulary list? E.g.: can I add to the "lesson 1" of my app the vocabulary list at the end of chapter one of a hypothetical book "learn Latin in 20 lessons"? What about dialogues, especially very basic ones, like "What is your name? My name is Paul. Where are you from? I am from Canada"? are they copyrighted? or it depends, and how can I determine the threshold? The app will focus mainly on ancient, dead languages, like Latin. I guess that sentences taken from ancient texts can be used freely as exercises. But what about basic sentences created by the author of a teaching book to illustrate specific examples? Or sentences from the initial exercises, which often are made up to illustrate specific grammatical concepts? Are those sentences copyrighted, or again could I use the sentences of the exercise at the end of chapter one of the same hypothetical book "learn Latin in 20 lessons" ? | Details depend on the juristiction. For that, consult a lawyer if you plan to publish your app anywhere. But generally, even simple texts from exercises can be covered by copyright. Compare song lyrics, which are not much longer (and might not involve more creative thought than a good exercise ...). For vocabulary lists, it gets more tricky, but those can be covered as well if the assembly of the list was a creative effort. So if you simply list the 1,000 most common worlds in English and their translation, you are possibly fine, but if the words are divided into units and lessons, that's creative work. | Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged. | AD&D, like all games, is covered under copyright. HOWEVER, games are not treated the same as books and other works. Rules of a game, including "stats" and other information required to play the game, are NOT protected by copyright. This is Copyright Law, and has nothing to do with a license which a work is published under. Artwork is fully protected by copyright, as is any setting descriptions. In the context of the D&D franchise, the actual wording of any rulebooks, monster descriptions, game modules, and such are all protected by copyright, so you can't wholesale cut-and-paste things. But, that does not extend to the various mechanics of the game. Armor Class, Hit Dice, etc. are all mechanics, and CANNOT be protected. That includes values assigned to monsters or characters or such. A company cannot also protect the particular layout of those statistics, if that layout is considered generic in nature. In the case we are talking about, a table listing the statistics is NOT protected, as it does nothing more than list those statistics, and contains no original, protected material of WotC. In addition, uniquely created monsters, characters, etc. all have their name protected, but not their statistics. But generic names thereof cannot be protected. It is perfectly permissible to have a clone copy of a Drow and call them a Dark Elf (a generic name). One could not copy the description of the Drow from a Monster Manual, but the idea of a Dark Elf cannot be protected, nor can the statistics thereof. It is explicitly permissible by Copyright Law to clone the rules to a game, which in the context of D&D includes a generic name for anything trademarked (thus, no Drow, and no Dungeon Master, but Dark Elf and Game Master), the mechanisms used to play the game -- including the terms used to reference them -- and all related numerical statistics associated with those components of the game. All of this is in addition to any rights the OGL gives you. These rights CANNOT be restricted by the OGL, as they are basic Copyright Law rights, not license rights. I've been writing D&D expansions and such for over 4 decades now (since the late 1980s), and this is what I've repeatedly been told by various Copyright lawyers. In short, provided you don't use the text description of a particular monster (and instead write your own one, using the same concept of what the monster is), and you don't use a trademarked name for it, it is possible to "scrape copy" the statistic summary section of any Monster Manual or the like. Here's an explicit parallel: the game of Monopoly. When creating a clone of Monopoly, here's what you CAN do: Copy the basic layout of the board - a square with the properties laid out in a path around the edge. Arrange the properties as they currently are, WITH THE CURRENT NAMES on them. Each property's name is not possible to protect, as they are generic names. Free Parking, Jail, and Go To Jail, and Go can all be labeled and placed accordingly. Chance and Community Chest cards can be named as such, and referred to as such. The text on the cards is also (mostly) usable. The costs and values of all Chance, Community Chest, and properties can be copied. The rules of movement, going to jail, etc. can all be copied. Have pieces that are Hats, Dogs, Cars, etc, and both Hotels and Houses, and explicitly refer to them by those names. Here's what you CANNOT do: Use the particular color scheme of the board Use any artwork, including the drawings on any cards. Use the particular graphic presentation of a card. Copy the design of any piece, except the House/Hotel which, insofar as they are very generic, can be extremely similar. You can only use the word "Monopoly" in the context of referring to the Parker Brothers game, not in any other context, as it is trademarked. The specific wording of the rulebook cannot be duplicated. You have to write the rules in your own words. The wording of certain Community Chest and Chance cards, where they are not just generic game instructions, cannot be duplicated. E.g. "Grand Opera Night—Collect $50 from every player for opening night seats" cannot be duplicated, but you can have any other wording for something that would gain you $50 per player. Now, see how that works in comparison to D&D? | A statement by a fictional character is part of the fiction, and so is normally protected by copyright. A short exclamation such as "You are not prepared!" might be ruled to be too short and not sufficiently original to be protected if it were used separately, but that would apply just as much to a short statement that was not a quote from a character. But something like one of Gandalf's speeches on "mercy and pity" to Frodo in Chapter 2 ("The Shadow of the past") in book 1 of The Lord of the Rings would clearly be protected. The longer and the more distinctive such a text is, the more clearly it would be protected. Whether it is put in the mouth of a character or is part of the narration makes no significant difference. Note, in a copyright sense a statement does not "belong to a particular universe", rather it belongs to a copyright owner, often the author, or in the case of a video game quite likely thy publisher. As this comment by Kevin mentions, and as I should have mentioned, reproducing a short quotation from a work of fiction, particularly if properly attributed, is quite likely to be fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more specific details. See also the threads tagged fair use If a quote is used for a different purpose than the original, in what is called a "transformative" manner in copyright cases, then it is more likely to be held to be fair use. The smaller of a percentage of the source item the quote is, the more likely it is that it will be considered to be a fair use. The less the use of a quote serves as a replacement for the source, or harms the market for the source, the more likely it is to be considered a fair use. See the links above for more detail. | united-states The flowchart included in the question is trying to summarize a rather large amount of legal uncertainty into one image. It must be emphasized that each decision point represents an unsettled area of law. Nobody knows which path through that flowchart the law will take, or even if different forms or implementations of AI might take different paths. The short and disappointing answer to your question is that nobody knows what is or isn't legal yet. To further elaborate on each decision point: The first point is asking whether the training process requires a license at all. There are two possible reasons to think that it does not: AI training is protected by fair use (see 17 USC 107). This is a case-by-case inquiry that would have to be decided by a judge. AI training is nothing more than the collection of statistical information relating to a work, and does not involve "copying" the work within the meaning of 17 USC 106 (except for a de minimis period which is similar to the caching done by a web browser, and therefore subject to a fair use defense). The second point is, I think, asking whether the model is subject to copyright protection under Feist v. Rural and related caselaw. Because the model is trained by a purely automated process, there's a case to be made that the model is not the product of human creativity, and is therefore unprotected by copyright altogether. Dicta in Feist suggest that the person or entity directing the training might be able to obtain a "thin" copyright in the "selection or organization" of training data, but no court has ever addressed this to my knowledge. This branch can also be read as asking whether the output of the model is copyrightable, when the model is run with some prompt or input. The Copyright Office seems to think the answer to that question is "no, because a human didn't create it." The third decision point is, uniquely, not a legal question, but a practical question: Do you intend to distribute anything, or are you just using it for your own private entertainment? This determines whether you need to consult the rest of the flowchart or not. The final decision point is whether the "output" (i.e. either the model itself, or its output) is a derivative work of the training input. This would likely be decided on the basis of substantial similarity, which is a rather complicated area of law. To grossly oversimplify, the trier of fact would be shown both the training input and the allegedly infringing output, and asked to determine whether the two items have enough copyrightable elements in common that copying can reasonably be inferred. | Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability). | Under the Berne Convention, a copyright notice is not required at all, although using one is good practice. Using one usually eliminates the claimed status of "innocent infringement", which, if found true by a court, greatly reduces damage awards. It is usual to place such notices at or near the start of a work. That is where people tend to look for them, and I don't see any good reason not to follow this practice. The book tradition is the the copyright page comes before any part of the actual work, including the table of contents, sometimes with a continuation at the end of the work, if there is more than one page of notices. But that is not now a legal requirement, if it ever was. In short, there are no rigid rules on this, but putting a copyright notice at or quite near the start is good practice, and I would suggest sticking to it. | Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center. |
Is marital status from another country valid in the US? If someone with F-2 visa status comes to the US with his/her spouse then wants to get married a US citizen, or green card holder in the US, should he/she get divorced from his/her spouse? Or is it not necessary because the previous marriage was not conducted within the US? | TLDR: get a divorce. Basically, the US (as with most countries) recognizes valid marriages from other jurisdictions that would be valid if performed by the couple in the US. Which means that same sex marriages before Oberfell would not have been recognized but are now. Marriage with minors are not recognized. Multiple simultaneous marriages are not recognized (no second or third husbands or wives). Some common law marriages can have problems with this, as there is no record of the marriage. | The general answer is, no, it is not valid in the US, see this article. Exceptions to laws recognizing e-signatures abound which exclude wills from general laws recognizing electronic signatures. Nevada is the one current exception (conveniently located between Oregon and Arizona). There have been attempts to legalize electronic wills, including in Arizona (SB 1298). Although Tennessee does not recognize e-wills, a gentleman in Tennessee went ahead and did it, and in Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 the court decided that the will was properly executed and witnessed. Electronic notarization is recognized in Arizona, though apparently for things you file with the government (not things that your heirs will eventually file), whereas in Oregon it is a general-purpose way of getting a document notarized. Since the courts are loathe to completely disregard a person's last will and testament because they didn't narrowly follow requirements, you might be able to "get away with it", but it would not make things easier for the executor. | You are courting seduction by the sovereign citizen doctrine. This is a crackpot legal theory that will get you nowhere. Run away as fast as you can. See, for example, Can a natural US person hold citizenship while remaining non-juridical?. See also "Mercedes-Benz Financial (DCFS Canada Corp.) v. Kovacevic, 2009", CanLII. This person fared particularly poorly because his argument relied in part on the UCC, which is a United States model code, but he was arguing in a Canadian court. Still, even in a US court, he would have lost. See What are "freemen of the land" or "sovereign citizen" theories and do they hold any water?. | The short answer is that yes, a couple can marry for the purpose of gaining access to the marital privilege in court actions, even if they are pending when the marriage occurs. There is basically no such thing as a sham marriage in this context. (There may be a handful of outlier cases as is the case in any legal rule, but this is the overwhelmingly uniform rule of law today.) In practice, outside the context of an annulment proceeding in the civil courts where one of the parties to the marriage or fiduciaries such as legal guardians for one of the parties to the marriage seek to have it invalidated, a legally entered into marriage is valid for all purposes without question. Even many marriages that can be annulled for religious purposes are not eligible to be annulled under non-religious civil law. Third-parties generally do not have standing to declare that a marriage be annulled. Usually marriage is conclusively established by the existence of a marriage license and the absence of a death or divorce by either party. Even the existence of a common law marriage, or the existence of some factor that prevents a marriage from being recognized as valid (e.g. one of the parties is already married or is underage) is often fairly easily proved (and is usually completely unrelated to the case in which a martial privilege is to be asserted and undisputed). Immigration law is the only context is which the status of a marriage as a sham is actively policed. Also, keep in mind that the marital privilege for evidentiary purposes is actually two separate privileges. One is the privilege not to testify against a current spouse in a legal proceeding. The other is the privilege not to testify as to confidential communications made to a spouse while the couple was married. Both have exceptions (e.g. for crimes in which one of the spouses is the victim). A confidential communication to a boyfriend/girlfriend prior to marriage is not protected by the confidential communications marital privilege even after the couple married. Only the testimonial privilege would be available with regard to those communications, and the testimonial privilege often has more exceptions than the confidential communications privilege (usually the exceptions are enumerated by statute that varies from state to state). A previous answer related to spousal privilege with quotations from a state statute to provide an example can be found here. In Colorado, which is fairly typical, the confidential communications privilege applies to all crimes (except those which are ongoing or are between the spouses), while the testimonial privilege does not apply to serious felonies. | As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there. | The US doesn't do exit immigration checks, so if your hypothetical Israeli overstayer can board a flight out of the US, they'll most likely be allowed to go without detention or other punishment. The US sees no value in spending government money to detain someone who is ready to leave of their own accord. I'm not sure why such a person should have "no valid documentation". Maybe you're confused by the common term "undocumented" for people without legal immigration status, but it usually doesn't literally mean they have no documentation at all. Most such people would still have their passport and other identification from their home country, and the passport is enough to board a flight back home. You say your hypothetical Israeli overstayer had a visa; so they must have had an Israeli passport when they entered the US. Under normal circumstances, they've still got it. If it expired, they could have renewed it at an Israeli consulate within the US; the consulate will issue passports to all Israeli citizens without regard to their immigration status in the US. Even if somehow they lost their Israeli passport and all other identity documents, the consulate would have the ability to verify their identity from Israeli government records (e.g. the photo and biometrics from their previous passport, which would still be in the Israeli government's database), and process their application for a replacement passport. | Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety. | Yes 15 USC 1501, which is part of the Lanham Act, the basic US trademark law, provides in subsection (a)(2) that: (2) The application [for registration of a trademark] shall include specification of the applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark. This clearly implies that the applicant may have a citizenship other than US, or else ther ewould be nbo point in specifying the citizenship in the application. subsection (e) of the same section provides, in relevant part: If the applicant is not domiciled in the United States the applicant may designate, by a document filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the name and address of a person resident in the United States on whom may be served notices or process in proceedings affecting the mark. This makes it cleat that an applicant need not be resident in the US., 15 USC 1141a provides that: (a) In general The owner of a basic application pending before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or the owner of a basic registration granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office may file an international application by submitting to the United States Patent and Trademark Office a written application in such form, together with such fees, as may be prescribed by the Director. (b) Qualified owners: A qualified owner, under subsection (a), shall— (b)(1) be a national of the United States; (b)(2) be domiciled in the United States; or (b)(3) have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in the United States. 1141a (b2) and (b)(3) make it clear that an applicant need not be a national (citizen) of the US. The USPTO's page "Trademark FAQs" lists under the heading "General - Trademark Help - Getting Started - Other" the following Q&A: Must I be a U.S. citizen to obtain a federal registration? No. However, your citizenship must be provided in the application. If you have dual citizenship, then you must indicate which citizenship will be printed on the certificate of registration. |
When can a customer be denied service for not wearing a (COVID) mask, considering medical exceptions? I work in a retail liquor store. We require customers to wear masks to prevent the spread of COVID19. Technically speaking is wearing masks a law, a health order or the store policy as a result of the health order? A customer asked if we had a mask he could use. We said no. He then argued he had a medical exemption and isn't supposed to be refused service. My questions are: Can a customer be denied service or entry for not wearing a mask even if they claim they have a medical exception? Must they prove it with some sort of certificate? Some people have claimed that they do not need to show proof. If the customer is acting in a dishonest manner, for example if I see them wearing a mask before entering the store, does that make a difference? Does the quality of mask or the material it is made of make a difference? Some customers pull their shirt over their face and my coworkers tell them that is alright. I am considering putting in a complaint to the health inspector. Also can customers remove their masks to use the face unlock feature of their smart phone? Some customers pay with their phones. | https://bchumanrights.ca/mask-poster/ Technically speaking is wearing masks a law, a health order or the store policy as a result of the health order? Technically speaking it's a Ministerial Order made under the power delegated to the Minister by the Emergency Program Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 111, s. 10. Can a customer be denied service or entry for not wearing a mask even if they claim they have a medical exception? No, they cannot. If they claim they have an exemption, then as far as you are concerned, they have an exemption. Refusing service would be illegal discrimination on the basis of disability. Must they prove it with some sort of certificate? No. Some people have claimed that they do not need to show proof. Those people are right. If the customer is acting in a dishonest manner, for example if I see them wearing a mask before entering the store, does that make a difference? No. Does the quality of mask or the material it is made of make a difference? Yes. They must wear a face covering. "face covering" means either of the following that covers the nose and mouth of a person: (a) a medical or non-medical mask; (b) a tightly woven fabric; Some customers pull their shirt over their face and my coworkers tell them that is alright. Depends on the shirt: if it is made of "a tightly woven fabric" then it is alright. | Vaccination status does not currently define a protected class under Florida or Federal law. Being or not being vaccinated is not legally recognized as a condition that "substantially limits a major life activity", hence is not an example of disability-related discrimination. The opposite scenario, where an employer refuses to hire an un-vaccinated person, potentially runs afoul of disability discrimination laws when a person has a legal disability that prevents their vaccination. As noted here, due to the scope of the Privacy Rule HIPAA does not directly apply to your question, when the patient discloses information. However, the healthcare provider cannot disclose such information without patient authorization. It's hard to see a First Amendment basis supporting the action (in case the law changes w.r.t. vaccination and discrimination). You could imagine a religion which holds that vaccination against some disease is blasphemy, and forcing an employer to hire the vaccinated is compelled speech which repudiates a fundament of their belief. Even so, it is not sufficient that the business owner holds some odd belief, the belief has to be essential to the nature of the business (see BSA v. Dale). That could be the case of a religious school. | No If the price advertised is not honoured by the business and you are asked to pay a higher price, you do not have an automatic right to buy the item at the special offer or sale price. As long as the shop or business tells you before you pay that the higher price applies, you have the option to either buy it at the higher price or decide not to. However, the shop or business may be in breach of consumer law in relation to misleading advertising. The prosecution (or not) of the misleading advertising is the government’s task, not yours. This is a common formulation across Common Law jurisdictions as it a codification of the historic common law position. An advertised price is not an offer capable of acceptance, it is an invitation to treat. That is, it is an invitation for you to make them an offer and the price that is likely to be accepted. It is overlaid with later developments in consumer protection surrounding false advertising and misleading and deceptive conduct. | It works by prohibiting discrimination based on use of medical marijuana, thus it limits employer actions w.r.t. hiring, firing, and on the job treatment. It is not an absolute prohibition. §2103(b)(3) states that Nothing in this act shall require an employer to commit any act that would put the employer or any person acting on its behalf in violation of Federal law. Since employers may be subject to federal drug-free workplace rules, detectable usage of medical marijuana is a fireable offense on such jobs, until the federal regulations are eliminated. The law is also clear that this does not create a right to be under the influence while on the job, and §510 lists definite prohibitions against actions while under the influence. As for the question of whether the law prohibits discrimination based on simple possession of a card but does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual use (leaving aside the preceding disclaimers), this has been decided in Palmiter v. Commonwealth Health Systems, Inc. – it's not just card-possession that is protected. Indeed, the hospital in this lawsuit did not contest the claim that the law protects employees who use medical marijuana, the dispute was over whether a cause of private action was created (can a fired employee sue? "Yes", says the court). See also Hudnell v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. | "Medical lawyer" is really the wrong focus, this is an issue of civil rights. The question would be, is it a violation of your civil rights to prevent you from taking your baby home; is it legal for the federal government to investigate people who refuse to take a covid test? You can take the question along with pertinent evidence to a civil rights attorney. To pick a non-random hospital's web page, they note that "Any person having surgery or a procedure, including birth, at a Texas Health hospital will be tested for COVID-19 to provide appropriate care for the patient, and for the protection of visitors and the care team", and "you will need to be tested at admission to help safeguard you and the care team". In answer to the question whether you can decline testing, they say "Testing is recommended to promote the health of you and your baby. Patients who have COVID-19 can have a weakened immune system and may have inflammatory symptoms that can compromise healing. We encourage you to speak with your provider about the best decision for you", which doesn't explicitly say "No you may not", nor "Yes, you may". However, they cannot literally force you to take the test: at most, they can refuse to treat you. In answer to the question "Will I be separated from my baby if I test positive for COVID-19?", they say "Texas Health will follow guidelines from the American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of OB/GYN and the Centers for Disease Control for how to keep you and your baby safe during your hospital stay. Ultimately, any decisions about care for you and your baby will be between you and your provider, based on what is best for you both". This is also not crystal clear. There are three primary legal issues, putting a worst spin on their policy. They say up front that you will be tested prior to admission: the question is whether you can decline to take the test but force them to admit you. Now we are closer to the realm of a medical negligence attorney – they can refuse to treat you, but that might leave them liable. The second question is whether they can temporarily take the infant away, against the mother's wishes (for example, hold the infant in a separate facility while the mother is in the hospital). The third question is whether they have direct authority to take the infant away when you leave the hospital. The third question gets a plain and simple no. The Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Services has some authority in such a matter, but taking a child requires an investigation and a court order. | Not at all. A US business always had the authority to require employees to be vaccinated before entering the workplace, except if a valid state law prohibits this. The EEOC has confirmed that none of the Federal laws which it enforces prevent such a requirement. The proposed mandate under the OSHA Act would merely have required a business subject to the mandate to do what it had the right to do anyway. Even if it is held that the US Federal Government does not have constitutional authority to impose such a mandate, that would not in any way impair any business which chooses to do so from imposing such a requirement on its employees, subject to the requirements under the ADA and the Civil Rights act to offer reasonable accommodations for sincere religious objections, and for disabilities that would interfere with accepting vaccination. Businesses generally are not "covered entities" under HIPPA, and so can ask employees for health information such as a vaccination record, if they choose to. Or they can choose to trust an employee's word on the matter. | Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you. |
Are the following Terms of Service clauses valid/enforceable? Wallhax is a website selling cheats for online games like Among Us, Apex Legends and dozens of others. Clearly what they do is in clear violation of these games' terms of services. On their own terms of services however, they have some (superfluous if not poorly written) clauses meant to prohibit the affected game developers from buying and inspecting the cheats: You agree you are not an employee of [...] and are not a family member or acquaintance of the aforementioned. You agree you are not an employee of any law firm contracted with [...] and are not a family member or acquaintance of said firm. You agree you are not an employee of any company offering an anti-cheat service including [...] and are not a family member or acquaintance of the aforementioned. You are not an employee of any game development studio. You are not purchasing from our site for any investigative purposes. You agree not to impersonate another person. You may not access the The Service, the website, forums, or software of The Service if any of the above terms apply to you. If you violate any of the above terms you agree to pay Wallhax $30,000 USD for each login to our software and forums. Now, imagine if a game development studio whose game's terms of services are violated thanks to Wallhax's products' assistance decides to ignore Wallhax's ToS, buys (either via a developer themselves or via a random person) the cheats, inspects how they work and updates the game to be resilient against them. Also imagine that Wallhax discovers it and demands the studio to pay thirty thousand dollars for each time the developer logged in. The studio stonewalls Wallhax, stating that the services they provide violate the game's terms of services, and Wallhax takes them to court. Would Wallhax manage to make the game developers pay the damages specified in the ToS? Disclaimer: I do not belong in the group of people prohibited from accessing WallHax's products. Nor have I bought or do I intend to buy them. This question is of theoretical interest. | No Penalty Clauses Apart from the final clause, none of the others is remarkable: a business can choose who it does and does not do business with subject to anti-discrimination laws. Of course, a law enforcement officer acting in the course of their duties would not be bound by any contract. However, the final clause is a penalty clause. A penalty is a clause that sets a harsh monetary punishment for the breach of a contract term, or failure to uphold contractual obligations. However, if the amount of money requested is greater than, or disproportionate to, the damage or loss that you actually suffer, there is the risk that this clause would be considered a penalty. According to the court, a clause is a penalty if it requests the payment of an amount that is “extravagant” and “unconscionable” in light of the most significant loss that the breach could have caused. $30,000 for me logging into the system would, on the face of it, appear to be a penalty. Tortious interference It is a tort (a civil wrong) to knowingly interfere in a contractual relationship between 2 parties. Although the specific elements required to prove a claim of tortious interference vary from one jurisdiction to another, they typically include the following: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties. Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. The contractual relationship is breached. Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs. The conduct of Wallhax clearly satisfies 1-5 with respect to an existing contract between a game developer and its users. With respect to damage, if they can demonstrate that the use of cheats cost them something - even $1, then there has been damage and the game developer can sue Wallhax. Notwithstanding, because the purpose of the cheats is to induce users to breach their licence with the developer, Wallhax's contract has illegality of purpose at its core and is therefore void ab initio - a nullity from the beginning. That is, there is no contract. Contracts against public policy Even if Wallhax's conduct does not amount to tortious interference, the encouragement of people to disregard their contractual obligations - that is, to disregard their legal obligations - is clearly against public policy. Contracts against public policy are also void ab initio. | The sale of in-game resources for real-world money is usually disallowed explicitly by a game's terms of service. One notable case was Blizzard's successful injunction against Peons4Hire, a World of Warcraft gold farming company. Setting aside terms-of-use considerations (which vary by game/platform), the sale of virtual goods for real money is broadly legal. Wikipedia has a short list of jurisdictions with notable decisions on virtual sales; see the page's references for the official news stories or government documents. Most of the rulings have been positive for virtual-goods vendors, though China has banned the sale of real items for virtual currency (the opposite of your proposed plan) and South Korea has banned the sale of virtual goods for real money outright. Such sales incur normal tax responsibilities, just as any other income does. I don't know if any jurisdictions have imposed special legislation that place income limits or special tax rates for income from the sale of virtual goods. In the case of Steam specifically, the sale of virtual goods is broadly disallowed in Section 2.G of the Steam Subscriber Agreement, but narrowly allowed in Section 3.D. All virtual Steam goods remain the property of Steam, and you have a license to use them, which includes sale in limited circumstances. The prohibition in Section 2.G reads: G. Restrictions on Use of Content and Services ...you are not entitled to: (i) sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Content and Services to other parties in any way, nor to rent, lease or license the Content and Services to others without the prior written consent of Valve, except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use); ... And the narrow permission to perform trades in the Community Marketplace in Section 3.D (per the above "except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement" exception of 2.G): D. Trading and Sales of Subscriptions Between Subscribers Steam may include one or more features or sites that allow Subscribers to trade, sell or purchase certain types of Subscriptions (for example, license rights to virtual items) with, to or from other Subscribers (“Subscription Marketplaces”). An example of a Subscription Marketplace is the Steam Community Market. You can use the Steam Community Market to trade items for real money; this kind of real-money sale is explicitly allowed and facilitated by Steam. Separately, you can also trade giftable games (N.B.: game trading does not support real money) using Steam's trading system. Applying terms to a game-trade (like requiring payment external to Stream's trading system) appears to be disallowed by the broad prohibition in 2.G, but it's not very clear. The mechanical transfer of the game from one account to another is allowed, but the fact that it is actually a sale in a way that is not explicitly allowed seems to make it against the terms of service. I have no idea to what degree this is enforceable nor to what degree Steam polices against trades that involve Stream-external money transfers (though a cursory search of conversations in the Steam forums suggests they might not care very much). | OK, so you understand that clickwraps do create enforceable contracts. the person "agreeing" to the dialog can arbitrarily manipulate the contents of the agreement terms So what? I can do a similar thing with a pen and paper agreement. You send me an agreement, I tell you I accept but secretly I have changed it. Well, guess what, when this ends up in court the judge won't care if I wiped my ass with it - I communicated my acceptance of your terms; therefore that is what I accepted. Under the hood, Google can show what the HTML was that their server sent to you and the http response that you sent back. They said "Do you accept?" you sent back "yes", deal done. What you did with the html in your computer does not matter one iota; just like what you did with pen and ink terms would. | Yes, it is legal for Steam to disable content on your PC because when you downloaded the Demo for the game "Observer", you "clicked through" and agreed to either a TOS (Terms of Service) and/or a EULA (End User License Agreement) which was a legally binding contract. That contract stated the terms of use of the demo and when Steam can disable or expire the demo, as well as the fact that Steam can change the terms of the contract itself. Steam can close your entire account if they choose for any of very wide ranging reasons, as outlined in the contract. The demo wasn't your property; it was software licensed to you by Steam, and they can delete or disable as outlined in the contract. Steam will be very careful, however, to not delete or damage anything else you have installed, or Windows itself, while respecting the Microsoft Windows TOS/EULA. Take some time to read the TOS and/or EULA for Steam, or any software for that matter; you'll see that in most cases, you only have a license to use the software, and don't actually own the software and don't have a right to modify it. | The web-browser game was copyrighted the moment it was created by the individual. It did not need a copyright notice to be copyrighted, or a TOS to inform you of copyright. The individual was fully within the law to claim infringement and demand you stop disturbing your mod as an unauthorized change to their game. They should have had a TOS up when they started distributing the game, but that's their choice. The developer could - or have their attorney - send their own legal "takedown notice" of infringement directly to you rather than Tweet about it or approach Google. Google's takedown and your "copyright strike" is different than your original copyright violation and involves Google's TOS - Google Chrome Web Store Developer Agreement | Google Chrome - regarding copyright violations of apps and code under distribution. By your use of the store, Google reserves the right to remove your extensions when there are ...violations of intellectual property rights, including patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, or other proprietary right of any party,... And, the original game being free and your mod being free rarely matters in copyright law and in cases of infringement. That's something a court would decide on the case and in looking at precedent(s). ...can I get into legal trouble for this? You could be sued by the maker of the game in civil court; that's up to them. Google's recourse is to simply remove the mod from the store and possibly restrict your use of their service(s), according to their TOS. For more background, see the Law SE Meta post I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? . | It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention "around $70AUD" which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly "do business in" Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC. | Short answer? No, the WTFPL offers no protection. A software license is a contract between the software vendor and the end user defining the terms and conditions under which the end user is permitted to use the software. Often, traditional software licenses contain terms that limit the vendor's liability. For example: "End User accepts the risk that this software will initiate computational conflagrations." It may also limit the end user's right to sue, by requiring binding arbitration, or by requiring them to sue in a particular court in a particular state. Whether and to what extent these clauses are enforceable is moot here, because the WTFPL doesn't contain them. Think of it this way. If you sign a contract with me to buy my house, and then you set fire to my car, you can't wave the house contract at me and say, "This is a legally binding contract, and it doesn't say I can't set fire to your car!" It doen't say that you can, either, and so it's not relevant to the lawsuit I'm going to bring against you for the damage to my car. Contracts are only relevant to a lawsuit if they contain a clause relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit. The WTFPL contains no clauses in which the end user agrees to do or not to do anything, and therefore cannot be a defense against him or her doing, or not doing, anything at all. | Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word. |
Why do courts dismiss cases as moot? Trump recently received a subpoena that would have forced him to testify at a trial. He appealed it saying he couldn't be compelled to testify as the sitting president. The appeal is now dismissed as moot since he is no longer president: While president, Trump had tried to quash a subpoena that would force him to testify at the civil trial in the Bronx and sit for a videotaped deposition beforehand. In 2019, his lawyers appealed a judge’s order denying his request. On Tuesday, the state’s Appellate Division dismissed Trump’s appeal as moot. “This appeal concerning the proper standard for determining whether a sitting President may be compelled to give videotaped trial testimony about unofficial acts in a civil action against him or her is moot given that the rights of parties will not be directly affected by our determination,” the court said in its ruling, “and that there will not be an immediate consequence of the judgment.” Source Why would the court do this instead of rule on it anyway? This sounds like it just postpones the ruling until some time in the future when it happens again. True, it might not happen again, but it also might. It feels like running away from a problem on the grounds that it doesn't need to be solved today, and therefore shirking responsibility. | The court is not running away from the problem; Trump isn't president, so the problem has actually gone away. Because there's no point in resolving a purely academic question, the courts generally accept the idea that it shouldn't spend taxpayer money on work that doesn't need to be done. When there are thousands of other cases working their way through the system, it doesn't make much sense for the court to answer questions that don't require answers. The other reason for the mootness doctrine is that the courts believe they can get the best available information, argument, and advocacy from parties that actually have something to gain from winning the case. Here, the court can't trust Trump to argue the case because it doesn't know whether Trump has any real interest in defending the prerogatives of the presidency. Maybe he's planning to run again, but maybe he's more interested right now in making life miserable for President Biden. And if that's the case, maybe he'd like to tank the case so the Texas attorney general can start issuing subpoenas to the president and his son. This tendency is the rooted in centuries of common-law precedent acknowledging that the courts shouldn't just sit around and offer answers to questions that aren't part of a real dispute. That principle resulted in the "cases or controversies" clause that limits the jurisdiction of Article III courts. There is no such constitutional limitation on the New York courts handling the case you're asking about, but they honor the mootness doctrine anyway. Society of Plastics v. Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 772 (N.Y. 1991) (“Under the common law, there is little doubt that a "court has no inherent power to right a wrong unless thereby the civil, property or personal rights of the plaintiff in the action or the petitioner in the proceeding are affected." ”) There are some exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including one for controversies that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review" -- essentially, for disputes that occur frequently but are too short-lived to be fully litigated. Abortion cases are a great example of this: If a woman is unable to obtain an abortion, she generally has less than nine months to take a case from filing through all its appeals before the baby is born, mooting the case. But that exception isn't a good fit for Trump's case, because subpoenas like this to sitting presidents aren't all that common, and the four or eight years of a presidential term are typically going to be enough time to fully litigate the question. This is especially true given the speed with which courts typically resolve cases that pose a credible threat to presidential prerogatives. For instance, Trump challenged another subpoena in Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, (2020). In that case, the prosecutor issued the subpoena on August 1, 2019, and it was less than a year before the U.S. Supreme Court had weighed in. So even though it's possible that the issue could come up again without being resolved before the president is out of office, it is not particularly likely, and therefore not a good candidate for resolution despite its mootness. | When a judge decides a case there will be An order - e.g. "Smith shall pay Jones £100,000" Reasons for the decision - i.e. a description of the evidence, and the judge's findings of fact and legal reasoning. Sometimes a party, even though they have completely won, is nevertheless aggrieved by some things the judge has said in the Reasons (or in the way the judge has handled the trial - e.g. the judge's interventions). For example the judge may have said that the winning party was not a credible witness but they nevertheless won because of the evidence of other witnesses who were found to be credible. The rule in England and Wales is that you can only appeal orders. So if the order is completely in your favour you cannot appeal just because you don't like the reasons. | SHORT ANSWER Suppose a President can see that such a vote is coming and will pass, shortly before an election. Can that President resign just before the vote in order to effectively avoid the disqualification penalty? Probably yes. But, there is no historical precedent for this happening. Nixon resigned before the House voted to impeach him, not midway into the impeachment proceedings. Neither Andrew Jackson nor Bill Clinton resigned prior to not being convicted on the basis of a U.S. House impeachment. Several federal judges and one cabinet official, however, have resigned midway through impeachment proceedings prior to being convicted, and in those cases, the case was dismissed and no judgment was entered by the U.S. Senate, so they were not disqualified from holding future federal public offices. LONG ANSWER Relevant Constitutional Language The pertinent provisions of the U.S. Constitution include the following: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7: 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 7: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Article II, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Analysis The key language is in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution which states in the pertinent part that: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States[.] This means that a President who is impeached by the House and convicted by the U.S. Senate may be prohibited from holding any federal office from President to dogcatcher in the future. But, this can only be done in a "judgment" of the U.S. Senate in connection with an impeachment based upon a conviction in the U.S. Senate following a House impeachment, which has never happened. The history of the impeachment language and the limitation to removals from office, suggest that only a person who is current serving in office may be impeached. Otherwise, the proceeding would be invalid as moot, and would be dismissed (as it has been in the case of many judges who have resigned after investigations are initiated or after a House impeaches but prior to a conviction of impeachment). A U.S. Senate ruling that someone is disqualified from holding future office can only be entered in a judgment of conviction for impeachment, so cannot apply to a past President. If this were done it would probably be an invalid "Bill of Attainder" or "Ex Post Facto" law. See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"). And, the U.S. Senate can't pass a law unilaterally, or enter a judgment convicting someone on an impeachment unless the House initiates the proceeding. There is no precedent concerning whether if someone who was convicted by the U.S. Senate and removed from office based upon an impeachment initiated by the U.S. House, in which the judgment did not disqualify the person impeachment from holding future federal public offices, the U.S. Senate could amend its judgment later on to also disqualify the person so removed from office from holding further public office. I suspect that if the question were presented that the federal courts would hold that the amendment of the impeachment judgment was not valid because the word "judgment" implies an immediate ruling upon a case and not a perpetual right to hold the person subject to the judgment in limbo regarding the consequences of his impeachment conviction. | Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly. | In U.S. practice, double jeopardy protections attach once the jury is seated and this scenario contemplates the change in position arising at trial. A mistrial could be called, or a continuance obtained, if the defendant suddenly claimed an alibi defense, since that amounts of a defendant waiver of double jeopardy protections. But without proof that the witness was tampered with, obtained at the last moment, it can be difficult or impossible to get proof of tampering or to contradict the story with other evidence to undermine the credibility of the witness. The prosecution would probably request a recess in the trial to regroup and try to admit evidence that the testimony changing witness made a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of that witness, from whomever that witness told the first time (probably a law enforcement officer). But this is still far less convincing to a jury than an affirmative statement from a witnesses about a key fact. If the prosecution could find evidence of defense side tampering and present it to the judge in the hours or small number of days before the trial ends, it might be able to get a mistrial declared. But it is much harder to get a mistrial for witness tampering when the witness shows up and testifies contrary to prosecution expectations than it is when the witness is, for example, killed or kidnapped and doesn't appear to testify at trial at all. But if evidence of neither type could be obtained before the jury was sent to deliberate and evidence was closed, and the jury then acquitted the defendant, it would be very hard for the prosecution to change this result. Perhaps not completely impossible, but very nearly so. The witness could be (and in this circumstance, despite the extreme rarity of perjury prosecutions, probably would be) prosecuted for perjury, but that wouldn't change the acquittal. If a link to the defendant could be found, the defendant could also be prosecuted for witness tampering or obstruction of justice or something similar. But that is hard to prove (and the witness would probably have to be convicted or provided with use immunity for his testimony) to do so. In English criminal law practice, in contrast, the likelihood of having the verdict of acquittal set aside and getting a new trial would be much greater (and the likelihood of getting a recess mid-trial would be greater in far more common bench trials in lower level criminal cases), but it would still be a serious burden for the prosecution that it might not be able to overcome. Lawyers aren't entitled to expect that witnesses will testify exactly the way that they discussed things with the lawyers before trial, and this can be explained away with a variety of excuses that are usually true ("after thinking it over after meeting with you, I realized that I was confused and getting it wrong"), but are sometimes a cover for a change of story that is not sincere. I've had similar things happen a few times in civil litigation and there is only so much you can do about it. | Yes... whether the judge will grant the subpoena is another matter and one that it is to premature to speculate on. With what I have seen of the indictment, Pence was not named as a witness in the investigation, which will call into question why he is being asked to testify to events that were not used to indict Trump (if he saw something, that should come out in the investigation prior to trial.). Without some show that the testimony was material to the investigations findings and the charge I doubt it would be granted... but there's nothing stopping the prosecution for requesting the subpoena. | The Fifth Amendment always protects someone from being forced to testify against themselves if it would implicate them in a crime (see, among others, Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). Any person can assert the privilege, regardless of their role in the trial, with the possible exception of the plaintiff (who is the one person who wanted to go to court). Like always with the Fifth Amendment, they can answer some questions but not others (but if they do answer a question, they need to fully answer it). In civil cases, the Fifth Amendment itself does not keep the jury from making adverse inferences against whoever invoked the privilege; if you refuse to testify, they can assume that it's because testifying would be extremely damaging in that particular case. However, most states have rules against that, and so invoking the privilege in state courts generally works like it does in a criminal case (where the jury basically ignores that the question was even asked). In federal courts, if a case is being heard under diversity jurisdiction (plaintiff and defendant are from different states but the claim is not a federal claim) the state rule is supposed to apply; if the claim is a federal claim, the federal rule applies and adverse inferences are allowed. While the Fifth Amendment can be invoked by anyone, there may be consequences. In many states (where adverse inference isn't allowed), a witness who will just invoke the Fifth and answer no questions can't be called, because it's a complete waste of time. If the plaintiff invokes the Fifth to not answer key questions, then the court can potentially dismiss the case; they have the right to assert the privilege, but their lawsuit might suffer for it. In federal court, another possibility that's been done several times before is that the civil case is just put on hold until the criminal matter is resolved. Sources: “The Fifth Amendment Can & Will Be Used Against You In a (Federal) Court of Law” Taking the 5th: How to pierce the testimonial shield Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment | I don't know how that would end, but states' AGs have take action against Trump personally in other matters, and that's bubbling through the courts; latest news I found on something like that on quick search (May 15): A lawsuit accusing President Donald Trump of illegally profiting off the presidency through his luxury Washington hotel was revived Thursday by a divided federal appeals court. [...] Maryland Attorney General Brian Frosh and District Attorney General Karl Racine — both Democrats — said they hoped Thursday's ruling from the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond would jumpstart efforts by the two jurisdictions to obtain financial records showing how much state and foreign governments have paid the Trump Organization to stay at the hotel and hold events there. More than three dozen subpoenas issued to various government agencies were put on hold while Trump's appeal was pending. The lawsuit was filed almost three years ago. U.S. District Judge Peter Messitte refused to dismiss it, but his ruling was overturned in July by a three-judge panel of the 4th Circuit. The judges found that Maryland and the District of Columbia lacked standing to pursue their claims against the president. But on Thursday, the panel's ruling was overturned by the full court of 15 judges. In a 9-6 ruling, the court found that the three-judge panel overstepped its authority when it ordered Messitte to dismiss the lawsuit. "We recognize that the President is no ordinary petitioner, and we accord him great deference as the head of the Executive branch. But Congress and the Supreme Court have severely limited our ability to grant the extraordinary relief the President seeks," Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote for the majority in rejecting Trump's request to dismiss the lawsuit. All nine of the judges in the majority were nominated by Democratic presidents. The six judges who disagreed — all nominated by Republican presidents, including three by Trump — wrote a scathing dissenting opinion, saying the lawsuit should be thrown out. "The majority is using a wholly novel and nakedly political cause of action to pave the path for a litigative assault upon this and future Presidents and for an ascendant judicial supervisory role over Presidential action," Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III wrote. DOJ spokeswoman Brianna Herlihy said the department is disappointed in the ruling. Etc. |
Private Florida school won't employ vaccinated teachers Regarding: https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/private-florida-school-employ-vaccinated-teachers-77347282 If indeed it is true that Leila Centner is: Spreading False COVID-19 information that supports pandemic infections to parents / students Will not employ vaccinated teachers Questions: What, if any, statutes has Center run afoul? Is there precedent for the First amendment right to effectively enable behavior #1? | Vaccination status does not currently define a protected class under Florida or Federal law. Being or not being vaccinated is not legally recognized as a condition that "substantially limits a major life activity", hence is not an example of disability-related discrimination. The opposite scenario, where an employer refuses to hire an un-vaccinated person, potentially runs afoul of disability discrimination laws when a person has a legal disability that prevents their vaccination. As noted here, due to the scope of the Privacy Rule HIPAA does not directly apply to your question, when the patient discloses information. However, the healthcare provider cannot disclose such information without patient authorization. It's hard to see a First Amendment basis supporting the action (in case the law changes w.r.t. vaccination and discrimination). You could imagine a religion which holds that vaccination against some disease is blasphemy, and forcing an employer to hire the vaccinated is compelled speech which repudiates a fundament of their belief. Even so, it is not sufficient that the business owner holds some odd belief, the belief has to be essential to the nature of the business (see BSA v. Dale). That could be the case of a religious school. | There is no law in the US that says you must tell the truth on the internet. Some places where one must tell the truth are: When speaking to police, the FBI, and most government agencies When filing your taxes with the IRS In certain business contracts When testifying before Congress But on the internet, you can claim to be the first man on the moon with impunity. If someone is gullible enough to believe you and send you money, that is their fault and responsibility. As far as eating a Pangolin, why should she "admit" it, when it was documented on Instagram? There is no duty to officially apologize for it. You can try to report her to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which enforces the Endangered Species Act, but as it occurred outside the USA, they will be powerless. Her claims are dubious, and possibly incorrect. Her treatment of an endangered animal is reprehensible. However, you posted this to a law site, asking about "reporting it" (to some sort of authority), and tagged it "criminal law". Her behavior is troubling, but I don't see anything that is remotely illegal or criminal. | If you are in Florida, the notion that this is "the only store around" is simply not accurate. I doubt that there is any place in Florida that is not within 15-20 miles of at least two stores. In any case, the store is within its rights to ban you from the store even if you acted lawfully. | Sending a letter to the Governor is legal You can do it, I can do it and the elected officials of Lancaster County can do it. Thanks to the first amendment, that letter can say pretty much anything you like subject to limits that themselves are subject to strict scrutiny - things like threats and defamation. Outlining a course of action that you propose to take is legal even if that course of action is itself illegal. I will also point out that people - sometimes even politicians - have been known to say things they don't mean. However, that just begs the question ... This article explains what's going on and, more importantly, the actual letter is here. I've read it. Twice. I can't see where the county proposes to do anything concrete that might be considered illegal. Apart from the first paragraph, the entire letter appears to be a case for why the county should be permitted to move from red to yellow on May 15 and they are asking for the Governor's support. Even the first paragraph is ambiguous; while it asks the Governor to move the county from "red" to "yellow" and states that they "intend to move forward with a plan" it is by no means clear that that plan is moving from "red" to "yellow" even though you could get that impression on a casual reading. Basically, what they intend to do is so vague that it's impossible to tell if it's legal or not. Of course, just because something is illegal doesn't mean it can't be done. The USA is a free country and the fundamental freedom is to reap the consequences of your actions. If the county does something1 then the state can take them to court - the court will decide if it's legal or not. 1 Or threatens to do something sufficiently concrete that an injunction against it could be issued. | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. | I'm just asking what the legality is for parents to vaccinate their children against rabies if they were bitten by an animal. Also, would legal implications change if the animal that bit the child later tested positive for rabies or if the child insists on getting a rabies vaccine but the parent refuses? Can the parent be charged for a crime if the child develops symptomatic rabies and dies? In this circumstance, while a parent has fairly broad discretion, once the necessity of preserving a child's life comes into play and rabies can be deadly, that discretion ends and the child's life takes priority. Failing to do so could constitute child abuse and result in termination of parental rights and criminal sanctions for child abuse causing death or something similar. Simply failing to treat rabies out of good faith ignorance of the option, however, would ordinarily not be a criminal offense. | This sucks. It is also legal. It's a private school, they can admit who they like (provided they don't discriminate on the grounds of protected characteristics like "religion" or "caste"). | No, absent a state law to the contrary (and I am aware of no such law in this case) it is not illegal. Universities, as institutions, are permitted to express opinions on political issues, especially political issues that are pertinent to their operations. Indeed, they often do so. (Political candidates are arguably a different matter and certainly involve a more complex analysis to determine if the Johnson Amendment applies to a public university, but that isn't at issue in this case.) Governmental entities may not take religious positions, but may take political ones. Generally, even public colleges like Rutgers have this autonomy. Indeed, lobbying is frequently necessary for the survival of a public university - it has no choice but to lobby and a free hand regarding the issues upon which it does lobby. |
Are there legal limits to U.S. states taxing out-of-state income? When a New York State non-resident has NYS income, NY's tax rates are based NOT on the absolute amount of the NYS income, but on the non-resident's federal income, pro-rated to the percentage earned in NY. For example, if the non-resident earns $5000 in NY, and $95,000 elsewhere, her tax is not based on a $5000 income, but rather, she pays 5% of the tax on a $100,000 income. In this example 5% is the percent earned in NY. The computation is on NY's form IT203, lines 31 to 46. (I understand the progressive mindset behind this, and my question is not about whether it is fair or just). My question: Are there constitutional limits on how aggressive a state could be in doing such things? I'm surprised NYS can compel a non-resident to even disclose out of state income, let alone set a tax that is based on that entire income. They are not formally "taxing" that other income .... but could they? If I drive from New York to LA and pay tolls and sales taxes in every state along the way, establishing a very weak and dubious "nexus", does every state become entitled to, say, impose an income tax on my entire global income? Is there anything to stop states and local governments from setting taxes that accumulate to more than 100% of my income? A couple of straw man theories Perhaps an overly aggressive approach to taxing out of state revenue would intrude on the rights of Congress by having the side-effect of discouraging (therefore "regulating") interstate commerce? The NY approach to income tax (and apparently CA does the same thing) do not appear to have that effect. Perhaps there is no constitutional limitation to what a state can do, but economics and politics regulates this? If a state is overly aggressive, outsiders will cease to contribute to its economy, and the voters will respond. So it can be self-regulating. I'm skeptical, however, about whether 50 states would benevolently "self regulate" this way over 200 years. If no state has ever attempted a wild non-resident money grab it must be because they cannot. | Both the Due Process Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause impose meaningful limits on states' ability to tax income on residents. The Due Process Clause requires "minimum contacts" between the state and the taxpayer. Under the Due Process Clause, states may only tax a nonresident's income when there is a "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2019). Despite the word "minimum," there isn't any fixed threshold at which contacts become sufficient to permit a state to impose a tax. Instead, the courts will ask whether the state's assertion of jurisdiction to tax the person offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." A critical question in this analysis will be whether the taxpayer enjoyed the "benefits and protection" of the state in connection with the subject of the tax. In your examples, then, you can probably guess how the courts would view each transaction. If you are a Connecticut resident but perform a $5,000 job in New York, you have physically entered New York, likely conducted business with another New York entity, and you can go to the New York courts if the other party breaches the contract by which you earned the money. You have meaningful contacts with the state and enjoy the protection of its laws, so the state is permitted to impose a tax on the income from that transaction. But if you drive from New York to California, your presence in each state is likely highly transient. You pay tolls for using the highways and sales taxes for lunch or something, but you aren't generating any income from those transactions. Your presence in New Jersey would not, for instance, entitle you to go into New Jersey courts to sue for a breach of your New York contract. New Jersey has no meaningful connection to that income, so it may not tax it. But contrast that with your lunch purchase, which creates sufficient connections to New Jersey to permit it to tax that transaction: you are physically in New Jersey, you are protected by New Jersey's food-safety laws, and you can go into New Jersey courts if Burger King intentionally poisons you. So the state can impose a sales tax on that transaction, but not income tax on out-of-state transactions. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing the "unfair burden" of double taxation on interstate commerce. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits the states from regulating, restricting, or substantially burdening interstate commerce without the consent of Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear time and time again that income taxes violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when they create a risk of double taxation that doesn't exist for taxpayers with no out-of-state business: Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (“Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.”) Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 (1939) (“Such a multiplication of state taxes, each measured by the volume of the commerce, would reestablish the barriers to interstate trade which it was the object of the commerce clause to remove.”) Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801-2 (2015) (“The tax schemes held to be unconstitutional ... had the potential to result in the discriminatory double taxation of income earned out of state and created a powerful incentive to engage in intrastate rather than interstate economic activity.”) So even though New York and Connecticut have sufficient contacts from a due-process perspective to permit both of them to tax your business, they many not tax all of your income if not all of it if another state has a claim to it as well. This has of course led to debates over exactly how much of your income New York and Connecticut is entitled to, and the question only gets more complex for businesses with larger footprints. Amazon, for instance, is doing business in every state and territory, so how do we divide its income among the 50+ entities looking to take a bite of those hundreds of billions of dollars in income? For quite a long time, most states used a three-factor calculation that apportioned income among the states based on how much of they taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales were in each state. Oversimplified, this means that if you had 5 percent of your property in New York, 40 percent of your payroll in New York, and 15 percent of your sales in New York, that would average out to 20 percent, so you would pay New York taxes on 20 percent of your income. Over time, the three-factor apportionment method has fallen out of favor, and many states adopted other methods -- especially calculations that more heavily weight the sales factor -- to encourage economic development. Because most large companies have only a small portion of their sales in almost any given state, they can substantially reduce their tax bills by setting up their headquarters in a state that is going to ignore the value of their real estate, equipment, and payroll when calculating their tax bills. tl;dr: Under the Due Process Clause, a state can't impose tax on anything it doesn't have some meaningful connection to. Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the states have to find a way to make split up taxes that they might share a claim to. | Maybe, but it is not a de jure taking. There are vast numbers of restrictions on what one can do with one's property and on businesses that one can conduct on that property. Zoning ordinances prevent me from setting up a chemical factory where I have my house; I can't build it up 4 stories and there is an obligatory setback from the property line for any extension. I can't freely build on my land, I need government permission in the form of a permit. This is allowed (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255), when the regulatory action advances a legitimate governmental goal and therefore the action is not a taking. The government might "take" land by rendering it useless without the formality of condemnation (United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745). But a moratorium on evictions does not render the property useless. The tenant remains liable for rent. | It is more complicated. From Wikipedia “The United States has income tax treaties with over 65 countries. These treaties reduce the chance of double taxation by allowing each country to fully tax its citizens and residents and reducing the amount the other country can tax them. Generally the treaties provide for reduced rates of tax on investment income and limits as to which business income can be taxed. The treaties each define which taxpayers can benefit from the treaty.” | Yes, that would be legal, indeed required According to the Michigan Dept of the Treasury: Individuals or businesses that sell tangible personal property to the final consumer are required to remit a 6% sales tax on the total price (including shipping and handling charges) of their taxable retail sales to the State of Michigan. Sales of electricity, natural or artificial gas and home heating fuels for residential use are taxed at a 4% rate. Michigan does not allow city or local units to impose sales tax. According to the official Michigan State Sales Tax Handbook Groceries and Prescription Drugs are exempt from sales tax, but prepared food is not. This includes restaurant food, and would, I think, include drinks served in a bar. When I worked in a Michigan restaurant and bar about 40 years ago, sales tax was charged, to the best of my memory. | This Wikipedia article says that Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947): ...applied the Establishment Clause in the country's Bill of Rights to State law. Prior to this decision, the First Amendment's words, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" imposed limits only on the federal government, ... However, the Everson opinion does not say that. Rather it quotes Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) which says: The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states, declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." Everson did say: Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment did not apply as a restraint against the states. Most of them did soon provide similar constitutional protectionsfor religious liberty. Murdock goes on to say that: It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, the payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 292 U. S. 44-45, and cases cited. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. and goes on to say It is contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax -- a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution. Thus, it may not exact a license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce (McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 309 U. S. 56-58), although it may tax the property used in, or the income derived from, that commerce, so long as those taxes are not discriminatory. Id., p. 309 U. S. 47, and cases cited. A license tax applied to activities guaranteed by the First Amendment would have the same destructive effect. The Murdock case was not in a school context. It was a case of a license tax on door-to-door sellers of religious literature (Jehovah's Witnesses), which tax the court found unconstitutional under the Establishment clause. It does not proclaim the first incorporation of the Establishment clause, but it does not clearly cite any earlier case that does so incorporate that clause. Everson v. Board of Education is the earliest case which I can find that applies the Establishment Clause to a state law in the context of public schools. Specifically, it was a case where a NJ law which provided that tax funds be spent to provide transport for children to private schools, including religious schools -- in this case Catholic schools. The Court in Everson took it as unquestionable that the state could not set up religious institutions, including schools, but held that the payment of transportation at issue in the case was permitted, because its primary purpose was to aid the students, not the religious school, it was open to various private schools, not merely religious ones (although in practice only students of Catholic schools benefited in the district sued), and because it aimed to improve public safety, lest children otherwise walk or hitchhike along busy roads. The court wrote: The people there [in Virginia], as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group. The movement toward this end reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-86 when the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia's tax levy for the support of the established church. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the fight against this tax. Madison wrote his great Memorial and Remonstrance against the law. In it, he eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either believer or nonbeliever, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free, and that cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established religions. Leaving history the Everson opinion goes on to say that: In recent years, so far as the provision against the establishment of a religion is concerned, the question has most frequently arisen in connection with proposed state aid to church schools and efforts to carry on religious teachings in the public schools in accordance with the tenets of a particular sect. Some churches have either sought or accepted state financial support for their schools. Here again, the efforts to obtain state aid or acceptance of it have not been limited to any one particular faith. The state courts, in the main, have remained faithful to the language of their own constitutional provisions designed to protect religious freedom and to separate religions and governments. The Everson opinion did not directly consider the case of a government actually running a religious school. It said that the meaning of the Establishment clause from cases applying it to the Federal Government before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment should also be used in cases applying it to state actions. It cited as earlier cases following that rule: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413; Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501. In particular West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette was in a school context, specifically about a law requiring school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, against claims of some Jehovah's Witnesses that this constituted an act of idolatry, and was religiously forbidden. (Children who refused were expelled, and their parents were prosecuted for failure to have their children attend school) The Barnette opinion said: Over a decade ago, Chief Justice Hughes led this Court in holding that the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition by peaceful and legal means to organized government was protected by the free speech guaranties of the Constitution. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 35 ... It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. ... The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not excepted. ... The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. it is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. ... It is important to note that, while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State, it is the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case. This is clearly the language of incorporation of the 1st into the 14th against an agency of state government, specifically a school board. The The Barnette opinion goes on to say: Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. ... If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us. [Footnote 19] We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power, and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. Somewhat later the case of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) considered an official school prayer used in the public schools of New York state, and held that it was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion said: We think that, by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty. The nature of such a prayer has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this, and the trial court expressly so found[.] [T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that, in this country, it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. That would seem to firmly dispose of any idea of a goverment-run religious school. As most if not all states had (and still have) their own versions of the Establishment Clause somewhere in their state constitutions prior to the passage of the Federal 14th Amendment, such schools might have been prevented by such state provisions. | Generally speaking, fraud in connection with an affirmative statement, in both criminal and civil cases, is limited to false statements of a presently existing material fact. Future income is not a presently existing fact. So, simply incorrectly stating your future income is not fraud. But, you are affirming when you make such a statement that you presently sincerely believe that you will have a future income of approximately the amount stated. And, if you make a statement about your future income when you do not actually believe that you will have that future income, then you have still committed fraud. In practice, there are lots of gray areas where a judge or jury considering the case would have to weigh the facts and your credibility. If you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $1,000,000 in the next year, when you had never done so before and didn't even have any plausible plan other than playing the lottery for doing so, this would almost surely be credit card application fraud. On the other hand, if you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $50,000 in the next year, when your income in past years had ranged from $30,000 to $45,000 from self-employment, and you believed sincerely that improvements in your marketing efforts and current economic trends were going to make the coming year your best year ever for income from self-employment that would give you a $50,000 income in the coming year, that would not be fraud. Where exactly the line between not fraud and fraud is drawn would be for the tier of fact to decide when and if the case went to trial. | It depends in part on what you mean by "money". US $100 bills are a prime example of "money". Art 1 §10 Cl. 1 of the US Constitution says No State shall ...coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts... Under the constitution, only the federal government can "print money" in the "universally usable" sense. Anyone can print or otherwise "emit" objects with economic value, and such objects can be voluntarily accepted in trade. State and local governments can incur debts and thus spend money now that they do not yet have, as long as there is no legal limit on a government's ability to go into debt. California could issue IOU-bucks with the intent that a holder could redeem them as real federal money or as gold or silver at some point. This limits the ability of a state treasury to print money, since in principle and practice it is redeemable in gold or silver. Each state has some set of laws and constitutional provisions that prevent writing rubber checks ad infinitum, for example only allowing debt for large capital projects (building) and requiring voter approval; requiring expenditures to not exceed projected revenues; granting emergency debt-mitigation powers (e.g. hiring freezes) to the governor when a state does go into unauthorized debt. In California, Art IV §12 of the state constitution requires a balanced budget, meaning that the state cannot create infinite obligations without infinite revenues. From the legal perspective, private banks do not create money, although non-legally, people may talk about what banks do as "creating money". At that point in the discussion, we will have left law and moved to the realm of economic theory. | Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns. |
Is Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms limited by Section 1? Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides as follows: Exception where express declaration 33 (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 [of the Charter] [...] Section 1 of the Charter states that: Rights and freedoms in Canada 1 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Does Section 1 imply that all uses of Section 33 are potentially subject to judicial review and may be invalidated upon a finding by a court that the limitation of Charter rights that was imposed by the legislature through Section 33 is not justifiable in a free and democratic society? Related: Could the Holocaust legally happen in modern day Canada? | No, it is not. Section 1 allows legislatures to infringe all Charter rights under certain reasonable circumstances. Section 33 is an alternative method by which legislatures can completely ignore the Charter rights that it can be applied to (ss. 2 & 7 to 15). Section 33 is a legislative procedural provision, it is not in itself an inherent right which would be subject to Section 1. Furthermore, reading Section 1 to apply in this way to Section 33 would completely eviscerate the meaning of Section 33 since it is a stronger mechanism for violating Charter rights. Case law on this is few due to the relative rarity of legislatures invoking the Section 33 notwithstanding clause and the fact that invoking it is generally a shield to judicial review. However, while not explicitly confirming what I said, Ford v. Quebec (AG) [1988] 2 SCR 712 basically takes for granted the above and applies it (note it can be a confusing read due to three different Charters being involved). In it, ss. 58 & 69 of Quebec's Charter of the French Language were disputed. Due to legislative hijinks*, it was unclear whether either section was covered by an invocation of the notwithstanding clause. The Court first undertook a procedural analysis to determine whether the notwithstanding clause applied and found that s. 58 was covered, but s. 69 was not (para. 34). Only after that did it address the substantive rights issues. While still analysing both ss. 58 & 69 to fall within the guarantees of Charter s. 2(b), the court only concluded s. 69 to infringe the Charter since (implicitly) s. 58 was not eligible for such a determination by virtue of the notwithstanding clause (para. 60). As Charter rights were found to be infringed, the Court then examined whether s. 69 could saved under Section 1. It could not, thus rendering it an unjustifiable infringement of the Charter (para. 73). *To keep this answer both short and focussed on law, we really do not have time to get into the Quebec government's initial responses to the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982. | The power definitely exists, and it is also said by some (respectable persons) that they have a duty to do so. There are many schools of legal interpretation. One trend is to attempt to discern legislative intent, based on whatever facts there might be such as newspaper articles or legislative committee reports. A contrary trend is to look exclusively at the text enacted by the legislature – this school is known as the Textualist school, and is currently dominant in the US Supreme Court. There are also non-textualist "progressive" trends that seek justice according to some social principle, rather than the text of the law or the definitive intent of the original legislators, which may address the situation that you have in mind. In civil cases, statutory law tends to be rather unclear, allowing a judge to decide on the basis of their beliefs of what is fair, equitable or just. That is because in the common law, close to a millenium old, judgments were supposed to be "just". In the US, much of the common law has been re-coded as statutory law, and in that case, the intent of the legislature is really to "encode the sense of justice implicit in the common law". This does not mean that trial judges have unlimited power to set aside the words of existing laws. Their primary obligation is to apply the law literally, as interpreted by their superiors (appellate courts). When the higher courts are silent and when the legislature is not clear, the trial judge has some leeway to follow whichever jurisprudential philosophy they adhere to. | Canada Short version: In the mid-'90s, a Supreme Court decision and an Act of Parliament clarified the legal process under which a province could secede from Canada. While unilateral secession need not be recognized, the Canadian government would be obliged to negotiate the secession of a province following a sufficiently clear referendum result. Long version: Since around the mid-20th century, there has been an active sovereigntist movement in the province of Quebec, and a sovereigntist party (the Parti Québecois, or PQ) has formed the provincial government in Quebec a few times. The PQ has twice held referendums on whether Quebec should separate from Canada. The first referendum, in 1980, was soundly defeated; but the second referendum, in 1995, was defeated by a margin of only about 1% of the votes cast. The question in this second referendum was criticized by the federalist movement as being rather confusing and convoluted. It also later emerged that the PQ government at the time had planned to unilaterally declare independence if the sovereigntist option had won, even at a 50% + 1 level. In response to these events, two major events occurred which greatly clarified the legal and political circumstances under which a province would be "allowed" to secede from Canada. First, in Reference re: Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada found that according to principles of both Canadian and international law, a province does not have the right to unilaterally secede; but they also found that the federal government is obliged to negotiate secession after a vote in favor of separation. [As an aside, the discussion in the Reference re: Secession of Quebec concerning the various issues at play is broadly applicable to any separatist movement, and the decision is worth reading if you want to delve into this more.] Second, the Parliament of Canada passed the Clarity Act, which more clearly laid out the conditions under which the government of Canada would recognize a secession vote. The provisions of the Clarity Act are as follows: Giving the House of Commons the power to decide whether a proposed referendum question was considered clear before the public vote; Specifically stating that any question not solely referring to secession was to be considered unclear; Giving the House of Commons the power to determine whether or not a clear majority had expressed itself following any referendum vote, implying that some sort of supermajority is required for success; Stating that all provinces and the First Nations were to be part of the negotiations; Allowing the House of Commons to override a referendum decision if it felt the referendum violated any of the tenets of the Clarity Act; The secession of a province of Canada would require an amendment to the Constitution of Canada. Taken together, the Supreme Court decision and the Clarity Act present a relatively clear legal & political path by which a Canadian province could secede. However, in the original question you ask Is there any sovereign country which currently has a law which would allow an arbitrary part of its territory to declare independence on its own if a majority of that territory is in favor? (bolding mine). If by "on its own" you mean "unilaterally, without negotiation", then strictly speaking this does not apply to Canada; a negotiation process and a constitutional amendment would also be required in the wake of a secession vote. Reference re: Secession of Quebec specifically bars a unilateral declaration of independence. Ironically (or perhaps because of these measures), support for sovereignty in Quebec has fallen significantly since 1995, and multiple splinter parties have formed out of the PQ. It therefore seems unlikely that the provisions of the Clarity Act will be tested in the near future. | A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act. | This is known as the "ministerial exception". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability. | The United States would be one such country. I'm sure it is not the only one. In the case of countries with constitutional courts there is basically no one to second guess their interpretations which is also true when the apex court in a country provides an opinion. Since no one can overrule many of these courts, they are allowed to do what they want. | The Canadian law governing interception of communication (wiretapping and recording) is explained here. Canada is a one-party country, so as long as one party (you, for example) consent, this would not be a violation of that statute. That source also believes (not unreasonably) that is would not constitute the tort of invasion of privacy since under the act The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled … is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard to the lawful interests of others (bearing in mind that is it allowed w.r.t. Section 184(1) of the Criminal Code: that is, it is reasonable to do so). | Section 381.00316 is unconstitutional because it is an unjustifiable content-based restriction on speech, in violation of the First Amendment. The law is unconstitutional because private businesses and their owners have a First Amendment right to demand that their customers engage in speech as a condition of doing business. If you've watched Showtime at the Apollo or America's Got Talent, you understand the concept that a business owner can make decisions -- objectively or subjectively -- about what kinds of speech they want to host. If you want to make it through your performance, it's incumbent on you to satisfy the predilections of the business owner. And this doesn't just apply to TV. If you went to a poetry slam at your local coffee shop, the owners could boot you if talked through the performances, making it difficult for other customers to enjoy the show. Likewise, they could boot you if you went to the mic and started spouting racist nonsense, or if you just stood at the mic and said nothing at all. In the Florida case, Norwegian is doing the same thing -- just not for artistic reasons. Beyond requiring customers to pay for a ticket, it is requiring its customers to communicate the message that they are vaccinated, and they are requiring them to communicate using written documentation. In other words, Norwegian is demanding that customers engage in speech ("I am vaccinated") in a certain way (written proof of vaccination), and that kind of exchange falls within the protections of the First Amendment. That speech is subject to regulation because of its vaccination-related content of that speech, making Section 381.00316 a content-based restriction on speech, which subjects it to strict scrutiny, meaning that the state cannot enforce the law unless it furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. The state argued that the law furthered compelling governmental interests in protecting medical privacy and preventing discrimination, but the court wasn't buying it: Here, Defendant has presented no evidence to demonstrate that his asserted interests are in response to real problems that Florida residents are actually facing. There is no evidentiary support to show that residents have experienced intrusions on their medical privacy or discrimination because some businesses, including cruise lines, have required COVID-19 vaccination documentation. The legislative record cited by Defendant is bereft of any facts or data underpinning the Statute’s purported purpose. In light of the absence of any appropriate data, reports, or even anecdotal evidence on this issue, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant’s articulated interests are based on a problem that exists in fact. And even if these were compelling interests, the state failed to prove that the law was actually advancing them. Because the law outlawed the exchange of written communication rather than outlawing the vaccination requirements themselves, businesses remained free to demand information about vaccination status (through oral statements, for instance), and to discriminate against who they knew or believed to be unvaccinated. (N.B.: For procedural reasons, they court actually applied intermediate scrutiny, but the law ends up invalid for basically the same reasons.) Section 381.00316 is unconstitutional because it substantially burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The law was also struck down because it intrudes on the federal government's authority to regulate interstate (and international) commerce. When a law is challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, courts ask two questions: (1) Does the state law favor in-state economic interests; and (2) Does the state law's burden on interstate commerce outweigh the legitimate local benefits to the state? A "yes" answer to either will invalidate the law. Here, the court held that the law did not directly favor in-state economic interests, but that the burdens on commerce outweighed the local benefits. Because the law did not meaningfully advance any of the local interests it had invoked (as discussed above), but it did impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce because Norwegian's ships travel to additional ports where proof of vaccination is required: Section 381.00316 will prevent NCLH and other cruise lines from possessing verified information necessary to effectively and efficiently process landing and disembarking at various, preferred domestic and international ports where documentary proof of vaccination is required. This affects not only opportunities for vacation activities like sightseeing, but also responses to mechanical and medical emergencies, or even geopolitical crises. Depriving cruise lines of corroboration of passengers’ vaccination status impedes their ability to prepare and address these eventualities. Either the First Amendment violation or the Commerce Clause violation would have been independently enough to invalidate the statute. Norwegian also argued that the statute was preempted by the CDC's Conditional Sailing Order and related orders, but the court declined to address that argument. |
Can a jury award a defendant in a criminal trial money? Hypothetically, Adam is charged with a crime and stays in jail for a few months before going before a jury. The jury decides that not only is Adam innocent, but he's so obviously innocent that he never should have been charged in the first place. Can the jury compensate Adam for this? If not, can Adam be compensated at all? | In the US this is generally governed by state law: RCW 4.24.350 in Washington state. The criminal jury is not empowered to make such a decision, but a separate civil trial for malicious prosecution would be possible. Plaintif (ex defedant) would have to prove that the action was instituted with knowledge that the same was false, and unfounded, malicious and without probable cause in the filing of such action, or that the same was filed as a part of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by filing an action known to be false and unfounded The basis for the lawsuit would be the objective facts that prove that the prosecution was false and malicious, and not the fact of acquittal or the subjective opinion of a juror. | You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm. | Yes Usually, whoever got their hands on the defendant first would have first crack at it. The second jurisdiction would commonly not prosecute provided that justice was done in the first but they can - double jeopardy is not in play as a bar as they are different legal systems but courts usually apply the spirit that a person shouldn’t be punished twice for the same act. | A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth. | Short answer, yes, jurors will typically render a decision of guilt vs. innocence. This is pretty common in nations where the legal system is derived from British Common Law (about 2 billion people world wide live in a Common Law nation). The U.S. is unique in that it uses juries for Civil Trials as well as Criminal Trials. The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution in which the 6th amendment guarantees the right to trial by impartial jury (contrary to popular opinion, it is not a jury of peers, as this alludes to the Peerage systems, which the U.S. never adopted). That line is from the Magna Carta which was influential in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. A jury usually consists of a panel of 12 people pulled from the locality of the crime, unless a change of venue has been granted because the alleged crime is so well known an impartial jury cannot be seated from the population. The jury will hear all the evidence from both sides, as well as opening and closing arguments. They will be provided "jury instructions" by the judge and must find if the evidence presented (The Facts) meet the criteria for a conviction of a charged crime (The Law). In all Jury Trials, a Jury fills the role of "Trier of Fact" while the Judge fills the role of "Trier of Law." While the judge has the education background to understand what the law says constitutes a crime and how to find that law as well as how to make sure the defense and plaintiff/prosecution make fair arguments, any random group of 12 people can understand facts and put together whose story they believe, the defense's or the prosecution's. In the case of an innocent person being convicted due to inept defense, this does happen and is horrible, but there are recourses in the form of appeals courts, which can overturn a trial and order that a new one be held (a mistrial, essentially, the original trial never happened and the person is legally innocent. Try again and do it proper this time.) Ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid grounds for appeal of a conviction and does happen. In the other scenario, an inept prosecution, this does happen as well and it's not the fault of the jury that the guilty person went free, but for the prosecution. The prosecutor is at a disadvantage in every criminal case to balance out the fact that their office has more resources to bring to bear then most defendants. Among these handicaps is that their "story" about what happened must not have any "plot holes" in it (beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard of proof) and that the prosecution has to convince 12 people that their story is the only way this could happen (try convincing 12 random people to agree to anything more complicated than "the sky is blue and grass is green") and they only have one shot to do it (Double Jeopardy essentially bars the prosecutor's office from initiating the appeals process... and blocks someone who is declared innocent from doing it because why the hell would you want to?!). Here, the problem is that the Prosecutor doesn't have to charge the accused right away and has a bit of generous time to investigate (depends on statute of limitations on particular crimes) ... but the right to a speedy trial means that once charges are filed, the clock starts on how long the prosecution has to bring the case. Delay to long and the judge will give a directed verdict that the person is innocent because the prosecution wasn't ready. The importance of this fact that is a staple belief of Common Law is in the "Blackstone Ratio" which states: Better that 10 guilty people go free than a single innocent person suffers So the jury finding the prosecution inept is certainly the prosecutor's problem, not the jury's problem. It's a feature not a bug. If an innocent person does suffer, then we have a bug and we must see that it is corrected. As a final note, the jury also has the power of Jury Nullification of the Law. In the U.S. it's not really certain if Jury Nullification invalidates the law completely but in effect, it allows the Jury to declare a person innocent because, while they believe the prosecution's story that the defendant did what they were accused of, they don't believe this person should be convicted because they believe the crime they're accused of should have never been a crime in the first place. | In general, the perpetrator can be sued by anyone who suffered harm as a result of his actions. The fact that he's also being prosecuted criminally doesn't change that, nor does it matter whether or not the victim is a "celebrity". The perpetrator could, for instance, be sued by any or all of: the victim himself, for his pain and suffering and loss of earnings the victim's club, for the financial loss due to the player not playing the victim's medical insurer, for the cost of his care. However, even if any of these plaintiffs win their case and are awarded some huge sum of money, it doesn't help them if the perpetrator doesn't have the money. They can only actually collect what the perpetrator has, and possibly some fraction of his future earnings (which are not likely to be very much if he is in prison). So unless the perpetrator is quite wealthy, it's unlikely they would go to the trouble and expense of a lawsuit. | The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions. | It is possible that someone is convicted. Destruction of evidence an constitute circumstantial evidence that a crime was committed, and other evidence, such as testimony, could pin the crime to one of the four possible suspects. A jury has broad discretion to assess the weight of the evidence. |
Title 53, why is it reserved? Title 53 is currently 1 of 54 titles that make up the United States Code, each title is marked with the topic of law it contains, but Title 53 is marked as reserved. The listing of Title goes: Title 52--Voting And Elections Title 53--[Reserved] Title 54--National Park Services And Related Programs Is there a specific reason why Title 53 was skipped over? Are there certain plans for what Title 53 is going to be? | So a little background will help. the United States Code has only been around since 1926 where before the law was a patchwork of acts. Over time congress has taken a bundle of acts and relegated them to be covered by a title in the code. This project is still on going with legislation for Title 52 and Title 54 passing in 2014. Title 53 is a work in progress intended at this time for Small Business matters but has not yet had legislation approved for it so at this time the legislation is reserved. Here is an explanation from Congress over H.R. 6389 (115th Congress): Originally enacted as title II of the Act of July 30, 1953 (ch. 282, 67 Stat. 232), the Small Business Act of 1953 was made a separate Act, renamed the Small Business Act, and revised by Public Law 85–536 on July 18, 1958. A month later, by Public Law 85–699, Congress enacted the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. Since 1958, the Acts have been amended a number of times and have been supplemented by provisions in other Acts that, while they do not amend either Act by their terms, have the effect of modifying the Acts. Some of the amendments added provisions that are now obsolete, and some added provisions that are inconsistent with other provisions. The Acts are classified to separate chapters of title 15 of the United States Code. The bill restates the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 631 et seq.), the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 661 et seq.), and related provisions of other Acts as a new positive law title of the United States Code. The new positive law title replaces the former provisions, which are repealed by the bill. The bill was prepared by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel as part of the Office’s ongoing responsibility under section 205(c) of House Resolution No. 988, 93d Congress, as enacted into law by Public Law 93–554 (2 U.S.C. 285b), ‘‘[t]o prepare, and submit to the Committee on the Judiciary one title at a time, a complete compilation, restatement, and revision of the general and permanent laws of the United States’’. The bill is a codification measure prepared in accordance with section 205(c) of House Resolution No. 988, 93d Congress as en- acted into law by Public Law 93–554 (2 U.S.C. 285b). The purpose of the bill is to enact a restatement of certain existing law relating to small business as a positive law title of the United States Code. The restatement of existing law does not change the meaning or effect of the existing law. The restatement consolidates various provi- sions that were enacted separately over a period of many years, reorganizing them, conforming style and terminology, modernizing obsolete language, and correcting drafting errors. These changes serve to remove ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections, but they do not change the meaning or effect of the existing law or impair the precedential value of earlier judicial decisions or other interpretations. | These situations do come up (and incidentally, this is nothing new, it has been a difficult and recurring legal issue since at least the 18th century), and they really suck to be in, and often there aren't easy answers. There are a lot of legal doctrines out there that are designed to avoid a hard clash of conflicting court orders and to prevent someone from suffering contempt of court sanctions when they are in this bind. Generally, litigants caught in this bind look for these outs. For example, when particular property or records are at issue, often the person in question will "interplead" the property placing it in the jurisdiction of a court to resolve and out of their hands. There is a doctrine called in custodia legis which provides that once something is in the custody of a court that another court may not exercise jurisdiction over it. The entire sub-field of civil procedure pertaining to jurisdiction and venue is designed to avoid these conflicts. U.S. law has a whole sub-field a statutes and legal doctrines like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine designed to prevent these conflicts from coming up when they arise between federal and state courts. One of the most important legal doctrines is that a person cannot be punished for contempt of court for failing to do something that the person being held in contempt of court does not have the ability to do. One argument, which doesn't always work, is that once you are subject to a legally binding court order that has been served upon you that you may not legally defy that court order in order to follow the order of a court which cannot override the decisions of the court issuing the first order. Usually, contempt citations are directed at individual employees or agents rather than at entities. For example, in a dispute over Indian Trust Funds against the United States government, contempt citations were brought against the Secretary of Interior personally and could have sent that individual to jail for not complying. One way the an individual can get out of the order relating to an employment or professional duty is to resign from office and thus deprive oneself of the ability to perform the order. But, the short answer is that there is no one simple legal rule for resolving these situations, and the litigants stuck in these situations look for every available legal argument to resolve it until it is resolved. | In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business". | A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months). | why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications. | So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds. | Almost none. It is a legacy of the era when copyright protection was a function of year of publication. Including it is appropriate, however, to meet the formal requirements for a legal notice of claim of copyright which has some procedural implications if it is omitted. | It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed. |
Can a ® so small as to be reduced to a dot confer any legal protection? The Bank of America iPhone app's icon has a very small ® next to the logo (shown below). The ®, barely visible in the blown-up picture below, is reduced to a small, vaguely pinkish dot on any device where the app may be found running, making its interior "R" practically indiscernible. I am wondering whether the implied presence of this symbol is still capable of carrying any legal force considering that the symbol itself cannot be made out. | In united-states trademark law, 15 U.S.C. § 1111 provides that: Notice of registration; display with mark; recovery of profits and damages in infringement suit Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1072 of this title, a registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, may give notice that his mark is registered by displaying with the mark the words "Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office" or "Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off." or the letter R enclosed within a circle, thus ®; and in any suit for infringement under this chapter by such a registrant failing to give such notice of registration, no profits and no damages shall be recovered under the provisions of this chapter unless the defendant had actual notice of the registration. Notice that display of the symbol is optional, the registrant "may give notice" by using the phrase or the ® symbol. But if such notice is not given a significant element of damages in case of an infringement is forfeit unless the infringer had "actual notice" of the registration of the mark. Since the purpose is to give notice that a word, symbol, logo or other indication is in fact a registered mark, making the registration so small that it cannot easily be seen might tend to defeat that purpose. If an infringer claimed not to be aware that an indication was a registered mark, and if the notice was displayed or printed in so small a form that this claim was plausible, it might raise an issue in an infringement suit. I have not found any caselaw on the point. "Finessing the Details of Type: Registered, Trademark, & Copyright Symbols" by Ilene Strizver advises that: These symbols are used at so small a size that they should be neutral in appearance, yet clear at the size they will be reproduced at ... when using a ® or a ™ after a word, the size should be adjusted as necessary, independently from the rest of the text, to look clear and legible, yet unobtrusive. Its proportion next to the neighboring word or glyph depends a lot on the final size of each appearance. A general guideline for text is to make these symbols a little smaller than half the x-height. As the type gets larger, the symbols can become proportionately smaller, especially in headlines. However this is a guide for typesetters and graphic designers, and is not legal advice. Several sources indicate that a single use of the R-in-a-circle in connection with a particular mark in any given document or set of packaging is sufficient (as is also mentioned in a comment). If elsewhere in the same web site the logo is displayed in a larger size, with a larger version of the symbol, that would probably offer all the protection needed under US law. This answer is US-centric. Law elsewhere may or may not be similar. | What you are describing may be the crime of insurance fraud: to avoid that, you would have to admit to the insurance company that you put a "Please steal me" sign in an unlocked car with the keys in the ignition, in a high-crime area. If we remove some of the elements of the scenario and reduce this to "leaving the keys in the ignition", this would probably be be considered contributory negligence, meaning that you failed to act prudently to protect your property. This can reduce the amount that the insurance company has to pay you. At this point, it depends on what state you're in, since sometimes a little bit of negligence (in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) means that you may get nothing. However, negligence hinges on an assessment of the actions and intentions of a party, and what you describe isn't "neglect", there is the direct intent that the car be stolen. Insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional loss. So the bottom line would be that the person would be out a car, and could be in prison for fraud if they did not reveal what they actually did. One should assume that the thieves took a lulz video of the sign before they stole the car, and posted it on FaceTube where it entered the viral hall of fame and was used against you in a court of law, so fraud is the worst choice. An alternative if you have a car is to donate it to charity, and take a tax write-off. | So-called AI software does not enjoy a special legal status (at present: one never knows what new law might be added). The question of whether any software can be distributed "safely" or "responsibly" is also not a legal issue. Nor is "true sentience" a relevant consideration, and nothing is guaranteed. When you distribute software of any kind, there is an implied warranty that the product is "fit", and if software kills you, you may be able to sue the creator for negligence. A software creator may then want to disclaim liability, by saying "WARNING: THIS PROGRAM MAY KILL YOU. OCP IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY INJURIES ARISING FROM USE OF THIS PRODUCT". This may or may not actually remove liability. In the UK "liability for negligence occasioning death or personal injury cannot be excluded", so such a disclaimer will not prevent a suit against the manufacturer. In the US, the issue is determined at the level of the state – here is a summary of the law in the states. Probably the primary question would be whether such a disclaimer is an unconscionable term, and the second question is whether the act constituted gross negligence (not simply "negligence"). Mississippi exceptionally does not allow disclaimers, but even then, it does allow disclaiming liability when it comes to computer hardware and software. A software disclaimer is not inherently unconscionable, though perhaps some specific disclaimer would be found to be. Courts typically disfavor disclaimers in the case of gross negligence, and again determining what constitutes "gross negligence" is determined on a state by state basis. If the act shows "reckless indifference to the rights of others" and "failure to use even slight care or conduct that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of others", then the act might be grossly negligent. | The law is here (too long to quote, or understand). There is a proposed modification of the law which may be enacted. In the section Justification, it is noted that under the existing law a global corporation may technically "own" five subsidiary corporations. Company A may own a winery in France while Company D may own a hotel containing a restaurant in New York. Under New York Law, the liquor license for the restaurant would be prohibited - and it could be subject to financial penalties. So the restrictions are broader that you mention (ownership of stock is an "interest"), but certainly what you mention is prohibited. The proposed law limits the effect to an interest in a restaurant or brewery "licensed under this chapter", i.e. in the state of New York (currently, a NY manufacturer cannot have an interest in an alcohol-selling restaurant anywhere). | For your example of items with Marvel characters on them for sale by people and companies not licensed by Marvel, Redbubble clearly states that We ask, rather we beg, that you remember this when you are posting work on Redbubble. If you make sure that all the works you upload consist of your very own, original ideas and are not infringing on the intellectual property or publicity rights of another... (from https://help.redbubble.com/hc/en-us/articles/201579195 ) and further, Redbubble has full contact information for the submission of Notice and Takedown Reports by each real trademark owner. There are many individuals who upload products which use unlicensed artwork in violation of trademarks, and Redbubble acknowledges this and gives recourse to the license holder to inform them so they can remove the items. It's not a perfect system, but Redbubble it seems makes every effort to help police their market. ( Teepublic has a very clear policy statement, too: https://www.teepublic.com/copyright-policy ) Many companies - such as Marvel - employ agents to regularly check such websites and issue takedown demands to the sites; the sites in turn remove the products, and in some instances, ban the individual from using the site again. In the case of Amazon, there can be two types of products sold that use trademarked artwork and characters: items sold by legitimate businesses that have license agreements with the trademark owners and who have the products sold by Amazon itself; and items sold on the Amazon marketplace by individuals who open Amazon Marketplace accounts themselves and don't have licenses. Amazon will be sure to check the products they sell; they will have a takedown notices system for their marketplace vendors. eBay is somewhat the same way; there is a mix of individuals and businesses on eBay, but eBay doesn't operate an umbrella sell/ship by eBay, like Amazon. It's kind of a whack-a-mole situation on the Interwebs. How much time/money does a company spend to chase down trademark infringement? Is it worth going to court for persistent violators? (These are, for the most part, civil cases, not criminal). Violators can always open a new account on sites such as Redbubble and eBay under a different name. And it starts all over again. | The US does not provide copyright protection for font design. As long as you dont distribute font generating programs, that would themselves be copyrighted, you are not infringing. Your derived information is okay because it is derived from a non-copyrightable work and is therefore not a derivative work. https://law.stackexchange.com/a/25673/1340 | Intentional sabotage of a TSA computer system is almost certainly a serious crime and would also almost surely give rise to civil liability, although you might avoid both if you warned the TSA that the phone was set up to intentionally break their system, in which case it might be confiscated as contraband. If the product had a "feature" unknown to you and that you had no reasonable reason to know of that caused the harm, you would ultimately have no criminal or civil liability, although the manufacturer might be strictly liable to the TSA under a product liability theory, and you would probably be detained as a witness to figure out what happened. If the product had a "feature" that broke the TSA computer that could be de-activated and that you meant to de-active but carelessly failed to, you would have negligence liability to the government and might or might not have criminal liability (I'm not enough of an expert in the relevant statutes to know). You might be liable for a strict liability Federal Communications Commission offense for having a device that is in violation of their regulations. | Yes, if you do not use the trademarked name. In the U.S. the graphical shape of fonts are not protected by copyright. See 37 CRF section 202.1 Typefaces are specifically excluded. Excluded are under (a) "mere variations of typographic ornamentation," and (e) "Typeface as typeface." The computer code that a font/typeface program uses to produce the shapes can be copyright. Importantly, fonts are protected by their trademarked names. |
GDPR Disclaimer On Cold Call Emails I live in the United States. I am helping someone who just started an online store selling tee shirts. In my research to come up with a plan regarding cold call email marketing, I came across GDPR. Her target market is the US, but she is not opposed to selling to anyone in the EU either. She wants to send advertisements via email to potential customers to introduce her store. In reading about GDPR, I understand the fines can be astronomical for contacting someone who is a citizen of a country governed by GDPR. That is the scenario, here are my questions: If her intent is to market to US based customers only and has a disclaimer on the ad, will that protect her from violating GDPR? Her disclaimer would look something like this: "GDPR Disclaimer - This advertisement is intended to introduce potential US based customers to XYZ company...yada yada yada. If you have received this email and if you reside in a country controlled by the GDPR law, this email was not intended for you and was sent to you in error. There is nothing you have to do, you are not subscribed on any list and you will not receive any further contact". She has obtained a list of hundreds email addresses from the internet. She has no idea who owns a given email address nor what country they reside in. Cold calling (not spamming) is allowed here in the United States. The fact that GDPR strongly discourages it (or outlaws it...not really sure which one when it comes to GDPR) should not preclude her from trying to reach potential customers in her own country. There are some domain extensions she would avoid entirely (such as "de" for Germany) as she would have the assumption any email in that domain would be for Germany and thus controlled by GDPR. Other domains are not that clear cut. The "com" domain is mainly US commercial, but "gmail.com" is a email provider which is global. How can I know if a given email address (for instance "[email protected]" is for a person in the United States, Europe, Australia, Japan or wherever? "jsmith" doesn't even really have to belong to someone with a first initial of "j" and a last name of "smith". It could be an alias for someone else. My point and my question is this. My friend doesn't want to violate GDPR, but at the same time she doesn't want to be precluded from marketing to potential customers in the US. How does she know if an email address is controlled by GDPR. It seems to me that there would have to be a way to know this or it cannot be enforced up to the point when it is discovered. Does this make sense? Is there any repository (online database) that would tell me is a given email address is owned by person who is in a country that is controlled by GDPR? It seems to me that there should be. She should be able to comply with the law by submitting her (say 500) list of email addresses in a query to a GDPR database and it kicking back the 20 or 30 addresses that are protected. In that way, she knows who she can market to and who she can't. As I understand it, there is no such repository so she has to guess which email addresses she can use and which she cannot. That is really unfair and it would essentially block her from reaching out to her intended audience out of fear she should send to someone in a GDPR protected country without intending to or knowing it. | That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal. | Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person, whether that information is public or not. The student website is definitely processing personal data of faculty. Any website is also necessarily processing personal data of visitors due to technical reasons, even though hosting has been outsourced to a third party. There's always a server, you just might not be managing it yourself. Thus, GDPR applies. Just because it processes personal data doesn't mean that the student website would be illegal. It just means the students are responsible for GDPR compliance of that website. Since the website is controlled by students and not by the university, the university DPO has no say here and the university can't demand the website to be hosted in a particular manner. Nevertheless, the DPO's suggestions might be quite sensible. Typical GDPR compliance steps include: having a clear purpose for which the personal data is being processed having a legal basis for that processing (here, probably a “legitimate interest” which will require a balancing test), see Art 6 providing transparent information to the data subjects providing a privacy notice to website visitors, see Art 13 notifying faculty per the requirements in Art 14 GDPR preparing to fulfill data subject rights such as access, rectification, and erasure when using a legitimate interest, there's also a right to “object” (opt-out) implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure security and compliance of your processing activities, see Art 24+32 making sure that third parties to which you outsource processing activities are contractually bound as “data processors” to only use the data as instructed by you, see Art 28 if you transfer data to non-European countries, having appropriate safeguards in place Does this sound complicated? It can be complicated. The point is that the internet is no longer the lawless Wild West. Just because you can easily publish a site with personal data, doesn't mean that you should. The GDPR is about requiring data controllers to find an appropriate balance with the rights and interests of the affected persons. Of course there are countries with less regulation, but there are also countries with fewer taxes and that isn't necessarily good for society. The easiest way to avoid these responsibilities will be to stop publishing the site as students – and instead taking up the university DPO's offer to have the university run the site. Which is less fun, of course, but the adult thing to do. If this motivates you further: note that the data controller (the people responsible for the site) must publish their contact information in the privacy notice, typically name + email + street address. The GDPR contains no exceptions that would help here. There is an exception for purely personal or household activities. But if the website would be available to the general public, it would be difficult to argue that this is purely personal. There's also case law such as the Lindqvist case requiring a narrow interpretation of that exception. In Art 9, the GDPR does mention that some restrictions are lifted if the data subject made the information public themselves. But that isn't relevant here, because Art 9 is only about extra-protected sensitive data, e.g. health information, union membership, or sexual orientation. | If person A deletes their account would that mean that person B no longer can view the email sent by person A? No. Person B's inbox implies overriding legitimate grounds that limit person A's "right to be forgotten". See article 17.1.(c) of the GDPR. Furthermore, item 2 of article 17 is not applicable because the email service did not make A's personal data public. The email service merely sent to B the record with which A unequivocally addressed B. This means that the email service does not even need to notify B regarding A's request for erasure. All the email service needs to do is remove A's account pursuant to A's request. | Canada's anti-spam legislation (CASL)1 at the time was more strict than the regulations in other countries (e.g. CAN-SPAM Act in the U.S.). Notably, it applied to all emails sent to people in Canada, including those sent from other countries (of course, likelihood of enforcement is another issue). In general, a commercial electronic message can only be sent to users with their consent (express consent to receive messages, or implied consent through e.g. club membership or existing business relationships). Additionally, receivers must be able to unsubscribe or opt out. What part is mandatory? It is not mandatory in the sense it is required by law. But rather Microsoft considers that the communication is essential to its service provided to the user. If you want to opt out this kind of communication, Microsoft is signaling that it can/will end the customer relationship, that is, the only way user can opt out is to stop using the relevant service. The term "mandatory service communication" is and was used in Microsoft's Privacy Statement and other relevant user agreements Your communications preferences You can choose whether you wish to receive promotional communications from Microsoft by email, SMS, physical mail, and telephone. If you receive promotional email or SMS messages from us and would like to opt out, you can do so by following the directions in that message. You can also make choices about the receipt of promotional emails, telephone calls, and post by signing in with your personal Microsoft account, and viewing your communication permissions where you can update contact information, manage Microsoft-wide contact preferences, opt out of email subscriptions and choose whether to share your contact information with Microsoft partners. If you do not have a personal Microsoft account, you can manage your Microsoft email contact preferences by using this web form. These choices do not apply to mandatory service communications that are part of certain Microsoft products, programmes, activities or to surveys or other informational communications that have their own unsubscribe method. https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-CA/privacystatement CASL does not require the sender to signal if it's necessary to its contract or not, but it does require the sender to identify the opting-out mechanism. In this case, the statement informs the user that this particular communication is integral to its service and cannot be opt out separately from the service. Unlike the later European GDPR where a necessity test is used, CASL does not have this requirement and the contractual parties can define if a communication is integral as they want by means of express consent via user agreements (subject to other federal and provincial data protection rules). Or its really long long title: An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities, and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act | Update: On 1 October 2019 the CJEU ruled in Case C‑673/17 (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband vs. Planet49 GmbH) that cookies require explicit consent regardless of personal data is being processed. (Where the exceptions don't apply). (paragraphs 68-70 of the ruling). That does probably invalidate my answer below. However, because I have based my answer on information provided by the Dutch DPA, I will not update my answer until that DPA has responded on this. Basically, your thoughts are all correct. The Dutch DPA (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) has written a manual how to use Google Analytics compliant with the GDPR without having to ask for consent. But unfortunately it is not available in English. Based on Art. 28 GDPR, you need a Data Processing Amendment with google. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data processing amendment Open it Accept it Click Save Anonymize your visitors IP Address. A full IP address is considered personal data. It is possible to remove the last octet before it is processed by google. Add { ‘anonymize_ip’: true } to the tracking code on your website Create a screenshot of the change, so you can prove later at which date you made this change. Disable Data Sharing with google. By default Google uses the data for 5 different purposes. Each of them would require consent from the visitor of your website. So you need to switch that off. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data sharing settings Uncheck all checkboxes (Google producs & services, Benchmarking, Technical support, Account specialists and access for sales experts) Click Save Disable Data Collection for Advertising. This has to be disabled at a different location, for the same reason as the previous step. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Tracking info Choose Data collection Turn off these two options (remarketing and advertising reporting) Click Save Disable the User-ID feature. This is probably turned off by default. But it is important to keep it turned off. So you need to verify this. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Trackinginfo Choose User-ID Disable it Click Save Even though you don't need consent to use Google Analytics, you still need to inform your users, for example by adding a few lines to your privacy policy explaining: You are using Google Analytics cookies. You have a data processing agreement with google. You have enabled IP anonymization/masking. You have disabled data sharing. You are not using any other google services in combination with Google Analytics. The Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens still recommends to offer an opt-out for Google Analytics, but it would not be required. As the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens is a DPA as defined in chapter 6 of the GDPR, you have to assume their advice really is GDPR complaint. In the past they also had performed other investigations to the privacy policies of google. | The GDPR is about "processing" not "storing", so your actions definitely fall under the GDPR. Also you have stored the email address and the email you sent in your "Sent" folder. You need to reply with all the information you have associated with that email address. This will at least be the email you already sent. If you scraped the email address from GitHub then you have it in a table with (presumably) other information such as the repository where you found it, in which case send that row of the table with the associated column headers. If you really just have a list of email addresses then say so. If you merely saw the email address and then typed a fresh email then say so. | There are a number of misconceptions here. GDPR does not generally impose blanket bans, but things get dicey if you're using data in a way that is not strictly necessary. Consent (freely given opt-in) is a way to continue nevertheless. A website without ads, tracking, or potentially tracking embedded content can probably work without having to ask for consent. Under the GDPR, every processing of personal data needs a purpose. This purpose must be covered by a legal basis. Some processing might be legally mandated or required by a contract with the data subject. It's also possible to base processing on a legitimate interest, but this requires a balancing test that also considers the data subject's rights and interests. As a last resort, consent can be an appropriate legal basis, but this comes with additional restrictions. Once you have a clear purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can process the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. Sometimes, laws prescribe a particular legal basis. This is the case for cookies. You can use cookies (and similar technologies that access information on the end user's device) as strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user. If you go beyond that, the ePrivacy Directive says you must obtain consent first. So for example, session cookies, shopping carts, or cookies that remember a “dark mode” preference are all perfectly fine because they are strictly necessary for something the user is trying to do. Also, you can use cookies to remember if the user gave or declined consent. On the other hand, analytics or tracking cookies are not necessary and require consent. If a website embeds third party content, this discloses personal data such as IP addresses to the third party. This disclosure requires a legal basis, most likely consent. There is case law about this regarding Facebook Like buttons on a page (→ Fashion ID case) but the same principle can be generalized to embedded Tweets or Youtube videos, images, or JavaScript files. A common way to handle this is to replace the embedded content with a placeholder, and to only load the embed once the user gives consent. But not all other domains or services are “third party” in the sense of the GDPR. When you engage a company to act as a data processor on your behalf, they are contractually bound to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. The GDPR allows you to outsource processing activities such as serving web content, as long as you have a suitable contract in place. Such “data processing agreements” are common for hosting providers or CDNs. When consent is to be used as a legal basis, it's important to consider the various conditions that the GDPR imposes (see Art 7 GDPR). The core principle is that consent must be freely given. You cannot make access to a site conditional on consent, so a naïve cookie wall or captive portal will be non-compliant. It's fine to force a choice, but “no” MUST be valid and possible. That consent is freely given also means that you must provide enough context for the user to make an informed decision, that the user must give consent through an unambiguous, affirmative action (consent is never the default), and that consent must be specific for a particular purpose (you can't bundle unrelated purposes). That is why modern consent management tools have multiple layers of information and allow the user to give consent for individual purposes (e.g. yes to analytics but no to ad personalization). In your particular context, you could proceed as follows: Figure out what kind of external content you're currently including. Can you enter into a data processing agreement with the external providers? If so, sign that. Can you host the content locally? This can be an easy solution except for video streams. Careful: copyright concerns might make this impossible. Can you replace the content with placeholders that only load if and when the user gives consent? That way, the rest of your site remains accessible without annoying consent walls. If the third party content is an unavoidable and essential part of your page, use an interstitial to inform the user of the risks before they proceed. | Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area. |
The Constitution, Law, and Income tax First let me say this, I'm not a Sovereign citizens, i'm not trying to not pay taxes, i'm not trying to argue if it is legal or not that you have to pay, you do. What im more interested in is the concept, notions and rulings before 1913 and the amendment, legality, conflicting Constitutionality, etc.... 1911-1913 very shady time in USA political history. They could admen the Constitution to make a law Constitutional. Article I, Section 9 No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. Also the arguments of Jefferson and Jackson on our monetary system. Wasn't the whole point of the revolutionary war not to pay taxes to Lombard Banks, Bank of England? And the whole Idea of America was to make its own money and not borrow or have money backed by these private companies/people? Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), affirmed on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), was a landmark case of the Supreme Court of the United States. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the income tax imposed by the Wilson–Gorman Tariff Act for being an unapportioned direct tax. | 1911-1913 very shady time in USA political history. They could amend the Constitution to make a law Constitutional. There's nothing shady about that in the least. In fact, it is the point of constitutional amendments: to provide a mechanism to change the constitution when it prohibits something that an overwhelming majority of people -- well, of congress and of state legislatures -- think should be allowed. A constitutional amendment can reverse the provisions of Article I; it can reverse a constitutional ruling by a court (or at least reverse the ruling's effect); and it can certainly overcome arguments by Jefferson and Jackson, which have very little legal weight if any. Wasn't the whole point of the revolutionary war ... It doesn't matter what the point of the war was. What matters is that the constitution controls what the government can and can't do, and the constitution can change. The constitution countenanced slavery until it didn't. The constitution required senators to be chosen by state legislatures until it didn't. The constitution forbade income tax until it didn't. | In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another. | As of present moment, under no circumstances. That said, the law may and probably will change around that. But the time has not come just yet. Trying to predict what the law will be is out of scope of this site. | Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them. | It depends in part on what you mean by "money". US $100 bills are a prime example of "money". Art 1 §10 Cl. 1 of the US Constitution says No State shall ...coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts... Under the constitution, only the federal government can "print money" in the "universally usable" sense. Anyone can print or otherwise "emit" objects with economic value, and such objects can be voluntarily accepted in trade. State and local governments can incur debts and thus spend money now that they do not yet have, as long as there is no legal limit on a government's ability to go into debt. California could issue IOU-bucks with the intent that a holder could redeem them as real federal money or as gold or silver at some point. This limits the ability of a state treasury to print money, since in principle and practice it is redeemable in gold or silver. Each state has some set of laws and constitutional provisions that prevent writing rubber checks ad infinitum, for example only allowing debt for large capital projects (building) and requiring voter approval; requiring expenditures to not exceed projected revenues; granting emergency debt-mitigation powers (e.g. hiring freezes) to the governor when a state does go into unauthorized debt. In California, Art IV §12 of the state constitution requires a balanced budget, meaning that the state cannot create infinite obligations without infinite revenues. From the legal perspective, private banks do not create money, although non-legally, people may talk about what banks do as "creating money". At that point in the discussion, we will have left law and moved to the realm of economic theory. | Neither of those clauses has anything to do with whether a tax on the use of Whatsapp is legal: The first clause tells users that they are responsible for any taxes that may be owed. It says nothing about whether such a tax is or is not legal. The second clause says that users may not charge for Whatsapp services. It says nothing about whether the government may impose a tax for the use of the services. That is all beside the point, though. Even if the TOS explicitly said, "No one may tax the use of our services," that would have no legal effect. Saying that you're exempt from taxation does not make you exempt from taxation. | Are there any restrictions on the taxes or duties a U.S. state can levy? Yes. For starters, states may not use taxes or other means to impede the federal government in its constitutional exercises of power. This precedent stems from a case called McCulloch v. Maryland from 1819. In 1816, Congress established the Second Bank of the United States. Many states were not fans of this action. One of them, Maryland, established a tax on all notes of banks not chartered in Maryland. When the head of the Baltimore branch of the bank refused to pay the tax, litigation commenced and it was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. SCOTUS held that the Constitution grants implied powers to Congress that allow Congress to implement a national government using its express powers and state action may not interfere with such exercise of power. Taxation, of course, is just one way a state may attempt to interfere with federal power. Can states impose duties on goods that merely transit their territory? Generally no. The Commerce Clause bars states from implementing taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce or that put burdens on it by subjecting commercial activities to numerous or unfair taxation. The Due Process Clause complements this concept by requiring there be a definitive link between a state and the person, property, or transaction which it seeks to tax. This goes back to the SCOTUS decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona where the state enacted a law barring trains from operating in the state with more than 14 or 70 passenger or freight cars, respectively. The Court held that this was a substantial burden on interstate commerce because trains would need to be broken up before they passed through AZ. Also, you couldn't just stop on the tracks and "break up" the trains, so that had to be done at a stop before getting to AZ. The court determined that with this law, AZ effectively controlled the length of trains as far from its borders as El Paso and Los Angeles. The alternative was to operate all trains at the lowest level allowable by any state, which would lead to AZ dictating train lengths around the country. In determining the validity of the law or regulation, a court uses a balancing test to compare the burden on interstate commerce with the importance of the state interest (the AZ law was purportedly for safety reasons). | In National Federation Of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the court addressed the matter of withholding funding, with respect to obligatory expansion of Medicaid, where ACA required states to expand Medicaid coverage, or lose all federal Medicaid funds. The effect, as described in the ruling was "[t]he threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget", which constitutes "economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion", and "The Medicaid expansion thus violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expansion". A law which withholds more than Medicaid funding would therefore clearly be at least as coercive as ACA. It is some interest that the ACA ruling put specific comparative numbers on the effect of the highway funding law underlying SD v. Dole, which they decided was "less than a half a percent" of the state budget. In contrast, in the case of Medicaid funding, their estimate was that Medicaid costs are about 20% of a state's budget, and the federal government pays 50%-80% of that. That means, picking low numbers, the effect of withholding Medicaid funding would be about 10% of a state's budget. The line between persuasion and coercion then seems to lie between .5% and 10%. The presumably introduced bill is here, for reference. The core paragraph is (a) None of the funds made available in any Act may be used to make payments to any unit of local government that permits individuals who are not citizens of the United States to vote in elections for State or local office. However, the introductory clause identifies the purpose as being To prohibit Federal payments to a unit of local government that allows individuals who are not citizens of the United States to vote in elections for State or local office, and for other purposes. The substantial difference is that propositions are not offices: the bill introduces ambiguity in legislative intent (the words of the statute say one thing, the potentially enforceable sections introduced into US Code say something else). The bill does not define "unit of local government", so we could search for existing definitions of that term. 31 USC 6701: primarily "a county, township, city, or political subdivision of a county, township, or city, that is a unit of general local government as determined by the Secretary of Commerce for general statistical purposes" (I don't think school, fire, hospital and water districts count). Alternatively 42 USC 12746: a city, town, township, county, parish, village, or other general purpose political subdivision of a State; the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, the Marshall Islands, or a general purpose political subdivision thereof; a consortium of such political subdivisions recognized by the Secretary [HUD] in accordance with section 12746(2) of this title; and any agency or instrumentality thereof that is established pursuant to legislation and designated by the chief executive to act on behalf of the jurisdiction with regard to provisions of this Act. To get the desired effect, the sponsor wants the definition in 2 CFR 200.64, which includes school districts (and that chunk is about federal grants, thus apt for the bill). The statutory authority for this interpretation is 31 USC 503. |
Does any state or other local authorities (eg, city) in the US require to have one's original car registration in the car, or is a scan always enough? I read (mirror): As far as the car registration goes, the National Insurance Crime Bureau suggests taking a picture of it on your cell phone or keeping a photocopy in your wallet. If you’re pulled over, Atlanta police confirmed to us that an officer will accept a picture or photocopy of your registration, if they even ask for it. Usually, they can verify the information on their computer. Does any state or other local authorities (e.g., city) in the United States require to have one's original car registration in the car, or does a scan of it always suffice? | Colorado law says: CRS 42-3-113 (6): The registration card issued for a vehicle required to be registered under this article shall, at all times while the vehicle is being operated upon a highway, be in the possession of the driver or carried in the vehicle and subject to inspection by any peace officer. Read literally, this requires the original card. It would probably be at an officer's discretion whether to accept a copy. By contrast, California has (emphasis mine): Vehicle Code 4454(a): Every owner, upon receipt of a registration card, shall maintain the same or a facsimile copy thereof with the vehicle for which issued. | What is one supposed to do if they want to take an extended trip somewhere? Or is one basically not allowed to take such trips if they are a US citizen eligible for Jury Duty? In the US you are not required to seek permission to travel, or prove your past whereabouts to the government if you happen to miss some civic duty. They generally call up way more people than they need for this sort of reason. The length of time you are gone or where you choose to travel is irrelevant. In my experience you are given about a month heads up. If you didn't receive the notice until you returned from out of town, and they send a follow up, simply inform them of the fact that you were gone and didn't receive the notice until you returned. Jury duty is an obligation to some extent, but it is also a right and a privilege. It isn't a criminal offence you are liable for if you didn't get the notice. If it were that important to verify your availability ahead of time the notification would be sent registered mail with a signature required. | depending on the Jurisdiction, you actually were in violation of law! In germany it is a misdemeanor to drive with the high beams on in such a fashion that it blinds or dazzles other road traffic, such as traffic from the front. It is also a traffic violation to drive with front lights that don't properly illuminate the street - such as a broken one. In the worst case, improper illumination voids the validity of the safety certificate (TÜV) and thus you may not drive the car at all on public streets until you have repaired the defect. Not having a valid TÜV can mean you are also not insured! In the US: YES, a stop is most likely legal In the united-states, Terry v Ohio is the governing case. It prescribes that, to initiate contact with a car and detain it on the street curb, reasonable suspicion is enough. What could be reasonable suspicion for the police? In the case presented, 'The high beams are on constantly to hide non-functioning/sufficient normal light' would be the very first thing that comes to my mind, so there very likely is reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Ot of course 'The high beams are suitable to dazzle me for a split second, and thus the driver endangered traffic'. Endangering traffic can actually be a felony in some cases. Or just 'They shone their brights into my eyes and violated the High Beam statute' - which is actually the most likely case. As a result, while a broken headlight is not reasonable suspicion to search a car, them and high beams might qualify to make a stop reasonable, especially if at first just a verbal warning not to dazzle oncoming drivers was intended by police. Only if the local law is worded in a peculiarity, that might invalidate a stop. And you might be in violation of law here too! california High Beams can be a traffic violation within 500 feet of oncoming traffic and 300 when trailing another car, if they are not so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. florida Under Florida Law, it is also a noncriminal traffic infraction to drive with the high lights on in such a way that it blinds traffic within 500 feet of them oncoming and 300 if you are behind them. Again, the test is that the beams are only ok if they are so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. new-jersey Here comes a possible source for your quote: New Jersey has a similar high beams law, but also a recent case. The judgment from the New Jersey Surpreme Court is only valid in New Jersey. According to it a high beam violation has to be witnessed by the officer themselves to justify a "terry stop". If you dazzle a moving police cruiser they may stop you. If you dazzle the moving car in front of them, they may stop you. But if you beam your high beams at a stopped car or no car at all, then the police can't stop you. HELD:The trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute, N.J.S.A.39:3-60, is unambiguous; drivers are required to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming vehicle. Neither a car parked on a perpendicular street nor an on-foot police officer count as an oncoming vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court s suppression of the evidence is affirmed. Had the officer, in that case, operated the car while being on the same road, the stop would have been constitutional. But he was on foot in a crossing street. texas Wait, actually the quote stems from Texas. However, it has nothing to do with high beams but additional lights such as "Angel Eyes". Texas too has a High Beam Statute, which just like other states, bans blinding oncoming traffic: (c) A person who operates a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder shall select a distribution of light or composite beam that is aimed and emits light sufficient to reveal a person or vehicle at a safe distance ahead of the vehicle, except that: (1) an operator approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet shall select: (B) a distribution aimed so that no part of the high-intensity portion of the lamp projects into the eyes of an approaching vehicle operator; and Even in Texas, blinding the police cruiser would thus be enough to stop the car, at least for a verbal warning and lecture. Common courtesy While it might not be against the law to dazzle someone everywhere, it actually does impact the other drivers: there have been crashes induced by traffic running high beams and blinding oncoming traffic, which then ran off the road or into other cars. In some countries, if they catch you for causing a crash that way, you are in for negligence. As a result, it actually is common courtesy in Europe to dim off your high beams when you notice oncoming traffic, and, if you don't run high beams yourself but notice high beams oncoming to flash them up for a brief moment so you get noticed. | So why are Amish people not required to register their "vehicle," and to have a driver's license when driving on public roads? The Texas registration requirement in Texas is at Sec. 502.040. REGISTRATION REQUIRED; GENERAL RULE: a) Not more than 30 days after purchasing a vehicle or becoming a resident of this state, the owner of a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer shall apply for the registration of the vehicle for: (1) each registration year in which the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway; and (2) if the vehicle is unregistered for a registration year that has begun and that applies to the vehicle and if the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway, the remaining portion of that registration year. (emphasis added) Now, you might argue that this requires owners of motor vehicles also to register their non-motorized vehicles, but I doubt that this is the prevailing interpretation. Regardless, an Amish person who does not own a motor vehicle is certainly not required by this subsection to register horse-drawn vehicles. Similarly, the requirement to hold a driver's license is at Sec. 521.021. LICENSE REQUIRED: A person, other than a person expressly exempted under this chapter, may not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person holds a driver's license issued under this chapter. (emphasis added) Similarly, this requirement does not apply to the operation of a horse-drawn vehicle. In other words, one statement in your question is incorrect: A driver's license is required for all persons "driving" a vehicle. In fact, a driver's license is generally required to drive a motor vehicle (and even there, exceptions exist). | I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? | Not at all. Under the Fourth Amendment, your house is where "privacy expectations are most heightened," and it is therefore generally the most difficult place to obtain a warrant to search. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). But the courts treat vehicles very differently. Because of "the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways," and because a vehicle "can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought," courts hold that the societal interests in enforcing the law generally outweigh any personal interest in privacy. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985). So while the general rule is that if an officer wants to search someone's home, he must first establish probable cause and then obtain a warrant, a search of a vehicle merely requires that the officer establish probable cause first -- no warrant necessary. | Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice. | Probably moot considering how much time has passed but here goes. California 22349(a) states that no person may drive upon a highway at speeds of greater than 65 mph. So if you're going to be convicted under 22349(a), it doesn't matter if you're going 80 or 90. The charge is that you were doing greater than 65. The judge found you were going 90. 90 > 65. Conviction secured. The only sticky part is if the judge charged you the extra $150 because he alleges you went 90 instead of 80. You could appeal that, since even the officer argues you went 80, but since the officer testified that his radar clocked you at 90, you'd probably lose, especially since the officer's rationale for writing 80 was, by his testimony, your alleged admission at the scene, and you at the scene would have reason to downplay your speed. TL;DR: Yes, the judge, as the trier of fact, can do that. Something came out during the trial (radar at 90) that contradicted the ticket (80) so the trier of fact (the judge) resolved this by going with the radar. You might have been able to get out of it, if you asked the officer why he didn't write 90 when that's what the radar read. There was a reason the officer didn't trust that radar, and if he articulated it, then the judge would likely have stuck with 80. |
Can etiquette prevail over the law? I was preaching and approached a lady. She said "no I do not want to listen" so, I left her. Then I saw some children. As I went toward the children, the lady started shouting. She stood up and threatened me that she would physically assault me. I went back to rebuke her that making threats is unlawful and it is also unlawful for her to tell me where I can go and who I can talk to, if the person I am speaking to has no problem with it. Her shouting and screaming resulted in a crowd gathering around and one man decided to assault me. I managed to record this lady threatening me on my phone so I have evidence. I also recorded the man threatening me who was the man that assaulted me. The police were called. And they said: "Even though there is no law forbidding adults to approach children, it is not good etiquette" therefore they will not let me get justice for the assault. They reasoned that I should let them get off with it and similarly they too should let me off with it (though I did nothing unlawful). I reasoned with them that this is not the right course. The right course is to do justice, against oneself, a rich person, poor person, one's relatives and friends, and against a large criminal party. I said "if I have done something wrong, it's only right I should be brought to justice and I would rightfully be a witness against myself. If we do not do justice people will just do the crime again." "The etiquette they follow, is not law and for a good reason as it causes oppression, and I think it is also against Human Rights." I was told by the police that they were not going to charge the lady or the man or further investigate it, even though I had the evidence to prove my case, as etiquette is above the law. My question is: Is etiquette above the law? Is it possible to answer this question both comprehensively and specifically. I am a self-studying law student and would like to understand these sorts of situations in law. This is in UK. | Etiquette is not "above" the law in the sense that an etiquette rule excuses a violation of law. However, at least in the US, the police are not required to investigate every alleged violation of law, nor is a prosecutor required to proceed against every lawbreaker, and the decision to proceed may be influenced by a perceived etiquette violation. It should also be mentioned that while a third person has no right to prevent you form talking to anyone who is willing to talk to you (unless the 3rd person is the parent of guardian of an underage person you wish to address), it is not in any way illegal to instruct you not to do so, even if the instructions are incorrect as a matter of law. Assaulting you is, of course, a different matter. | Not exactly, some actions that fall under "antisocial behaviour" are crimes in of themselves and they can be prosecuted in the normal manner (Of course where someone is prosecuted for those they're prosecuted for the specific crime not "antisocial behaviour") This doesn't mean however that doing anything that's not explicitly illegal leaves the Police powerless. In the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 there's a pretty broad definition of the term "antisocial behaviour": (a)conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person, (b)conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to that person's occupation of residential premises, or (c)conduct capable of causing housing-related nuisance or annoyance to any person. A constable can issue a Community Protection Notice (CPN) or the Police and select other organisations the option to apply for a civil injunction aimed at preventing the perpetrator(s) from continuing, the injunctions are ordered by Magistrates sitting in a civil capacity and the standard of proof is the civil one - i.e. "balance of probabilities" not "reasonable doubt". Violating a CPN can lead to a fine of between £100 and £2500 while violating such an injunction is considered Contempt of Court and while that still isn't a criminal offence can still see the guilty party land in jail for up to 2 years. | The only meaningful discussion from the Supreme Court of what constitutes a "true threat" comes from Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003): “True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. ... The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” Ibid. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. A few other courts have elaborated further: A true threat is a communication that, when taken in context, “would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 986 (11th Cir. 2013). A “true threat” is defined as a “statement that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.” United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 330 (8th Cir. 2011). As far as I know, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to conclude that a speaker must intend his communication to be threatening. Most courts find it sufficient to show only that the speaker intended to make the communication, and that a reasonable person would feel threatened by it. If your hypothetical were in court, the debate would be about the two questions above. Since it doesn't sound like there's any question that you meant to make the statement, most of the debate would focus on whether a reasonable person would feel threatened by your statement. The prosecution would ask the victim about the background of your relationship, what you said, what your demeanor was, and what the victim understood the statement to mean, and then the prosecutor would argue that in the context in which the statement was made, any reasonable person would fear being harmed. Your defense attorney would try to minimize the seriousness of the statement, demonstrate that you never followed through (though this may not be relevant), suggest that the statement wasn't serious and wasn't intended to be serious, and that no one could believe you honestly intended to hurt the victim. From there, would be up to the jury to decide who it believes. | A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth. | Generally, irrespective of charge, there is no 'shield laws' in the UK legal system. Any such provisions are a matter of discretion for the judge on the same grounds as the admissibility of evidence. Though the following case relates to a murder case rather than rape, it does provide justification for the lack of 'shield laws'. In R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36; [2008] 1 A.C. 1128 (henceforth Davies), as described in para 3, per Lord Bingham, the witnesses were subject to extensive protective measures, as 'they claimed to be in fear forth their lives if it became known that they had given evidence against the defendant'. [Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011 Penguin) 99]. The case addresses issues at the time of the original hearing. However, more recently, there have been statutory provisions for anonymity of witnesses, specifically section 86 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This enables witness anonymity orders to be made, however there are specific requirements that can be found in subsequent provisions of the Act, but there is no common or absolute protection of victims or witnesses. A closing note regarding the 'victim' in the rape case, it should be noted that in the UK legal system, as criminal cases are brought by the CPS on behalf of the Monarch, not the victim and as such the victim is, for all intents and purposes, a witness. | Almost. Under section 26 Equity Act 2010, the offence of harassment does not include discrimination based on "marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy or maternity": Harassment (1)A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a)A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b)the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i)violating B's dignity, or (ii)creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. (2)A also harasses B if— (a)A engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, and (b)the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b). (3)A also harasses B if— (a)A or another person engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or that is related to gender reassignment or sex, (b)the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), and (c)because of B's rejection of or submission to the conduct, A treats B less favourably than A would treat B if B had not rejected or submitted to the conduct. (4)In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account— (a)the perception of B; (b)the other circumstances of the case; (c)whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. (5)The relevant protected characteristics are— age; disability; gender reassignment; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. However... There is also the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which, at section 1 and section 2 creates the offence without a requirement to show any discrimination based on protected characteristics. | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | (Note that some of the below may be UK specific, but the general principle applies in many other jurisdictions) Well the first thing is to stop working from this from the wrong direction: There is no law that makes it legal to assault someone: the law only makes it illegal to assault someone (eg in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 apply). The law states that it is illegal to assault someone. So let's explore how sport works. In most legal systems, you are able to give consent for certain activities or risks. This is also why certain other activities (for example, things a couple may enjoy in their own home) are not necessarily assault if consented to. Essentially, therefore, your consent gives the person doing the hitting the legal excuse (a little different to a normal excuse for forgetting your homework or being late to work): or a defense that their actions were reasonable. This stops the issue being the law, therefore, and becomes an issue of what does/doesn't constitute an "excuse". It is not therefore a question of "What law allows you to commit a crime during sport?" instead it is really one of "Exactly how much consent can a person give, to allow consent to be used as an excuse, and at what point is that consent no longer an excuse?" For example in R v Brown (UK Case Law) it was established that you cannot give unlimited consent. Similarly in every jurisdiction I'm aware of, that consent is only able to be given within the realms of the rules of the sport. As soon as the rules are broken, a crime may have been committed. I won't go into the details of R v Brown here, as I'm not convinced that it's suitable for SE (although I'm sure you can find it), but to give a more sport-related example, R v Donovan established that No person can license another to commit a crime, if (the jury) were satisfied that the blows struck ... were likely or intended to do bodily harm ... they ought to convict ... only if they were not so satisfied (was it) necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. Again, similar case law or exemptions exist in most jurisdictions. Essentially what this establishes is that if the intent is to cause harm, rather than to undertake the sport or activity to which consent has been given, it is still a crime The question after this is then generally one of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and often (but not always) the victim's wishes are taken into account. In some cases, the sportsman is prosecuted: for example this British football player who assaulted an opponent. In other cases there is either insufficient evidence, or insufficient interest in the prosecution. In many cases where the rules are broken but no serious harm is done, for example where rules are broken accidentally or in a minor way, the police or prosecution service (or equivalent) may simply regard the matter as sufficiently dealt with. This is the same as with most other cases, where not every instance of assault is necessarily prosecuted: two teenage brothers fighting may not result in a prosecution, or an assault in the street may not carry enough evidence. And to indirectly answer the question - the reason players are often not prosecuted is because "In the public interest" incorporates an element of public opinion. If a certain action has become (or always been seen as) acceptable, it is unlikely to be prosecuted. For example minor fouls in games, or accidental fouls causing injuries. The other primary reason is that the victim chooses not to press charges (although this isn't required, and the police are able to press charges themselves, it is often taken into account) |
How far does liability extend in a civil conspiracy? Acme LLC makes widgets. Bob is a member of Acme. Bob tries to take Acme's widget maker, thinking he can operate the machine himself, but breaks it in the process. Of course Bob has also violated his covenants as a member of Acme. Acme sues Bob and obtains a money judgment against Bob for damages – to the machine, to Acme's business, and for the costs of litigation. But Bob is as poor as he is stupid, so Acme can't collect on the judgment. Acme had a contract with Charlie to supply widgets. In the course of suing Bob, Acme discovers that just prior to Bob's perfidy Charlie had entered an agreement to buy widgets directly from Bob, instead of from Acme. Charlie knew that Bob could only supply widgets by taking the widget maker from Acme. In this scenario it seems like Charlie and Bob have committed some sort of tortious conspiracy. What are the correct legal terms? I think "tortious interference" and/or "tortious inducement," but not sure. Charlie has plenty of money. In this scenario is Charlie liable for any of the damages that Acme was awarded against Bob? If so, on what common law basis? | How far does liability extend in a civil conspiracy? It extends to joint and several liability insofar as that "is another vital instrument for maximizing deterrence" Paper Systems Inc. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 281 F.3d 629, 633 (2002). Charlie's awareness that Bob would have to misappropriate Acme's equipment implies that Charlie was in a position of being able to deter Bob. Accordingly, Charlie's failure to try deterring Bob (let alone notify Acme) also renders Charlie liable to Acme. Similarly, EMI Sun Village, Inc. v. Catledge, 16-11841, (11th Cir. June 2019, unpublished): [T]he law regarding conspiracy [in Florida] is well-settled, and provides that an act done in pursuit of a conspiracy by one conspirator is an act for which each other conspirator is jointly and severally liable. (brackets in original, citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Alexander, 123 So.3d 67, 80 (2013)). But joint and several liability is applicable only in regard to "compensatory damages, [whereas] punitive damages [if available] are assessed separately against each defendant [...] [so as] [t]o ensure compliance with the constitutional demand for fairness", Green v. Howser, 942 F.3d 772, 781 (2019) (brackets added). Ascertaining the sense or direction of one or more claims of tortious interference/inducement involves additional details. For instance, if even prior to agreeing with Charlie Bob had set his mind to taking Acme's equipment, Acme has no viable claim against Charlie for tortious interference/inducement in regard to Bob's relation with Acme. That is because, although unbeknownst to Acme, the relation was essentially broken beforehand. From another angle, if breaking the equipment harms Acme's business with other clients, Acme would have claims for tortious interference in which Bob and Charlie would be jointly and severally liable regardless of Charlie's knowledge of Acme's other relations. Likewise, Acme has a viable claim of civil conspiracy pursuant to the harm Bob caused to Acme's property. | No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria. | They are merely telling you what the law is There is a tort called interference with contractual relations: The question strikes at the heart of our economic and legal system both of which are based upon principles of freedom of contract and freedom of choice. However, parties that freely enter contracts cannot freely breach such contracts and Courts have shown that they are prepared in some cases to provide relief against unlawful interferences with contractual relations. If A (the vendor) has contracted with B (the realtor) it is unlawful for a third-party (you) to induce A to breach their contract. If you were to approach A and they then broke their contract with B, B could sue A for breach of contract and you for interference in contractual relations. Anti-competition law is directed at ensuring there is a free and fair market for goods and services but once two parties have willingly entered a contract, they are no longer participating in the market. Now, if A approaches you, that's on A and hence why the answer o both questions is c. | united-states The argument you are making, restated in legal terms, is roughly as follows: Users have a duty to not reuse passwords. When a user reuses a password, and their password is subsequently stolen and used to fraudulently access the plaintiff's system, that password reuse becomes the proximate cause of the plaintiff's business injury. Therefore, our storage of plaintext passwords cannot be the proximate cause, and so we cannot be liable. This argument is mostly wrong. Leaving aside the fact that you're going to have a tough time convincing a jury of #1, a tort may have more than one proximate cause. Both the password reuse and the plaintext storage were but-for causes of the injury (i.e. if either had not happened, then the injury would not have happened). The injury was foreseeable, because it is well known in the security industry that many users in fact do reuse their passwords, professional advice notwithstanding. In most US states, that's enough to establish proximate cause. In the minority of states using the "direct causation" test, you might be able to characterize the user's password reuse as an intervening cause, and thereby avoid liability. However, there are other elements of tort law which must be established aside from proximate cause, and so by itself this does not resolve the question of liability. Other defenses might be applicable; for example, the terms of service might contain an indemnification agreement, which (if upheld) would make the user(s) responsible. The defendant might also argue that there is no duty of care, that it was not breached, or that the injury was or should have been de minimis (i.e. that the plaintiff should have taken greater care to prevent damages arising from account hijacking). | So-called AI software does not enjoy a special legal status (at present: one never knows what new law might be added). The question of whether any software can be distributed "safely" or "responsibly" is also not a legal issue. Nor is "true sentience" a relevant consideration, and nothing is guaranteed. When you distribute software of any kind, there is an implied warranty that the product is "fit", and if software kills you, you may be able to sue the creator for negligence. A software creator may then want to disclaim liability, by saying "WARNING: THIS PROGRAM MAY KILL YOU. OCP IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY INJURIES ARISING FROM USE OF THIS PRODUCT". This may or may not actually remove liability. In the UK "liability for negligence occasioning death or personal injury cannot be excluded", so such a disclaimer will not prevent a suit against the manufacturer. In the US, the issue is determined at the level of the state – here is a summary of the law in the states. Probably the primary question would be whether such a disclaimer is an unconscionable term, and the second question is whether the act constituted gross negligence (not simply "negligence"). Mississippi exceptionally does not allow disclaimers, but even then, it does allow disclaiming liability when it comes to computer hardware and software. A software disclaimer is not inherently unconscionable, though perhaps some specific disclaimer would be found to be. Courts typically disfavor disclaimers in the case of gross negligence, and again determining what constitutes "gross negligence" is determined on a state by state basis. If the act shows "reckless indifference to the rights of others" and "failure to use even slight care or conduct that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of others", then the act might be grossly negligent. | If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get. | What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction. | united-states Under U.S. law in almost every U.S. jurisdiction this would be illegal conduct. Arnie would be a co-conspirator with Bob in money laundering and in embezzlement of government funds. These would usually be criminal felonies. The government (or a private whistleblower called a "relator" in what is called a "qui tam" action, conducted in a procedurally proper way which afford the government an opportunity to sue itself before bringing the private qui tam action) could also sue Arnie and Bob and hold them liable, jointly and severally, for the funds diverted to Arnie and Bob in this scheme, and probably for punitive damages and/or civil penalties as well. If the role played by Arnie was instead played by a U.S. publicly traded multinational company doing business in another country (or by an official of such a company who has knowledge of or is involved in the transaction with Bob), and it was also illegal to do this in that country (whether or not that law was enforced in that country), then the U.S. multinational company involved would also have violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). As noted at the link: The FCPA is jointly enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which apply criminal and civil penalties respectively. So, in that case, it would be a violation of both U.S. and the other country's laws, in all likelihood giving rise to liability to both criminal and civil consequences in both countries. It isn't patently obvious that this conduct would be illegal under the law of every country, although it seems likely. For example, a sheriff operating a prison in Alabama can do something very similar (skim money off prison operation funds by obtaining low bids for prison service contracts) legally. Similarly, if Arnie had actually gone out and purchased metal parts from a third party at Bob's direction and then delivered those metal parts to Bob's government employer, that would be entirely legal almost everywhere (although any kickback to Bob, if that was what was really happening would still probably be some form of embezzlement in which Arnie might be conspiring). Also, while this is considered corrupt in most of the developed world, in many developing and undeveloped countries, civil servants are paid almost nothing and kick backs for supervising government contracts are tolerated at a minimum as a matter of unstated official policy by senior managers of the government entities that unofficially sanction or encourage this conduct by their subordinates. This reality is one of the main reasons that the U.S. FCPA is heavily criticized politically and in academic commentary. what would be the legal consequences of someone unconnected to the transaction who knows about it reporting or not reporting it? For example, does not reporting it give rise to a risk of civil or criminal liability? Normally, someone not involved in Arnie's company, like a family member of Arnie, would have no legal duty to report this conduct upon learning of it, and would face no legal consequences for failing to report it, if the person not reporting it wasn't actually involved in the scheme. Someone who cared about Arnie might want to counsel him that he is engaged in very risky conduct that could have catastrophic consequences if discovered and prosecuted. They might advise him that while this scheme does generate funds for Arnie that might not be worth the risk. Ultimately, as a practical matter, if that person didn't want to harm Arnie, however, that person would have to let Arnie decide for himself what to do. If subpoenaed to serve as a witness, someone who knew about Arnie and Bob's conduct (other possibly than Arnie's spouse and his lawyer if his lawyer learned about the conduct only after the fact), could be compelled to testify in a court of law against Arnie about what the person who knew about this scheme knew, possibly contributing to Arnie going to prison and facing monetary penalties. |
Can a hit and run victim sue the car owner for not having insurance? An adult driver hit-and-ran someone who found the car later at the driver's mom's house. Her son had been driving but she owned the car. She talked to the police and gave them the insurance card, which had expired 9 months prior. If one sued the son in small claims court for the damages, could one sue her also? She has more assets so a victim could be fully paid sooner than just from her son. UPDATE 1: Jurisdiction is Bonneville County, Idaho; inside Idaho Falls city limits. Re: previous question, I didn't word it well, and some users edited it to remove information which caused answers that weren't applicable anymore. I decided to narrow the focus and try asking again. UPDATE 2: Damages are about $5k. A cop told me later that she's alo responsible for costs because she didn't have insurance, that's where I got the idea about sueing her also. I don't know if he's wrong. Idaho is an at-fault state and requires proof of $25k/$15k bodily and property liability insurance before registering a car. He lives with her and drives her car; therefore he should be on her insurance. They also check VIN every two months with a nationwide database to ensure they still have insurance. Violations include suspended car registration, license suspension, and required SR-22 insurance (expensive). Second violation is up to six months jail and up to $1k fine. The mom has court history of not having car insurance, but they've been dismissed. It's odd she didn't have card in car each time, so she either she really does forget to put in her car, or she buys a policy the same day as citation to prove to court she was insured and get charges dismissed. I think she does have insurance, but gave officer cancelled card so she only pays $75 ticket, her rates don't go up, and her son can make payments over several years. I hope by suing her with son, that I can force her to bring forth the insurance or risk a lien on her house, force sale of valuable items, etc. That's why I'm hoping to include her in lawsuit. | You can't sue her for not having insurance. You sue for the damage you suffered. You can name her as a defendant alongside her son on the theory that she contributed to the accident by letting her son use the car, and then let the judge sort out who gets landed with the liability. Depending on the rules in your jurisdiction you might have to pay her travel expenses and/or lost wages if the judge decides she wasn't to blame (and the same for her son, but that sounds like a slam-dunk). However you might be better off going for victim restitution. That way the order gets made as part of the criminal case against the son. Less hassle for you, and the state authorities are responsible for actually getting the money out of them. Edit: It turns out that Idaho has the Family Car Doctrine in its law, so the mother is legally liable for her son's accident (thanks to ohwilleke for the pointer). | Yes Assuming you were assaulted (with or without battery) and you suffered injury (physical or otherwise) during that assault you are entitled to damages. The injury has to flow from the assault but not necessarily from the assaulter. For example, if you fled across the road and were struck by a car you could sue your attacker. Because assault is an intentional tort, it is not necessary for you to prove that actual financial loss was suffered - this is not negligence. The court can assess economic loss, non-economic loss and exemplary (punitive) damages. | At this point, there is little legal recourse. Once the delay becomes "unreasonable", you might be able to sue them and get some compensation. I do not know what would constitute an "unreasonable" delay in your circumstances and I don't doubt that a month seems unreasonable. You have explained the reasons for the delay, so it's not like they are waiting around for no reason. They are not required to hire more agents to process the claim; unfortunately, they are not legally required to act in a fashion that customers like (i.e. aggressively work to solve the problem). It does sound like there is a customer-service problem, which is what reviews and the BBB are about. You can of course be on the phone with the mechanic and the insurance agency, and if things get severe you can file a complaint with the state insurance commissioner. | Legal action might be taken by the garage, because you had a contract to repair the gearbox which you cancelled (causing them some damages in time spent). You could hope that the store-owner will pay the invoice that you sent, but that seems to not be likely. The store owner can't sue you for sending him the invoice: the mechanic can sue you for not paying what the work billed for. But you do have a recourse, which is that you were acting on behalf of the store owner. I assume that you were in possession of the old gearbox, so it simplified matters if you took transported it to the mechanic, since the store owner was going to pay. In other words, you were acting as the store owner's agent: you were authorized to create a contractual arrangement between the garage and the owner. The one problem is that apparently the garage thought they were doing the work for you, and not for the owner. So they may sue you, and you may sue the owner. And suing anybody costs money. The owner is, perhaps, trying a strategy of not paying what he does actually owe, in the theory that the alternative of suing is too much time and bother (besides, it's the garage owner who would have to get the ball rolling – unless the shop owner first wants to sue to recover the gearbox). Given the information you have provided, I don't see a basis for the shop owner suing you. In order to sue someone, that person has to have caused you some damage. He could claim that he didn't authorize you to take the gearbox to the garage, or that you were negligent in making the arrangements with the shop (for instance if he said "but only if they will do the diagnosis for free"), in which case the court will have to decide whose story is more believable. | Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute. | You have the right to refuse the insurance company's offer and keep your car, but that would be self-defeating. You can keep the car at the shop, and you will incur storage fees; it is possible but quite unlikely that the insurance company will change its mind and offer you more money (unless you're contending that they made a serious technical error in computing the value). The insurance company has no obligation to the shop, but they might have an obligation to you (i.e. it might be a term of the policy that they will pay storage fees up to some limiting condition). Whether or not you have to move the car or pay storage fees is between you and the shop. If I understand your idea about a signed document from the shop waiving fees, you're suggesting that they might waive the fees if you end up having to pay it, but they would stick the insurance company for the amount if the insurance company were to pay. Again, the insurance company only pays what you owe, and under this scenario, you wouldn't owe storage fees, so the insurance company wouldn't be obligated to pay. If you were on the up and up about this, the insurance company would just say "No, that doesn't work". If you were not on the up and up about the arrangement, that would be fraud. | We cannot advise you to pay the fine or contest it, but we can say that the law is. A notation like "no tag" is not the same as a formal charge that would be filed against you if you were prosecuted, under Georgia Code 40-2-8. The law says (b)(2)(A) It shall be a misdemeanor to operate any vehicle required to be registered in the State of Georgia without a valid numbered license plate properly validated, unless such operation is otherwise permitted under this chapter Hence driving with expired tags is against the law. The state indicates that the penalty for non-renewal is "10% of Ad Valorem Tax due + 25% of License Plate Fees", the latter being $20. There is also a fine of $25 for operating a vehicle without a valid county decal; you presumably know what the current ad valorem tax on the vehicle is. | The Example of Colorado Law In Colorado, a private individual who is a victim of theft can bring a lawsuit for civil theft in which a prevailing theft victim can recover the actual economic amount of the theft (including pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate from lost use of the stolen property per a separate pre-judgment interest statute), treble damages (i.e. actual damages plus twice that amount as a civil penalty), and their attorneys' fees and the costs of the litigation. Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4-405. Rights in stolen property All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his right to such property. The owner may maintain an action not only against the taker thereof but also against any person in whose possession he finds the property. In any such action, the owner may recover two hundred dollars or three times the amount of the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and may also recover costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees; but monetary damages and attorney fees shall not be recoverable from a good-faith purchaser or good-faith holder of the property. Returning the property stolen doesn't change the fact that civil theft was committed, it only reduces the amount of the damages by the amount repaid and prevents interest from continuing to accrue. In practice, it would be very uncommon for someone to bring a suit for civil theft after they are repaid. But, nothing in principle prevents this from happening until the statute of limitations runs (in Colorado that is probably three years from the date that the theft is discovered), although there might be an argument that accepting the funds returned by mutual agreement might constitute a waiver of their claim, or might give rise to equitable defenses of estoppel or laches. Criminal Charges Of course, in the U.S., even if the company doesn't press charges, a prosecutor does have the authority to press criminal charges without their consent. A theft victim does not have the legal authority to relieve you of criminal liability for theft. There are some countries other than the U.S. where a theft victim can relieve someone who committed theft of criminal liability (if I recall correctly, Germany is one of them), but that is a minority position internationally as a legal matter (although actual practice is often different). Civil Lawsuits For Theft In Other Jurisdictions While most states do not have a statutory civil theft statute, almost every state and country would allow a civil lawsuit for "conversion" or the equivalent for taking property that does not belong to you for your own benefit (which is a tort). Other U.S. states and other countries would vary over whether repayment of funds converted prior to commencement of a lawsuit limits actual damages and exemplary damages based upon actual damages to pre-judgment interest, or even constitutes a complete defense, or not. Most U.S. states allow for an award of punitive damages in connection with an intentional tort (statutes of limitations and pre-judgment interest award rules vary greatly). Most non-U.S. jurisdictions would not allow an award of punitive damages in a civil action involving an intentional tort. In the absence of a statutory authorization of the kind found in Colorado, attorneys' fees and costs would normally not be allowed for a U.S. plaintiff in an intentional tort case like this one, but most non-U.S. courts would allow an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party in a case like this one. Practical Considerations The fact that you repaid the funds makes some defenses to future civil or criminal charges very challenging. You can't truthfully deny that you repaid the funds and that comes close to an admission of guilt. But, if you state under oath that you engaged in this conduct, you make yourself vulnerable to criminal prosecution based upon that testimony under oath. In practice, one reason that the business is actually unlikely to sue you in this situation (unless they discovered that more than $50,000 was taken) is that having lost your job and paid them $50,000 you may not be able to pay even a large judgment if it was awarded against you (although such a judgment, if entered, would probably not be dischargeable in bankruptcy under U.S. law). So, the cost-benefit analysis of such a suit for the company might not make much sense. Also, while having a suit like this filed against you would certainly damage your reputation seriously in a way that could be located with a public records search, it might also moderately harm the reputation of the company which revealed that its internal controls were lax enough to make it possible for the theft to happen. In the case of a large business the damage that this could do to the fair market value of the business and its creditworthiness might outweigh the benefit it would receive from bringing such a lawsuit. |
Is it legal to install MacOS (Hackintosh) on Windows (inside VirtualBox) in a commercial environment? I'm a developer and I'm working in a company where i will have to develop cross-platform desktop apps (with electron), mobile apps (with Cordova) and even extensions, including Safari. So it goes without saying that I need all three platforms. I currently have really powerful laptop (so virtualization is not a problem) where I have Windows and Linux (as dual-boot & vagrant VirtualBox). I have MacOS and iPhones at work, but i would like to install MacOS in a VirtualBox, so i can work from home too (that I do a lot), since I don't have any apple products at home (and I can't take any from work). The problem is not MacOS itself as I have already installed Hackintosh in the past. My question is, is it, somehow, legal to install MacOs or Hackintosh on my laptop, so I can use it in commercial environment (work), as we get legal checks quite often. (Buying new licence is not a problem, or I can use one of the MacOs at my work - I don't know how this works with Apple) | The Apple macOS EULA is here Basically the license says you can only run macOS VMs on Apple hardware that is running macos. The part on virtual machines includes 1 iii) (iii) to install, use and run up to two (2) additional copies or instances of the Apple Software within virtual operating system environments on each Mac Computer you own or control that is already running the Apple Software, for purposes of: (a) software development; (b) testing during software development; (c) using macOS Server; or (d) personal, non-commercial use. | Yes. The introduction to the license says "You may adapt — ... build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially". (My emphasis). Note that there is an attribution requirement so you need to find a way to attribute each image to its individual author. For the fine details, you certainly need to read the actual license (rather than the introduction) and you probably need to consult your own, paid-for, IP lawyer - but if you are just scoping the project out at the moment, you should be fine. For contrast, here is a Creative Commons licence that does prohibit commercial use. | Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged. | Apparently not The full text of the license is not included on the page you link to, or on any linked page that I checked. But the FAQ says: free educational licenses can be used strictly for non-commercial educational purposes (including academic research). Exactly how this company defines "non-commercial educational purposes" is not stated. If work is done on a student project, and after a non-student license is purchased that project is commercialized, would the license have been violated, and if so, would the company be likely to sue? The fist question cannot be answered without the full text of the license, and the second would require reading the minds of the company officials. But it seems reasonably clear that this is not what the company has in mind. Another user has pointed out a link to the actual license terms which I failed to note. Section 3.1 of the license says, in relevant part: ... JetBrains grants You a non-exclusive and non-transferable right to use each Product covered by the Toolbox Subscription for non-commercial, educational purposes only (including conducting academic research or providing educational services) ... This would seem to confirm what the FAQ quoted above says. It is hard to see how any development intended as an eventual commercial product would be covered under such a license term. It would appear that a regular non-student license would be needed for such use. | Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use". | Go to the Source If you follow the Legal link at the bottom of the page and read the terms of service, among other things, it says (my emphasis): 1. Access to the Services Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Stack Exchange may offer to provide the Services, as described more fully on the Network, and which are selected by Subscriber, solely for Subscriber’s own use, and not for the use or benefit of any third party. ... Subscriber certifies to Stack Exchange that Subscriber is an individual (i.e., not a corporate entity) at least 13 years of age. ... 2. Network Content ... The Network is protected by copyright as a collective work and/or compilation, pursuant to U.S. copyright laws, international conventions, and other copyright laws. Other than as expressly set forth in this Agreement, Subscriber may not copy, modify, publish, transmit, upload, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in this Section), create derivative works based on, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content, software, materials, or Services in whole or in part. Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. From time to time, Stack Exchange may make available compilations of all the Subscriber Content on the Network (the “Creative Commons Data Dump”). The Creative Commons Data Dump is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. By downloading The Creative Commons Data Dump, You agree to be bound by the terms of that license. Any other downloading, copying, or storing any Content for other than personal, noncommercial use is expressly prohibited without prior written permission from Stack Exchange, or from the copyright holder identified in such Content's copyright notice. In the event You download software from the Network, the software, including any files, images incorporated in or generated by the software, and the data accompanying the software (collectively, the “Software”) is licensed to You by Stack Exchange or third party licensors for Your personal, noncommercial use, and no title to the Software shall be transferred to You. Stack Exchange or third party licensors retain full and complete title to the Software and all intellectual property rights therein. 3. Subscriber Content You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. ... Consequences Under Clause 1 Subscribers to Stack Exchange must be individuals (natural persons in legalese). The proprietor of LearnHub.org are unlikely to be an individual and are therefore not a Subscriber under the terms of use. Under Clause 2, everything on Stack Exchange is copyright and some things are trade marked as well. The copyright for posts vests in the Subscriber and is licenced to SE (CC BY-SA 3.0) or vests in SE directly as the creator. Clause 8.1a. of CC BY-SA 3.0 requires SE to grant a licence to any recipient of a distribution (e.g. on a web site) on the same terms. For this reason the limitations on the copyright in Clause 2 can only apply to those items where copyright vests in SE directly; not to the content of the Subscriber posts. Assuming that it is only Subscriber posts that they are reproducing then they either need to: Comply with CC BY-SA 3.0 and attribute the work as required by that licence; what they have put up does not on the face of it do that because: They are referring to an earlier version of the licence Attribution under 3.0 is detailed in Clause 4.c. and this doesn't meet the criteria. Have been licenced by the original copyright holder; which seems unlikely. Meet the fair use criteria; attribution would not be required but would certainly be polite. Fair use turns on the specific facts of the case - on the face of it they could put forward a credible argument that their use is fair use. Complications Jurisdiction matters here; copyright laws are not uniform across the world. For example, Australian copyright has a much more limited "fair use" concept than the US and also creates a "moral copyright" of the author that exists independently of the copyright of the owner. For signatories to the Berne Convention; the country of origin for simultaneously published works (which online posting is) and therefore the law applying is the country that gives the shortest term of protection. The convention is annoyingly silent of what that means if there is more than one qualifying "Country of Origin"; this leaves scope for litigants to try to apply the most favourable domestic law that could be applicable and the case could be brought in any of several jurisdictions. This is the stuff that makes lawyers rich! | You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you. | Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..." |
How to get current insurance information from car owner of son's hit-and-run charges A month ago I had a hit-and-run on my property and car, and a few hours later they were found at his mother's house. Car owned by mother, driver is her adult son. Mother finally gave investigating officer an insurance card for traffic tickets. That insurance company informed me the policy expired ten months before, and mailed an official letter about it. A different officer told me the mother is also responsible for being the car owner and not having insurance. I don't know if she really has no insurance, or if she gave the old insurance to avoid a claim against her new insurance. Investigating police officer said both are uncooperative, won't answer phone calls or knocking on door. An arrest warrant was issued for son a few weeks ago. Police records won't give me information because it's an active case under investigation. I've spoken to the primary officer and prosecuting attorney office about the expired insurance, and requested they ask the mother if she has a new insurance, and if not can they charge her for not carrying insurance. They seemed to dodge the question and finally said I should fill out a restitution form or I can take them to small claims court. However, both options will take years to recoup my damage expenses whereas a current insurance policy can pay within a month. Son was finally arrested on two misdemeanors a few days ago, so a court case now exists against him, but nothing about his mother. She does not have an arrest warrant, nor a court case. Idaho law requires proof of insurance to register a vehicle. Vehicles can be registered for one or two years, but most drivers opt for one year since there's no discount for two years. I asked, but understand the DMV can't give me any insurance information they have on file for the car's VIN and owner. It's been ten months now, so there's a decent chance it's been registered with a new insurance company. My goal is to try to find current insurance, whether from the DMV, or to get them to cite/arrest mother for not carrying insurance, in which case she'll have to admit to no insurance or produce current insurance. Do I have any options to get the police or prosecuting attorney's office to do these things for me? If so, what's the quickest and most effective path? | The criminal charges against the driver and his mother are police business, not yours. You have a civil case for damages against the driver, and possibly his mother on the theory that she enabled her son's behaviour. Depending on the amount you should either sue them in the small claims court or else hire a lawyer. If you win the case and the driver was uninsured at the time of the accident then there are two outcomes: either they pay the damages or they go bankrupt. If the latter then sorry, you are out of luck. Also talk to your insurance company; if you are insured for this kind of event then they will take the case off your hands, pay you, and then litigate to recover the money themselves. | Each of the 50 states plus non-states has their own laws, but there is nothing general about contract or other law in the US that forces a rental facility to accept customers who don't have / won't get the insurance that they require. It is a reasonable requirement, because it protects their interest insofar as angry customers might sue the facility because their car was broken into, and many of them would mistakenly believe that their car insurance covers theft or destruction of contents (thus leading to a desire to sue, to cover the property loss). It may be just too much hassle and too risky for them to assume the correctness of a customer's claim that they already have adequate coverage and will maintain said coverage, with no practical means to verify the claim. | You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on. | You do not contact the District Attorney's Office, the Police do that. You call your police department and they will dispatch a car to you. Meet with them and tell them the case. They will take the report back and get it to the D.A.'s office. The D.A.'s office will decide if there is a case or not. If they find there is a case, they will contact you for the next steps. It starts with a phone call to the police. | There is a form, which both parties to the sale sign. Note that it does entail paying sales tax. There are other aspects to the sale which reinforce the "It's not my car anymore" message, such as returning the plates and getting a receipt for the plates. Even doing the sale in a DMV lot would not help you. | This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough. | No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that. | It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state. |
Is a lawyer allowed to stop representing his client? Imagine a person accused of committing a crime hires a lawyer. After a while something happens and the lawyer decides he or she doesn't want to represent the client any more. For example: Ethical reasons: When they were hired the lawyer thought the client was innocent (e. g. he thinks the wife accuses the husband of rape just to piss him off), but in the course of the process they came to the conclusion the client is guilty (e. g. the husband actually raped his wife). Defending an innocent client was OK with the moral standars of the lawyer, defending a criminal, who committed a particularly nasty (according to the beliefs of the lawyer) crime isn't. Client doesn't pay: The client, whether innocent or not, runs out of money and can't pay the lawyer any more. Is it legal for the lawyer to stop defending his client? Notes: I'm only interested if it's legal. I understand that if a lawyer steps down from a lawsuit, it may ruin his reputation (other clients may fear they will do the same during their trials). If the answer to this question depends on the state, then I'm interested in a criminal lawsuit in Arkansas. In the section ethical reasons I mean a situation, when the lawyer has the gut feeling that the client is 100 % guilty, but the court may think otherwise. In real life there are situations, when you have a feeling like that, but you can't prove it. Nonetheless, you act based on that feeling (even if there is no evidence that could prove this feeling to another party). The evidence may be not enough for court or police, but it's enough for them. | A Lawyer In A Court Case Needs Court Permission To Withdraw Once a lawyer is representing a client in court, the lawyer can cease to represent the client, either by "withdrawing" or in a "substitution of counsel" (which is far less regulated), but a lawyer can only withdraw and leave the client unrepresented if the lawyer obtains the permission of the court presiding over the case to do so, after giving appropriate formal notice to the client. And, the court is within its rights to refuse to allow the lawyer to withdraw from the representation in most cases, and certainly if the reason for the lawyer's withdrawal is that the lawyer is not getting paid. Why would a court deny a lawyer permission to withdraw? A case in which a former client is self-represented is a nightmare to deal with at trial from a practical perspective for a judge, screws up the judge's calendar if the trial has to be delayed to allow a new lawyer to get up to speed after being hired, and is also much more prone to lead to reversible error that could cause the case to be overturned on appeal. For example, usually when a lawyer is present and the prosecution seeks to admit inadmissible evidence, the lawyer objects on the proper legal ground and the judge evaluates the objection and keeps the evidence out. But, if no one objects, letting in the evidence can still lead to a reversal on appeal if doing so was "plain error", and the "plain error" or objection preservation analysis on appeal becomes even trickier if the defendant representing himself objects to the evidence coming in, but for the wrong reasons - for example, objecting to inadmissible hearsay on the grounds that it is irrelevant when it isn't irrelevant but is inadmissible, but mentions that the person questioned "wasn't even there" when the statement was made. Also, since there is a right to counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases, when a lawyer withdraws (especially for non-payment) the court now has to determine whether or not the client is indigent (which non-payment would typically support an inference of) and if so, the court must appoint a new lawyer who would have to do lots of redundant work to get up to speed in a case. Failure to do so would be fertile grounds for potentially setting aside a conviction. This is particularly a concern when the only issue is nonpayment of fees, so nothing about the representation itself is fundamentally flawed. Judge's don't have much sympathy for the lawyer in these cases in criminal matters, because the ordinary custom and practice is to work for a flat fee that is mostly paid up front. A judge who forces a lawyer to keep working a case like that is prioritizing fairness for the client over coddling the lawyer's bad business management of the lawyer's firm, protecting the public from having to hire a public defender at the public's expense in the case in a manner that might involve wasteful redundant legal work, and protecting the public interest in keeping an eye on police misconduct. But, if a lawyer is not getting paid early in a case, for example, entering an appearance on an emergency basis around the time of an arrest and then seeking to withdraw a week or two later when the client fails to make a promised retainer payment, the lawyer will usually be allowed to withdraw by the court. Generally speaking, the closer the case gets to the trial date, the more likely it is that the court will refuse to allow the lawyer to withdraw. The Impact Of A Withdrawal On A Lawyer's Reputation It is not as a general rule harmful to a lawyer's reputation to withdraw from representing a client. As noted before, there are circumstances when it is mandatory to do so (see Rule 1.16(a) below), and most of the reasons for withdrawing that are permitted but not required (see Rule 1.16(b) below) would also not damage a lawyer's reputation. For example, nobody is going to fault a lawyer for withdrawing from a case because he contracted cancer (a lawyer in my office suite had to do this, then returned to practice during a multi-year remission, and then had to withdraw again shortly before his death), or because a client has become non-responsive. Indeed, one of the main motives for a lawyer to withdraw other than not getting paid, is that the client's conduct makes it impossible for the lawyer to represent the client in a manner that doesn't harm the lawyer's reputation. For example, a key part of a lawyer's reputation is his ability to make a statement of fact or law, when not under oath to the court or to another lawyer in a case, which people will consider trustworthy without having to verify it formally. But, if a lawyer's client lies to the lawyer causing a representation made by the lawyer to end up being false, the lawyer may want to cease representing the client so that the lawyer does not end up innocently making a false statement that damages the lawyer's reputation in the future. Similarly, one of the most common reasons for a lawyer to withdraw other than not being paid is that the client simply stops responding to telephone calls, stops showing up to meetings with the lawyer, doesn't respond to mail or email, fails to appear at court for hearings, or at mediation sessions, or at probation officer meetings, etc. Since a lawyer is required to get a client's signature and/or approval for certain steps of a case, and often to show up in person at hearings as well, the lawyer is required to withdraw to preserve the lawyer's reputation because not doing so would force the lawyer to have violations of court rules that the lawyer is responsible for meeting on behalf of a client. It would be rare for a good lawyer to make it through a career without having to withdraw for a reason like this at least half a dozen times over a career. Obviously, there are reasons for a withdrawal that can hurt a lawyer's reputation. If the lawyer withdraws because he won't be able to make court dates because he will be serving a jail sentence himself or will be in drug rehabilitation or is facing embezzlement charges, that isn't good for the lawyer's reputation. Similarly, if the lawyer withdraws following a judge's implication that the lawyer has engaged in misconduct in a case, or following a client letter to court accusing the lawyer of something unsavory, that hurts the lawyer's reputation. A client discharging a lawyer from a case can be good or bad for the lawyer's reputation, if it happens infrequently, although frequently being fired by clients is always bad for a lawyer's reputation. If the client seems crazy or mean spirited, being fired won't hurt the lawyer's reputation. If the client seems reasonable or seems to have good cause to fire the lawyer, it does hurt the lawyer's reputation. But, in general, good lawyers withdraw from representing clients, not exactly on a regular basis, but certainly many times during the course of an ordinary, highly reputable career. A typical, good quality, ethical lawyer with a busy practice will withdraw from representing a client in the middle of a case perhaps once every two to four years on average, and more often if the lawyer handles a lot of small cases and a high volume of clients. Put another way, a typical reputable lawyer probably withdraws from representing 0.5%-2% of the lawyer's clients mid-case. Of course, if a lawyer routinely withdrew mid-case from say 5%-20% of that lawyer's cases, that would reflect poorly on the lawyer who, even if each individual withdrawal is proper, is not doing a workmanlike job of screening potential clients. Reasons For Withdrawal Allowed Under Arkansas Law The authorized reasons for withdrawing from a representation in Arkansas are set forth in Rule 1.16 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct: (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law; (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged. (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client; (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; (3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; (4) a client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation. (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. Ethical Reasons The Question First of all, to clarify, the question when asking about "ethical reasons" is asking about personal, not legally enforceable reasons based in personal morality that a lawyer might withdraw. This terminology can be a bit confusing because violations of legally enforceable rules of professional conduct for lawyers, are commonly called "ethics rules". But, violations of "ethics rules" were discussed above, and this part of the answer is about non-legally enforceable reasons rooted in a lawyer's personal moral compass that might cause a lawyer to withdraw from a representation of a client in the middle of a case. The question says this about "ethical reasons": Ethical reasons: When they were hired the lawyer thought the client was innocent (e. g. he thinks the wife accuses the husband of rape just to piss him off), but in the course of the process they came to the conclusion the client is guilty (e. g. the husband actually raped his wife). Defending an innocent client was OK with the moral standars of the lawyer, defending a criminal, who committed a particularly nasty (according to the beliefs of the lawyer) crime isn't. and In the section ethical reasons I mean a situation, when the lawyer has the gut feeling that the client is 100 % guilty, but the court may think otherwise. In real life there are situations, when you have a feeling like that, but you can't prove it. Nonetheless, you act based on that feeling (even if there is no evidence that could prove this feeling to another party). The evidence may be not enough for court or police, but it's enough for them. Criminal Lawyers Routinely, Ethically Represent 100% Guilty People No criminal lawyer who deserves to be practicing law, and honestly, almost no lawyer period, would consider it unethical to represent someone who is 100% guilty in a criminal case. Indeed, the prevailing assumption is that 95%+ of criminal defendants are guilty of something, and criminal defense lawyers actually kind of dread representing a client who really is 100% innocent, because the acceptable standards of success in the case that won't result in injustice and acceptable litigation options in the case, are so much narrower. The fact that a client is 100% guilty, in and of itself, even if the lawyer thought originally that the client was innocent, is absolutely not an honorable reason for a lawyer to withdraw, and the reputation of a lawyer who withdrew from a representation simply on the grounds that the client really did commit a heinous crime, would be shattered. The most esteemed lawyers are those who represent the clients who are charged with the most heinous crimes. Lawyers aren't in the business of deciding whether someone is guilty or innocent. That is the job of a judge and jury. They are in the business of putting the client's best foot forward. Indeed, frequently, a lawyer will intentionally refrain from having a client tell the lawyer about the facts necessary to actually know if the client is guilty or not. Lawyers are not primarily in the business of getting innocent people acquitted. They are primarily in the business of getting people who are guilty of something, or are culpably engaged in activity that is arguably a crime and arguably not a crime, the best available outcome under the circumstances. This involves insisting that the prosecution do everything it is required by law to do in order to prove its case in a lawful manner, negotiating with the prosecutor over what particular crime is the most appropriate way to classify particular conduct, and pushing for the most lenient possible sentence. For example, criminal defense lawyers routinely push to have clients who are 100% guilty acquitted because the evidence against the defendant was obtained illegally by the police. Part of a lawyer's role in defending a criminal case involving a guilty defendant is to perform the larger civic role of constantly monitoring the law enforcement system for police misconduct that incidentally benefits the client (and that is one reason why a court doesn't want to let a lawyer withdraw when the defendant is likely to be guilty but there are indications of police misconduct in the case). Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 which governs a lawyer's legal duty to raise only meritorious claims and defenses specifically addresses the difference between civil and criminal cases in this regard: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. The official comment (number 3) to this rule, related to the criminal case exception states: The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule. What Sort Of Personal Moral Considerations Are Appropriate? The main ground for withdrawing from representing a client for "personal" moral reasons is that (from Rule 1.16 above): a client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement Typically, this involves matters of litigation tactics that are not illegal or fraudulent, but that are likely to hurt an innocent third party, to further victimizes the person harmed by the crime, or appeals to prejudice or hate or corruption that could do long term damage to the legal climate or other people. For example, suppose that there is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that a husband killed his wife, and the husband can't provide an alibi for his whereabouts at the time of the crime because he has amnesia, but the lawyer knows that the wife was actually killed by your client and the husband was actually saving the life of the burglar who in a car accident leaving the scene before the burglar bonked the husband on the head causing the husband to lose his memory. Your client was a burglar who was caught red handed for the burglary with items in his trunk and DNA evidence in the house, but your client lied and said that the wife was dead when he entered the house. A lawyer might conceivably limit how far he would be willing to go to point the blame at the husband even if the client wanted the lawyer to pursue that angle. Or, the victim might be a child who after being victimized had a frail emotional state. The client might push the lawyer to rudely and aggressively question the child and to intimidatingly investigate the child's friends, in an effort to cause the child to have a breakdown and refuse to cooperate further with the prosecution, but lawyer might not be willing to use that tactic even though it might work. Or, the client might be on trial in a county with a lot of KKK members some of whom will probably lie about their biases and end up on the jury. The client might want the lawyer to make an argument that implies with dog whistle type statements that the victim was a gay Jewish black man who didn't deserve to live anyway, while the client was the descendant of a plantation owner who was active protecting KKK interests in the county, and effectively nudge the jury to engage in jury nullification and acquit the client even if they believe that he is guilty. But, the lawyer might not be willing to use that tactic. But, no lawyer worth his salt would ever withdraw in the middle of a case from representing a client simply because the lawyer learned that the client was a KKK leader who was 100% guilty of the crime, and not because of a disagreement in the tactics that the client insisted that the lawyer use. | Unless the lawyer is sitting around with nothing to do (in which case s/he has bigger problems than one yelp review) s/he would have to take time which could otherwise be spent on paying cases to file such a suit. The lawyer would still have to pay court fees to file such a suit. If such a suit were clearly meritless (say the review is not defamatory but merely an expression of opinion) then it should be dismissed early in the process, and the judge and other legal insiders who may follow such matters are likely to have a negative view of the lawyer based on such a filing. This may well hurt the lawyer. more than any Yelp review ever could. If the lawyer files a clearly meritless suit, the court may well order that s/he pay your legal fees as well. There are no guarantees, but the risk of a lawyer filing a "revenge suit" over a moderately negative Yelp review seem low. | The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions. | If the two lawyers will never be on opposing sides of a case, there's no conflict of interest and thus nobody cares. For example, two lawyers in different fields probably won't encounter a conflict. If the lawyers are involved in the same field, there's a risk of a conflict of interest. Normally, the lawyers can shield themselves from legal trouble by disclosing the conflict any time it comes up. Where possible, the lawyers should avoid such cases before the conflict even starts (i.e., a lawyer should not take a case if they believe that the other lawyer will be on the other side). Similarly, disclosing the relationship to their boss allows their boss to avoid assigning such cases. In short: Such a relationship could have consequences, but a competent, ethical lawyer is unlikely to experience them. | Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints. | It's hard to say, given how little we know about the case and the information, also what you mean by "corrupted" and what your evidence is. Here are two hypothetical cases that illustrate different possibilities. 1: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was murdering his brother". Lawyer deems this to be a bad argument because murder is punished more severely than robbery. The lawyer is doing his job, protecting the interest of the client. No crime or civil wrong. 2: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was in church". The lawyer doesn't understand that this is exculpatory evidence, thinking "they never asked about church, there's no point in me raising this issue". The client can probably sue for incompetence. There are possible criminal charges possible, for example if the lawyer is working for The Mob he might be involved in an actual criminal conspiracy. | If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent? | Short Answer The concern raised is a real one, but it is much less serious than one might naively expect. Long Answer Precedents Apply Only To Resolve The Legal Arguments Presented On The Facts Found To Exist At Trial A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Develop Facts At Trial Isn't A Serious Problem A precedent determines the law as applied to a particular set of facts found by the trial court and confirmed as properly in the trial court record by the appellate court, as to a particular legal issue. Failure to prove facts at trial due to the fault of counsel for a party in the trial court changes the scope of the precedent. Failure to establish facts in one case that sets a precedent, doesn't prevent a similarly situated party, in a case with essentially the same actual facts, from doing a better job and thus presenting a set of facts that are not governed by the same precedent. The precedent from the ill argued case would not apply because the facts as found by the trial court would be different. A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Present Legal Arguments Isn't A Serious Problem if a someone lost a case merely because they did not come up with an argument which, should they have come up with, would convince the judge to rule in their favour, and that case has become a precedent, the fate of any following cases in lower courts with comparable facts will be decided by that unluckily slow-thinking litigant/lawyer. Likewise, suppose that due to incompetence of counsel, a key legal argument isn't made. When a trial court lawyer makes that mistake, the precedent will merely resolve the legal arguments that were resolved by the trial court. This won't preclude a future litigant from making different legal arguments that are stronger in the same circumstances since the precedent won't resolve those legal arguments. For example, suppose that a trial, a lawyer for one side fails to argue that the statute of frauds (which requires certain contracts to be in writing) bars the claim, and the judgment in favor of other other side on an oral agreement is upheld on appeal. A lawyer in a new case with the same facts can move to dismiss the other side's claim based upon the statute of frauds, because the precedent upholding the oral agreement didn't resolve the question of whether the statute of frauds could be used to dismiss the claim arising under that agreement. There Aren't Better Alternatives To Sift Through Legal Arguments No lawyer can make every argument. The incentives of the system and the professional regulation of lawyers, however, increases the likelihood that the strongest arguments will be made to the court setting the precedent and in the trial court before an appellate court considers the issue, relative to pretty much any other means of clarifying ambiguous issues in the law, where the advocates for different legal rules usually don't have the same strong incentives to argue their cases as well as they possibly can. The Risk Posed By Ineffectual Rhetoric In Favor Of Good Rules Of Law Is Real But Limited This doesn't mean that bad lawyering doesn't give rise to bad precedents. But when this happens it is usually because for a given argument and set of facts, the lawyer for one side is so much more rhetorically effective in making a legal argument than the lawyer for the other side which is proposing a "better rule" of law. But the exclusion of people who can't finish law school and pass the bar exam from the process makes a truly decisive advantage for one party over another in rhetorical effectiveness fairly rare. To the extent that rhetorical failure in appellate briefing is the cause of a bad precedent, the long term systemic effect of this problem (some would call it a feature of the system rather than a flaw) is that the side with more resources that can afford to hire better lawyers will tend to produce legal results that favor similarly situated parties going forward. Thus, it produces a sort of diluted "natural selection" effect (a bias that is equally, if not more concerning, in the duel of lobbyists for all sides of an issue in the legislative process). The other safeguards discussed below, limit this risk, although not completely. Other Safeguards Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The requirement of an actual "case and controversy" for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the requirement of "standing" for subject-matter jurisdiction are designed to prevent someone from intentionally making straw man arguments on appeal that produce precedents that are bad law. Thoughtful Appellate Judges When Opinions Are Published Also, appellate court precedents are made by a panel of multiple (usually three at the first direct appeal level) experienced and esteemed judges who are acutely aware that the decisions that they are making in precedent setting cases influence the law in other cases which causes them to look beyond the arguments of the parties to resolve the dispute. It isn't at all uncommon in such cases for an appellate court to resolve a case on appeal on the basis of arguments not made by either party in their briefs, or precedents or statutes not mentioned by either party. Furthermore, most appellate court decisions are unpublished opinions that expressly determined by the panel making the decision not to make a binding precedent, which allows panels of judges in these cases to take less care to run afoul of the risk of making a bad decision due to bad lawyering by a party. So, in the minority of cases that are published and create binding precedents, judges are especially careful to consider this risk. Five More Safeguards The other main safeguards in the case law system against bad precedents due to poor lawyering by a party are: (1) the ability of uninvolved third-parties to file amicus briefs in connection with an appeal presenting perspectives on legal issues not presented by a party, (2) the ability of a state supreme court or the U.S. Supreme Court (or both) as the case may be, to overrule intermediate appellate court precedents that were wrongly decided, (3) the ability of legislatures to change non-constitutional legal rulings by statute, (4) the procedural requirement that the relevant state or federal attorney general be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in cases challenging the constitutionality of a law, and (5) the ability of the political process to amend the relevant constitution to address a bad binding precedent by a highest court on a constitutional issue that the legislature cannot fix. Collectively These Safeguards Help Somewhat None of these safeguards are fool proof. But, collectively, these safeguards reduce the risk of a bad precedent being established due to bad lawyering in an adversary system, that the inherent limitation of a precedent being limited to particular facts and particular legal arguments provides as a primary means of preventing. Other Causes Of Bad Precedents Are More Of A Problem In general, once all of the considerations above are taken together, the risk of a bad precedent being made due to bad lawyering, while it is real, is significantly smaller than the risk that a bad precedent will be made because the appellate judges rendering the precedent making opinion are bad judges. Bad judges usually end up as judges with appellate precedent making power because they were selected more based upon political considerations, as they are in many states, and in the federal system, rather than primarily based upon the soundness of their legal judgment. When one risk factor that can lead to a bad decision is much larger than another risk factor that can lead to a bad decision, further improvements in the smaller risk factor will rarely make all that much of a difference in the overall likelihood that the system will produce a bad precedent. So, the adversary system, is, on balance, good enough make the risk of bad precedents arising from bad lawyering a not very troubling problem with the system, even though it is a real risk that sometimes does produce bad precedents. |
Mask mandate for unvaccinated employees and privacy Is it legal for an employer such as a public school (in the US) to impose a mask mandate on only unvaccinated employees, or would that be a violation of those employees ADA or HIPPA rights? It seems like an employee could easily claim they are singled out be being required to wear a mask. | ADA is about "disabilities", and not being vaccinated is not a disability under the law. Applicability of HIPAA is very complex and unclear. The Privacy Rule refers to and restricts the actions of Covered Entities. Healthcare providers and insurance companies are Covered Entities. The regulation 45 CFR 160.103 defines "covered entity" as (1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter 45 CFR 164.512 lists instances where authorization to disclose is not required, saying that "A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information without the written authorization of the individual". The employer is not likely to be a "covered entity", so these permissions are irrelevant. Furthermore, included in this section is a provision where disclosure is allowed in the case of (v) An employer, about an individual who is a member of the workforce of the employer with various conditions following such as (A) The covered entity is a covered health care provider who provides health care to the individual at the request of the employer: (1) To conduct an evaluation relating to medical surveillance of the workplace; or (2) To evaluate whether the individual has a work-related illness or injury However, these permissions apply to covered entities, not employers. ("Work-related" is not defined, but having a dangerous contagious disease does clearly relate to the workplace, thus it would be reasonable but not guaranteed to consider such a disclosure to be connectable to this section). 45 CFR 164.510 says that A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information, provided that the individual is informed in advance of the use or disclosure and has the opportunity to agree to or prohibit or restrict the use or disclosure, in accordance with the applicable requirements of this section §508, covering required authorization ("explicit yes") says Except as otherwise permitted or required by this subchapter, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information without an authorization that is valid under this section. There is no applicable provision whereby the proposed employer policy would clearly expose the employer to legal sanctions, since HIPAA does not purport to regulate everybody, only those entities where Congress authorized it to do so, via the concept of a "covered entity". Furthermore, the employer is not directly revealing any personal medical information: the employee (the other employee) is. A vaccinated employee is allowed to wear a sticker that says "I was vaccinated". An imaginable application of HIPAA to vaccinated employees would be a policy of requiring a vaccinated employee to advertise that they were vaccinated. One can reasonably guess that a person who does not wear a mask, given such a policy, has been vaccinated, but it is not a reasonable inference that a person who wears a mask has not been vaccinated (many vaccinated people continue to wear masks out of an abundance of caution). There is no legal basis for penalizing an employer who allows vaccinated employees to do things that weakly suggest that other employees have not been vaccinated. | 34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed. | If the school is a private school, then definitely yes: the school can also mandate clothing and grooming standards, and so forth – attending private school is optional, and they can even require the parents to provide the computer. (Mandatory) public schools have less power, but they still have the right to require students to do things that the parents do not like. For example, a parent might not like the particular history curriculum, or the might not like the fact that the child has to study music, but that is a power granted to public school districts. If the requirement were "unreasonable" in some sense, parental prerogative might win out over the school's rational of educational necessity. But it is no more unreasonable to require a student to learn how to use a computer that it is to require them to learn how to read a book. You might argue that reading is "more necessary" than developing computer skills, but the school district's curricular judgment is placed above that of a parent, so you would have to establish that giving a child access to a computer is objectively unreasonable. | A school district has been sued for something like that. In Church of God, Etc. v. Amarillo Indep. Sch., 511 F. Supp. 613, plaintiffs successfully sued the school district "to enjoin the enforcement of the Amarillo School District's absence policy which limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays to two days each school year", where "A fundamental tenet of the Church of God is that members must abstain from secular activity on seven annual holy days". The school district imposed an absence polity where "School work missed may be made up whether an absence is excused or unexcused", and "Excused absences shall be granted to students for a maximum of 2 days for religious holidays in each school year". The court concluded that "This policy poses an unquestionable burden on the Plaintiffs' religious belief", and "This burden is not ameliorated by the make-up work provision. The provision does not require a teacher to evaluate the work made up. It in fact directs the teacher to enter a zero for that work". In this case "Summary judgment is granted and judgment rendered enjoining the enforcement of the Amarillo Independent School District's excused absence policy insofar as it limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays". This is not a matter of religious discrimination, this is a First Amendment issue. The policy is in violation of the Free Exercise clause. Eliminating spring break per se is not a problem: doing so and providing no excused absences is the problem. In the above case, there was clear a religious principle of the church to the effect that one must be off the clock on the holiday. As far as I know, there is no requirement to abstain from work or school on Shrove Tuesday, Ash Wednesday or Good Friday. Nevertheless, in recognition of New Jersey state law which allows any student to take off a religious holiday – including Shrove Tuesday and Ash Wednesday, and dozens more – the Board of Education has prepared a list of such holidays, which includes Wiccan, Hindu, Baha'i, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Church of Scientology (and so on) religious holidays. | You may not assault a violator, you may notify the authorities. If your state has passed a law making it a felony to be outside without a mask, you can perform a citizen's arrest (but no state has such a law). So you cannot take the law into you own hands, and you run the risk of being arrested on felony assault charges if you do. There is always a significant risk that you are wrong about whether the order applies to a particular individual. You can always file a lawsuit, but you'd be in highly-experimental legal territory in terms of succeeding, specifically the claim that the person endangered your health (you can't sue on behalf of others, except e.g. as a parent on behalf of harm done to a child). For instance, nobody has successfully sued another person for going out in public having the flu on the grounds that they unreasonably put plaintiff at risk. You would have to experiment with that argument, to show that going out with a mask is reasonable and going out without a mask is unreasonable. | The First Amendment generally prohibits the government from taking any actions to limit your speech, the same as adults. There are certain exceptions, particularly if you are enrolled in a public school, which has some latitude to impose speech restrictions to “avoid substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of others” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, (1969). While you are a minor, though, your parents have virtually unlimited freedom to limit your freedom of speech. If they want to punish you for buying a hat or saying things they disagree with, they can generally do that. EDIT: The hat you've linked to probably would not fall within the Tinker exception. A similar case arose in Schoenecker v. Koopman, 349 F. Supp. 3d 745 (E.D. Wis. 2018), where a student was removed from class for wearing similar apparel supporting Second Amendment rights. The school made a vague allegation that his shirts were disruptive, but the court found that its concerns about disruptions were largely unreasonable and unsubstantiated. See also N.J. ex rel. Jacob v. Sonnabend, No. 20-C-227, (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2020). | http://www.healthinfoprivacybc.ca/confidentiality/when-can-and-cant-they-tell-others is a pretty good summary. Different rules apply to private practices than public clinics and hospitals. I will assume that the clinic on campus is private. This is a summary of the summary about who your information can be shared with: Health care professionals can share information within your "circle of care". Specifically, they are allowed to assume your consent to this but you can explicitly withdraw that consent. This would include doctors within the same practice. Admin staff can access your information for administrative purposes. Anyone you have authorised them to share it with e.g. relatives, friends etc. The Medical Services Plan for billing and admin If you are unable to drive If there is suspected of child abuse If you are wounded by a gun or a knife If you are a danger to others For your specific questions: I asked about it and they said it's confidential, but confidential to the clinic. Correct, unless you explicitly revoke this. the counselling department can share information with the doctors This is tricker, these people may be either within your "circle of care" or they may be part of the same organisation. Notwithstanding, councillors are not doctors and are governed by the everyday laws related to confidentiality i.e. information given in confidence is confidential and everything else isn't. If you are told the limits of the confidentiality i.e. they tell the doctor, then those are the limits unless you renegotiate them. he would know I only have one kidney? Well you said "the counselling department can share information with the doctors" and this would require the information going the other way i.e. the doctor sharing with the councillor. Even if this type of sharing was OK in general (and I'm not sure it is, see above); the information shared should only be what is required for the councillor to do their job - the number of kidneys you have is probably irrelevant to this. What laws apply to situations like this where confidential information in one entity (medical office) decides to share it without the consent of the patients to another entity (the counselling dept.)? Well, we are not sure there are 2 entities: legally there may only be 1 - the university. Anyway, the laws are the Personal Information Protection Act and common law (Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455) | I would say no, it's not the same. There's a reasonable expectation of privacy that you have in an office that isn't present when you're standing on a roadside or in a city park. In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit said "The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities" was in the spirit of the First Amendment. And this is not limited to police; an arrest "in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission" was found to be a First Amendment violation in Iacobucci v. Boulter (1st Cir. 1999). But a private meeting in an office is not a "public place" as it is meant in Glik (even if the building is owned by the government.) And the Glik decision says "To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions." |
What is the threshold for probable cause to run a drug-sniffing dog around a car in Pennsylvania? What is the threshold for probable cause to run a drug-sniffing dog around a car in Pennsylvania? My husband was pulled over in Pennsylvania. There was nothing in arms reach out in plain sight to cause a search. He pulled over off the road, which the officers falsified, they ran the dog around the car after they made him leave and dropped him off themselves. He was only driving a customer's car and they are blaming him with false claims. Someone please explain the threshold to search. | The police performed an "open air sniff". Federal and Pennsylvania law differ on this. Under Federal law, this is not considered a search and can be done on any vehicle- usually to get cause for a more invasive search. (Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).) Under Pennsylvania law, an open air sniff requires reasonable suspicion. This is lower than probable cause- all it requires is that a reasonable person could suspect from the facts that a crime may have or could be committed. Being overly nervous during a routine traffic stop driving someone else's car could potentially be considered reasonable suspicion- as I only have your second-hand account, I won't speculate further. If there was no reasonable suspicion, any evidence found by that search, or evidence found by a search justified by it would be suppressed. Fourth Ammendment rights also apply here. The police cannot detain someone solely for the purpose of waiting for a sniffer dog. They have ways and techniques to waste time for this purpose, but if the stop was concluded before the dog arrived, your husband would be free to leave. Again, I have only your second-hand account so I won't speculate on whether this happened. He should speak to his lawyer about specifics of the case. | It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary. | First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat. | I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers | Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | Yes, police are allowed to touch your car or wipe snow off the windshield to view a parking permit. Indeed, if they just ticketed people because their permit could not be seen through the snow, there would be a huge public outrage. They are not allowed to search your car without permission or probable cause in an emergency, but wiping snow or touching the exterior of your car do not constitute searches. Likewise, towing companies are allowed to touch your car in order to tow it away for whatever legal reasons there are for towing a car. | See Rodriguez v United States 575 U.S. ___ (2015). It has language describing the extent to which a police office can make "ordinary inquiries" incident to a traffic stop (internal citations removed): Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The government is only prohibited from unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless traffic stops are allowed if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has violated a traffic law. Once stopped, the officer can make "ordinary inquiries" described above. Regarding Fifth Amendment concerns, the Fifth Amendment's document-production privilege does not apply to regulatory type records that are required to be kept by law or items analogous to a required record. Baltimore City Dept. of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) |
Legal status of Cellebrite hack The CEO of Signal has posted the discovery of security vulnerabilities in Cellebrite products. These products are used by police to evade security on seized mobile devices and thereby download the contents for forensic examination. More details here. What Moxie Marlinespike claims to have discovered is that malicious files on the device being probed by a Cellebrite product can hack the Cellebrite product in turn, altering not just the findings for the device being probed, but also for other devices probed in the past. (The terms "hack" and "probe" here are used purely to distinguish the direction of the security penetration). So, what is the legal situation if you have one of these files stored on your device? The file contains malicious software, but it only activates if the device is connected to a Cellebrite product. Assuming you didn't give permission for this, are you guilty of hacking the Cellebrite product? I'm principally interested in US and UK law, but answers for other countries would be acceptable too. | A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them. | You can't own a database; you might, however, own (have) the copyright to a database if you created it or the creator transferred that right to you. You can also possess a copy of a database: the question is whether it is legal. "Leaked" implies that it is taken without permission, so you might be in violation of copyright law by possessing a copy. The only databases that would escape copyright protection would be those US government works, things put in the public domain, and things publically licensed to allow copying. Plus, any database whose content fails to exhibit a modicum of creativity (Feist). A database might be inherently illegal (at least in your hands), so it would depend on what the content is. The first thing that comes to mind is a database from a child-porn website, which contains numerous illegal images: see section 110 of Title 18. "Leaked" information might involve violation of 18 USC 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act), which prohibits unauthorized hacking. It does not directly prohibit being in possession of a hacked database: but you might still be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact. (That is one of those ad libitum areas of the law where there's no way to know for sure what is and is not "okay"). If they do prosecute you, you might rely on Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, where because it was a matter of "public interest", propagation of illegally obtained material was held to be protected by the First Amendment. Also there is the case of the Pentagon Papers. At the federal level, there are no controls over storing credit card information so if you get a copy of the Target or Home Depot hacked database, there's no federal law against that (if we discount "accessory after the fact"), but there are circumstances in Minnesota where retaining such information could be illegal. | Some jurisdictions have laws which make it illegal to create a software which is intended to commit crimes (usually computer-related crimes). For example, the German criminal law §202c StGB makes it illegal to create (or sell, convey, etc.) a program which has the purpose to commit crimes against the previous paragraphs 202a (stealing data) or 202b (intercepting data). The constitutional court later clarified that this law is only to be used against programs which serve no other purpose than to commit crimes and not against "dual use" tools which can also be used for legitimate purposes. So if one were accused of committing the crime of creating such a program, then a possible defense strategy could be to convince the court that they never intended for their program to be used to commit crimes. | This sounds a bit far-fetched. There are laws against circumventing copy protection measures (DRM) but not against aimbotting (to the best of my knowledge). Thus, you cannot reasonably believe that a click-assist functionality would be used to break laws. It could definitely be used to break private contracts such as an EULA, but you are not a party to that contract and are not bound by its terms. Of course, when you use such click-assist tech in an online game, you might be breaking your contract with the game vendor or server provider. But this doesn't imply that a click-assist would be forbidden outside of that context. Note that assistive technologies sometimes have exceptions from laws, e.g. a permission to circumvent DRM if necessary for accessibility. In the US, the Librarian of Congress adopts exceptions for a duration of three years. While none of the current exceptions match your specific scenario involving video-games, it can be permissible to break DRM on e-books or videos for certain accessibility enhancements. | So-called AI software does not enjoy a special legal status (at present: one never knows what new law might be added). The question of whether any software can be distributed "safely" or "responsibly" is also not a legal issue. Nor is "true sentience" a relevant consideration, and nothing is guaranteed. When you distribute software of any kind, there is an implied warranty that the product is "fit", and if software kills you, you may be able to sue the creator for negligence. A software creator may then want to disclaim liability, by saying "WARNING: THIS PROGRAM MAY KILL YOU. OCP IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY INJURIES ARISING FROM USE OF THIS PRODUCT". This may or may not actually remove liability. In the UK "liability for negligence occasioning death or personal injury cannot be excluded", so such a disclaimer will not prevent a suit against the manufacturer. In the US, the issue is determined at the level of the state – here is a summary of the law in the states. Probably the primary question would be whether such a disclaimer is an unconscionable term, and the second question is whether the act constituted gross negligence (not simply "negligence"). Mississippi exceptionally does not allow disclaimers, but even then, it does allow disclaiming liability when it comes to computer hardware and software. A software disclaimer is not inherently unconscionable, though perhaps some specific disclaimer would be found to be. Courts typically disfavor disclaimers in the case of gross negligence, and again determining what constitutes "gross negligence" is determined on a state by state basis. If the act shows "reckless indifference to the rights of others" and "failure to use even slight care or conduct that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of others", then the act might be grossly negligent. | The takedown action is a little sketchy. The law regarding takedown notices and host liability is here. The notice includes "Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed", a "signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed", and a statement that "the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law". These things are present in the notice, for which reason the items were taken down. The complaint states that The clear purpose of this source code is to (i) circumvent the technological protection measures used by authorized streaming services such as YouTube, and (ii) reproduce and distribute music videos and sound recordings owned by our member companies without authorization for such use. We note that the source code is described on GitHub as “a command-line program to download videos from YouTube.com and a few more sites.” and the source code expressly suggests its use to copy and/or distribute the following copyrighted works owned by our member companies: Icona Pop – I Love It (feat. Charli XCX) [Official Video], owned by Warner Music Group Justin Timberlake – Tunnel Vision (Explicit), owned by Sony Music Group Taylor Swift – Shake it Off, owned/exclusively licensed by Universal Music Group Complainants are "confused" about actual infringement (which is prohibited by copyright law), and creating a method for infringing copyright. Under DMCA and US copyright law, copying is infringing, programming is not infringing. The complaint does not clearly allege unauthorized copying of another person's intellectual property, and their complaint is based on the theory that certain programming actions constitute copyright infringement. I don't actually think they are confused, I think they are testing the boundaries. Github has no reasonable options but to comply; the authors have the option of filing a counter-notice; then RIAA has the option of claiming that they have filed a copyright infringement lawsuit. If they do, the material remains taken down and the courts sort it out if a lawsuit is actually filed. There is minimal burden on the complainant to reign-in over-zealous takedown notice practices: Lenz v. Universal Music finds that complainants must give good faith consideration to a fair use defense. 17 USC 1201(a)(1)(A) states that No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. Let's assume that the removed material does circumvent a technological measure protecting a work. This is a separate offense in Title 17. 17 USC 501(a) defines infringement of copyright, saying Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author Production of an anti-circumvention technology is not included in those sections: on a plain reading of the law, this is not infringement. To summarize the legal dance at issue: RIAA has taken the first legal step in alleging infringement, and Github has taken the material down because Github does not get to decide what the courts would conclude. Let's assume the authors file a counter-notice stating that there is no infringement; then, equally, let's assume that RIAA states that they files a lawsuit. Github will leave the material down. Let's also assume that RIAA actually files suit. Under the prior assumption that the material violates 17 USC 1201(a)(1)(A) which seems likely, the authors could be slapped for being in violation: but they would not have been in violation of §106-122. What recourse would the authors have for RIAA's misuse of the term "infringe", and against whom? Nothing against Github: the service provider does not get to decide the merits of the case. Perhaps RIAA. From Lenz supra, If an entity abuses the DMCA, it may be subject to liability under § 512(f). That section provides: “Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section—(1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages․” Id. § 512(f). Subsection (1) generally applies to copyright holders and subsection (2) generally applies to users. Only subsection (1) is at issue here. The court said that We must next determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Universal knowingly misrepresented that it had formed a good faith belief the video did not constitute fair use. This inquiry lies not in whether a court would adjudge the video as a fair use, but whether Universal formed a good faith belief that it was not. Contrary to the district court's holding, Lenz may proceed under an actual knowledge theory, but not under a willful blindness theory. Perhaps the authors can prove actual knowledge. The Lenz reasoning on this point (§IV C) is rather contorted. | The Radiocommunications Agency (now OFCOM) issued some guidance about this in 2001. The specific offence is defined by s5 Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949: Any person who ... uses any wireless telegraphy apparatus with intent to obtain information as to the contents, sender or addressee of any message (whether sent by means of wireless telegraphy or not) of which neither the person using the apparatus nor a person on whose behalf he is acting is an intended recipient ... shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. It's also an offence under s5(1)(b)(ii) to disclose the contents of any such message, so the reception and disclosure of radio messages not sent by or addressed to you are both offences. I don't know if there have been any successful prosecutions specifically for monitoring aircraft communications. I doubt whether a hobbyist listening for his own enjoyment would attract the attention of the authorities, but if he started to publish recordings of the traffic then that might well do it. | Source code is protected by copyright, even if it is designed for an unethical or illegal purpose. Making a copy without permission is copyright infringement, as is distributing a copy without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. In the US the primary exception is fair use. Whether a use constitutes a fair use or not depends on the detailed facts, including the nature and purpose of the use, and the plausible effect on the market for the protected work. The question does not contain enough information for even a rough fair use analysis. It is generally not unlawful to create malware, only to use it to access a computer or network without permission, or to do other unlawful acts. Thus the copyright holder could sue without implicating him- or herself in a crime. However, damages would probably depend largely on the commercial value of the program, and if the only plausible use was criminal, the legitimate value might be quite low. Possessing an unauthorized copy of a work is not a crime, nor is it infringement. The maker and distributor of an unauthorized copy commits infringement, but the recipient does not. Whether unauthorized access and downloading is a crime under the CFAA depends on the factual details. Many things that might technically be crimes under the CFAA are not prosecuted. That is a matter for the relevant prosecutor to determine. |
What actions to take when a Data Processor doesn't respect GDPR? We've recently exchanged emails with one of our Data Processors, because they don't grant the ability to permanently delete hosted documents (pdf, png, etc.) on their platform. Such documents might contain personal information. In the event where an end-user would want to permanently delete such documents, we don't have the ability to do it for them (because the Provider doesn't give us any tool for doing so). Thus, we can't comply with any privacy-related request from our end-users. It also seems even the Processor cannot perform such a request in the event where we would forward the request to them. (they don't seem to have the necessary tools, either) Therefore, we believe they don't comply with GDPR because of the Right to erasure/rectification. The Processor doesn't recognize their responsibility on this matter, and are stating they respect GDPR regulations. Although, they haven't provided us with any meaningful reply regarding that particular matter. They're basically saying they're doing things "by the book" and sending us links to their online documentation, which do not answer the issue at hand. At this point, we're concerned about what to do next. It feels like they won't acknowledge the issue and won't take responsibility about fixing it. We're thinking about opening an official enquiry, but we're unsure how to proceed. Edit: The data processor is based in the US, while we are based in France (EU). We have signed a DPA with them. | The data processor is not responsible for complying with the GDPR. You are ultimately responsible, since you are the data controller. The data processor is merely required to assist you, but it's unclear what that means in the presented scenario. Per Art 28(3)(e) GDPR, the DPA must require the data processor to provide reasonable assistance: That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: […] taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to respond to requests for exercising the data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III; However, per Art 28(1) you can only engage processors that you deem sufficient to protect the data subject's rights: the controller shall use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject. Here, it seems that your company failed to ensure that the processor provides the features you need for compliance. Many companies claim to be GDPR-compliant, but that doesn't mean that your use of their services will be GDPR-compliant as well. Depending on how the Art 28(3)(e) requirement was implemented in the DPA you may have a right to assistance even if the processor doesn't implement necessary features in their software, but enforcing this contract could require a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction (but that's par for the course for international B2B contracts). It is worth noting that the GDPR right to erasure doesn't always apply. In a processing activity where no erasure right is likely to arise, it would be perfectly fine to use a data processor that doesn't offer any possibility for erasure. Similarly, it can sometimes be legal to use technologies like Blockchain or Git that make erasure difficult or impossible. However, it is the responsibility of the data controller to analyze the impact of such a choice up front, before commencing the processing activities. In some cases, this could require a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). Note that transfers of personal data into the US are illegal or at least questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The Privacy Shield is no longer a legal basis for such transfers. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are technically allowed, but only “on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available” (cf Art 46). The ECJ's judgement calls this into question. This could be a further incentive to migrate to a more GDPR-compliant service. | Overview As described, only the last of these seems to be compliant ways of obtaining consent, and indeed even that is not fully compliant, although features not described might make it so. However, if there is a lawful basis for processing PI other than consent, under GDPR article 6, then there is no need to obtain consent at all, and doing so in an improper way is irrelevant. However storage of or access to local information (such as cookies) requires consent unless such storage or access is "strictly necessary" for providing a service which the user has requested. Relevant GDPR Provisions GDPR article 6 lists six possible lawful bases for processing personal data. These are, in summery: (a) consent; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract or to takwe steps requested by the Data Subject; (c) necessary for compliance with a legal obligation; (d) to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person (e) or the performance of a task carried out in the public interest (f) legitimate interests of the Controller The other provisions cited here apply only to PI for which the lawful basis is consent. GDPR article 7 reads: (2) If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. (3) The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. GDPR Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. GDPR Recital 42 reads: ... in particular in the context of a written declaration on another matter, safeguards should ensure that the data subject is aware of the fact that and the extent to which consent is given. In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. For consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended. Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. GDPR Recital 43 reads: ... Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. Analysis I will review each of the scenarios in the question in turn. Scenario 1: not allowing [a user] to use the site until the user clicks Accept. No options, just an "Accept" button. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). It appears that the provision of a service (use of the site) is conditional on consent not needed for that service (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). the data subject has no genuine or free choice (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 2: A banner stating that "By browsing the site you accept the conditions". Just an "x" to close the banner. Using the site is allowed while the banner is displayed. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: Consent was not "given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data" (Art 7(2)). The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). the data subject has no genuine or free choice (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 3: A banner with an "Accept" (and possibly "Reject") button. No other options. Site navigation is allowed while the banner is displaying. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 4: A banner with an "Accept", "Reject" and also a "Settings" options where the user can fine tune the way his data is being used by the site. This might constitute freely given consent, provided that: a document is displayed or linked to that describes the kinds of PI that will be processed, and the purposes of the processing; There is some easy and obvious manner to withdraw consent, and to change the individual choices on what to consent to, after the banner has closed, or on any subsequent visit to the site; The consent section of the settings dialog must be clearly distinguished from other sections that do not deal with consent; Just where the lines must be drawn between "different personal data processing operations" which each requires the possibility of separate consent is not yet fully clear. And again, if the site or service does not store or otherwise process PI, or has a lawful basis for doing so other than consent, and does not store or access local information, it need not obtain consent at all, and the question of what constitutes freely given consent becomes irrelevant. Of course many sites do depend on consent as the lawful basis for much of their activity. | Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post: If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here. If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps. | This issue touches upon two distinct GDPR rights: Art 15 right to access: you have a right to receive a copy of all personal data concerning you that are undergoing processing (including storage). Access may only be denied where this would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” Art 20 right to data portability: if processing is being carried out by automated means, and processing is based on certain legal bases (consent or contract, but not legitimate interest), then you have a right to receive a copy of your personal data in a machine-readable format, for personal data that you have provided to the data controller. Whereas the right to access is fairly straightforward, the right to data portability applies under much more narrow conditions. Basically, it's a right that you can download any data that you've uploaded so that you can move to a different service. Google Takeout is primarily concerned with your right to data portability, and provides your data in a machine-readable format. Any photos that you've uploaded to Google Photos, you'll be able to download. Thus, it could be technically compliant to exclude information that they've inferred about your personal data, such as image-recognition results. Such results would still be personal data under the GDPR definition of the consent, and would be covered by your right to access. Google might argue that you already have access to this data through the web interface. In my opinion the GDPR clearly requires the data controller to provide a “copy”, i.e. the data in some durable form – not merely access through a web interface. Whereas your question is specifically about Google, the same issue applies to other services as well. E.g. Ruben Verborgh has an interesting blog series on trying to get access to all their data from Facebook, though unsuccessful so far. Similar to your scenario, Facebook offers a download for personal data but does not include all personal data in this download. In one of the documents provided by Facebook in the course of the exchange, they note that they allow access to photo tags through the web interface, but do not include this in downloaded data – without providing further justification. | This is a good question, as it raises an issue which places the controller's interest in providing a smoothly functioning customer sign up process against customers' right not to have their data leaked. Note that it is not necessary to consider "enumeration" here. Even just being able to check whether one person has a registered account raises the issue. The relevant provisions of the EU GDPR (or in the UK, the UK GDPR as defined in sections 3(1) and 205(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018) are (emphasis added): Article 4(2): 'processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction So, disclosure of the fact that a user has a registered account amounts to "processing". Article 6(1): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of these, only (a) and (f) are likely to be of any relevance: (a) is not too useful since it isn't feasible to design a sign-up system that depends on the user's consent (which they may not give). That leaves us with (f). As noted by the Information Commissioner's Office, "Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing.". The legitimate interest here would be that you need a sign up system which prevents duplicate registrations. Remember though that the processing has to be "necessary" for the purposes of the legitimate interest. One might argue that it is not since you could design the system to give the appearance of accepting the duplicate registration followed by sending an email to the account holder to inform them. On the other hand this will result in a less user friendly experience which could itself be a legitimate interest. Ultimately this is a balancing exercise and it is hard to say whether you have struck the right balance until someone complains to the ICO or the court and a decision is issued. The fact that the practice is widespread among well-resourced and large companies would tend to indicate that it is lawful albeit this is not conclusive in the absence of a court decision. I'm not aware of any cases involving this particular issue but would be interested to hear from others on this point. If the processing is unlawful then Article 18 is applicable: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies: [...] (b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead Where processing has been restricted under paragraph 1, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject’s consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. In other words, the data subject could ask you not to disclose their registration status via the sign up page, and you would be obliged to comply with the request. Separately from the above points, in order to be lawful you must provide the data subject with certain prescribed information at the time when the data is collected. Of particular relevance here are the following items: Article 13(1): Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information: [...] (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; So even if you conclude that the processing will be lawful you will have to give some consideration to the basis so that you can comply with the above provision. | No, you do not need to show a privacy policy just for running a publicly accessible server, as long as any traffic data such as IP addresses is only used as strictly necessary for providing the service requested by the user. The background here is that while GDPR is a very general law, the ePrivacy directive (ePD) provides more details for telecommunication and information society services, which also includes SSH servers. Per ePD Art 6, traffic data may be used (1) for the purpose of the transmission/service or when the data has been anonymized, (2) for billing purposes, or (3) for marketing or value added services, when the user has given their consent. Information about the processing is only required under ePrivacy for cases (2) and (3), but not for processing that is strictly necessary. Now the tricky question is under what circumstances you can log (failed) log-in attempts or use tools like fail2ban. One argument is that such measures are strictly necessary to ensure the security of the communication, but these measures are evidently not necessary for performing the transmission in the sense of ePD. There are a few ways to resolve this: necessity has to be interpreted more broadly, and security measures are indeed necessary. For example, ePD Art 6(5) mentions fraud detection, without authorizing it explicitly. an IP address is effectively anonymized in the sense of the ePD since you do not realistically have means for linking the IP address to any particular person. This is a fairly weak argument, but could be supported by GDPR Recital 26 which defines anonymous data. Counterpoint: IP addresses are online identifiers which are explicitly included in the definition of personal data in GDPR Art 4(1). an IP address is not just traffic data that falls under the ePD, but also personal data that falls under the GDPR. When the IP address is merely used to make a transmission, it is not processed as personal data and only ePD concerns apply. But when we process it to ban the IP, it is processed as personal data under a legitimate interest. This processing does not fall under any of the categories from ePD Art 6, so that only GDPR concerns apply. These include a requirement to inform the data subject about the processing at the time in accordance with GDPR Art 13, which could be satisfied by displaying a link to a privacy policy in the course of the login process. For a legitimate interest argument, it also depends on the expectations of the typical data subject. Since some security measures such as security logs are normal and should be expected, a legitimate interest argument is likely to be strong. I think this is the correct conclusion, even though the “it's not traffic data, or at least doesn't fall under the ePD” argument is quite weak. It hinges on the assumption that security measures are not “value added services”. This fits the intent of the ePD, but not the actual definition of value added services. In any case, you do not need to ask for consent unless you're required to obtain consent e.g. under ePD Art 6(3) or because your processing of personal data relies on consent as the legal basis per GDPR Art 6. It also has to be noted that ePD has no immediate effect, but has to be implemented by each EU member state in national law. These laws can provide more specific guidance. | These documents constitute personal data and - in principle - you, as the subject, have the right to get a copy of them by issuing a "subject access request". The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing. For any further copies requested by the data subject, the controller may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs. Where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, the information shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form. (Art. 15 (3) GDPR) GDPR applies to controllers of any kind, including government organisations. The subject access request can usually be a simple email. The ICO has a template for this: https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/your-right-of-access/ (but keep it simple, you can literally just ask for "all personal data" they have on you; no need to speculate on what kind of data they may have). The subject access request is sent to the actual controller, but if you don't get a response to your request after 30 days, you can file a complaint with the supervisory authority (see here for Germany; note that federal institutions are supervised by the BFDI, not the data protection authorities of the Länder). Also note that you may have to go through some trouble to be properly authenticated by the controller. They do need to be certain that you are the data subject. There are also reasons why a controller can refuse to provide some or all of the information (e.g. if your request is clearly excessive or unfounded, if it's impossible to comply without violating another data subject's rights), but I would be surprised if any of those applied in your case. Your rights can also be restricted depending on the legal basis for processing. This includes rights that are illogical as well as some that provide special protection for processors: You can't object to processing based on consent (but you can revoke your consent), fulfilment of contract (but you can cancel your contract), a legal obligation on the part of the processor, or a vital interest (but you still have the right to erasure) Your right to portability and right to erasure does not apply if processing is based on a legal obligation or a public task (justice, parliamentary or government functions, statutory functions etc.) your right to portability also doesn't apply if processing is based on vital interest (e.g to protect someone's life) or legitimate interest of the processor. It is possible that processing all or some of your data was based on the performance of a public task, in which case they will refuse your request. | Under GDPR Article 6 section 1(f), a lawful basis for processing is: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. It seems that informing a data subject of the availability of a possibly better-focused related site would be a "legitimate interest", and merely doing a broad geo-locate on the IP does not seem to impact the "interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" so it would seem this could be done without specific consent in advance. I don't know of any legal case on this specific point, however. |
Does acceptance of communication with identifying characteristics originating from a disputed territory imply recognition of that territory? To give an example: One of the more well known currently disputed territories is Crimea. As telecommunication services, and users of such, do continue to operate from that territory under the aegis of a Russian persona, (like a Crimean based website using a .ru domain or personal and business phones in Crimea using a Russian country code), does acceptance of such communication imply recognizing the territory as part of Russia? To me it seems a bit tricky because in the ordinary sense the answer would be of course. It would be silly to accept a phone call, carry on a conversation, then refuse to accept the first few digits of the phone number. If this norm holds then the communication operators and their receivers are recognizing identifying claims. However, in this case that would mean accepting that Crimea is no longer part of Ukraine. And governments are receivers of communication too. (There does not seem to exist technical means to block the propogation of such communication. And it also may not even be possible, for internet companies specifically, to refuse recognition of any technically valid domain without jeopardizing their interconnections.) | No Recognition of territorial claims is the sole province of the diplomatic branches of national government, and of heads of state. In the US it is the State Department, and ultimately the President. The actions of telephone operators and people engaging in other forms of communication cannot and do not bind the decisions of the President, or of other heads of state. Besides, there may be cases in which a telephone country code or a web domain may not match the actual, undisputed legal status of a territory. Accepting a phone call does not affect a country's legal status. For decades the US did not recognize the communist regime in China. Legally, it considered that the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) was the only valid government, and the acceptance of telephone calls did not change that. | If the data controller has “reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request”, then “the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject” (Art 12(6) GDPR). Until the data subject provides this information, the request is paused. But what are reasonable doubts, and what additional information can the controller request? The GDPR itself provides no clear guidelines, though general principles apply – the additional information must be necessary, adequate, and proportionate for the identity conformation purpose. The controller's obligation to comply with access requests must be balanced with the controller's obligation to ensure the security of data by rejecting invalid requests. Just accepting any request without any verification would also be a breach of the GDPR. For example: If the company identifies data subjects by email address, then demonstrating control over the email address would be an appropriate verification step. But just mentioning the email address would not be enough since it could be someone else's email address. If the company provides a website where data subjects have created user accounts, then being able to log in to the account would be an appropriate verification step. In these examples, asking e.g. for government photo ID would not be appropriate because that doesn't help strengthen the link between the person making the request and the personal data being processed. Such data collection would be disproportionate and unnecessary. In contrast, if you walk into a bank and ask for a copy of your data, it would be entirely appropriate for them to ask for government ID because (a) the higher general risks warrant stronger checks, and (b) such ID will help confirm that the person making the request is indeed the proper account holder. The bank will also have been legally required to request ID when the account was originally opened, so that asking for ID as an identity verification measure during this later request won't involve collection of more data than they already have. (These examples were made up by me and are not official, but read on.) The EDPB has issued draft guidelines on the right of access 01/2022, which also discuss the issue of additional information for identity verification in sections 3.2 and 3.3. In particular, paragraphs 73-78 talk about IDs: 73. It should be emphasised that using a copy of an identity document as a part of the authentication process creates a risk for the security of personal data and may lead to unauthorised or unlawful processing, and as such it should be considered inappropriate, unless it is strictly necessary, suitable, and in line with national law. […] it is also important to note that identification by means of an identity card does not necessarily help in the online context (e.g. with the use of pseudonyms) […]. 75. In any case, information on the ID that is not necessary for confirming the identity of the data subject, […] may be blackened or hidden by the data subject before submitting it to the controller, except where national legislation requires a full unredacted copy of the identity card (see para. 77 below). […] 76. […] Example: The user Ms. Y has created an account in the online store, providing her e-mail and username. Subsequently, the account owner asks the controller for information whether it processes their personal data, and if so, asks for access to them within the scope indicated in Art. 15. The controller requests the ID of the person making request to confirm her identity. The controller's action in this case is disproportionate and leads to unnecessary data collection. […] Example: A bank customer, Mr. Y,, plans to get a consumer credit. For this purpose, Mr. Y goes to a bank branch to obtain information, including his personal data, necessary for the assessment of his creditworthiness. To verify the data subject’s identity, the consultant asks for notarised certification of his identity to be able to provide him with the required information. The controller should not require notarised confirmation of identity, unless it is strictly necessary, suitable and in line with the national law […]. Such practice exposes the requesting persons to additional costs and imposes an excessive burden on the data subjects, hampering the exercise of their right of access. 77. Without prejudice to the above general principles, under certain circumstances, verification on the basis of an ID may be a justified and proportionate measure, for example for entities processing special categories of personal data or undertaking data processing which may pose a risk for data subject (e.g. medical or health information). However, at the same time, it should be borne in mind that certain national provisions provide for restrictions on the processing of data contained in public documents, including documents confirming the identity of a person (also on the basis of Art. 87 GDPR). Restrictions on the processing of data from these documents may relate in particular to the scanning or photocopying of ID cards or processing of official personal identification numbers. To summarize: controllers can request IDs only in comparatively niche scenarios, and must then take additional safeguards to protect the sensitive document (e.g. instructing the data subject to redact parts of the ID, not making copies, and immediately deleting the ID after successful verification). A lot here comes down to national laws, which may explicitly require or forbid use of the ID in this context. The EDPB guidelines are not binding or normative, especially since this guidance is still in the public consultation phase. However, the guidelines present an overall consensus of the national data protection authorities in the EU, and the guidelines are regularly cited by courts. In practice, many controllers do ask for disproportionate amounts of data. Sometimes this seems to be an attempt to discourage data subject requests, which would clearly be non-compliant. In some cases, this is due to a narrow interpretation of “reasonable doubts” in which they try to eliminate any doubt about the identity. If the data subject and data controller cannot agree on a suitable identity verification process, then the data subject can: Art 77: lodge a complaint with a data protection authority, and/or Art 79: sue the data controller in court, both for compliance (fulfilling the request) and for compensation (if damages were suffered). It is worth noting that the data controller is responsible for being able to demonstrate compliance (Art 5(2) accountability principle), such as demonstrating the apparent reasonable doubts to a supervisory authority or to a court. When the controller requests ID, the controller has the burden of proof to show that this is compliant. | See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22). | There is no exhaustive list of material banned specifically in WhatsApp profile pictures, but there is an exhaustive list of crimes that § 140 StGB applies to: Whoever rewards or approves of publicly, in a meeting or by disseminating material (section 11 (3)) in a manner which is suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace one of the unlawful acts referred to in section 138 (1) nos. 2 to 4 and no. 5 last alternative and in section 126 (1) or an unlawful act under section 176 (3), sections 176a and 176b, under section 177 (4) to (8) or section 178 after it has been committed or culpably attempted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. In turn, sections 138 and 126 enumerate various crimes, whereas the other mentioned sections relate to (child) sexual abuse. Section 138 (1) no. 5 lists: murder under specific aggravating circumstances (section 211) or murder (section 212) or genocide (section 6 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a crime against humanity (section 7 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a war crime (section 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a crime of aggression (section 13 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) The last alternative is indeed a “crime of aggression” which is defined in particular as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”. In Germany, there is a clear consensus that Russia is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine. The “Z” symbol is used in a Russian context in support of this invasion. It is therefore understandable that a prosecutor has the reasonable suspicion that publicly posting a Russian flag with the Z symbol is public approval of this crime of aggression. Spiegel Online reported of 140 similar cases across Germany. Thus, the photo could be real. Of course, the accused should not accept this invitation to talk to the police and instead get themselves a criminal defense attorney. A defense strategy would likely argue that the profile picture was not “suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace” so that the conditions of § 140 StGB were not fulfilled. More realistically, the defendant would not contest a fine. | That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small. | The "letter" you quote says more than what Ionos says publicly, the latter not mentioning any date. The most obvious possibility is Treasury Department sanctions against Russia: while the sanctions don't necessarily prohibit servicing and any all Russian nationals or residents, Russia is subject to sanctions and that's what the TOS says. A problem is that the TOS refers to a "country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions", which is not legally defined. Here is the Treasury Department's explanation of that point (which is that there are very many types of restrictions: there is no legal category of "embargo restrictions"). One could then argue, in one's breach of contract arbitration hearing, that the clause cannot reasonably be interpreted the way the company (possibly) intends it to be. The force majeure clause does not seem relevant unless they see some way in which the invasion of Ukraine makes it impossible for the company to fulfill the contract with Russians. | The international laws of war are generally much easier to apply in the context of a group of people claiming to be a state, than in the context of a group of people who do not claim to be a state. For example, one of the critical questions for classifying an individual under the laws of war is whether the enemy combatant is publicly identified as a soldier of the entity against which a country has declared war. In the context of an entity that claims to be a state, like Daesh, the distinction between identified soldiers, civilians, and covert combatants is relatively workable to apply. There are actually tens of thousands of people who personally identify themselves as regular soldiers loyal to a particular Islamic State with a defined territory, chain of command and political leaders, and there are millions of people who personally identify themselves as civilian subjects of Daesh who are not soldiers, and there are probably even people who personally identify themselves as covert combatants for Daesh - like some of the European terror incident perpetrators we've seen over the last couple of years. People applying the laws of war still need to do their best to accurately determine who fits in which category, but the categories in question are bona fide meaningful categories that are mutually socially agreed to by everyone involved that are reasonably well defined. Recognition of something as a "state" for law of war purposes is also something quite different from recognition of something as a state for diplomatic purposes. Inherent in the laws of war is the understanding that one side may believe that the other side is an usurper or illegitimate government. In contrast, in conflicts with many organized groups that are clearly non-state actors in the eyes of all involved, the distinction between publicly identified soldiers of a state and covert combatants is often ill defined. Calling people citizens or subjects of that non-state group is likewise hard to analogize to the kinds of situations contemplated when the laws of war were devised. Does one have to be a "member" of the organization to qualify as a subject? Does one have to provide "material support" or conspire to carry out some specific acts? Or, does subjective support or a bare public statement of allegiance on a facebook page or bumper sticker suffice that did nothing material to aid the cause suffice? This matters because, under the laws of war, subjects of an enemy can be interned humanely even if they are not combatants, and the lawful treatment of public and covert combatants is very different under the laws of war. | The UN charter is really hard to amend It requires approval by two-thirds of its member states, and ratification by two-thirds of its member states, including in both cases by the five permanent members of the security council (the USA, the UK, Russia, China, and France). It's happened a total of 3 times, in each case, for completely non-controversial reasons. |
Can a corporation terminate my account, just because I keep complaining on legitimate issues? For privacy, I don't want to identify which discount broker in Canada. Last week, I received this surprising letter. Based on information received by our Compliance Department, we have decided to terminate our relationship with you. You are advised to close your account by May 21, 2021. I answered all questions on my account opening application truthfully. I'm a Canadian citizen and permanent resident in Canada. I can think of just one reason for Broker to terminate my contract. I emailed their Compliance Department multiple times because their service keeps getting disrupted and their customer service is so shoddy. They never improved, so then I emailed Head of Compliance. Their phone lines are always busy – no reasonable person can wait for hours. Their trading software glitches! Their staff don't answer emails punctually – obviously customers shouldn't have to chase for replies! When they do reply, they apologized. They never denied my complaints, or ask me to stop complaining – not once! But I know it's difficult to prove that Broker terminated my contract just because I complained against them. Broker's lawyers can just fabricate some legitimate reason for closing my account. | Whether or not you are entitled to maintain the account in perpetuity depends on the contract. Most likely they have the right under the terms of the contract to unilaterally close the account, just as you have that right – you don't have to justify closing your account. So the first thing to do is check the contract. The second thing to do is determine the actual reason, if they are willing to offer a reason. They (probably) cannot maintain an account for a person who is not a permanent resident of Canada, and they may not have the required evidence that you are a permanent resident of Canada. | They can't simply keep the money; that's against the law. But in a situation like this, it's easy to get lost in the bureaucracy. The company may be in violation of different laws, re: For Your Information | United States Department of Labor, so you can try pointing this out in another email or letter. The threat of the Feds or other enforcement agency looking into the matter may make something happen. Or, try this: find the CEO (or a similarly high-ranked executive) on LinkedIn; many have open messaging in interest of good PR. Message/email them and carefully (and nicely) explain the situation. (A CEO will likely have an assistant monitoring their LinkedIn account. But, there are many stories of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos personally responding to emails.) Someone will make it happen and the employees who have not been helpful will be in hot water. | Can you have valid Terms and Condictions when there is no entity mentioned? No, but the example you post is inapplicable because the terms clearly state in the beginning that the agreement is between "you" and "Binance operators". The latter is defined shortly thereafter. Thus, it certainly identifies the entity. A contract does not need to exhaustively list all information such as parties' registration(s) or domicile. As long as a reasonable person is able to grasp who are the entities entering a contract, that contract is binding and enforceable. If it cannot be ascertained from the contract who the counterparty(-ies) is(are), then neither party can prove that he and other entity(-ies) knowingly and willfully agreed to an exchange of considerations or promises thereof. Accordingly, nobody would have standing to sue others for breach of contract. | They are still in business because they went to the agencies that regulate them and sought exemptions and waivers from the requirements that they not have criminal convictions. Certain highly regulated industries, like the banking and securities (stocks, bonds, etc.) industries require the companies, their executives, and individual people be licensed. Usually, individuals and companies with a history of "bad behavior", are denied licensure. Each industries regulations and laws define what that bad behavior is, but a felony conviction for a financial related crime certainly meets that definition. However, being denied a license or booted from the industry is not automatic. The agencies that enforce these regulations, have the ability to continue to license someone who has a felony conviction. I know I am speaking in general terms, but let us look at the securities industry for a specific example. Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, companies that manage investments/mutual funds, like J.P. Morgan & Chase, Co. must be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. To paraphrase, Section 9(a) of the 1940 Act, it says that individuals cannot control or manage an investment company if they had a felony conviction on the past 10 years. It goes on to state that those same requirements apply to companies meaning they are denied a license. But, section 9(c) allows “people” (which includes companies) that are prohibited from being licensed to get an exemption from these rules through the SEC's administrative process. Here, JP Morgan and the other companies mentioned in the press release are big players in the securities industry. All of them manage mutual funds and buy/sell securities for clients. Therefore, they each applied and received this exemption at the same time or right before they pleaded guilty so it wouldn’t disrupt their business. Here are the administrative orders from the SEC’s website dealing with this exact issue. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., et al. - Notice of Application and Temporary Order Release No. IC 31613; File No. 812-14466 The permanent order: SEC Release No. IC - 31674 If you’re interested in the law that applies, these orders are a good place to start. Also, here is a less detailed article on this issue in the NY Times. | Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract. | Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.) | Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?” | is there any legal action I can take against the dealership to enforce their compliance with our contractual agreement? Yes, you can sue for breach of contract. You would probably seek an order for specific performance. You could also claim damages but it is difficult to see exactly what damage you have suffered. Is there a reasonable timeline that they must deliver within if a date is not specified in the contract? Yes, where a contract is silent on a date for performance of an obligation they must be carried out in a reasonable time. From the circumstances 4 months is starting to seem unreasonable but they will no doubt argue that it is reasonable- this is something the court would decide. |
Does the maxim "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius" apply to the rules for dating my teenage daughter? Non-lawyer here. Someone I know who IS a lawyer says that the maxim "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius" governs conduct everywhere, even in non-legal settings. I asked if it governs the conduct of teenage boys trying to date my teenage daughter. He said that absolutely it does, and that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Frankly, I have no idea what he's talking about. What would it even mean for this maxim that he called a "canon of construction" even to apply here? | Your lawyer friend is misguided Casual conversation and writing are not subject to any maxims of interpretation - the words mean what the speaker/writer says and what the listener/reader understands and these may be different things. In a conversation about restaurants, there is no implication that the places not mentioned are not restaurants or don't exist. Even if I were to write a published magazine article called "The 10 best restaurants in the world", there is no implication that no other restaurant can possibly be better than those 10. This applies even in business settings. For example, this is the Petbarn logo: It has images of dogs, fish, cats, and birds. By your friend's argument, it would be unlawful for them to sell products for the care of pet snakes or lizards since they aren't on the sign? Or, for that matter, to operate from a building that is not a "barn"? Finally, your friend is wrong even in legal interpretation. There are many ways of contract and legislative interpretation that are or have been in use in every jurisdiction. "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius" is one maxim of interpretation but it may be in conflict with others. For example, if a regulation on aircraft listed various types of aircraft but didn't mention helicopters but nevertheless had an entire section devoted to rotor maintenance the "Rule against surplusage" would require that helicopters be included. In any event, modern courts tend to take a more holistic view to interpretation and the use of individual maxims is optional. | No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria. | Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow. | While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly. | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. | Law, as such, is not a moral or a philosophical construct. It can be based on moral constructs and often it is. And, of course, the process of writing laws is often informed by philosophy. But law as such is neither one of those. Law is a set of behaviors which are known to be acceptable to the powers "that be." This maybe an unsettling idea. But it is true nonetheless. The phrase that summarizes this is "any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism." What makes it seem untrue is that in the modern tradition laws are written down. And, when there is a need to resolve doubt as to whether something is illegal or not, they are carefully considered through a deductive process. Within countries, there is little question who "the powers that be" happen to be. But when it comes to laws governing actions between nations, it is more complicated. Yes, treaties make it clear, ahead of time, what types of expectations exist. Predictability (even in war) allows for long-term planning. And even laws of war are usually followed because wars are fought with the expectation that at some point they will end. And predictability allows to set end-goal conditions. Notably, entities which have no clear end-goals in sight are the ones least likely to follow any laws. The idea of any group of countries sitting in court of another group of countries is mostly a political theater. There is no possibility of predictable outcomes from entities which have not made commitments to those outcomes. So whether some countries have to follow "laws" set out for them by other countries (or non-government entities) is largely a result of those countries or entities being in positions of power to dictate their will. This is not the same as international laws being strictly de facto. Agreed-upon restrictions and restrictions which have been dictated from the top-down, by those with more power, are de jure because they create predictable boundaries on behavior. De facto restrictions are the ones which have come to be the case without any prior agreement or fiat. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court. |
Can I legally allow my dog to pee on someone's fence? I live in Scotland and my dog likes to have a wee at 3D objects. Particularly he likes peeing at wooden fences and bushes of my neighbours. Now they're not very nice, they always complain no matter what. Am I breaking the law by letting the dog have a wee there or is it considered to be public area because it's the side of the street? | No, you are not breaking any laws. There is a law about fouling but that's about defecation. Dog Fouling (Scotland) Act 2003 | Short answer: It depends. It is lawful if one has a lawful reason, such as it's needed for work, or it's a folding pocketknife (e.g. a Swiss Army Knife) with a blade less than 3 inches. Long answer: The primary legislation is s.139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which makes it unlawful to have in a public place: (2) ... any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed except a folding pocketknife. (3) .... [this includes] a folding pocketknife if the cutting edge of its blade exceeds 3 inches. Subsection (4) gives the "good reason or lawful authority" general defence for possessing such an article which is complemented and supplemented by: (5) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. This site gives some more information and identifies certain knives that are banned, and this site, under "legislation", lists semi-related offences. . | You can basically take pictures of anything from your property if it is "public" (i.e. easily visible from your property). People on the road are in public, and have no reasonable expectation of privacy. The basic restrictions on photography are (1) you cannot trespass (you aren't), and (2) you cannot take pictures of certain government operations (e.g. airport border crossing – certain aspects of government prohibition may require lawsuit to rein in government policy that is at odds with the 1st Amendment; also secret military installations, for which there is specific law, 18 USC 795). Commercial exploitation of people who you photograph is strongly protected in California, and that is it. | It depends. The police and only the police decide what are and are not police matters. However, although it might not be a police matter, you still have lots of options at your disposal. For example, does your jurisdiction (city, town, municipality, etc.) have an animal control division? i.e., City dog catcher. Most do. If so, I would call the animal control division and file a report. They might possibly do a field visit and take the animal into custody if the animal is still roaming loose. If you sustained bodily injuries, you should get checked by a doctor and have those injuries documented in a medical report. If possible, you could drive by the property and take photos of the unchained dog roaming loose. Then, armed with your evidence consisting of: police report medical injury report animal control report and photographs of the scene You could (with the help of a licensed attorney) file a civil suit against the pet owner. You might be able to win an award for damages, pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages as well (check with your attorney). Also, your attorney could advise you if you might have a cause to move for an enforcement action against the dog and/or its owners that might or might not include having the animal removed from the owners custody or in extreme cases of negligence and bad behavior possibly "put to sleep." Your suit might focus on collecting from the homeowner's insurance policy of the pet owner and you could potentially collect a lot of money with the right set of facts and evidence on your side. You might want to look for an attorney who specializes in personal injury. Most PI attorneys work on a contingency. Meaning they don't charge an up front fee and will only get paid if you win your case or settle. In which case their fee is typically about 1/3 of what you get awarded in settlement or judgment. | You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause. | Check out this article on "Attractive Nuisances" http://realestate.findlaw.com/owning-a-home/dangers-to-children-attractive-nuisances.html Here are some of the general requirements of something being an "Attractive Nuisance" A potentially dangerous condition exists on the property The landowner created or maintained the potential hazard (this one is important since you did not create nor maintain the potential hazard) The landowner should have known the condition would attract children The landowner should have known the condition could harm children Generally, a landowner is not going to be held liable for the injuries of a undiscovered trespasser. Consider that word undiscovered. (aka, the landowner doesn't know someone is sneaking in and using the trampoline) However, if a landowner knows that trespassers have been on his/her land, then these persons are discovered trespassers to whom the landowner owes "the duty of ordinary care to warn of danger." What all this means? Anyone can always be sued for anything. If the kid jumps badly, lands on your property, gets hurt, they might have a case or the judge might see it your way. Perhaps consider the laws of "Attractive Nuisances" and "Discovered Trespassers". To note: A lot of people might say that you can't be held liable for something like this, but that is slightly false. As a property owner you CAN be held liable for anything that happens on your property. Including someone trespassing onto your property without your permission, even to commit crimes, and hurting themselves in the process. Many court cases have ruled in favor of the law-abiding landowner, but that's not to say there is a guarantee of this. The best thing to do is always minimize your risks. | I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision. | The rink is private property; they can let who they like in, and they can refuse entry to who they like. They can ban you for any or no reason. (The only exception to this is that they can't refuse entry because of some protected characteristic like race or gender.) The owner doesn't have to personally issue a ban; any person they authorize can do so. (Consider the case where the owner is something like the Disney Corporation; bans aren't going to be issued by the board of Disney - they will be delegated to the local manager, and probably the shift leader). You can still show up of course, but you are quite likely to be thrown out. |
Is a contract allowed to have illegal / unenforceable clauses? My understand of contract law in general, is that an illegal or unenforceable clause does not render the whole contract void, but rather that specific clause is essentially stricken out, as if it did not exist. So, if an employment contract has a clause which said ‘in order to resign you must kill a man’ that clause would not apply, because it would require illegal behaviour. Or, in a legal system which had a maximum one month notice period, a clause which required three months notice would not be enforceable. So an employee could still give one month of notice. And any other conditions of the employment contract (working hours, location, etc.) would still apply. My question is, could a company still keep illegal/unenforceable clauses in its contact, knowing full well these are indefensible in court? If it matters, let’s suppose the illegality of the clause has been determined before both parties signed. Jurisdiction: answers from any are welcome, I am especially interested in the U.K. and Germany. | Severability My understand [sic] of contract law in general, is that an illegal or unenforceable clause does not render the whole contract void, but rather that specific clause is essentially stricken out, as if it did not exist. This is not true. Or, at least, not necessarily true. The courts, when interpreting a contract, try to give effect to the parties intentions. Or, more precisely, what an impartial, reasonable person would conclude their intentions at the time were based on the evidence. A contract is a set of mutual promises - if one of those promises is unenforceable, was it the parties intention that: the remainder be enforced, or absent that promise, they would not have made a deal, or they would have made a different deal, say, at a different price? It’s hard to make general statements about severability because they turn on the particular facts of each case. However, the common law doctrine is that severance means severance - you can take words out, but you can’t add words in or change the meaning of words you left behind. If doing that leaves nonsense, then the clause can’t be severed, and the whole contract is void. Further, what’s left must still be a contract. If the severed portion leaves a remainder that does not meet the requirements of a contract (e.g. because the severance totally removed one party’s consideration), then the whole contract is void. Similarly, if the severed item is central to the purpose of the contract, then the whole contract is void. Finally, at least in Common Law countries, there is a difference between provisions that are unenforcable (e.g. unfair restraint of trade clauses) and those that are illegal (e.g. your murder before resignation clause). In most jurisdictions, if a provision is unenforcable at common law or through statute, severability is an option. However, if the provision is illegal, then responses differ. In England and Wales, a provision that requires criminality or the commission of a tort cannot be severed - the illegality 'infects' the entire contract and makes the whole thing void. However, in Australia, the degree of illegality matters - heinous illegality infects the entire contract, but incidental illegality may not. For example, see REW08 Projects Pty Ltd v PNC Lifestyle Investments PTY LTD [2017] NSWCA 269 [23 October 2017] - the NSW Court of Appeal ruled that a property sale that contained clauses designed (by both parties) to defraud the state of Stamp Duty was nevertheless enforceable against the vendor - this would likely have been decided the other way in England and Wales. Of course, many contracts make express provision for unenforcable terms in what are known as severability clauses. These can go further than mere severance and allow the court to add words or even redraft entire sections to preserve the contract. However, this is not a panacea because what you agreed to in your severability clause may not be what you thought you agreed to when the rubber hits the road. For example, when you are forced to sell your Picasso for the 1,000USD deposit only, and you can't get the 100,000,000,000 Iranian Rial balance due to US sanctions. Therefore, deliberately leaving unenforcable provisions in a contract is dangerous because you don't know what you are going to get. However, is it unlawful? Well, that depends. There is nothing wrong with making legally unenforceable agreements. You and I can agree to go to the movies this Thursday. That's an unenforcable social arrangement, not a contract. If you stand me up, I can't sue you even if I bought popcorn for you. Similarly, there is no prohibition on having unenforcable terms in an otherwise legally binding contract, particularly if everyone knows they are unenforcable. Indeed, many large contracts are accompanied by Memorandums of Understanding that are unenforcable statements about how various organisations intend to work together to give effect to the contract. However, if the term is included to be deceptive or misleading by one party against the other (intentionally or otherwise), there may be legal consequences. A person who was misled into entering a contract may be able to have that contract declared void. Also, many jurisdictions make misleading and deceptive conduct in trade or commerce an offence. | The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK. | Agreements to agree are unenforceable The contract requires you to negotiate and, probably, to do so in good faith (or at least, not in bad faith). That means you must come to the table looking to do a reasonable deal. It doesn’t, and cannot, require you to make that hypothetical deal. That would be an agreement to agree and there is a long line of legal precedent that such terms are unenforceable. | Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job. | There are three answers here. First, as is common on this site, you are using the term, "legal" and "illegal." Those are not legally meaningfully terms. A good lawyer won't use those terms to mean allowed or disallowed. We talk in terms of potential civil or criminal liability, or other sanctions and consequences. To say that something is "legal" does not communicate much. Second, all contracts are governed by a duty of good faith. That means that you cannot try to "trick" someone with the terms of the contract and expect to enforce that contract against them and you cannot try to skirt your obligations by finding a tricky form of compliance not within the mutual understanding of the agreement. As with all things, defining good faith is not easy, and depends on the specific context of a situation. It is worth distinguishing between the duty of good faith, and the duties one owes to a fiduciary; good faith is surely far less, but nevertheless still meaningful. Third, a defense to non-performance of a contract is that the agreement as written is unconscionable. A contract that is a grossly unfair deal where the contract was not actively negotiated (i.e. Blindly signing a bad form contract), may fall under this category. Note: I am not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; contact a licensed attorney in your area; do not rely on my statements; I merely am providing a general answer that is academic in nature. | That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow. | If you don't go to court the court can issue an arrest warrant. Telling the court that your employer forbade you may or may not let you avoid punishment for contempt. You are obliged as an employee to follow the lawful and reasonable requests of your employer. Telling you not to follow a summons is neither legal (technically it's an attempt to pervert the course of justice) nor reasonable. Presumably, the requirement for 48 hours notice is contractual: contracts are only valid where they are not in conflict with the law: this is. If you go your employer is under no obligation to pay you for the time you miss but it would not be lawful for them to impose sanctions. Call the court, ask to speak to the registrar, explain the situation and ask what to do. Then do that. | No Or at least not necessarily. Contract terms are legally one of three types: Conditions, Warranties, or Intermediate. Breach of any term allows the aggrieved party to sue to recover damages - monetary compensation to restore them to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. Breach of a condition also (or instead) allows them to terminate a contract. Breach of a warranty does not. Intermediate terms are terms that might be a condition or might be a warranty depending on how egregious the breach was. A contract can explicitly make a term a condition, the historical and still used phrase being that X is “of the essence”. If the contract is not explicit (most aren’t), then that is the concept that the court uses to decide - is the term “of the essence”, that is, absolutely fundamental to the performance of the contract. Similarly a term can be explicitly a warranty, usually by saying party Y “warrants” something. Most incidental or procedural terms are warranties - if breached, they never give rise to a right to terminate. Most terms are intermediate, particularly most terms about time. Normally, intermediate terms are warranties but if a breach is egregious enough, then this can elevate the term to a condition. Payment terms are a classic: if you are a day or a week late in making payment, the other party can’t cancel the contract. If you are a year late, they can. Somewhere in between, your breach changes the term from a warranty to a condition. For your situation, the early delivery is clearly a breach of a warranty, not a condition. If it even is a breach - the contract may say that they are obliged to deliver by 1 December: delivery on 1 November is clearly in compliance with that term. If it is a breach, you do not have the right to terminate the contract and if you tried you would be breaching the contract yourself by repudiation. By the way, repudiating the contract is definitely breaching a condition. A huge number of contract disputes turn on who validly terminated and who repudiated the contract. If it is a breach, you can sue for damages which, since they have not charged you for November, would be what it cost you or what you lost by having their bin on your premises for a month. My guess that this would be in the order of zero. |
When, if ever, did the United States governemnt declare the Coronovirus to be a "Natural Disaster"? For the purposes of this post, I do not care when infection rates from the coronavirus (COVID-19) took off in reality. I am interested in the legal abstraction of when the United States federal government officially declared the Coronavirus to be a "natural disaster" Was the covid-19 pandemic ever officially classified as a natural disaster? If so, did natural disaster classification occur before February 19, 2020? This is relevant to income taxes filed in the year 2020. There is a tax deduction for those suffering from "natural disasters" | I'm not aware of any any IRC provision allowing a deduction for those suffering from "natural disasters," but there are several provisions allowing preferential treatment for income and losses linked to a "federally declared disaster." IRC section 165 defines "federally declared disaster" as: any disaster subsequently determined by the President of the United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Because the governors for all states and territories have requested and received disaster declarations under the Act, retroactive to January 20, 2020, COVID-19 is a federally declared disaster for tax purposes, according to the IRS. | tl;dr: no, they're not law yet. Background The two bills are different. A5217 proposes to create a juvenile alternative to the current community service program, and A1969 proposes changes to the state's anti-bullying law. It looks like they've reassigned the number "5217." The correct version of A5217 is at this link. A bill becomes law when signed into law by the governor. To be delivered to the governor, the bill has to pass both houses of the legislature. In order to pass in one house, the bill has to survive a full vote there. To be voted upon, a bill typically has to clear its committee. Sometimes that entails getting adequate support (like sponsors). Bills include the language "Be it enacted" because each house has to vote on the precise language the governor will eventually sign. A5217 is still in progress, meaning that it has yet to pass the Assembly. It has been introduced, referred to the Assembly Law and Public Safety Committee, and got a third prime sponsor (on May 24 DiMaso joined Lopez and McKnight as a sponsor). The companion bill, S3447, has been introduced and referred to the Senate Law and Public Safety Committee. A1969 has been introduced and referred to the Women and Children Committee. It does not yet appear to have a Senate companion. | The CDC does not authorize shots or vaccine distribution. The FDA authorizes vaccine distribution, or distribution of medicines in general. A medicine is authorized for use in a certain way, which is an "instruction" directed at the medical professional. So-called "off-label" use is discussed by the FDA here. Such use if legal, it simply stretches the limits of what the FDA was allowed to approve (e.g. was found to be safe and effective for X, was not similarly tested for Y). Patients are free to take whatever medicines they want if they can find them, and if they are not on the Controlled Substances list. Hence it's legal to take DMSO, but it's not legal to peddle it as a cancer cure. The prescription regime for covid vaccinations seems to be somewhat relaxed, in that it is likely that many people get a vaccine without a (meaningful) doctor's exam, instead, you show up and get the shot. This is normal with flu shots. The upcoming 3rd shot approval is addressed to doctors, so they can then recommend third shots. | The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S. | The US government is not required to publish a single list of "embargoed" countries, however defined. They are, however, required to publish the legal underpinnings of any restriction. This takes two forms. First, Congress must pass some law that enables the restriction. This page hosted by the Senate explains how to find such laws, however, it only goes back so far. You can find all of the US Code on the House US Code website. Usually, any change of sanctions don't require new legislation. The second set of publications are executive orders and executive-branch regulations, which are published in The Federal Register. For example, this is an executive order (February 21, 2022) regarding blocking of certain persons and transactions related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce then published an implementation of that order, which is published in the Federal Register. The Office of Foreign Assets Control, Dep't of Treasury later published licenses related to this. The obvious problem is that hundreds of pages of information are published in the Federal Register every day, so keeping up with the rules is challenging. A partial substitute would be to check the web page of each department that might be involved in promulgating such regulations. The Dept. of Treasury has pages on financial sanctions. One thing they provide is useful information about is list of countries that you need to worry about in terms of U.S. sanctions: there is no list. As they explain, U.S. sanctions programs vary in scope.Some are broad-based and oriented geographically (i.e. Cuba, Iran).Others are “targeted” (i.e. counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics) and focus on specific individuals and entities.These programs may encompass broad prohibitions at the country level as well as targeted sanctions.Due to the diversity among sanctions, we advise visiting the “Sanctions Programs and Country Information” page for information on a specific program. OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) has approximately 6,300 names connected with sanctions targets. OFAC also maintains other sanctions lists which have different associated prohibitions. Many individuals and entities often move internationally and end up in locations where they would be least expected.Accordingly, U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing with SDNs regardless of location and all SDN assets are blocked.Entities that an SDN owns (defined as a direct or indirect ownership interest of 50% or more) are also blocked, regardless of whether that entity is separately named on the SDN List. Because OFAC's programs are dynamic, it is very important to check OFAC's website regularly.Ensuring that your sanctions lists are current and you have complete information regarding the latest relevant program restrictions is both a best practice and a critical part of your due diligence responsibility. The Dep't of Commerce has a less-useful list, the entities list, and also a Trade Enforcement web page. You should note that sanctions against the Central African Republic stem from Executive Order 13667 of May 12, 2014, but the Dept. of Treasury amended the regulations as of September 29, 2022 not in response to a new executive order. This is reflected on the Treasury Dep't web page on sanctions. It is unknown, and perhaps unknowable, whether the Dept. of Commerce will promulgate any foreign sanctions regulation that are not mirrored on the Treasury Dept. web page. In the case of the CAR sanctions, the executive order directed Treasury to write rules, though the Sec'y of State also received ordered (not related to financial sanctions). | In the US, the laws that govern habitable residences and the related issues - such as land zoning, health regulations, sewer and water services, private and commercial building codes, etc. - are very localized at the city and county levels. So you need to check with the city and county where you want to place such a structure and determine the relevant laws. Commercial buildings are much more heavily regulated than private residences. (And some federal laws and codes could supersede local laws.) Many cities and counties have their zoning and building codes and requirements online, as well as permitting systems to apply for building and utility hookup permits. It's true that some counties in the US have minimal zoning or building codes, so yes, you could move a shed to land you own in that county and build your own road, haul your water, put up solar panels, dig an outhouse, and not deal with any - or very few - regulations. But cities and towns will be much more regulated, since zoning and building codes are used to insure public safety, and services such as water and sewer are supported by taxes and protect public health. In other words, you may not legally be able to live in a shed that does not have city sewer, water and electric service. There may also be building codes for minimum size of bedrooms, egress windows for fire, ventilation, heating systems, so even if a small house is sold as a complete residence in a package, it may not pass local building codes. Breaking zoning, building and health codes can result in the local inspectors visiting and determining if the residence is up to code; they will not typically need a warrant or your permission to enter. They can order you to bring the residence up to code, if possible; or condemn the structure and require you to move out. | From a legal perspective, I think the ruling is reductio ad absurdum correct. California voters passed Proposition 65. Consequently, CA Health and Safety Code 25249.6 says "No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual, except as provided in Section 25249.10". Section 25249.8 mandates a list, and defines "known to the state" A chemical is known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity within the meaning of this chapter if in the opinion of the state’s qualified experts it has been clearly shown through scientifically valid testing according to generally accepted principles to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity, or if a body considered to be authoritative by such experts has formally identified it as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity, or if an agency of the state or federal government has formally required it to be labeled or identified as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity. Acrylamide is so listed, and has been for 18 years, reason code listed as "AB-IARC, AB-US EPA". The law does not say that "the benefits may outweigh the risks", nor does the law say anything about usual doses. There is an "escape clause", if one (the defendant) can prove that there is no effect (25249.8(b)): An exposure for which the person responsible can show that the exposure poses no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question for substances known to the state to cause cancer, and that the exposure will have no observable effect assuming exposure at one thousand (1000) times the level in question for substances known to the state to cause reproductive toxicity, based on evidence and standards of comparable scientific validity to the evidence and standards which form the scientific basis for the listing of such chemical pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 25249.8. In any action brought to enforce Section 25249.6, the burden of showing that an exposure meets the criteria of this subdivision shall be on the defendant. The answer on Skeptics does not address the EPA finding (and the science underlying it). At this point we can only conjecture about the defense's scientific argument (the ruling is still in the works, pending feedback from parties), but the judge said "While plaintiff offered evidence that consumption of coffee increases the risk of harm to the fetus, to infants, to children and to adults, defendants' medical and epidemiology experts testified that they had no opinion on causation" and that the coffee makers hadn't presented the proper grounds at trial to prevail. Insofar as human subjects testing of suspected carcinogens is illegal, any argument that "but this only shows that it causes cancer in rats" is legally empty: rats are a suitable proxy for humans. This is a state report addressing a potential carcinogen, 4-Methylimidazole. The report notes that to have a No Significant Risk Level finding, the substance must have less than a "daily intake level posing a 10^-5 lifetime risk of cancer". A further requirement is that "risk analysis shall be based on the most sensitive study deemed to be of sufficient quality" (whatever that is). This study mentions a previous study which was rejected because "these studies do not meet the criteria specified in Section 25703(a) because the experiments were not designed to adequately control for and examine the potential carcinogenicity of 4-MEI". Basically, Spiegelhalter's argument is too meta, and doesn't constitute a proof that acrylamide poses no risk of cancer. If the defendants commissioned an independent scientific study to overcome earlier carcinogen findings, perhaps the study failed on technical grounds. The bar that has to be cleared is very high. The EPA regulation says that the maximum contaminant level goal for acrylamide is zero. That is the carcinogen-science basis for specific allowable levels in water supplies. | Are the reasons (mom can't stay because of covid-19 and the son is too young to live by himself) legally justifiable reasons? Unfortunately, not in this case. The landlord can prevail by arguing that the mom, insofar as a holder of a non-immigrant visa, knew or should have known of the risks of being denied entry in the US. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 154 (a) & (b), the mom is the "Party [who] Bears the Risk of a Mistake". Since the risks of which the mom was aware include even arbitrary ones such as the USCIS officer's discretion, an allegation of "supervening circumstances" as per the coronavirus crisis is very unlikely to add any merit to the mom's legal position. Is the 8 months compensate reasonable? Although this is admittedly subjective, at first glance it appears reasonable or perhaps even generous (the landlord is proposing the midpoint: half of the remaining 16 months) considering that the landlord is entitled to the completion of the lease. The "8 months as compensation" is essentially the landlord's proposal to settle his otherwise viable claim of breach of contract. You as lease holders can always attempt to negotiate and make alternative proposals, which is what you are doing already. Here, the landlord seeks to obviate court proceedings that can be a drag for both him and especially for the mom because she would be unable even to present her arguments in court and/or quasi-judicial proceedings. A settlement would benefit the landlord also from the standpoint that he would no longer be required to prove mitigation of damages (if that is a requirement in his jurisdiction). And, unless the settlement provides otherwise, the landlord would be free to immediately re-rent the unit without having to reimburse the mom (or the person(s) whose name is in the lease). That being said, it is important for the lease holder(s) to secure in writing (specifically in the settlement document) a statement from the landlord in the sense that, by virtue of the agreed compensation, the landlord waives any and all claims related to the early termination of the lease. It is always smart to be cautious and preclude the landlord from eventually bringing a claim alleging that the agreed compensation was for something else or that it did not fully settle the controversy(-ies). |
Is there a proper term for fraud by buying product from yourself to pad sales numbers? Basically trying to make a business look larger or more lucrative by running the same money around in circles. Or something like that. The context I'm dealing with is hypothetical/fictional and involves a few more parties than the simple case, so inexact or related terms would also be of interest. Also any (English speaking?) legal system's terminology would work. | You’ve presented a number of different scenarios, without a lot of specifics, so I’ll start from the top, and from a US perspective. A very generic term that would come up in this situation is material misstatement. one might say that an account or line item is overstated or understated, or a misstatement could arise from the omission of a necessary note, because notes are an integral part of the financial statements. Financial statements are said to be materially misstated if the misstatement would affect the choice of a typical decisionmaker. There’s no explicit standard for what is or isn’t material, but in practice, auditors often choose some small fraction of net income as the threshold. Materiality can also be caused by positive vs. negative earnings, or other thresholds, like financing agreements which might oblige the company to keep its current ratio above a certain level, for example. In the US, the rules to which the statements have to be materially correct are known as GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and they are codified in the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Accounting Standards Codification (FASB ASC). Depending on how the scheme is arranged, issues in the realm of “buying stuff as a “customer” to make the business look good” include: Substance over form: it may not be appropriate to recognize as a sale at all. If the net effect is a transfer of cash from the owner or manager to the business, while the goods find their way back into the company warehouse, that could be considered as paid-in-capital, or even a liability, rather than a sale. Owner bought some product to inject cash, and put the goods back in the inventory? That’s cash from the stockholder, not a customer sale. Somebody in management moved a truckload of product to his storage unit, only to return it after year end? That might be more accurately characterized as a loan, not a sale. I don’t know of any specific terms for this exclusively, but there have certainly been cases where companies moved inventory to undisclosed warehouses in an effort to hide fictitious sales from their independent auditors. Edit: Another term for certain sales without commercial substance is a “roundtrip transaction” or “roundtripping.” Disclosure notes: even if there is commercial substance to the transaction, it may require disclosure notes, such as those for related party transactions, as required by ASC 850. Transactions with related parties must be disclosed even if they are not given accounting recognition (ASC 850-05-5). Examples of related parties are given in ASC 850-05-3, including “an entity and its principal owners, management, or members of their immediate families,” among others. Under the relevant definition, a person does not need a formal title to be considered a member of management (ASC 850-10-20). The related party disclosure is not required in consolidated financial statements, for transactions that are eliminated in the consolidation process (ASC 850-10-50-1). For sales from a public company to a bona-fide external customer, there’s also the major customers disclosure, but the threshold for that is 10% of revenue, which is much more than enough to materially impact the bottom line. Generally, transactions between a parent company and a subsidiary will be eliminated in the preparation of the parent’s (consolidated) financial statements (ASC 810). This means if the parent company A sells goods with a carrying value of $30 to its subsidiary, B, at a price of $50, A doesn’t recognize that $20 gross profit until B sells the goods to an outside party. Internally, B might carry the goods at $50 on B’s books, but A would have to cancel it out so that only $30 of that appears on A’s consolidated balance sheet. The consolidation method is applied when one business has a controlling interest in another, and in summary it means that the parent company reports A+B’s financials as if it was all a single entity. That means B’s assets and liabilities, revenues and expenses, are all reported as part of A. It also means any transactions between B and A are transactions within the entity; you wouldn’t recognize a gain or loss (nor revenue and GP) if your marketing department sold office equipment to your engineering department, and you don’t get to with subsidiaries either. Consolidation requires not only eliminating revenues, cost of goods sold, and excess carrying value of inventories on intra-entity transactions; it's also gains and losses on things like equipment, meaning the same transaction could require a consolidation adjustment twenty years later to eliminate excess depreciation expense. Long story short, ASC 810 deals with consolidation, and those rules apply when you create or purchase a subsidiary to buy your stuff, or use a subsidiary to pass the same $200,000 back and forth. When the parent entity does not have a controlling interest in the investee (the basic threshold is 50% of voting shares, or by some other agreement) but does have significant influence (representation on the board or other factors in ASC 323-10-15-6), then it will be treated as an equity method investment. Instead of adding the line items together, it's a single asset and A's portion of B's earnings are a single line item on the income statement, but the adjustments are similar to those in a consolidation. Another kind of revenue recognition game which companies used to play involved bill-and-hold arrangements, wherein the customer (or the “customer,” or a salesperson without any real input from the supposed customer) would place an order, and the company would send (or at least, prepare and book) an invoice (revenue), but not ship the goods until the customer actually asked for them. These days, the rules on revenue recognition are fairly guarded against these kinds of things, but some other examples of “sales” that aren’t really sales include consignment arrangements, repurchase agreements (could be a sale with right of return, or depending on terms could be effectively a lease or a financing arrangement), and the gross vs net revenue issue for principle/agent situations (airline and hotel booking sites are a popular example. If they’re an agent they’re required to report their commission on a net basis but would likely prefer to look bigger by calling it a $110 sale and $100 cost of goods sold, instead of just $10 revenue). If you’re interested in management schemes to mislead the users of financial statements, check out the SEC’s online archive of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) here. Some of them just deal with individual professionals who should know better, but they can be pretty interesting, whether they involve poor ICFR, or intentional deception on the part of upper management (it's on management either way). | No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false. | "Doing the same thing" is very common. We even have names for certain categories of websites, such as "web shop" and "blog". Such concepts are not protected in general. Obviously, you can't copy the name of existing webshop, or their logo, but things like a "rectangular layout of products for sale" aren't original. There is of course a grey area here, because there's a continuum of similarity. In general, similarities that follow from technical justifications are acceptable (having an upload button is sort of the point for your website), similarities that are cosmetic only (same color choice) might be interpreted as intentional attempts to cause confusion. | I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you. | Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages. | Yup, it's illegal. You want something, they have something you want. They let you have the thing provided that you do certain things, otherwise they won't give it to you. So providing a credit card is material to the contract. You know that the credit card number is false, you are representing that it is true, the card is a material fact, you intend to get them to allow you in using this false representation, they don't know it is false and they rightfully rely on your truthfulness. They have been harmed by your false representation (maybe: it would cost you a lot in attorney fees to try to challenge on this point). This is fraud. | You cannot use a trademark in a way that may cause confusion that your goods and services are associated with or endorsed by the trade marked goods and services. If you are clear that they are not then you shouldn't have any problems on that front. You also cannot defame the brand: that is make derogatory comments that are not true. On a practical note, when Pepsi (for example) sends you a cease & desist notice, what are you going to do? They can go to the petty cash tin for $2 million to make your life a legal hell for 18-36 months: how much do you have to defend your rights? | The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X. |
Can you have contract involving Child Support? I know that it is not possible to have a contract (whether within prenup or separate from it) that dictates the terms of Child Custody or Child Support. But can you have a contract that depends on the result of Child Support verdict? For instance, can you have this contract: "The spouse that receives Child Support that its amount is over X amount of money, would have to pay back any extra amount." The above contract, does not technically dictate the terms of Child Support, however obligates the spouse to return back any amount over X amount rewarded. My question is, would such contract (or something similar to it) be a valid and enforceable contract? | No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child. | Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the United States? Yes. There would need to be first, a legal establishment of paternity if that is not already in place, and then an application to a court for a child support order. The question of whether one should proceed in a U.S. court or a Brazilian court is a tactical one that would be evaluated based upon the circumstances by the lawyers involved in doing so. Generally, that would open the door to child custody proceedings as well in the same, or a parallel case. | If you lived in a community property state, that would create responsibility for your late wife's debts (but Kansas is not one). If you signed a financial responsibility agreement you would be liable (but I assumed you did not). No matter what, her estate is liable, and that could eventually affect you (her debts must be paid first). However, there is one last criterion, the "doctrine of necessaries". This ruling notes Kansas recognizes the doctrine of necessaries, under which a spouse can be held liable when the other spouse obtains necessary items, like food or medical care, on credit. See also St. Francis Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Bowles for support that the doctrine survives in Kansas. | The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless. | canada* What you describe is completely acceptable First, one of the goals of child support is to provide a similar standard of living in each household, so spending an amount on rent that happens to be a large portion of the child support amount is understandable. Second, the fact that the child only spends part of their time at Parent B's home is already accounted for in the computation of the amount owing. Child support in Canada is based almost exclusively on the income of the parents, taking into account the proportion of time the child spends with each parent. And this is all subject to any specific hardships of the paying parent. Only where a portion of child support is based on a special and extraordinary expenditure (e.g. a specific extracurricular activity, or medical insurance) is it expected the claimant make that specific expenditure. If they stop making that expenditure, then the child support add-on associated with that expenditure is removed. * I understand the question is directed to Arkansas, but I have provided an answer for those interested in Canadian law, in line with the guidance here ("Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions – while it might not answer your question directly, your question will be here for others who may be from those jurisdictions. If you do this, please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"). | Variations of contracts must be consented to by all parties. This means that if the company sent your friend varied terms, it would have included means by which she would have consented - this may be by continuing to use a service. You cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract. You could try to charge the company PoS terminal storage fees, but it's highly unlikely to be enforceable if they don't agree to it. In theory if they are aware of the change and they accept them in some way then they are bound to the terms just as she would be, even if they later claimed that they were not aware of them. There is some precedent - in Russia - for this with a bank and it made the news some time ago. There's plenty of cases in which people who don't read EULAs or loan contracts thoroughly are still forced to honour their obligations to their creditors under them. | Jurisdiction has not been provided, so I've written a general answer: Not necessarily; often, such provisions clauses will have their own expiration dates, for example "for five years after signing, X", with X still being valid after cancellation up to 5 years(so if you cancel after 3 years, X is still valid for 2 more years), or "for two years after cancellations, Y"(especially common with non-compete clauses) where the time-limit of Y starts when the contract is cancelled. Other clauses are meant to indeed be enforced forever, such as some non-disclosure, non-disparagement, or indemnity clauses. For example, an indemnity clause in a contract that prevents a party from suing the counter-party for work done under the contract would be pointless if it could be bypassed by a party terminating the agreement. There are lots of legal limits, based on the terms of the provision, and its nature, all governed by the contract law of the jurisdiction under which the contract was drafted under and/or is governed by (this is generally obvious, except for some cross-border contracts, which generally will have a declaration as to whose laws apply). It is not inherently abusive, but can certainly be abused. What is considered abusive often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (not only on this issue, but on legal issues in general). It depends on the jurisdiction, and generally on the terms of the provision itself. If the court asked to enforce the terms of the agreement feels that the provision is illegal or abusive, they won't be enforced (and possibly the entire document declared null and void, depending on the central-ness of the illegal or abusive provision; some provisions specifically state that invaliding the provision doesn't invalidate the whole contract to try to prevent this). If they don't feel the provision is illegal or abusive, they will generally enforce it. | The contract is enforceable No one is in any doubt that the parties to the contract are you and Smith Homes and everyone knows that Smith Homes means Smith Homes LLC. The written document is only evidence of the contract, the contract is the entire commercial relationship. Contracts are not invalid because they have typos or minor irregularities- otherwise virtually no written one would be. The law can be very pragmatic sometimes. |
How should a law abiding police officer have handled George Floyd? Everywhere I read says Derek Chauvin case was a slam dunk. Now that he is convicted, there is even less room to argue he was following the law when he handled George Floyd. But considering the US police militarization and the way they usually handle civilians, and my lack of knowledge of police protocol, for me it is hard to see how any other police officer, with the same training as Derek Chauvin, would have done much different so it would not have risked killing the detainee. Thus, my question: how a law abiding police officer should have handled George Floyd differently? | The most obvious answer is that he should have knelt on his lower back, not on his neck. And this should not be maintained for an extended period, only until appropriate restraints (e.g. handcuffs) can be applied. The proper use of force is to put the other person in a situation where it will hurt them if and only if they resist. For comparison, consider this amazing 2018 take-down: Toronto van attack: Witness video of takedown of person believed to be suspect - YouTube And keep in mind that this individual hadn't simply tried to pass counterfeit money in a convenience store; he'd just been on a rampage that killed 10 people and seriously injured 16 others: New footage revealed from Yonge St. van attack of Alek Minassian’s path of destruction - YouTube — Toronto van attack - Wikipedia | Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on. | To be determined. Warren Decision [t]he duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists [emphasis added] Castle Rock and Warren denied the existence of a legal duty to specific individuals of performance of law enforcement activity given the specific fact pattern in those cases. These rulings have been generalized into what's been called the No Duty to Rescue Doctrine (NDRD). It's possible a future court could uphold those principles and apply the NDRD to the Parkland case. Or not. Depends on the arguments of fact and law made in court to that effect. The primary argument against applying the NDRD might be as you described, i.e., the specific nature of Peterson's duty assignment to Parkland. One interesting angle on this question is if Peterson owed a duty to act, then who rightfully owned the debt of his obligation? One could argue the Sherrif's department that employed Peterson was the sole lawful holder of his duty to perform and not the school or the victims. In short, it's all very complex and the specific facts at play (which are still surfacing) will be determinative as no applicable statutes or case law yet exist that extend beyond the cited references. | The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts. | He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse. | "I don't know" is a better answer than most, but you should only say that if it's the truth. The three most important rules to follow when being questioned by a police officer are as follows: Do not lie. Do not incriminate yourself. Be cooperative (to the extent that you're not lying or incriminating yourself). "Do you know why I pulled you over?" or "Why do you think I stopped you?" are perfect opening questions for law enforcement to ask because there is no good answer. Any answer you give puts you at a disadvantage for the rest of the stop because you've tacitly accepted the officer's assumption that you did something wrong. The best response would be to simply reply back with their own question. "Why did you pull me over, officer?" If you say it right, it's rational, polite, and cooperative without actually answering anything. Your position from the very beginning should be that you did nothing wrong (even if you know that you did). It's the officer's job to make the case. It's not your job to help them. | Law enforcement officers have a wide latitude when dealing with someone who is not following the law; in general they cannot issue you a fine if you are not speeding but they are not required to issue a fine if you are speeding. So if the LEO decides for whatever the reason that you do not deserve a ticket even if you were driving sobre the speed limit, he ello not issue it and that would be the end of it. Now if the officer issues the ticket, there is recourse. The most simple would be simply to forward additional evidence to the police department, even informally, to see if they rethink about it and void the ticket on their own. If they still refuse, there are always procedures to legally challenge a ticket, which may depend based on the jurisdiction and even the kind or amount of sanction. In general I would expect that it goes that far and you can show that it was indeed an emergency, even in the absence of a specific law a judge would invalidate the fine because it would go against the public interest. And if even that does not work, you may probably ask for a pardon. | Ah, but destroying the insulin is not "tantamount to to murdering the victim". Any pharmacy or hospital can supply more. Once the villain is secured, or the cop and victim are away from the villain, additional supplies can be obtained. That does not justify deadly force. (And since the T J Hooker series was set in a large US city, such supplies would have been readily available, 24/7. If the setting was far away from any such supplies, the case would be different.) However, if the cop has plausible reason to fear that the villain will attack him or the victim, and pose a serious threat of injury or death, the cop can use as much force as is reasonably required to defend himself or the victim, including deadly force if that is needed. He may not use more force than is reasonably required, but in practice once it is established that there was a valid threat, or reasonable grounds to believe that there was a threat, the cop's judgement on how much force was needed will only be overruled in a really egregious case. Under current law, the cop may not use deadly force simply to stop the suspect from escaping, unless there is some unusual factor involved. I think the law may have been interpreted differently on that point when the TV show was made, in the early 1980s. |
Do I need to offer a data processing agreement I recently created a browser extension that allows you to pretty-format a web page and save it in various formats (Word, PDF, etc). I have made it publicly accessible through the browser extension gallery, so anyone can install and use it. The way this extension works is it uploads the content of the page you are viewing to my own server, the server processes it, and then lets you download the resulting file. This all works fine, but I recently started getting questions from users concerned about the fact that their data (possibly private and sensitive) gets uploaded to the internet. They were asking me to provide a GDPR-compliant data processing agreement, so they can install it on their company's computers. I do not have any kind of agreements, and in fact I do not even own a company at all. This browser extension, and the server that it uploads the data to is all my personal effort, and I never bothered to do any legal work around it. In this case, am I legally obliged to create a company and have any data processing agreements in place? (not sure if it matters, but I live in the UK, and I rent my server in the USA) | No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to. | First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read. | What would be the legal validity of this behaviour? Your changes to the browser source of the website contract or license of Terms of Service (TOS) - essentially a "click-wrap" license - before agreeing to it means nothing in a legal sense, other than to void the contract. The other party (the website) can't possibly agree to those contract changes without them being submitted as contractual changes and agreeing to them, if they did agree to them. That's basic contract law. That website TOS probably has a clause that says that if you don't agree to the TOS in full, as written, without modifications, you can't use the website. And the TOS may also say that they reserve the right to prevent you from using the site by closing your account or even blocking your access. Your "witness" to the contract changes is meaningless, as your witness is not a party to the contract. And any witness to the fact that you have changed the terms of the TOS before agreeing to it would work against you in a civil proceeding as proof of your attempt at modifying the contract. | It is the data controller's responsibility to respond to data subject requests. If you provide a B2B service, you are most likely a data processor who only acts on the controller's behalf, on the controller's explicit instruction. This will depend on your contract with the controllers, your customers (see Art 28). Typically a processor would merely forward any data subject requests to the controller. Only if you are contractually obligated to serve data subject requests would it be possible for you to respond directly. If a processor were to fulfil a data subject request on their own initiative, that would arguably be a GDPR violation. However, the processor has to assist their controller with compliance per Art 28(3)(e), e.g. by implementing an admin interface through which the controller can service GDPR requests. The core issue here is that controllers and processors have slightly different obligations in order to be GDPR compliant. Controllers owe compliance to the data subjects, but processors only act on the controller's behalf and owe compliance to their controllers – they have no direct relationship with data subjects. Assuming you were a controller, then yes, I would assume you would have to decrypt any data that you are able to decrypt in order to fulfil a data subject request. Access requests can only be denied if: Art 12(5): they are “manifestly unfounded or excessive” (which the controller has to demonstrate), or Art 15(4): the access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others”. Art 11(2): the controller can demonstrate that they are actually unable to identify the data subject so no data subject rights in Art 15–20 apply. A request is not automatically excessive just because it will require substantial CPU time, this exception is more often triggered when data subjects request the same data very frequently (e.g. every week). You are not required to provide or search data that you don't have access to (e.g. E2E encrypted data). Your use of per-field encryption is a very strong security measure (depending on how keys are managed). But GDPR is not about achieving maximum technical data protection, but merely requires appropriate safety measures (see GDPR Chapter 4, especially Art 32). Asymmetric encryption of small fields within a database is unlikely to be appropriate, taking into account the cost of processing and the data subject's ability to exercise their rights. A different security measure to ensure that every business only sees the correct data would be through testing and code review of your SQL queries, and full disk encryption of the server storing the database. In practice, asymmetric encryption is most often just used to encrypt a symmetric key, which is then used for the actual data. But which measures are appropriate also depends on the risk to data subjects – your approach could make sense for very sensitive data. Art 14 does not play a role here. It is about transparency of processing: that you need to (a) notify the data subject that you're processing their data, if feasible, and that you (b) provide information about this processing, usually in form of a privacy policy. Art 14 is the pendant to Art 13, which applies when data is obtained directly from the data subject. The Art 15 right to access and the Art 20 right to data portability are distinct from the right to be informed. In any case, it is the controller's responsibility to fulfil these rights. | Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite. | The GDPR only require explicit (hard) consent if you use the cookie to store personal data. Given the conditions you cite, the data you store is not personal data, so this cookie does not require consent. In theory, someone having access to both session cookie and "analytics cookie" could relate the two, but that is highly non-trivial. You may have to do DPIA to demonstrate that this is non-trivial, or that you have mitigation in place to mitigate staff abusing such access. But provided things are as you say, the "analytics" cookie does not require consent. | I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel). | Not Allowed Under the GDPR The suggested method does not seem to comply with the GDPR, and would not be lawful for a Data Controller that is subject to the GDPR. Specific Provisions Let's consider some specific provisions of the GDPR: Article 4 Article 4 paragraph (11) states: "consent" of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; If the choice is "obscure" then it is not clear, and legal consent has not been given. Article 7 Article 7 paragraph 3 reads: The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. It does not appear in the situation described that the data subject has been clearly informed that consent is being given. Recital 42 Recital 42 reads in relevant part: In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. ... Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. The specified means do not seem to comply with R42 Recital 32 Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. ... If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. The format in the question seems to rely on inactivity as a way of giving consent, and is surely not clear. |
(San Francisco, CA) Can a landlord keep a security deposit if my apartment rental application is approved, but I back out of signing the lease? I went to go see an apartment in San Francisco, CA and the said that they require a security deposit of 1.5x monthly rent just to apply for the unit. They claimed they would give the security deposit back if my application was declined. However, if my application is accepted, they are claiming that the security deposit is theirs to keep, regardless of wether or not I sign the lease and move in. i.e., if I'm approved but decline the lease, they're saying my security deposit is forfeit. That can't be legal, right? | Can a landlord keep a security deposit if my apartment rental application is approved, but I back out of signing the lease? That can't be legal, right? No. That is a violation of California CIV 1950.5. Although 1950.5(b) reflects that one of the permissible purposes of a security deposit is "to reimburse the landlord for costs associated with processing a new tenant", item (e) limits that amount "as [is] reasonably necessary for the purposes specified in subdivision(b)". A deposit of 1.5 times the monthly rent clearly is excessive for "processing a new tenant", let alone processing an applicant who never became a tenant because no lease agreement was entered. All other permissible uses of security deposit are inapplicable in your matter. Furthermore, if the landlord required a separate payment for the application, then your application fee satisfies the provision in 1950.5(b). This means that the landlord has the obligation to reimburse you 100% of the security deposit. | The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems. | Short answer: Yes, you can get out. However, this will be harder than you may want it to be. You will need to check your lease agreement for an arbitration clause. If the lease mentions disagreements will be handled by arbitration (or an arbiter), you need to know that going into this. Arbitration clauses usually stipulate that the landlord picks the arbiter, who will almost always be predisposed to side with the landlord. This pamphlet sheds insight into the situation. Skip down to PDF page 22, section header "My neighbors are constantly playing loud music..." Summarized, you can get out but if other tenants are not as affected, it will be hard to prove it affects you differently. You do, however, have the benefit of knowing the particular situation is illegal (as compared to the pamphlet's example of playing music, which is only situationally illegal). First, get written, signed testimony from other tenants (your roommate, the one above the smoker, etc). Preferably, get these signatures notarized. The testimony should include an acknowledgement that the signer has smelled the marijuana and a statement about how often this occurs, along with the date of signature. Next, send a certified letter to your landlord. Keep a copy of this letter. In it, state your intention to move unless they fix the situation within thirty (30) days. Remind them you already have informed them of this situation. Inform them you have (hopefully notarized) testimony of the marijuana smoking from other tenants, remind them that this is illegal, and that this is affecting your health. You may also warn them that if they do not rectify the situation and you leave after thirty days, they cannot keep your deposit or charge you a termination fee- they have breached your lease contract through failure to maintain a safe and livable rental unit (a gentle reminder that you will seek legal action if they attempt to keep your deposit or charge you fees is appropriate). In the letter, request an immediate, written response with their intentions on the matter, and give a deadline (like 3 days from receipt). As a certified letter, you will know when they get it. The wording of this letter is important. You want to clearly state the facts without sounding self-righteous, angry, or vindictive. And proofread the heck out of it. If the landlord is faced with possible legal action for forcing an illegal tenant to follow the law, and certain legal action for trying to keep a legal tenant to remain in illegal, harmful circumstances, they may well decide to oust the smoker. If your scare tactic doesn't work, however, you should make good on the threat- really do leave after thirty days, and if they attempt to charge you for anything or withhold your deposit, you really should contact a lawyer. You should also, however, have the money saved to pay the termination fees, just in case. Because the smoke affects you differently, and there is no easy way to prove this, an unsympathetic court (or arbiter) may rule against you. (NOTE: I am not a lawyer, but I did have to break a lease and spent a good deal of time researching and discussing my situation with a lawyer. In the end I lost my deposit but did not have to pay any fees or missed rent.) | Are the reasons (mom can't stay because of covid-19 and the son is too young to live by himself) legally justifiable reasons? Unfortunately, not in this case. The landlord can prevail by arguing that the mom, insofar as a holder of a non-immigrant visa, knew or should have known of the risks of being denied entry in the US. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 154 (a) & (b), the mom is the "Party [who] Bears the Risk of a Mistake". Since the risks of which the mom was aware include even arbitrary ones such as the USCIS officer's discretion, an allegation of "supervening circumstances" as per the coronavirus crisis is very unlikely to add any merit to the mom's legal position. Is the 8 months compensate reasonable? Although this is admittedly subjective, at first glance it appears reasonable or perhaps even generous (the landlord is proposing the midpoint: half of the remaining 16 months) considering that the landlord is entitled to the completion of the lease. The "8 months as compensation" is essentially the landlord's proposal to settle his otherwise viable claim of breach of contract. You as lease holders can always attempt to negotiate and make alternative proposals, which is what you are doing already. Here, the landlord seeks to obviate court proceedings that can be a drag for both him and especially for the mom because she would be unable even to present her arguments in court and/or quasi-judicial proceedings. A settlement would benefit the landlord also from the standpoint that he would no longer be required to prove mitigation of damages (if that is a requirement in his jurisdiction). And, unless the settlement provides otherwise, the landlord would be free to immediately re-rent the unit without having to reimburse the mom (or the person(s) whose name is in the lease). That being said, it is important for the lease holder(s) to secure in writing (specifically in the settlement document) a statement from the landlord in the sense that, by virtue of the agreed compensation, the landlord waives any and all claims related to the early termination of the lease. It is always smart to be cautious and preclude the landlord from eventually bringing a claim alleging that the agreed compensation was for something else or that it did not fully settle the controversy(-ies). | In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved. | The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to. | B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do. | The old terms apply ... ... until the landlord gives notice and ends the lease - then the tenant has to get out. This is not inconsistent with the requirement to “execute all revised rental agreements upon request” - unless and until new terms have been agreed, there are no “revised rental agreements”, once there are, the tenant can be requested to (and must) execute them. There seems to be a misapprehension that this term gives the landlord a unilateral right to change the terms - it doesn’t. However, if the landlord wanted to formalize the month-to-month arrangement that is created under the old lease with new documents (or any other mutually agreed arrangement), then the tenant is obliged to sign it. |
Why and when did some American appellate courts add an 's' to the word 'Appeal' in their title? In England & Wales and most of the Commonwealth, the title of an appellate court is the Court of Appeal. The word 'appeal' is singular because it describes the purpose of the court in contrast to the Court of Justice (i.e. justice has been done by the court below, and the action now is that of appeal, similarly to the nomenclature of a Court of Cassation, a Court for the Correction of Errors, etc). In the United States, some states follow the 'traditional' nomenclature—eg, the largest, California, has a Court of Appeal. However, the federal courts, and many states, instead add an additional 's' to the title of appellate courts. Why is this, and where did it originate from? | On January 15, 1780, the Continental Congress resolved to establish "for the trial of all appeals from the courts of admiralty in these United States, in cases of capture", then a few lines later resolved "defraying the expence of said court of Appeals", and resolved actions "to carry into full and speedy execution the final decrees of the Court of Appeals", thus clearly establishing the acceptance of the first federal court of the US, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. Some years earlier, Nov. 25 1775, the Continental Congress passed a number of resolutions pertaining to judiciously deal with seized goods in the course of the war (when there was no codified law or court system), where "prosecutions shall be commenced in the court of that colony in which the captures shall be made", but "cases an appeal shall be allowed to the Congress, or such person or persons as they shall appoint for the trial of appeals". The Court of Appeal of England and Wales was created in 1875, which seems to be the first UK court specifically established for hearing appeals. There is no obvious linguistic reason for these different names assigned to the functionally same court in two countries, but once a name is officially given, it takes an act of Congress or Parliament to change the name. | It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment—specifically the ratio—that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today) | Generally speaking, a decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is binding only in the District of Columbia. Courts of other jurisdictions are not required to adhere to its decisions. If the issue came up again in Virginia or Maryland, courts there would have no obligation to follow it. Virginia tort law is different from D.C. tort law, so Virginia courts would need to determine whether their law is different on this particular point. | You have your answer already in the quotation you give. Her petition to appeal in forma pauperis was presented on February 26, 1931, and granted on March 17, 1931 At that time the Appeals (Forma Pauperis) Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 22) was in force. This created a limited form of legal assistance for paupers that paid for, amongst other things, counsel to appear before the House of Lords on appeal. See the costs order made by the House of Lords on remitting the case. | "Regina" or "R" or "The Crown" or "The Queen" is the respondent. These are different ways of expressing the same concept. However, it is not typical to name "Crown Prosecution Service" in the citation, or the formal heading of the case. This differs from Scottish practice where appeals look like "Adam v HM Advocate". Other public prosecutions can be brought by bodies other than CPS, such as the Health and Safety Executive, so R does not invariably mean the CPS. For England and Wales, the philosophy is that criminal prosecutions are brought by the Crown as the fount of justice, and maintained as such on appeal, and it so happens that the interests of the public are represented by agencies such as the CPS. They are not representing their own interests and are not parties to the case. We do see "Adam v Crown Prosecution Service" in judicial review cases, which are civil rather than criminal. For example, SXH v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] UKSC 30 was about challenging the CPS's decision on whether to prosecute somebody. An "appeal by way of case stated" may also arise in this way, where there is a point of law to be decided in the Administrative Court of Queen's Bench, such as Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin). The DPP is the head of the CPS. The distinction is that a judicial review is about whether the public body's decisions were lawful - they are the ones being scrutinized - whereas in a criminal case, the prosecution is mounted on behalf of the public in general, with the CPS merely happening to be the agency usually responsible. Equally, the CPS can be a party to employment disputes and things like that. "R (Crown Prosecution Service)" looks a little unusual because "R (Somebody) v Anotherbody" usually means a judicial review on behalf of the Somebody, against Anotherbody, with the R being a vestige of the historical basis for this kind of review. It would be odd for the CPS to be in that position. If you look through recent Court of Appeal judgements you will see some variations in presentation, but a common pattern of saying something like this: In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) On appeal from Oxford Crown Court Mr Justice Glossop Before: Lord Justice Tibbs Mrs Justice Bloggs Mr Justice Dubbs Between: Regina (Respondent) and Adam (Appellant) B Smith (instructed by Appeals-R-Us Solicitors) for the Appellant C Jones QC (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent | There is currently no difference, but there have been substantial differences in the past. Since the Courts Act 1971 (specifically s.42), the City of London has had its own county court that is on the same basis as other county courts. It is called "The Mayor's and City of London Court" for historical reasons, as that was the name of the court that was the previous closest equivalent. The 1971 Act establishes that the new version of the court has the same jurisdiction as any other county court, thus taking away any special privileges which the old version had. It was already almost like a county court by virtue of the City of London (Courts) Act 1964. Moreover, since the Crime and Courts Act 2013, there are no longer separate county courts, but one enormous one that sits in several places. That includes the City of London location. In criminal matters, the Crown Court (established under the same 1971 Act) is logically also one enormous court. When it sits in the City of London, it is known as the "Central Criminal Court" (Senior Courts Act 1981, s.8(3)), but is still the same court. It does not have any special status with respect to the City, being meant to handle cases from all of Greater London as well. Formerly, it had to operate a complex system of separate juries for City cases, but nowadays that is all uniform. For magistrates' courts, the Courts Act 2003 created a single jurisdiction for all of England and Wales. That is divided into "local justice areas", one of which is the City of London - these replace the old "petty sessional divisions". There are no special rules for the City. Applying the general rules for a particular criminal case would result in it being dealt with in the place where the offence is alleged to have happened, or where the accused lives, or where the witnesses mostly live, or "where other cases raising similar issues are being dealt with" (s.30(5)(d)). Perhaps soon, powers under the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 will be exercised to abolish local justice areas (s.45), enabling even more flexibility with the assignment of cases to courts. In particular, this is meant to make it easer to shift cases around depending on local workload, or on which court location is genuinely most convenient in all the circumstances. The Act also removes (ss. 46 and 47) the current special rules about the City of London court premises being provided by the City authorities, rather than by the Ministry of Justice which handles all the other ones. Formerly, there have been plenty of law courts for the City, or its livery companies, or St Paul's Cathedral (the consistory court had criminal jurisdiction over clergy), or the "compters" (debtors' prisons). Some of these still exist in a ceremonial capacity but do not function as courts. For example, the aldermen of the City can meet as the "Court of Husting", which was formerly a functioning law court but nowadays has the sole purpose of enrolling certain deeds, and hasn't done that since 1978. There are still two Sherriffs, nominally associated with the Poultry Compter and Wood Street Compter, but their courts have not existed since 1867. Some of the City's officers have residual ceremonial connections with the Old Bailey or other institutions, but these have no practical impact on the work of the courts. | The direct answer is "no" and the indirect answer is "yes", that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide). | Under U.S. law, a U.S. court can assert jurisdiction sufficient to enter a binding judgment (called "long arm personal jurisdiction") if the events giving rise to the lawsuit took place in the state where the state or federal court in which the suit is brought is located. Generally speaking, modern U.S. law allows the service of the summons and complaint that gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant if the events giving rise to the suit took place in the state, to be served anywhere in the world (or even in outer space, for that matter). But, the practical reality is that serving someone with process from a U.S. court in another country would be difficult and expensive, and enforcing the judgment if you win could likewise be difficult. There are also a couple of other problems specific to small claims court: Many small claims courts do not have the full jurisdiction that the U.S. Constitution allows them to have by virtue of the statutes that authorize them and their contemplation that proceedings take place predominantly or entirely in person. It isn't uncommon for the statute authorizing a small claims court to limit its jurisdiction to defendants that live in the same county. Most small claims courts are only allowed to enter money judgments subject to some very narrow and idiosyncratic exceptions. Most small claims courts do not have jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract to sell a car, even though they could award money damages for breaching the contract to sell the car if those money damage could be demonstrated convincingly. These barriers particular to small claims court could be solved by filing suit in another state court that has broader jurisdiction. (The federal courts would probably not have jurisdiction over this case even if there was "diversity of citizenship" between the parties because the amount in controversy would probably be less than $75,000 unless it was a very fancy car indeed to be worth that much used.) Different consideration would apply if these facts and circumstances arose outside the United States, depending upon the jurisdiction in question. |
Are Parent-to-Child death threats legal exceptions? Is it legal for a parent to make a death threat to their child verbally, to "keep them in line"? Is a parent threatening a child with death an exception, if they said it was "from love and my instincts I know them -- I needed to help them think"? Is that just a verbal abuse problem for a psychologist to deal with, or does the law cope with the parent-child verbal abuse/death threat issue specifically? From reading about the law, it seems parents get exceptions to be using/abusing that language. I'm asking about a Death threat as defined officially by US law, but global examples are welcome too. | “I’m going to kill you” is not a threat Or at least, not necessarily. A criminal threat is more than words - it must encompass the intent to carry out the threat. Except in wholly exceptional circumstances, this type of language between parent and child is not a threat. | If you have an actual lease under which you reside at your parents' place, they must abide by the terms of that lease – presumably that sets the rent that you pay and states how long the lease is good for, Otherwise, if you're just living there, and have been living there for some time, then the courts may treat you as a month-to-month tenant. That means that they can end the tenancy with 30 days notice. Or, they can initiate an eviction proceeding. The less optimal outcome is that the court may treat you as a house guest, in which case no formal eviction proceeding is necessary. One way or the other, it is illegal to physically give a person the heave-ho from their residence, even if it is a family member. One recourse then is to hire an attorney to persuade your parents of at least that aspect of the law, if it is really in doubt. This gent addresses the matter for parents whose children have moved back home. He also mentions hiring a mediator, which could put the situation on a clearer legal ground. As for psychiatrists, anybody can see a psychiatrist; and anybody is free to hire a lawyer to try to force another person to see a psychiatrist. The prospects of getting a court order to force a child or a parent to see a psychiatrist because they are at loggerheads over some matter is extremely remote. The courts only force psychiatric treatment in extreme cases (e.g. threats of violence, actual delusions). | The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law." | Attorneys’ Duty to Report Child Abuse addresses your question. Based solely on Rule 1.6(1) of the ABA's model rules (A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm...), some people read an exception to attorney-client privilege in the case of child abuse. Many states have mandatory reporting for people that become aware of child abuse. Some states make all people mandatory reporters. Others make only certain professions (e.g. teachers, firefighters, physicians, clergy, many others) mandatory reporters. Some of these states include attorneys as mandatory reporters. Some states that include attorneys as mandatory reporters allow for the attorney to invoke the attorney-client privilege as a reason to not report. The laws in each state as of 2004 are summarized in the table on pages 69-71 of the article. I'm not familiar with the law in every state today, but California's is not significantly different from 2004. Attorneys are not mandated reporters. | Under the Dutch Civil Code article 1:245, "All minor children are subject to authority". Article 1:247 says that "Parental authority comprises the duty and right of the parent to care for and raise his minor child". This basically means that parents have the right to exercise authority over their children (until age 18). Art. 1:249 says that: A minor child must observe the rights and powers that are granted to his parent or guardian in connection with the exercise of authority and he must take into account the interests of the other members of the family of which he forms a part. There are some exceptions, under Art. 1:246, people who cannot exercise authority over a minor: ...minors, adults who are placed under guardianship and persons whose mental abilities are so disturbed that they are unable to exercise such authority, unless the disturbance is temporary. As for the latter, that is a determination that would have to be made by the court. Death and divorce of parents add complications. There is also subsection 1.14.2.2a, about emancipation of an underage mother, where a mother 16 or older can request emancipation ...to care for and raise her child under the right to exercise authority over it and then The Juvenile Court may award the request only if it thinks this is in the best interests of the mother and her child. If another person was charged with exercising authority over the child, then the emancipation of the underage mother has the result that she as of then shall exercise this authority exclusively. Under §1.14.4, the court can also order custodial control of a minor If the moral or mental developments of a minor or his health are seriously endangered and other measures to avert this danger have failed But such control is given to a Foundation under Art. 1(f) of the Youth Care Act (not an SO). Under Art. 1:266 Provided that this is not contradictory to the interests of the children, the District Court may remove a parent from the right to exercise authority over one or more of his children on the ground that this parent is unfit or unable to comply with his duty to care for and raise his children. Art 1:269 is more specific about grounds for depriving parental authority. Insofar as they have apparently denied your request under §1.14.4, that is about as far as one can go. | In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do. | Not much. Consider the following: The father can not force the mother to abort the pregnancy. Ex post facto agreements of non-payment are, in all likelihood, unenforceable. The father will be obligated to pay child support under the laws of the state with jurisdiction over the paternity. The abortion angle won’t work. Setting aside commentary regarding the politics or ethics of abortion. I think we can agree it is a highly charged and emotional topic for some people. I point to the fact it always seems to be an issue during Supreme Court nominations and presidential elections. Given the explosive nature of the issue of whether abortions should be legal or not (in the case where the mother does not want to carry full term) could you imagine how much more dynamite it would add to the debate if the question were whether or not to allow the father to force the mother to terminate the pregnancy against the mother's wishes! One can only imagine how much more bombastic the abortion debate might then become. You can’t escape child support (most likely). To give you a sense of how difficult it is to escape the obligations of child support. Consider the following... A Kansas man was ordered to pay child support when he thought he was being a sperm donor only and signed numerous agreements with the lesbian couple he thought he was helping. In that case, the court justified its ruling on the grounds that a doctor was not involved in the insemination process. But nothing prevents future courts from making the same ruling in cases where a doctor is involved in the insemination process. Especially if that state either withdraws from the The Uniform Parentage Act, amends it, repeals it, or never adopts it in the first place. Sperm Donors and Child Support: Even in cases in which the donor is known, but holds himself out as unknown, some courts have held the donor legally obligated to pay child support. Read more here. Ex post facto agreements are problematic. Now that you've edited the question, the above link is even more useful for providing a possible avenue to try (albeit unlikely to work): a non-payment agreement. The discussion in that link describes that even if you could somehow convince the mother to go along with it, it is unlikely (though not impossible) to be enforced by the courts. It depends on the facts (e.g., intercourse vs. in vitro), circumstances (e.g., relationship vs. no relationship between the parties), timing (e.g., before vs. after the agreement), etc. of the impregnation itself. Notwithstanding all the above, if you still have questions, you might consider floating an idea of an approach you think you might try (in a separate question) and get reactions to that specific proposal. | england-and-wales Is this illegal? YES, NO, MAYBE Context is everything, and it depends on whether this was just playful (for want of a much better word) or sexual touching. Assuming that the "grandma" is actually her grandmother, the likely offence - if there is one at all - would be sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s.25 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003: A person (A) [i.e. grandma] commits an offence if — (a) [s]he intentionally touches another person (B) [i.e. the child], (b) the touching is sexual, (c) the relation of A to B is within section 27 [which includes grandparents], ... (e) — ... (ii) B is under 13. Touching is defined at s.79(8): (8) Touching includes touching — (a) with any part of the body, ... (c) through anything [e.g. panties] ... Sexual is defined at s.78 as: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that — (a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual. A key point to prove is whether s.25(1)(b) is met or not, so again: context is everything. Is it legal only for women to do? NO - Both males and females (over the age of criminal responsibility of 10) can commit any sexual offence apart from rape which is purely male-specific for anatomical reasons. |
Can I post on Twitter a stock photo without paying? Found a cool image: https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/urban-crowds-of-people-from-above-royalty-free-image/1180113568 There are many jurisdictions: Twitter jurisdiction Getty Images jurisdiction my jurisdiction author jurisdiction But I don't want to spend loads of dollar everytime I tweet an image. What does the IP & copyright & internet law say in 2021? | Reproducing someone else's copyrighted material without permission is a violation of that copyright. This includes using it to promote your Twitter account. This is a violation of copyright law and of Twitter's TOS. There may be Fair Use exceptions- this question is arguably fair use. However, it's extremely unlikely your intended post counts. In the case of the image in question, royalty-free means you pay for a single licence for that image and can then use it as much as you want (according to that licence). You can post that image in as many of your tweets as you like- you don't have to pay each time. If you don't want to pay for images you use, use public domain images, images with licenses that allow you to use them, or create them yourself. | No. Copyright protects expressions of ideas, not ideas themselves and not historical facts either. Conceivably, the persons written about might have a commercial right to use of their person or image, but the doctrine there is not copyright and the analysis is different. | The default answer is NO, but you would have to check the terms&conditions of Meetup.com. For a simpler example, just look at the bottom of this page: "user contributions licensed under cc by-sa 3.0 with attribution required". That means that you can copy pictures from this site to your Facebook page, if you acknowledge the photographer and link back to here. | Yes. The introduction to the license says "You may adapt — ... build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially". (My emphasis). Note that there is an attribution requirement so you need to find a way to attribute each image to its individual author. For the fine details, you certainly need to read the actual license (rather than the introduction) and you probably need to consult your own, paid-for, IP lawyer - but if you are just scoping the project out at the moment, you should be fine. For contrast, here is a Creative Commons licence that does prohibit commercial use. | If there is a trade mark and if Polaroid owns it and if you infringed it then yes they can force you to remove it. In addition, they could sue you for either damages (i.e. what they lost because of your infringement) or an account of profits (i.e. what you made because of your infringement). That is what trade mark law is for! If the trade mark is registered then this is trivially easy for them to demonstrate. If it is unregistered then it becomes a question of if the mark is clearly recognisable as Polaroid's; IMO they could probably show that it is - those particular border dimensions were distinctive of Polaroid instant cameras for many years. If you want to republish the app, you could probably avoid trade mark issues by allowing users to set the dimensions of the photograph and border, the colour of the border and the location of the caption. | If the image is protected by copyright (as most modern images are), the uploading it as a profile picture or using it on a web site is copyright infringement unless one has permission from the copyright owner, or an exception to copyright applies. If copyright infringement occurs, the owner can sue for damages, or issue a takedown notice, or both, but does not have to do either. In the vast majority of cases, no one will do anything about such infringements if the owner (or the owner's authorized agent) does not. All the above is true in all of Europe and North America, ad in most other countries as well. Permission can be granted directly by the copyright owner to a user, or granted by the owner releasing the image (or other wrk) under a license. Google's general developer TOS Document](https://policies.google.com/terms#toc-content) reads (in relevant part): Google content Some of our services include content that belongs to Google — for example, many of the visual illustrations you see in Google Maps. You may use Google’s content as allowed by these terms and any service-specific additional terms, but we retain any intellectual property rights that we have in our content. Don’t remove, obscure, or alter any of our branding, logos, or legal notices. If you want to use our branding or logos, please see the Google Brand Permissions page. Other content Finally, some of our services give you access to content that belongs to other people or organizations — for example, a store owner’s description of their own business, or a newspaper article displayed in Google News. You may not use this content without that person or organization’s permission, or as otherwise allowed by law. The views expressed in other people or organizations’ content are theirs, and don’t necessarily reflect Google’s views. It would seem that each Google service has its own terms which indicate in what ways one may use Google content. It would further seem that content originally obtained from others and distributed by Google will have some set of permissions granted by the uploader. These must be checked for each image, I would think. There is no single one-rule-fits-all answer. I gather that the APIs will have methods for determining which images are from Google itself, and which from others, and some method for indicating the permissions that accompany an image. A user of these APIs must learn how to extract ownership and permissions metadata for an image obtained via the API, and how to use it (or not use it) in accordance with the available permissions. Now let us look at exceptions to copyright. These vary by country. Several European countries have an exception for "personal use" which might cover the profile pictures, but probably will not cover general use on a web site. There are exceptions for "news reporting" which might cover images illustrating recent news events. Some have exceptions for educational or instructional use. The UK (and several othe countries) have the concept of fair dealing which bundles several exceptions together. This might cover an image used in a personal profile, use of images in news reports, and limited educational use, but will probably not cover general use on a website. The US has the concept of fair use which is rather complex, but does not specifically include a "personal use" exception. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and other threads here tagged with fair-use for more on this. It is somewhat unlikely that any of these exceptions will cover general use on a web site of images obtained via Google APIs and used beyond the permissions listed in the metadata accompanying the image. But it will very much depend on the specifics of the case. If the image fetching is doe not by you in building a site or an app, but by your app's users who may then use them improperly, strictly speaking that is each user's own responsibility, you cannot effectively police what your users do, and have no duty to try. It will be a good practice if you include text explaining to your users that not all images are free for general use. You might want to link to the Google TOS. If the API returns metadata indicating the permissions status of each image fetched, yo0u might well want to provide this metadata in a useful form to your users. You might even want to allow a user to filter images obtained by permission status. But whether this is practical or useful to users will depend on the purpose and design of an app. | Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy). | Copyright protection exists for any work (picture, paragraph, song etc), and persists for many years until it expires. Unless the work was created a long time ago, or was created by the US government (not the same as "funded by government money"), you should assume that the work is protected. That means that you must have permission to copy it. Sometimes, a work has associated with it some such permission, in the form of a "license". Without such a license, you have to request the copyright owner for permission to copy – whether or not they say that the work is protected by copyright (because by law it is protected, so they don't have to say that it is). If you request permission to copy, and do not receive the required permission, then you cannot legally copy the work. The copyright holder has no obligation to explicitly deny permission. You can certainly list the URL for an image, you just cannot copy the image in your book. |
Does hosting, developer or user location determine which laws apply? Example scenario: I live in Switzerland and develop a software. I publish the source code (and maybe a binary executable file) on a server located in the USA. Let's also assume a user from another country downloads and uses this software. I wonder, which countries laws regarding different aspects (like license, copyright and liability) apply (especially for me as developer). Additional context: Switzerland does according to Art. 8, PrHG (Which sadly isn't available in English) not permit to "transfer" liability to the end-user (as far as I understand), as many open source licenses do. So could I become liable, if the software was provided from a server located in another country than Switzerland, which permits such "transfer" of liability? Potentially related: User data storage location - This question seems similar to me, which lets me assume that in the above example, the law of all three countries could theoretically apply to me (even if the laws are conflicting each other). | A plaintiff chooses where to sue, provided that the chosen court has jurisdiction. The laws of the court's jurisdiction will generally apply, although in some cases it will also look at the laws of another relvant jurisdiction. Therefore, the laws of the developer's location, the hosting location, or of any user's location might apply. Often a user agreement of a license will specify that disputes are to be determined under the laws of a particular jurisdiction. Such agreements are often given effect, but some courts disregard them in some circumstances. Crafting an agreement to limit exposure to other laws as much as possible is the kind of thing for which good legal advice is generally needed. | Am I correct to infer that content/data created by a US city have an open license (public domain if created by US city employees or open license if created by a contractor)? No. For example, Larimer County, Colorado created election administration software in-house rather than using an outside contractor to do so, and it would be lawful for it to license that software to other governments in a manner that helps recover its development costs. There is an issue over whether a city or state can copyright its municipal ordinances or statutes or regulations in a legally enforceable way when people have a legal duty to comply with them. Some courts have held that state statutes that are binding upon people can't be protected in that manner. Efforts of the West Corporation to protect its page numbering system that was widely used by courts to refer to public domain case opinions were mostly invalidated in litigation. An open question is that most municipal governments incorporate by reference in their ordinances Uniform Building Codes that are subject to private copyrights and are not terribly cheap to obtain copies of. Yet, every person doing construction work is bound to follow the enacted ordinance including the parts incorporated by reference. | Whenever there is a license to share things, the license creator wants the license to be widely used, but absolutely does not want slightly different licenses that could be used to trick people, or that just cause legal problems when used. Normal copyright law applies. And for the reasons above, the GPL license as an example allows you to copy the license verbatim but absolutely doesn’t allow you to make any modifications other than changing who is the person licensing a work. I would be curious what happens legally if someone licenses something with a sneakily modified copy of the GPL and then makes claims against a licensee who assumed it was the original GPL. | I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.) | The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court. | According to US law, the GPL is a license, not a contract. This means it is valid without consideration, it also means if you are in violation of the license, then you are committing copyright infringement, instead of being in breach of a contract. In Germany, the GPL is a contract. And that's fine, because German law doesn't require consideration for a contract to be valid. It's interesting in that the GPL license doesn't require you to state whether you agree to the license/contract or not. But if you don't agree to the contract then there is no contract, and you have no right to use the software. | What should he do use or not use digital currency on sundays? If I understand correctly, you are asking about a scenario where the parties agree that the governing law will be that of jurisdiction B notwithstanding that the contract, or the relevant part thereof, will be performed in jurisdiction A. If A and B were [in] different countries, the issue could depend on what (if any) international treaties binding both countries provide regarding a conflict of laws. Absent any realistic specifics (enasia and eukaria are not realistic), let's assume that A means the U.S. or is some jurisdiction in the U.S. The contractually chosen law (jurisdiction B) would apply unless doing so contravenes policy restrictions of the jurisdiction where the contract is performed (jurisdiction A). Those policy restrictions could be public policy, legislation, or legislative intent that can be inferred from jurisdiction A's laws. For instance, see Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2011): The law of the state chosen by the parties ... will be applied ... unless ... application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state[.] (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws at § 187(b)). Note that discrepancies between A's law and B's law do not necessarily result in a material detriment to A's policy, and it is unclear from your post whether refraining from using digital currency on Sundays would be such case. One would need to ascertain A's public policy and/or legislative intent (if the relevant legislation has been enacted). | Each country has its own copyright law, but the majority of countries have signed the Berne Copyright Convention, and most of those that have not, have joined the TRIPS agreement, which includes most of the same provisions. See Wikipedia for a list of those countries that do not adhere to Berne. Bangladesh is not on the list. The Berne Copyright Convention specifies the basics of copyright protection, requires a minimum term of protection, requires that copyright be granted without any formalities such as a copyright notice or registration, and requires that authors from other signatory countries be given at least as much protection as authors from the current country. It leaves many details to local law, however, including what exceptions to copyright are allowed. However, the Berne Convention does not require that buying a work that infringes copyright be treated as infringement, and I do not know of any country where it is, although I do not know the details of copyright law in Bangladesh In the united-states the copyright owner has the right to make or authorize the making of copies and to distribute or authorize the distribution of such copies. But once an authorized copy has been sold, the owner of the copy may re-sell it, lend it, or give it away to anyone, and no permission from the copyright owner is required. In the US this is called the "First Sale Doctrine". The laws of many other countries, including the EU countries and the UK, are similar in this regard. That means that it is perfectly legal to take lawfully created and purchased copies into another country and resell them there. Moreover, if someone makes a copy without permission, or knowingly distributes such a copy, that person commits copyright infringement, and could in theory be sued, but the buyer does not. It should be noted that under US law the First Sale Doctrine does not apply to unauthorized (pirated) copies. It is copyright infringement to knowingly sell (but not to buy) unauthorized copies under US law, and it is an infringement to re-sell such copies if the seller knows that they are unauthorized, although at a private sale this is not likely to be enforced. The Copyright law of Bangladesh is somewhat different. Section 71 (in chapter 13) provides that infringement occurs: (a) when any person, without a license ... or in contravention of the conditions of a license ... (a)(i) does anything, the exclusive right to do which is by this Act conferred upon the owner of the copyright; ... (b) When any person- (b)(i) makes for sale or hire, or sells or lets for hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or hire, or (b)(iv) imports into Bangladesh, any infringing copies of the work. The "exclusive rights" are given in section 14(1) of the same act (part of chapter 3) The relevant ones are: (a) to reproduce the work in any material form including the storing of it in any medium by electronic means; (b) to issue copies of the work to the public except copies already in circulation; At the end of section 14, it is noted that: For the purposes of this section, the copy which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation. This seems to be the Bangladesh version of the First Sale Doctrine, and it does not, at least not explicitly, contain the same rule as US law does, that to see or rent an unauthorized copy is infringement, even if there was a previous sale. But such a rule may have been imposed by caselaw. So a copy of a book (or any other protected work) purchased in Bangladesh might or might not have been properly authorized, but the purchaser is not committing infringement in either case. Section 74 of the Bangladesh copyright act does provide that ⎯(1) The Registrar, [may] ... order that copies made out of Bangladesh of the work which if made in Bangladesh would infringe copyright shall not be imported. (2) ... the Registrar or any person authorized by him in this behalf may enter into any air-craft, ship, vehicle, dock or premises where any such copies ... may be found and may examine such copies. (3) All copies to which any order made under sub-section (1) applies shall be deemed to be goods of which the bringing into Bangladesh has been prohibited or restricted under section 16 of the Customs Act, 1969, (Act IV of 1969) and all the provisions of said Act shall have effect accordingly This appears to permit the seizure of improperly imported copies, but not prosecution of a purchaser of such copies. Whether it would be likely to be enforced in the case of copies sold in a street market I could not guess. Moreover, it is unlikely that a publisher will find it worth its while to sue a street market seller, even if that person sells a clearly pirated copy of a book, particularly in a foreign country (foreign to the publisher, that is). The publisher or copyright owner probably could sue, depending on the details of the law in the country where the sale occurs. But the suit would have to be brought in the courts of that country, and might well cost more to bring than any plausible damage award would yield. Still some copyright owners might sue if they learn of such a sale. But the buyer is not at risk unless the law in the country where the sale takes place is different from that of most countries in this matter. |
Examples for songs copyright violation it looks like you have to learn from examples of what constitutes copyright violation when sampling someone else's tune for example in a hip hop song (or even in a rap song). I used search engine duckduckgogo to find "song copyright trial" in video section but found no examples of actual trials discussing this matter. I remember not too long ago Led Zeppelin got away with one, maybe it wasn't too similar. But cannot find the trial on the internet- maybe it was livestreamed and no one recorded. Is there anyone that can share examples of how they decide if a song is similar enough to another song? maybe you are solicitor or they copy from you? or even the one copied (if you are not in jail!)? | Rolling Stone has a short non-technical article on a dozen famous cases. This page is a massive database on music copyright infringement cases going back to 1844, along with analysis of the cases. That analysis may well suffice for your interests: here is an except from a recent case: In fact, there is no melodic material in the section in question in the plaintiff’s work. The harmonic progression of the arpeggiated chords of both songs is utterly commonplace and not copyrightable expression. Neither are “structure, tempo, instrumentation” when, as here, these elements in both works contain no protectable authorship individually or combined. The plaintiff’s references to “iconic notes” and “feel” are meaningless. What excited the plaintiff was merely the fact that a portion of the defendant’s song sounds like his. This similarity, however, doesn’t support a claim of infringement of a musical work when, as here, the musical elements of the portions of the songs in issue underlying the recorded sounds of both works contain little or no protectable original expression Apart from providing the appellate court rulings, this also includes original complaints and petitions, certain trial court rulings, and amicus briefs which are the "technical" core of the court's finding of fact. However, you will need to read a varied sample of these cases and not just pick one at random. This will at least provide the raw material basis for discovering how these decisions are made. | The takedown action is a little sketchy. The law regarding takedown notices and host liability is here. The notice includes "Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed", a "signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed", and a statement that "the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law". These things are present in the notice, for which reason the items were taken down. The complaint states that The clear purpose of this source code is to (i) circumvent the technological protection measures used by authorized streaming services such as YouTube, and (ii) reproduce and distribute music videos and sound recordings owned by our member companies without authorization for such use. We note that the source code is described on GitHub as “a command-line program to download videos from YouTube.com and a few more sites.” and the source code expressly suggests its use to copy and/or distribute the following copyrighted works owned by our member companies: Icona Pop – I Love It (feat. Charli XCX) [Official Video], owned by Warner Music Group Justin Timberlake – Tunnel Vision (Explicit), owned by Sony Music Group Taylor Swift – Shake it Off, owned/exclusively licensed by Universal Music Group Complainants are "confused" about actual infringement (which is prohibited by copyright law), and creating a method for infringing copyright. Under DMCA and US copyright law, copying is infringing, programming is not infringing. The complaint does not clearly allege unauthorized copying of another person's intellectual property, and their complaint is based on the theory that certain programming actions constitute copyright infringement. I don't actually think they are confused, I think they are testing the boundaries. Github has no reasonable options but to comply; the authors have the option of filing a counter-notice; then RIAA has the option of claiming that they have filed a copyright infringement lawsuit. If they do, the material remains taken down and the courts sort it out if a lawsuit is actually filed. There is minimal burden on the complainant to reign-in over-zealous takedown notice practices: Lenz v. Universal Music finds that complainants must give good faith consideration to a fair use defense. 17 USC 1201(a)(1)(A) states that No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. Let's assume that the removed material does circumvent a technological measure protecting a work. This is a separate offense in Title 17. 17 USC 501(a) defines infringement of copyright, saying Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author Production of an anti-circumvention technology is not included in those sections: on a plain reading of the law, this is not infringement. To summarize the legal dance at issue: RIAA has taken the first legal step in alleging infringement, and Github has taken the material down because Github does not get to decide what the courts would conclude. Let's assume the authors file a counter-notice stating that there is no infringement; then, equally, let's assume that RIAA states that they files a lawsuit. Github will leave the material down. Let's also assume that RIAA actually files suit. Under the prior assumption that the material violates 17 USC 1201(a)(1)(A) which seems likely, the authors could be slapped for being in violation: but they would not have been in violation of §106-122. What recourse would the authors have for RIAA's misuse of the term "infringe", and against whom? Nothing against Github: the service provider does not get to decide the merits of the case. Perhaps RIAA. From Lenz supra, If an entity abuses the DMCA, it may be subject to liability under § 512(f). That section provides: “Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section—(1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages․” Id. § 512(f). Subsection (1) generally applies to copyright holders and subsection (2) generally applies to users. Only subsection (1) is at issue here. The court said that We must next determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Universal knowingly misrepresented that it had formed a good faith belief the video did not constitute fair use. This inquiry lies not in whether a court would adjudge the video as a fair use, but whether Universal formed a good faith belief that it was not. Contrary to the district court's holding, Lenz may proceed under an actual knowledge theory, but not under a willful blindness theory. Perhaps the authors can prove actual knowledge. The Lenz reasoning on this point (§IV C) is rather contorted. | You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime. | First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply. | The RIAA changed their litigation strategy in the late 2000s and it (and its members) generally no longer sue individuals. See https://hbr.org/2008/12/why-the-riaa-stopped-suing If you're just asking for a prediction about whether Tenenbaum or Thomas-Rasset would be sued today if they were to impermissibly make copyrighted music available to the public again, my preduction would be no. But I have to say this is an odd prediction to ask us to make. And I wouldn't have much to argue against somebody who predicts the other direction. | No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder. | They wouldn't need to keep samples, just the fingerprint. So they could send a guy with a laptop to Japan, download all the songs, fingerprint them, and take the fingerprints back home. It's not a problem, but it would be expensive. I suspect that US and European record companies will make the music available to them for free, otherwise they'd have to pay 20-30 million dollars for 20-30 million songs. The Japanese record companies wouldn't, so while it is technically and legally possible to collect the fingerprints, it would be expensive. And what is the benefit? We are talking here about music that you cannot legally own, that you cannot legally buy after the software recognised it, so there is very little incentive to spend that money. | I see that channel offers playlists and "videos" of popular music by several artists. The one video I tried had the music with no accompanying video or images. The channel's about page says that then operator does not own the copyrights to the music and cannot grant others permission to play it. It is possible that the channel operator has obtained permission from the artists and is thus operating under a valid license. It is possible that the channel is committing copyright infringement, but the various copyright owners have not noticed the channel, or have noticed it but decided not to take action. There is no easy way for an outsider to tell which of these is correct. If the operator has not obtained proper permission, then it seems that this would be copyright infringement. If so, any copyright owner could send a takedown notice, use YouTube's own copyright complaint mechanism, or could file a copyright infringement suit. But nothing compels the owner to act if the owner chooses not to, it is entirely the owner's choice. I do not see that the US fair use or any other exception to copyright would be likely to apply here. If the owner brought suit and won (and a win seems likely to me, from what I can see), the operator would be liable for damages, which might be sizable, or mild. In the US at least the owner could also obtain a court order (injunction) requiring the operator to stop using the owner's copyrighted music. If the owner complained to YouTube, the site could add a "copyright strike" against the operator's account. After a few strikes (I think three) YouTube will cancel the account, according to its posted policies. Similar outcomes could face anyone else who posted or made available for streaming copyrighted content (such as music) without permission from the copyright owner. But again, everything depends on action by the copyright owner. If the owner chooses, for whatever reason, not to act, then nothing is likely to be done about the infringement. |
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